Different in the Gap

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1 Introduction

When Dutch ISAF troops entered Afghanistan's Uruzgan province in 2006, they went to great lengths to be impartial and understand the sensitivities between the rivaling tribes. After the Dutch command was handed over to the Americans in 2010 the latter immediately legitimized the power of the strongest local leader, trained his forces and gave him large funds all to keep the Taliban at bay (Beeres, Van der Meulen, Soeters & Vogelaar 2012, p. 173).

In Bosnia in 1996 a British IFOR contingent embedded with the Americans in Tuzla was allowed to drink alcohol and have dinner in town. The Americans on the other hand were confined to the base unless for patrols or special assignments, all requiring minimal four vehicles. The Americans were ordered even to wear their helmets when on the base (Bauman 2004, p. 134).

When UNIFIL II was deployed in Southern Lebanon in 2006 all participating nations were bound by the same 'Rules of Engagement'. In practice most nations had their own interpretation of these rules. The French for instance understood the possibility of using force against both Hezbollah and the Israeli army while the Italians only wanted to use force against Hezbollah (Ruffa 2013, p. 17).

What explains similar armies behaving differently in comparable operational circumstances? An important contribution to the academic debate regarding similar armies showing significant variation executing the same operation was made by Chiara Ruffa. In 'What Peacekeepers Think and do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon' Ruffa (2013) explains the difference in these armies operational styles by means of Social Constructivism (p. 2). Although this theory thus has explained differences in executing classic peacekeeping operations it has never been tested on armies dealing with a security gap. A security gap occurs when international actors fail to deploy civilian police forces (in time) and domestic forces are unable to provide public security while at the same time international peacekeepers avoid this role (Friesendorf 2012, p. 12). This thesis wants to test if Social Constructivism, or more specifically its derative 'Strategic Culture', can explain why similar armies behave differently in a security gap. This will be done by looking at Kosovo as a case study.

As a result of Serb atrocities against Kosovar Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo ultimately a multinational peacekeeping force was implemented in Kosovo in June 1999. This force was known as KFOR (Kosovo Force). As Serbian forces left Kosovo within two weeks after KFOR's deployment (Brocades Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). KFOR found itself confronted with a 'security gap'. Soon it became clear that most national KFOR contingents differed in the way they executed public security tasks. In this thesis I will focus on three of these countries; the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Despite each having comparable equipment, training standards and procedures (NATO) every one dealt differently with the 'security gap'. This leads to the following main research question:

"Does the theory of Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the difference in the way similar armies deal with a security gap?"

In order to answer the research question the following specific questions need to be addressed:

1) What is Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture?

2) Does Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the US approach with regard to providing public security in Kosovo?

3) Does Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the British approach with regard to providing public security in Kosovo?

4) Does Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the Dutch approach with regard to providing public security in Kosovo?

Basically, according to social constructivism, social structures like trade relations, domestic preferences, states and armies are for the most part (if not completely) based on shared immaterial concepts like ideas, norms and assumptions and to a much lesser extent (if at all) on objective 'materialist' factors like biology, technology and the environment (Wendt 1999, p. 1; Slaughter 2011, p. 19). The concept of strategic culture fits in the constructivist discourse as according to the strategic cultural view the behavior of states and armed forces is equally influenced, shaped and based on immaterial concepts. The notion of strategic culture was first used by Jack Snyder in his analyses of American and Soviet strategic cultures four decades ago (Duffield, 1999; Klein, 1991; Meyer 2005, p. 51; Snyder 1977). Since then four generations of scholars have further developed this concept, often in ongoing disagreement with each other. This has resulted in, as Toje (2009) states, "a rich flora of strategic culture research" (p. 7). However, all generations of strategic cultural scholars agree that historic experiences play an important part in the making and shaping of a strategic culture. Although many strategic preferences of states "are rooted in the 'early' or formative military experiences of the state or its predecessor" more recent significant experiences can also "reshape a nation's strategic culture very quickly" (Johnston 1995, p. 34; Lord 1992, p. 267).

This thesis wants to demonstrate that the theory of Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture can be used to explain the difference in the way armies deal with a security gap. It will present evidence that specific recent experiences like a military defeat, a military victory or an experience of collective guilt, can quickly impact a nations strategic culture and subsequently lead to different specific operational behavior. As this thesis will show, a recent military defeat will lead to political and military restraint when considering participating in future military deployment. And when troops are indeed committed an aversion of own casualties will result in a generally reserved operational bearing and above all a strong emphasis on measures of force protection when confronted with a security gap. A recent experience of military victory will have a somewhat opposite effect and result in a more assertive operational attitude combined with subsidiary measures of force protection. Both of which benefit public security tasking. When a nation has recently experienced an event resulting in collective guilt it demonstrates an initial reluctance to participate in new military operations but, as the case study shows, a subsequent enthusiasm and commitment to public security operations. It must be noted however that the relative permissiveness of the operational environment could have attributed to this ensuing extravert approach.

The research strategy for this thesis is to compare the armies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (as part of KFOR), which are similar in many respects but yet dealt differently with the security gap in Kosovo. The independent variable for this research is the 'threat perception of the operational environment' which will be operationalized by looking specifically at three different types of significant historic experiences, each influencing one of the three nation's strategic cultures. These are experiences of military defeat, of military victory and of (collective) guilt.

The way armies execute public security tasks in the security gap are the dependant variables. To operationalize these I have chosen three strands of activities that are typical for public security peacekeeping operations: Security Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection (Ruffa 2013, p.8). In short, security operations are the normal day to day activities of an army in a peacekeeping environment and include activities like patrolling, manning checkpoints, disarming armed groups, preventing (armed) hostilities and providing public security. Civil Military Cooperation is the "cooperation between the military on the one hand and civilian institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United Nations etc.) on the other "(Mockaitis 2004, p. 5). And force protection are all measures taken to protect military personnel and military locations.

By means of 'controlled comparison' I will compare the abovementioned three KFOR contingents and compare the way they execute Security Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection. Concluding, I will label each country's effort and qualify each country as either minimalistic, intermediate or vacuum-filling. Or in other words, minimal effort, intermediate effort or maximum effort

An important source for this research has been *Soldiers and Civil Power* by Thijs Brocades Zaalberg which describes several complex peacekeeping operations and the differences between nations when dealing with power vacuums and CIMIC. Another key source has been Thomas Mockaitis' *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The case of Kosovo* in which, among others, the American and British approach of CIMIC in Kosovo is analyzed. Lastly, the nations researched in this thesis all have done their own research regarding their peacekeeping operations. These studies not only shed an historical light on their operations in Kosovo but also on previous operations which helps to put their actions in Kosovo into a broader strategic cultural perspective. These studies will be combined with books and newspapers like the Washington Post and the New York Times who have written about the operations in Kosovo and interviewed soldiers.

From the many nations participating in KFOR I have selected the Americans, the British and the Dutch for this research. This is firstly motivated by the fact that much research already has been done regarding their peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and the relatively wide availability of useful published material. Secondly, these three militaries have comparable equipment, training standards, procedures (NATO) and peacekeeping experience on the Balkans. And all three were operating under the same mandate and KFOR instructions regarding public security. But at the same time the studied contingents show significant variation when executing Operational Activities, CIMIC and Force protection. And although the threat level was possibly initially not identical for all three sectors, all sectors became equally permissible after the first few months of deployment.

Chapter 2 will cover the theoretical framework which will begin with the phenomenon of the security gap followed by the historical development and state of the art of social constructivism and strategic culture. In chapter 3 I will treat the research strategy for this thesis and discuss the independent and dependent variables and the strategy for data collection. The three case studies will be covered in chapter 4. In chapter 5 I will discuss the conclusions of this thesis.

2 Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I will first discuss the phenomenon of the security gap and the two schools of thought that propose different ways of how armies should deal with this gap. Secondly I will elaborate on the historical development and state of the art of two cultural theories that subsequently could explain armies' and nations' preferences for either school of thought. These theories being firstly 'social constructivism' and secondly its derative 'strategic culture'. Concluding I will explain which variation of strategic culture I will test in this thesis.

2.1 The Security Gap

The term 'security gap' was first used by scholars in 1998 and has since been used to describe the power vacuum that occurs when international actors fail to deploy civilian police forces (in time) and domestic forces are unable to provide public security while at the same time international peacekeepers avoid this role (Friesendorf 2012, p. 12). When a security gap occurs the main question is whether the military, the (often multinational) peacekeeping forces already in place, should step in and get involved in the execution of public security tasks. Until the KFOR operation and the Australian-led operation in East Timor (INTERFET), both of which were initiated in 1999, there was international consensus that the answer to this question should be negative (Jakobsen 2002, p. 1). This because traditionally most military feel they should to stay away from public security tasks or keep their involvement as limited as possible. The military are reluctant because they are not trained for it, fear that it degrades their combat readiness, worry about the effect it might have on their military identity and usually lack the mandate for it (Perito 2004, pp. 4-5; Friesendorf 2012, p. 11). While most agree that there are clearly cases were only the military could provide security most would also concur that soldiers should not act as judge and jailer as well. This position is what Jakobsen (2002) in his work *The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Challenges: As Little as Possible or Filling the Gap?* calls the 'minimalist' school of thought (p. 1). But although the 'minimalists' dominated the discourse regarding the security gap in the mid-1990s, few realized that the military was actually already playing a significant role in public security in the various peacekeeping operations of that decade. During Operation Just Cause (Panama 1989), UNITAF (Somalia 1992), MNF (Haiti 1994) and I/SFOR (Bosnia 1995) the military was noticeably involved in public security in various degrees, thus proving that during the 1990s military involvement in public security was actually the rule rather than the exception (Jakobsen 2002, p. 4).

But it were actually both the KFOR and INTERFET operations that finally served as eye openers and undeniably showed that even though the military might not like it, there often is no alternative but to take on public security tasking in order to prevent chaos and anarchy (Jakobsen 2002, p. 4). Especially, and that was what made KFOR and INTERFET so different

from previous public security support operations, because in both Kosovo and East-Timor all former police, judicial and penal structures had evaporated and had to be built up from scratch. So as it happened in both operations the peacekeepers reluctantly ended up executing the full spectrum of public security tasking and started acting as police, judges and jailers. Proponents of such broad military involvement in public security tasking (opposing the aforementioned 'minimalists') adhere to what Jackobsen (2002) in turn calls the 'vacuum-filler' school of thought (p. 1). According to the 'vacuum-fillers' the involvement of the military in public security should simply be accepted as a logical aspect of modern peacekeeping operations. Furthermore they argue that the military should actually strive to fill the public security vacuum as soon as possible. The rationale behind this view is straightforward, as there is general agreement that failing to close the security gap immediately could compromise the long-term success of a peacekeeping operation (Jakobsen 2002, p. 3). And as it happens, only the military will have the capabilities to get this done in the initial phase of a peacekeeping operation. Consequently, according to the 'vacuum-fillers', the military should therefore be smart and make sure it is prepared to be able to take on this role which they feel is inevitable (Jakobsen 2002, pp. 2-3). It should be understood that minimalists and vacuum-fillers are both opposite ends on a scale on which military forces can operate. When Jacobsen (2002) discusses the military involvement in public security in various operations this becomes all too clear (p. 6). And although he does not specifically use the term 'intermediate' I will use it in this thesis when a country falls between the minimalist and the vacuum-filler side of the spectrum.

Now having discussed the phenomenon of the security gap and its different schools of thought, the interesting question is then how nations' and armies' choices for their position on the scale between vacuum-fillers and minimalists can be explained. For this explanation I will now take a close look at the theory of Social Constructivism and the concept of Strategic Culture.

2.2 Social Constructivism

When looking for theories explaining the way peacekeeping operations are carried out, the three main approaches of international relations, i.e. realism, institutionalism and liberalism, seem hardly useful. While they try to explain *why* nations participate in peacekeeping missions these theories seem far less capable of explaining *how* these operations are executed. Indeed, some scholars argue that the classic international relations theories have yet to be successfully integrated into the study of peacekeeping (Kleiven 2012, p. 59). Having dismissed the three classic theories as being of little use in solving their puzzle some scholars have eventually turned to social constructivism to explain the actual execution of peacekeeping operations. In "What Peacekeepers Think and do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon" Chiara Ruffa (2013) explains the difference in these armies' operational styles during the UNIFIL II mission by means of social constructivism (p.2). Inspired by constructivist research in the social sciences she shows that "the interpretation of the operational environment influences the way soldiers behave" (Ruffa 2013, p. 2). In other words, each army interprets or "constructs" the operational environment differently, which leads to different military behavior. Furthermore she provides evidence that these differences in perception are "partly shaped by different armies previous experiences" (Ruffa 2013, p. 2).

For instance, the Ghanaian and Italian armies previous positive and the French previous negative experiences in Lebanon during UNIFIL I could be linked to each nations' threat perception during UNIFIL II (Ruffa 2013, p. 13). But while its relevance and usefulness are not in doubt, there is actually some debate as to whether social constructivism is in fact a theory or not. Some scholars argue that social constructivism is strictly speaking not a theory but rather an ontology, "a set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and agency" (Slaughter 2011, p. 19), while others state "it is a social theory on which constructivist theories of international politics — for example, about war, cooperation and international community — are based" (Adler 1997, p. 323). Alexander Wendt (1999), a leading proponent of the social constructivist approach, states in his book *The Social Theory of International Politics*:

Students of international politics have increasingly accepted "two basic tenets of 'constructivism'; (1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (p. 1).

In other words, according to social constructivism, social structures like trade relations, domestic preferences, states and armies are for the most part (if not completely) based on shared immaterial concepts like ideas, norms and assumptions and to a much lesser extent (if at all) on objective 'materialist' factors like biology, technology and the environment. Furthermore Wendt states that the interpretation of use and value given to these social structures is also socially constructed rather than intrinsic to these structures (Wendt 1999, p. 1; Slaughter 2011, p. 19). The attribution of value to these social structures is constructed from a complex "mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which scholars must understand if they are to explain (state or other socially constructed actor) behavior" (Slaughter 2011, p. 19). The emphasis on social context, for which this theory sometimes is called ideational, leads constructivist to focus on matters of identity and belief (Slaughter 2011, p. 19). Subsequently "the perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and out-groups and fairness and justice" all become important determinants of an actor's behavior (Slaughter 2011, p 19). Thus, when looking at the behavior of armies through the lens of social constructivism, the idea is that each army (which is a social structure) interprets or gives 'value' (which is based on a mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs) to its operational environment (which does not have any objective value by itself) and then acts according to this interpretation.

2.3 Strategic Culture

Cultural theories like social constructivism since long enjoy an important place in the field of international security (Desch 1998, p. 141). The notion that behavior of states and armed forces is for a large part influenced, shaped and based on immaterial concepts is what some scholars more specifically have encapsulated in the concept of 'strategic culture' (Duffield, 1999; Klein, 1991; Meyer 2005, p. 51). Strategic culture has been part of the constructivist discourse for almost four decades and was first used by Jack Snyder (1977) in his analyses of American and Soviet strategic cultures, where he "attempts to describe the nuclear capacity of the Soviet Union in terms of its cultural proclivities from which nuclear tactics and strategies emerged, rather than in material terms alone" (Hadfield 2005, p. 61; p. 5). In his analyses 'strategy' "refers to how hard power can be applied to reach political ends" (Toje 2009, p. 4),

and ‘culture’ refers to: “A set of cognitive standards like norms and values and a set of evaluative standards such as rules and models that define what social actors exist, how they operate and relate to another” (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 6). The main driver behind the concept of strategic culture was to understand what was behind what was perceived as irrational state behavior. Johnston (1995) states:

Rather than rejecting rationality per se as a factor in strategic choice, the strategic culture approach challenges the ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choices (…) strategic culture is compatible with notions of limited rationality (where strategic culture simplifies reality), with process rationality (where strategic culture defines ranked preferences or narrows options) and with adaptive rationality (where historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice) (pp. 34-35).

In other words, according to cultural strategists there is no collective model of rationality. When Snyder studied Soviet nuclear deterrence policy he concluded that American military analysts were erroneously convinced that the Soviets would behave similarly to the Americans in both deterrence and actual nuclear war scenarios. The dominant American view was based on the rationalist assumption that nuclear wars could not be won and thus would not be started as mutual destruction would make nuclear war basically useless for all parties. When this comforting assumption proved incorrect as the Soviets were found to have a preference for preemptive, offensive use of force, it became clear that what was considered irrational for the United States was actually rational for the Soviet Union. The conclusion was then drawn that both countries clearly had different preferences which had to be based on cultural inclinations (Johnston 1995, p. 32). This eye-opening awareness prompted scholars to further investigate the subject (Gray 1981, p. 21). Then primarily focused “on explaining why Soviets and Americans apparently thought differently about nuclear strategy”, Snyder, Gray and other scholars of the mid-seventies and early eighties are part of what is now called the ‘First Generation’ of strategic cultural thinkers (Hadfield 2005, p. 61; Johnston 1995, p. 36).

The main criticism of ‘First Generation’ thinkers holds that they have difficulty defining strategic culture. By defining the notion of culture exceedingly broad and encompassing nearly all relevant explanatory variables they tend to weaken the theory (Johnston 1995, p. 37). When one considers technology, geography, organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political culture, national character, political psychology, ideology and the international system all relevant parts of a nation’s strategic culture, there is little room for any non-strategic culture-based arguments to explain strategic choices (Johnston 1995, p. 37). In fact it could be argued that each of these variables alone could be used to explain strategic choices. Another shortcoming of the first generation was that they implied that a certain strategic culture automatically would lead to one specific type of behavior. This, in retrospect, is far too simple as further research has shown that nations with similar strategic cultures could come to different types of behavior (Johnston 1995, p. 37). And furthermore, others suggest that a nation can actually have more than one strategic culture (Gray 1999, p. 51). And lastly first generation scholars took the problematic view that a nation’s strategic culture was coherent, unique and consistent over time. One look at, for example, the strategic policy of the United States from say the mid 19th century until 1945, one can hardly detect any consistency. Starting with:

A general absence of extra-continental adventurism before the 1890s; the 'spurt' of overseas activity from then until around 1905; the isolationist period from then until 1941 (broken by five or six years of Wilsonian idealist engagement); the massive mobilization effort during the Second World War; the containment period; followed by detente; etc. (Bloomfield 2012, p. 440).

The second generation of thinkers, prominent in the mid-1980s,"started from the premise that there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do" (Johnston 1995, p. 38). They argued that strategic culture is merely a useful tool for the political or military decision-making elite which they can use to provide the people with "popular representations" of what violence is or ought to be and who the 'enemy' is against to whom this violence legitimately is deployed (Klein 1988, p 136). In other words, a state's elite has its own agenda based on its hegemonic, *realpolitik* strategic interests and uses strategic culture instrumentally to shape the national political and popular climate making way for an "acceptable justification for operational strategy" (Johnston 1995, p. 39). Second generation scholars like Bradley Klein argue that although strategic culture is above all the product of historic experience, there is a big disconnect between strategic culture and strategic behavior. As strategic behavior is the domain of the decision-making elite the strategic choices they make are thus only restricted by their agendas and interests rather than the broad national strategic culture (Klein, 1988). According to second generation thinkers it could thus be possible that two countries with a similar strategic culture have leaderships that nevertheless each uses a different strategic cultural representations and justifications of violence and the 'enemy'. In other words, the leaderships behave differently than one expect when taking note of their strategic cultures (Johnston 1995, p. 40).

Unsurprisingly though, there are is an important argument that weaken this second generation concept. The main issue is that this theory implies that the decision-making elites are more or less disconnected from the strategic culture they try to manipulate. This assertion seems rather problematic, however, as the elites are immersed in their own national strategic culture and are likely to be "constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors created. This raises the possibility the elites cannot escape the symbolic discourses they manipulate" (Johnston 1995, p. 40). This means that cross-national differences in behavior of the decision-making elites is actually hardly surprising and should rather be expected (Gray 1999, p. 61).

The third generation of scholars, who gained prominence in the 1990s, felt the need to make serious work of the conceptualization of the ideational independent variables and put specific focus on particular strategic decisions as dependant variables (Hadfield 2005, p. 62; Johnston 1995, p. 41). Both military culture (the culture of military organizations) and political-military cultures (the political culture of when and how to use force) and even organizational cultures were used as independent variables. Third generation scholars challenge the realist edifice or starting point "and focus on cases were structural-materialist notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice" (Johnston 1995, p. 41). For most third generation scholars the roots of national cultural characteristics and preferences tend to be the product of recent experiences rather than that they were conceived in long forgone formative eras (Johnston 1995, p. 41). The approach of the third generation has two significant strengths. First, they obviously avoid the determinism of the first generation and are careful not to use 'behavior' as the independent variable. By separating behavior from strategic culture and

treating behavior as the dependant variable and strategic culture as independent variable they try to "falsifiable" the concept of strategic culture (Toje 2009, pp. 6-7). Second, they are primarily committed to competitive theory testing by which they pit alternative explanational models against each other. Like for instance testing a "realist model against institutionalism and organizational-cultural explanations" (Johnston 1995, p. 42). This was impossible from a first generation viewpoint where simply no alternative models were possible within its methodological framework as all models are automatically an integral part of the all encompassing strategic cultural concept (Johnston 1995, p. 42). When discussing eventual weaknesses of this third generation approach Johnston (1995) finds its focus on realism somewhat problematic. He argues that because state's choices, driven by realist preferences, can range from basic survival to power maximization, there is an enormous range of possible optimal strategies. Thus without choosing a particular variant of realism it would be hard to set up conclusive comparisons (p. 42). In my opinion this would not have to be overly problematic because it would be quite possible to compare states with comparable preferences.

With the turn of the century and the coming of new actors like the European Union and China strategic culture now seems to have even a fourth generation of research on the subject. This has resulted in, as Toje (2009) states, "a rich flora of strategic culture research" were "different academics often apply very different conceptions of the term (p. 7). Today there are four main strands, or one could say open ends, that since then divide the strategic cultural debate. The organizational, the political, the strategic, and the global strand (Desch 1998, p. 141). Some scholars argue that militaries have dissimilar organizational cultures and uses that explain why different militaries fight differently (Legro 1995, p. 1). Others, most notably Elizabeth Kier (1996), emphasize the effect that domestic political considerations have on the way militaries operate, instead of this being predominantly the result of external strategic drivers. Kier argues that different national political cultures will thus result in various ways of executing military operations (p. 187). Katzenstein and others add to this that the domestic variation regarding the use of force varies "significantly among states similarly situated in the international system" (Desch 1998, p. 142). Johnston (1995) suggests that domestic strategic culture, much more than external international forces, best explains a state's strategy (p. 63). Lastly some scholars focus more on global cultural norms instead of domestic considerations. They claim for instance that "global cultural norms proscribing the use of particular weapons best account for why they are not used" (Desch 1998, p. 143). Concluding, the concept of strategic culture went through several decades of interesting development resulting in a wide variety of views whose advocates often hotly debate each other (Gray, 1999). What most strategic culturist scholars nevertheless agree on is that "ahistorical or 'objective' variables such as technology, polarity or relative material capabilities are all of secondary importance" (Johnston 1995, p. 34). According to Johnston (1995) "it is the interpretive lens of strategic culture that gives meaning to these variables (p. 1). He concludes:

Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policymakers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played, reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice. Done badly, the analysis of strategic culture could reinforce stereotypes about strategic dispositions of

other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local strategic cultures (pp. 63-64).

Having discussed social constructivism and strategic culture the next step is now to choose which of the aforementioned variations of strategic culture I will use to explain the difference in the way similar armies deal with a security gap. For this I return to the work of Ruffa who, as mentioned earlier, presented some evidence that armies' previous experiences have had influence on their perception of their environment and subsequently, behavior (Ruffa 2013, p. 13). More specifically, Ruffa shows that the various experiences of the French, Ghanaian and Italian armies during their Lebanon deployment in the period 1979-2006 had influenced each nations' threat perception resulting in differences in operational behavior in their deployment in Lebanon in the 2007-2008 period (the army of South Korea was also studied but was not deployed in the first period) (Ruffa 2013, p. 3). Interestingly these experiences could thus be typified as relatively recent with a maximum of just over 25 years.

All four generations of strategic cultural scholars agree that historical experiences play an important part in the making and shaping of a nations strategic culture. Johnston (1995) and others state that many strategic preferences of states "are rooted in the 'early' or formative military experiences of the state or its predecessor. For example one could think of the legacies of colonialism that still play a significant role in the national identity and strategic culture of many former colonies across the globe (Lantis 2009, p. 469). These preferences are influenced by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and state elites" (p. 34) as these develop through time. Although few dispute the importance of historic events influencing or changing strategic culture, some see strategic culture only changing "slowly and lagging behind changes in 'objective' conditions" while others add to this that "traumatic events - particularly a military defeat - can reshape a nation's strategic culture very quickly" (Johnston 1995, p. 34; Lord 1992, p. 267). Meyer (2005) speaks of historic experiences, like defeats, victories or guilt, that "plant themselves deep into collective memories as 'lessons learned' and or 'beliefs held'" (p. 51). And subsequently influence domestic political environment confirming "political-military culture as a product of changing domestic political contexts, hence varying as domestic politics varies" (Johnston 1995, p. 41). One of the scholars who agrees that historical experiences can alter strategic culture both either fundamentally or at a slower more piecemeal pace is Longhurst who refers to these experiences as 'critical junctures' (Longhurst 2004, p. 17).

When analyzing strategic cultural literature the most prominent historical events influencing strategic culture are the abovementioned historical defeats, victories and to a lesser extent (collective) guilt. Only a few defeats have failed to change a nations historical culture (Meyer 2005, p. 51; Perito 2004, p. 115). The defeat of France in the First, and Germany and Japan in the Second World War has had a dramatic impact on these nations' national identity and strategic culture (Kier 1996; Longhurst 2004; Katzenstein 1996). Historic victories often also have an impact on strategic culture (Meyer 2005, p. 51; Gray 1981, p.26). For example, the American strategic culture in the pre-Vietnam period was largely based on having won all major wars and almost all small scale conflicts for the last few hundred years (Gray 1981, p. 24-26). In turn British strategic culture until the mid-fifties was also based on its Second World War victory and relatively successful imperial policing (Mitchell 2004). The notion of historic (collective) guilt is discussed by Longhurst (2004) when describing and analyzing

Germany's postwar security policy in 'Germany and the use of force, The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003'. Apart from the grand strategic cultural effects of 'just' the military defeat Germany suffered in 1945, its postwar strategic culture was also shaped by collective guild with regard to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime (Longhurst 2004, p.13).

When explaining behavior by relating it to relatively recent historic experiences as in Ruffa's study, one can clearly not speak about threat perceptions that were rooted in 'early' formative experiences (Johnston 1995, p. 34). On the contrary it could be argued that these perceptions are "clearly the product of recent practice and experience"(Johnston 1995, p. 41). This notion of strategic culture being shaped by relatively recent experiences is far removed from the views of first generation but rather typical for third generation strategic cultural thinkers (Johnston 1995, p. 41). And although Ruffa has used social constructivism and never refers to third generation strategic culture I would argue this distinction is rather semantic. This is one of two reasons I will use third generation variations of the theory of strategic culture when trying to explain the differences in how armies deal with a security gap. The second argument for using third generation strategic culture is that contemporary scholars hardly seem to refer to first and second generation scholars anymore when explaining strategic behavior. Even though the field of third generation strategic culture is divided, it seems that first and second generation views have been outdated as they are generally only mentioned when discussing the historical development of the discourse (Toje 2009; Bloomfield 2012).

In addition of what has been mentioned earlier regarding the strategic culture of the United States and the United Kingdom (historic victories and imperial policing) much additional research has been done on these countries. Of the three subject nations of this thesis however, relatively little strategic cultural research has been done regarding the Netherlands. With regard to the United States, Lantis (2004) states that "The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States served as a turning point in the American definition of national security interests and became the lens through which foreign policy would be interpreted for the foreseeable future"(p. 362). Thereby clearly recognizing a (traumatic) historic experience as a determinant for strategic culture. Additionally the effect that the American involvement and subsequent defeat in Vietnam had on American strategic culture can hardly be overstated (Appy 2015, Lord 1992)."External events, domestic economic and political pressures, and elite predispositions" are further identified as important determinants of American strategic culture (Lantis 2004, p. 363). Lastly, the determinant of military victory, as the United States having won all major wars and almost all small scale conflicts until Vietnam, has been mentioned earlier. With regard to the United Kingdom the historic Atlantic bond with the United States has been identified as a "central pillar of the UK's strategic culture" pointing to international relations as a strategic cultural determinant (Luif 2006, p. 110). Other scholars mention, mostly referring to the period until the mid-twentieth century, Britain's strong maritime strategic culture which was rooted in the fact that Britain as an island relied on a navy both for defense and the protection of its commerce (Gray 2006, p. 159). In the latter case geography could be identified as an obvious determinant. The determinant of military victory has been mentioned earlier with regard to the United Kingdom. Recent strategic cultural research regarding the Netherlands has concluded that its strategic culture continues to shift away from "war and coercion by means of force" (Biehl, Giegerich, Jonas 2013, p.

265). Multiple domestic political considerations for this change have been noted, clearly indicating the domestic political environment its determinant (p. 264).

3 Methodology

In this chapter I will cover the research strategy for this thesis and discuss the independent and dependent variables and the strategy for data collection.

3.1 The independent variable

The research strategy for this thesis is to compare the armies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which are similar in many respects but yet dealt differently with the security gap in Kosovo in 1999. The independent variable for this research is: threat perception of the operational environment.

As explained in the theoretical framework, strategic culturalists argue that a nation's threat perception is based on and shaped by its strategic culture. They further state that historical experiences play an important part in the making and shaping of that strategic culture. These historical experiences can be traumatic events that change a strategic culture very quickly or long-term flows of events that only gradually shape it (Johnston 1995, p. 34; Lord 1992, p. 267). In this thesis I have therefore chosen to use third generation scholar Kerry Longhurst's (2004) definition. Longhurst defines strategic culture as:

A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experiences (p. 17).

Longhurst's definition is typical third generation as it clearly opposes the first generation view that strategic culture would be permanent or static. It further discerns itself from many earlier definitions by acknowledging that strategic culture can be altered either swift and dramatically at fundamental watershed events or at a more slower gradual pace. These options make it useful for explaining a wide array of strategic behavior. In this thesis an army's threat perception of the operational environment will be operationalized by looking specifically at three types of historic experiences that had a significant impact on its strategic culture. These are experiences of military defeat, of military victory and of (collective) guilt (Meyer 2005, p. 51). The operationalization of the independent variable will be as follows:

Historical defeat: the historical experience of a nation's military defeat which affected its strategic culture through 'lessons learned' or a change in 'beliefs held'. By defeat is meant any military campaign that is generally experienced and acknowledged as a defeat.

Historic victory: the historical experience of a nation's military victory which affected its strategic culture through 'lessons learned' or a change in 'beliefs held'. By victory is meant any military campaign, short or prolonged, that is generally experienced and acknowledged as a victory.

Historic (collective) guilt: the historic experience of an event resulting in collective guilt which affected a nation's strategic culture through 'lessons learned' or a change in 'beliefs held'. This collective guilt stems from the distress that nations or armed forces experience when they accept responsibility for events they are ashamed about. This guilt is generally experienced and acknowledged as such.

Obviously most nations have experienced defeats as well as victories, and some also have experienced events that caused feelings of collective guilt, and not all of these experiences have affected their strategic culture. In this regard I will qualify these experiences as significant when states either 'distil lessons learned' from them or they influence or alter states 'beliefs held' or both (Meyer 2005, p. 51). I will acknowledge this when there is an obvious difference in a state's 1) transmitted ideas and/or, 2) attitudes and/or, 3) traditions, 4) and/or preferred methods of operation when comparing these notions before and after the significant historic experience.

3.2 The dependent variable

The way the armies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands operate in the security gap, more specifically execute public security tasks, are the dependant variables. I will use Jacobsen's terminology when labeling their effort either minimalistic, intermediate or vacuum filler.

To operationalize these dependent variables I have chosen three strands of activities that are typical for public security peacekeeping operations: Security Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection (Ruffa 2013, p.8).

Security Operations: Security operations are the normal day to day framework operations of an army in a peacekeeping environment. Security operations include activities like patrolling, manning checkpoints, disarming armed groups, preventing (armed) hostilities between former belligerent parties and providing public security. The willingness to disarm armed groups is indicated by the priority given to the actual enforcing of the disarmament. The importance given to providing basic public security is indicated by the number/percentage of military police per contingent, the number of arrests that were made when providing public security and the overall willingness to maintain public order. Armies can score low, intermediate or high.

CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation is the "cooperation between the military on the one hand and civilian institutions (including humanitarian organizations, the United Nations etc.) on the other "(Mockaitis 2004, p. 5). I will specifically look at the number or percentage of assigned and non-assigned CIMIC personnel per contingent. How many local government functions have been taken over or assisted by the military (municipal administration, medical care, public utilities)? Armies can score low, intermediate or high.

Force Protection: Force Protection are all measures taken to protect military personnel and military locations. I will specifically look at the level of priority given to the security of the contingents bases or lodging locations, its movements (armored or un-armored, number of vehicles or on foot) and dress codes. Armies can score low, intermediate or high.

By means of ‘controlled comparison’ I will compare the abovementioned three KFOR contingents and compare the way they execute Security Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection and qualify each country as either minimalistic, intermediate or vacuum-filling.

Considering the above discussed theory I would come to the following preliminary hypothesis:

1) When a nation has suffered a relatively recent historic defeat which affected its strategic culture it will act minimalistic when confronted with a security gap
2) When a nation has experienced a relatively recent military victory which affected its strategic culture it will act intermediate or vacuum filling when confronted with a security gap
1) When a nation has relatively recently experienced an event resulting in collective guilt which affected its strategic culture it will act as a vacuum-filler when confronted with a security gap

3.3 Strategy for data collection

The sources that will be studied in this research will include literature on the intervention in Kosovo and the Security Gap. A key source regarding strategic culture and its development is *Thinking about Strategic Culture* by Ian Johnston. In this very often quoted work he describes the three generations of strategic cultural thinkers discussing their strengths and weaknesses. Another important source for this thesis is *Soldiers and Civil Power* by Thijs Brocades Zaalberg. Zaalberg describes several complex peacekeeping operations and the differences between nations when dealing with power vacuums and CIMIC. Although almost a decade old it is still the most comprehensive to date regarding the Dutch intervention in Kosovo. Additionally Zaalberg also describes important aspects of the British and American participation in Kosovo. Through Zaalbergs bibliography I came in touch with works from Priest, Perito, Sanger and Van Loon. A third very relevant source has been Thomas Mockaitis’s *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The case of Kosovo* in which, among others, the American and British approach of CIMIC in Kosovo is analyzed. Lastly, all three militaries of the nations researched in this thesis have done their own research regarding peacekeeping operations. These studies not only shed an historical light on their operations in Kosovo but also on previous operations which helps to put their actions in Kosovo into a broader strategic cultural perspective. The most relevant of these official military publications are the U.S Army’s ‘Lessons From Kosovo, The KFOR Experience’, ‘Disjointed War, Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999’, the ‘Somalia After Action Report’ and the British Army’s ‘Operation Banner: an analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland’. These studies will be combined with books and newspapers like the Washington Post and the New York Times who have written about the American involvement in Kosovo and interviewed soldiers.

4 Case studies

In this chapter I will start with the historic events that led to the Kosovo crisis concluding with the state of the operational environment faced by the international peacekeeping forces when

first entering Kosovo. Then I will discuss three case studies and analyze the way the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands operated in the unfolding security gap in Kosovo. Each case study will start with an historical overview of the selected nations' strategic culture emphasizing a relatively recent significant historical event which influenced its strategic culture. Then I will describe and analyze the way each nation executed Security Operations, Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Force Protection in Kosovo and qualify each country as either minimalistic, intermediate or vacuum-filling with regard to the security gap using Jacobsen's terminology.

4.1 The Kosovo Crisis and KFOR

The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was created under the leadership of Tito in 1945 was composed of six republics. Of these the Socialist Republic of Serbia was the largest and most populated. To prevent Serbia of becoming too powerful, two autonomous governed provinces were established within Serbia's borders, of which Kosovo was one (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 34). And although the majority of the population in Kosovo was of Albanian ethnicity most public functions were occupied by the Serbian minority and tensions between the Albanian en Serbian communities were never far from the surface. Despite Kosovo was allowed to have a seat in the central government, have its own parliament, a police force and national bank in 1974, the Albanians were still considered a minority with a lower status (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000 p. 36; Youngs & Dodd 1998, p. 10). After a few peaceful years things began to deteriorate when Tito died in 1980 and Yugoslavia drifted into economic and political unrest (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 36; Youngs & Dodd 1998, p. 11). And as many Serbs left Kosovo mostly because of the poor economic situation, it was often perceived that they had left fearing Albanian reprisals. The idea of Serbs having to leave Kosovo due to Albanian pressure struck a nerve with Serbs nationwide as Kosovo is strongly connected to the national Serbian identity. As it was in Kosovo that the Serbs in the fourteenth century fought some decisive battles with the old Ottoman Empire. And although the Serbs actually lost most of the battles, this period is celebrated as the time when the Serbs curbed the Ottoman invasion of Europe (Wentz 2002, p. 318).

It was in this poor economic climate and amidst growing ethnic tensions that Slobodan Milosevic was elected president of the Serbian Republic in 1989. Known as a strong advocate of Serbian nationalist empowerment, Milosevic was known for his strong anti-Albanian rhetoric and would soon prove to deliver more than just words. And about a year after Milosevic was in office, Serbian authorities launched a series of measures aimed at retracting Kosovar autonomy and strongly curtailing the Kosovar Albanians (Wentz 2002, p. 312; Zaalberg 2005, p. 291). Finally, continuing repression convinced many Kosovar Albanians that only armed resistance could change their dire situation. On 22 April 1996, four simultaneous attacks on Serbian security personnel were carried out in several parts of Kosovo (Youngs & Dodd 1998, p. 15). A hitherto-unknown organization calling itself the 'Kosovo Liberation Army' (KLA) subsequently claimed responsibility (Wentz 2002, p. 312).

What followed were years of civil war with attacks of the KLA against Serbian targets and the Serbs executing revenge attacks on the Albanians. This resulted in more than fifteen hundred ethnic Albanians killed by August 1998 and four hundred thousand forced out or having fled the province (Clark 2007, p. 10; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000).

Triggered by a massacre in September 1998 an agreement between Serbia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was signed to end the atrocities committed by the Serbian forces (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, p. 75). This agreement resulted in a monitoring mission named the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). But within months it became clear the mission had failed as the KVM seemed totally incapable of stopping the violence (Clark 2007, p. 10). The attacks from both adversaries even intensified and the number of Serbian forces did not decline opposing earlier promises. In the meantime more and more ethnic Albanians were driven out Kosovo (Clark 2007, p. 10).

In January 1999 NATO increases its pressure on Serbia by threatening with airstrikes and peace enforcing ground operations. In February the international community tries to get both the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanian shadow government to agree on a cease fire, negotiating in the French town of Rambouillet (Zaalberg 2005, p. 292). The main goal was to agree on a withdrawal of the Serb security forces and a disarmament of the KLA (Wentz 2002, p. 314). But, despite frantic efforts of the international community, the Serbs ultimately refuse to sign the agreement. To make matters even worse, Serbia actually launched a major offensive in Kosovo, causing even more civilian casualties and refugees (Clark 2007, p. 12). Ultimately a final warning was given by the UN Secretary-General ordering the Serbian authorities to immediately stop their aggression in Kosovo. When the Serbian government again fails to comply NATO, with consent of the UN Secretary General but bypassing the UNSC, subsequently launches an air campaign and starts bombing Serbian military targets on March 24, 1999 (Clark 2007, p. 12; Zaalberg 2005, p. 293).

Finally, after nearly two months of hammering airstrikes, the Serbian government was back at the negotiation table. Serbia had nine major highways, seven airports and fifty-nine bridges destroyed. Two thirds of its main industrial plants were severely damaged and seventy percent of its power stations were out of order (Priest 2003, p. 272). And, although the final political status of Kosovo remained unclear, in June an agreement was signed. The agreement foresaw the withdrawal of all Serbia's military and security forces from Kosovo, the unconditional return of all refugees and the implementation of an international peacekeeping force (Gordon et al 2002, p. 1; Zaalberg 2005, p. 294). This NATO force was to become known as Kosovo Force or KFOR. Now under international rule KFOR had Kosovo divided into five geographic areas each under control of a Multinational Brigade (MNB). Each MNB was led by a lead nation. These lead nations were Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Italy. The MNB's were for a large part subordinate to British general Michael Jackson who was KFOR's first overall commander (Mokaitis 2004, p. 8).

When the first KFOR troops entered Kosovo on June 12 1999 the local Serbian authorities had literally dropped everything and had only one priority; preparing to leave the province in one piece. Almost overnight there were no functioning police forces, no functioning courts and no penal system (Jakobsen 2002, p. 7). And with the Serb security forces no longer around or on duty the Albanian population started attacking the largely unprotected Serbian minority (Jakobsen 2002, p. 8). Especially in places where Serbian forces previously had committed war crimes the revengeful Albanians were killing hundreds of Serb civilians (Priest 2003, pp. 273, 282). Although the primary task of KFOR was to enforce peace and deter renewed hostilities between the Serbian forces and the KLA, they also had a mandate to "establish a secure environment" (Zaalberg 2005, p. 296). In any case general Michael

Jackson, KFOR's commander, did not need any encouragement to start restoring order. According to Jackson taking action was actually the only logical thing to do:

For those who say this is not for the military, my next question to them would be, for whom is it when there is nobody else there? Or do you just let it go? Do you allow anarchy? What do you do when a foot patrol of soldiers in Pristina comes across a Serb about to murder an Albanian. You don't have a secure environment with murderers running around (Jackson 1999, cited in Jakobsen 2002, p. 2).

Jackson was soon backed in this by the supreme NATO leadership. Three weeks after the start of the ground operation NATO affirmed that KFOR troops had full authority to perform police tasks (Brocades Zaalberg 2005, p. 320). Not much later Jackson was actually ordered by his top NATO superior, the American general Wesley Clark, to arrest 'looters and arsonists' (Brocades Zaalberg 2005, p. 321). And although Jackson had already begun drafting something of a uniform KFOR policy regarding the execution of public security tasks, it would become a big challenge to get all MNB's act accordingly. It would soon be clear that the German, British, American, French and Italian MNB's all had their own way of executing law enforcement in their respective MNB's.

4.2 The United States

Since its founding the United States has been almost continuously involved in military engagements ranging from low-intensity conflicts, occupations and peacekeeping operations to full scale warfare participating in two world wars. Until 1945 these ventures almost exclusively ended in victory for the United States, shaping its strategic culture and growing typical national beliefs (Gray 1981, p. 26). And until the 'loss' of Vietnam in the early 1970's many of these beliefs had remained unchallenged for numerous decades. But the traumatic experience of Vietnam, with more than 58,000 Americans killed and 153,000 wounded, served as a national benchmark for failure as the carpet was pulled under the long comforting notion of American technical and moral superiority (Herring 1986, p. 256). In *American reckoning: the Vietnam War and our national identity* Christian Appy (2015) states:

Never before had such a wide range of Americans come to doubt their nation's superiority; never before had so many questioned its use of military force; never before had so many challenged the assumption that their country had higher moral standards (p. 3).

A poll in 1971 showed that an unprecedented 58% of the American people not only thought the war in Vietnam was wrong but also that it was immoral (Appy 2015, p. 7). Clearly Vietnam had seriously shaken up the American strategic culture resulting in a national consensus that "the United States should use military force only as a last resort; only where the national interest is clearly involved; only when there is strong public support; and only in the likelihood of a relatively quick, inexpensive victory" (Lord 1992, p. 270). These views were subsequently formulated in the Weinberger and later Powell-doctrine in the early nineties. But besides the watershed experience of Vietnam and the resulting reluctance with regard to the use of military force, most scholars roughly identify, at least up till Kosovo, four main characteristics typical for the American strategic culture.

Firstly the United States believed it was a unique force for good in the world and "heir to powerful traditions of political liberalism - limited government and the rule of law - and of religious enthusiasm and moralism" (Lord 1992, p. 265). From this notion sprung an idealistic projection of its values to the rest of the word seeking to spread freedom and democracy to those denied the benefits of the American system (Nix 2012, p. 98). Secondly, it was widely believed that the United States actually could achieve anything "that they set their hands to in earnest"(Gray 1981, p. 27). Johnson (1997) concurs and states "Americans typically believe that any problem can be solved with the right amount of effort and dedication" (p. 349). He continues with the example of the US advisory role in South Vietnam:

Frustrated that the South Vietnamese were not adopting the American cultural norm that advocated an adherence to an established programmatic method in order to measurably advance towards an agreed end-state and peace, the US (simply) took over the war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels (p. 349).

Third comes the notion some scholars have of the American people of being pragmatic with an inclination to look for technical solutions for a problem (Lord 1992, p. 265). This is also reflected in the American emphasis on, when possible, waging a war based on technology rather than human attrition (Gray 1981, p. 28). Lastly the United States is OTHER STUDIES attributed to be impatient and have a relatively 'short attention span' with a desire for quick solutions (Nix 2012, p. 99). Nix (2012) concludes the United States has a preference "for wars of limited duration, with clearly defined 'bad guys', clear paths to victory through overwhelming 'high tech' force, and a rapid return of forces to America's shores after conflict termination"(p. 98). It were for the most part these strategic cultural notions that were prevalent when the United States started deploying troops in Somalia in 1992. The dramatic events eventually unfolding in its capital Mogadishu would prove to have a significant impact on the American strategic culture.

When the United States entered Somalia, a country raged by civil war, its mission goal was to provide security and food relief. Interestingly the US ambassador in Kenya (neighboring Somalia) had reported to Washington to think twice of entering Somalia and makes notion of the American strategic cultural ideal of a speedy technical solution. He stated: "I do not think Somalia is amendable to the quick fix so beloved of Americans" (Alexander, 2013). When the initial calamity of immediate starvation was evaded the mission soon faded from public and political interest. When American troops eventually wanted to arrest a prominent warlord in Somalia's capital Mogadishu things soon got from bad to worse. Within the hour two American Black Hawk helicopters were shot down resulting in isolated pockets of American troops attacked by frenzied mobs of armed Somali. The next day, when the relief operation had ended, eighteen American servicemen were killed, 77 were wounded and one was captured (Center of Military History United States Army 2003, pp. 5-14). That morning the American public woke up with images of cheering Somali's dragging dead American soldiers through the streets, resulting in a wide public outcry (Murray 2008, p. 79). The very Somali people the Americans believed they had just saved from starvation had ostensibly savagely killed American servicemen (Center of Military History United States Army 2003, pp. 5-14).

The result was immediate pressure on the Clinton Administration to get all American troops out of Somalia immediately (Murray 2008, pp. 79-80). However, with one American captured

and the US troops being essential for the sustainment of the UN operation, an instant total withdrawal was not an option. The Administration then set the date for ending mission support on March 1994, a mere six months after the incident (Center of Military History United States Army 2003, p. 13). The events in Somalia had a strong influence on the American strategic culture as there was no longer support for humanitarian missions or peacekeeping operations. And at the same time there was a strong aversion of casualties resulting in what American diplomat Richard Holbrook described as the 'Vietmalia' syndrome (Perito 2004, p. 115). When, a few weeks after the last American troops had left Somalia, large scale massacres were reported in Rwanda, the United States had no intention of intervening. As in November 1995 the Bosnian war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreements and US peacekeepers were reluctantly deployed in Bosnia, American decision makers were adamant the so called 'Mogadishu line' was not to be crossed. They meant that the UN forces should never become a combatant as what had happened in Mogadishu. So, with the American losses in Mogadishu in mind, they thus put a strong emphasis on force protection and went in very heavy (Friesendorf 2012, p. 30). Or in the words of a Bosnia specialist working for the White House in that period:

The Administration lost faith in the usefulness of ground troops in 1993, after 18 soldiers were killed in a failed raid in Mogadishu. They believe that Somalia demonstrates conclusively that you cannot have any casualties. They take this as a matter of faith (Owens 2000, p. 187).

When the Kosovo crisis emerged the American public seemed perceptive of images of suffering Albanians and opinion polls showed half of the American public in favor of sending ground troops in mid April 1999 (Owens 2000, p. 186). But the Clinton Administration seemed "to have no confidence that popular support would survive the first casualties" (Owens 2000, p. 186). This was initially reflected by Clinton excluding the involvement of ground forces and only use airpower (given its relative small risk of American casualties) to curb Serbian aggression. On March 24, the start of the US led NATO air campaign against Serbia, Clinton stated: "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war" (Erlanger, 1999). Repeating this statement a week later: "The thing that bothers me about introducing ground troops into Kosovo and into the Balkans, is the prospect of never being able to get them out" (Owens 2000, p. 187).

It was clear the American Administration deeply feared the Mogadishu scenario. When in June the Serbs finally gave in and the air campaign had proven successful, not a single American life had been lost (Priest 2003, p. 273). This, and the fact that after the US led air campaign any NATO ground operation without American troops seemed politically unthinkable, made the US ultimately deploy ground troops in Kosovo. Be it under the condition that since the United States had been driving Bosnia, Europe should now take the lead in Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p. 295). And indeed KFOR was thus initially led by a British 'three star' general. The Americans 'just' sent a 'one' star general commanding their troops and choose a sector for their deployment that supposedly was one of the quieter sectors of the province…(Priest 2004, p. 274; Mockaitis 2004, p. 13).

4.2.1 The United States in Kosovo

The American led MNB was responsible for the southeastern part of Kosovo dubbed MNB-East. With Serbia in its east and north and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on its southern border, MNB-East measured about 900-square-miles making it no bigger than Los Angeles county (Priest 2003, p. 273). This region of Kosovo was initially also less damaged than the other MNB areas (Mockaitis 2004, p. 13). The American led MNB (including Russian, Greek and Polish troops) was designated Task Force Falcon and counted at its height in October 1999 around 8400 troops (Gordon, McGinn, Nardulli, Perry, Pirnie 2002, p. 103). When the Americans entered their area of responsibility in June 1999 they were quickly overwhelmed by rampaging Albanians executing revenge attacks against the remaining Serb minority. The Americans were caught by surprise and had difficulties putting all the violence in context (Priest 2003, pp. 281, 299). Only in August the violence was beginning to die down (Clark 2007, p. 26). During these first chaotic months the Serbs had turned from the enemy into the victims and the Albanians, who had been the unofficial ally, seemed to have become the new enemy (Priest 2003, p. 291). In words of an American soldier: "The Serbs are so much nicer. They offer us alcohol and treat us like kings. The Albanians are stupid" (Priest 2003, p. 302).

4.2.2 Security Operations

At the start of the employment Task Force Falcon (like all KFOR troops) had two primary military tasks. In order to enforce peace and prevent renewed hostilities they firstly needed to see to a swift and orderly withdrawal of the Serbian military and security forces from Kosovo. Secondly the American troops needed to disarm and demilitarize the KLA (Zaalberg 2005, p. 295). But as it happened the Serbs left the province in an unexpectedly orderly and disciplined manner in less than two weeks (Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). This quickly diminished the need for keeping the Serbs and the KLA from fighting each other or Serbian troops attacking Kosovar Albanian civilians. The American security operations in the first months of deployment were thus characterized by trying to protect the Serbian minority against Kosovar Albanians and disarming the KLA. Acting "with a strong force posture and frequent presence patrols" the Americans encountered little armed resistance or direct opposition but were unable to effectively stop the mayhem that was taking place as soon as the Serb security forces had left the province (Gordon et al. 2002, pp. 103-104).

Although on June 21 KFOR representatives reached an agreement with the KLA about demilitarization and disarmament the Americans (and the British) had actually already begun confiscating their weapons before this date (Zaalberg 2005, p. 305). According to Zaalberg (2005) "the American's took an overall robust stance on disarmament" (p. 335). The Americans were increasingly active raiding KLA headquarters and training locations seizing firearms, mines and explosives (Clark 2007, p. 33). Although some authors claim they could have done more as "the U.S. military's strong emphasis on force protection has greatly inhibited this type of action on a large-scale basis" (Gordon et al. 2002. p. 108). But despite the disarmament of the KLA and the large number weapons and ammunition found, many thousands of weapons still remained in the hands of individuals who violently used them against Serbian civilians as soon as they had the chance (Gordon et al. 2002, p. 108; Clark 2007, pp. 23-25). Suppressing interethnic violence, fighting fires and crowd and riot control

(often using armored vehicles and even attack helicopters to disperse the crowds) would make up the daily operational routine of the American troops during the first months of deployment (Clark 2007, pp. 25, 35-36). But the Americans never seemed to have enough troops to really quell the violence and found themselves often powerless to prevent the killing, massive looting and burning of Serb property (Clark 2007, pp. 23-26). As described by Clark (2007) in the report "Operation Joint Guardian, The U.S. Army in Kosovo", despite aggressive patrolling "Murder, assault, kidnapping, extortion, burglary, and arson were reported daily" (p. 21). As one American staff officer summarized the early days of the operation:"I think everybody was surprised at the amount of retribution that was occurring. We handled it the best we could. Short of having a soldier in front of every Serb house, there was no way we were going to stop it" (Clark 2007, p. 21). And although a company of 120 US military police who were trained at basic law enforcement were active in the MNB, this hardly seemed to have made a noticeable difference (Priest 2003, p. 280; Perito 2004, p. 186). Whereas despite the massive looting and arsoning the Americans had made 'just' fifteen arrests by July 7 only beating the French and Italians who, combined, had arrested six suspects (Zaalberg 2005, p. 335). This implies that there was simply no will to take on public security tasking too serious. According to Lord (1992): "America's political elite has shown little knowledge of or interest in 'imperial policing' as the British used to describe low-intensity warfare"(p.268). This was confirmed in July by US Defense Secretary Cohen who was quoted in the Washington Post saying: "The more we do, the less incentive there is for the UN to come in and assume that burden (…) This is a mission [providing public security] that does not belong to NATO forces" (Smith, 1999).

Concluding, the Americans seem to have been actively patrolling and maintaining a presence in their sector but were not able to stop the violence against the Serb population which seemed to have surprised them. A lack of available troops is given as the main reason for not being able to keep order. Despite the availability of a useful quantity of military police and the number of incidents fifteen arrests were made. They were successful in disarming the KLA and took the initiative to confiscate their weapons even before there was a formal agreement on their disarmament. It is noted however that they might have been even more successful had it not been for reasons of casualty aversion. The statement of Defense Secretary Cohen implies that more could have been done but that there was no political will. Overall the Americans seem to score at best intermediate on operational activities.

4.2.3 CIMIC

According to the American military in the Kosovo era, the philosophy was that rebuilding was not a task for the military but for NGO's, the international community and local civil institutions (Mockaitis 2004, p. 16). This is reflected in the role CIMIC was given in the American military doctrine were it was subordinate to conventional military operations. Its primary role was "to clear all civilian obstacles for the tactical commander and enable him to fight his conventional battle" (Zaalberg 2005, p. 392). With at one time more than 8.000 troops in the American MNB, about fifty-eight were dedicated to CIMIC (Zaalberg 2005, p. 400). Mockaitis (2004) concludes in his work 'Civil Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo' that the success of the US CIMIC in Kosovo has been mixed. If there were successes they seem far less than what would have been expected related to the number of troops and resources available (p. 16).

Although the American field commanders in Kosovo soon understood their mission was to be executed on the streets and in interaction with the population, the US CIMIC activities were burdened with strong force protection measures (Priest 2003, p. 282). This overemphasis on force protection was clearly unlikely to help CIMIC teams getting closer to the population. When for example a CIMIC officer wanted to go to a local meeting his team was required to have a force protection unit with extra vehicles making it a rather large convoy. When on destination he was required to wear a helmet and body armor making him indistinguishable from the soldiers who would be guarding him (Zaalberg 2005, p. 401). Officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) complained that this robust display of military power often intimidated the already frightened population (Mockaitis 2004, p. 15). Zaalberg (2005) concludes that "The force protection measures resulting from the US military's risk-averse mentality hampered the American civil affairs teams in moving among the people" (p. 401).

Because of the idea that rebuilding was not a task for the military, funds for CIMIC were cut during the mission making the work obviously more difficult. This resulted that CIMIC officers from the most powerful military in the world had to find NGO's willing to pay for many of their projects (Mockaitis 2004, p. 16). To make up for this the Americans often provided these NGO's and other relief agencies with security and helped them coordinate and sometimes facilitated their efforts (Clark 2007, p. 29). Compared to the British and the Dutch (as will be shown later) the Americans had the largest dedicated CIMIC contingent. They however clearly had given CIMIC a relatively low priority (funds cut off), no indications of the taking over any government functions and the acceptance of their CIMIC efforts suffering from strict force protection measures. This leads to a low score on CIMIC.

4.2.4 Force Protection

For the American troops in Kosovo force protection clearly was their first and foremost priority (Gordon et al. p. 108). According to Mockaitis (2004) "Nothing underscores American discomfort with peace operations more than the emphasis on force protection at the expense even of mission success" (p. 14). He also points out that some suggested that the Americans with their overemphasis on force protection seemed to regard force protection "as the mission itself, rather than a means to accomplish it" (Mockaitis 2004, p. 15).

The first that comes to mind when discussing American force protection in Kosovo is Camp Bondsteel which became the most pregnant example of the American presence in the province. Unlike other KFOR headquarters in Kosovo which were located in major towns, Camp Bondsteel was positioned in open country providing wide arcs of fire in case of an unlikely siege (Mockaitis 2004, p. 14). Protected with an earthen wall, eleven watchtowers and 180 km of barbed wire, Bondsteel was at that time the largest temporary military base since Vietnam (Priest 2003, p. 280). But despite Bondsteel being a virtually impregnable fortress military personnel was still required to carry a weapon when walking around inside the base. A New York born civilian American Albanian interpreter, working for the American troops at Bondsteel, thought the army went way too far with their force protection. According to her the force-protection measures "seemed to have too many soldiers on the edge. They were safer at Camp Bondsteel than she had been in New York city"(Priest 2003, p. 298). The camp based roughly five thousand American troops in October 1999 which was then about

three-quarters of all the American troops in Kosovo. But of these troops a large percentage based at Bondsteel actually never left the camp as they were needed for the sole purpose of garrisoning it and operating its many facilities (Mokaitis 2004, p. 14). With a fire department, dining facilities, several coffee bars and a Burger King, the camp was dubbed 'Disneyland' by other NATO troops (Zaalberg 2005, p. 325). And while other nations, most notably the British, choose to locate many units within local communities the Americans claimed it to be unwise to station soldiers amongst the population (Smith, 1999).

Not surprisingly force protection culminated when the Americans ventured outside their protected base. Only travelling in convoys with minimally four armored trucks, two locked and loaded shooters per vehicle, who were always in full combat gear wearing helmets and body armor (Mokaitis 2004, p. 14). Interestingly, while most soldiers and officers understood that these measures were taken to get them home in one piece, many disliked the overly precautions and felt themselves imprisoned. Especially when they compared their modus operandi with their European counterparts who mostly could move fare more freely and interact with the population (Mokaitis 2004, p. 15). American soldiers "were not generally allowed to consume local food or beverages or purchase things from local shops, cafes, and business establishments" (Wentz 2002, p. 474). According to Zaalberg (2005): "Most soldiers realized that their combatant presentation kept the atmosphere when dealing with the population unnecessary tense" (p. 261). And Wentz (2002) reports: "It was felt by many that the flack vests, helmets and weapons intimidated local civilians and was awkward and disruptive in small offices and other areas where the teams came in contact with the locals" (p. 474). Nevertheless the Americans stayed cautious and did not allow individual units to adjust their measures to fit the local situation or task (Mockaitis 2004, p. 14). Mockaitis (2004) concludes "Robust rules of engagement, over-emphasis on force protection, and the impatience of American culture have made U.S. soldiers more confrontational than they need to be for most peacekeeping situations"(p. 33). And according to the American Albanian translator again, the American soldier "needs to be able to discern between a real threat and a created one" (Priest 2003, p. 299). Considering the high level of priority the Americans have given to the protection of their bases, their vehicle movements, always wearing body armor and helmet when off the base (and even wearing helmets on the base) they clearly score high regarding force protection.

4.2.5 Case analyses

The American case shows that the tragic events in Somalia in 1993 were nationwide experienced as a military defeat. This traumatic experience led rather quickly to a change in the American strategic culture resulting in declining support for humanitarian or peacekeeping operations and a strong aversion of casualties. The latter was especially persistent with top level political and military decision makers who were initially very reluctant when it eventually came to deploying ground forces in Kosovo. When they ultimately decided to deploy boots on the ground their first and foremost priority evidently was to avoid American casualties. Consequently the American threat perception of the operational environment in Kosovo was high which resulted in a strong emphasis on force protection. Security operations and CIMIC were all seen as of secondary importance and were often hampered or limited by measures of force protection. Therefore the overall American effort to provide public security as part of its peacekeeping operation in Kosovo could be labeled minimalist.

Regarding alternative explanations, it is true that all MNB-sectors experienced outbursts of violence and public disorder in the first months but it is possible that the aggression in the American sector indeed called for serious force protection measures. In other words, it is feasible that the violence outbursts confirmed their initial threat assessment and ensuing high threat perception which would have justified strong force protection. It is further possible that strong force protection measures furthermore could have increased the tensions with the population or at least would not have aided in defusing them. In other words, there could have been a question of a self fulfilling prophecy whereas a high threat perception leads to heavy force protection leading in turn to a higher threat (perception?) of the operational environment.

4.3 The United Kingdom

Of all peacekeeping forces in Kosovo the British army was the most experienced in dealing with public security. While more than capable of large scale conventional operations and taking part in the brunt of the fighting in both World Wars, the British army has for most of its history been fighting in expeditionary wars (Cassidy 2005, p. 58). Consequently, counterinsurgency, intrastate security and stability operations have been central in the British military experience (Cassidy 2005, p. 58). These historic experiences have made and shaped Britain's strategic culture which seemingly has made the British army well suited for the challenges presented to them in Kosovo (Mockaitis 2004, p. 23).

When looking at the history of British strategic culture it is of interest to look at how they categorized war or armed conflict in the nineteenth until the second half of the twentieth century. During this period the British spoke of 'small wars' when they meant limited conventional conflicts that could be dealt with their standing professional army. When they spoke of a 'Great War' this meant that this was a larger conflict which would require conscription. Insurgencies, rebellions or any other kind of violent turmoil which flamed up in the empire almost continuously, were not seen as wars and thus not classified as such. When responding to this kind of disturbances, which were thought of as business as usual, this was mostly labeled as 'policing' or 'counterinsurgency' (Mockaitis 1993, p. 7).

It is important to note that these 'disturbances' were not primarily seen as a military problem and thus were not treated like one. In the minds of the British the idea was that "Unrest must be dealt with through a combination of reform (winning 'hearts and minds') and police measures"(Mockaitis 1993, p.7). The military naturally could be brought in to support the police but the basic thought was that soldiers should only be assisting the civil powers. They were normally not to act independently as a military force. It was also considered imperative that they, just like police forces, would calibrate their use of force and never exceed the level that was necessary to restore order. Indiscriminate or excessive use of force was to be avoided at all times as this was considered wholly counterproductive (Mockaitis 1993, p. 7; Friesendorf 2012, p. 31). Thus during their colonial years the British army acquired the ability to calibrate the use of force which eventually was to become their trademark (Friesendorf 2012, pp. 30-31).

Their most prolonged, successful and often referred to use of military force in the public security domain was the British army operation in Northern Ireland. Starting in 1969,

‘Operation Banner’ had daily up to 10.000 soldiers on the streets during the height of the conflict in the early seventies (British Army 2006, p. 2). With a total of 600 British servicemen killed, 102 of which were lost in 1972 (the largest number in one year since Korea), the army’s self-discipline was severely tested (British Army 2006, p. 2). According to historian Martin van Creveld, cited in the British army’s official report on their operations in Northern Ireland “the British army’s self-discipline, and particularly restraint and forbearance in the face of grievous provocation, was a key factor in Northern Ireland” (British Army 2006, p. 15). According to the same report the army indeed “rarely over-reacted. It did not respond with tanks on the streets. It generally displayed humanity and humor, although during the early 1970s this was difficult to sustain and a desire to ‘sort the Micks out’ was often apparent” (British Army 2006, p. 15).

As stated earlier the British army’s campaign in Northern Ireland was the longest in British history. The acceptance that operations like these could require years or even decades of military commitment seems also a part of British strategic culture. As Cassidy states “The British also seem to exhibit more patience when it comes to protracted internal security problems, which is probably attributable to a tradition of operating in small, autonomous units in isolated and faraway places”(Cassidy 2005, p. 59). Patience is also demonstrated on a tactical level with regard to building relations with the population and other local actors. When compared to the Americans who, according to Mockaitis, have a ‘low-context’ impatient culture were ‘time is money’, the British usually take their time. On the Balkans, and in many other cultures, people are not custom to “cut to the chase” and “get to the point” but first need time to build a relationship. The British seem to understand this and benefit from being able to take a slower pace when the situation requires this (Mockaitis 2004, pp. 25-26).

Thus the strategic culture of the British Army, shaped by a long history of ‘Imperial Policing’ with its unique ability to calibrate force seems to be well suited for establishing public order. But to think that the British have softened since the last World War and would have forgotten how to put up a fight is erroneous. As Friesendorf (2012) points out “For the UK maximum force has always been the option – the warrior spirit is inculcated in the British Army as much as it is in the US military” (p. 32). And indeed, before their intervention in Kosovo they launched a successful military campaign against Argentina in 1982 and had participated with equal aggression in the Gulf War in 1991 (Friesendorf 2012, p. 30). And even during peacekeeping operations in Bosnia in the mid-nineties they occasionally showed their teeth as they were estimated to have killed more than 200 adversaries up to 1995 (Dodd 1995, p. 11).

As already observed with regard to their service in Northern Ireland an important aspect of the British strategic military culture is their ability to accept own losses. According to Cassidy “The British approach to casualties is best described as a stiff-upper-lip attitude. A history of taking a limited number of casualties in remote places for unclear reasons has made the British tolerable of casualties” (Cassidy 2005, p. 59). And indeed just a few years before their involvement in Kosovo the British totaled sixty own troops killed in Bosnia (Dodd 1995, p. 11). There are no indications these losses have had any noticeable impact on the British military culture and in any way have influenced the execution of operations in Kosovo. As Cassidy (2005) states “The British Army does not try to avoid casualties, and it does not seem to be averse to taking them” (p. 59).

Concluding, the British army is shaped by a strategic culture that makes it proficient of executing full scale conventional operations while at the same time it stays capable of executing public security tasks were calibrated force is mandatory. And when losses are suffered these so far seem to be accepted as part of the deal and do not seem to affect their ability to only use calibrated force when needed to (Zaalberg 2005, p. 260). While at the same time the British are never shy to use deadly force and can be an aggressive opponent. In short the British do not feel that peacekeeping or operations other than war degrade combat skills and reduce readiness but instead "believe that the best war fighters make the best peacekeepers" (Zaalberg 2005, p. 257).

4.3.1 The British in Kosovo

Though the area of the British led MNB-Central was somewhat smaller in size than the rest of the MNB areas it was demographically the largest. It included Kosovo's capital Pristina in which KFOR Headquarters and main offices of numerous NGO's were located (Mockaitis 2004, p. 23). Enclosed by the French, German and American sectors it bordered Serbia in the east. Entering Kosovo as one of the first KFOR troops the British went in with a significant force wielding initially to full brigades in June 1999. At its height in October 1999 MNB-central counted just over 9.000 troops including soldiers from eight different countries, all under British command (Mockaitis 2004, p. 23).

Where other lead nations seemed overwhelmed by the revenge attacks, massive looting and burning of initially Albanian but soon Serbian property, the British were able to prevent much destruction by launching foot patrols as soon as they arrived in their area of responsibility (Mockaitis 2004, p. 26). Before long the British were filling the security gap left by the retreating Serbian security forces and Serbian civil administration. They were soon praised for being able to switch from a firm and no-nonsense approach to a more relaxed posture (Zaalberg 2005, p. 332).

4.3.2 Security Operations

As stated above the British forces went in heavy and wasted no time deploying patrols in an effort to prevent the massive violence as occurring in other areas of the province. Their quick and firm deployment prevented much destruction (Mockaitis 2004, p. 26). According to a British officer "We will not tolerate any armed group using its muscle. We will respond robustly" (Agence France-Presse, 1999). Just like the Americans the British were firm in demilitarizing the KLA and started confiscating weapons even before there was an official agreement on their disarmament (Zaalberg 2005, p. 305). Regarding British security operations it is hard to make a clear distinction between 'security' activities like patrolling, setting up checkpoints and providing public security on the one hand, and CIMIC on the other. In the British concept both are complementary and even with the most basic operational tasks the British are able to keep the relations with the environment open. As Mockaitis (2004) points out "They manned checkpoints with an easy going, non-confrontational style that defused tension" (p. 26). Anticipating the need for law and order expertise the British had incorporated some 140 Royal Military Police and about a dozen military Special Investigators in their KFOR contingent (Perito 2004, p. 186). In some areas the British also had four times as much local interpreters than the Americans (Smith, 1999). Taking public security seriously

their activities resulted in fifty arrests by July 7, being only surpassed by the Germans (Zaalberg 2005, p. 335). Concluding; their immediate response to civil unrest by deploying patrols as soon as they entered their area, their number of arrests, their number of military police and active stance on disarming the KLA results to a high score regarding operational activities.

4.3.3 CIMIC

The best way to describe the British philosophy regarding CIMIC is to quote a British commander in Kosovo who stated "CIMIC is every soldier's job" (Mokaitis 2004, p. 24). According to Zaalberg (2005) the British military leadership was inclined to "see civil aspects as an integral part of the mission whether dubbed civil-military cooperation, civil affairs, civil-military operations, civic action, liaison, or support to the civil power" (p. 393). He continues that this was:

rooted in a long tradition of colonial policing, counterinsurgency and the continued involvement of military forces in internal security operations in Northern Ireland. Any level of success in these hybrid civil military efforts had relied heavily on the triangular relationship between civil administration, civil police and the military (p. 393).

Interestingly the British, with twelve staff, had one of the smallest dedicated CIMIC units of all lead nations in Kosovo (Mockaitis 2004, p. 24). This however, had nothing to do with any disinterest or lack of priority but again reflected the idea that all troops were considered to take on CIMIC tasks as an integral part of their job. And in doing so also contributed to their own force protection.

As the British concept of CIMIC puts the emphasis on "dialogue and interaction, rather than activities" there has been actually surprisingly limited military involvement in reconstruction projects in Kosovo and there are no indications they had taken over any government functions besides public security (Zaalberg 2007, p. 16). But this does not seemed to have any detrimental effect on the relations with the population and other civilian actors (Zaalberg 2007, p. 16). Mockaitis (2004) confirms this and finds the British approach overall impressive (p. 26). According to him "UNHCR representatives and NGO personnel generally found the British to be more effective at CIMIC than other national contingents"(p. 26). And "Several NGO/IO observers described them as "in a class by themselves" among the NATO peacekeepers" (p. 26). So the British, despite having officially the smallest CIMIC detachment of all lead nations, actually had all their officers and men acting with a CIMIC mindset. So from an alternative point of view it could be argued the British actually had the largest CIMIC force of all. Either way, despite having not taken over any local government function, the British clearly score high on CIMIC.

4.3.4 Force Protection

While certainly not shy to use deadly force when threatened, the British concept of force protection goes far beyond the use of firepower and physical precautions. To them good relations with the local community often provides them useful intelligence which they feel is about just as important to protecting the troops as helmets and body armor. The British also believe that muscular conventional force protection does more to create a barrier between

peacekeepers and the population than it does any good (Mockaitis 2004, p. 25). Many years of experience in small wars and counterinsurgency seemed to have taught the British to prefer only to use minimal force, and only if need be (Cassidy 2005, p. 59). The British in Kosovo often referred to their Northern Ireland experience where many of them had served (Zaalberg 2005, p. 261). For the British force protection is part CIMIC and vice versa. A British company commander in Pristina said patrolling in pairs and staying close to the community allowed his soldiers to:

get under the skin of the place, to establish a database on the pattern of life and determine who's doing what, to have a cup of coffee with everybody. It's in the training we got from Northern Ireland to look for something that doesn't fit in (Smith, 1999).

Thus in Kosovo the British approach to force protection can be described as firm but approachable. With their forces widely dispersed they were often located in bases cordoned only with white plastic tape instead of barbed wire and sandbags (Smith, 1999). Some British units hired apartments in isolated villages where they tried to speak the language and look after the needs of the population (Zaalberg 2005, p. 261). Mockaitis (2004) confirms this and describes they also “billeted soldiers with Serbians frightened of Albanian retaliation”(p. 26). And although they tried to settle local disputes by mediation the British were not afraid to teach obstinate locals a lesson by beating them up (Zaalberg 2005, p. 333).

Having a different threat perception than for instance their American counterparts, they almost always patrolled on foot. Especially in built-up areas they preferred to walk about and made sure it was always the same group of soldiers that patrolled the same villages and neighborhoods (Zaalberg 2005, p.333). Almost never wearing their helmets the British had put on berets and their weapons slung around their backs (Zaalberg 2005, p. 261). According to a British officer in Kosovo "To wear body armor and a helmet is the wrong psychological approach. It also makes you tired, so you can't concentrate. And a helmet makes you look down, instead of up. It's like being behind a desk" (Smith, 1999). The British approach of force protection is clearly not one based on physical protective measures but on being able to anticipate on possible dangers by keeping the distance between the population and the troops as small as possible. Thus in a conventional way the British score low on force protection.

4.3.5 Case analyses:

The British case evidently shows a strategic culture that radiates self confidence gained through both earlier and more recent positive military experiences in the public security domain. An important part of their strategic culture is the notion that casualties are an unavoidable reality of military deployment. This resulted in what in retrospect appears to be a threat perception that seemed permissive to adjustment and able to adapt to a changing environment. It is possible that the British high score on operational activities, especially in the first violent phase of the deployment, actually helped to reduce the threat in the long run as the British showed the Kosovar Albanians, that they were serious in keeping things under control. In any case their threat perception allowed them to score low on conventional force protection but it is beyond doubt they would have increased their protective measures if their threat perception had asked for it. As described earlier, their emphasis on CIMIC is for a large part instigated by considerations of force protection. Their good relations with the population

made it possible to keep their physical force protection at a relatively low level especially when compared to other nations. Therefore the overall British effort to provide public security as part of its peacekeeping operation in Kosovo could be labeled vacuum-filler.

It could be argued that the British sector was relatively safe and strong force protection measures were not necessary. In addition, a permissive environment would also make it easier to interact with the population hence their high score on CIMIC. The researched sources have given however no indication that this would be the case.

4.4 The Netherlands

For most of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century Dutch strategic culture was that of a colonial power which looked at the greater powers (Britain, France, Germany, and of course the US) as role models (French & Tjepkema 2010, p. 3). Although neutrality had always been the preferred position in international affairs in that period "the Dutch have always been prepared to fight when their interests were at stake" (Biehl, Giegerich, Jonas. 2013, p. 265). In the Dutch colonies many insurgencies were fought and also during the Second World War the Dutch military bravely showed its teeth. It was only after the Second World War, followed by wars of decolonization and the subsequent loss of the Netherlands Indies, that the days of unilateral military campaigns were finally over (Biehl et al. 2013, p. 265). In the postwar years that followed the Netherlands slowly developed into the typical postmodern state as we know it today. In his article 'The new Liberal Imperialism' Robert Cooper (2003) writes that the postmodern state "rejects force for resolving disputes and consequently codify self-enforced rules of behavior". And that "Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability" (Cooper, 2003). In this new world "Western European countries no longer want to fight each other" (Cooper, 2003). These characteristics can be easily applied to the Dutch who have wholeheartedly embraced the postmodern system. Because of its dependence on international trade, the pursuit of international stability was to become the "primary Dutch security goal with stable international relations a prerequisite for the absence of external threat, the promotion of prosperity and the maintenance of internal stability" (French & Tjepkema 2010, p. 4). Because of the Dutch political tradition of negotiation and compromise "a legalistic/normative order" became fundamental in dealing with more powerful nations and "explains the strong Dutch emphasis on both international rule of law and ethics" (French & Tjepkema 2010, p. 4). The Dutch NATO membership is also confirmed as a means to have influence in dealing with stronger nations on the continent (De Wijk & Van Ham 2005, p. 9). With an constitutional amendment to promote international order the Dutch have been military involved in more than a dozen significant and an even higher number of less prominent peacekeeping operations for the last forty years. Actively trying to improve the world is considered by some authors even a part of the Dutch self image (Biehl et al. 2013, p. 264).

The Dutch had been involved in peacekeeping on the Balkans since 1992 which is mostly remembered by the dramatic events that took place in Srebrenica in 1995. In July 1995 Bosnian-Serb military forces started an offensive against a Bosnian-Muslim enclave located around the town of Srebrenica. The enclave was designated a safe area by the UN and protected by a Dutch peacekeeping battalion. As Muslim refugees kept pouring in looking for safety Bosnian-Serb forces increased pressure on the enclave cornering the Dutch and the

frightened population. After five days the Dutch battalion, feeling completely outgunned and outmanned, surrendered and subsequently withdrew from the enclave. Not before long it became clear that, after the Dutch troops had left, the Bosnian-Serbs had shot almost all Muslim men in Srebrenica totaling up to 7.000 killed (NIOD, 2002; Priest 2003, p. 261). These horrific events led to an international and national outcry and feelings of embarrassment and guilt were felt collectively throughout the nation (Giphart, 2000). The Srebrenica affair eventually resulted in a Dutch parliamentary enquiry, a Dutch cabinet resignation and multiple lawsuits against the Dutch state and Dutch military commanders.

This historical event clearly had an effect on Dutch strategic culture. The same year the tragedy took place the Dutch government, determined never to repeat the Srebrenica scenario again, formulated strict criteria which any future military deployment had to meet. Among others it was stated that Dutch involvement in international peacekeeping operations was no longer to be taken for granted. Furthermore there needed to be a clear command structure, solid and unambiguous agreements with international partners, plainly formulated and feasible mission goals and the mission needed to have a fixed end date (Politiek en Parlement, 1998). When an eventual participation of Dutch ground troops in Kosovo became apparent (the Dutch had already participated in the NATO air campaign against Serbia) the Dutch were resolutely sticking to their checklist and were keen on the safety of their military personnel. The Dutch would only participate under a clear UN mandate and under the strict condition that American ground forces would also be deployed (Politiek en Parlement, 1998). When the green light eventually was given the Ministry of Defense made sure it kept its troops under a tight grip determined never to repeat the disastrous events of 1995 (Zaalberg 2005, p. 320).

4.4.1 The Dutch in Kosovo

As part of the German-led MNB-South the Dutch (artillery) battalion was initially planned as a rear-echelon (fire) support unit for the German brigade and placed under German command (Zaalberg 2005, p. 299). The MNB was planned to be centered around the town of Prizren, the second largest town of Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p. 297). But as it happened just one day after entering Kosovo it was decided that the entire Dutch battalion was to be redirected to the town of Orahovac. With a large Serb minority living in Orahovac and strong KLA positions around it, it was negotiated that the Dutch would be tasked to provide protection for the Serbs (Zaalberg 2005, p.300). While still under German command which was located in Prizren, the Dutch were virtually on their own in Orahovac. So instead of a rear echelon support role they were now made responsible for a municipality of 65.000 people (Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). This was the beginning of what was to be called Task Force Orahovac.

4.4.2 Security Operations

Although the first days in Orahovac were relatively quiet compared to other parts of Kosovo this quickly changed and before long all operational activities were focused on providing basic public security (Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). And while no proof was found it was organized, arson and looting started on a large scale soon after the Serbian forces had left the area (Zaalberg 2005, p. 314). According to Friesendorf (2009) “The Dutch, with the shadow of Srebrenica over them, tried to establish a modicum of order” (p. 94). Thus in a matter of days all troops that could be spared, including cooks and mechanics, were put on the streets in an

effort to stop the chaos (Van Loon 2002, p. 119). Patrolling both on foot and in vehicles the troops were occasionally confronted with cases of maltreatment and theft (Van Loon 2002, pp. 119-120; Zaalberg 2005, p. 302). But compared with some other MNB's there were only very few threats made directly to the soldiers. Van Loon (2002) points out that although caught criminals were not happy, much went in an atmosphere of mutual respect (p. 121). After six weeks twenty German and some twelve Dutch military police took over most of the policing (Zaalberg 2005, p. 326). When the UN finally took over in October, 75 arrests had been made by Task Force Orahovac (Van Loon 2002, p. 121; Zaalberg 2005, p. 336). Besides the humanitarian aspect another reason to take on public security was to deny the KLA the opportunity to act as the new Kosovo police force. This was the ambition of the KLA but was considered an extremely undesirable option (Van Loon 2002, p. 120).

Initially the KLA was left alone and was only disarmed after the disarmament agreement on the 21st of June. And this was firstly only enforced in the town itself as there were too few troops to also police the countryside (Zaalberg 2005, p. 305). And although the KLA was generally cooperative the Kosovo gun culture sometimes necessitated to show military muscle in the shape of a tank to persuade local powerbrokers to hand in weapons or dismantle a checkpoint without loss of face (Zaalberg 2005, p. 307). But nevertheless Zaalberg (2005) remarks that "The Dutch soldiers had an overall good-natured and relaxed attitude and were often seen joking with most of the population as they patrolled the streets, which tended to charm the Albanian majority" (p. 329). But more pregnant, according to Van Loon (2002) it was only for the Dutch effort in Orahovac that the Serb minority was saved from the worst of consequences in the first months of KFOR's deployment (p. 119).

As described above the Dutch immediately responded to the civil unrest by deploying every available soldier on patrol in order to restore order. Compared with the Americans and the British they had the highest number of arrests but the smallest number of military police. They did disarm the KLA but not before the agreement was made and had insufficient troops to enforce this in the countryside. The Dutch score high on security operations.

4.4.3 CIMIC

When planning for the mission initially no CIMIC activity was foreseen as the Dutch were expected only to serve as fire support for the German brigade. And although the general idea was that CIMIC was actually something for specialists, two artillery officers were later appointed as CIMIC-officers (Van Loon 2002, p. 117). The initial low priority given to CIMIC is also indicated by the fact the Dutch had no translators with them when entering Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p. 326). In addition of the two CIMIC-officers, a few days after entering Orahovac two senior non-commissioned officers were put in charge of what was to be called the 'complaints bureau'. At this location the population could tell their stories and voice their complaints which took away a lot of anger and frustration (Van Loon 2002, p.120). Zaalberg (2005) confirms this and adds that "The 'complaints bureau' turned out to be one of the most fruitful initiatives of the operation "(pp. 326-327). With basic public security on an acceptable level after a few months the Dutch were now expanding their efforts to other terrains and a start was made with the setting up of a municipal administration. Under Dutch KFOR auspices Serbian and Albanian administrators were gradually set to work and clear out the mess (Van Loon 2002, p. 122). Also garbage collection, water and power supply and even

assisting the distribution of food supplies was initiated or assisted by Dutch KFOR-troops (Van Loon 2002, p. 123). In fact:

Most of the city's public services were either already being run by KFOR, operated in coordination with international governmental agencies or NGOs, or delegated to local staff after having been initiated by the Dutch. In order to operate effectively and assure access to all ethnic groups, basic public services such as the fire department and the hospital were under military control for the time being (Zaalberg 2005, p. 386).

There truly seemed to be no limit as even "An attempt was made to jump-start production in the local wine factory and the plastic factory by using some of the military's vast logistical capabilities" (Zaalberg 2005, p. 387). Although the two designated CIMIC officers played an important role subsequently the whole battalion was actually performing CIMIC on a daily basis (Van loon, 2002). Without proper training and with a lot of improvisation this was absolutely not what they had expected to be doing when they entered Kosovo (Zaalberg 2005, p.330). Nevertheless their efforts seemed to be held in high regard by the UNHCR (Van Loon 2002, p 126). The Dutch, despite having probably the smallest CIMIC detachment of all nations, had just like the British almost all their officers and men performing CIMIC. But instead of the British, the Dutch went out of their way to assist and often run local government functions. The Dutch clearly score high on CIMIC.

4.4.4 Force Protection

Surprisingly little information is available regarding the way the Dutch handled their force protection in Kosovo. Like all KFOR troops entering the province in June 1999 they were prepared for violent encounters with the Serbian forces and possibly the KLA. As part of the German MNB, who put the same excessive emphasis on force protection as the Americans, the Dutch initially went in heavy and conventional (Mockaitis 2004, p. 19). But although the Dutch were wearing helmets and armored vests in the first chaotic months in Orahovac this is never mentioned again in later reporting (Zaalberg 2005, p. 312). Interestingly the Dutch, though formally part of the German MNB with its high level of German force protection, seemed to have quickly adapted to the relatively permissible environment. Soon all efforts of Task Force Orahovac were focused on CIMIC activities which were unlikely to have taken such proportion with a strong emphasis on force protection. The absence of any reporting mentioning force protection after the first months in Orahovac probably indicates that this was hardly an issue at all. Consequently the Dutch score low on force protection.

4.4.5 Case analyses

In 1995 the Dutch were confronted with a worst case peacekeeping scenario in Srebrenica which led to national feelings of embarrassment and guilt. These sentiments instigated Dutch political decision makers, adamant never to be put in a Srebrenica-like situation again, to quickly formulate strict criteria which were to be met when considering future peacekeeping operations. With Srebrenica fresh in mind the Dutch were at first reserved and cautious when it came to troop deployment in Kosovo. Ultimately Dutch troops were only to be committed for one year and initially just as rear echelon support troops under German command. When the Dutch, much to their own surprise, quickly were made responsible for the security of the Serbian minority in Orahovac, they nonetheless did not need much encouragement to make

the best of it. Based on the available sources it is however quite hard to assess the initial Dutch threat perception. The fact that they first only opted for a support role implies that they wanted to avoid any 'frontline' responsibility which could indicate a high threat perception. This would likely be related to their Srebrenica experience.

Scoring high on security operations could be also be linked to the Srebrenica experience as the Dutch were resolute that they would now do everything to prevent civilian casualties under their responsibility. With regard to CIMIC, although initially very low on the agenda as they had planned for their support role, the Dutch quickly embraced the British model making every soldier responsible for CIMIC. It obviously differed from the British in that the Dutch almost literally took over or strongly supported all public services in the municipality whereas the British focus on personal contact and negotiation instead. With regard to force protection it is most probably that this got a low priority after the first few months in the mission and the situation calmed down. Scoring high on security operations, high on CIMIC and low on force protection is typical for the vacuum-filler approach. It does however imply a low threat perception which is actually difficult to explain with regard to the effects of Srebrenica on the Dutch strategic culture. It is probable that their approach, at least for some part, could be attributed to the relative permissiveness of the operational environment. Both Zaalberg and Van Loon confirm the relative safety of Orahovac after the initial first months, especially when compared to other sectors.

5 Conclusion

The Americans show that the tragic events in Somalia, that were experienced as a painful military defeat, quickly influenced its strategic culture resulting in great reluctance regarding humanitarian or peacekeeping interventions and above all a strong aversion of casualties. And whereas six years later the American public seemed to be sensitive for the suffering of the Kosovar Albanians and a majority favored sending ground troops, the American leadership was dragging its feet. When American troops were eventually sent the political and military leadership's main goal seemed above all to avoid American casualties. This led to a minimalist approach with regard to the security gap in Kosovo. In turn the generally positive recent British military experiences, which had an ingrained notion of accepting casualties, led to strategic culture of robust self confidence that had a far more 'outgoing' approach than the Americans with regard to the security gap. This led to an overall vacuum-filler approach. As a result of the national trauma caused by the events in Srebrenica the Dutch initially were very reluctant when it came to consider a possible new military adventure on the Balkans. When Dutch troops were ultimately deployed in Kosovo it was under closely guarded conditions and they were initially only to perform rear echelon duties. When circumstances dictated that they were to take on a far greater responsibility than anticipated, namely the protection of a large number of civilians, the Dutch gave it their best effort without hesitation. This is likely attributed to their strong desire never to repeat a Srebrenica like scenario which had left deep scars of embarrassment but above all guilt in their strategic culture. However, in addition it must be noted that the relative permissiveness of the operational environment did facilitate this extravert approach.

It could be argued that the operational environment was not equal in the three sectors. And there are indications that the aggression towards the Serbian minority was more intense in

American sector, whereas the Dutch sector was known to be relatively permissible. In the American and British cases it is however unlikely that this would have significantly influenced the outcome of the analyses. This because the Americans maintained a strong force protection posture long after the situation in their area had calmed down. Regardless of the actual threat, their threat perception remained high. The British, as stated earlier, simply adjust their posture to the environment so this would not have significantly influenced the outcome of the analyses either. The interesting question remains what the Dutch reaction would have been when confronted with a more hostile environment. Would they, as reflected in their initial reluctance, perhaps would even have abandoned the mission adhering to their political and military abort criteria? Or if they had stayed, would they then had focused primary on their own protection? Or would they, fuelled by the burden of guilt, have also done their utmost best to protect the civilians with less regard for their own safety? Both options could be plausibly explained with regard to their Srebrenica experience.

So does the theory of Social Constructivism/Strategic Culture explain the difference in the way similar armies deal with a security gap? In the case of the American and the British clearly yes. Relatively recent defeats as well as victories are shown to affect a nation's strategic culture leading to related behavior. In the Dutch case the outcome is somewhat ambiguous as stated earlier. Circumventing this indefinite outcome by classifying the events in Srebrenica as an experience of defeat rather than of an experience of guilt would still not have explained their high score on security operations and CIMIC and low score on force protection. Lastly it would be interesting to further investigate if there is a divergence in the strategic culture as embodied in the general public and that embodied in the political and military decision makers. This situation is suggested in the American case and is also part of the notion of second generation scholars of strategic culture.

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