

# Offending an Emperor

*Shaping the Narrative of Desi Sangye Gyatso's Deceit in Daiqing  
Imperial History*

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Frontispiece: The remark so often seen in the Khan's memorials, *saha* in Manchu, *zhidao le* in Chinese, in Elhe Taifin's hand. This is written to indicate the Khan is now *au courant* of the content of the memorial.

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## Conventions

Since this study is primarily based on Manchu materials, it takes the Manchu language as its basis for in-text reference to primary materials and historic figures. The terms generally used to refer historic figures are given in a transliteration of their respective languages in-text, while a multilingual glossary of names and titles is provided as appendix A.

Therefore, Chinese terms are given in pinyin, with characters provided in a footnote at the first reference.

Manchu is given in Daiqing-transliteration.<sup>1</sup> The Manchu script is designed to reflect the pronunciation, the transliteration will follow Manchu spelling. Every Manchu letter is given one equivalent in the Latin alphabet. Their pronunciation is close to the English pronunciation for most letters, with the exceptions of 1. *x*, used for a sound like *sh* in *shush*, or a retroflex *sh* like *shi* in Mandarin; 2. *v* for transcription of a sound like *u*, but further back in the mouth. Various authors hold that it was mostly used to distinguish uvular consonants from velar ones. 3. *Q* sounds like English *ch* in *cheese*, or like Chinese *ch* in *chang*; 4. *y*, when used as a vowel, is pronounced as *i* Mandarin *zhi*, *chi*, *shi*, *ri* (it occurs mostly, though not exclusively, in Chinese loans).<sup>2</sup>

Since the Tibetan script employs spelling conventions that do no longer reflect the pronunciation of most Tibetan dialects, a transcription is used throughout this text with the purpose of rendering pronunciation approximating the Lhasa dialect, rather than adhering strictly to a letter per letter transliteration. In the glossary, the standard Wylie transcription is used for further reference.

This thesis cites a small amount of Mongolian words. They are transcribed from the classical script, and their Cyrillic spelling is provided. As they are very few, and no Mongolian language sources have been used, I have not included Mongolian in the first, more comprehensive glossary. A second, small glossary is provided that lists these select words in transcription, Cyrillic, and classical spelling.

Finally, where translations are given in text, the original location of the excerpt will be provided in a footnote, while the text of the excerpt in the respective original language(s) will be provided in Appendix B. In the case of Manchu, it will be given in transliteration, both since no input method is reliably available for regular text processing software, and because a strict transliteration interferes only a little with pronunciation. While it is a shame that the original script cannot be consistently given for the sake of accuracy and authenticity, the transcription will not do harm to intelligibility. In the case of Chinese, the original will be given in characters. In the case of Tibetan, the original will be given in Tibetan script.

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<sup>1</sup> “Daiqing Transcription.”

<sup>2</sup> For a more comprehensive analysis of pronunciation of Manchu, see also Li, *Manchu: A Textbook for Reading Documents*, 17; Ji 季, *Manyu Yufa*, 3–4; Möllendorff, Von, *A Manchu Grammar with Analysed Texts*, vi, 1–2.

## Introduction

In the spring of 1697, Elhe Taifin Khan of the Daiqing dynasty<sup>3</sup> was at Ningxia, in preparation for the final assault on his bitter rival, Galdan Boshogtu.<sup>4</sup> On the brink of this final act of seven years of campaigning against the Zunghars across the steppes of Mongolia and the scorching Gobi Desert, a new challenge to the Khan's authority presented itself. Elhe Taifin Khan received an envoy from the regent of Tibet, Sangye Gyatso, who finally informed him formally of the death of the fifth Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama had at that time been deceased for over fifteen years, and only now the Desi<sup>5</sup> had decided to disclose his passing, and communicate it to the Khan of the Daiqing. Upon receiving the "news", Elhe Taifin was outraged. The Desi had deceived him for fifteen years. Elhe Taifin felt mistreated and disrespected, and the Desi would have to be confronted with consequences for his actions.<sup>6</sup> And, indeed, over the next years, this event proved to have been a watershed in Daiqing-Tibetan relations.<sup>7</sup> The consequent events have been recorded in different historic works, out of which a rigorous redaction process has filtered a select narrative. It is my aim to dissect this narrative and include divulging accounts to demonstrate how Daiqing historiography of these particular events was produced and edited, and how non-Daiqing accounts factor in.

Elhe Taifin Khan of the Daiqing who had newly proven its intolerance of insubordination was dismayed by the Desi's deceit. Until this point, relations between the Daiqing and the Tibetans had been well, with as highpoint the visit of the Dalai Lama to Beijing in 1652. Now, however, the Khan was faced with a difficult predicament. How to properly respond to the insolent Desi's behavior? The Desi had been chosen by the Dalai Lama, the central figure in the Gelugpa-school of Tibetan Buddhism, which had achieved dominance through patronage by the Khoshud Mongols.<sup>8</sup> To the Daiqing, the Mongols remained the greatest threat to stability in the Daiqing Empire. The majority of the Mongols had reconverted to Buddhism over the last century. Along with the growing trend of Buddhism, the Dalai Lama's following among the Mongols increased as well. The crack that had appeared in the Daiqing's relations with Tibet might reverberate among the Mongols, were the Khan not to tread with the utmost delicacy.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the Manchus employed their advocacy for Tibetan Buddhism as a method to legitimize their rule over the Mongols in the region. Early in the dynasty, they had become patrons of the Gelugpa-school and its highest lamas, thus invoking the historic relationship between Khubilai Khan and the Sakyapas and strengthening their bond.<sup>10</sup>

Elhe Taifin Khan's response to the sequence of events reveals a great deal about his conceptions of rulership and authority. It illustrates the Daiqing's struggle to legitimize their rule and gain hegemony in Inner Asia, visible through Elhe Taifin's chiding of the Desi, and preserved in the proclamations he issued and the letters of the envoys he dispatched. Yet,

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<sup>3</sup> Elhe Taifin Khan, Ma. *elhe taifin han*; Ch. *kāngxī huángdì* 康熙皇帝, r. 1661 – 1722. Daiqing dynasty. Ma. *daiqing*; Ch. *dàqīng* 大清 1636-1912. Throughout this thesis, I take the Inner Asian cultural paradigm and the Manchu language as my chief point of departure for terms and names. Therefore, I speak of Khans instead of Emperors, of the Daiqing dynasty instead of the Qing, and of Elhe Taifin instead of Kangxi.

<sup>4</sup> Mongolian *Bošoytu* (Mo. Сур. Бошигт); it is rendered into Manchu as *boxoktu*.

<sup>5</sup> Tib. རྗེ་མཚོ། The Desi is a regent, the chief aid to the Dalai Lama, and the chief political figure in the Dalai Lama's absence.

<sup>6</sup> Unda 濫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 40:79.

<sup>7</sup> Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 43.

<sup>8</sup> 戴 Dai and 杜 Du, “和硕特蒙古与明末清初甘青地区格鲁派寺院势力的扩张 Khoshut Mongolian Troop and the Expansion of Gelu Monastery [sic] in Gansu and Qinghai in the Late Ming and Early Qing Dynasties.”

<sup>9</sup> Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, 244.

<sup>10</sup> The patron-priest relationship emerged as the Mongols' method of governing Tibet during the early the Yuan dynasty. It was the cornerstone of the relationship between Tibet and the Mongols, and has continued to shape Tibetan relations with rulers in Inner Asia up until the fall of the Qing in 1912. It is elaborated on in the fourth chapter of Sam van Schaik, *Tibet: A History*; and discussed in Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*: 64-71.

even more is revealed in the letters he wrote home, which were saturated with the Khan's personal opinions, frustrations, and honest surprise:

Since it is quite exceptional, I do not consider this to be a trivial matter. My son, the Imperial Crown Prince, as I want you to be in the know, I have written the whole affair up meticulously and sent it to you. Read it carefully!<sup>11</sup>

These messages were never meant to be disclosed, and, because of their personal nature and secret contents, they constitute an invaluable source for research on Daiqing history.

Elhe Taifin's letters, i.e. the palace memorials to Beijing, have in part been the basis for historic court productions on the Daiqing conquests, the *Strategic Histories*.<sup>12</sup> The *Strategic Histories* were compiled under close supervision and direction of the Khan, in the decades following the military campaigns. When the content of the memorials is compared to their corresponding sections in the histories, often the two do not match. This is all the more intriguing when we come to realize the full depth of the distorting reverberation that these discrepancies have on historic works during the Daiqing era, and indeed through to the present day.

This conscious effort to shape the narrative of history aims to extinguish all conflicting views and dominate the understanding of history in subsequent periods. "Its dominance is such that it permeates all dimensions of discourse," and outshines diverging narratives from the same chronological domain. Such a discourse-permeating narrative has been termed the "main-sequence" narrative by Pamela Kyle Crossley.<sup>13</sup> This type of narrative framing extends much beyond the simple distinction of a state view of affairs as opposed to a private view. It aims to replace and extinguish any divergent narratives, and is aided in this endeavor by the production and publishing power of the state. I will draw extensively from this theoretic framework, contending that the main-sequence narrative is not just relevant during the Daiqing dynasty, it in fact still continues to influence our views of events during the Daiqing period. Also, today's understanding of Daiqing history is mobilized to influence our geopolitical views of the People's Republic of China and its legitimacy as a ruling power over e.g. Tibet, and influences the illusion of continuity between different dynasties. Indeed, it strengthens the perception of the Republic of China and then the People's Republic of China as legitimate successors to the Daiqing Empire. Through a careful examination of the historiography, a first step in the revision of our views of Daiqing history may be made.

This narrative shaping is manifested in different layers of Daiqing historiography. The content of the secret memorials was altered when they were recorded into *Strategic Histories*, which in turn formed the basis for the *Veritable Records*, reign histories compiled after a Khan passes away.<sup>14</sup> Until the most recent decades, in studies of the Daiqing dynasty, mostly the Chinese versions of historic materials had been used, and the Manchu and Mongolian versions were thought to be lacking meaningful contributions or additions to the Chinese version. To the contrary, a tremendous amount of monolingual Manchu materials has been produced during the Daiqing dynasty, and survives to the present day.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously, the

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<sup>11</sup> *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 863. *umesi aldungga ofi . largin seme gvnirakv . hvwang taizy be sakini seme da dube be getukeleme arafi unggihe . kimqime tuwarao ..*

<sup>12</sup> Ma. *bodogon i bithe*; Ch. *fanglüe* 方略.

<sup>13</sup> Crossley, "The Historical Writing of Qing Imperial Expansion," 43.

<sup>14</sup> Ma. *yargiyan i kooli*; Ch. *shilù* 實錄.

<sup>15</sup> Bartlett, "Books of Revelations," 25. Bartlett's article was the first publication on the importance of Manchu materials for research on the (Dai-)Qing dynasty in Western academia. Elliott, "The Manchu-Language Archives" is a more recent publication of a new overview of surviving Manchu archival materials and their locations, along with an elaboration on the origins of the Palace Memorial System, reiterating the importance of Manchu-language materials and providing the (Dai-)Qing History scholar with a useful reference work. A third work emphasizing the central role of Manchu documents is Uyunbilig's *Manchu Archives and Studies on Frontier and Ethnic Groups in Qing Dynasty*.



*Veritable Records* are still often cited as if they reflect historic fact. While indeed, much of their content is reliable, we are missing out on crucial details and critical information on pivotal moments in history.

However, during the second half of the twentieth century, interest in the Manchu language gradually increased again, for the first time since the fall of the Daiqing dynasty in 1912. While it had been dismissed ever since the fall of the Daiqing dynasty, more access to, and more scholarship on Manchu materials gave rise to a new direction in Daiqing history scholarship: the New Qing History school. It aims to lift studies on the Daiqing period out of a theoretical framework that has overemphasized the concept of sinicization. This entails that the ruling elites of dynasties founded by foreign invaders (such as Mongols or Manchus) will gradually assimilate into the Chinese majority population. Instead, it challenges the Sino-centered discourse by considering Inner Asian concepts on issues such as language, steppe culture and religions.<sup>16</sup> The discovery of large quantities of monolingual Manchu materials and engagement with these materials led to a reconsideration of the position of Manchus, Manchu identity, and therefore all other sources in Daiqing dynasty history. My thesis aims to build on the new paradigm that has come to dominate scholarship on Daiqing history, and in consideration of the complex position of the Manchu ruling elite, shed more light on the process of Daiqing historiography.

After all, Manchu, as the language of the ruling elite, was used prolifically for the most secret, and therefore, arguably, the most important communication, which was in turn incorporated in Daiqing dynasty main-sequence historiography. While on the frontier, the Khan wrote in Manchu to the Court in Beijing, and to his generals. In order to further centralize power onto the person of the Khan through manipulating the flow of, and access to information, Elhe Taifin Khan developed the Palace Memorial system. It was a highly secure system to transmit information exclusively between the Khan and the addressee.<sup>17</sup> Sometimes, the Manchu memorials would even be headed by a small note in Chinese: “do not translate,” further emphasizing the confidential nature of the Khan’s words.<sup>18</sup> Since the language was used especially as a “security language,” they are often concerned with developing situations on the frontier, crises, and other military matters.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, when Elhe Taifin wrote to inform the Court of Desi Sangye Gyatso’s deceit, he employed this system, writing a secret memorial to the crown prince. Although Elhe Taifin Khan’s palace memorials have been used in several studies, research on them is still in the beginning stage. They have mostly been researched in relation to the Zunghar-campaigns, while they are a cardinal source on all events during the time that Elhe Taifin was away from court.<sup>20</sup> From the perspective of Daiqing dynasty historical research, the conflict between Elhe Taifin and Desi Sangye Gyatso has been insufficiently researched, and is documented so far predominantly by main-sequence Daiqing sources. On the other hand, scholars of Tibet have generally paid more attention to this event, even though no historic analysis of Sangye

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<sup>16</sup> Cams, “Recent Additions to the New Qing History Debates”; Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History”; Wu, “New Qing History: Dispute, Dialog, and Influence.”

<sup>17</sup> Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 160–64.

<sup>18</sup> Ch. *búyì* 不譯.

<sup>19</sup> Uyunbilig, *Manchu Archives and Studies*, 1–3; Elliott, “The Manchu-Language Archives,” 21; Crossley and Rawski, “A Profile,” 71. Crossley and Rawski briefly discuss the roll of Manchu as a security language in this same paper: 71–74.

<sup>20</sup> Čimeddorji, *Die Briefe* is an elaborate work of research into the Daiqing-Zunghar-conflict, with particular emphasis on Elhe Taifin’s memorials to his son; Perdue, *China Marches West* discusses the Zunghar conflict extensively, while drawing mostly from official histories, memorials are also used for documentation. On page 193, he bases a short analysis of the incident with Sangye Gyatso mostly on the *Strategic History* in Chinese. On pages 190–3, Perdue illustrates the attempts by the Khan to shape the narrative of history; Perdue, “The Qing Empire in Eurasian Time and Space: Lessons from the Galdan Campaigns” focuses exclusively on the wars against the Zunghars, with little attention to side; Perdue, “Embracing Victory, Effacing Defeat” briefly discusses the Zunghar campaign and the *Strategic History* subsequently written under Elhe Taifin’s direction. The article illustrates predominantly the Daiqing’s tendency to dress up its history in favor of its Khans, while on the other hand Daiqing historiography attempts to extinguish divulging accounts; Uyunbilig, *Manchu Archives and Studies* focuses on Manchu language archival materials for the importance of frontier studies. Indeed, attention is paid to Daiqing-Tibetan relations, in one chapter on Elhe Taifin’s military action against the Zunghars after their invasion of Lhasa.

Gyatso's dealings with the Daiqing has been carried out from the perspective of Tibetan Studies, either. Multiple studies on Tibetan history do explore this incident and its effect, as it proved to be a critical juncture for Daiqing-Tibetan relations. However, in these cases little attention is paid to the Daiqing dynasty side of the events, because the scholars of Tibet often base themselves exclusively on Tibetan sources.<sup>21</sup> Yingcong Dai's work should be named as one exception, as it describes the incident more elaborately. Nevertheless, he makes no use of Manchu sources or any archival materials.<sup>22</sup> Also, Ahmad's famous study of Daiqing-Tibetan relations in the 17<sup>th</sup> century is exceptional, due to its connecting of the Daiqing and Tibetan sources, but falls short in an equal manner on the Daiqing side: he makes use exclusively of the Chinese *Veritable Records*.<sup>23</sup>

Therefore, a gap in extant scholarship emerges. While the conflict between Desi Sangye Gyatso and Elhe Taifin Khan was a watershed in Daiqing-Tibetan relations, studies that have briefly mentioned this crucial episode often base themselves in summary sources such as the Chinese *Veritable Records*, and mostly do not consider Manchu materials, either archival or historiographic,<sup>24</sup> and mostly neglect the Tibetan sources altogether. On the other side, there are the scholars of Tibet, who do not base themselves on Daiqing sources. To date, no study has profoundly explored this incident, making use of archival material and official Daiqing historiography in Manchu and Chinese, and involved the appropriate Tibetan sources. It is my aim to take into consideration the off-sequence Manchu archival materials of Elhe Taifin's own hand, the palace memorials sent during the spring of 1697, and contrast them to main-sequence historical works of the Daiqing dynasty. Besides, I shall give proper consideration to Tibetan language primary sources, in order to sketch a clear image of the events during the conflict between Desi Sangye Gyatso and Elhe Taifin Khan. Together, the renewed consideration of Daiqing sources and the involvement of Tibetan sources will result in a more thorough comprehension of the historiographic processes of both the Daiqing and Tibet, while illuminating the actual course of events. Following this line of approach, my main aim is to find out: how were the events concerning the Desi's concealment of the Dalai Lama's death, and the ensuing diplomatic interactions, recorded by both the Daiqing and the Tibetans? How do these recordings differ from one another? And, which additional intentions of the authors become apparent from the style and content in the historiographic productions?

Before examining the conflict between Tibet and the Daiqing in the later 1690s, I will review the relationship between the Daiqing and Tibet prior to the Zunghar-conflict. Thereafter, this chapter examines how the conflict between the Daiqing and the Zunghars prompts a shift in the Daiqing's attitude, which comes to a boiling point when the Desi finally reveals his deception in the spring of 1697. Furthermore, it examines the historic nature that forms the foundation for the relationship between the Daiqing Khans and the Tibetan government. Finally, it delves into Sangye Gyatso's ascent to *de facto* ruler of Tibet, and the development of his relationship with the Khan, with the aim to explain how this ultimately led to the level of indignation on Elhe Taifin's part as he discovered the Desi was deceiving him.

Following this, the second chapter covers the content of the Khan's personal correspondence regarding the Desi's deceit, and related documents sent to accompany his personal comments. It discusses Khan Elhe Taifin's descriptions of events chronologically, and analyzes their incorporation into main-sequence historiography. My focus lies especially with Khan Elhe Taifin's train of thought. How did Elhe Taifin Khan perceive the hierarchy between Daiqing authority and Tibet, and how did he view the Desi's position, measured

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<sup>21</sup> Chen 陈 and Gao 高, *A Complete History of Tibet 西藏通史*, 335; Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 129–33; Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, 125–28; Aris, *Hidden Treasures and Secret Lives*, 142–45.

<sup>22</sup> Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 49.

<sup>23</sup> Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*.

<sup>24</sup> While there is a Manchu edition of the *Veritable Records*, it is difficult to access, and it has not been used for research on this topic by any scholar to date.

against his own rulership? What factors did the Khan take into account when acting against the Desi, and did they change over time? The second chapter aims to answer these questions through a comparison of Elhe Taifin's personal writings with the main-sequence historiography. The chapter sheds light on distinctions between Daiqing main-sequence and off-sequence. These distinctions in turn illuminate the Khan's intentions in the redaction process.

The third and final chapter will observe the Tibetan productions that describe this event. I will discuss two contemporary Tibetan-language sources, which are both closely affiliated with the events surrounding the concealment of the Dalai Lama's passing. The first and most informative is the sixth Dalai Lama's biography, compiled by Desi Sangye Gyatso himself. Secondly, there is the Panchen Lama's autobiography.<sup>25</sup> These sources comprise a description of Sangye Gyatso's actions from a perspective not aligned with the Daiqing. The third chapter will explore these Tibetan sources with the intent to illuminate any discrepancies that arise when contrasted with the Daiqing narrative, and examine their narratives as purposefully constructed, too. What is written, what is not, and how the content is presented is all of equal significance.

Finally, I will summarize my findings, drawing on all three chapters above to illustrate how Elhe Taifin Khan has propagated a main-sequence narrative in Daiqing state-produced historiography.

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<sup>25</sup> Sangye Gyatso སངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho 'i Rnam-Thar*; Lobzang Yeshe ལོབ་ཙང་ཡེ་ཤེས།, *'Od-Dkar-Can Gyi 'Phreng-Ba*.

## Chapter 1: Daiqing-Tibetan Relations and the Tibetan Role in the Region

Ever since the conquest days of the Daiqing, Tibet, and especially Tibetan Buddhism, had constantly played a role in Mongol politics on the western front of the Daiqing empire. In the seventeenth century, from the first beginnings of the predecessor to the Daiqing through to Elhe Taifin's expeditions against the Zunghars in the northwest, Manchu rulers actively engaged with Tibet. Their relationship was one of mutual benefit. It fortified the leaders of Tibet, allowing them to shape a Tibetan state through the support of powerful Inner Asian allies. In turn, the Daiqing, as an ally of Tibet were given legitimacy to rule in Inner Asia.<sup>26</sup> As the Daiqing's power expanded, they were soon confronted with a need for the support of various Mongol tribes. Because of the unstable situation on the Mongol front, a good relationship with the Tibetans was essential to the success of their efforts.

In this chapter, the Daiqing's relations with the Tibetans prior to the Desi's incident will be examined. The developments in both Tibet and the Daiqing Empire throughout the seventeenth century are of great scale and vast consequences. Therefore, this chapter limits itself to those developments in Daiqing-Tibetan relations, which were pivotal in the power-dynamic of East Asia at the time, and that demonstrate a variety of causes to the incident involving Desi Sangye Gyatso. This ultimately led to the immediate fallout after the incident. The principal aim of this chapter is to elucidate the Daiqing's relations with Tibet prior to and during the Zunghar conflict, discussing in particular the historic concepts that are invoked by both sides in affirmation of their relations. As the Desi's apparent deceit unfolds, and Elhe Taifin Khan learns the details, the previous status quo of the Daiqing-Tibetan relations seems to collapse rapidly.

The irred Elhe Taifin dispatches his envoy to Lhasa once again, writes letters home, expressing his disbelief, and deliberates how to reprimand the Desi and solve this matter in a proper manner. After all, alienating the Tibetan government, and thus the Gelugpa-school, would deprive the Daiqing court of their approved legitimacy in Inner Asia. Possibly, the consequences would be dire for the stability among the Mongols. Many of them had already been impacted or turned into refugees by the seven-year war that was only just concluding.<sup>27</sup> Handling the situation with great care was imperative. However, Elhe Taifin Khan seemed to feel wronged and betrayed. Apparently, he felt that he held the authority to demand an honest accounting from the Desi. The end of this chapter illustrates why Elhe Taifin Khan felt he had the right to information of the Dalai Lama's passing, through an analysis of the Desi's role in Daiqing-Tibetan relations.

### *1.1 Tibet in the Seventeenth Century*

The earlier seventeenth century was a decisive period for the consolidation of the Gelugpa as the (politically) dominant school of Buddhism in Tibet. This period sheds light on the formation of the Tibetan government and its institutions that later came into conflict with Elhe Taifin Khan.

Over the first half of the seventeenth century, the Tibetan plateau was rife with religious conflict. In Central Tibet, the state of Tsang advocated the Karma Kagyü-school of Tibetan Buddhism, and aimed to prevent the Gelugpa from further expansion. Decades earlier, the state of Tsang had subjugated the state of Ü, that was traditionally linked with the

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<sup>26</sup> Millward, "The Qing Formation, the Mongol Legacy, and the 'End of History' in Early Modern Central Eurasia," 108–9.

<sup>27</sup> Uspensky, "The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective," 234; Dai 戴 and Du 杜, "Khoshut Mongols and the Expansion of Gelu."

Gelugpa school. The situation for the Gelugpa was deteriorating quickly. After the ruler of Tsang died in 1621, he was succeeded by Karma Tenkyong. After his father had died, he had resumed the harassment and erosion of the yellow-hatted Gelugpa school. Entire monasteries were forced to convert to the Karmapa-school. In Tsang, Gelugpa monks were harassed and killed. The Gelugpas were growing more desperate. Because of suppression by the ruler of Tsang, or discontent with their position as only a minor school while the Karma Kagyü was being assisted by the state, Gelugpa leaders dispatched three representatives to the Mongolian allies of the Gelugpa school, the Khoshud and Zunghar Oirats.<sup>28</sup>

In 1637, Gushri Khan had led his Khoshud Mongols from the steppes to the northwest to the region of Kokonor.<sup>29</sup> After he had defeated Choghtu Taiji and settled around the lake Kokonor, he continued to expand his influence, and conquered surrounding areas, until he had successfully established Khoshud rule over the entire region of Kokonor.<sup>30</sup> He had been an advocate of the Gelugpa school before, and now, the Gelugpa was in urgent need of military support. After first secretly visiting the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama as a pilgrim and receiving instructions, Gushri Khan returned to Kokonor. Here, he began preparations for an attack on Tsang.<sup>31</sup>

On the opposing side stood the Choghtu Mongols and Ligdan Khan, who had been in conflict off and on with the rising Manchu state for the past decade.<sup>32</sup> As of 1633, the King of Tsang dispatched envoys to persuade Ligdan Khan to convert to the Karma Kagyü school, and lead his troops to aid in the destruction of the Gelugpa school. The Choghtu Oirats were not religiously aligned to any side originally, but sided with Tsang and the Karma Kagyü later on.<sup>33</sup> Karma Tenkyong, ruler of Tsang, called upon them to come to Central Tibet and wage an attack on the Gelugpa. Ligdan Khan died *en route*, whereas the Khan of the Choghtu Mongols then sent his son, Arslan, to “wipe out the Gelugpa sect.” On his way with ten thousand troops, Arslan was contacted by Gushri Khan, who managed to somehow change his mind.<sup>34</sup> After having arrived in Tibet, Arslan acted contrary to the will of his father, who then had him assassinated. At this point, Gushri Khan attacked the Choghtu in Kokonor and eliminated them, for without Arslan, they would probably continue to oppose the Gelugpa school.<sup>35</sup>

Subsequently, the Dalai Lama’s chief attendant, Sönam Chöphel, requested Gushri Khan to conquer Kham, to the east of Ü-Tsang. After Kham was firmly under Khoshud control, Sönam Chöphel once more sent a request to Gushri Khan, asking him to deal with Tsang. From Kham, Gushri Khan ascended westward to Tsang. He encountered little resistance, up until the siege of Shigatse, the capital of Tsang. Sönam Chöphel mobilized his own troops, subjugated a Tsangpa stronghold in Ü and joined up with Gushri Khan at Shigatse. After a year of open war between Ü and Tsang in 1642, Shigatse was finally captured, along with Karma Tenkyong.

The fall of Shigatse to Gushri Khan and Sönam Chöphel represented the end of several centuries of division in the area of Greater Tibet. The Tibetan plateau had now been

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<sup>28</sup> Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, 101–5; Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 119–21; Uspensky, “The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective,” 232; Zhao 赵, *The Qing Dynasty and Tibet*, 11. This conflict is often portrayed as a struggle, where the Gelugpa is being oppressed by the state of Tsang. See also Luo 罗, “Gelupai Fazhan de Sancu Kunjing Ji Qi Tupu”; Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 117–18. He holds that some among the Gelugpas were not content to be placed as an equal among other schools, unfavored by the political rulers, and therefore chose to contact their Mongol allies to solicit intervention.

<sup>29</sup> Kokonor is a Mongolian geographical name, meaning “blue lake” (Mo. Cyr. Хөхнүүр). In Chinese, the region is called by the same name, *qinghai*, and in Tibetan is called also “blue lake,” *tsho-ngön*.

<sup>30</sup> Borjigidai, “The Hoshuud Polity in Khökhnuur (Kokonor),” 182.

<sup>31</sup> Luo 罗, “Qing Yu Ying de Cuowei,” 96.

<sup>32</sup> Uspensky, “The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective,” 232.

<sup>33</sup> Luo 罗 speculates that this might be due to their alliance with Ligdan Khan, “Gelupai Fazhan de Sancu Kunjing Ji Qi Tupu,” 75.

<sup>34</sup> Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, 103; Luo 罗, “Qing Yu Ying de Cuowei,” 96. Shakabpa notes that no records exist of the meeting, while Luo draws the conclusion that Gushri Khan was the one to change Arslan’s mind. Luo does not give any giving evidence to this effect. In any case, Arslan seems to have behaved differently than instructed after this meeting took place.

<sup>35</sup> Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, 104–5.

placed wholly under the rule of the Koshud Khanate led by Gushri Khan, through his close alliance with the Gelugpa school. This unification simultaneously spelled the end of strife between the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, with the Gelugpa having achieved supremacy. This was confirmed once more by Gushri Khan, who presented the areas of Tibet to the Dalai Lama as tribute, conferring onto him “supreme authority” over Tibet.<sup>36</sup> This signified the establishment of the Ganden Podrang government, named after the Dalai Lama’s palace in the Drepung monastery near Lhasa. The Dalai Lama had now been installed as ruler over all of Tibet. Gushri Khan’s right to rule was similarly confirmed by the Dalai Lama, who granted him the title of “Dharma-king, upholder of religion.”<sup>37</sup> In this final act of the conflict between Ü and Tsang, between the Gelugpa and the Karma Kagyü, the symbiosis between the religious school without military might and the Mongol Khan in need of more legitimacy than only his power of conquest becomes most visible.

Further, Sönam Chöphel was named Desi, ‘regent’ of Tibet in name of the Dalai Lama.<sup>38</sup> He was to handle all political affairs, thus becoming de facto ruler of Tibet. For the first time, the position of Desi had been created. Rule of the Ganden Phodrang was firm and steady, the Gelug reigned supreme, and almost half a century later, the position of Desi was filled by Sangye Gyatso.

## 1.2 Significance of Tibet to the Early Qing

Even before the establishment of the Daiqing dynasty, its precursor state under Nurhaci had had contacts with Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism since its first beginning. In 1615, the first Tibetan Buddhist temples were built in Hetu Ala, the capital of Nurhaci’s Aisin state at that time, to the east of Mukden.<sup>39</sup> A critical trend of conversion back to Tibetan Buddhism in favor of their native religion was taking place among the Mongols. The actions to favor Tibetan Buddhism by the Aisin state were meant to present the Aisin Khans as patrons, and to woo the Mongols to their side.<sup>40</sup> Also, as a result of their conquest of Ligdan Khan, the Daiqing claimed to have obtained the seal of the Yuan (1271-1368). Hong Taiji, successor to Nurhaci as Khan of the Aisin and (later) Daiqing empire, commenced to present himself more and more as a universal ruler, a true successor to the Khans of the Yuan dynasty, and a patron of Tibetan Buddhism as well. He remodeled his state as the Daiqing dynasty: a new dynasty, challenging the wavering Ming for the Mandate of Heaven.<sup>41</sup>

In 1637, the Daiqing, as the Aisin had now been renamed, had its first contact with the leaders of the Gelugpa. They actively aligned themselves with this school and allied themselves with the Khoshud Khanate. This was not surprising, since Ligdan Khan and the Choghtu Mongols had been opposing the Khoshud, but were both defeated by the Daiqing. In 1642, as the Gelugpa had just established its supremacy over Tibet by installing the Dalai Lama as ruler in their new theocracy, the Daiqing dynasty strengthened its ties to the Khoshud Khanate and the Ganden Phodrang government in Tibet. The first embassy from both Gushri Khan and the Ganden Phodrang was received at Mukden, capital of the Daiqing state. They paid tribute to the court, and the Daiqing recognized them in their own right, acknowledging the use of the title of “Dharma-king, upholder of religion” by Gushri Khan, as it had been

<sup>36</sup> Shakabpa, 111; Luo 罗, “Gelupai Fazhan de Sancu Kunjing Ji Qi Tupu,” 76.

<sup>37</sup> Uspensky, “The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective,” 232. Tibetan བཟུང་འཛིན་ཚོས་རྒྱལ།.

<sup>38</sup> Desi, from Tibetan རྗེ་མཆོག།

<sup>39</sup> Zhao 赵, *The Qing Dynasty and Tibet*, 9; Farquhar, “Khan as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch’ing Empire,” 20; Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 158–59. Interestingly, the Khans of the Aisin seemed not too keen on Buddhism at all, complaining about the untrustworthiness of lamas.

<sup>40</sup> Zhao 赵, *The Qing Dynasty and Tibet*, 8.

<sup>41</sup> Veit, “Die Mongolische Völkerschaften,” 400; Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, 203.

bestowed by the Dalai Lama.<sup>42</sup> The embassy in turn presented the Daiqing Khan with a letter from the Dalai Lama, addressing the Khan as the “Mañjuśrī-Great Khan.”<sup>43</sup> The Dalai Lama identified him as a manifestation of the Buddha Mañjuśrī. This recognition by the Dalai Lama was not just of tremendous value for the legitimacy of rulership over Mongols and Tibetans. It further strengthened the Daiqing Khans claim to authority and legitimacy as successors to Khubilai Khan, extending it to future the generations, for Khubilai Khan was also asserted to be a manifestation of Mañjuśrī.<sup>44</sup> Mongols and Tibetans alike appear to have attached great importance to this identification by the Dalai Lama, as they regularly employ this epithet in letters to Elhe Taifin Khan later on, as we shall see.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, the visit in itself lent legitimacy to the Daiqing’s self-presentation as a successor to the Yuan dynasty. By choosing to visit the Daiqing court, the Tibetan government in fact rejected the Ming dynasty, the current imperial court in China proper, and other contenders for regional hegemony, further strengthening the Daiqing’s standing with the Mongols, the Tibetans, and to an extent the Chinese. Uspensky argues that it even recognizes “the Manchu dynasty as the only legitimate government in the areas both to the north and to the south of the Great Wall.”<sup>46</sup> As they received the embassy, the Daiqing’s intent was surely to achieve this hegemony, to become the legitimate universal rulers, and to further emulate the position of Khubilai Khan and later, Altan Khan, by entering into a prospective patron-priest relationship. Ahmad argues that the Dalai Lama likewise was exploring the possibility of accepting the Daiqing Khan as a (or perhaps, *the*) patron.<sup>47</sup>

Over the next decade, the Gelugpa settled in their role of rulers over Tibet. The Daiqing crossed the Great Wall in 1644, and in an unexpected turn of events set out to conquer China proper. Then, in 1648, briefly after the stabilization of Tibet and while the Manchus were still eliminating rebellions and loyalists to the fallen Ming dynasty, the Daiqing court invited the Dalai Lama to personally visit Beijing, the Daiqing’s new capital. The Dalai Lama certainly did not feel any urgency to comply; he set out in 1652 after receiving the third invitation, traveling only for several hours per day during the mornings, with an entourage of more than three thousand people.<sup>48</sup> In the summer of 1652, they reached the Ordos, and sent a letter to the Daiqing court, requesting the Khan to meet the Dalai Lama either at Daika or at Guihua, outside the Great Wall.<sup>49</sup> This request sparked a vivid argument at court, with Manchu officials advocating for the Khan to ride forth and welcome the Dalai Lama, while the Chinese officials argued it was unbecoming of an Khan to leave China proper.<sup>50</sup>

It is remarkable to see that the sides of the argument were drawn cleanly along ethnic lines. The Chinese officials voiced their opinions against the Khan leaving China proper, while the Manchus advocated for the meeting of the Dalai Lama outside the borders, citing as

<sup>42</sup> Borjigidai, “The Hoshuud Polity in Khökhnuur (Kokonor),” 189; Uspensky, “The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective,” 232.

<sup>43</sup> Farquhar, “Khan as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch’ing Empire,” 19.

<sup>44</sup> Farquhar, 14, 19, 25. Reference to the Khan as Mañjuśrī is more common in Mongolian sources than elsewhere.

<sup>45</sup> It occurs regularly in the *Strategic Histories*. E.g. Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*. e.g. 40:121 *fulahvn ulgiyan inenggi* / 丁亥: *si yaya baita be gemu manjusiri han i hese be dahame yabuqi aqambi*. ‘In everything, you should always behave in accordance with the will of the Mañjuśrī Khan.’ 41:100 *sahaliyan muduri inenggi* / 壬辰: *manjusiri han i genggiyen de wesimburengge*. ‘presented to the radiance of the Mañjuśrī Khan.’ *amba gosingga manjusiri han kemuni gosime hese wasimbure jakade*. ‘since the greatly compassionate Mañjuśrī Khan sent an edict with constant benevolence;’ *gubqi be gosire amba manjusiri han*. ‘the Mañjuśrī Khan, whose compassion is universal.’

<sup>46</sup> Uspensky, “The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective,” 233; Ahmad, in *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 158–60 also confirms this.

<sup>47</sup> Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 158–60.

<sup>48</sup> Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 125.

<sup>49</sup> Rockhill, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908,” 14; QSL Shizu Shunzhi 9-08-29 戊辰. The city of Guihua 歸化 is known today as Hohhot, by its Mongolian name (Mo. Cyr. Xox xor), meaning “blue city.” In Manchu, it is referred to as such, but in a Manchurized loan of the Mongolian: *huhu hoton*.

<sup>50</sup> Rockhill, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908,” 15.

a reason that they were the ones to invite the Dalai Lama.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the role of the Dalai Lama as a religious leader with great influence on the Mongols played a role, too. The Khan gives as a secondary objective that the Khalkha Mongols' reverence of the Dalai Lama would convince them to submit to the Qing, whereas they surely would spurn the Qing, were the Khan to refuse to meet the Dalai Lama in person.<sup>52</sup> Sam van Schaik even argues that the threat of the Khalkha Mongols was the primary motivation for the invitation, as "the Manchus mainly saw the Dalai Lama as a powerful ally who wielded a strong influence over the Mongols."<sup>53</sup> It appears that the Chinese officials were concerned chiefly with proper decorum of the Khan as befitting a ruler in Chinese fashion, while to the Manchus, the Khan was not constricted by any such ritual restraints. They encouraged him to go, to show suitable deference to the Dalai Lama, in order to attain strategic goals. The young Khan had been inclined to side with his Manchu officials, and greet the Dalai Lama outside the Great Wall. However, he finally did change his mind, but under the seeming pretext of an inauspicious omen rather than officials counseling the Khan to observe proper ritual. In the end, the Dalai Lama was received by imperial envoys, and escorted to the capital.

Just several months after his arrival in Beijing, and much sooner than planned, the Dalai Lama departed again, citing health concerns for himself and his retinue due to the climate in Beijing.<sup>54</sup> The Manchu Khan, and thus Emperor of China, had undoubtedly viewed the visit of the Dalai Lama to Beijing as a great success, since it signified an affirmation of the legitimacy of their rule. It was also a step in the direction of the Khalkha Mongols, who would surely be more likely to submit to an authority recognized by the Dalai Lama. From the Tibetan side, there was a complete lack of urgency to come to Beijing, but the Dalai Lama did in the end accept the invitation and went to Beijing. It was also in his interest to cultivate a strong alliance with the Qing. Uspensky emphasizes that this diplomatic mission of the Dalai Lama was most likely an act of "mutual recognition" by the Daiqing court and the Ganden Phodrang.<sup>55</sup> In the end, it does appear that the Dalai Lama and Elhe Taifin Khan have established a patron-priest relationship, modeled on that of earlier lamas and Inner Asian monarchs. Elhe Taifin and the Dalai Lama based themselves on the historical precedent of Khubilai Khan and Phagpa Lama, or Altan Khan and the third Dalai Lama Sönam Gyatso. The fifth Dalai Lama names the relationship in his autobiography, and Elhe Taifin is named and presents himself as patron in his letters, and histories.<sup>56</sup>

The decade of the Daiqing conquest determined relations between the Daiqing and Tibet for the remainder of the seventeenth century. After this formative period, the Daiqing court and the Ganden Phodrang maintained regular contact, through envoys that were sent to and fro on a regular basis. Slowly, though, challenges to the stable relations presented themselves. When Wu Sangui, a Ming dynasty turncoat, rebelled, both he and Elhe Taifin Khan attempted to pull the Dalai Lama to their side.<sup>57</sup> While initially, the Dalai Lama allowed an expedition as per the wishes of his patron, the Khan, he quickly came to regret this position and tried to remain neutral, not in line with the desires of Elhe Taifin.<sup>58</sup> However, it was not until later in the 1670s that a real challenge emerged to the patron-priest relationship between Elhe Taifin and the Dalai Lama. Galdan had become Khan of the Zunghars, and had begun to harass the Mongols in Kokonor. He harbored aspirations of uniting all the Mongols

<sup>51</sup> Rockhill, 15.

<sup>52</sup> Rockhill, 14–15; Zhao 赵, *The Qing Dynasty and Tibet*, 94.

<sup>53</sup> Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 126.

<sup>54</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China, 1644-1908," 17.

<sup>55</sup> Uspensky, "The Status of Tibet in the Seventeenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries: A Mongolian Perspective," 233.

<sup>56</sup> Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 214. Ahmad gives the translation from Tibetan, with transcription; Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, e.g. 40:2-6 *xahvn meihe inenggi* / 辛巳; The Manchu word used to express the concept of 'patron' is *vklige ejen* or *vlige ejen*, a loan from Mongolian (Мо. Сур. өглөг ин эзэн).

<sup>57</sup> Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 205.

<sup>58</sup> Ahmad, 215.



under his banner. This was a grave threat to the stability of the Daiqing. When the Oirats of Kokonor were attacked by Galdan, they asked the Dalai Lama to intervene. The Dalai Lama managed to convince Galdan to give up his expeditions into Kokonor, because Galdan had great respect for the Dalai Lama. He had been a lama himself, previously. Simultaneously, the Dalai Lama bestowed upon him the title of Boshogtu Khan, providing him with legitimacy of his rulership.<sup>59</sup> The Dalai Lama advocated a policy of peace, which was upheld in the Dalai Lama's name by Desi Sangye Gyatso up until and well beyond the point that the conflict escalated to violence. Elhe Taifin Khan continued to remind Galdan of this, and pressed him to adhere to the Dalai Lama's hopes.<sup>60</sup>

### 1.3 Desi Sangye Gyatso and the Khan's Ire

The Ganden Phodrang's power resided not exclusively with the Dalai Lama, but also with the Desi, the Dalai Lama's regent. In 1679, Sangye Gyatso was appointed Desi. As he inaugurated Sangye Gyatso, the Dalai Lama announced that the Desi was henceforth authorized to conduct all governmental affairs, since he himself was becoming too old.<sup>61</sup> Thus, the Dalai Lama had recused himself entirely from politics and diplomacy, leaving these matters to his newly appointed Desi. While the position of Desi had existed since the establishment of the Ganden Phodrang in 1642, the Dalai Lama had now elevated it to a new level of political power. The Desi had been inserted right into the middle of the patron-priest relationship, squarely between the Dalai Lama and any envoys that were to contact him. After a mere three years in his position, the Dalai Lama passed away. In keeping this a secret, his appointment as Desi carrying the Dalai Lama's full mandate was of great help to Sangye Gyatso. In this manner, he could simply state that the Dalai Lama wished not to be disturbed in his retirement. This enabled him to continue to exercise power, and conceal the Dalai Lama's decease.

Disclosure of the Dalai Lama's passing would have created an enormous political vacuum, of which the Desi was keenly aware. Only the Panchen Lama wielded similar spiritual authority to the Dalai Lama, but, since the last Panchen Lama had passed in 1662, the new incarnation was still too young to govern. Cairang speculates that the Desi feared that without the authority of the Dalai Lama, Mongols might take their chance and in the best case, no longer obey Tibetan leadership, or in the worst case, invade Tibet once more.<sup>62</sup> The menace of instability also formed a threat to his own position. Van Schaik concurs with this view, stating that “[p]erhaps it was to protect his own position, or perhaps the fragile stability of Tibet as a whole.”<sup>63</sup> However, Ahmad makes the case that the Daiqing simply misunderstood the political structures in Tibet, and that the Desi had never had any intention of hiding the Dalai Lama's decease.<sup>64</sup> This seems implausible, as the Desi subsequently tried his best to perpetuate his deception. Eventually, Mongol envoys, Tibetan monks, and Daiqing envoys alike grew impatient. One by one, they demanded audiences with the Dalai Lama. Sangye Gyatso had a clever solution for this troublesome complication: a monk who bore

<sup>59</sup> Rockhill, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908,” 20–21.

<sup>60</sup> Rockhill, 21–22.

<sup>61</sup> Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 129; Cairang 才让, “Lun Disi Sangjie Jiacao Zhi Lishi Diwei 论第司·桑杰嘉措之历史地位,” 20; Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 50; Unda 温达, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 37:30, *sahalyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅. The Desi claims that he has been entrusted with all the affairs of government: *te dalai lama . se sakdafi . ini eiten baita be minde afabufi*; “now that the Dalai Lama has become old, he has entrusted me with all his affairs.”

<sup>62</sup> Cairang 才让, “Lun Disi Sangjie Jiacao Zhi Lishi Diwei 论第司·桑杰嘉措之历史地位,” 20.

<sup>63</sup> Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 129.

<sup>64</sup> Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 50–52.

some likeness to the deceased Dalai Lama was temporarily installed as an impersonator, and thus deceived all visitors to the Dalai Lama, who could not come too close to the imposter.<sup>65</sup>

The Desi persisted in his pretense, even when Elhe Taifin Khan was long aware of the Dalai Lama's passing; he had heard it from prisoners captured after the battle with Galdan at Jao Modo.<sup>66</sup> One of these prisoners reported that the Dalai Lama had incited Galdan to carry out his expedition into China, and that it was in truth not Galdan's plan at all. It supposedly was Jedrung Trülku, who had been sent by the Desi to select an auspicious date for Galdan to do battle, and prayed for him.<sup>67</sup> This convinced Elhe Taifin that the Desi was at fault for the entire conflict with the Zunghars.<sup>68</sup> After he had levied his accusations against the Desi, stating he knew that the Dalai Lama had long passed, the Desi replied:<sup>69</sup>

You, exalted Lord, are divine, and thus know of everything beforehand. Therefore, you are aware that the Dalai Lama will come out of meditation next year. I was overjoyed, that you had sent an introductory delegation of these two lamas. This lama *Pönchung*<sup>70</sup> originally lived with the Dalai Lama for ten years, so when he sees the Dalai Lama, will he be mistaken? These two lamas will wait until the Dalai Lama comes out of his meditative reclusion, and go back once they have seen him clearly. When they present their observations to you, Khan, you will know at that moment that I have been sincere all along, and cease all your thoughts of suspicion. Had the Dalai Lama genuinely deceased, would I have dared to send Nyimathang Shabdrung, saying that the Dalai Lama would come out of his meditative reclusion, to report this to the Khan? It is true indeed, that the Dalai Lama's earlier reincarnation is still alive!<sup>71</sup>

Desi Sangye Gyatso continued his bluff, in spite of the Khan's knowledge of the mendacity of his assertions. Elhe Taifin now saw his suspicions confirmed. Because of the report of the prisoners, and the Desi's feigned innocence, he was convinced of the Desi's malign intent. Elhe Taifin viewed his own intentions as wholly in line with the wishes of the Dalai Lama.<sup>72</sup> The Zunghars would never have been able to wreak havoc on the Central Asian stage, were it not for the absence of the Dalai Lama. After all, he would never have allowed Galdan's insubordinate activities. Elhe Taifin states:

The Dalai Lama is respected by all Mongols as if he were the Buddha, but the Desi has managed affairs in the Dalai Lama's place. Galdan's evil and rebellious practices are all the Desi's doing.<sup>73</sup>

The Desi's crime was complete. He had positioned himself in the relationship between Elhe Taifin and the Dalai Lama, between patron and priest. Elhe Taifin had become convinced that the Desi's concealment of the Dalai Lama's passing was a deliberate attempt to keep the Khan in the dark, and use the Dalai Lama's influence on the Mongols to destabilize the situation on the Daiqing frontier, and perhaps even threaten the long-term existence of Daiqing rule. A scorned and indignant Elhe Taifin Khan decided that the Desi's actions should have consequences.

Since his acts of deception through proclaiming all kinds of directives in the Dalai Lama's

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<sup>65</sup> Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, 129; Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, 126–27.

<sup>66</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908," 25; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 192.

<sup>67</sup> Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 49. Jedrung Trülku (Tib. འཇུང་ཏུལ་ཀུ) is rendered in Manchu as *jirung kvtuku*. See also Appendix A: Glossary.

<sup>68</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 193.

<sup>69</sup> Perdue, 193.

<sup>70</sup> *Pönchung* is a Tibetan title, consisting of two elements: *pön* 'lord, official' (Tib. དོན་ལྔ) and *chung* 'small' (Tib. ཚུང་). It might be translated as 'minor official.' The personal name of this lama is Jinpa Gyatso (Tib. ཇུན་པ་གྱུ་མཚོ་).

<sup>71</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 36:50-1, *sohon ihan inenggi* / 巳丑.

<sup>72</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 868.

<sup>73</sup> Unda 溫達, 37:45, *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

name have become clear, the Desi cannot go unpunished. If the Dalai Lama knew the truth, he, too, would be grateful to me.<sup>74</sup>

Elhe Taifin Khan again emphasizes his own conformity to the Dalai Lama's perceived conviction, while further painting the Desi as untrustworthy. Even the Dalai Lama would have opposed his actions, and therefore, consequences are in order. Since Elhe Taifin was patron to the Dalai Lama, he would defend his beneficiary, and thus defend the Gelugpa. Moreover, not only had the Desi deceived all adherents to the Gelugpa school, Elhe Taifin Khan now believed that he had instigated an attempt by the Zunghars to penetrate into the borders of his empire, thereby destabilizing his state. The Desi's deceit was not a diplomatically isolated event; it involved all major players on the Daiqing's western frontier. Due to the challenge to Elhe Taifin Khan's authority, Tibet was thrust forward as the conflict with Galdan drew to a close, and thenceforth remained at the center of the Khan's attention in his efforts to stabilize the western front. The Desi's miraculously successful attempt at concealing the decease of the Dalai Lama proved to be a watershed in Qing-Tibetan relations.

#### 1.4 Conclusion

The first half of the seventeenth century was a period of great conflict in East Asia. On the Tibetan plateau, a war broke out between religious schools, involving Mongols because of their military capabilities. Finally, the Gelugpa won out, thanks in large part to support from the Khoshut Mongols. They established a theocracy with the Dalai Lama in a stronger position than had ever been the case before. Simultaneously, the Daiqing dynasty emerged as a potent force, vanquishing the Northern Yuan, and eventually also conquering China proper. The new Tibetan government and the Daiqing court soon looked to each other for legitimacy and support. They based themselves on historical precedent in the cultivation of their priest-patron relationship, invoking the memories of Phagpa and Kubilai Khan, or Altan Khan and the Third Dalai Lama.

The rise of the Zunghars and their threat to the Daiqing complicated the relationship between the Ganden Phodrang and the Daiqing court. When the Dalai Lama passed away in 1682, his death was concealed by the Desi, Sangye Gyatso. He understood that Tibet was vulnerable to instability, as there was no political ruler strong enough to exercise religious authority. After the death of Gushri Khan, there was no ruler among the Mongols strong enough to keep them in line, and to keep the Zunghars further north at bay. When Elhe Taifin Khan finally discovered the Desi's deceit, he took it as a great affront, as it was a grave violation to the priest-patron relationship. In addition, he became convinced that the Desi was at fault for the conflict with the Zunghars. As Elhe Taifin Khan learnt of the tremendous influence wielded by the Desi, the Khan rebuked him. The Desi constantly aligns himself with the Dalai Lama, claiming to act in accordance with the Dalai Lama's wishes, merely protecting him. Elhe Taifin framed the Desi not only as a rogue official who acted in conflict with the Dalai Lama's will, he also became the villain of the entire Zunghar war.

This portrayal is made visible through the description of the Desi in the Daiqing histories. He is depicted as someone bent on the destabilization of the Empire and the Daiqing's hegemony on the Central Asian frontier. In the next chapter, I analyze the portrayal of the Desi in the Daiqing sources, focusing on the Desi's appearance in the *Strategic Histories* as compared to the Khan's private remarks on him.

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<sup>74</sup> Unda 溫達, 40:80, *nihon qoko inenggi* / 乙酉.

## Chapter 2: Palace Memorials in the *Strategic Histories*

Due to the extensive archival and historiographic institutions of the Daiqing dynasty, documentation and records of events during the Daiqing are voluminous and often very detailed. Several layers of history can be retraced through the Daiqing's chronicles. Due to the amount of extant archival materials, many events that have been described can be researched in detail, through comparison of different historiographic works of the Daiqing to either off-sequence Daiqing sources or sources external to the Daiqing. Starting from Elhe Taifin period, the Daiqing dynasty introduced a new genre in history writing, that of the *Strategic History*. The primary goal of these histories was to reflect the strategies by which the enemy in a particular conflict had been defeated. These histories are much more detailed, however, and include anything in relation to the conflict they cover. Unique about these historic works is the level of precision in their documentation. They are chronologically organized, and before discussing the events of any particular day, they always state the Khan's location when he was on expedition. The entire work was compiled both in Chinese and in Manchu. They have formed the basis for countless historiographic works and academic research. Thus, the *Strategic Histories* might even "still control our perception of Daiqing imperial expansion."<sup>75</sup> Therefore, their importance for modern understanding, and equally crucial, misunderstanding, of conflicts in the Daiqing dynasty cannot be overstated.

The events concerning Desi Sangye Gyatso's role in the war with Galdan Boshogtu Khan of the Zunghars are meticulously recorded in the *Strategic History of the Personally Lead Expeditions for Pacification of the West and Northwest*.<sup>76</sup> Usually, the compilation of *Strategic Histories* would include all relevant documents to an event, copy and translate them into the text.<sup>77</sup> The incorporated documents were usually redacted, to an extent befitting the content's suitability to the intended narrative. This censorship is visible again when Sangye Gyatso is discussed in the *Strategic History*. Of particular interest here is the role played by the Manchu language. It was used especially for sensitive information, so that almost all of the highest-level communication in the Daiqing court was in Manchu. This also goes for the Khan's communication with the court, while he was away on his expeditions. His memorials often contain details of military strategy, and were therefore highly sensitive. They were sent in highest secrecy to the court, often to be disclosed only to Manchu officials of the Inner Court. Sometimes the explicit instruction was given not to translate the content to Chinese.<sup>78</sup> This highlights the importance of the information discussed, and raises questions about the compilation of the *Strategic Histories*.<sup>79</sup> After all, if the Khan had earlier commanded not to translate, could the information still be incorporated into the public and multilingual *Strategic History*? What are the consequences for historiography, in either scenario?

Thus, since the original archival materials are still extant and accessible, this chapter aims to elucidate where censorship might have taken place in the *Strategic History*, through

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<sup>75</sup> Crossley, "The Historical Writing of Qing Imperial Expansion," 51.

<sup>76</sup> Ma. *beye dailame wargi amargi babe neqihiyeme toktobuha bodogon i bithe*; Ch. *qinzheng pingding shuomo fanglüe* 親征平定朔漠方略.

<sup>77</sup> Zhou 周, "Lun Qingdai Fanglüe de Shixue Jiazhi 论清代方略的史学价值," 84.

<sup>78</sup> Crossley and Rawski, "A Profile," 71-2. Ch. *búyì* 不譯; Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*. One example of an explicit statement to inform exclusively Manchu officials can be found on page 254, in the conclusion of a memorial from the Khan to his son Inqeng: *hwang taiheo de donjibu . gung ni dolo donjibu . manju aliha da aliha amban . dorgi hiya amban de donjibu*. "Divulge this to the Empress, divulge it to the Inner Court, divulge it to the Manchu court ministers, and to the Inner Court guards and officials."

<sup>79</sup> The value, history, and method of compilation of *Strategic Histories* is discussed more extensively by Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A New Manual*, 835; Zhou 周, "Lun Qingdai Fanglüe de Shixue Jiazhi 论清代方略的史学价值"; Yao 姚, "Qingdai Dang'an Yu Guanxiu Fanglüe 清代档案与官修方略." For a more extensive elaboration on the Khan's memorials, the value and unique nature of Manchu primary, archival materials, and the Palace Memorial system by which they were sent, see Chuang 莊, *Qingdai Zouzhe Zhidu* 清代奏摺制度; Elliott, "The Manchu-Language Archives"; Borjigidai, *Manchu Archives and Studies*.

examination of the Khan's memorials back to the central court in Beijing. It examines also the similarities between the redactions, and explains the intent behind censorship in content and the discrepancies between the different editions.

### 2.1 *Adaptation of Palace Memorials in the Strategic History*

When the Dalai Lama passed away, the Desi made sure nothing would change. Tibet was vulnerable to instability due to a lack of legitimate rulership if the Dalai Lama's passing should be disclosed. The Panchen Lama was not yet ready to rule, the Qoshot Mongol successor to Gushi Khan, Dalai Khan, did not wield as much authority. Moreover, Tibet was engaged in a war on its western border.<sup>80</sup> This was not a time for further shocks to this fragile, young state. Most likely, this is why Desi Sangye Gyatso chose not to reveal the Dalai Lama's passing. In fact, it appears that the Desi was so successful in his deceit, that he had begun to strengthen his position as ruler. The Daiqing court granted the Desi the title of *wang*, 'king' of Tibet, in 1694, upon his own request. This demonstrates not only the Desi's audacity and confidence, but also, as Dai argues, that the Daiqing did not question the Desi's loyalty to them.<sup>81</sup> Certainly, this move solidified the Desi's position. However, in all the forty-eight volumes of the Chinese version of the *Strategic History*, the Desi is only referred to as *Wang Diba* twice,<sup>82</sup> and three more times the bestowal of the title is being questioned; the Khan explains why he originally gave the title, and proclaims his regret:

The Desi was originally a low-ranking official to the Dalai Lama, because of his excellence I promoted him, but while he openly defended the way of Tsongkhapa, in secrecy he colluded with Galdan to betray the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Kvtuktu,<sup>83</sup> and to ruin Tsongkhapa's teachings. Earlier, he sent Jedrung Trülku to Galdan to read sūtras and choose the date of war. For the benefit of all living beings, I invited the Panchen Kvtuktu, but the Desi did not allow him to go.<sup>84</sup>

When only two years later Elhe Taifin heard from his prisoners that the Desi had been lying to him for almost fifteen years, the revelation was all the more shocking. It was after the battle at Terelji in Jao Modo county in the summer of 1696. First, the Khan sent two lamas to find out the truth. One of these, Pönchung Jinpa Gyatso had lived with the Dalai Lama before, so he would know the Dalai Lama's face, and be able to confirm that he was still alive. Once in Lhasa, the lamas were not allowed to see him, but had to wait until the Dalai Lama would leave his meditative seclusion.<sup>85</sup>

The Khan now drafted letters to the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, Dalai Khan, the Desi, and Tsewang Rabten, Galdan's nephew, and an ally of the Daiqing in the war against Galdan. In these letters, he made four demands of the Desi: "to report truthfully the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama; to uphold the Panchen as the leader of the Yellow Sect and allow him to go to Beijing; to surrender to the Daiqing [Jedrung Trülku, who the Desi sent to instigate Galdan's attack on the Qing, according to Elhe Taifin], and to escort Galdan's daughter [...] to Beijing."<sup>86</sup> He ended his edict outright threatening the Desi with war, "as per the example

<sup>80</sup> Petech, "The Tibetan-Ladakhi-Moghul War (1681-83)."

<sup>81</sup> Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 47-48.

<sup>82</sup> 王第巴.

<sup>83</sup> In Manchu, a reincarnation is referred to by means of Mongolian nomenclature. Most commonly, the word *kvtuktu* is used, a loan from Mongolian *qutuγtu* (Mo. Cyr. хурарт). It is an honorific, meaning 'exalted.' The Mongolian word for 'reincarnation' is also found, rendered in Manchu as *hvbilgan*, from Mongolian *qubilyan* (Mo. Cyr. хувилгаан).

<sup>84</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 26:111-2 *xanggiyan indahvn inenggi* /庚戌.

<sup>85</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 508-9; Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 36:31.

<sup>86</sup> Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 49.

of breaking Galdan.”<sup>87</sup> Selected as the emissary was Booju, Second Class Secretary of the Lifanyuan.<sup>88</sup> He was sent on his way in September 1696.

Booju had reached Ü-Tsang, or Central Tibet, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of December 1696. Before the Desi, he delivered the Khan’s message clearly, “endeavoring to make the Desi understand all your edicts, one by one.”<sup>89</sup> Then, the Desi gave his reply to the various letters. Booju wrote up a memorial, quoting the Desi’s reply in full. He sent this to the Khan as a secret memorial. It reached him on the twentieth of February. The Desi starts out by stating his loyalty to the Daiqing Khan, emphasizing that he would not dare deviate from either the Dalai Lama’s, or the Khan’s will. When Booju laid before him the Khan’s four demands, the Desi rejected them all. He claimed that the Dalai Lama was still alive, and would soon come out of his meditative recluse. Furthermore, he stated that he, along with everyone else, had encouraged the Panchen Lama to visit Beijing, and indeed, the Panchen had wished to go. However, he now professed the wish to stay in Ü-Tsang, after the envoys sent to invite him had used “threatening and uncomfortable language.”<sup>90</sup> It was only after the former envoy had departed, that Galdan’s envoy arrived. This is why, the Desi says, he does not blame Galdan for the Panchen’s reluctance. At this point, the *Strategic History* leaves out a small section of the original memorial: it was not only after the other envoy had left, that Galdan’s envoy arrived. It was after the other envoy left, *and* the Panchen Lama had relayed the intimidating conversation with the Daiqing’s representative to the Dalai Lama, which then became public, that Galdan’s envoys arrived.<sup>91</sup>

Regarding Elhe Taifin’s demands to send him Jedrung Trülku and Galdan’s daughter, the Desi conceded that Jedrung Trülku had deviated from the instructions of Elhe Taifin Khan, and the Dalai Lama.<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, he could not arrest Jedrung Trülku, since he was a great reincarnation, and, according to Booju, the seventh in his line of reincarnations.<sup>93</sup> Still, he had been punished. The Desi had confiscated his household and possessions, and banished Jedrung Trülku to Kham, the easternmost part of Tibet. Finally, the Desi discusses Elhe Taifin’s demand to deliver him Galdan’s daughter. The Desi pleads for her life with Elhe Taifin.<sup>94</sup>

Booju’s presentation of the Desi’s response has been incorporated into the *Strategic History* in its entirety, and almost without any alteration. Only two short clauses have been omitted. Otherwise, no significant adaptations have been brought about. The second of these short, omitted clauses has been discussed above. The first is the opening formula, which is merely a fixed statement of respect toward the Khan, required in all memorials. It was replaced by a short explanation on the circumstances of the memorial:

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<sup>87</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 26:111-2 *xanggiyan indahvn inenggi* / 庚戌: 如破噶爾丹之例。

<sup>88</sup> Ma. *ejeku hafan booju*; Ch. 主事保住。

<sup>89</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 605.

<sup>90</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, 605–13: *xerime iqakv gisun*.

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> Booju may have misunderstood the Desi, or a mishap in translation might have taken place. The Desi refers to Jirung Kvtuktu in his letter as one of the seven *qorji*, a Manchu rendering of the Tibetan *chorje* རྗེ་ལྷན་པོ།, ‘dharma-lords.’ See Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, 666-675.

<sup>94</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, 605–13:

‘You, Mañjuśrī-Khan, love all black-headed people under heaven, as if they were your own newborn children. So, while I would send you this one girl, how could this be any benefit to your empire? It is only Galdan who is ruining your rule and the Dharma. It is only therefore that you, Lord, would wish to cut short the lives of his descendants. Having stated it like this, she is only one girl, do not make a distinction between her and her husband, let them live on as before. This one thing I, the Desi, request of you, kneeling and venerating you.’

*Memorial*

Memorial. Respectfully presented by Booju, Second Class Secretary of the Lifanyuan. Due to my intention to follow the imperial instructions.

*Strategic History*

Booju, Second Class Secretary of the Lifanyuan, who was sent as an envoy to the Desi's vicinity, presents a report of the situation regarding the Desi.

Even though this memorial has been adapted with relatively few changes, it illustrates the thorough comprehensiveness of the editing process of the compilers. Consider the Manchu fragments below:

*Memorial*

ferguwequke ejen enduringge ofi . yaya baita be doigonde sara jakade uthai ishun aniya . dalai lama i qan qi tuqire be safi . ere juwe lama be takabume unggihengge . mini dolo ambula urgunjembi

ere onqon lama . daqi dalai lama i hanqi juwan aniya tehe be dahame . ere tuwaqi endembio

[...]

geren i kenehunjere gvnin inu nakambi

[...]

ere emu baita be diba bi niyakvrafi hengkileme baimbi

*Strategic History*

ferguwequke ejen enduringge ofi . yaya baita be doigonde sara jakade uthai ishun aniya . dalai lama i qan qi tuqire be safi . ere juwe lama be takabume unggihengge . mini dolo ambula urgunjembi

ere onqon lama . daqi dalai lama i hanqi juwan aniya tehe be dahame . ere tuwaqi endembio

[...]

geren i genehunjere gvnin inu nakambi

[...]

ere emu baita be diba bi niyakvrafi hengkileme baimbi<sup>95</sup>

While the wording of these fragments is exactly the same, their punctuation reveals that they have been revised. In memorials, punctuation is somewhat more generously used. Furthermore, the double dots are much more prevalent. Usually, single dots are meant to delineate clauses, or parts of sentences, or geographical and personal names. Therefore, the single dot is prolifically used after words such as *jakade* 'because,' *manggi* 'afterwards,' which are phrase-final conjunctions, and object marker *be* and locative case marker *de*, and in enumerations. Generally, the single dots maintain their original position once adapted into the *Strategic History*, although sometimes they are removed, too (marked in pink). On the other hand, double dots are much less prevalent. In memorials, they are used often to delineate sections of a memorial, perhaps equivalent to a paragraph. However, in the *Strategic History*, they are used much less frequently, exclusively to conclude a larger section, such as an entire day, or an entire memorial. In the sections above, the altered double dots have been marked in green. Whereas they occur four times on about two consecutive pages, from which I have selected these excerpts, they have been eliminated from the *Strategic History*, where they only occur once the entire memorial has concluded.

Once a memorial is incorporated into the *Strategic History*, it is clearly not merely copied, but carefully made to fit the style of the historiographic work. The punctuation has

<sup>95</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 36:57-8 *sohon ihan inenggi* / 己丑 ; Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 609-11.

been normalized, with the double dots now signifying the full end of a larger section, whereas they were employed much more generously in the original memorials.

In addition to the Desi's response, Booju added a personal comment, which unsurprisingly was not edited out of the state history narrative: "this time, the Desi was trembling with fear."<sup>96</sup> Therefore, at this point, the Desi seems to have realized the gravity of his affront to Elhe Taifin. He had also sent another set of letters to Elhe Taifin, which arrived on the 13<sup>th</sup> of March 1696, some two months after Booju had delivered his initial report on the meeting with Desi Sangye Gyatso. He himself sent three letters, two short ones, and one somewhat more elaborate. Secondly, among these letters was also a short appeal by Dalai Han. Curiously, the *Strategic History* mentions that on that day, "the letter presented by the Desi in order to explain his own position and to request a gentle edict had arrived."<sup>97</sup>

This instance is an example of more thorough redacting on the part of the Daiqing historiographers. Again, like the previous document, the opening formula has been omitted. This is quite a redaction, since the opening formula is very extensive:

A memorial to the radiance of the Superior Mañjuśrī Khan, who is renowned by all for his majesty and fortune, and who has unified all that is under heaven, while bringing together the palms of the hands in veneration, and after having knelt, respectfully presented by the King *who has achieved Buddhahood*, promulgates the teachings of the Buddha, and protects the law of the vajra-wielding Dalai Lama.<sup>98</sup>

It may seem fairly insignificant to remove such a lengthy opening formula. While it does not contribute to the content of the letter, it does speak to the position of the Desi in Daiqing history. In this passage, the Desi refers to himself as a *wang*, a 'king.' Certainly, he had the right to use this title in correspondence with the Daiqing. After all, the Daiqing court had granted him this title in 1694. However, he is almost exclusively referred to by the Daiqing as simply *diba*, the Manchu word for 'Desi.' His rank of *wang* is almost never mentioned. In the *Strategic History*, an attempt is made to erase this earlier mistake of granting the Desi the title. While the title is almost never used, thus discrediting the earlier recognition of the Desi, it is referred to several times. For example, Elhe Taifin expresses regret at his earlier decision, specifically implying that he was deceived. After all, the Desi was colluding with Galdan in secrecy, trying to undermine him.<sup>99</sup>

Likewise, in the beginning of the letter, a seemingly small alteration changes the precise intention of the text. In the beginning of this letter, the Desi states the reason for his reply:

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<sup>96</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 613.

<sup>97</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 37:28 *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

<sup>98</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 666–75. In the translation given above, the cursive part reflects Manchu *butda abdi*. This certainly is not a Manchu phrase, nor is it Chinese, Tibetan or Mongolian. Possibly, it should correspond to Sanskrit *buddha āpti* बुद्ध आप्ति, and I have tentatively translated it as such.

<sup>99</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 26:111-2 *xanggiyan indahvn inenggi* / 庚戌.



*Memorial*

The Chinese in the north and the Mongols all respect the religion of Tsongkhapa and Dalai Lama Sönam Gyatso. Although ever since their time, up until the current Dalai Lama, there have been patrons, none among the patron-lords has ever been above the divine Khan.

*Strategic History*

Although the Chinese in the north and the Mongols all respect the religion of Tsongkhapa and the Dalai Lama, none among them has ever been above the divine Khan.<sup>100</sup>

While the original text states a specific timeframe, in the *Strategic History*, the superiority of Elhe Taifin Khan is made indefinite, detached from a timeframe altogether. Even though a small alteration like this one does not compromise the content of the letter, it is precisely through these types of changes that a shift in symbolic positioning takes place. The Desi is stripped of the titles granted by the Daiqing, and as such is portrayed as less legitimate and more of an opportunist in the eyes of the Daiqing. Simultaneously, the Khan is given a stronger role.

After a lengthy opening, the Desi's letter proceeds to repeat mostly what Booju also reported. Although the Desi could not give in to any of the four demands, he maintains his innocence, asks for forgiveness from the Khan, and claims that he is doing everything he can to obey the Khan. Any indications that he is not behaving accordingly are merely due to his own incomprehension:

In my opinion, I think I have not behaved in an evil and rebellious way in any instance. Since it is just because of a lack of understanding that deviant behavior might emerge, could you forgive me, please? I am willing to devote myself fully to following the Khan's edicts, and therefore, I have presented to you before. Now, however, I am respectfully following the Khan's edicts, striving to do the best I can. Since you think lovingly of the Dalai Lama, please, bestow upon me a gentle edict.<sup>101</sup>

The Desi's letter has been preserved almost wholly in the *Strategic History*, with not many more changes made than to Booju's report. Apart from the opening formula, other changes that are made are adaptations and omissions or personal names and toponyms. For example, the Desi several times specifies locations in Tibet, where events have taken place. Both times, the Tibetan place names are seemingly deemed irrelevant to the history, since they are replaced by a more generic phrase, or simply left out:

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<sup>100</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 666–75; Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 37:29–43 *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

<sup>101</sup> Unda 溫達, 37:29–43 *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

*Memorial*

When Bark'am and other places like it requested us to send reinforcements, they first communicated this with other places.

In accordance with your edict, we took Ri U Qekul, Tubdan, and the temple called Qoimk'ur Ling that were subordinate to him.

*Strategic History*

This was first communicated to other places.

In accordance with your edict, we took the temple that was subordinate to him.<sup>102</sup>

These changes are inconsequential to the content of this letter, and do not do harm to the reliability of the *Strategic History* as a historic source. Still, the *Strategic History* is certainly less detailed than the original letter. Two other small, but fairly inconsequential changes, are the removal of the loanword *sakil*, 'vow,' twice, and the replacement of two single words.<sup>103</sup>

Along with this first letter, included were three more letters. Altogether, on the 24<sup>th</sup> of the second month of Elhe Taifin 36, or March 16<sup>th</sup> 1697, four letters arrived from the Tibetan government. The Desi had sent three, including his lengthy reply cited above. The other two letters were considerably shorter. These additional letters are the first examples of significant, impactful adjustments to the narrative of the Desi's deceit, and his correspondence with the Khan, in the *Strategic History*. While sometimes, adjustments are made to the content and form of a text that is incorporated into the *Strategic History*, it is not usually the case that documents are completely left out of the historic work. In this instance, the history omits three out of the four letters that the Desi and Dalai Khan have sent to the Khan sequentially. Also, the history does not mention anything with regard to their contents. The first of these three is quite short, but perhaps the most relevant:

Presented by the Desi. Presented with respect beneath the feet of the radiance of the Supreme Mañjuśrī Khan, whose unblemished learning is like a flower, and who has unified all between heaven and earth by means of his might and fortune. As you look upon all living beings full of benevolence, you yourself led your army against the rebellious enemy. You have eliminated the origin of the brutal, rebellious people. I have taken up this letter to congratulate you, because you have completely annihilated the enemy, along with hadas to cover it, along with a statue of the *Bazar Bidarana* Buddha, who is able to destroy all things, and along with a statue of Gyaltzen, who announces all heroes who vanquish their adversaries. As an example, even though they are cheap things, I have offered as many flowers as I could obtain to the Buddha. In any case, I implore you to reflect on this with enlightenment, please reflect on it!<sup>104</sup>

The Desi opens this letter exceptionally respectfully, with a lengthy opening formula, addressing the Khan as the Supreme Mañjuśrī Khan, signaling that he is recognized as the highest authority (*dergi*), and a legitimate ruler to Buddhism, as he is recognized as a manifestation of Mañjuśrī. He proceeds to congratulate the Khan with the defeat of Galdan, and even offers to the Buddha on the Khan's behalf. He praises the Khan for his accomplishments. This conflicts directly with the Khan's view of the Desi; he maintains that the Desi is cooperating with Galdan to undermine his campaign against the Zunghars. In the second letter, the Desi tells the Khan that he acts in accordance with both the Dalai Lama's

<sup>102</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 666–75; Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 37:29–43 *sahaliyan tasha inengi* / 壬寅.

<sup>103</sup> Mongolian *sakil* (Мо. Суг. сахил).

<sup>104</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 676–82.

wishes, as well as the Khan's.<sup>105</sup> He asks the Khan to reflect on the difficult situation that he is in. He cannot both be true to the Dalai Lama, and obey the Khan's wishes completely.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, he hopes that the Khan will consider aligning his actions with the Dalai Lama's view, and again asks to be forgiven for any offense that he might have given, without being aware of it.<sup>107</sup> Finally, Dalai Khan's short letter says that he is saddened to hear that the Khan has sent a reprimanding edict to the Desi, and he urges the Khan to "henceforth, ceaselessly issue edicts that are good to the rule and dharma, like before."<sup>108</sup>

In the three additional letters, the Desi approaches the Khan, asks for forgiveness on the basis of his kindness, and urges the Khan not to behave differently from the way advocated by the Dalai Lama. Different from the first letter, which has been included in the *Strategic History*, is that the Desi first took responsibility for his mistakes, only asking the Khan for forgiveness. Seemingly, the Desi here positions himself alongside the Khan, presenting himself as an ally through congratulating the Khan on his defeat of Galdan. At the same time, he stresses that he cannot obey the Khan and the Dalai Lama both, because they are striving for different goals. This implies that the Khan is deviating from the Dalai Lama's will. In this, he is supported by Dalai Khan, the Khan of the Qoshot Mongols, who now holds the title of "Dharma-king, upholder of religion," as successor to Gushi Khan.

Through the removal of these three documents, the narrative for the most part removes the agency of the Desi and completely excludes Dalai Khan's perspective. Rather, the Desi's point of view is presented with only one of his three letters, in which he defies the Khan's demands, but simultaneously claims to do his best to follow the Khan's will. Through the exclusion of Dalai Khan, who actually agrees with the Desi, the Desi is portrayed even more strongly as a deviant character, whose only ally is the evil Galdan. The focus shifts to Khan Elhe Taifin's view of the Desi, who now proceeds to actively shape the narrative, in his own favor.

## 2.2 The Mongol Factor

The Desi is cut short after only one of his messages. Now, the *Strategic History* presents what happens after the Khan has received and read the letter from the Desi, and presumably also the other two letters, as well as the letter from Dalai Khan. This episode is concluded by the Khan, who takes over the narrative from the Desi. Elhe Taifin takes the opportunity presented to him by the Desi's request to demonstrate his imperial benevolence. He shows the message to his advisors,<sup>109</sup> and asks them for their opinion on the matter. The advisors once more cite the Desi's crimes; "he has fallen short on all demands," referring to the four demands Elhe Taifin made. Therefore, he must be reminded, and another edict should be sent.<sup>110</sup> The Khan disagrees with his advisors. He presents his point of view, considering an angle that confirms the strategic importance of the support of Tibet: the Mongols. The excerpt below is given in full, because of the crucial point that the Khan is making.

My opinion differs from yours; I have read in the histories and classics that there are many instances in which the Outer Mongols invaded and tormented China. From the Han, Tang, and Song dynasties up until the Ming, generation upon generation has borne

<sup>105</sup> *ibid.*: *bi ubade eiten be sara gala de xu ilga be jafaha dalai lamai hese be huxxeme alifi . juwe jurgan i doro xajin be heolederakv faxxambi .*

<sup>106</sup> *ibid.*: *mini teile dergi amba han i baita de muterei teile faxxaqibe . genggiyen i gvmin de aqanahakv ofi .*

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*: *dalai lamai emgi doro xajin emu oho sain doro be genggiyen i bulekuxereo . mini donjihakv sahakv haqin be beye tuqibuhe babe bulekuxefi onqodoroo .*

<sup>108</sup> *ibid.*: *ereqi amasi kemuni nenehe songkoi doro xajin de sain ogoro hese be lakqarakv wasimbureo ..*

<sup>109</sup> 'Advisor' translates Manchu *hebe i amban*; Chinese *yìzhèngchén* 議政臣.

<sup>110</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 37:42-3, *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

suffering. To our state, it is more beneficial to make the Mongols want to submit to us, instead of intimidating them. Our armed forces are a terrifying tool. Only when the divine ruler has no other choice should he use them. For example, when boils grow on the human body, we should use needles and sage. May our muscles and skin in good health be harmed in vain? The way of ruling the world is just like that. If confusion has occurred somewhere, we undertake a military expedition to protect. If nothing is amiss, we leave it at peace. By this reasoning, everyone gets to live at their own accord. Moreover, ever since the distant past, we have ranged far with our expeditions. There were none, who did not do harm to the Court's vigor. Therefore, I have made it the highest priority to make sure that such events do not recur! All Mongols respect the Dalai Lama like the Buddha.<sup>111</sup>

The Khan has brilliantly taken over the narrative. He begins by confirming that the Mongols, indeed, are the real threat; a good relation with Tibet is a crucial means to the end of pacification of the frontier and elimination of the Zunghar threat. But, ever since the Han dynasty, no Chinese dynasty has ever successfully dealt with the threat from the steppe. By invoking the historic record of successive Chinese dynasties, Elhe Taifin both reaffirms himself as the legitimate successor to them, and elevates himself above them, since he will be able to vanquish the Mongols for the first time in history. Elhe Taifin's method to achieve this is ingenious. He aims to have the Mongols voluntarily submit themselves to him. This can only be accomplished through cooperation with the Dalai Lama. Now, he turns to the Desi.

The Desi has conducted affairs in the Dalai Lama's stead. Galdan's evil and rebellious behavior is all due to the Desi. Therefore, I dispatched Second Class Secretary Booju to bestow upon the Desi a reprimanding edict. Now, the Desi is terribly afraid, and he has obeyed all my edicts. He is very humble in his memorials, and has explained his situation. He has requested my loving compassion. Afraid, he is embarrassed about his crimes and he has confessed. This might be called the highest form of respect! It was abundantly clear that I was aware of the Dalai Lama's passing. The Desi sent Nyimathang Shabdrung to secretly inform me in detail. After Nyimathang Shabdrung arrived, it would surely come out that the Dalai Lama had passed away. He requested me to conceal it on their account. The Dalai Lama had gotten along with us well for over sixty years, there was never any strife between us. When the Desi was respecting our favor, all Mongols were also content. What are your thoughts?<sup>112</sup>

Elhe Taifin blames all of the conflict with Galdan on the Desi. This is no small accusation, and reveals much about the perceived weight carried by the Dalai Lama's position.<sup>113</sup> The Khan asserts that if the Desi had not, in the Dalai Lama's name, lent his support to Galdan, he may never have campaigned against the Daiqing. Such a severe crime should not go unpunished. Therefore, he had sent Booju to reprimand the Desi. The Khan states several bewildering things about the Desi at this time. First, he says that the Desi is scared, and has "obeyed all [his] edicts."<sup>114</sup> At this point, this seems completely untrue. In the only letter from the Desi that has been recorded in the history, as well as the other two, the Desi has denied all the Khan's charges, maintained that the Dalai Lama was still alive, and refused to give in to the Khan's other three demands. Yet, the Khan here states the opposite.

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<sup>111</sup> Unda 溫達, 37:43-7, *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> The weight of the Dalai Lama's position is also confirmed when the Eight Taijis, the leaders of the Qoshot Mongols in Kokonor, are asked to specify their allegiance to the Khan and the Dalai Lama. Their answer reads: 'In the east is the Khan, in the west is the Dalai Lama, and we have made their two ways one.' Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 28:5-6.

<sup>114</sup> Unda 溫達, 37:43-7, *sahaliyan tasha inenggi* / 壬寅.

Then, the Khan also brings up the secret communication from Nyimathang Shabdrung for the first time.<sup>115</sup> Around the arrival of Booju in Lhasa, the Desi sent an urgent message, carried by Nyimathang.<sup>116</sup> Probably, the Khan's reprimand had frightened the Desi. In his bibliography of the sixth Dalai Lama, the Desi writes that he had promised a truthful accounting to the Khan's delegate.<sup>117</sup> However, no such promise is mentioned by Booju, and there is nothing in the Daiqing records to suggest that he did. Up until this point, this secret communication had not been mentioned in the *Strategic History*. Here, the Khan discloses it, and makes clear that it has already taken place. Nyimathang had relayed to the Khan a secret message, orally.<sup>118</sup> That it was oral is crucial; without a record on paper, the message was more difficult to incorporate into the *Strategic History*. While the exact content is not provided here, the Khan reveals that Nyimathang had confirmed that the Dalai Lama was indeed deceased, and the Desi admitted to the crime of concealing it.

Now, the Khan comes around to his final point: in the past, the Desi obeyed the Khan. Rather, the Khan did not take any notice of dealings in Tibet, since they did not influence his affairs. Only when it turned out that the Desi was influencing the Mongols and inciting violence against the Daiqing, did he turn to Tibet. As long as the Desi obeyed the Khan, not only was there peace, but the Mongols were also all content, says the Khan. This is his real ambition: to pacify the Mongols. Now that the Desi had pronounced his regret for his decision, and appeared to be remorseful, the Khan decided he could be forgiven. Still, though, the Desi had only given in to one of the Khan's four demands. The Khan's willingness to let these demands slide emphasizes the precarious position of the Khan. The Mongols on the frontier were an unstable and large force; making steps in the direction of peace on the frontier was his primary goal. Antagonizing the Desi, or waging war on the position of the Dalai Lama would surely exasperate the Mongols and imperil the Khan's favorable status to Buddhists. So, Elhe Taifin chose to forgive the Desi, since he professed his renewed loyalty to the Daiqing.

Elhe Taifin is then lauded by his advisers for his acumen. For now, this was the end of the matter. Booju and Nyimathang would be dispatched together to inform the Desi of the Khan's decision later on. The Khan summarizes all of this and further developments in one lengthy account to his son at court.

### 2.3 A Final Turn of Events

About six weeks later, the Khan had received Nyimathang and heard his message. To reply to the Desi, he had yet again dispatched Booju, together with Nyimathang Shabdrung. With his new edict under way, Elhe Taifin describes the recent events concerning his relationship with the Desi. Altogether, this description is exceptionally long for a palace memorial: some twenty-three pages. It has been incorporated into the *Strategic History*, albeit not in its entirety. While the memorial is dated only once, it has been distributed over three dates in the *Strategic History*, and various parts of the twenty-three page memorial have been cut up and distributed over almost ninety pages in the *Strategic History*. The content of the memorial has been divided over two dates, that are three days apart. The former section of the

<sup>115</sup> *Nyimathang Shabdrung* (Tib. ཉིམ་ཐང་ཞབས་བྲལ།) is in Manchu and Chinese named the *Nimatang Kvtuktu / Nimatáng Kütükètu* 尼玛唐库图克图. *Kvtuktu* is a loanword from Mongolian, reflecting Tibetan *trülku* (ལྷ་ལྔ།) 'emanation body,' the current manifestation in a line of reincarnated lamas. The Tibetan term *shabdrung* (ཞབས་བྲལ།) 'at the feet of' echos the exalted position he held in the Tibetan clergy; it is a term used for reincarnated lamas held in high regard.

<sup>116</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908," 29.

<sup>117</sup> Aris, *Hidden Treasures and Secret Lives*, 142. Neither Booju, nor the Khan, have made any mention of the Desi's promise to give an honest report, although he did send Nyimathang Shabdrung precisely for this purpose.

<sup>118</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 40:06: *xahvn meihe inenggi: nimatang kvtuktu sei anggai wesimbuhengge*; Unda 溫達, 40:04: 辛巳: 尼麻唐庫圖克圖等口奏云. It has only been specified in the *Strategic History* that his memorial was oral. In the Khan's memorial, no mention is made of oral presentation.

memorial, together with a small part of the latter section, are given on April 21<sup>st</sup>, 1697. The remaining parts, and additions, are given four days later, on April 25<sup>th</sup>, while in the original memorial was only the date of arrival at court was given; April 30<sup>th</sup>.<sup>119</sup> The coherence of this memorial has been lost entirely, where the original memorial reads as a fluid whole. Yet, in the state history, it has been broken up into smaller pieces, it is interrupted, sometimes new sections have been added for additional detail, some parts are left out, and the text has not gone unedited, either. The entire memorial has been subject to thorough redaction.

This memorial is of singular importance. At a personal level, the Khan gives his thoughts on the Desi; he surmises the sequence of events, and new details are given about the correspondence between the Khan and the Desi. It demonstrates a miscalculation on the Khan's part; how he was outsmarted by the Desi. Most crucially, it illustrates how the narrative in the *Strategic History* has been altered to present Elhe Taifin more favorably.

The Khan begins with several personal comments, instructing his son to read it carefully, describing the process of memorializing by Nyimathang, also confessing his inclination toward the Dalai Lama. He feels he now fully understands what happened: "Now, they have cleared up all the affairs. Since it is quite exceptional, I do not consider this to be a trivial matter."<sup>120</sup> These remarks have been cut in the *Strategic History*. Instead, it presents a part from the end of the memorial, a message from the Desi, asking the Khan for his favor. He explains that he has requested the Dalai Khan and the Taijis of the Qoshot Mongols not to disclose the Dalai Lama's passing.

The memorial continues with Elhe Taifin's description of the content of Nyimathang's message, beginning with an immediate confirmation of Elhe Taifin's suspicion, followed by an explanation:

In the Dog-year [1682] the old Dalai Lama passed away. The young Dalai Lama is now fifteen *se* old. In our country, we depend on the Dalai Lama to survive. At the time that the Dalai Lama passed away, we had wanted to communicate it immediately, lest unrest break out.<sup>121</sup>

They say that the Desi had sworn before a Buddha-statue that their statement is true, and ask the Khan to keep the Dalai Lama's passing a secret, so as not to alarm anyone else. The Khan agrees to keep the secret until the eighth of December, the same year, as per the Desi's request.<sup>122</sup> In the memorial home, he writes:

I have spent the last several years in the knowledge that there was no Dalai Lama. If the Dalai Lama had really still lived, Jedrung Trülku and others would certainly not have behaved like this. It would also not have come to this downfall of the Kalka and the Oirat. Therefore, I had issued a severe edict. Now, though, since the Desi has with sincere heart disclosed the truth to me in a secret message, I shall also protect his confidence.<sup>123</sup>

Elhe Taifin states that he had known for years that the Dalai Lama had passed away, because of the behavior of various players on the Tibetan-Mongol stage, amongst whom Jedrung Trülku, who had aided Galdan. He does not mention the prisoners from the battle of Jao Modo, who had first told him about the Dalai Lama's decease. Elhe Taifin suggests that

<sup>119</sup> The date given on the memorial is 康熙三十六年閏三月十日到, 'arrived on April 30<sup>th</sup> 1697.' Then, in the *Strategic History*, the former part of the memorial is given on April 21<sup>st</sup> (*xahvn meihe inenggi* / 辛巳) and the second part on April 25<sup>th</sup> (*niohon qoko inenggi* / 乙酉).

<sup>120</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 863-85.

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.* In Manchu and Chinese, age is given in *se* (Manchu) or *sui* 歲 (Chinese). In the year that a child is born, it is already one *se* old. After the new year, one *se* is added; thus, the little Dalai Lama, born in the year 1682, was fifteen *se* old in the year 1696, or fourteen years in the Western tradition. A good rule of thumb is to subtract one from the number of *se* to come to the Western number, although one should keep in mind that there are exceptions to this guideline.

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.*, 864-5.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*

he found out by himself. Therefore, he had sent a severe edict, delivered by his envoy Booju. This edict achieved its intended effect of frightening the Desi into submission. Now, he held a more favorable view of the Desi, certainly also considering his importance to Mongol affairs. In the *Strategic History*, the memorial has so far been preserved with only minor adaptations: removal of single words such as *mini*, ‘my,’ or the editing of personal pronouns into an authoritative narrative: *bi* ‘I’ becomes *dergiqi* ‘from the Khan.’<sup>124</sup> Still, the content has remained untouched, save for the opening remarks. Here, a curious change takes place.

The memorial continues by stating that the Khan had sent an envoy to the Desi, as he wished to address a congratulatory letter to the sixth Dalai Lama. In the history, the text continues, saying: “issuing an edict to the Desi, I dispatched my envoy Booju.”<sup>125</sup> This, then, concludes the matter. However, in the memorial, the full text of the edict is given. It is missing from the Chinese and Manchu *Strategic History*. This is highly irregular, especially since it was an edict issued by Elhe Taifin himself. Usually, removed passages were written by adversaries or advisers, in order to emphasize the Khan’s train of thought, his personal narrative, over the others. However, in this instance, the content of the removed edict reveals a miscalculation on the part of the Khan. Until this point, he had felt content about the Desi’s confirmation of the Dalai Lama’s decease fifteen years earlier. Now, either because of genuine appeasement, or forced by the looming threat from the Mongol frontier, Elhe Taifin unequivocally acknowledges the Desi’s legitimacy. The opening formula addresses the Desi with the highest respect. It once more employs the title he was granted by the Qing, *wang butda abdi*, while also confirming that his role is in accordance with the Dalai Lama’s will.<sup>126</sup>

Issued to the King *Butda Abdi*, who expands and promulgates the teachings of the Buddha, and who holds the dharma of the vajra-wielding Dalai Lama.<sup>127</sup>

Most conspicuous is this wording corresponds exactly to the Desi’s own messages discussed above, which were also deleted from the *Strategic History*. To address the Desi precisely as he himself presented himself, with all titles and the epithets granted by the Dalai Lama, signals that Elhe Taifin acknowledged him as the legitimate ruler over Tibet, the “King of the Land of Tibet.”<sup>128</sup> The Khan continues by summarizing recent events in the Desi’s relationship with him. He blames the Desi for aiding Galdan, but acknowledges the shift in his allegiance.

*Butda Abdi*, you previously conspired with Galdan. Constantly, you were observing and siding with the Oirats. Because you acted stubborn and did not deliver Jedrung Trülku, who ruined our endeavor, I sent you an especially severe edict at that time, since it surely would not have been like this, if the Dalai Lama were present. Now, you are in great distress, due to the severe, instructive edict that the Divine Lord had issued. Now, I wish that you will reply that you only and with all your effort will respectfully obey the Khan’s edicts. You have memorialized to me a sincere request, saying: “if you think lovingly of the Dalai Lama, lovingly issue a gentle edict to me.”<sup>129</sup>

Subsequently, he continues to reiterate his remaining three demands: the delivery of Jedrung Trülku, the delivery of Galdan’s daughter, and allowing the Panchen Lama to visit

<sup>124</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 40:7-8; Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 864–65.

<sup>125</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 40:10.

<sup>126</sup> On the title *wang butda abdi*, ‘King who has achieved Buddhahood,’ see note 95.

<sup>127</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 866–67.

<sup>128</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, 666–75; Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 28:55 甲午: 土伯特國王; Unda 溫達, 28:105 *niowanggiyan morin inenggi: tubet gurun i wang*.

<sup>129</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 867–68.

Beijing. Finally, the Khan concludes with his vision of the future relationship between the Desi and himself.

If you henceforth do not disobey my edicts with all respect and submission, I will disregard your former transgressions, and cherish you as before. If it is like this, being of great merit to the people of your country, you will eternally receive the highest honor!<sup>130</sup>

This is the conclusion of Elhe Taifin's message to the Dalai Lama's court. There is no mention of a congratulatory message to the sixth Dalai Lama, even though this was purported to be the primary goal of the edict. The *Strategic History* leaves it only at that; a congratulatory message was sent.<sup>131</sup> However, the memorial offers a more candid perspective. The main purpose of this delegation to Lhasa was certainly not to congratulate the sixth Dalai Lama upon his accession, but rather to convince the Desi to submit to the Daiqing through threats, but enticing him with the prospects of the benefits brought by his submission. He panders to the Desi, addressing him with the title granted by Elhe Taifin himself two years earlier. It is striking how respectful the Khan is toward the Desi, whereas he had earlier accused him of working against himself and betraying the Dalai Lama, favoring Galdan.<sup>132</sup>

Although the message is worded softly, an ultimatum is implicit in the latter half. Elhe Taifin insists on his remaining three demands once more. He does assert himself as ruler over the entire world, and even claims to be responsible for the peace in Tibet.<sup>133</sup> Why, then, would such a message be removed from the *Strategic History*? One answer is the respectful demeanor and deferential address to the Desi. All instances that have awarded respect and title to the Desi have been removed from the *Strategic Histories*. The Khan's amical tone is in contrast with the narrative so far, and forwards, too. The Desi is always presented as a malignant antagonist, whereas the Khan had not always been so absolute in his judgment of the Desi. Another explanation for the deletion of this edict lies in a subsequent event. The Khan has made a gross miscalculation in his reconsideration of the Desi.

Several days went by after the Khan had dispatched Booju, bearing the considerate edict above. Elhe Taifin then received word from his envoy Inngu, who had been sent to Tsewang Rabten. Inngu reported that Tsewang Rabten was overjoyed to receive the Khan's edict, and immediately mobilized his troops to advance on Galdan. However, while Inngu was with Tsewang Rabten, a delegate from the Dalai Lama arrived. This messenger disclosed to Tsewang Rabten that the Dalai Lama had been dead for sixteen years now. The new Dalai Lama, to whom Desi Sangye Gyatso was still regent, had instructed him not to raise troops. Thus, Tsewang Rabten immediately laid down his arms and returned. On top of this, Inngu then said: "All the people in the northwest have heard about the situation of the Dalai Lama."<sup>134</sup>

Elhe Taifin was outraged. The Desi had broken his promise to keep the secret until December, playing Elhe Taifin for a fool. Also, he had caused Elhe Taifin's most important ally against Galdan to cease his participation in the conflict. There was no longer any question of his intentions. Elhe Taifin now unequivocally condemns the Desi:

Since his acts of deception through proclaiming all kinds of directives in the Dalai Lama's name have become clear, the Desi cannot go unpunished. If the Dalai Lama knew the truth, he, too, would be grateful to me. Therefore, even without speaking of it, no one will not be

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<sup>130</sup> *ibid.*, 870-1.

<sup>131</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 9-10, *xahvn meihe inenggi*; Unda 溫達, 7, 辛巳.

<sup>132</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 26:111-2: *xanggiyan indahvn inenggi* /庚戌.

<sup>133</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 868.

<sup>134</sup> *ibid.*, 871-2.



astonished by the Desi's evil to the land of Tibet, as they discover it.<sup>135</sup>

The Khan now turns to the Tibetan lamas, who he had sent to Lhasa to discover the truth of the matter. They are scolded and eventually punished for their purported disobedience. The memorial concludes with these remarks. Several more personal comments of the Khan have been cut out in the *Strategic History* here, varying from annoyances over translation procedures to a discussion of the Dalai Lama's burying rites.<sup>136</sup>

In spite of Elhe Taifin's anger towards the Desi, he does not take action against him. Apart from instructing Booju to proclaim the Dalai Lama's death all along the way to Lhasa, he took no further action, and did not alter the content of his messages.<sup>137</sup> This is crucial, and provides a new perspective in understanding the final stage of the issue between Elhe Taifin and the Desi. This new mission to Lhasa was sent just before Elhe Taifin's final campaign to the northwest. During this time, Galdan dies, exhausted. Elhe Taifin emerges victorious, and a new situation presents itself on the frontier. Tsewang Rabten has taken over as leader of the Zunghars, and Elhe Taifin has much enlarged the Daiqing's influence over Central Asia. Elhe Taifin had, during the years of warring with and against Mongols discovered the immense influence of Tibet. For stability on the western frontier, a good relationship with Tibet was essential. Perhaps this is why Elhe Taifin once again had offered a rapprochement to the Desi.

Simultaneously, the Desi had witnessed the Daiqing's might, and found himself, along with all of Tibet, a potential new target for a military campaign, now that Galdan had been eliminated. After Elhe Taifin's threat of military action, the Desi had swiftly adopted a soft tone, initially succeeding in appeasing the Khan. The Desi's reply to Elhe Taifin's latest message comes January 4<sup>th</sup>, 1698, and it is very telling. He thanks the Khan for his bestowal of silk gifts, and for sending a gentle edict.<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, he states that he has made arrangements to collect Jedrung Trülku within four months, and that Galdan's daughter is being brought to the Khan, too. Also, mention is made of the Panchen's visit to Beijing, but no arrangements are made yet. These are the three remaining demands Elhe Taifin made. The Desi is responding to Elhe Taifin's gentle edict; the edict that had been deleted from the *Strategic History*.

Taking into account the previous edict sent by Elhe Taifin, it is Elhe Taifin himself, much rather than the Desi, who is approaching the other side with the goal of reconciliation. In the *Strategic History*, Elhe Taifin is portrayed as a resolute ruler, who is committed to achieving a stabilization of the frontier, and pacification of the Mongols. This had to be achieved through a stable relation with the Tibetan government, which meant that he was forced into working with the Desi. While certainly aware of the threat of antagonizing the Daiqing Khan, the Desi was reluctant to appease the Khan until after Galdan's death. It was the Khan, rather than the Desi, who sought a rapprochement, but the *Strategic History* presents it as vice versa.

## 2.4 Conclusion

Striking about these edicts, memorials, and letters is how well they have been preserved in the *Strategic History*. They have been adapted into the official historiographic narrative, often with only minor adaptations. While a letter from an adversary might be an excellent chance to frame them as much more malevolent than they might have been, this is

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<sup>135</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Elhe Taifin Zouzhe*, 875–76.

<sup>136</sup> *ibid.* 876–85.

<sup>137</sup> Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 52.

<sup>138</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 47:38–40.

not what the history does. It still presents a history that is true, it reflects the words of an adversary as he wrote them, but might leave out inconvenient information. The historiographers bend the truth to suit the Daiqing's narrative.

That the editing process was thorough and comprehensive is obvious. It is revealed by any Manchu archival original compared to the *Strategic History* through minor discrepancies. These include punctuation, but also spelling, small grammatical changes, and formulaic changes. Together, they shed light on the compilation process of the *Strategic Histories*. This work does not merely contain copies of all documents relating to the conflict it describes. The full measure of its content has been rewritten, and modeled to conform to a standard style, to which formal Manchu texts should ostensibly adhere. While it is thus evident that the documents contained in the *Strategic Histories* have been subject to meticulous revision, it is not until a further comparison of documents is conducted, that the total effect of the Daiqing historiography's narrative shaping is exposed.

As a case example for an in depth study of this process, I have closely documented the progress of the narrative between Elhe Taifin Khan of the Daiqing Empire and Desi Sangye Gyatso, *de facto* head of state of Tibet. The discrepancies discovered in an analysis of the correspondence between the two rapidly demonstrate a level of redaction that is far more profound than the changes made largely with regard to the style of the text. The texts, though in most instances preserved exquisitely, are dotted with small omissions. Sometimes, these include merely toponyms, or similar, negligible details. However, occasionally, the omissions arrive at an astonishing magnitude: whole messages and edicts are removed from the history.

The Khan's voice is amplified: he takes over the narrative, where the Desi's responses are removed. And, where convenient, the Emperor's own words are removed to create a narrative in which he is at the center and commands the attention, in which he appears strongest, and in which his adversaries obey his demands without him even asking.

The *Strategic History* of Elhe Taifin's campaigns to the northwest include much on Tibet, and not without cause. It was a major theme, and important developments took place in the years of the Khan's campaigning against the Zunghars. The years 1696-8 were pivotal in the Daiqing's strategy toward Tibet. For the first time, Tibet's influence in Central Asia, and on the Mongols in particular, became evident to the Daiqing. From this point onward, Elhe Taifin's focus turned toward Tibet, as evidenced by his extensive engagement with Tibetan affairs in the last twenty-five years of his reign. That the affair of the Desi and the transition from fifth to sixth Dalai Lama has been recorded in the *Strategic History* that chronicles Elhe Taifin's campaigns against the Zunghars and Galdan, can be attributed to this watershed by itself.

Here, more meticulous consideration of the primary sources that were involved in the compilation of the *Strategic History* has revealed that the Khan ascribed significant value to the historic representation of his contemporary position vis-à-vis the Desi of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, as well as his position in the Buddhist world. The attention given to a more positive appearance in the Desi's narrative together with the volume of primary documentation that has been adapted into the *Strategic History* betrays the tremendous importance that the Khan attaches to his depiction in history.

Through a focus on this instance, new information has been brought to the surface on the Khan's correspondence, and the nature of the Desi's response. These documents have previously gone unnoticed, either because of inaccessibility of the material, or due to the language in which they were written. The rising notion that reconsideration of the value given to primary sources in Manchu is a worthwhile topic in historic research focused on the Daiqing Empire is confirmed again, here.

At the same time, these results of an examination of such a modest portion of only one *Strategic History* raises many new questions, and opens the door for further research. Are the source materials similarly manipulated in other narratives in this *Strategic History*? What about other *Strategic Histories*, also from different periods? And in the end, what purpose is served by this manipulation of history? Additionally, it is crucial to take heed of the far-reaching consequences of this narrative shaping. Should it really be the case that the Daiqing's state historiography has been subject to more molding than previously envisioned, what are the consequences for our understanding of the Daiqing period, interactions on the Central Asian stage, the other players on this stage such as Tibet, the Muslim oasis cities, or Zungharia, and ultimately, the historic expansion of the Chinese state, today?

## Chapter 3: Views from Tibet

The Daiqing main-sequence historic productions have pushed a narrative that positions the Khan at the center of all interactions. Above, I have already presented the profound inconsistencies between the archival, off-sequence palace memorials, and the final presentation of events in the finished state production of Daiqing historiography. While different layers in this historiography were presented, it is solely Elhe Taifin's side that is presented. In this chapter, I draw from Tibetan sources. The culture of Tibetan historiography remains far removed from the Daiqing institutionalized documentation. Its productions betray their authors' personal points of view, rather than presenting a centralized state narrative. Desi Sangye Gyatso, and also Panchen Lama Lobzang Yeshe, have compiled histories that portray the events from an entirely different perspective. Comprehension of the Tibetan historiographic process, and subsequent inclusion of Tibetan materials is crucial to achieve a balanced narrative of Daiqing-Tibetan history. The decentralized historiographical tradition in Tibet is a strength in this respect. It reflects the view of individual authors. Therefore, it offers a great degree of potential for corroboration of historical fact, to other Tibetan sources as well as to the singular Daiqing narrative.

### 3.1 Tibetan and Daiqing Historiography and Study of the Daiqing Period

The tradition of Tibetan historiography is markedly different from that of the Daiqing Empire. The Manchu court adopted the Chinese institutions for history writing well before they passed through the gates of the Great Wall in 1644, and throughout the dynasty these institutions were expanded. Daiqing historiography is detailed and meticulous; the enormous historiographic apparatus recorded everything. Finally, this has resulted in the compilation of numerous state histories in various genres of different chronological scales. These historic productions provide us with the means to do detailed research. They enable us to track chronologically, and therefore also between different productions, certain documents, as I have done above. While the development of the historiographic institutions arrived at its zenith under Abkai Wehiyehe Khan (r. 1736-1795),<sup>139</sup> the growth of the Daiqing historiographic institutions was well under way in Elhe Taifin's time, as evidenced by the emergence of the historiographic genre of the *Strategic History*.

While Daiqing bureaucracy has bequeathed upon the historian a luxury of documentation and historic productions, the same cannot be said for the writers of Tibetan history. Although Tibetan writers have always been prolific in their productions, their interests lay not primarily with record keeping or producing a state history.<sup>140</sup> Rather, Tibetan writers chiefly compiled works of a Buddhist character. This is not surprising: Buddhist Lamas dominated Tibetan society and held a "monopoly of literacy".<sup>141</sup> Therefore, Tibetan historiography is dominated by Buddhist themes. So strongly in fact, that Tibetan political historiography is convoluted by Buddhism.<sup>142</sup> Still, starting from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, a trend

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<sup>139</sup> The efforts of Abkai Wehiyehe Khan to mobilize historiographic institutions to chronicle, preserve, and promote Manchu culture have already been researched to some extent. An excellent example of one such study is Crossley, "Manzhou Yuanliu Kao." She demonstrates how Abkai Wehiyehe's projects propelled the Daiqing institutions to a new level of historic documentation and propagation.

<sup>140</sup> I should like to remark here that it is difficult in any case to speak of a unified Tibetan state at various times in Tibetan history. Exceptions are considerably easier to produce; Tibet was a unified political entity during the Imperial period (7<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> centuries CE); the Mongol period; and again from the fifth Dalai Lama's rule onward.

<sup>141</sup> Vostrikov, *Tibetan Historical Literature*, 59.

<sup>142</sup> Vostrikov, 59–62; Liu 刘, "Jicheng Yu Shanbian: Qingdai Zangzu Lishi Bianzuanxue Jianlun," 84. Tibetan historic sources are often concerned primarily with Buddhism, but do also provide information on a myriad of historic or contemporary affairs. A popular genre in Tibetan historiography that demonstrates this interweaving of political and Buddhist histories is that of the *chos- 'byung* (Tib. མཐོན་འཇུག་),

toward a historiography that emphasized the pursuit of historic truth next to Buddhism prevailed.<sup>143</sup> Additionally, Tibetan historiography has never been centralized. A state history has never been produced. Writers are always individual authors, although of course, their points of view do at times coincide with the points of view of the government, as in the case of Sangye Gyatso.

In the study of Daiqing history, Tibetan sources have not played an important role. This is not as much due to the ecclesiastical nature of Tibetan works, but rather because of a general tendency to rely on Chinese materials. These are more readily available, and both compiled and indexed in a more accessible manner, not to mention that both within and outside China, many more researchers are proficient in Chinese, while scholars of Tibet are comparatively few in number. Even though a general trend toward the inclusion of so-called minority languages in historical research is on the rise, much remains to be done. Admittedly, the Tibetan sources are more difficult to access. They are less clearly marked in terms of chronology, if at all, and the information on political history is less dense than in the state historiography of the Daiqing. Nevertheless, Tibetan sources are essential to this study of the interactions between Elhe Taifin Khan and Sangye Gyatso, and their portrayal in main and off-sequence historiography. Much like the Manchu sources, which have been demonstrated to provide a novel perspective, the excerpts on these events to be found in Tibetan sources are equally valuable and cannot be neglected. They indubitably present the events from a point of view that would be missed completely, were we only to rely on Chinese-language, or even only on Daiqing historic productions.

The most valuable source for the series of events that I am concerned with here is Sangye Gyatso's biography of the sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso.<sup>144</sup> The Desi describes in a fairly concise manner the visit of Daiqing envoys and Sangye Gyatso's efforts in averting an escalation of the conflict, despite rapidly deteriorating diplomatic relations. Additional details are offered by the Panchen Lama Lobzang Yeshe, a contemporary of the Desi. He was central to the conflict, as the Khan demanded he visit Beijing. Until he moves to Nakartse to tutor the young Dalai Lama, he writes in his autobiography about the Desi's actions.<sup>145</sup>

### 3.2 The Tibetan Perspective

For about thirteen years, the Desi managed to conduct affairs in the name of the late Dalai Lama unnoticed. This in itself is a remarkable accomplishment, and most likely may be attributed to his excellent administrative capabilities. He managed to fulfill the duties of his own position as Desi and those of the Dalai Lama.<sup>146</sup> Still, the Dalai Lama's absence was becoming ever more conspicuous. Visitors and envoys began to push Sangye Gyatso to allow them an audience. In diplomacy with the Daiqing Empire, the Desi had been aided by geography. The distances between Lhasa and anywhere in Daiqing Empire are vast, and travel was further complicated by the altitude and difficult terrain of Tibet. Yet, the Khan was bound to find out eventually. After the battle at Jao Modo in the summer of 1696, the time had come.<sup>147</sup> The scepticism about the Dalai Lama's longevity was at this point so widespread,

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literally *History of Buddhism*. Vostrikov also states that this is the case especially in earlier works. The *Histories of Buddhism* far outshine in their popularity the genre of *Chronicles* (*lo-rgyus* ལོ་རྒྱུས་), which are chronological descriptions of historic events.

<sup>143</sup> Liu 刘, "Jicheng Yu Shanbian: Qingdai Zangzu Lishi Bianzuanxue Jianlun," 88–89.

<sup>144</sup> Sangye Gyatso སངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho 'i Rnam-Thar*.

<sup>145</sup> Lobzang Yeshe ལོ་བཟང་ཡེ་ཤེ།, *'Od-Dkar-Can Gyi 'Phreng-Ba*.

<sup>146</sup> Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, 127.

<sup>147</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908," 25; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 192.

that prisoners captured in northern Mongolia informed the Khan of the Dalai Lama's decease years ago.

In the sixth Dalai Lama's biography, Desi Sangye Gyatso recounts his experience of the first contact after the Khan's discovery. He writes:

At this point, I was gradually hearing about the matter of Boshogtu Khan; that on the thirteenth of the fifth month, as he encountered the Daiqing forces, his daughter Anu was killed, and that he [and his forces] were wholly defeated and scattered.

[...]

Gradually, the news reached me that the Khan had beaten the enemy, who had come early in the morning, that there would be additional envoys. [...] <sup>148</sup>

Despite the brevity of his description, Sangye Gyatso's recollection is dense with information. He heard of the devastating defeat suffered by Galdan, the Boshogtu Khan. It was clear that more envoys from the Daiqing Empire would be coming his way, although he does not mention why. There is no mention yet of any intent to hide information from the Daiqing Khan, yet, his envoys were on their way. Once they arrive at Lhasa, the Desi lists their names, all three at once: Booju, Pönchung Jinpa Gyatso, and Dimchi Sönam Zangpo, suggesting that they arrived simultaneously. <sup>149</sup> Booju presented the Khan's edict to Sangye Gyatso. Sangye Gyatso has recorded this event, in brief, of course:

A summary of the contents [of the edict]: "whether the fifth Dalai Lama was still there, these Lamas themselves should examine, and they have sent out an invitation to the Panchen Lama. The daughter of Boshogtu Khan, who is now in the hands of Boshogtu Junang, and Jedrung Gugye, need to be apprehended and delivered [to me]. If these things do not happen, I will either come, leading an army, or send an army," it said.

And Booju also said: "We have many military units, and Bhutan has also sent a petition to the Khan." Pönchung Jinpa Gyatso and Dimchi are also staying to wait with their offerings for an audience with the Dalai Lama. To Booju Jargvqi, together with Khetsun of Tsona, who brought this severe edict, I planned on a fortuitous day to send a hada, as a good present for emerging victorious from the war, and the cause of their purification; a vajra, a statue of total conquest, as a token of victory, together with additional letters and gifts. <sup>150</sup>

In the first part, the core of the Khan's edict is summarized. Booju names the Khan's four demands. Still unclear is the name of the husband of Galdan's daughter; Boshogtu Junang was not named in the Manchu edict. Also, instead of using *trülku*, Sangye Gyatso refers to Jedrung as *sku-skye*. <sup>151</sup> Interestingly, the Desi has not recorded his reply to Booju. Why he did not, is uncertain. Unfortunately, it means that only the Daiqing sources describe his reply. Perhaps he did not record it due to his proclaimed loyalty to the Daiqing, while his reply is a refusal of all the Khan demanded.

Although the Desi did not record this, the Panchen Lama has produced historiographic works of his own. In his autobiography, he writes of the visit of the Daiqing envoys, and their request of his visit. Here, a first discrepancy shows up, but surprisingly, between the Desi and the Panchen Lama. The Desi states, according to Booju in a private report to the Khan, that

originally, the Panchen Lama had wanted to go. Later on, when the envoys that had come uttered threatening and uncomfortable language, he had said that he had thought about it, and

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<sup>148</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho'i Rnam-Thar*, 280 r. 20–281 7.

<sup>149</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, 281 l. 12–13.

<sup>150</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, 282 l. 4–15.

<sup>151</sup> Tib. ལྷོ་ལྷོ། A variation on ལྷོ་ལྷོ།, semantically equal.

would not go.<sup>152</sup>

However, the Panchen Lama's autobiography mentions nothing of the sort. To the contrary, he states several times that the reason he will not go to the Daiqing court is that he has never been exposed to smallpox, and unequivocally so:

I said to the envoys: "Because of the reason that I have not ever been infected with smallpox, it is not prudent for me to leave the court. Therefore, of previous and future envoys, I ask to be exempted, except when presented with a situation of necessity. Otherwise, since this barrier is ubiquitous and unceasing, there is no way to change my thoughts. Moreover, because of my disposition of not having lived through smallpox, it is necessary to request an instruction of protection and mercy for my concerns."<sup>153</sup>

The Desi appears to be trying to shift the blame to the Daiqing envoys, and away from himself, since the Khan has purported that he would be intimidating the Panchen Lama into refraining from a visit. The Panchen Lama mentions nothing that indicates a bad relationship between him and the Desi. Smallpox, meanwhile, was an excellent reason to be exempted from a visit to Beijing.<sup>154</sup>

The second part of the Desi's description of Booju's first audience describes a more sinister aspect of the Khan's edict. This was the part that made the edict *qira*, 'severe,' and the threatening tone of the edict was not to be lost on Sangye Gyatso. Booju made sure of it. Several days later, the Desi writes that he meant to disclose the truth to the Khan now. But, he was prevented from doing so, as suddenly a duststorm obscured the sky. He took this as an omen, and instead prayed with his congregation to avert an invasion by the Daiqing.<sup>155</sup>

Despite the brevity of Desi Sangye Gyatso's writing style, his Tibetan account of the events is a perfect complement to the Daiqing sources. He fills in the gaps precisely where the Daiqing sources have gone periods without intelligence from their emissaries. Also, it puts an end to much speculation on the part of historians, who have stated their apprehension at the conscious intention of Sangye Gyatso to conceal the Dalai Lama's passing. Rockhill, for example, argued that in the Desi's view, the Dalai Lama had only been dead between the passing of the fifth, and discovery of the sixth a year later.<sup>156</sup> Ahmad holds that accusations of the Desi's deceit by the Daiqing were merely due to a mistranslation between Tibetan and Chinese. He refers to the Tibetan phrase *gsang bkrol*,<sup>157</sup> which should be understood, according to Ahmad, as "emerging from secrecy," i.e. 'coming out of meditation.'<sup>158</sup> Although this might at first glance make for a plausible translation, Ahmad neglects context and other instances of the word *gsang*. A report of disclosing the secret is made to the Khan by Nyimathang Shabdrung. This is confirmed by the Daiqing sources,<sup>159</sup> and by the Panchen Lama's records. He writes, quoting Sangye Gyatso using *gsang* again:

<sup>152</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Kangxi Zouzhe*, 608.

<sup>153</sup> Lobzang Yeshe ལོབཟང་ཡེ་ཤེས།, 'Od-Dkar-Can Gyi 'Phreng-Ba, 315 l. 2-4. Five pages before this instance, on page 310 l. 5-6, the Panchen Lama also refuses the same request in a strong and uncompromising tone.

<sup>154</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China. 1644-1908," 3; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 47, 135. Smallpox was a widely feared disease. Mongols were often exempted from visiting the capital because of lack of immunity, and Elhe Taiḥn Khan might have been chosen to succeed Ijishvn Dasan Khan (1644-1661) precisely because he had survived the disease and acquired immunity at a young age. The Panchen Lama surely was aware of the role played by smallpox in the system of Daiqing visitation, and whether true or not, used his vulnerability to the disease to apt effect.

<sup>155</sup> Sangye Gyatso སངས་རྒྱལ་ལྷ་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho 'i Rnam-Thar*, 282 l. 15-20.

<sup>156</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China. 1644-1908," 29.

<sup>157</sup> Tib. གསང་བཟོས། The word *gsang* indeed carries the meaning of 'secret.' Yet, *bkrol* is exclusively a transitive form of the verb 'grol: 'to loosen,' and also defined by Jäschke (*A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, 102-3) as 'to remove obscurities.'

<sup>158</sup> Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, 52.

<sup>159</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 40:06: *xahvn meihe inenggi*; Unda 溫達, 40:04: 辛巳.

On the fourth day of the sixth month, a letter came, in which the venerable Desi wrote: “Although it became necessary to make most sacred this secret, that the previous Dalai Lama had departed to other fields in order to disseminate the Dharma of the Buddhas of the ten directions, who held all permanent things, this year, it is now so that I have sent Nyi[ma]thang Shabdrung to grasp the singing bird and offer testimony to the venerable Khan.<sup>160</sup>

*Gsang* is used time and again in conscious reference to the act of concealment; it confirms categorically the deliberate effort on Sangye Gyatso’s part to keep the fifth Dalai Lama’s passing secret from the world.

A second, striking detail in Sangye Gyatso’s writing is his recognition of Galdan’s authority. The title of *Boshogtu Khan* was granted to him by the Dalai Lama, after all.<sup>161</sup> Whereas the Daiqing sources consistently discredit their opponents’ moral, political and religious authority through the structural eradication of their allocated titles, Sangye Gyatso makes no such effort. To the Khan he refers with the words *gongma rgyalpo*, which does signal his unsurpassed position; *gong* indicates the ‘highest,’ and is therefore used for Emperors when regarding the Chinese sphere, *Qayans* when regarding the Mongolian sphere, and Dalai Lama’s in seventeenth century Tibet.<sup>162</sup> Still, the Desi does not go to the lengths the Panchen Lama does, to demonstrate his respect to the Khan. In this, the Panchen Lama goes one step further: he refers to the Khan not only by the title *gongma rgyalpo*, but employs the honorific *sku zhabs su*,<sup>163</sup> ‘at the venerable feet of.’ The contrast between the Panchen Lama’s, and the Desi’s writing, reveals an omission of an honorific on the Desi’s part, and thereby lays bare the Desi’s disdain for the Khan, whose exalted person he does not once address with a suitable honorific.

With the Daiqing’s envoy back on his way to the Khan, things settled down in Lhasa for a while. Booju had been in Lhasa around the Tibetan new year of 1697, leaving soon after the celebrations. It would take more than half a year before the Desi would see him again. According to the Daiqing sources, the Desi had requested the Khan, and pledged himself, not to reveal the Dalai Lama’s passing until the end of the same year. When he nevertheless did inform Tsewang Rabten and asked him to cease military action, Tsewang Rabten deferred. Elhe Taifin changed his instructions to his new embassy to Lhasa. Along with Nyimathang, returning from his mission to the Daiqing, Booju and Sahaliyan traveled to Lhasa as representatives of the Khan. Their arrival is the starting point of Sangye Gyatso’s chapter recounting this episode of his diplomatic experience with the Daiqing, entitled *Asking for forgiveness through disclosing the secret to the Khan, and his demand of the venerable Panchen and Baatur Taiji to come to China*.<sup>164</sup>

Sangye Gyatso’s description of their arrival appears to confirm that the Khan had changed his attitude toward the Desi, despite his latest turn. The Desi writes:

<sup>160</sup> Lobzang Yeshe ལོབ་བཟང་ཡེ་ཤེས།, *’Od-Dkar-Can Gyi ’Phreng-Ba*, 320 l. 4–5.

<sup>161</sup> Rockhill, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Khans of China. 1644-1908,” 20–21.

<sup>162</sup> *Rgyal-po* རྒྱལ་པོ་ ‘King’ is used to refer to any kind of ruler. Galdan is named the *sbo-shog-thu-rgyal-po* ལྷོ་ཤོག་ཐུ་རྒྱལ་པོ་, or *sbo-rgyal* ལྷོ་རྒྱལ་ for short, the ‘Boshogtu Khan.’ The Daiqing Khan is also a *rgyal-po*, namely the *gong-ma-rgyal-po* གོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོ་, ‘the imperial king’ or ‘uppermost king.’ The Dalai Lama is referred to as simply *gong* གོང་། or *gong-sa* གོང་ས། ‘the highest position.’

<sup>163</sup> Lobzang Yeshe ལོབ་བཟང་ཡེ་ཤེས།, *’Od-Dkar-Can Gyi ’Phreng-Ba*, 320 l. 5: གང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོ་འི་སུ་ཞམས་སུ་ གོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོ་འི་སུ་ཞམས་སུ་ *gong ma rgyal po’i sku zhabs su*, ‘at the venerable feet of the highest Khan.’

<sup>164</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་ལྷོ་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho’i Rnam-Thar*, 310. Here, I have translated ‘China,’ rather than ‘Daiqing,’ because in Tibetan, the word *rgya-nag* རྒྱལ་ནག་ is used. This same term has been used throughout Tibetan history to refer to the various empires in China proper.



From China, Judge Booju arrived together with the official Sahaliyan. I received them, who had brought me six rolls of silk and a golden edict, in the old assembly hall of the Potala palace.<sup>165</sup>

The Khan had specifically granted the Desi lavish gifts, and a golden edict to boot. It appears Elhe Taifin was trying to woo the Desi. He had presented him with a stick, and it seems that in Elhe Taifin Khan's judgment, this had had the desired effect. A panic-stricken Sangye Gyatso had dispatched Nyimathang Shabdrung to quickly appease the Khan. The Khan had then dispatched this second embassy, in an attempt to renew his relationship with the Desi. All the while, the Desi still had not lent his full cooperation to the Khan; several demands were left unfulfilled. The Khan had offered a first opportunity for rapprochement, but not completely without any further conditions. The Khan's embassy stressed that his earlier demands should still be fulfilled:

If in fact Batur Taiji were not to go to China, there would not come a good [balance of] government and dharma. Whether there are any other officials that will come or have gone, and also, whether he has many or few servants, it is necessary that he go to China by whatever means. A delay has come up for the Jedrung Trülku, so his arrival should be expedited. As for the demand of the Panchen's coming, once again, he should be sent, together with Kalka Kadampa Batur and Demo Trülku.<sup>166</sup>

A little later, the Desi again describes another message, this time delivered by the Khan's other envoy, Cangya Gugye. The content of his message is strikingly similar to that delivered by Booju and Sahaliyan:

The official [...] arrived, and reiterated the insistent request from the Khan that Batur Taiji and [the Panchen Lama] should come to China. Cangya Gugye also said, that if they did not come, a situation in which the good for the unity of the Rule and Dharma does not come would arise. Therefore, Booju was earlier on raising the question of what is appropriate, and in the same way he presented the letter with the demand of the visit. Once they have come in accordance with [the Khan's] instructions, they would be sent back immediately with the requirements of those things, that are most pervaded by value to the Rule and Dharma.<sup>167</sup>

With regard to Sangye Gyatso's obscuring of the Dalai Lama's death, this was the last major interaction in Lhasa. It is also the last that Sangye Gyatso writes on the matter, here. Again, he makes no mention of his own actions in response to the Daiqing's embassies. Yet, according to Daiqing records, the Desi's reply arrived early in 1698, with Sangye Gyatso deferring to the Khan's demands.<sup>168</sup> For now, the Khan seemed appeased.

The excerpts given above are short. As is intrinsic to Sangye Gyatso's writing style, he has summarized the indubitably lengthy edict into the demands made of him by the embassies from the Khan, twice. The urgency and gravity of the Khan's requests must have been abundantly clear, and Sangye Gyatso did indeed defer to all the Khan's demands, according to the Daiqing's *Strategic History*.<sup>169</sup> He himself does not write about it. This may be due to one or more out of three factors. The first of these is his succinct writing style. Sangye Gyatso

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<sup>165</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, 310 l. 1–3. The names of the Manchu officials have been severely distorted, but not unrecognizably so. Booju and his title of *jargvqi* 'judge' have been rendered into Tibetan as *sbo'u-cu sbyar-kho-che*; and Second Class Secretary Sahaliyan. He is portrayed in the Tibetan text as *thu-shi-mal sa-kha-li*. *Sa-kha-li* is recognizable as Sahaliyan. His title is *ejeku hafan* in Manchu, and in Chinese *zhushi* 主事. However, *thu-shi-mal* is a clear transcription of the Mongolian *tüsimel* (Mo. Суг. түшмэл) 'official,' with no clear indication to his exact rank.

<sup>166</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, 310 l. 4–9.

<sup>167</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, 312 l. 19 – 313 l. 4.

<sup>168</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 47:38-40.

<sup>169</sup> Unda 溫達, 47:46-54.

rarely devotes more than a handful of lines on a folio to a diplomatic encounter. The second factor for his omissions might be the scope of his work. He simply did not regard them as important, since they were outside the scope of his topic: a biography of the sixth Dalai Lama. Still, the fact that he does include the Khan's messages directly contradicts this argument. So far, he has consistently left out his own replies, and always recounted the messages of the various embassies from the Khan, albeit truthfully, when compared to the Daiqing sources. Therefore, these first two appear to be unlikely. While Sangye Gyatso's narrative is truthful, it suffers from omissions where his replies to the Daiqing are concerned. Rather, it is a strategy to determine the narrative. The Khan has a dominant, aggressive role, as evidenced by his "strict edict" and "insistent requests."<sup>170</sup> Simultaneously, the Desi's role is downplayed.

Perhaps, it was not inappropriate of Sangye Gyatso to present the situation in this manner. A theme that is repeated time and again by Sangye Gyatso in his presentation of the Khan's words is *gzhung bstan*. It is a concept of Elhe Taifin's design. The first of the two words, *gzhung*, means 'governmental rule.' The second, *bstan*, means 'teachings,' referring to the Buddha's teachings: the Dharma. It is a translation from the same words used in Manchu or Chinese edicts.<sup>171</sup> When Buddhism gets involved with the Daiqing's foreign policy, these are the words that are invoked. Where the Dharma is concerned, the problem is not the offense given to the Dharma, it is the damage done to both the Dharma and Rule, implying specifically that of the Daiqing. Implied in the juxtaposition of these position is a balance, which should not be disturbed. For example, he also uses 'Dharma and Rule' when first rebuking the Desi. He wrote that "for years, the Dalai Lama and I united Dharma and Rule, we were respectful toward one another."<sup>172</sup> This is the status quo that is to be restored.

On the opposite side are the offenders, and in contexts where Buddhism plays an important, diplomatic role, casting someone as an offender to both Dharma and Rule, accomplishes a new dimension of discrediting. He is no longer just the enemy of the Daiqing state, but also the enemy of Buddhism itself. Once it had become clear that the Daiqing had won out over the Zunghars, Sangye Gyatso appealed to the Khan, using these words, to plead for the life of Galdan's daughter: "It is only Galdan, who is ruining the Dharma and Rule!"<sup>173</sup>

Elhe Taifin Khan employs this juxtaposition as a means to legitimize his own rule over Mongolia and Tibet through Buddhism, and to impose his influence on the approval of figures important in the Tibetan political hierarchy, through inserting the aspect of 'Rule,' and implying that a balance should always exist between this Rule, and the Dharma. Effectively, this entails the Daiqing's involvement in any affairs on the Daiqing's western front concerning Buddhists. The Khan and the Dalai Lama are patron and priest, they together aim to maintain peace and avoid the killing of any living beings.<sup>174</sup> Therefore, any who would wage war are in violation of the Rule and Dharma.

Desi Sangye Gyatso's writing indicates that the perceived balance of Rule and Dharma that should be maintained is also an implicit threat. As the Khan judges who is, or is not, in violation of the balance, he is mandated to undertake actions. He has managed to use the patron-priest relation to get access to Tibetan affairs. Sangye Gyatso's account of the last embassies concerning the Khan's in particular stresses Rule and Dharma. Quoting the Khan, Sangye Gyatso mentions it four times in only several folios worth of text. In spite of his summarizing writing style, he has made sure to include these remarks. It is because of their threatening nature. Of the four instances, the former two involve Booju and Sahaliyan's visit

<sup>170</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་གླུ་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho'i Rnam-Thar*, 310 l. 3; 312 l. 21. Tib. *bka' lci* བཀའ་ལློ། as a translation for Manchu *qira hese*, a "strict edict"; *bka' nan che* བཀའ་ནན་ཅེ།.

<sup>171</sup> Tib. *gzhung bstan* ; Ch. *dào fǎ* 道法; Ma. *doro xajin*.

<sup>172</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 28:61.

<sup>173</sup> Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 國立故宮博物院故宮文獻編輯委員會, *Kangxi Zouzhe*, 611.

<sup>174</sup> Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China. 1644-1908," 21-22. Elhe Taifin Khan professed as much, as he kept reminding Galdan of this intention to strive for peace, as was the Dalai Lama's intention.

and their demand of Batur Taiji's visit, and the latter two are about the Daiqing envoy Cangya Gugye two both Batur Taiji and the Panchen Lama.<sup>175</sup>

if in fact Baatur Taiji were not to go to China, there would not come a good [balance of] Rule and Dharma.

To Batur Taiji, they offered a letter that stated the demand that he come for the essential integrity of Rule and Dharma.<sup>176</sup>

if [Batur Taiji and the Panchen Lama] did not come, a situation, in which the good for the unity of the Rule and Dharma does not come, would arise.

Once they have come in accordance with [the Khan's] instructions, they would be sent back immediately with the requirements of those things, that are most pervaded by value to the Rule and Dharma.<sup>177</sup>

Elhe Taifin was quite insistent. Although he does no longer threaten the Desi with direct military invasion, the tone behind these words still conveys the same inclination, in an otherwise friendly message. In Daiqing sources, "Rule and Dharma" is often mentioned to indicate merit in those who uphold it, or when they are violated, to defame and discredit opponents, and therefore elevate the Khan. In his communication with the Desi, the Khan employs it to imply the Desi is still to prove himself. Sangye Gyatso was keenly aware of this, and the emphasis placed in Sangye Gyatso's work on this choice of words by the Khan underlines the implication. Read between the lines, supporting the balance of "Rule and Dharma" means nothing more than to be obedient to the Khan's will.

A visit to the Daiqing court by the Panchen Lama and Batur Taiji was the last demand that remained unmet. Sangye Gyatso does not write about his reply, and even in the Daiqing sources, there is nothing concrete about the Panchen Lama and Batur Taiji's visit. No arrangements had been made yet. A year later, the situation remained unchanged. Although the detailed records of the Daiqing *Strategic Histories* ends here, Sangye Gyatso's account stretches far beyond the year 1698, and describes the aftermath absent from the Daiqing *Strategic History*.

In 1694, Sangye Gyatso had received a seal from Elhe Taifin.<sup>178</sup> He was appointed "King of Tibet" by the Daiqing. Sangye Gyatso had already been the *de facto* ruler of Tibet, and this was only confirmation of his authority. The Khan expresses his regret at his granting of this title in his strict edict to Sangye Gyatso, brought to Lhasa by Booju on his first mission. Otherwise, throughout all events mentioned above, the symbolic title and its seal were not mentioned. All the while, the Khan might have hoped that the Desi could eventually act as a voluntary vassal, so that the Daiqing's influence over Tibet would increase steadily and without much effort. This hope had certainly dissipated as the time passed by, until in 1698, the Khan's patience had finally been exhausted. A Daiqing emissary came from Xining, and brought a stern message:

The Panchen Lama has declined to come over and over. Thus, the Desi is a shirking cheat! The seal that was granted the Desi by the Khan must be returned, and the multilingual golden edict and other things brought by Booju Jargvqi should also be returned.<sup>179</sup>

<sup>175</sup> Since the latter passage has been quoted at length above (p. 39, note 166), I have only selected the two relevant phrases here.

<sup>176</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho 'i Rnam-Thar*, 310 l. 4–5, 11–13.

<sup>177</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, 312 l. 19 – 313 l. 4.

<sup>178</sup> Unda 溫達, *Bodogon i Bithe*, 28:55.

<sup>179</sup> Sangye Gyatso ལངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཚོ།, *Tshang-Dbyangs Rgya-Mtsho 'i Rnam-Thar*, 730 l. 5–7.

Rescinding the seal was a symbolic gesture. It amounted to little beyond a clear indication to Sangye Gyatso that the Daiqing no longer considered him a ruler in accordance with the “Rule and Dharma” principle. While it constituted an ill omen for the years to come, the real threat of military invasion had melted away with the death of Galdan. The Daiqing had for now established its dominance on the western front, and the influence over the Mongols that was wielded by the rulers of Tibet was not an immediate threat; its ability to shift the balance in a war between two equally matched parties had vanished with Galdan’s demise.<sup>180</sup>

### 3.3 Conclusion

The Tibetan historical sources that are concerned with politics are few. A strong focus on Buddhism has pushed to the periphery of historiography all other topics. This shows in Desi Sangye Gyatso and Lobzang Yeshe’s works, too. There is a drastic asymmetry between Tibetan works and Daiqing state productions in the attention paid to the question of the fifth Dalai Lama’s passing, and the Khan’s inquisition into the Desi’s integrity. Among many hundreds of pages, the Desi and Lobzang Yeshe provide only short excerpts of the events surrounding the Khan’s embassies. Perhaps, it reflects also a slight indifference toward their giant neighbor; after all, Lhasa had always been so far removed from China, and the possibility of consequences. An insult to the Manchu Khan would not cost them too dearly.

Due to a rich and extensive literary tradition, they did record their interactions with the Daiqing. While the Daiqing’s historiographic productions are of incomparable size, they are not always reliable and tend to favor the Khan. Above, I have first provided a comparison with the archival materials that they were based on, as a first example of the discrepant and propagated content of the state productions. Secondly, a crucial check is formed by the off-sequence materials provided by actors on the opposite side of the conflict. If only for this, the Tibetan sources written by Sangye Gyatso and Lobzang Yeshe are invaluable.

Additionally, the Tibetan sources fill in gaps, where the Daiqing sources are left wanting. The Daiqing envoys in Lhasa have not left detailed accounts of their time in Lhasa, but Sangye Gyatso recorded their stay to some detail. While they supplement each other, at times they discuss identical topics. In those cases, careful reading of these recordings are a means to dispel doubt on presumptions, claims, and accusations made by the Khan, which are often echoed in modern scholarship, still. The Panchen Lama makes no mention of the Desi’s bullying him into staying in Lhasa, and the Desi’s constant, conscious use of the term *gsang* ‘secret’ in this and varying forms puts an end to any doubt that his efforts to conceal the Dalai Lama’s passing were not deliberate. The Desi’s attitude to the Khan is revealed through the absence of appropriate honorifics, and the Khan’s threats to the Desi are more candidly presented.

While brief, they are comprehensive, and their timelines encompass lifetimes. Therefore, these sources can always serve as a check on Daiqing productions. Extant scholarship on this matter, as with many topics in Chinese and Daiqing history, deals mostly with sources in only a single language: Chinese. While the added consideration to Manchu sources has shed light on many issues concerning consistency, while it has laid bare discrepancies, and discovered omissions, it is still only representative of the attitudes and arguments of the Daiqing Khan. Only through the inclusion of historical literature from the opposite side can a more balanced, equal, and unbiased image of Daiqing history be sketched. Neglect of these materials and the unwillingness to involve them leads to a biased, singular

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<sup>180</sup> Rockhill, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China. 1644-1908,” 31.

historic narrative that favors the Daiqing narrative. Indeed, the propagated narratives reverberate in our understanding of Daiqing history today.

In this, Tibet is not the only relevant party. Sources in Mongolian, Chaghaday, Arabic, Korean, languages from Europe, and many others are able to counter the historic narrative that has been constructed carefully by centuries of state controlled productions. Simultaneously, use of Daiqing-external materials will reveal new information, challenging the historian to unite diverging narratives and navigate through the partisan writings of historic authors. Ultimately, a more balanced view may be restored, without being outshone by the main-sequence.

## Conclusion

Over the two years that the question of the fifth Dalai Lama's passing played out, the decisions made by Desi Sangye Gyatso and Elhe Taifin Khan were momentous. They both wielded tremendous influence, and their decisions and reactions have contributed in no small way to shaping the world as we know it today. We, who are alive hundreds of years later, have only slivers left of the Daiqing and Tibet in their time; the swath of documents that revolved in and between their governments has been largely preserved. Also, in order to explain the events of their days, the Daiqing, through its state institutions, and Tibetans through individual authorship, have industriously produced a multitude of written works. They compiled thousands of pages to teach, instruct and warn their descendants and successors. These archival remnants and historiographic productions are what we have left to interpret and make sense of their world, reading through the eyes of their intended reader.

For this study, I have made use of as many of these materials, as variegated as possible, to examine and illuminate the events surrounding Elhe Taifin Khan's discovery of Desi Sangye Gyatso's deceit. First, I presented the historic context of the relation between the Khan and the Ganden Phodrang government in Tibet. The historical connections and institutions invoked in the relationship between the Daiqing and the Ganden Phodrang harks back centuries, and it is essential to a thorough understanding of Tibetan events in the Daiqing to be clear on the shared history on which they are drawing. I have striven to present a narrative through the archival materials, often compiled while the Khan was on campaign. Simultaneously, it has been my goal to point out where the main-sequence narrative, constructed in state-sponsored historiographic productions diverges from the information found in the archival materials, the off-sequence narrative. Additionally, I have expanded my scope to include Tibetan historic works; narratives often overlooked by virtue of lacking a strong dissemination, and eventually outshone by the narrative propagated by a militarily and politically dominant force. In unison, the examination of the cultural-historic context, the contrasting of main-sequence productions vis-à-vis off-sequence archival materials within the Daiqing narratives, and the inclusion of Tibetan materials in the comparison were meant to provide an answer to my research questions: how were the events concerning the Desi's concealment of the Dalai Lama's death, and the ensuing diplomatic interactions, recorded by both the Daiqing and the Tibetans? How do these recordings differ from one another? And, which additional intentions of the authors become apparent from the style and content in the historiographic productions?

In the first chapter, I elucidated the institutions and perceived common history drawn on to establish common relations, and why the violation of these agreed-upon institutions entitled the Khan to a sense of indignation and expectation of an accounting. In addition to a concise overview of the Daiqing's relations with the Ganden Phodrang and their common Inner Asian history, which was invoked to construct their relations, this chapter was meant to illuminate the reasons behind Elhe Taifin Khan's severe indignation. Despite diplomatic ties, Tibet was at this time a separate political entity, and Daiqing records indicate that the Khan also held this view. Yet, upon discovery of the Desi's deceit, the Khan took it as a grave offense. In one part, the fault lay with the Desi's violation of the priest-patron relationship, and in another, it happened because the Khan was convinced the Desi had instigated the Zunghar-Daiqing conflict, and had utilized the Dalai Lama's influence to this end, while being partial to Galdan. These formed the motives for the Khan's initial rebuke of the Desi.

The second chapter tracks this, and all further interactions, through the different layers of Daiqing historiography. It is here that the discrepancies between the main-sequence and off-sequence materials are exposed, and my aim was to explain the intentions and effects of

the redactions, the shaping of the main-sequence narrative. The Khan's palace memorials have mostly been incorporated into the *Strategic Histories*, but have been thoroughly revised. No edict has gone unredacted. Yet, the redactions range broadly in severity. In some cases, only punctuation has been made to suit the style of the entire *Strategic History*, formulae have been adjusted, foreign terms removed, and grammar might have been revised. In other cases, large portions of the memorials were omitted, or even entire diplomatic documents were left out of the *Strategic History*. The effects of the redaction process are profound: the Khan is often represented as a brilliant leader, consistent and stern in his diplomacy, with a natural right to rulership. Where inconsistent, the Khan's course is represented as just and correct. The Khan is central to all events, and he often commands the narrative, whereas his adversaries are silenced. Their agency is diminished by denying them the inclusion of large parts of the messages they relayed to the Daiqing court. The Desi makes for an excellent example of this process. Large parts of his interactions with the Khan have been removed from the *Strategic History*. Instead, the Khan speaks for him, discussing his actions and framing him as an ally of Galdan and an opponent of both himself and the Dalai Lama.

Where the Desi did hold agency, was in Tibet, and especially in the Tibetan language works he has bequeathed upon the world. He and Panchen Lama Lobzang Yeshe have compiled relevant works. The study of these materials soon revealed that information on the question of the secret of the fifth Dalai Lama's passing is sparse. In a concise manner, Sangye Gyatso describes the visits of the Daiqing envoys and their messages. Lobzang Yeshe, too, recounts their visits, and his interactions with them. The Tibetan sources present a novel perspective in the otherwise strongly dictated narratives of the Daiqing's interactions with Tibet. Sangye Gyatso and Lobzang Yeshe have provided an invaluable addition to the extensive Daiqing documentation. Most importantly, they present a pristine view of the Tibetans, left unscathed by Daiqing editors. Secondly, they also corroborate or invalidate Daiqing sources. Only through reading the words of the Tibetans, can the Tibetans be accurately presented. Indeed, the deceit was intentional; and the Desi did not bully the Panchen Lama into staying in Lhasa, he feared smallpox.

The episodes of interactions between the Daiqing and Tibet in the 1690s are tremendously important, as they were the direct precedent to decades of instability in Tibet, leading to its eventual, albeit predominantly nominal, annexation into the Daiqing Empire. The only way to comprehend and interpret the events of this era is through the historic sources, left to us by the figures that experienced the events. Yet, none of these sources is impartial. They do not reflect historic fact, but an interpretation of events, brought forth by an individual actor. In the case of Daiqing state sponsored historiographic productions, the sequence of events has become constructed to an even higher degree. When making use of historic documents in research, this is to be taken into account. This thesis has taken the case of Elhe Taifin Khan's quarrel with Desi Sangye Gyatso as an example of early Daiqing tampering with historic events, and shone light on the process of redaction, while also attempting to present a more balanced narrative, including the view of the two most involved Tibetans: Desi Sangye Gyatso, and the Panchen Lama Lobzang Yeshe.

The extraordinary scale of the Daiqing's historiographic canon makes it impossible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its editing process. However, this case serves to demonstrate the magnitude and profound implications of the redactions. Daiqing historiographic productions have all been produced by the same institutions, pursuing the same goals: the creation, reinforcement, and dissemination of the main-sequence narrative. The ramifications of this conclusion carry great significance for our consideration of Daiqing historic works. A natural superiority of off-sequence, archival material over main-sequence, redacted productions is implied, due to the more pristine, more candid state of the content.

Secondly, for a fresh perspective on the constructed narrative and corroboration of what we might have perceived thus far as historic facts, a turn to Daiqing-external materials is warranted wherever possible. In the case of this thesis, Tibetan sources were involved and provided a new outlook on the events, corroboration, invalidation, and additional information.

The same is true for the off-sequence, archival materials. They have produced numerous new insights into the Daiqing, and this is due to several factors. Accessibility connected to the rise of the internet and modern media is one; another is the language of the materials. Most historic research on China and its perceived succession of dynasties is concerned with materials in Chinese. Under the domination of Chinese, languages on the periphery are often discounted or neglected. This is true for Tibetan, and until recently, it was even more so for Manchu. The New Qing History school has advocated the inclusion of Manchu materials in Daiqing history research, and proposes a view of the Manchus as non-sinicized, but retaining a distinct, Inner Asian identity. Following this new paradigm, monolingual Manchu sources have assumed a renewed value, which is indeed manifested in the Khan's memorials. Knowledge of Manchu is key to a comprehensive understanding of the Daiqing's dynamics, its functioning as rulers over a immense, multi-ethnic Empire, also home to a great diversity of religions, and the continued rulership by the Manchus, a vastly outnumbered minority, for almost three hundred years.

The paradigm shift initiated by the New Qing History school should not be limited to Manchu language materials. The insights gained since the rise of the New Qing History school are invaluable. More such achievements are on the horizon, accessible through the inclusion of more, different languages in scholarship of the Daiqing period. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the main-sequence of history, constructed in the Daiqing, has further restricted itself only to the Chinese language. It has thus distanced itself from the most precious, richest archival materials. Through the involvement of off-sequence material in more languages, Daiqing history may be revised and reconsidered. The main-sequence that today still dominates our view of history contributes to the illusory linear succession of "Chinese" dynasties, culminating in the nigh teleologic birth of a Chinese nation state at the beginning of the twentieth century, as propagated today. Inclusion of sources in languages that have assumed a minor role today, as opposed to Chinese in both society and academia, will inevitably lead to the exhaustive erosion of the main-sequence of the Daiqing, as well as that of today. It will be substituted by a historiographic equilibrium, representative of all different perspectives in conflicts.



## Appendix A: Glossary of Names, Titles, and Places in Manchu, Chinese and Tibetan

	<i>Manchu</i>		<i>Chinese</i>		<i>Tibetan</i>	
	<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Original Script</i>	<i>Transcription</i>	<i>Original Script</i>	<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Original Script</i>
Abkai Wehiyehe Khan	abkai wehiyehe khan	ᠠᠪᠬᠠᠢ ᠠᠪᠠᠨᠠᠨᠠᠨᠠᠨᠠᠨ ᠬᠠᠨ	qiánlóngdì	乾隆帝	chan-lung-gong-ma	ᠴᠢᠨᠯᠤᠩᠭᠣᠩᠮᠠ
Batur Taiji	batur taiji	ᠪᠠᠲᠤᠷ ᠲᠠᠢᠵᠢ	bātú'ěr tàiji	巴圖爾台吉	ba-dur-tha'i-ji	ᠪᠠᠳᠤᠷᠲᠠᠢᠵᠢ
Booju	booju	ᠪᠣᠵᠤ	bāozhù	保住	sbo'u-ju; sbo'u-cu	ᠪᠣᠵᠤ
Boshogtu Junang	boxoktu jinong	ᠪᠣᠰᠣᠬᠣᠲᠤ ᠵᠢᠨᠠᠩ	bóshuòkètú jìnóng	博碩克圖濟農	sbo-shog-thu-ju-nang	ᠪᠣᠰᠣᠬᠣᠲᠤᠵᠢᠨᠠᠩ
Boshogtu Khan	boxoktu han	ᠪᠣᠰᠣᠬᠣᠲᠤ ᠬᠠᠨ	bóshuòkètú hàn	博碩克圖汗	sbo-shog-thu-rgyal-po; sbo-rgyal	ᠪᠣᠰᠣᠬᠣᠲᠤᠬᠠᠨ
Cangya Gugye	janggiya kvtuku	ᠴᠠᠩᠵᠠ ᠭᠦᠭᠡ	zhāngjiā kùtúkètú	張家庫圖克圖	lcang-rgya-sku-skye	ᠴᠠᠩᠵᠠᠭᠦᠭᠡ
Chorje	qorji	ᠴᠣᠷᠵᠢ	chuó'ěrjī	綽爾濟	chos-rje	ᠴᠣᠷᠵᠢ
Daiqing dynasty	daiqing gurun	ᠳᠠᠢᠴᠢᠩ ᠭᠤᠷᠤᠨ	dàqīng chádài	大清朝代	ching-rgyal-rabs	ᠳᠠᠢᠴᠢᠩᠭᠤᠷᠤᠨ
Dalai Lama	dalai lama	ᠳᠠᠯᠠᠢ ᠯᠠᠮᠠ	dálài lāma	達賴喇嘛		
Darhan	darhan, dargan	ᠳᠠᠷᠬᠠᠨ / ᠳᠠᠷᠭᠠᠨ	dá'ěr hàn	達爾漢		
Demo Trülku	dimu kvtuku	ᠳᠢᠮᠤ ᠲᠦᠷᠦᠯᠦᠬᠤ	dimù kùtúkètú	諦穆庫圖克圖	de-mo-sprul-sku	ᠳᠢᠮᠤᠲᠦᠷᠦᠯᠦᠬᠤ
Desi	diba	ᠳᠢᠪᠠ	dībā; dīsī	第巴; 第司	sde-srid	ᠳᠢᠪᠠ
Elhe Taifin Khan	elhe taifin khan	ᠡᠯᠬᠡ ᠲᠠᠶᠢᠨ ᠬᠠᠨ	kāngxīdì	康熙帝	khang-zhi-gong-ma; in Tibetan texts often referred to simply as gong-ma-rgyal-po, lit. 'the Superior King.'	ᠡᠯᠬᠡᠲᠠᠶᠢᠨᠬᠠᠨ
Galdan	g'aldan	ᠭᠠᠯᠳᠠᠨ	gá'ěrdān	噶爾丹	dga'-ldan	ᠭᠠᠯᠳᠠᠨ
Ganden Phodrang					dga'-ldan-pho-brang	ᠭᠠᠯᠳᠠᠨᠫᠤᠯᠲᠠᠩ
Gelugpa			gélūpài	格魯派	dge-lugs-pa	ᠭᠡᠯᠦᠭᠤᠯᠠ
Guihua	huhu hoton	ᠬᠡᠢᠬᠠ	guīhuà chéng	歸化城	mkhar-sngon-grong-khyer	ᠬᠡᠢᠬᠠ
Gushri Khan	guxi han; gusi han	ᠭᠤᠰᠢ ᠬᠠᠨ / ᠭᠤᠰᠢ ᠬᠠᠨ	gùshí hàn; gùshǐ hàn	顧實汗; 固始汗	gu-shrī-bstan-'dzin	ᠭᠤᠰᠢᠬᠠᠨ
Ijshvn Dasan Khan	ijshvñ dasan han	ᠢᠵᠢᠰᠬᠠᠨ ᠳᠠᠰᠠᠨ ᠬᠠᠨ	shùnzhdì	順治帝		
Jimba Jamsu	jimba jamsu	ᠵᠢᠮᠤ ᠵᠠᠮᠤᠰᠤ	jīn (jīn) bā zhā (zhá) mùsù	津 (晉) 巴扎 (札) 木素	sbyin-pa-rgya-mtsho	ᠵᠢᠮᠤᠵᠠᠮᠤᠰᠤ
Jedrung Trülku	ji rung kvtuku	ᠵᠢᠷᠦᠩᠲᠦᠷᠦᠯᠦᠬᠤ	jīlóng kùtúkètú	濟隆庫圖克圖	rje-drung-sprul-sku	ᠵᠢᠷᠦᠩᠲᠦᠷᠦᠯᠦᠬᠤ
Karma Kagyü					karma-bka'-brgyud	ᠬᠠᠷᠮᠤᠪᠬᠠᠨ
Karma Tenkyong					karma bstan-skyong	ᠬᠠᠷᠮᠤᠪᠰᠠᠨ
Karmapa					karma-pa	ᠬᠠᠷᠮᠤᠫᠠ
Kham	k'am	ᠬᠠᠮ	kāmù	喀木	khams	ᠬᠠᠮ
Kokonor	huhu noor	ᠬᠡᠢᠬᠠ ᠨᠣᠷ	qīnghǎi	青海	mtsho-sngon; a-mdo	ᠬᠡᠢᠬᠠᠨᠣᠷ
Lhasa	lasa	ᠯᠠᠰᠠ	lāsà	拉薩	lha-sa	ᠯᠠᠰᠠ
Lifanyuan	tulergi golo be dasara jurgan	ᠲᠤᠯᠦᠷᠭᠢ ᠭᠣᠯᠤ ᠪᠡ ᠳᠠᠰᠠᠷᠠ ᠵᠢᠷᠭᠠᠨ	lífányuàn	理蕃院		
Lobzang Yeshe					blo-bzang-ye-shes	ᠯᠣᠪᠵᠠᠩ ᠶᠡᠰᠡ
Nakartse					sna-dkar-rtse	ᠨᠠᠬᠠᠷᠲᠦᠰᠡ
Ningxia	ning hiya	ᠨᠢᠩᠰᠢᠶᠠ	ningxia	寧夏		
Nyimathang Shabdrung	nimatang kvtuku	ᠨᠢᠮᠠᠲᠠᠩ ᠲᠦᠷᠦᠯᠦᠬᠤ	nímátáng kùtúkètú	尼麻唐庫圖克圖	nyi-ma-thang-zhabs-drung	ᠨᠢᠮᠠᠲᠠᠩᠲᠦᠷᠦᠯᠦᠬᠤ

	<i>Manchu</i>		<i>Chinese</i>		<i>Tibetan</i>	
Onqon	onqon	ᠣᠨᠴᠣᠨ	wēnchūn	溫春	dpon-chung	དཔོན་ཅུང་།
Panchen Lama	banqan kvtuku	ᠪᠠᠨᠴᠢᠨ ᠬᠠᠮᠠ	bānchán kùtúkètú	班禪庫圖克圖	paṅ-chen	པཎ་ཅེན།
Sahaliyan	sahaliyan	ᠰᠠᠬᠠᠯᠢᠶᠠᠨ	sàhalián	薩哈蓮	sa-kha-li	སཱ་ཁཱ་ལི།
Sangye Gyatso					sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho	སངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱལ་མཚོ།
Shigatse	rig'ase	རིག་ཤེ།	rikāzé	日喀則	gzhis-ka-rtse	གཞིས་ཀ་རེ།
Sönam Gyatso	sonom jamsu	སོནམ་ཇམ་སུ།	suǒnán jiàcuò	索南嘉措	bsod-nams-rgya-mtsho	བསོད་ནམས་རྒྱལ་མཚོ།
Sönam Chöphel					bsod-nams-chos-'phel	བསོད་ནམས་ཅོས་འཕེལ།
Tsang	zang	ཧཱུང་།	zàng	藏	gtsang	གཅོང་།
Tsangyang Gyatso					tsangs-dbyangs-rgya-mtsho	ཚངས་དབྱངས་རྒྱལ་མཚོ།
Tsewang Rabten	cewang rabtan	ཅེ་འཇམ་རབ་བྲའན།	cèwāng lābūtān	策旺拉卜灘	tshe-dbang-rab-brtan	ཚེ་དབང་རབ་བརྟན།
Tsoka					mtsho-kha	མཚོ་ཁ།
Tsongkhapa	zungk'aba	ཧོང་ཀའ་པ།	zōngkābā	宗喀巴	tsong-kha-pa	ཙོང་ཁ་པ།
Ū	u sy	འུ་སེ།	wū sī	烏思	dbus	དབུས།
Wu Sangui	u san gui	འུ་སའ་ཁྱེ།	wú sānguì	吳三桂		
Xining	si ning	སི་འཇམ་།	xīníng	西寧	zi-ling	ཟི་འཇམ་།

## Appendix B: Glossary of Mongolian Names and Terms

As Used in Text	Mongolian Cyrillic	Classical Mongolian: Transcription	Classical Mongolian: Original Script
boxoktu	Бошигт	bošoγtu	ᠪᠣᠰᠢᠭᠲᠤ
guihua (huhu hoton)	Хөх хот	köke qota	ᠬᠥᠬᠡ ᠬᠣᠲᠠ
hubilgan	хувилгаан	qubilγan	ᠬᠤᠪᠢᠯᠭᠠᠨ
kokonor	Хөхнуур	köke naγur	ᠬᠥᠬᠡ ᠨᠠᠭᠤᠷ
kvtuktu	хутагт	qutuγtu	ᠬᠤᠲᠤᠭᠲᠤ
sakil	сахил	sakil	ᠰᠠᠬᠢᠯ
tüsimel	түшмэл	tüsimel	ᠲᠦᠰᠢᠮᠡᠯ
vklige ejen	ӨГЛӨГ ИН ЭЗЭН	oglige-yin ejen	ᠣᠭᠯᠢᠭᠡ ᠶᠢᠨ ᠶᠡᠵᠢᠨ

## Appendix C Original Text of Translated Excerpts

Below are given the excerpts I have cited in translated form throughout the text. They are ordered by their respective footnotes.

70. *ferguwequke ejen enduringge ofi . yaya baita be doigonde sara jakade uthai ishun aniya . dalai lama i qan qi tuqire be safi . ere juwe lama be takabume unggihengge . mini dolo ambula urgunjemi . ere onqon lama . daqi dalai lama i hanqi juwan aniya tehe be dahame . ere tuwaqi endembio . ere juwe lama . dalai lama i qan qi tuqire be aliyafi . getukeleme tuwafi amasi genefi ejen de wesimbuqi . ejen tere erinde mini yargiyan be saqi ombime . geren i genehunjere gvnin inu nakambi . unenggi dalai lama i beye akv oqi . bi gelhun akv dalai lama be . bi qan qi tuqimbi seme . nimatang kvtuku be takvrafi . han de wesimbumbio . dalai lama i nenehe beye bisirengge umesi yargiyan .*
71. *bi dalai lamai emgi doro xajin uhe ofi .*
72. *dalai lama be geren monggoso fuqih i adali ginggulembi . diba serengge . dalai lamai funde baita iqihiyara niyalma . g'aldan i ehe fudasihvn be yabuhangge . gemu diba i haran seme ..*
73. *juwan ninggun aniya haqin haqin i dalai lamai gisun seme holtoho baita iletu ojoro jakade . dalai lama unenggi sara gese oqi . inu ejen be hukxeme . diba be wakaxarakv ome muterakv .*
83. 第巴原係達賴喇嘛下管事人朕優擢之封為土伯特國王乃陽奉宗喀巴之道法陰與噶爾丹比欺達賴喇嘛班禪而壞宗喀巴之法前遣濟隆庫圖克圖至噶爾丹所為噶爾丹誦經選擇戰日朕為衆生往召班禪沮而不遣.
84. *meni juwe lama be . dalai lama be tengkime takambi . getukelefi jio seme hesei afabufi unggihe bime . diba geli . suweni juwe lama i jihengge umesi sain . dalai lama i nenehe beye bisirengge umesi yargiyan . suwe tuwafi . amasi genefi han de getukeleme wesimbu sembi .*
- 皇上聖明凡事先知遂知達賴喇嘛明歲出定遣此兩喇嘛前來識認臣心甚喜此溫春喇嘛向與達賴喇嘛同居十年令伊識認自能立辨俟此兩喇嘛至達賴喇嘛出定驗明回奏皇上.
88. *omxon biyai orin juwe de u sy zang de isinafi . wang diba de dergi hese be emke emken i ulhibume akvmbume wasimbuha .*
91. *jirung kvtuku be ulan butung ni mudan de manjusiri han . dalai lama i hese be dahame yabuhakv .*
93. *manjusiri han abkai fejergi sahaliyan ujuanga irgen be gemu fulgiyan jui i adali gosire be dahame . ere emu sargan jui be udu unggiqibe . giyanakv gurun de ai tusa ombi . damu g'aldan . doro xajin be efuleme yabure jakade . ejen terei enen juse be lakqabuki sere dabala . tuttu sehe seme ere emu sargan jui be dahame . qeni eigen sargan be faksalarakv . da an i banjibureo . ere emu baita be diba bi niyakovrafi hengkileme baimbi .*
95. *diba i ere mudan i gelehe goloho .*
96. *diba i beye i babe sume nesuken hese wasimbure be baime wesimbuhe bithe isinjija ..*
97. *abkai fejergi be uherilehe . horon hvhuri gubqi de algika . dergi manjusiri amba han i genggiyen de . waqira dara dalai lamai xajin be jafaha . fuqih i taqihiyen be badarambume selgiyere wang butda abdi niyakovrafi gingguleme gala be giogin arafi wesimburengge .*
98. 第巴原係達賴喇嘛下管事人朕優擢之封為土伯特國王乃陽奉宗喀巴之道法陰與噶爾丹比欺達賴喇嘛班禪而壞宗喀巴之法前遣濟隆庫圖克圖至噶爾丹所為噶爾丹誦經選擇戰日朕為衆生往召班禪沮而不遣.

99. *amargi ergi nikan . monggo yooni dalai lama sonom jamsu . zungk'aba i xajin be kundulembi . tereqi ebsi . ere dalai lama de isitala vklige ejen biqibe . erei dorgide . nenehe enduringge han qi wesihun vklige ejen akv .*
- amargi ergi nikan . monggo . yooni dalai lama . zungk'aba i xajin be kunduleqibe . erei dorgide nenehe enduringge han qi wesihun ejen akv .*
100. *mini gvnin de yaya babe ehe fudasihvn yabuhakv gese gvnimbi . damu ulhiqu akv ofi amba han i gvnin qi jurqehe ba biqi . onqodome gamareo . han i hese be dahame . faxxame hvsun buki seme . neneme wesimbuhe bihe . te biqibe . damu han i hese be gingguleme dahame . muterei teile faxxame yabuki . dalai lama be gosime gvniqu . minde nesuken hese gosime wasimbureo ..*
101. *bark'am i jergi ba i qooha be aisilame unggireo seme baiha jergi babe neneme donjibume wesimbuhe babi; dergi han i hese be dahame . ini harangga ri u qekul . tubdan . qoimk'ur ling sere miyoo be tatame gaifi .*
- ere jergi babe neneme donjibume wesimbuhe babi; dergi han i hese be dahame . ini harangga miyoo be tatame gaifi .*
110. *mini gvnin suweni gvnin qi enqu . bi ging suduri be tuwaqi . tulergi monggoso . dulimbai gurun de etuhuxeme yabuhangge labdu . han gurun . tang gurun . sung gurun qi ming gurun de isitala . jalan tome gemu jobolon be alihabi . monggoso de horolome yabuha . monggoso i gvnin be dahabuhangge . musei gurun de isirengge akv . qooha serengge ehe agvra . enduringge niyalma umainaqi ojarahv oho manggi . teni baitalambi .. duibuleqi . niyalmai beye de yo nixaraha banjiqu . nama suiha be baitalaqi aqambi . hoqokon saka sain yali sukv be balai nimebume koro araqi ombio . abkai fejergi be dasara doro . inu uttu . faquhvn oqi . tuwanjihiyame dailambi . baita akv oqi . ergembume ojimbi ere giyan de ini qisui banjinarangge kai . tere anggala julgeqi ebsi goro dailame yabuhangge . gurun booi da sukun kokirabuhakvngge akv . tuttu bi damu baita be dekdeburakv be wesihun obuhabi . dalai lama be geren monggoso fuqih i adali ginggulembi .*
111. *diba serengge . dalai lamai funde baita iqihiyara niyalma . g'aldan i ehe fudasihvn be yabuhangge . gemu diba i haran seme . tuttu bi ejeku hafan booju be takvrafti . diba de qiralame hese wasimbuha bihe . te diba ambula golofi . mini hese be gemu dahaha . wesimbuhe gisun umesi goqishvn . beyei babe sume . gosime jilara be baihabi . weile de geleme hafirabufi gashvhabi . ere inu ginggulere ten seqi ombikai . dalai lama akv oho be . mini sahangge umesi getuken . diba . nimatang kvttuku be unggifi . ini gvnin be hafukiyame narhvxame wesimbumbi sere be tuwaqi . nimatang kvttuku isinjiha manggi . urunakv dalai lama akv oho babe tuqibume . qeni jalin de gidareo seme minde baimbi . dalai lama muse de sain i yabume ninju aniya funqehe . umai ehe ba akv . diba i uttu baimbe wesimbuqi . kemuni yabubuqi ogoro baita . ede uthai diba i weile be onqodome . ini baiha babe yabubuqi . diba musei kesi hukxembime . geren monggoso gemu urgunjemi . suweni gvnin aisembi sehe ..*
112. *dergi de enduringge han . wargi de dalai lama juwe enduringge doro emu ofi .*
119. *te baita be gemu getukelefi . umesi aldungga ofi . largin seme gvnirakv ..*
120. *sakda dalai lama . indahvn aniya akv oho . ajige dalai lama banjifi ere aniya tofohon se oho . meni bade dalai lama de akdafi taksifi bihe . dalai lama i akv oho fonde uthai wesimbuki seqi . aika kvbulin tuqirahv .*
121. *ere aniya juwan biyai orin sunja de teni qan qi tuqifi geren be hengkilebumbi .*
122. *bi ere utala aniya dalai lama i akv be safi goidaha . unenggi dalai lama bihe biqi . semba qimbu kvttuku . g'aldan siretu . qiqik dalai g'ambu . jirung kvttuku se ainaha seme uttu yaburakv . kalka vlet inu efujere de isinarakv bihe . uttu ofi bi qira hese wasimbuha .. te diba unenggi gvnin i yargiyan be tuqibume minde narhvxame wesimbuhe be dahame . bi inu narhvxame asarafi .*
126. *waqira dara dalai lamai xajin be jafaha . fuqih i taqihyan be badarambume selgiyere wang butda abdi de wasimbuha .*

128. *butda abdi si . neneme g'aldan de hebe ofi . yaya baita be urui vlet i iqi haraxame yabure . baita be efuleme yabuha jirung kvtuku be memerefi benjihkev ojoro jakade . tere fonde bi . dalai lama biqi ainaha seme uttu akv bihe seme sinde qohotoi qira hese wasimbuha bihe . te si enduringge ejen qira hese taqibume wasimbure jakade . ambula mujilen joboxombi . te damu han i hese be gingguleme dahame muterei teile faxxame jabuki . dalai lama be gosime gvniqi . minde nesuken hese gosime wasimbureo seme hing seme baime wesimbuhebi .*
129. *ereqi amasi si ele ginggun ijishvn i mini hese be jurqerakv yabuqi . bi . sini nenehe waka be gemu gvniirakv . da an i gosimbi . uttu oqi . sini ba i irgen de ambula tusa ombime . si inu wesihun derengge be enteheme bahafi alimbikai .*
130. 為小達賴喇嘛遣使稱賀乃撰勅遣主事保住等往諭第巴  
*ajige dalai lama de urgun i doroi elqin takvraki sefi . diba de hesei bithe wasimbume .*
131. 第巴原係達賴喇嘛下管事人朕優擢之封為土伯特國王乃陽奉宗喀巴之道法陰與噶爾丹比欺達賴喇嘛班禪而壞宗喀巴之法前遣濟隆庫圖克圖至噶爾丹所為噶爾丹誦經選擇戰日朕為衆生往召班禪沮而不遣。
132. *tere anggala suweni tubet gurun be . bi gosirakv tuwaxatarakv oqi . elhe be bahafi banjijiqi ombio .*
133. *takvrabure hafan inggu isinjifi alarangge . bi boro tala qi ebsi jime . jurgan qi cewang rabtan de unggire bithe isinara jakade . ere bithe be gamame amasi cewang rabtan i jakade isinaha manggi . cewang rabtan ambula urgunjeme uthai hese be dahame qooha gaiifi g'aldan be dailame jihe . saksa tuhuruk qi orin inenggi on de isinjifi . dalai lama i elqin dargan emqi genefi dalai lama akv ofi juwan ninggun aniya oho . ajige dalai lama tofohon se oho . suwe meni meni bade te . ume qooha ilire sere jakade . uthai qooha nakafi amasi mariha . inggu bi terei yabume muterakv be safi inu amasi jihe . dalai lama i turgun be wargi amargi urse gemu donjiha sembi ..*
134. *juwan ninggun aniya haqin haqin i dalai lama i gisun seme holtoho baita iletu ojoro jakade . dalai lama unenggi sara gese oqi . inu ejen be hukxeme . diba be wakaxarakv ome muterakv . ede diba . tubet i gurun de ehe be gisurerakv saqi ombi seme ferguwerakv niyalma akv .*
137. *xangnaha ninggun suje be . ejeku hafan booju . sahaliyan se gajifi wasimbure jakade . alimbaharakv ambula urgunjehe [...] qira hese wasimbure jakade . bi ambula joboxome gvniimbihe . te booju jarhvqi ejen i nesuken hese be . wasimbure jakade . bi alimbaharakv ambula urgunjehe ..*
147. འདིར་རིམ་གྱིས་སྒོ་ཤོག་ལུ་རྒྱ་ལོ་ཐོགས་ལས་སུ་སྒྲ་བ་ལྔ་པའི་ཚེས་བཅུ་གསུམ་ཉིན་རྒྱ་དམག་དང་ལྷག་པའི་ཨ་རུ་བསང་བྱིངས་ཐོར་ཐོས་པ་སོགས་ [...] རིམ་གྱིས་གོ་ཞིང་གོང་མ་རྒྱ་ལོ་ཤིན་པ་ལ་ལེབས་རྒྱའི་དགེ་ལེན་དང་རྒྱ་ནག་མི་སྒྲ་འཕམ་མ་ཡོད་ཚུལ་[...] གྱི་གཏམ་རིམ་སྒྲིབས་སུ་བྱུང་།
148. མ་གྲོལ་བའི་ཐོག་རྒྱ་ནག་གི་སྒྲ་དཔོན་རྒྱུན་པ་རྒྱ་མཚོ། དེམ་ཚེ་བསོད་ནམས་བཟང་པོ། རྫོལ་ཏུ་སྐྱུར་ཁོ་ཚེ་གསུམ་
149. དོན་གྱི་དོ་ཁ་སྒྲ་ལ་དང་པོར་བཞུགས་མ་བཞུགས་སྒྲ་མ་འདི་ཉིད་གྱིས་བཞུགས་ཏུ་དང་པུ་ཚེན་རིན་པོ་ཚེ་སྤྱན་དྲངས་པ་ལྟར་གྲོང་བ། རྗེ་དུང་སྤྱི་ལོ་དང་ལོ་ཤོག་ལུ་རྒྱ་ནང་ལ་ཡོད་པའི་རྫོ་རྒྱལ་གྱི་སྐུ་མ་མོ་བཟང་ནས་སྐྱུ་ལ་དགོས་ཚུལ་འདི་ནམས་མ་བྱུང་ན་དང་དམག་བཅས་ཡོད་ངམ་དམག་གཏོང་གསུང་བ་དང་རྫོལ་བྱས་ཏུ་དམག་ལས་མང་པོ་ཡོད་ལྷགས་འབྲུག་པས་གོང་མར་ཞུ་འབྲུག་བྱས་ལྷགས་སོགས་ཟེར་དཔོན་རྒྱུན་པ་རྒྱ་མཚོ་དང་དེམ་ཚེ་གཉིས་གོང་དུ་འབྲུག་རྒྱའི་བཀའ་ཤོག་དང་བཅས་མཇལ་ཁ་བསྐྱུག་གི་བསྟོན། རྫོལ་ཏུ་སྐྱུར་ཁོ་ཚེ་མཚོ་སྐུ་མཐའ་བཅུན་དང་བཅས་བཀའ་ལྷེ་བ་ལེབས་པ་ནམས་ལ་དག་བྱེད་གྱི་རྒྱ་མཚོན་དང་། གཡུལ་ལས་རྒྱལ་བའི་ལྷགས་སྐྱུ་སུ་ཁ་བཏགས་ཉིན་བདེ་མ། དོ་ཚེ་ནམ་པར་འཛོམས་པའི་སྐྱ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་སོགས་ཞུ་ཡིག་རྟེན་འཕམ་དང་བཅས་རྫོང་ཚུལ་བྱས།
151. *banqan kvtuku neneme geneki sefi . amala jihe elqin sei xerime iqakv gisun tuqike de gvniifi generakv seme henduhe .*
152. མི་སྒྲ་རྣམས་ལ། འདི་རང་འབྲུག་ནང་མ་ཐར་བའི་རྒྱུན་གྱིས་པོ་བྱང་དུ་བསྐྱོད་མ་བདེ་བས་མི་སྒྲ་ལྷིབ་དགོངས་བཞུགས་ལུ་ལུ་བ་མ་གཏོགས། གཞན་ནས་དེ་རིགས་གྱི་བཀག་འགགས་མེད་པས་དགོངས་འཛོམས་མེད་པ་དང་། དུང་འབྲུག་བ་མ་ཐར་བའི་གཤིས་གྱིས་དགོངས་བཅེ་བསྐྱུངས་དགོས་པའི་བསྐྱབ་རྟོན་ཞུ་དགོས་ཚུལ་དང་།
154. འདི་གར་ཚོས་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་ནས་གོང་དུ་བརྗོད་པའི་ཡང་གསང་རྒྱགས་པར་དེ་ཉིན་ནམ་མཐའ་སྐོ་བྱར་དུ་འཚུབ་པའི་ནམ་མཐའ་ཐལ་རྒྱང་གིས་ཁྱབ་པར་གྱུར་ཅིང་དེའི་ལྷོ་ལ་འཁོར་སུ་ནང་རྟེན་དང་རྒྱ་ཅན་གྱི་སྐུ་ཐང་མཚོད་གཏོར་སྤྱན་གཟིགས་རྣམས་བཀའ། འདུས་ཚོགས་དང་སྟན་ཅིག་མཐའ་དམག་བཟུངས་པར་བསམ་པ་སྤྱད་གྲུབ་མ་ལན་གསུམ་གྱི་རིང་གསོལ་བ་བཏབ་པར་ཡིད་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཁྱེལ་བར་བྱུང་།
158. *nimatang kvtuku sei anggai wesimbuhengge sakda dalai lama . indahvn aniya akv*

oho . ajige dalai lama ere aniya tofohon se oho .

尼麻唐庫圖克圖等口奏云老達賴喇嘛戊午己故小達賴喇嘛生今年十五

- 159. ལྷ་སྐོད་ཟླ་བའི་ཚེས་བཞིའི་ཉེན་ལྗེ་སྲིད་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ནས་ཤུག་ལོང་མཁན་ཆེན་རྒྱལ་བའི་དབང་པོ་རྟལ་འཛོན་ཅན་རྣམས་ཚོས་ལ་བསྐྱལ་བའི་ཆེད་ཞིང་གཞན་དུ་གཤེགས་ཚུ་ལ་བསྐྱན་པར་གསང་སྤོང་ཤིན་ཏུ་དམ་ཤིང་དགོས་བྱུང་ཡང་། འདི་ལོ་ཉི་མར་ཞབས་དུང་གོང་མ་རྒྱལ་པོའི་སྐུ་ཞབས་སུ་རྣ་བའི་བཅུད་ལེན་གཞེགས་འབྱུང་དུ་བཏང་བའི་གནས་ཚུལ་དང་།.
- 160. གོང་མར་གསང་བཀོལ་ཞུས་པས་དགོངས་དངས་དང་། བ་དུར་ཐའི་ཇི་དང་། བཤ་ཆེན་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་རྒྱ་ནག་ཏུ་ཕེབས་དགོས་སྐོར།
- 164. ལྷ་ནག་ནས་སྤོལ་བྱ་སྐྱར་ལོ་ཆེ་དང་ལུ་ཤི་མལ་ས་ལ་ལེ་ཅན་འཕྱོར་ཉེ་དེད་དུ་བཀའ་ཤོག་ལེར་པོ་གོས་ཡུག་དུག་གི་རྟེན་དང་བཅས་འདུག་པ་པོ་ཏུ་ལའི་ཚོམས་ཆེན་རྣེད་པར་སྐྱབས།
- 165. རོན་གྱི་རྒྱུད་བ་དུར་ཐའི་ཇི་རྒྱར་མ་ཕེབས་ན་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་ལེགས་པོ་མི་ཡོང་།  
ཕེབས་ཕྱིན་དཔོན་པོ་གཞན་ཡོང་མེད་དང་ཞབས་ཕྱིའང་མང་ཉུང་མེད་པས་ཅེས་ཀྱང་ཕེབས་དགོས་ཚུལ། ཇི་དུང་འགོར་གཞི་བྱུང་བར་མཐོགས་འདེགས་ཡོང་བ།  
པཤ་ཆེན་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་ཕེབས་དགོས་སྐོར་བསྐྱར་བཤམ་ལར་ལ་ལ་དན་བ་དུར་དང་དེ་མོ་སྐུལ་སྐྱོང་བདེ་དཔེན་དགོས་ཚུལ་...
- 166. མི་དཔོན་པ་འཕྱོར་བ་དུར་ཐའི་ཇི་དང་ཨེར་ཉེ་མི་ཉོང་ཐའི་ཇི་སོགས་རྒྱར་ཕེབས་དགོས་པ་གོང་མའི་བཀའ་ནན་ཆེ་ཞིང་ལྷང་སྐྱ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱང་མ་ཕེབས་ན་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་ལར་རྒྱར་ལེགས་པོ་མི་ཡོང་ཚུལ་བྱུང་བས་ཅི་འགའ་ཀྱི་དྲི་བར་བྱུང་བ་ཐོན་དུ་སྤོལ་བྱ་སྐྱར་གོ་ཆེས་ཟེར་བ་བཞིན་ཕེབས་དགོས་པའི་ཡི་གེ་ལུས་གྲུབ་པ་སྐར།  
བཀའ་བཞིན་ཕེབས་ནས་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་དུ་འཁོས་ཁྱབ་གང་ཆེ་དགོས་ཚུལ་དང་བཅས་འཕྲལ་སྐོག་བྱས།
- 171. 達賴喇嘛與朕道法合一相敬有年
- 172. *damu g'aldan . doro xajin be efuleme yabure jakade .*
- 175. རོན་གྱི་རྒྱུད་བ་དུར་ཐའི་ཇི་རྒྱར་མ་ཕེབས་ན་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་ལེགས་པོ་མི་ཡོང་།  
དབང་ལག་རྣམས་དགོས་ཚུལ་འདུག་པ་དང་བཅས་བ་དུར་ཐའི་ཇིར་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་ལར་རྒྱར་གལ་ཆེ་གཤིས་ཕེབས་དགོས་ཚུལ་གྱི་ལྷ་ཡིག་ལུས་ཞིང་།
- 176. ལྷང་སྐྱ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱང་མ་ཕེབས་ན་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་ལར་རྒྱར་ལེགས་པོ་མི་ཡོང་ཚུལ་བྱུང་བས་ཅི་འགའ་ཀྱི་དྲི་བར་བྱུང་བ་ཐོན་དུ་སྤོལ་བྱ་སྐྱར་གོ་ཆེས་ཟེར་བ་བཞིན་ཕེབས་དགོས་པའི་ཡི་གེ་ལུས་གྲུབ་པ་སྐར།  
བཀའ་བཞིན་ཕེབས་ནས་གཞུང་བསྐྱན་དུ་འཁོས་ཁྱབ་གང་ཆེ་དགོས་ཚུལ་དང་བཅས་འཕྲལ་སྐོག་བྱས།
- 177. 因爾不違達賴喇嘛之旨輔助道法朕是以優封爾為土伯特國王
- 178. པཤ་ཆེན་མ་ཕེབས་ན་ཡང་མ་ཕེབས་ལྗེ་པས་གཡོ་སྐོར་ཡིན།  
ལྗེ་པ་ལ་གོང་མས་གནང་བའི་ཐམ་ག་བཞེས་པ་དང་བསྐྱར་སྐྱོང་སྐྱོར་ཆོགས་བཅས་སྤོལ་བྱ་སྐྱར་གོ་ཆེ་བཀའ་ཤོག་ལེར་པོ་ཞིག་ཞུར་ནས་སྐབས་རྒྱ་དེད་

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*Dbyangs Rgya Mtsho 'i Thun Mong Phyi 'i Rnam Par Thar Pa Du KU La 'i 'phro 'Thud Rab Gsal Gser Gyi Snye Ma Glegs Bam Dang Po*

ཐམས་ཅད་མཁོན་པ་དུག་པ་སློབ་ཐོབ་རིན་ཆེན་ཚངས་དབྱངས་ཀྱི་མཚོའི་ལུན་མོང་ཕྱིའི་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ་དུ་ལྷ་ལའི་འཕྲོ་འཕྲད་རབ་གསལ་གསེར་གྱི་སྒྲེ་མ་སྒྲེགས་བཅ་

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