Pegida under closer scrutiny: How a regional protest movement evolved into a pan-European phenomenon

Leiden University

Dr. Anne-Isabelle Richard

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Guy Hoeks

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Introduction

EU leaders are currently facing a widespread refugee crisis. In order to address the crisis as a common European challenge, individual member states need to take their responsibilities for refugees and fellow member states. While politicians on both the European and national level are looking for concrete steps and solutions, resistance against the reception of refugees has been growing increasingly. Anti-immigration protest groups as Pegida in Germany are literally on the march spreading a message that includes calling a halt to immigration from non-Western states into the EU. Supporters of Pegida call themselves patriots against the 'Islamisation' of the West. In order to get a better understanding of the movement, this study will give a close examination of Pegida, the refugee crisis and the EU in relation with the German media. Furthermore, the position of these media towards the Dresden-based media will be scrutinised and investigated to what extent the former affects the latter.

Looking at the structure, the thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 will set out the story behind Pegida, what the movement precisely stands for in terms of its complaints against non-Western immigrants, who the figureheads are, why it organises its Monday night marches, and where the turnout is largest. As Pegida promptly emerged as a movement led by citizens, this chapter also explains the different concepts of social movements and seeks to classify Pegida in order to identify the movement rationales. Since the refugee crisis has already exposed that national governments are incapable of resolving the issue of refugees alone, EU member states need to collaborate to preclude the crisis from getting worse. The EU has been heavily criticized for either doing too little or for being powerless to rightly address the inflow of refugees attempting to reach Europe.

Chapter 2 therefore explores the locus of Pegida in relation with the refugee crisis and the EU. Firstly, the chapter will delve into the current situation against the backdrop of the refugee crisis and how the EU attempts to take control over the present problems. The concept and definition of Euroscepticism will then be touched upon as well as an essential part of the academic debate on Euroscepticism. Subsequently, it will be assessed to what extent Pegida is a Eurosceptic movement, mapping out the areas which Pegida particularly focuses on.

Zooming in on the implications of Pegida's quick rise, chapter 3 will introduce an online content analysis examining to what extent the image of the Dresden-based

movement is shaped or affected – either positively or negatively - by *Bild* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SDZ). By choosing these two newspapers, this chapter keeps an important facet in mind. Bild and SDZ are respectively the largest national boulevard newspaper and the biggest subscription daily newspaper in Germany. Clearly, this will not fully cover all of the readers in Germany, but it provides an appropriate representation of German readerships in the framework of this research. By selecting and scrutinising online news articles, an online media content analysis will be conducted in which the use of language regarding the articles' content, headlines and (sub) headings will be singled out and analysed. Accordingly, employing such an online content analysis would be the most effective means to investigate the position of Pegida within two of the most influential German media.

Finally, the thesis concludes by answering the following research question: How can Pegida's evolvement be explained best and to what extent have Bild and SDZ contributed to or hampered the rise of the movement?

1. The emergence of Pegida as a protest movement

1.1. The rapid rise of a Dresden-born initiative

It is 10 October 2014 when Lutz Bachmann wanders through the streets of the city of Dresden when he comes across a pro-PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) demonstration. The woman who holds the microphone on the stage spreads a message including that the Kurds need be given weapons in order to defend themselves against Islamist terrorists.[1] The PKK– outlawed in Germany since 1993 - wanted to show solidarity with the citizens of Kobani, a city in Syria then recently bombed by the Islamic State (IS). Bachmann films the event with his mobile phone. As Bachmann later recalled, the demonstration inspired him, and the fundament of a protest movement was laid that night. At the same time, he was not at all supportive of the Kurdish cause being a fierce opponent of political rallies of outlawed foreign organisations. In his view, these demonstrations pointed out the danger of 'religious wars' on German streets. In other words, Germany should not get involved in 'non-German' or 'Islamic' conflicts. This notion would initially become one of the spear points of Pegida.[2] On that very same day, Bachmann, a butcher's son from Dresden and several times convicted for - among other things - burglary, posted the video on YouTube.[3] One day later he created the Facebook group called 'Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes' (Peaceful Europeans against the Islamisation of the West), which soon turned into Pegida. In very little time, the Facebook group changed into a popular meeting point. Ordinary people got in touch with nationalists linked to motorcycle clans and the notoriously right-wing fan groups of football club Dynamo Dresden.[4] Also, the organisational structure began to take form rapidly. Alongside Bachmann as the face of the 'Orga Team', Pegida soon encompassed twelve members, of which Kathrin Oertel, the only female member of Pegida who – as an exception – publicly

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[1] Wolf, Ulrich, Schneider, Alexander, Wolf, Tobias. 2014. "Pegida - wie alles begann." *Medium Magazin für Journalisten* (2): pp.16.

[2] Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?" *The Political Quarterly* pp.524.

[3] Hauser, Uli. *Wutbürger, die nicht reden wollen*. Stern, 15 December 2014 [last accessed 7 January 2016. Available from http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/die-koepfe-hinter-pegida--wutbuerger--die-nicht-reden-wollen-3472688.html.

[4] Maximilian Popp, Andreas Wassermann. Prying into Pegida: Where Did Germany's Islamophobes Come From? *Spiegel* 12 January 2015 [last accessed 1 April 2015. Available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/origins-of-german-anti-muslim-group-pegida-a-1012522.html 1012522.html. pp.2.

appeared in the Günther Jauch talk show on the national German television *Das Erste*, 'Hausmeister' (caretaker) and vice chef Rene Jahn and 'Pegida-Planer' (scheduler) Frank Ingo Friedemann, were the most important figures.[5]

The first rally took place on 16 October 2014, a Monday night, in the form of a 'Spaziergang' (walk) through the streets of Dresden, the capital of Sachsen. By chanting 'Wir sind das Volk' (we are the people) and choosing the Monday night to protest, Pegida hijacked the slogan of the 1989 protestors and placed itself into the tradition of the insurgence prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in East Germany.[6] Whereas only 350 people had come to the events by the end of October, Pegida attracted increasingly more people over the following weeks, not only in the centre of Dresden, but also in other places in Germany. Regional counterparts instantly popped up across the country, such as Bagida (Bayern), Bogida (Bonn), Bärgida (Berlin), Dügida (Düsseldorf), Pegida Frankfurt Rhein-Main, Legida (Leipzig), and Mügida (München). However, no other sister movement was able to equate the number of protestors that turned up in Dresden at its height. Shortly before Christmas, on 22 December 2014, approximately 17.500 people took part in the protest march in Dresden.[7] In the aftermath of the Islamist terrorist attacks on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the number of protestors mid-January even exceeded those numbers when Pegida attracted as many as 25.000 demonstrators at their marches. In response to the growing popularity of Pegida, counter-protests quickly emerged as well. Promoting the German 'Willkommenskultur' (Welcoming culture) and tolerance towards foreigners, NoPegida was one of these initiatives that outnumbered Pegida everywhere except in Dresden.[8] Criticisms of Pegida in the media soon followed as well. German newspapers as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on an online petition signed by more than 170.000 people against Pegida.[9] Also Bild published an article stating that eighty prominent Germans ranging from prominent

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[5] Machowecz, Martin. Busen, Bier und Islamismus. *Zeit*, 23 April 2015.

[6] Weiß, Volker. *Sind sie das Volk? Pegida – die Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 6 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. Available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " *Journal for Deradicalization* pp.179.

[9] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. *170.000 Unterschriften gegen islamfeindliche Bewegung*. 28 December 2014 [last accessed 25 November 2015. Available from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/pegida-170-000-unterschriften-gegen-islamfeindliche-bewegung-13343927.html.

politicians to famous actors and artists expressed their concern about the rise of Pegida and its alleged xenophobia and intolerance towards Muslims in Germany and refugees in general.[10] There was no doubt that Pegida opposed the arrival of Muslim refugees in Germany, but the underlying message remained rather vague. Supporters of Pegida, i.e. the people who took to the streets and raised their voice in the Monday night rallies, were only connected through a 'fear' of 'Islamisation' and Muslims infiltrating German society leading to a subsequent 'loss' of German culture and identity. Accordingly, the call for a movement programme became louder. Prior to the rally on 15 December 2014, Pegida published a movement paper of nineteen bulleted position statements on one page. The position paper included, inter alia, Germany's duty to take in war refugees and to give them asylum ('Das ist Menschenpflicht!' – That is a human duty!; point one), but the number of asylum seekers to Germany should be controlled based on a points system in line with Canadian and Swiss models (point six). It also put forward the preservation and protection of the Christian-Jewish 'Abendland' (the Occident or Western civilisation; point thirteen).[11]

As a result of the quick rise of Pegida and the many criticisms it provoked, various scholars began to scrutinise Pegida critically. Volker Weiß, a historian specialised in anti-Semitism and right-wing extremism in Germany, argued that Pegida's position paper depicted mostly positive formulations (i.e. in favour of refugees) regarding the acceptance of refugees calling for better integration measures and suggesting to apply the classic law-and-order strategy to themes such as the expulsion of asylum seekers and criminal refugees (point nine).[12] At the same time, it stood for progressive topics such as sexual self-determination (point twelve), which is traditionally strongly disapproved of within conservative and extreme-right wing circles. According to Weiß, Pegida therefore succeeded to create a position covering a wide range of subjects, which cannot only be associated with extreme right parties as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD).[13] However, with criticism mounting, the resistance against the Dresden-based movement grew as well. Whereas

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[10] Bild. *Nein zu Pegida!* 6 January 2015 [last accessed 25 November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/pegida/promis-sagen-nein-zu-pegida-39208948.bild.html.

[11] PEGIDA.*"Pegida Positionspapier"* 2014. [last accessed 20 December 2015. Available from http://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Weiß, Volker. *Sind sie das Volk? Pegida – die Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes.* Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 6 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. Available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes.

most German journalists and many scholars strongly condemned Pegida immediately, German politicians initially were more cautious in choosing their position. However, by the end of the year, Angela Merkel joined in the discussion about Pegida as well, sharing the abhorrence of the 'hate marches' in her New Year's speech.[14]

Together with the statements pointed out in the position paper, an oft-heard complaint of Pegida is that the elite have long forgotten about the 'ordinary' man as the 'political elitist' turn up in talk shows to only 'blather' about nothing but their own topics. Bachmann often adopts the rhetoric insisting that the political establishment has betrayed its voters by not paying attention to the concerns of the German citizen.[15] In response to the claim, Dietmar Hüser, Professor at Saarland University, draws the comparison with the Poujadist movement, a protest group in France at the time of the political crisis of the Fourth Republic in the 1950s, in which Pierre Poujade invoked a 'populist' rhetoric denouncing the critical state-citizen relationship in the hopes of winning the people's heart. One of the chief strategies copied by Pegida is the argument of implying to be non-political and hence standing by the ordinary people. According to Hüser, this is one of the reasons Pegida can be seen as a populist movement.[16] In addition, the contradiction of elite vs. the ordinary man could create a sense of solidarity, even strengthening the 'romantic' feeling of regional identity in times of globalisation. This exclusiveness was also reflected in the fact that Pegida refused to speak to the press - even though this media boycott was later largely abandoned.[17] As part of the obstinate anti-media campaign, Pegida put German media aside as 'Lüggenpresse' (lying press). The reason was simple: the media lied to the public and could therefore not be trusted. In line with this argument, Pegida suggested that people often feel misunderstood by what newspapers write and should

[14] Spiegel. *Neujahrsansprache der Kanzlerin: Merkel prangert Hass bei Pegida-Märschen an.* 31 December 2014 [last accessed 28 November 2015. Available from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/merkel-kritisiert-pegida-bei-neujahrsansprache-scharf-a-1010785.html#.

[15] Weiß, Volker. *Sind sie das Volk? Pegida – die Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes.* Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 6 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. Available from http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes.

[16] Maja Henke, Edward Lloyd 2015. "Protest und Populismus – eine schwierige Abgrenzung in Zeiten pegida von AfD und Pegida. Ein Bericht über die Tagung „Protestkultur – Populismus?" 2014 in der Akademie für politische Bildung Tutzing." Außen Sicherheitspolit pp.289.

[17] Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?" *The Political Quarterly* pp.525.

accordingly take a cautious stance towards the press.[18] That is why Bachmann and his companions usually did not give interviews, except for one time when Bachmann told Bild the 'exclusive' story of Pegida.[19] In January 2015, it however went wrong for Bachmann when he was forced to step down after a photo of him as Adolf Hitler leaked and went viral. Making even international headlines, the publication of the 'Hitler-selfie' soon fed on speculations about Bachmann's past, as he could not refute the racist allegations that flew around on the internet. This affair led to a split in the Pegida camp between, on the one side, Bachmann supporters and Oertel and Jahn on the other.[20] However, his absence did not last long as Bachmann returned as movement leader less than four weeks later.[21] Nevertheless, the Hitler-selfie was not without consequences. Ever since the photo was published, claims over Pegida's alleged radical right-wing character had been fuelled further, especially in the German media. Die Zeit asked which picture Pegida would suit best. It assumed that Pegida supporters did not perceive of themselves as fitting in with Germany's extreme right tradition, including (neo-) Nazism. Subsequently, Die Zeit rather spoke of 'extremism of the centre', coming up with an interesting explanation for Pegida's rise. In order to uncover possible culprits of Pegida's emergence, the Union of Sachsen should be blamed for being incapable of creating an atmosphere in which right-wing sentiments do not prevail. By pointing at the ultra-conservative radical-evangelical Bible belt, the newspaper accused local politicians of having contributed to the backwardness in every region of the south and the east of Sachsen.[22]

Despite a series of internal scandals, Pegida meanwhile knew how to keep its followers captivated. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo killings in January, Pegida experienced a short-lived revival, but the following weeks it appealed to fewer people as the number of protestors steadily diminished. Nonetheless, the movement attracted

[18] Matheis, Katharina. *„Wir sind alle rechts, na und?"*. Handelsblatt, 16 December 2014 [last accessed 29 November 2015. Available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pegida-demonstration-in-dresden-luegenpresse-halt-die-fresse/11121312-2.html. pp.2.
[19] Bild, Fischer, Christian. *Wir hören erst auf, wenn die Asyl-Politik sich ändert!* 1 December 2014 [last accessed 1 October 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/demonstrationen/pegida-erfinder-im-interview-38780422.bild.html.
[20] Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?" *The Political Quarterly* pp.526.
[21] Bild. *Er ist wieder da*. 22 February 2015 [last accessed 10 October 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/lutz-bachmann/wieder-pedida-chef-39878132.bild.html.
[22] Lühmann, Michael. *Pegida passt nach Sachsen*. Zeit, 16 December 2014 [last accessed 29 November 2015. Available from http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-12/pegida-dresden-politische-tradition.

special political attention and praise from one party in particular: Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Alexander Gauland, vice-president of the party, stated that the Paris attacks served as the evidence for the importance of Pegida's existence, declaring that traditional parties should take Pegida seriously. Gauland contended that the killings had exposed the vulnerability of the fundamental values, such as democracy, freedom of speech and press freedom.[23] The rapprochement to politics was further enforced through an initiative of Bachmann to recruit Tatjana Festerling, a former AfD party member from Hamburg, to stand for the mayoral elections of Dresden in June 2015. However, Festerling was not able to realise the political ambitions of Pegida's leader as she decided to withdraw her candidacy in the second round. According to Dostal, the low turnout during the elections demonstrated that people still felt disconnected from politics, and yet unhappy with points other than those raised by Pegida.[24] Notwithstanding the failed political mission, Pegida did not lose its attraction. After a few relatively calm months, the Pegida rallies, in fact, got a real boost by mid-October 2015. This time the movement staged its largest demonstration in months. Thousands of demonstrators (between 9.000 and 12.000 people) came together one week before the first anniversary of Pegida and declared their anger at the German government for taking in nearly one million refugees. During the rally, a few Pegida supporters held up small-scale gallows featuring two nooses and signs with the names of Angela Merkel and her vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel saying 'reserved'.[25]

1.2. Where does Pegida's 'Wut' come from?

As we already briefly touched upon, both in German media and through the work of scholars, Pegida has been described through an array of terms. Whether it be populist, far right, or even far right populist, Pegida appears to be difficult to label. According

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[23] Stern. *AfD sieht Pegida durch Pariser Terrorakt gestärkt*. 7 January 2015 [last accessed 30 November 2015. Available from http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/afd-sieht-pegida-nach-anschlag-auf--charlie-hebdo--gerechtfertigt-3468838.html.

[24] Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?" *The Political Quarterly* pp.526.

[25] Handelsblatt. *Radikal, radikaler, Pegida*. 13 October 2015 [last accessed 1 December 2015. Available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fluechtlingskrise-radikal-radikaler-pegida/12442380.html.

to Thran and Boehnke, Pegida is a "grassroot political protest movement"[26], whereas Dostal labels it as "a right-wing populist movement" that has led to "a split between national liberals and national conservatives".[27] Moreover, Nachtwey argues that the perception of Pegida's supporters as 'worried citizens' is not entirely incorrect. Nonetheless, they could be better seen as 'rechte Wutbürger' (right-wing angry citizens) originating from "the radicalisation of the centre".[28] Henke and Lloyd go one step further by arguing that the use of the term populism in relation with movements such as Pegida is likely to generate a more problematic standpoint, for it often disguises obvious racist or fascist traits within a certain group.[29] One thing is for certain, Pegida seeks to get rid of the extremist labels. At one of the demonstrations, Oertel proclaimed to the media in general: "Dear press, I have to disappoint you. We are a right-wing movement. We love our fatherland. But contrary to the left-wing extremists we do not throw stones and do not insult the police whom are of great support to us. The police shall be complimented tonight."[30] Thus, according to the leaders themselves, Pegida should be seen as a right-wing nation-loving movement. Yet, the movement continues to demonstrate some vague inconsistencies concerning the content of the programme, which makes it hard to label the movement as such. When comparing the one-page manifesto to the topics of the speeches, it is remarkable to see that they do not always correspond. This ambiguity explains itself in the fact that visiting speakers raised new subjects that did not feature in the manifesto, such as the critique of an anti-Russian bias in German mainstream media that was expressed by one of the speakers, but cannot be found in the paper. It is unclear whether all of these topics have gained the equal support of Bachmann and his companions. According to Dostal, the creation of the position paper has been done

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[26] Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?" *The Political Quarterly* pp.530.
[27] Dr. Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " *Journal for Deradicalization* pp.178.
[28] Nachtwey, Oliver. 2015. "Rechte Wutbürger." Blätter für deutsche und international Politik: pp.82.
[29] Maja Henke, Edward Lloyd 2015. "Protest und Populismus – eine schwierige Abgrenzung in Zeiten pegida von AfD und Pegida. Ein Bericht über die Tagung „Protestkultur – Populismus?" 2014 in der Akademie für politische Bildung Tutzing." Außen Sicherheitspolitik pp.291.
[30] Matheis, Katharina. *„Wir sind alle rechts, na und?"*. Handelsblatt, 16 December 2014 [last accessed 29 November 2015. Available from http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pegida-demonstration-in-dresden-luegenpresse-halt-die-fresse/11121312-2.html. pp.2.

to appeal to mainstream conservatives as well as to avoid criticism of the movement as extremist.[31]

In order to further scrutinise Pegida and its origins, it is important to look at the relationship between culture and social movements. Both terms are closely linked and therefore often used to analyse each other. Kidd gave a simple definition of culture including "the way of life of a group of people". He continued by arguing that it is "the pattern of social organisation and the 'normal' ways in which we are expected to behave in society touches upon all aspects of our daily lives", adding one important side note: "Not all cultures are the same."[32] Culture is also related to another key word, identity. However mentioned in the previous section, it is useful to discuss it here in more detail. Identity relates to "how we think about ourselves as people, how we think about other people around us, and what we think others think of us".[33] Though frequently linked in sociology, culture and identity should not be conceived as the same. While the former represents the macro pattern, i.e. the bigger picture, the latter is more focused on micro meanings, which are the individuals.[34] The learning of a culture – i.e. the process whereby the traditions of a community are passed down the generations – that is known as socialisation, plays an important role in this analysis.[35] A combination of socialisation, culture and identity allow us to discuss how people behave within a social movement as Pegida. As already mentioned, the 'Abendland ideology' can be seen as one of the key pillars of the position paper. Pegida's definition of the Abendland includes reference to the Judeo-Christian values that are regarded indispensable parts of Germany culture and identity. According to Thran and Boehnke, this ideology is a value-based way to construct an 'imagined community', putting it in Benedict Anderson's classic definition of a nation.[36] Seeing things through this paradigm, all foreigners are, in principle, considered not capable to be part of this community - irrespective of their intentions - since their 'national identity' does not comply with the moral order that is imagined to exist in the national community.[37] According to Thran and Boehnke, Anderson's ideas can be applied to

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[31] Dostal, Jörg Michael. 2015. "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?" *The Political Quarterly* pp.525.
[32] Kidd, Warren. 2002. *Culture and Identity* 1th ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp.5-6.
[33] Ibid. pp.7.
[34] Ibid. pp.7.
[35] Ibid. pp.16-17.
[36] Dr. Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " *Journal for Deradicalization* pp.192.
[37] Ibid. pp.190.

Pegida's critical stance on themes such as immigration, asylum and 'Islamisation' serving as an explanation of it.[38] On the other hand, one could ask why Pegida's ideology thrives so much in Dresden. Prof.dr. Harmut Rosa, of the Friedrich-Schiller-University in the east German city of Jena, addressed the question in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of why it is possible that – of all people - citizens of Dresden and surroundings feel like strangers in their own country with a immigrant percentage of below three of which 0,1 Muslim. Rosa blamed the failed adaptions of the East-German citizens to the West-German institutions and structures after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As a consequence, East German citizens do not feel attached to these 'self-created' institutions lacking the connection to feel at home in the country they live. As a result, the 'response-axis' between mainstream politicians and large parts of the citizens in Dresden has broken down, as the political parties in general seem powerless to serve the people.[39] Arguably, the lack of connection could point out why East-German citizens tend to trust a local newcomer Pegida rather than the existing mainstream parties in the region. These citizens, consequently, feel invigorated by the strong anti-establishment message instigating anger and disbelief towards the traditional political system.

1.3. Digital promotion of activism

For the sake of a better understanding of the functioning of Pegida, shortly considering the history of social movements from the second half of the twentieth century is needed. As the late Charles Tilly argued, history helps to explain why particular social movements adopted certain elements that differentiate them from other sorts of social movements.[40] Sociologists have seen a particular shift of activities and interests over the course of time. Whereas social movements in the 1960s promoted ardent political reformism and unconventional protest objectives, Su H. Lee suggested that social movements - over the decades – became "more identity-oriented and localised collective articulations of interests, issues, and needs relating

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[38] Dr. Malte Thran, Lukas Boehnke, and 2015. "The value-based Nationalism of Pegida " *Journal for Deradicalization* pp.178.
[39] Rosa, Harmut. "Fremd in eigenen Land?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 April 2015.
[40] Tilly, Charles. 2004. *Social Movements, 1768-2004*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. pp.3.

more directly to everyday life and values".[41] Furthermore, Su H. Lee argued that what had previously been non-political and non-public areas of identity, difference and lifestyle, all became the contentious subjects of social movements. Today grassroots collective protests are a widely known and visible phenomenon, whereby some of them remain inconspicuous and therefore less newsworthy to the public, because they perform at the local level with often single-issue statements. The additional features of such social movements are locally informal ties, loosely affiliated centres, and encompassing heterogeneous political demands and identities. Su H. Lee suggested that these autonomous groupings require relatively high levels of commitment, expertise, and informal networks.[42] Ostensibly, these three aspects drive Pegida. While Pegida expects its supporters to commit to march every Monday night, visiting speakers need to rely on a certain degree of knowledge in order to speak to the audience (such as the Dutch politician Geert Wilders who held a speech in April 2015[43]), and Bachmann initially used his personal network to get people mobilised ("ninety per cent was a close circle of friends").[44] Su H. Lee defined these New Social Movements (NSMs) as collective protests of grassroots citizens activism including "citizens who translate the routines of life into extraordinary activism whereby the identities they constitute form the infrastructures of NSMs in practice and in theory".[45] Furthermore, much academic work - by among others Kolb - has been done on the implications of social movements in terms of its successes and failures. In other words, the relationship between what protestors do, in which context they do it, and the varying responses of the government have frequently been examined.[46] In order to further clarify the position of Pegida regarding social movements, it makes sense to also examine social movement organisations (SMOs) as these organisational groups are usually part of social movements and aim to challenge the normal

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[41] Lee, Su H. 2007. *Debating New Social Movements. Culture, Identity, and Social Fragmentation*. Lanham: University Press of America. pp.3.
[42] Ibid. pp.3.
[43] Zeit. *Wilders-Auftritt mobilisiert einige Tausend Pegida-Anhänger*. 13 April 2015 [last accessed 1 December 2015. Available from http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-04/pegida-geert-wilders-dresden-auftritt.
[44] Wolf, Ulrich, Schneider, Alexander, Wolf, Tobias. 2014. "Pegida - wie alles begann." *Medium Magazin für Journalisten* (2): pp.16.
[45] Ibid. pp.16.
[46] Kolb, Felix. 2007. *Protest and Opportunities: The Political Outcomes of Social Movements*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. pp.22.

democratic political process.[47] The main difference between NSMs and SMOs is that the former focuses more on the practical notion of staging a demonstration or other forms of action in order to promote social change, whereas the latter is thought to espouse a systematic approach to coordinate the movement's direction. [48] Nevertheless, NSMs and SMOs are often used together within academic research. Since its foundation, Pegida has frequently stated that it primarily endeavours to change certain aspects of the political environment, with special reference to German policies on immigration and integration. Concerning these latter issues, Bachmann expressed his fear over the 'Glaubenskriegen auf deutschem Boden' (religious wars in Germany) making the repulsion of the IS fighters one of Pegida's focal points.[49] Within the organisational framework of SMOs, a NSM is often employed as the mobilising strategy, which represents collective vehicles – both informally and formally – to engage people in collective action.[50] An example of such collective vehicles will be given in in the next paragraph, as this closely relates to Pegida's tactic.

Having examined SMOs and NSMs, it should be stressed that Pegida as a movement contains more than what they both represent. Given the various examples of successful digital media strategies of social movements, Pegida is certainly not a unique phenomenon. During the Arab Spring in 2011, digital media became the main tool that allowed social movements to rise up against regimes, even as these authoritarian governments executed counter-strategies through the same social canals to supress political dissent.[51] Furthermore, Germany has experienced a rich history of activism and involvement of citizens. Perhaps needless to say, there have been some social movements which Germans rather not associate with. Emanating from the ashes of Nazism, Germany saw an upsurge in extreme right-wing and violent neo-Nazi groups in the 1990s, especially youth under eighteen who wished to identify

[47] Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly. 1999. "Social Movements and Public Policy." In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.pp.3.
[48] Roberto Fernandez, Doug McAdam. 1988. "Social Networks and Social Movements: Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer." *Sociological Forum* pp.358.
[49] Andrea Dernbach, Frank Jansen, Albrecht Meier, Hans Monath, Martin Niewendick. *Die Angst vor dem Fremden*. Tagesspiegel, 9 December 2014 [last accessed 1 December 2015. Available from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/-pegida-bewegung-die-angst-vor-dem-fremden/11097382.html.
[50] Carty, Victoria. 2015. *Social movements and new technology*: Westview Press. pp.7.
[51] Philip Howard, Muzammil Hussain. 2011. "The Role of Digital Media." Journal of Democracy no. 22 (1): pp.36.

themselves with neo-Nazi rock music calling for violence and death to foreigners. German intelligence believed that there were 76 neo-Nazi groups including over 40.000 members across Germany in 1992. The Kohl administration therefore even adopted a legislation that included the ban of distributing neo-Nazi rock music in order to suppress right-wing extremism. Kohl was of the opinion that the particular sensitive topic of neo-Nazi revival in the form of music even transcended the debate on freedom of expression and therefore must to be tackled by the means of a prohibition.[52] A more recent example of social activism in Germany is Stuttgart 21, a large protest movement that disputed about a new railway station in the city of Stuttgart in 2013.[53] Yet, Pegida can be seen as a unique movement in Germany, as the country has never seen such an effective digital promoter of social and political change, even not Stuttgart 21. In the case of Pegida, the new information communication technologies (ICTs), including digital technology and social media, have been playing a significant role.[54] With the onset of the digital revolution in 2004, Carty argued that social movement scholars and academics have shifted their attention to the new range of tools that activists have at their disposal.[55] As Bachmann stated, the use of Facebook has been key for the promotion of Pegida. Without his 'social' network on Facebook, Bachmann would not have had a collective vehicle to make Pegida a success.[56] Via the social platform, Bachmann and his companions extensively communicate and disseminate information about, for instance the walks on Monday night, but they also share relevant news articles and documents concerning immigration and integration issues. A good example of Pegida's mobilising strategy is the post on Facebook on 5 October 2015, which shows a short clip of Pegida supporters collectively chanting a German song and waving black-red-yellow flags of Germany. The post is viewed 122k times, shared 2.325 times and liked by 5.050 people.[57] This denotes the immense success of the use of Facebook, taking into consideration the ostensible ease of targeting, reaching and mobilising a

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[52] Jacobs, David. 1993. "The ban of neo-Nazi music: Germany takes on the neo-Nazis." Harvard International Law Journal no. 34 (2).
[53] Rabea Haß, Hanna Hielscher, Dennis Klink 2014. "Germany—A Movement Society? An Investigation of Non-activism." *Journal of Civil Society* pp.353.
[54] Carty, Victoria. 2015. *Social movements and new technology*: Westview Press. pp.1-3.
[55] Ibid. pp.7.
[56] Wolf, Ulrich, Schneider, Alexander, Wolf, Tobias. 2014. "Pegida - wie alles begann." *Medium Magazin für Journalisten* (2): pp.16.
[57] PEGIDA. Facebook, 5 October 2015 [last accessed 1 December 2015. Available from https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden.

vast group of people, without high financial burdens. Examining Pegida's tactical brain, the movement could be defined best as a merger of the NSM and SMO, having the extraordinary activism to promote social and political change of the former and the organisational structure of the latter, upon a highly efficient mobilising strategy through social media input.

1.4. Conclusion

Due to unconventional ways of promoting the controversial theme of the 'Islamisation' of Germany, Pegida has been a conspicuous movement right from the start of its existence. Popular media and prominent figures from different backgrounds expressed their concern about Pegida in terms of largely condemning Pegida's message of 'prejudices of and hate towards Muslim refugees'.[58] As the academic debate on how to define Pegida is rather diffuse, various scholars proposed several ways in order to label Pegida that were usually translated into terms such as extreme right, right-wing or populist right-wing. This is partly the effect of the confusion Pegida has created in terms of the different topics that were brought up at the marches and the written content of the manifesto. Several speakers chose to discuss topics, as German's external relations with Russia, rather than presenting thoughts on the issues outlined in the position paper. It remains unclear whether this has been done intentionally in order to distract the attention from its alleged extremist character. The confusion nevertheless sparked a thorough discussion among various actors on Pegida's sincere character. Placing the Dresden-based movement in the tradition of protest movements in Germany, Pegida is certainly not a unique phenomenon in the context of social movement studies. Yet, the digital opportunities at hand including the potential communicative power of social media positively enhance the means of disseminating information and promoting objectives in a sophisticated way. As a result, Pegida relies on Facebook as a strong collective vehicle which enforces its mobilising strategy, making the Dresden-based movement a peculiar protest movement.

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[58] Spiegel. *Neujahrsansprache der Kanzlerin: Merkel prangert Hass bei Pegida-Märschen an*. 31 December 2014 [last accessed 28 November 2015. Available from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/merkel-kritisiert-pegida-bei-neujahrsansprache-scharf-a-1010785.html#.

2. The triangle of Pegida, the refugee crisis and the EU

Whereas previous chapter unveiled the story and motives behind Pegida, mostly in a national context, this chapter will link the Dresden-based movement to Germany's political situation within Europe and examine the relationship to the EU.

2.1. Refugee crisis leaves EU states divided

The EU is struggling to find an agreement on how to handle the refugee crisis. Thousands of refugees are trying to find their way to Europe, by sea (arriving in Spain, Portugal, Lampedusa, Malta, Sicily, Greece etc.) and over land borders (Bulgaria, and even via Russia to non-EU state Norway). Many of them fled civil wars in Syria and Libya, political oppression or armed conflicts.[59] According to EuroActiv – which based its conclusions on findings of German magazine Die Welle, approximately 1.28 million illegal immigrants were recorded to have entered the EU between January and November 2015.[60] Some prominent European figures like the Greek Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, spoke of the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War.[61] When looking at violent break-ups related to post-war Europe in the past, the number of refugees in the current crisis, however, does not surpass the exodus from the former Yugoslavia displacing millions of people and killing hundreds of thousands throughout the 1990s.[62] Nevertheless, EU member states appeared heavily divided over the issue of taking in refugees. That was the occasion for the European Commission to take action and to release the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015. By calling for a set of measures and a consistent common policy, the Commission aimed to "restore confidence in our [the EU's] ability to bring together Europeans and national efforts to address migration, to meet

[59] Jesús Férnandez-Huertas Moraga, Hillel Rapoport. 2014. "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy." *CESifo Economic Studies* pp.638.

[60] EurActiv. *Illegale Grenzübertritte in der EU auf Allzeithoch*. 14 December 2015 [last accessed 10 December 2015. Available from http://www.euractiv.de/sections/eu-aussenpolitik/illegale-grenzuebertritte-der-eu-auf-allzeithoch 320392?__utma=1.349155260.1449048779.1450100292.1450104001.6&__utmb=1.5.9.14501040225 2&__utmc=1&__utmx=-&__.

[61] AFP. *EU says world facing worst refugee crisis since WWII*. The UN Refugee Agency, 16 August 2015 [last accessed 11 December 2015. Available from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=55d17e7b5.

[62] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2000. "War and humanitarian action: Iraq and the Balkans." In *The State of The World's Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.211.

our [EU's] international and ethical obligations and to work together in an effective way, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility".[63] Even if the number of refugees arriving in Europe is 'small' in comparison to those hosted by 'states of first asylum' outside the EU, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, it still appears a daunting task to share the refugee burden fairly among EU member states.[64] It mainly puts huge pressure on the states of first arrival, in accordance with the Dublin system that determines these EU states responsible to examine asylum applications, with thousands of refugees disappearing into 'illegality' somewhere in the Schengen area. The Commission stated that the Dublin system is to be revised in 2016.[65] Moreover, the European Agenda on Migration report consisted of ten so-called action points that pleaded for, amongst others, targeting criminal smuggling networks. The High Representative of the EU, Federica Mogherini, proposed options for possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to 'identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers'.[66] With the assistance of Frontex and Europol, this needed to be done by strengthening the JOT MARE mission that battles against refugee smuggling. Furthermore, a comprehensive permanent system will be set up to share the responsibility for large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers among member states. The first step was taken when the Commission came up with a legislative proposal in September 2015 to relocate 120.000 people 'in clear need of international protection'.[67] In response to the high volumes of refugees entering the EU, German Chancellor Merkel meanwhile took the lead and stated that all Syrian refugees are welcome ("Wir schaffen das") to Germany.[68] In both her own country and in other member states, Merkel's words provoked a wide variety of reactions. According to Ellis, a journalist of The Independent, this declaration was Merkel's 'Mother Teresa' moment, but could simultaneously entail the death knell for the EU as 'a non-imperial empire' (as former Commission President Barosso called it once), because a number of member states chose to close their borders rather than following

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[63] European Commission. 2015. A European Agenda on Migration. pp.2.
[64] Jesús Férnandez-Huertas Moraga, Hillel Rapoport. 2014. "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy." *CESifo Economic Studies* pp.638-639.
[65] European Commission. 2015. A European Agenda on Migration. pp.13.
[66] Ibid. pp.3.
[67] European Commission. *Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action*, 9 September 2015 [last accessed 11 December 2015. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm.
[68] Tina Hildebrandt, Bernd Ulrich. *Im Auge des Orkans*. Zeit, 20 September 2015 [last accessed 11 December 2015. Available from http://www.zeit.de/2015/38/angela-merkel-fluechtlinge-krisenkanzlerin/seite-4. pp.4.

the same pathway.[69] The division became more apparent at the EU summit on 22 September 2015 where the focus lay on strengthening the Union's external borders as well as overcoming the hostility of predominantly 'the Visegrad four', Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, who were adamant not to accept the Commission proposal for sharing the refugee burden.[70] Probably the most discussed issue in German media in October 2015 was the clash between Merkel, head of the conservatives (CDU), and her colleague Seehofer, leader of the conservatives in southern state of Bayern (CSU), who publicly criticized her open door policy opting for an emergency brake on refugee flows ("Mehr geht nicht").[71] As Seehofer addressed the Landtag parliament in Bayern in October 2015, he called for the set up of so-called transit zones, in which refugees are held at the border crossings to examine whether they are allowed to enter the Union.[72] According to Seehofer, if Merkel stuck to her generous political standpoint towards refugees, this would only enforce the popularity of 'anti-Islam movement' Pegida.[73] In an attempt to dissociate from the Dresden-based movement, Seehofer made Pegida suddenly the central topic at the parliamentary speech deploying it as an 'instrument of pressure' to push his own argument: if Merkel does not alter her policy, resistance against refugees will only rise and even worse things might happen.

2.2. How Pegida and the EU relate to each other

A striking thing about Pegida is that - despite people outside of Dresden ostensibly seem less sensitive to anti-Islam rhetoric given the lower turnouts in places such as Bonn and Düsseldorf[74] - Pegida has increasingly gained (mostly negative) attention from prominent politicians at the 'Bundeslevel', who openly reject the movement as

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[69] Ellis, Robert. *The EU is crumbling – and Turkey won't hold it together*. Independent, 9 December 2015 [last accessed 11 December 2015. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-eu-is-crumbling-and-turkey-wont-hold-it-together-a6766101.html.

[70] Robert, Aline. *EU summit to focus on roots of refugee crisis*. EurActiv, 23 September 2015 [last accessed 12 December 2015. Available from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/eu-summit-focus-roots-refugee-crisis-317864.

[71] Sturm, Daniel Friedrich. *Merkel und Seehofer? Ein Fall für Familientherapie*. Welt, 4 October 2015 [last accessed 12 December 2015. Available from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article147196939/Merkel-und-Seehofer-Ein-Fall-fuer-Familientherapie.html.

[72] BR24. *Seehofer warnt Merkel in Flüchtlingspolitik*, 20 October 2015 [last accessed 12 December 2015. Available from http://www.br.de/nachrichten/seehofer-merkel-pegida-100.html.

[73] Ibid.

[74] N-TV. *"Aufstand der Anständigen" beginnt*, 22 December 2014 [last accessed 12 December 2015. Available from http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Aufstand-der-Anstaendigen-beginnt-article14204926.html.

such. Following Merkel's line of reasoning, Thomas De Maizière, German Minister of Internal Affairs, sharply criticized Pegida in October 2015 setting the organisers aside as 'hard-core right-extremists'. This was in stark contrast to one year earlier when he rose in defence of Pegida supporters stating that he took their concerns seriously.[75] As a result, Pegida, which once started as a small regional initiative, has now evolved into a nation-wide discussed topic. It therefore brings back the question of what kind of movement Pegida is in terms of its geographical identity.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea of marches against the 'Islamisation' of Europe brought also people in other places to the streets, but it still remains unclear if Pegida can be labelled as a particular geographical phenomenon. According to Werz and Koschkar, Pegida is a Dresden, Sachsen, East German, pan-German, and even a pan-European phenomenon. They contended that Pegida is first and foremost a Dresden phenomenon, because there is hardly any place more conservative than Dresden where people tightly hold to the memory of the 'old' Dresden before the 1945 bombardments. Also, from the start Pegida supporters held up signs saying "Dresden zeigt, wie's geht" (Dresden shows how it works). Pegida can also be seen as a Sachsen phenomenon, for discontent with the Berlin centrum reigns as the slogan 'Wir Sind das Volk' copied from the 1989 protests insists. Furthermore, (the more radical) Legida in Leipzig - located in western part of Sachsen - demonstrates an almost equally strong commitment (compared to Dresden) to turn up at the marches. Pegida could also be regarded an East German phenomenon. As Prof.dr. Harmut Rosa already implied, protests like Pegida are more likely to take place in East Germany than in the western part of the country. Werz and Koschkar argued that it is due to the fact that East German citizens generally do not have a connection with religion, which could possibly lead to antipathy towards 'the other'. Furthermore, the missing link with (mostly Islam as) religion generates certain prejudice towards non-Christian (including Muslim) refugees. In addition, Werz and Koschkar concluded that places where there are relatively the fewest foreigners, the fear of foreigners usually is the strongest. In the case of East Germany, a large part of the citizens see foreigners as intruders endangering the unity of the region, resulting in a greater fear of 'Vereinigungsverlieren' (loss of unity). Pegida is thought be a pan-

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[75] Zeit. *De Maizière warnt vor Pegida*, 18 October 2015 [last accessed 13 December 2015. Available from http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-10/pegida-maiziere-innenminister-rechtsextremismus-islamfeindlichkeit.

German phenomenon as well, because there is the ubiquity of collective suspicion (both in the east and the west of Germany) towards the elitist politicians depicting the 'electoral gap' with particular parts of the population. Last but not least, Pegida can be conceived as a pan-European phenomenon, since the question of 'ungesteuerte' (uncontrolled) immigration sparked as much controversy as the fear of 'Europa von oben' (Europe from above). Though similar movements in Austria, Switzerland and Spain did not bring as many people to the streets as Pegida in Dresden, and as, to a lesser extent, in Leipzig.[76] Despite these sister movements vary in success and do not even come close to Pegida's popularity in Dresden, the Charlie Hebdo attacks do have instigated the emergence of dozens of new sister movements in other European countries, as France, Norway, Belgium, Spain and the UK, of which some appeared to spread the message effectively. At the start of February 2015, the Pegida UK Facebook page had been liked more than 12.000.[77] As reflected in the previous chapter, one should nevertheless take into account that Pegida's popularity, either abroad or in Germany, can be discernibly affected by unexpected events as the Charlie Hebdo killings, which to a great extent determine how many people turn up at the Monday night marches.

Clearly, Pegida has no longer limited itself just to Germany. By the end of January 2016, Bachmann and Festerling spoke in Roztoky, a small Czech town near Prague, where the Dresden-based movement brought the idea to life to organise an anti-Islam march across Europe on 6 February to be held in Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia.[78]Ascertaining that Pegida has, perhaps unconsciously, grown into a pan-European movement, it is interesting to examine closely how Pegida is related to the EU. The Dresden-based movement posted on its Facebook page on 10 September 2015 a new ten-bullet point programme entitled 'German asylum politics'. Although it seemed as if Pegida merely focused on national politics regarding the acceptance and integration of refugees in national context, terms such as 'Europe', 'EU', 'Brussels', 'the European Council' and the

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[76] Nikolaus Werz, Martin Koschkar 2015. *Regionale politische Kultur in Deutschland: Fallbeispiele und vergleichende Aspekte*: Springer pp.203-206.

[77] BBC. *Pegida in the UK: Don't believe the 'likes'*, 4 February 2015 [last accessed 22 February 2016. Available from http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-31117764.

[78] Meisner, Matthias. *PEGIDA plans anti-Islam demos across Europe*. EurActiv, 26 January 2016 [last accessed 22 February 2016. Available from https://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/pegida-plans-anti-islam-demos-across-europe/.

adjective 'European' [officials] are all together mentioned ten times. [79] When comparing this programme (henceforth named the 2015 programme) with the previously published manifesto (hereinafter referred to as the 2014 manifesto), both rest on mostly the same standpoints involving the EU to play a significant role. A returning remark in the 2015 programme concerns the issue of 'Islamisation'. In contrast with the 2014 manifesto, point eight reflects a more fierce argument against Muslim refugees insisting that the refugee crisis needs to be resolved through the adoption of Muslim refugees by 'wealthy Sharia-paradises' Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates, rather than EU states taking in non-Christian refugees. According to the 2015 programme, these 'stone-throwing and giant Sharia paradises' are better suited to accommodate the "crowds of Muslim asylum seekers, than a Europe of nonbelievers". [80] Furthermore, the 2015 programme appeared also more decisive in distributing refugees. While the 2014 manifesto advocated a European distribution key in terms of sharing equally the burden on all EU member states, the 2015 programme includes the call for an immediate stop for asylum seekers and the call for an urgent German asylum law (point one), setting a maximum of adopting 2,000 refugees per year instead of taking in one million refugees. [81] This demonstrates the radically altered locus of Pegida towards Germany's European course and the EU given the resolute rejection of the (Commission's) distribution key against the backdrop of the ongoing refugee crisis.

2.3. Pegida as a Eurosceptic movement

With the publication of the 2015 programme, Pegida has moved swiftly to become a one-issue protest movement: it appears that Pegida aims to address more intensively the issue of Muslim refugees, rather than focusing on points raised in the 2014 manifesto such as sexual self-determination (point twelve) and gender mainstreaming (point seventeen). A feasible explanation can be found in the fact that the EU and the members - despite joint efforts in the form of, among other things, the European

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[79] PEGIDA. *10 Forderungen an die deutsche Asylpolitik*, 10 September 2015 [last accessed 13 December 2015. Available from
https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden/posts/979362725435484:0.
[80] Ibid.
[81] PEGIDA. *10 Forderungen an die deutsche Asylpolitik*, 10 September 2015 [last accessed 13 December 2015. Available from
https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden/posts/979362725435484:0.

Agenda on Migration - still have not found an appropriate means to cope with the influx of refugees, of which Muslims are believed to form a considerable part. By zooming in on the relationship with the EU, Pegida has some critical remarks concerning the involvement of 'Brussels' in German migration and asylum politics. Reiterating a recurring issue, one indirect critique is that the EU should not resolve the issue within 'its own borders, but locally outside the Union' (point eight). Pegida's demand therefore is the immediate abolition of the Schengen area and the restoration of national borders as some EU states already started border controls (point two).[82] It is obvious that Pegida and the EU clearly do not think very much along the same lines, but to what extent can Pegida be conceived as an anti-EU or eurocritical movement? Before scrutinising this matter in relation with Pegida, it is useful to look at the definition of Euroscepticism and the academic background. Whereas Eurosceptiscim was already detected in the 1970s, it only appeared on the agenda of EU researchers in the mid-1990s a few years after the launch of the Maastricht Treaty. This coincided with the emergence of the debate on democratic deficit: the claim that supranational EU institutions led by bureaucratic technocrats fell short of fulfilling the principles of democracy.[83] According to Leconte, there was a certain correlation between the EU's democratic deficit and Euroscepticism; in fact, the latter was the consequence of the former. Various scholars studying Euroscepticism across the EU, amongst others Szczerbiak and Taggart, argued that in the build-up to the 2004 enlargement some important differences were revealed about how European integration was viewed. This perception culminated in the referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands one year later when a sign of 'popular disquiet with the EU' was expressed.[84] Whether it was to be the turning point in European integration or not, it is certainly an historical benchmark not particularly in favour of further European cooperation, and one that changed 'ever closer union' thinking among EU member states.

Emanating from the research on Euroscepticism by EU scholars two dominant schools arose, notably the Sussex School and the North Carolina School. Whereas

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[82] PEGIDA. *10 Forderungen an die deutsche Asylpolitik*, 10 September 2015 [last accessed 13 December 2015. Available from
https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden/posts/979362725435484:0.
[83] Leconte, Cécile. 2015. "From pathology to mainstream phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism debate in research and theory." *International Political Science Review* pp.251.
[84] Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart. 2008. *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.1-2.

Szczerbiak and Taggart belong to the first school, scholars such as Hooghe and Marks are attached to the latter. Both Szczerbiak and Taggart and Hooghe and Marks extensively examined and compared party-based Euroscepticism in European politics. Pegida might not be conceived as a political party, but it certainly touched upon a range of highly sensitive political topics, such as immigration and asylum. Hence, the analysis of party-based Euroscepticism can be applied on the Dresden-based movement. Without going too much into detail, it is useful to highlight some relevant aspects in the academic work that both schools stand for. [85] As the term Euroscepticism contained doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in general, Hooghe and Marks concurred with Szczerbiak and Taggart in perceiving Euroscepticism as holding an array of "critical positions on European integration, as well outright opposition".[86] In 'Opposing Europe?', which was published in two volumes, Szczerbiak and Taggart discussed the distinction between two types of Euroscepticism, what they coined 'Hard' and 'Soft Euroscepticism'. While Hard Euroscepticism encompasses "where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived", Soft Euroscepticism includes "where there is no principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense of 'national interest' is currently at odds with EU's trajectory".[87] According to Mudde, there, however, is some lack of clarity in constructing a clear division between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, examining whether it should be the quantity or quality of the opposed policies. In turn, Szczerbiak and Taggart claimed that it should rather be based on the scrutiny of 'the core parts of the European project', leaving the qualitative/quantitative issue open to discussion. [88] Although this explanation nevertheless is a bit vague, it simultaneously creates space to identify the core parts of the European project one prefers to focus on. In the case of Pegida, the

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[85] Mudde, Cas. 2012. "The comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus the North Carolina School." *East European Politics* pp.193.

[86] Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks. 2007. "Sources of Euroscepticism." *Acta Politica* pp.120.

[87] Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart. 2008. *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.7-8.

[88] Mudde, Cas. 2012. "The comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus the North Carolina School." *East European Politics* pp.197.

recurrent themes are asylum, immigration and integration (all three inextricably linked to 'Islamisation') being indispensable parts of the European project today. These are also closely related to the issue of refugees as discussed in the first section of this chapter. Instead of being a core part of the European project, the refugee crisis has rather developed into a core problem for the European project, because a large number of EU members appeared to be incapable or unwilling to manage the influx of refugees. In this respect, one could suggest that the refugee crisis has rather enforced Pegida's support in mostly the eastern part of Germany, as Pegida gained considerable support there. When examining both the 2014 manifesto and the 2015 programme, one, furthermore, sees a remarkable change of standpoint regarding the refugee crisis and the EU. Whereas the 2014 manifesto called for a common European distribution system for refugees and a fair way of sharing refugees among EU member states clearly in support of a distribution key (point four), the 2015 programme radically altered this viewpoint calling for the suspension of the Schengen Treaty and adopting an immediate German asylum 'emergency' law (point one and two).[89] Based on the alteration in the standpoint on refugees of the latter programme, it could even be argued that due to the refugee crisis Pegida opted for tougher measures in terms of not taking in any (Muslim) refugees and demanding a cap of refugees in general. An unconventional rally in Sachsen in October 2015 largely confirmed this 'in practice', as Pegida had mobilised thousands citizens in order to create 'a human border' against refugees arriving in the city of Sebnitz close to the German-Czech border.[90]

Thus, in the first instance, Pegida did not seem unsympathetic towards a 'European solution' of the distribution of refugees in terms of its explicit statement including being the 'patriots for Europe sharing equal rights and duties'.[91] Clearly, the 2014 manifesto took a critical stance on the current course of the EU, without fully rejecting the EU as a whole per se. This is in stark contrast to the statement in the 2015 programme, in which Pegida called for stricter controls of national borders

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[89] PEGIDA. "Pegida Positionspapier" 2014. [last accessed 20 December 2015. Available from http://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf.
[90] Welt. Tausende bilden *"lebende Grenze" gegen Flüchtlinge*, 5 October 2015 [last accessed 8 January 2016. Available from http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article147207351/Tausende-bilden-lebende-Grenze-gegen-Fluechtlinge.html.
[91] PEGIDA. 10 Forderungen an die deutsche Asylpolitik, 10 September 2015 [last accessed 13 December 2015. Available from https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden/posts/979362725435484:0.

and condemned the 'completely failed Dublin system which goes almost entirely at the cost of Germany'. As for the collaboration with other EU states, the programme, moreover, states that if there will be resistance against 'our German asylum policies'; Germany needed to answer by immediately leaving the EU.[92] This latter point implies that the Dresden-based movement in fact is far more Eurosceptic than previously pointed out. Based on the 2015 programme, conceiving 'patriotic' Pegida as a Hard Eurosceptic movement, however, would not be entirely accurate, since it pleads for the EU to work out a solution outside the Union's borders. Notwithstanding, Pegida indeed possesses elements of Hard Euroscepticism displayed by mainly the 2015 programme. In addition, Pegida certainly opposes the EU because the Union embodies a supranational 'enemy', which runs counter to Pegida's national interests (hard Euroscepticism). However, at the same time, the Dresden-based movement demonstrates characteristics of soft Euroscepticism given that the EU is seen as problematic as long as its development is in conflict with Pegida's interests.[93] Accordingly, one could conclude from this that Pegida was to support the Union if the latter would operate at the will of the movement.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter showed that the refugee crisis has left EU members heavily divided. Especially the matter of 'fairly' distributing refugees among each other provoked an immense outcry. To what extent the refugee crisis has enforced Pegida's popularity in terms of growing numbers of supporters is hard to tell. However, as also reflected in the previous chapter, attendance levels of Pegida marches did go up in times of growing numbers of refugees into Germany in the autumn of 2015. Apart from the probable correlation, it is clear that prominent national politicians labelled Pegida as dangerous to German society and to the country's position in EU politics. However it may be, Pegida increasingly gained more attention as an anti-establishment protest movement, to a great part due to the same politicians. By comparing a couple of relevant EU-related issue in the 2014 manifesto and the 2015 programme, it is

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[92] PEGIDA. 10 Forderungen an die deutsche Asylpolitik, 10 September 2015 [last accessed 13 December 2015. Available from https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden/posts/979362725435484:0.
[93] Aleks Szczerbiak, Paul Taggart. 2008. *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.8-9.

noticeable that Pegida radically changed its course on the Union. The refugee crisis laid bare that Pegida's standpoints are inextricably bound to the EU's policy on asylum and immigration and has simultaneously demonstrated that the movement drastically altered its position on allowing non-Christian (including Muslim) refugees into Germany. As a result of the change in direction of the 2015 programme, Pegida wholeheartedly expressed its strong disapproval of the EU present political course, even implying that Germany should implement its own asylum rules and abandon, amongst others, the Dublin system or rather leave the EU. Putting it in Szczerbiak and Taggart's distinction, it is remarkably evident to see that Pegida has shifted from a Soft Eurosceptic attitude to less EU-friendly stance incorporating elements of Hard Euroscepticism and focusing as a single-issue movement merely on the asylum, immigration and integration.

Chapter 3: How is Pegida portrayed in the German media?

As previous chapter captured the triangle of this thesis including Pegida, the refugee crisis and the EU, it is useful to place Pegida's development into a more specific context by looking at how Germany has dealt with refugees and asylum policies, and how the media generally report on the issue of immigration and asylum seekers in Germany, and Pegida, in order to find out to what extent media coverage affects the movement.

3.1. Understanding German's position on immigration

In order to get a hold of Germany's relationship towards immigrants, one should first capture the understanding of how media generally tend to report on migrant-related issues. According to Chouliaraki, this usually happens to be twofold. On the one hand, the refugee is defined as a sufferer who "raises the moral claim to cosmopolitan solidarity", whereas, on the other hand, refugees are often depicted as a threat who endangers the nation's unity.[94] In other words, there is ambivalence in perceiving the refugee in the media. Accordingly, the representation of the refugee as a 'speechless'

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[94] Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2012. "Between pity and irony: paradigms of refugee representation in humanitarian discourse." In *Migrations and the Media. Global crises and the media*, edited by Bernard Gross, Kerry Moore, Terry Threadgold. New York: Peter Lang. pp.14.

creature is a rather negative critique as it is attached to the notion of 'those who do not belong', while the 'utopian' agency of the refugee is seen as a critique of positive representation in terms of 'hopeful self-determination'. What both strategies of representations have in common, tough, is the fact that they seek to resolve the ambivalence of the refugee as an 'ethnic-political signifier', that brings together the 'common humanity' as a justification for acting upon the refugee's suffering.[95] Nevertheless, both representations have been accused of 'dehumanising' refugees given that they tend to conceal the real story behind refugees, "depriving each individual refugee of her/his own quality of humanity".[96] When looking at the post-war period in Germany, the subject of immigrants and refugees has always been a contentious one, especially after the reunification in 1989. The reunion of East and West Germany largely coincided with an upsurge of violence from mostly neo-Nazi related groups. Due to the high unemployment rate in the former East Germany, these groups were able to recruit new members and spread xenophobic sentiments mainly against Turks already living in Germany as a result of the labour recruitment contract between West Germany and Turkey in 1961.[97] The early 1990s saw a sharp increase of neo-Nazi assaults against – again - mostly the Turkish community resulting in 849 reported acts in 1991, a five-fold increase from the 1990 figures, to a doubled number of approximately 1,500 in 1992. Perhaps more alarming, it was thought that the spate of attacks in Mölln (November 1992) and Solingen (May 1993) more westwards, killing eight people, were inspired by events occurred in the east.[98] Among all the places where racist crimes were committed, the Sachsen city of Hoyerswerda probably became the most symbolic for the outright violence against immigrants and the ever-present neo-Nazi sympathies in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Neo-Nazi groups carried out a series of attacks on migrant dwellings during 1991 leading to a flight of migrants to Berlin and Niedersachsen. Subsequently, these

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[95] Chouliaraki, Lilie. 2012. "Between pity and irony: paradigms of refugee representation in humanitarian discourse." In *Migrations and the Media. Global crises and the media*, edited by Bernard Gross, Kerry Moore, Terry Threadgold. New York: Peter Lang. pp.14.-15.
[96] Ibid. pp.15.
[97] Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt, Daniel Steinvorth. *Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities.* Spiegel, 7 September 2010 [last accessed 9 January 2016. Available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/turkish-immigration-to-germany-a-sorry-history-of-self-deception-and-wasted-opportunities-a-716067.html.
[98] McGowan, Lee. 2014. "Right-Wing Violence in Germany: Assessing the Objectives, Personalities and Terror Trail of the National Socialist Underground and the State's Response It." German Politics no. 23 (3):pp.201.

neo-Nazi figures declared Hoyerswerda "the first migrant-free city", which would become eventually the "Unwort des Jahres" (the taboo word of the year) in 1991.[99]

At the same time, Europe faced a rising number of people applying for asylum largely due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wars in Yugoslavia in 1991. Due to these events, the situation was considered so serious in terms of increasing asylum applications that Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1992 publicly thought of declaring a state of emergency in Germany. The Conservative leader of Germany warned of "the danger of a profound crisis of confidence in our democratic state which crossed the threshold of our capacity".[100] According to Schuster, there is a striking paradox noticeable in the way Germany welcomed refugees after and before the reunion. By the end of 1992, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had taken in the GDR after the Berlin wall had fallen, became economically the strongest state in Europe and also politically stable, having had only six different governments since the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949. However, the newly formed Germany lead by the Kohl coalition, limited the possibilities for migrants to be successfully granted asylum, though as for war refugees there was adopted a special status.[101] This was in stark contrast to the position it had taken in when it was still a poor country shortly after the Second World War. The horrors of the War displaced millions of Germans and its geographical position in the Cold War deeply influenced the West German asylum policy. The new *Rechtstaat*, the structure of the German state soon set up after the War, offered a generous way to respond to the demands of citizens, including rights for foreigners. In fact, a constitutional provision (Article 19 (4)) was drafted that allowed anyone, including non-German citizens, access to the German courts.[102] Also, Article 16 (2) 2 was implemented to ensure that the post-war Germany, which had seen so many flee the atrocities on its territory, would be a safe haven for people who were politically prosecuted.[103] When drafting these articles in 1949, members of the parliamentary committee in West-Germany had been in most cases victims of the War themselves. Schuster contended that they,

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[99] Grimmer, Claudia. *Die 90er in Deutschland. Da war doch was?* BR24, 11 September 2015 [last accessed 24 February 2016. Available from http://www.br.de/nachrichten/fluechtlinge-rueckblick-kosovo-balkan-100.html.
[100] Schuster, Liza. 2003. *The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.pp.180.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid. pp.183.

however, could not have foreseen that the basic right outlined in, inter alia, Article 16 and 19 would have been invoked to such a great extent in order to gain asylum in the beginning of the 1990s.[104] Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany had received applications that fluctuated considerably, from roughly 100,000 in 1980 to less than 20,000 three years later, until in 1992 the number of applicants rose to 400,000. Followed by the reunification and the relaxation of the Soviet borders, 2,5 million ethnic Germans entered unrestrictedly and claimed full citizenship rights, though limits on the entry would later be put in place. Clearly, this latter group were not fleeing war and therefore no refugees as such, but Germany saw itself obliged to take them in. As far as the other claimants concerned, the majority of the refugees were not genuine politically prosecuted refugees, but rather people who sought brighter prospects in economic sense.[105]

Throughout the 1990, Germany, that saw a mild economic boom, had to cope with the daunting task of integrating the indigenous population (East Germans), the returnees (Germans refugees) and the newcomers (non-German refugees from mostly former Yugoslav countries) into one single country.[106] In the wake of Kohl's speech, Manfred Kanther, interior minister of the Kohl cabinet, enforced the words of his Chancellor. Against the backdrop of the soaring violence towards the Turkish migrants, Kanther chose more or less the same line of argument as Alfred Degger, the then-head of the CDU in Hesse in 1982, pressing for Turkish 'guest workers' to go 'home' and to reserve "what is left mainly for the Germans". According to Der Spiegel, two political parties in 1992 became increasingly at odds over Turkish immigrants and refugees. The newsmagazine contended that, on the one hand, Kohl's CDU displayed "the crudely xenophobic rhetoric of large sentiments within the party", while the Green Party demanded "a multicultural society and a right of residence for all".[107] This rift demonstrated the highly sensitive and ongoing debate on how to deal with asylum seekers. Furthermore, it showed that the media tend to report in very black-and-white terms. Sticking to the critical migrant policy, Kohl

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[104] Schuster, Liza. 2003. *The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.pp.182.
[105] Ibid. pp.181.
[106] Ibid. pp.184.
[107] Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt, Daniel Steinvorth. *Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities*. Spiegel, 7 September 2010 [last accessed 9 January 2016. Available from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/turkish-immigration-to-germany-a-sorry-history-of-self-deception-and-wasted-opportunities-a-716067.html.

expressed to *Tagesspiegel* in 1996 that "whoever abuses his right to hospitality will have to leave this country". Schuster contended that the use of Kohl's vocabulary was politically loaded as it was reminiscent of the way the Nazis put it: "Persons who are not citizens [Staatsbürger] can live in Germany only as guests and must be subject to legislation governing foreigners".[108] As Cohen argued, one was terrified to be compared to such horrific elements, as the Nazi past had long thwarted any ideas of German national identity and history.[109] Throughout the second half of the 1990s, the urgent question of integration became more pressing and the tension on the political level became ever more tangible. In the run-up to the state election of Hesse in 1999, CDU politician Roland Koch provoked widespread controversy with a petition campaign to abolish the possibility for migrants of holding dual citizenship in order to take away doubts about integrity. Alongside fierce criticisms in the media, the Socialists, Liberals, Greens and even members of Koch's own conservative party heavily condemned the plan for being xenophobic and populist, since this would rather work counterproductive.[110] Manz stated that Germany, after the millennium, still has been struggling to get a hold of the delicate question of what to call German. One thing was for certain; migrants had put down "the springboard for a fully-fledged debate about German identity" and integration. Accordingly, the then parliamentary leader of the CDU, Friedrich Merz, brought about the *Leitkultur* discussion (Merz however did not invent the term himself) in 2000. According to Merz, the *Leitkultur* stands for the dominant national culture to which Germany as the host society adheres and which should serve as a guideline for foreigners that would eventually foster assimilation of the latter group into Germany.[111] In subsequent years, the debate on national identity remained a hot-button issue, including remarks of the CSU Prime Minister, Edmund Stoiber in 2002 on the fear over losing German culture expressed in terms of *Durchrassung* and *Überfremdung*.[112] Coming back to the distinction made earlier between refugees in public discourse, it is clear that Germany faced an unsettled history full of ethnic hatred, racist violence and resistance denoting the

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[108] Schuster, Liza. 2003. *The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp.189.

[109] Cohen, Yehuda. 2010. *The Germans: Absent Nationality and the Holocaust*: Sussex Academic Press. pp.103.

[110] Rhein-Zeitung. *Union im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik*, 5 January 1999 [last accessed 9 January 2016. Available from http://archiv.rhein-zeitung.de/on/99/01/05/topnews/staatsbuerger.html.

[111] Manz, Stefan. 2004. "Constructing a Normative National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in Germany, 2000/2001." *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* no. 25 (5): pp.482.

[112] Ibid.

extremely sensitive issue of foreigners in Germany. Whereas neo-Nazi groups are still visible today, German media do their utmost to condemn attacks against refugees and refugee houses. Several prominent journalists, such as ADR host Anja Reschke, have called out to stop racist remarks against refugees on social media.[113] With hundreds or even thousands of refugees coming to Germany each day in 2015, the four largest German nation-wide media, Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, SDZ and Die Welt, rather tended to report on the refugee as a 'sufferer' than as a 'threat' in order to give the refugee crisis a face. Tough these media are not necessarily seeing things through rose-coloured glasses, news items usually cover personal stories of the refugees on their way to Germany.[114] When taking into account the challenges, crises and catastrophes Germany had been facing during its post-war history ranging from the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the reunification, it is explainable why Angela Merkel, herself born in East Germany, took the decision to push her country towards a more progressive migration policy. Although her 'wir schaffen das' speech provoked an immense backlash, including a rift with colleague Seehofer, Die Welt journalist Poschardt argued that Merkel has put herself in the tradition among the "Deutsche und Unionisten als ein Kollektiv des Gelingens" (The collective success of the Germans and unionists), in which Adenauer successfully ruled Germany during the Cold War and Kohl gave strong impetus to the unity of Germany.[115]

3.2. The online revolution of traditional newspapers

Having only touched the tip of the iceberg regarding Germany's history of asylum and immigration, the previous section, nonetheless, demonstrated how the past has shaped the way media tend to report on the issue. On the other hand, media are considered to be an autonomously influential force. According to De Vreese, media in

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[113] Connoly, Kate. *German TV presenter sparks debate and hatred with her support for refugees.* Guardian, 6 August 2015 [last accessed 9 January 2016. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/german-tv-presenter-anja-reschke-sparks-debate-support-refugees.

[114] Bleiker, Carla. *German media: Covering the refugee crisis from all sides.* DW, 2 September 2015 [last accessed 10 January 2016. Available from http://www.dw.com/en/german-media-covering-the-refugee-crisis-from-all-sides/a-18690337.

[115] Poschardt, Ulf. *Merkels Verabredung mit der Geschichte.* Welt, 15 December 2015 [last accessed 10 January 2016. Available from http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article150005458/Merkels-Verabredung-mit-der-Geschichte.html.

general have traditionally had the role as agenda setter, tough the notion of the media as news framer also acquired considerable support. As a result, the media "may not only influence what citizens think about" (agenda setting), but also "how they think about a certain issue (news framing)".[116] Taking this into account, mass media, including any means of communication – as newspapers and television - have played a significant role in disseminating news and imparting information for over sixty years. According to McNamara, they are believed to have far-reaching effects, provoking violence, sexual promiscuity and fostering discrimination against women, so as leading to corporate collapses, fall in sales of products and even bringing down presidents.[117] As the media work as agenda setter and news framer, Riffe, Lacy and Fico, moreover, suggested that newspapers rely heavily on other factors including "a news organisation's market, the resources available for journalists, on-scene reporter judgements and interactions with both purposive and non-purposive sources and decisions about presentation style, structure, emphasis, and language".[118] Since the digital revolution, traditional newspapers have increasingly and successfully enabled the use of online news services. Accordingly, online news sites that are connected with traditional media branches appeal to a large readership.[119] Yet, despite online communications having undoubtedly contributed to the transformation of newspapers and attracted mostly young readers to create an environment whereby news can be read every second of every day, Skogerbø and Winsvold contended that the predictions of the demise of traditional print newspaper have not (yet) come true.[120] Although media analysts and researchers have still not found an answer to the question whether traditional newspapers can be reinvented on a digital platform, daily newspapers have, thus, been succeeding to reach an (younger) audience on the Internet.

As we look at the German media landscape, Bild and SDZ can be seen as respectable traditional newspapers, tough having wholly different backgrounds. Since

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[116] Vreese, Claes de. 2007. "A Spiral of Euroscepticism: The Media's Fault? ." *Acta Politica* no. 42: pp.273.
[117] Macnamara, Jim. 2005. "Media content analysis: Its uses; benefits and best practice methodology " *Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal* no. 6 (1):pp.1.
[118] Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, Frederick Fico. 2014. *Analyzing Media Messages. Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*. New York: Routledge. pp.9.
[119] Xiaopeng Wang, Daniel Riffe. *An Exploration of Sample Sizes for Content Analysis of the New York Times Web Site*. WJMCR, 20 May 2010 [last accessed 10 January 2016. Available from http://wjmcr.org/vol20.
[120] Eli Skogerbø, Marte Winsvold. 2011. "Audiences on the move? Use and assessment of local print and online newspapers " *European Journal of Communication* no. 26 (3): pp.215.

the Second World War, the most-read newspapers in Germany cover a small political spectrum including left-wing liberals on the one side and conservatives on the other. Despite, or perhaps in spite of, the limited political scope, newspapers are not bound to any political party, unlike newspapers in states such as Italy.[121] When observing Bild and SDZ, both fit the political spectrum with Bild bending towards the conservative side and SDZ leaning towards the left-wing liberals. SDZ is considered to be the largest nation-wide subscription newspaper in Germany and one of the two – next to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - major *Qualitätskaufzeitungen* (quality newspapers).[122] Every day SDZ reaches 1,16 million both national and international readers. Furthermore, the Munich newspaper has got regional branches throughout Germany, including Berlin, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Hamburg and Stuttgart, and is thought to be an "opinion-forming news medium with a local and regional anchorage, the principles of liberalism, tolerance and editorial independence".[123] On the other hand, there is Bild, which is conceived as more controversial given that it is a *Boulevardzeitung* (popular newspaper or tabloid) differentiating itself from the quality newspapers in the way that it rather raises subjects on the front page associated with gossip, sex, and crime. Whereas quality papers as SDZ generally appeal less to young readers, this particular readership finds Bild more accessible due to the easy, pictorial and entertaining stories.[124] Unlike SDZ, Bild traditionally set an anti-communist tone in news stories while nowadays claiming a more conservative and cynical position.[125] As the media possess a powerful means, Artl and Storz asserted that "everyone wants to stay on good terms with Bild, for there is a massive fear of being portrayed negatively especially among politicians".[126] Bild therefore constitutes a 'dangerous political instrument', which not only has the power of describing Germany, but also of breaking it.[127] Whereas Bild, as a tabloid, aims to sell as many newspapers as possible by publishing scandalous news stories, SDZ articles usually rest more on in-depth research and well-balanced considerations. This is also what one could see

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[121] Brocchi, Davide. *Die Presse in Deutschland*. Cultura21, 6 December 2008 [last accessed 11 January 2016. Available from http://magazin.cultura21.de/kultur/wissen/die-presse-in-deutschland.html.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Süddeutsche Zeitung Der Wirtschaftsgipfel. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* [last accessed 11 January 2016. Available from http://www.sz-wirtschaftsgipfel.de/suddeutsche-zeitung/.
[124] Brocchi, Davide. *Die Presse in Deutschland*. Cultura21, 6 December 2008 [last accessed 11 January 2016. Available from http://magazin.cultura21.de/kultur/wissen/die-presse-in-deutschland.html.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Hans-Jürgen Arlt, Wolfgang Storz. 2011. Drucksache „Bild" –
Eine Marke und ihre Mägde. Frankfurt/Main Eine Studie der Otto Brenner Stiftung. pp.79.
[127] Ibid. pp.1.

reflected in the main goals of Bild's publishing house Axel Springer, the tabloid has twelve times as many readers, an estimated number of 12 million.[128]

3.3. How Bild and SDZ portray Pegida

Having discussed two opposing newspapers, an online content analysis has been carried out through the assumption of two hypotheses, one for both Bild and SDZ. Although academics from an array of disciplines including communications, history, language studies, political science and social science use content analysis, it is most commonly conducted by communications and social scientists.[129] As a result, definitions of content analysis and ways to use it abound. According to the late behavioural scientist Berelson, content analysis contains "a technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communications".[130] The use of quantitative content analysis in particular provides numerous advantages. According to the Riffe, Lacy and Fico, this technique sets to take messages that are "separate and apart from communicators and receivers". Subsequently, "the researcher can draw conclusions from the content evidence without having to gain access to communicators who may be unwilling or unable to be examined directly".[131] Moreover, Wodak and Busch stressed the importance of sociological variables that are seen as relevant for an interpretation, or explanation of a certain text.[132] Kerlinger supported this view by adding that content analysis is "a method of studying and analysing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables".[133]

By highlighting various variables (such as religion, party affiliation, gender, and turnout), one could measure and test to what extent a particular hypothesis can be perceived as valid. The content analysis on Bild and SDZ has delved into a few variables, which will be given in the next paragraphs. Before doing so, the sampling of the selected online articles requires some explanation. Wang and Riffe contended

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[128] Bild. *BILD und die Fakten* [last accessed 11 January 2016. Available from http://www.bild.de/digital/bild-zeitung-druck/bildzeitung/bild-und-die-fakten-7356678.bild.html.
[129] Prasad, Devi. 2008. "Content Analysis. A method of Social Science Research." *CSS*: pp.5.
[130] Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, Frederick Fico. 2014. *Analyzing Media Messages. Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*. New York: Routledge. pp.19.
[131] Ibid. pp.30.
[132] Ruth Wodak, Brigitta Busch. 2004. "Approaches to media texts." In *The SAGE handbook of media studies*, edited by D. McQuail J. Downing, P. Schlesinger, & E. Wartella pp.108.
[133] Prasad, Devi. 2008. "Content Analysis. A method of Social Science Research." *CSS*: pp.2.

that the purpose of sampling is to render "a manageable subset from a large population or sampling frame to represent that population". An ideal sample, in their opinion, involves "a trade-off between the ease of study and the representation of the population".[134] Since the foundation on 11 October 2014, Pegida has been hotly debated in German media. By skimming through the archives on Bild's and SDZ's websites and setting the period from 11 October 2014 until 30 November 2015, 'Pegida' appears to be mentioned in respectively 700 and 1690 articles. It is, however, debatable whether these results are entirely accurate. As a result, it is hard to decide which sample size studies should embrace. Whereas search engines, such as Google, tend not to generate random results, this thesis has systematically chosen a dozen online news articles each month from both Bild and SDZ in order to avoid any bias or preference. While Bild already published its first article on 11 November 2014 reporting on the "Krawall-Angst in der Innenstadt" (fear of riots in the city centre),[135] SDZ only put online on 3 December 2014 its first piece on Pegida, "Rechts orientierte Wutbürger" (right-wing angry citizen).[136] Hence, the period of December 2014 until November 2015 has been taken as timeframe for this research project, mapping out precisely an array of crucial events including the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the fracture in Pegida's camp between Oertel and Bachmann, Pegida's political rapprochement with the AfD, Merkel's welcoming statement, and the soaring numbers of refugees in the autumn of 2015, of which each unquestionably affected Pegida's popularity. Hence, as for the sample size, one online article of each month has been singled out from the website archives, encompassing twelve pieces each both for Bild and SDZ.

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[134] Xiaopeng Wang, Daniel Riffe. *An Exploration of Sample Sizes for Content Analysis of the New York Times Web Site*. WJMCR, 20 May 2010 [last accessed 10 January 2016. Available from http://wjmcr.org/vol20.
[135] Bild, Sten Hornig, Christian Fischer *Krawall-Angst in der Innenstadt*, 17 November 2014 [last accessed 12 January 2016. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/demonstrationen/angst-vor-krawallen-38594838.bild.html.
[136] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Cornelius Pollmer, Jens Schneider, Jan Bielicki. *Rechts orientierte Wutbürger*, 3 December 2014 [last accessed 13 January 2016. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/demos-gegen-islamisten-rechts-orientierte-wutbuerger-1.2248894.

Bild

Tabloids are thought to speak the language of the 'ordinary' man. It is frequently stated that speaking to the ordinary man is a powerful tool for success.[137] In the case of Bild, this is no different. In fact, Bild resembles Pegida in the respect of standing up for the ordinary man and raising 'the people's voice'.[138] According to Brichta, the formula of British tabloids is "old and tried, compounded of police court reporting, amazing revelations, and a political point of view that was generally populist, hostile to the rich, the aristocracy, and the monarchy".[139] Most of these elements perfectly match Bild, but one important aspect is missing. Jäger asserted that Bild is traditionally against foreigners and "tires itself never of attacking an discriminating against immigrants, using suggestive symbols and images like that of the threatening 'flood of asylum-seekers', who will make 'our boat' sink".[140] By keeping this indispensible element in mind, the following hypothesis has been employed:

As Bild is traditionally seen as critical towards refugees and immigrants, the tabloid supports Pegida's position in terms of reporting in favour of the Dresden-based movement

In order to test his hypothesis, it is crucial to identify some variables to examine closely and provide a better insight into the context in which a particular term is being used. Based on the research question and how this thesis has been built up, four variables can be extracted: geographical origin, religion, political affiliation, and turnout. Despite the fact that these variables are inextricably related to Pegida as such, it ought be stressed that these variables hold separate values. Regarding geographical origin, it remains difficult to label Pegida as a particular geographical phenomenon. As we have seen, Pegida could be labelled as a Dresden, Sachsen, East German, pan-German, and even a pan-European phenomenon. Also, the variable religion should be incorporated and studied. Forming the core issue of the movement's existence, the

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[137] Brichta, Mascha K. 2012. 'Love it or Loathe it': Audience Responses to Tabloids in the UK and Germany: Transcript Verlag. pp.206.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid. pp.46.
[140] Jäger, Siegfried. 1998. "Political Discourse: The Language of Right and Left in Germany." In *The German Language and the Real World: Sociolinguistic, Cultural, and Pragmatic Perspectives on Contemporary German*, edited by Patrick Stevenson. Oxford University Press. pp.246.

outspokenly anti-Islam tone runs like a red thread through the two movement programmes. Furthermore, as part of the campaign, Pegida seizes any opportunity to mention that Germany relies on Christian-Jewish values. Concerning the third variable political affiliation, it is an open secret that Pegida rubs shoulders with Eurosceptic political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). And finally, the variable turnout has been decisive in terms of the Monday night demonstrations determining the success of the movement.

As the variables have been justified, the online content analysis has singled out a number of terms related to these variables in the context of Pegida. The term 'Pegida' (nor its full name "Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes") itself has not been taken into account, since all terms incorporated are inextricably linked to Pegida. As for geographical origin-related terms[141], they are altogether named 58 times, followed by religion (33)[142], turnout (26)[143] and political affiliation (18).[144] Clearly, the definition of geographical origin has produced a larger number of results than the other variables. This has one important implication. Despite being a phenomenon originated from Dresden, Bild's content confirmed that Pegida has evolved into a nation-wide discussed topic. In "Nein zu Pegida!" (No to Pegida) on 6 January 2015, Bild conducted interviews with famous Germans who raised their voice against Pegida. While one might have expected otherwise, Bild

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[141] The selection of geographical origin-related terms (some of them have been mentioned twice or more) embraces 'Dresden', 'München', 'Bonn', 'Würzberg', 'Ausländerfeindlichkeit', 'Kassel', 'Kadiga', 'Schleswig-Holstein', 'Leipzig', 'Dresdner', 'Sachsen Polizei', 'Zuwanderer', 'Hetz-Holländer', 'Ostdeutschland', 'Russland', 'Deutschlands Städte', 'Hamburg', 'Einwanderer', 'Stuttgart', 'Berlin', 'Deutschland', 'deutschen Autoren', 'Türkei', 'Syrien', 'deutschen Nationalelf', 'Ausländer', 'Überfremdung', 'Flüchtlingen', 'Minderheiten', 'Kulturen', 'Fremdenfeindlichkeit', 'DDR', 'Asylbewerbern', 'Deutschen', 'Nationalitäten', 'Herkunft', 'multinationale Vielfalt', 'Migrationshintergrund', 'Frankfurt', 'Mainz', 'Kulturelle Vielfalt', 'Neubürger', 'weltoffene Stadt', 'Kogida', 'Asylbewerbern', 'Abspaltung Sachsens', 'Legida', 'Heidenau', 'Freital', 'Westdeutschland', 'weltoffenheit', 'Patrioten', 'Krisengebieten', 'Ort', 'Entwicklungshelfer', 'weltoffen' and 'Exportland'.
[142] The selection of religion-related terms (some have been called twice or more) encompasses 'islamfeindlichen', 'Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD)', 'unchristlich', 'Abendlandkultur', 'Christentum', 'Heiligabend', 'Weihnachtsliedersingen', 'Christen', 'Muslime', 'Düsseldorfer Synagoge', 'Antisemitismus', 'Weihnachtssingen', 'Weihnachtsbotschaft', 'Islamisierung', 'Kirchen', 'glaubens paschaul', 'Islam', 'Die Heiligen Drei Könige', 'Morgenland', 'Gott', 'Religion(en)', 'Moslems', 'christlich-abendländische Kultur', 'religiöse Bekenntnisse' and 'Christ'.
[143] The selection of turnout-related terms (some have been mentioned twice or more) includes mainly numbers of demonstrations (e.g. 10.000 Teilnehmern/Menschen/Anhänger/Demonstranten/Gegendemonstranten), but also 'anti-Pegida Kundgebungen', 'Verantstalung(en)', 'Demonstration(en)' and 'Gida-Gänger'.
[144] The selection of political affiliation-related terms (some have been mentioned twice or more) encompasses 'AfD', 'ex-AfD-politikerin', 'politische Organisation', 'CDU', 'große Koalition', 'Regierungschefin', 'SPD', 'SPD-Generalsekretärin', 'Nazi-vergleich', 'Nato-Propaganda, politische Unzufriedenheit' and 'Nato'.

clearly sketched a negative image of Pegida being "against the open-minded and tolerant Republic of Germany".[145] What is more, Bild explicitly championed the idea of taking in refugees by means of a petition signed by eighty famous Germans. In short, the tabloid took an opposing view rather than taking Pegida's position. Surprisingly enough, this is not the only criticism. When examining the article of "Tourismus in Dresden bricht ein!" (Tourism of Dresden collapses) on 24 June 2015, Bild one-sidedly blamed Pegida for contributing to the decreasing numbers of tourists coming to the city of Dresden.[146] Another remarkable finding is that the tabloid readily attempts to unveil Pegida's alleged links with neo-Nazism, as two almost identical articles, though published at different times, suggest. Both pieces, entitled "Ex-Pegida-Frau blamiert sich mit Goebbels-Vergleich" (Ex-Pegida woman disgraces herself with Goebbels comparison) on 22 May 2015 and "Pegida-Chef vergleicht Justizminister Maas mit Goebbels" (Pegida boss compares minister of Justice Maas with Goebbels) on 2 November 2015, insist and put emphasis on the recurrence of neo-Nazi 'scandals'.[147]

Considering the religion-variable scores high as well, one would think that Bild shares the notion of stopping the 'Islamisation'. If anything is true, it is the opposite, as Bild rather took in a dismissive position condemning Pegida's anti-Islam course. In the article "Mit Gott gegen Pegida" (With God against Pegida) from 20 July 2015, Bild reported on seven religions which stood up against "the hateful face of Pegida".[148] Also, the tabloid tends – though to a lesser extent - to report enthusiastically on the lower turnouts ("Weniger Teilnehmer als erwartet!" – less participants than expected!) ostensibly against Pegida ("3000 gegen 700! Und wieder legt Leipzig Legida lahm." – 3000 against 700! And Leipzig brings Legida to a halt yet again).[149] As for the political affiliation variable, Bild proved not very keen on

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[145] Bild. *Nein zu Pegida!* 6 January 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/muenchen/pegida/promis-sagen-nein-zu-pegida-39214178.bild.html.
[146] Bild. *Tourismus in Dresden bricht ein!* 24 June 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/pegida/wegen-pegida-tourismus-in-dresden-bricht-ein-41476096.bild.html.
[147] Bild. *Ex-Pegida-Frau blamiert sich mit Goebbels-Vergleich.* 22 May 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/maybrit-illner/talk-zu-pegida-und-afd-lucke-wirrer-goebbels-vergleich-41051740.bild.html.
[148] Bild. *Mit Gott gegen Pegida.* 20 July 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/pegida/mit-gott-gegen-pegida-41856112.bild.html
[149] Bild. *Und wieder legt Leipzig Legida lahm.* 31 August 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/leipzig/demonstrationen/demo-tag-in-leipzig-42404266.bild.html.

reporting on Pegida's ties with politics. The tabloid plainly condemned ex-AfD politician Festerling's plan of breaking away the eastern state of Sachsen from Germany. By speaking of a 'vague' Pegida-plan doomed to fail, Bild decisively showed no sympathy for Pegida's political aspirations.[150] Based on the variables and the contextual analysis, one could hardly contend that Bild is supportive of Pegida. Whereas it was expected that Bild would take Pegida's position given the former's history of mostly anti-migrant reporting, the tabloid, in fact, critically opposed the Dresden-based movement on any of the examined variables. When looking at the content and the predominantly harsh tone of the twelve articles, it moreover is striking to conclude that Bild has been determinedly taking position against Pegida right from the start.

SDZ

Concerning Bild's counterpart SDZ, a dozen online news articles there have been selected as well, one from each month in the period from December 2014 until November 2015. As the Munich newspaper generally earned a good reputation as quality newspaper and appealed more to the left-wing end of the political spectrum, it is less likely that SDZ would give full support to Pegida. Hence, the following hypothesis has been put to the test:

SDZ presents a dismissive position on Pegida, criticizing the movement's hard-core anti-Islam rhetoric.

Like the online content analysis applied on Bild, this analysis has consistently been carried out through the observation of the four variables, geographical origin, religion, political affiliation and turnout, again without taking the term 'Pegida' itself into consideration. It turned out that the geographical origin-related (named 67 times)[151]

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[150] Bild, Luisa Schlitter, Sten Hornig. *Festerling will Sachsen von Deutschland abspalten*. 12 October 2015 [last accessed 12 October 2015. Available from http://www.bild.de/regional/dresden/pegida/festerling-will-sachsen-von-deutschland-abspalten-42989004.bild.html.

[151] The selection of geographical origin-related terms (some have been called twice or more) encompasses 'Pegida', 'Dresden', 'Hogesa', 'Ostdeutschland', Köln', 'Fremdfeindlichen Pegida-Spaziergängern', 'Russland', 'Deutschland', 'Fremdenfeindlichkeit', 'Glaubenssätzen', 'Kirchentür', 'Kreuzkirche', 'Wittenberg' 'Sachsen-anhalt', 'Niedersachsen', 'Sachsen', 'Türken', 'Wien', 'Pole', 'Römer', 'Arminia-Typ', 'Cherusker', 'Deutschland', 'Germanien', 'Deutscher', 'Nation',

and political affiliation-related vocabulary (59)[152] were the most-discussed variables in this analysis, followed by turnout (21)[153] and religion (15)[154]. Consequently, there are some dissimilarities to Bild traceable. Unlike the tabloid, SDZ reported extensively on the political affiliation with the AfD. In "Pegidas Partei" (Pegida's party) on 9 October 2015, the Munich newspaper wrote about the sudden electoral upswing of the AfD arguing that virtually seven per cent of the voters were to support the Eurosceptic party nation-wide. Taking into consideration the refugee crisis, the authors suggested that the AfD was able to mobilise 8,000 citizens to the streets in Erfurt to demonstrate against Germany's asylum policy. They, furthermore, contended that while Pegida and the AfD were previously attacking each other, it could be ascertained that the AfD sought closer cooperation with Pegida calling for this 'Herbstoffensive' (fall offensive) in Erfurt.[155] Also, in another article published nine months earlier, SDZ sees a link between the rise of Pegida and the AfD's popularity: As the AfD obtained twelve per cent of the votes at the Landtag-elections in 2014, Pegida was founded later that year and directly gained support of some AfD figures.[156] Furthermore, SDZ focused elaborately on news items about refugees' backgrounds as in "Nach Pegida" (After Pegida) on 7 June 2015[157], seeking, however,

'Niederlanden', 'internationalen Redner', München, Bagida, 'Bundesrepublik', 'Frankreich', 'afrikanischen Land', 'Iran'. 'Indien', 'ausländische Mitarbeiter', 'ausländische Wissenschaftler', 'ausländerfeindlich', 'ausländische Kollegen', 'Heimatland', 'Eritrea', 'Marienplatz', 'Asylummisbraucher', 'Erfurt', 'Flüchtlinge' and 'Asylbewerber'.

[152] The selection of political affiliation-related terms (some have been called twice or more) included 'AfD', 'Neonazis', 'Linkspartei', 'Politiker(n)', 'AfD-basis', politischen Diskurs', 'Parteien', 'Berufspolitikern', 'Politikbetrieb', 'Mitgliederzahlen', 'politisch', 'Politik', 'Political correctness', 'rechtspopulist', 'rechtsaußen', 'EU-Austritt', 'Ukip','Rechtsradikalen','Front National', 'Abschied vom Euro', 'Rechtsextremisten', 'Kommunalwahl 2014', 'Stadrat', 'Populismus', 'populistisch', 'Establishment', 'SPD', '(Ober)bürgemeister(in)', 'Landtagwahlen', 'Landtag', 'Fraktion' 'Politikversagen', 'AfD-Obersten', 'Vorsitzende', 'AfD-chef', 'Pegida-Partei' and 'Rechtextremismus'.

[153] The selection of turnout-related terms (some have been mentioned twice or more) included mainly numbers of demonstrations (e.g. 15.000 Teilnehmern/Menschen/Anhänger/Demonstranten/Gegendemonstranten), but also 'fremdfeindlichen Pegida-Spaziergängern', '(Groß)Kundgebung', 'Zulauf', 'Abendspaziergang', 'Protestierer', 'Pegida-demonstranten', 'Zulauf', 'Gegendemonstrationen', 'Pegadisten' and 'größere Zahl'.

[154] The selection of religion-related terms encompassed 'Salafismus', 'Islamisierung', 'antisemitische Verschwörungstheoretiker', 'Kirche(n)', islamfeindliche Bewegung', 'Abendland', 'Götz von Berlichingen', 'Ostermontag', 'Islam' and 'Koran'.

[155] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Cornelius Pollmer, Jens Schneider. *Pegidas Partei*. 9 October 2015 [last accessed 12 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-im-aufschwung-pegidas-partei-1.2683289.

[156] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Beitzer, Hannah. *Das Jahr der großen Wut*. 26 December 2014 [last accessed 1 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-hogesa-afd-und-montagsmahnwachen-das-jahr-der-grossen-wut-1.2271049.

[157] Süddeutsche Zeitung , Haunhorst, C. *Nach Pegida*. 7 June 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/leben/fremdenfeindlichkeit-nach-pegida-1.2507124.

mostly to retrieve where the Pegida's 'Wut' (fury) comes from ("Das Jahr der Großen Wut" – The year of huge outrage on 26 December 2014[158]), what the implications are ("Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikalen" – From Pegida emerge free radicals on 29 January 2015[159]), and how to deal with Pegida ("Wo Hasstiraden verpuffen" – Where torrents of hatred fall flat on 23 April 2015[160]). According to SDZ, Pegida largely expressed their anger at the mainstream media and politicians concluding that the movement does not only encompassed neo-Nazis or members of extreme right groups, but also 'ordinary' people as schoolteachers, university professors and former school friends of Pegida counter protestors. As a result, the newspaper noted that the outrage of Pegida supporters partly emerged from the middle-class of society.[161] Finally, looking at religion-related terms, it is remarkable how little content there is on Pegida's anti-Islam position. While Bild set Pegida aside in almost all of the twelve pieces as being 'anti-Islam', SDZ has primarily chosen to report on the movement's anti-establishment/anti-elitist attitude, nearly always leaving out any reference to religion. SDZ rather spoke of Pegida in terms of spreading racist remarks and inciting hate towards mainly the media, politics and foreigners in general.[162] Another striking difference between SDZ and Bild is that the latter barely wrote about Pegida's increasing turnouts in September and October 2015, whereas the former in the same period certainly did in terms of 'Zulauf' (increase) and 'größere Zahl' (bigger number). Nonetheless, both newspapers seem to agree that Pegida is a 'right-wing populist movement' being potentially sensitive to radicalisation.[163] Concerning the hypothesis, it is apparent that SDZ not only disapproved of Pegida, but also sought to clarify the movement's rationale to demonstrate. In this sense, it is evident

[158] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Beitzer, Hannah. *Das Jahr der großen Wut*. 26 December 2014 [last accessed 1 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-hogesa-afd-und-montagsmahnwachen-das-jahr-der-grossen-wut-1.2271049.

[159] Süddeutsche Zeitung. *Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikale*. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zerfall-der-bewegung-aus-pegida-entstehen-freie-radikale-1.2324609.

[160] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Hutter, Dominik. *Wo Hasstiraden verpuffen*. 23 April 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/kampf-gegen-rechts-wo-hasstiraden-verpuffen-1.2447512.

[161] Süddeutsche Zeitung, Beitzer, Hannah. *Das Jahr der großen Wut*. 26 December 2014 [last accessed 1 October 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-hogesa-afd-und-montagsmahnwachen-das-jahr-der-grossen-wut-1.2271049.

[162] Süddeutsche Zeitung. *Unermüdlich und besessen*, 25 May 2015 [last accessed 15 January 2016. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/pegida-unermuedlich-und-besessen-1.2492756.

[163] Süddeutsche Zeitung. *Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikale*. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zerfall-der-bewegung-aus-pegida-entstehen-freie-radikale-1.2324609.

to ascertain that SDZ has altered its tone of reporting from mere understanding in the first articles of the analysis to a steadily harsher tone on Pegida. Despite the gradual shift in position, SDZ repeatedly condemned Pegida's demonstrations and its disgraceful symbolism ("Pegida und das Symbol der Hitler-Attentäter" – Pegida and the symbol of Hitler's assassins on 3 August 2015). In order to properly evaluate the hypothesis, it is crucial to state that SDZ dismissed Pegida not merely because of anti-Islam elements, but rather because the movement is generally seen as anti-establishment including violent, aggressive and hateful remarks against foreigners in general.[164]

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to clarify the position of asylum and immigration in German history. It has put into perspective how German media tend to report on migrant-related topics, which generally are felt to be highly sensitive. The events of the Second World War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall heavily affected Germany's treatment of refugees and largely determined how German's approach to refugees ought to be employed. Although the violent resistance among particularly neo-Nazi-related groups has not abated in past years, the most prominent German media expressively distanced themselves from any racist comments. In fact, most of these media opted for reporting on welcoming refugees. On the political level, a certain shift from the CDU's viewpoint in taking in refugees has slowly become visible. While the conservatives' position was characterised by conflicts with other parties, usually fiercely criticizing Germany's asylum and integration policy, Merkel's speech has promptly reversed the party's traditional role of ardent asylum-critic into a surprising progressive leader. As we have seen, mass media play an influential role as an agenda-setter and news framer regarding contentious topics as asylum, integration and immigration. In this respect, Bild and SDZ heavily influence the public opinion in Germany. Both media determine what the reader reads and how this is framed. Concerning Pegida, both newspapers mostly reported negatively whereby generally rejecting the movement. As this might have

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[164] Süddeutsche Zeitung. *Aus Pegida entstehen freie Radikale*. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 January 2015 [last accessed 1 November 2015. Available from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zerfall-der-bewegung-aus-pegida-entstehen-freie-radikale-1.2324609.

been expected from SDZ, the outcome of the analysis on Bild can be conceived as fairly surprising. In fact, it appeared that Bild used stronger terms to express its disapproval of Pegida. Whether this rejection was enforced through Bild's usual 'sensational' manner of reporting or not, it nonetheless is most noteworthy that specially Bild reports so decisively on Pegida's position. Furthermore, despite the distinction of quality paper vs. tabloid has been clearly laid out, Bild and SDZ appeared to draw the same conclusion from Pegida. Two of Germany's most prominent newspapers see Pegida as an objectionable movement that jeopardises Germany's tolerance towards foreigners. Whereas Bild, as a tabloid, systematically labels Pegida as an anti-Islam movement, SDZ, as a quality newspaper, rather gives a more in-depth account of where the anti-migrant and hateful comments originate from and does therefore not only focus on Pegida's anti-Islam position.

Concluding chapter

Roughly one year after the foundation, it ought to be concluded that Pegida has sparked a tremendous amount of controversy and discussion, and still is making the headlines today. Although the turmoil emanating from a social movement is nothing new in Germany, it should be stressed that Pegida is slightly different from its predecessors. Despite the academic debate on whether to call Pegida a right-wing populist, an extreme right-wing, or a deeply xenophobic movement is divided, the Dresden-based movement proves not to be a unique phenomenon, as Germany can look back on a turbulent history full of different social movements and dynamic activism. At the same time, Pegida nevertheless is an uncommon movement in Germany, due to its effective strategy of promoting social and political action. It is a movement that started out as a blurry initiative by a highly dubious figure, but soon appeared to be able to mobilise a mass of people in an unconventional manner through promoting the marches against the 'Islamisation' of Germany and Europe. Pegida, in fact, appeared to be capable of keeping appealing to people to attend the marches. This is strongly connected with the movement's scale. Pegida possess the organisational brain of the SMO and the collective activism of the NSM, being capable of assembling people in a coordinated way. However, it must not be ignored that the Dresden-based movement often unpredictably benefited from several sudden events, as the Charlie Hebdo killings in January 2015, and also took great advantage

of the ongoing refugee crisis and the incapabilities of political leaders to find common solutions. Hence, it is highly noteworthy that Pegida emphatically meddles with political affairs. Following this line of reasoning, the positive effects of the political relationship with the AfD should not be neglected, as Pegida benefited considerably from the electoral results of the German party, the overall attention and often strong support it received from AfD politicians. As a result of this close-knit relationship, Pegida has grown into a nation-wide discussed phenomenon.

Equally remarkable to mention is the role of the use of Facebook. As indispensable part of the successful strategy, this social medium became the central place for Pegida to impart information and spread beliefs on politically sensitive topics as asylum, immigration and integration. In fact, as time elapsed, Pegida has become increasingly more focused on 'Islamisation' as the chief focal point and how to position the movement towards this theme. In doing so, the movement has not only been limiting itself to Germany. Accordingly, Europe and the EU play an indispensable role in how the Dresden-based movement actively pursue its goals, as outlined in both the 2014 manifesto and the 2015 programme. Due to the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Pegida became known even outside of Germany, where sister movements in European countries swiftly popped up, though not having the same success as in Dresden. Moreover, within Pegida's position papers, Europe finds itself at the centre of discussion. It became crystal clear that Pegida radically changed stance on the EU. Whereas, the 2014 manifesto had been relatively positive on the European project, the 2015 programme fiercely rejected the EU. Due to the refugee crisis, the project of European integration has been under increasing attack from EU member states which appeared helplessly divided in resolving the matter. As a result, the EU's status quo concerning the refugee crisis could be described as a core problem, ostensibly fostering the increasing support of Pegida in terms of higher turnouts, especially in September and October 2015. The message of abolishing the Schengen area and adopting an immediate German asylum 'emergency' law seemed to appeal to many German citizens, who might have lost faith in Germany's current direction towards the refugee crisis.

At the same time, it should be noted that there has been considerable resistance against Pegida stemming from different layers of the German society. In this respect, it is interesting to see what the analyses of Bild's and SDZ's reporting have brought about. While it was expected that at least Bild, as a usual sceptic of

taking in refugees and hard-hearted critic of integration issues, would take Pegida's side, the opposite was in fact true with Germany's most-read tabloid being an ardent champion of the refugees' cause. Despite Bachmann's interview to Bild at the backdrop of scant media moments, Pegida supposedly forgot about Artl and Storz's words to stay on good terms with Bild. On the other hand, there was the outcome of the SDZ's analysis. While the hypothesis insisted on SDZ's supposedly dismissive position on Pegida largely based on its hard-core anti-Islam rhetoric, the newspaper's reporting mostly inclined to leave the topic of religion aside, preferring to single out and condemn the violent and hateful remarks towards foreigners in general. Despite the hypothesis was proved largely false or untrue, it has become evident that SDZ firmly rejected Pegida's too extreme ideas. In an attempt to further address the research question, it can be argued that Bild and SDZ, as suitable representatives of the German media, have contributed greatly to the largely negative image of Pegida, being able to subjectively select and frame the news. As one might expect from a usual refugee-critic, Bild, for instance, could have chosen not to report on certain issues that would damage Pegida's reputation, like the petition against the movement.

All in all, it should be underlined that Pegida's evolvement can be described best by taking note of Germany's (and the EU's) incapability (or unwillingness) of finding ways to manage the refugee flows into Europe. As for the German media, both Bild and SDZ, alongside many other media, have devoted considerable attention to Pegida. Regardless of the fact that the online articles examined have predominantly not been in favour of the Dresden-based movement, the extent to which Pegida is reported on has added much to the overall visibility and coloured representation of the movement, both in Germany and abroad. Nonetheless, it remains hard to state to what extent Bild and SDZ's way of news coverage have actually affected Pegida's emergence. Instead, it could be contended with more certainty that unexpected events such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the upsurge in refugee numbers after Merkel's welcome statement have substantially contributed to the soaring attendance levels in the months thereafter, given that even 'ordinary' and 'worried' German citizens took to the streets taking part in Pegida marches to raise their voice. Perhaps these people were not all wholly supportive of the movement's standpoints, but rather determined to participate as a sign of growing discontent with mainstream politics.

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