

The PRC for the reduction of CO₂

THE DIFFUSION OF NORMS AND INTERESTS

Bachelor thesis

University:	Leiden University
Studies:	International Relations Organizations [BA3]
Course:	BA thesis 6: Design of Global Economic Institutions
Docent:	Dr. M.D. Sampson
Name:	Laura G.L.C. van Megen
Student number:	S1205439
E-mail:	l.g.l.c.van.megen@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Date:	12-06-2017
Word count:	8720 (excluding bibliography and appendix)
Version:	2



Universiteit Leiden

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents	2
Introduction	3
Theoretical framework and literature review	5
International cooperation from a rational cost-benefit perspective	5
Norm diffusion	6
Norm localization	7
Environmental protection and China	8
Contributions	11
Methodology and research design	12
Conceptualization and variables	12
Methods	14
Analysis and results	17
Participating in international organizations	17
Leadership role in international cooperation	19
Putting the environment above economic growth	21
Conclusion and discussion	25
Conclusion	25
Discussion	26
Bibliography	27
Appendix	31

INTRODUCTION

The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 required developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. It did, however, not bear much fruit because the world's biggest polluter, the United States (US), did not ratify the treaty. In 2015, almost 20 years later, a breakthrough occurred when 196 member-states signed the Paris Agreement and pledged action against climate change. China, who has surpassed US in greenhouse gas emissions for some time now, has already ratified the agreement and has repeated its commitment even after the Trump administration withdrew just last week (Hua, 2017). Moreover, the PRC has unilaterally announced a 3 billion USD investment for the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. With this, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is taking on a leadership role in helping developing countries combat climate change. Due to China's uncooperative attitude and rigid position during earlier climate conferences – in particular during the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference – the international community was surprised by its proactive commitments and diplomatic behavior during the Paris negotiations (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.48). Paul G. Harris (2011, p.1) wrote that the Copenhagen conference revealed that in the international management of climate change, all value was placed on the national interests of the member states. It was not in the interest of the PRC to cooperate and therefore it did not. This refers to rationalist thinking in terms of cost-benefit analysis. But what if it is not just about cost-benefit analysis? Why has China changed his behavior in relation to climate change when it was apparently against their interest to cooperate? And what are the causal mechanisms behind this shift in policy and attitude? The following research question will be answered in this thesis:

“To what extent can norm diffusion explain China's change in environmental policies and attitudes towards international cooperation in combatting climate change, measured from COP-15 in Copenhagen to COP-21 in Paris?”

In this thesis I will show that China has been influenced by the norm on international cooperation in tackling climate change. This thesis adds to the theoretical debate between rationalist cost-benefit analysis and norm diffusion and norm localization. I will also show that in some respect internalization of a foreign norm can be serving a state's self-interest. The three concepts are therefore not mutually exclusive, but, rather, supporting entities. The

real-world implications of this research are a deeper understanding of the PRC's standpoint on climate change and thus compliance behavior. By analyzing China's shifting position towards constructive engagement at the COP-21 in Paris, policy makers and representatives of other states during climate conferences will better comprehend China's intentions. Understanding this key player will help with negotiations processes and implementation processes and can help predict behavior and possible breaking points.

I have conducted a discourse analysis of Chinese newspaper articles published around the COP-15 in Copenhagen en COP-21 in Paris to show that international cooperation in tackling climate change is gaining importance by the PRC. Moreover, I have used data on compliance to commitments made during several climate summits to show that not only the rhetoric has changed, but policy as well.

I will show that the PRC, via several mechanisms, is internalizing *and* localizing the international – and initially ‘foreign and hostile’ – norm. By numerous international consultations, high-level meetings and participation in international organizations (IOs), environmental protection has now become policy. By the power of domestic pressure groups and the strategic choice of the central government to align the norm with domestic objectives, green growth has now become a core value of the development agenda. Moreover, the strong sense of self has caused the PRC to not only become a participant, but also assume a leadership role in the global response to climate change.

THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

International cooperation from a rational cost-benefit perspective

Although no one denies that international cooperation is possible, political scientists differ as to the likelihood of its occurrence and the ease of cooperation (Baldwin, 1993, p.5). Checkel (2001, p.559) writes that for rationalists the compliance of states can be traced back to coercion (sometimes), instrumental cost-benefit calculations (always), and possibly social incentives. Agents calculate their response on a cost-benefit ratio and assess whether the benefits (material, social or both) outweigh the costs of sanctions, (security) threats or losing reputation (Checkel, 2001, p.544).

When writing about cooperation on environmental protection, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ by Hardin (1968) cannot go unmentioned. In his article the author uses an analogy of sheep and herdsmen in a meadow to highlight the difficulty of protecting non-excludable (‘common’) goods. Every rational actor would increase its stock to maximize the output, because individual gains outweigh common costs. However, eventually the system crashes, the quality of the stock deteriorates and all the herdsmen are worse off than they did before increasing the livestock (Maclean, 2015, p.227). Hardin (1968, p.1247) proposed to solve this problem either by changing the structure and privatizing the commons, or by ‘mutual coercion mutually agreed upon’: adopting some authority to regulate grazing policies. ‘Some authority’ could be the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Neorealist scholars attach importance to relative gains when assessing cooperation in different fields, such as climate change (Hodgson, 2011, p.4). Because in most cases environmental protection would not be classified as a military-security issue, cooperation could take place under absolute gains benefits analysis (Lipson, 1984, p.15-18). But what if there is *no* material benefit to states’ cooperation on climate change? Grundig (2006) researched patterns of cooperation in the issues areas of ozone depletion, global warming and trade. The benefits of the first two issue areas are non-excludable goods and have enormous implementation costs. Moreover, states can easily benefit without cooperating and it is difficult to punish defectors. However, as Hodgson (2011, p.4) argues, Grundig’s analysis does not explain why in some cases states do find consensus on environmental issues and sign agreements. The Kyoto Protocol is a clear example: even though the Bush administration

“defected”, this did not result in other countries withdrawing their support (and compliance) for the Kyoto Protocol, even though this would be the rational response.

In short, not all actors adhere to rules imposed by ‘mutually agreed on coercive’ institutions such as the UNFCCC. Moreover, not all decisions are made on a cost-benefit basis. These are insufficient explanations for changes in behavior. It is therefore important to look at other explanations.

Norm diffusion

Norms are “collectively held ideas about behavior such that unlike ideas which may be held privately, norms are shared and social: they are not just subjective but *intersubjective*” [emphasis in original] (Finnemore, 1996, p.23). Within every specific society, state or region these collectively held ideas on behavior exist. Accordingly, the norm is not rigid, but also malleable by agents in the particular context (Oh & Matsuoka, 2013, p.4).

In essence, the transnational process of norm diffusion influences domestic decision-making. If the process is strong enough, the norms will become the only appropriate type of behavior. At this point the norm is ‘internalized’ (Gilardi in: Carlsnaes et al., 2012, pp.453-475). There are several ways in which norm diffusion can take place:

Firstly, some authors argue that norms can be taught. Finnemore (1993) writes on norm diffusion by IOs, specifically the United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). She belongs to what Acharya (2004, p.242) calls “*the moral cosmopolitans*” that make up the first wave scholarship on normative change and norm diffusion. Finnemore (1993) argues that UNESCO diffused the norm of states’ responsibility for science to other states where local conditions would not have prompted these demands at that time.

Secondly, some scholars stress the role of domestic variables. Moral cosmopolitans downplay the role of the actor and view norm diffusion as primarily being taught by (and due to the power of) transnational agents. The unaddressed black box is how actors are persuaded to internalize the norm: “*this learning is asocial and devoid of interaction*” (Checkel, 2001, p.561). The second wave scholarship of scholars on norm diffusion focused on the observed divergence of norm diffusion rate (Oh & Matsuoka, 2013, p.4). The stress was put upon the “*degree of fit*” between existing, domestic norms and organizational/political institutions and transnational norms. It emphasized the role of domestic context (political, organizational and cultural) of the agents in conditioning the new norm (Acharya, 2004, p.243).

Checkel (2001, pp.562-563) proposes five hypotheses under which circumstances agents should be particularly open to preference change. Firstly, the agent is in a new and uncertain environment. Secondly, the agent has few cognitive priors that are inconsistent with the new norm. Thirdly, the norm-maker is a powerful member of the in-group to which the agent wants to belong/belongs. Fourthly, lecturing or demanding is less effective than ‘acts out principles of serious deliberative argument’. Lastly, the subject should not be too politicized.

The third manner in which norm diffusion can take place is initiation by domestic demand. A security of economic crisis may be a catalyst for a need to revise ‘the rules of the game’. Another possibility is that local actors want to legitimize their authority after domestic political changes. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.893) state that the existence of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ is a common phenomenon in norm diffusion: “*domestic “norm entrepreneurs” advocating a minority position use international norms to strengthen their position in domestic debates*”. Finally, pressure by societal groups could also prompt the demand for new norms (Acharya, 2004, p.247).

Moreover, it is important to note that the arguments on whether behavior is norm-based or interest-based miss an essential element of the equation: norm internalization can often be self-interested, based on the specification of the nature of the norm and the interests of the actor (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.912).

Norm localization

Logically, not all norms find fertile soil in other states. Besides the domestic context possibly not being a perfect fit for the norm, the norm can also be an imperfect fit for the domestic context. In his article, Acharya (2004) writes about norm localization: one shape that norm diffusion can take. He defines localization as “*the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices*” (Acharya, 2004, p.245).

There are several factors that favor localization. Firstly, the localization of norms can have a positive effect on the legitimacy of local actors. The actors can enhance their authority and ‘borrow’ legitimacy from international norms, while ingrain them with local norms, leaving the latter dominant.

Secondly, another influential factor is the existence of strong, local norms. If the local norms are foundational or inherent to a group for multiple generations, the likelihood

increases that the norm cannot be transferred wholly, but rather will be localized by the norm-takers.

Thirdly, the before mentioned domestic ‘norm entrepreneurs’ can play an essential role. They have to be perceived as upholding local identity and values, as opposed to being an outside force (in Chinese discourse: ‘foreign hostile forces’).

A fourth condition favoring localization is the norm-takers’ sense of identity. If the norm-taker sees itself as being unique in its position in the international field, values and identity, an international norm would rather be localized than adopted wholly (Acharya, 2004, pp.247-249).

In conclusion, the concept of localization helps in understanding why particular norms are rejected and others accepted as well as the degree to which norms are internalized by given actors (Acharya, 2004, p.269). This author researched the topic of norm localization in regional setting, I, however, will use his analysis of norm localization on the domestic context of the PRC.

Environmental protection and China

In the 20th century the Chinese leadership viewed environmental degradation as a necessary evil to increase economic growth and alleviate large-scale poverty (Li, 2016, p.49). In the Mao era, the environment was viewed as something to be exploited for economic growth rather than protected. When the communist ideology was losing ground, the Chinese public’s tolerance for environment related problems started to decrease as well. As a result of putting the economy above environmental protection, the PRC is currently the largest national emitter of greenhouse gas (Harris, 2011, p.XI). Nationally, the PRC faces a multitude of climate change-induced disasters and therefore a shift to a green growth path is necessary for energy security, environmental quality and long-term economic growth (Li & Wang, 2011, p.519). However, until less than a decade ago, China persistently advocated that it had the right to reject internationally binding limits on Green House Gas (GHG) emissions in order to develop (Harris, 2011, p.2). This point of view was particularly clear during the Copenhagen Accord negotiations (Shambaugh, 2013, p.153). However, recently the PRC has been proactive in bilateral and even multilateral settings and climate negotiations. In Figure A the shift in focus is exemplified. Every fifth year the PRC adjusts its socio-economic development policies and targets in a Five-Year Plan (FYP). The targets are classified as either mandatory or expected. Mandatory indicates that the target is compulsory and must be achieved within the time restrictions of the FYP period. Expected show an indicative

development orientation and is non-binding in nature. In the 11th FYP (2006-2010) fewer targets are set in general and most are classified as ‘expected’. In the 12th FYP (2011-2016) most environment-related targets are set and nearly all are classified as ‘mandatory’ (Li & Wang, 2012, p.52).

	11th FYP		12th FYP*	
	Expected	Compulsory	Expected	Compulsory
GDP growth	7.5%		7%	
R&D/GDP ratio	2% in 2010		2.2% in 2015	
Total population		Capped to 1360 million in 2010		less than 1390 million in 2015
Increase in disposable income of urban and rural residents	4.9% per year		7% per year	
Urbanisation	47%		+4% relative to 2010	
Energy intensity reduction		20%		16%
carbon intensity reduction	NA			17%
proportion of non-fossil fuels	10%** (8.3%)			11.4% by 2015***
Reduce emissions of chemical oxygen demand and sulphur dioxide		10%		8%
Reduce emissions of ammonia and nitrogen oxides	NA			10%
forest coverage		from 18.2% (2005) to 20% (2010)		21.7% in 2015
timber reserve	NA			Increase by 600 million cubic metres
Reduce water use per unit of industrial growth		30%		30%
Industry solid waste reutilisation rate (%)	60%		72%	
efficiency of irrigation	50%			53%

* So far, the nature of some targets has not been determined and may be subject to adjustment during the Plan period as amendment cannot be excluded. This would be released by specific sectoral plans.

** According to the 11th FYP targets for Renewable Energy and the Medium and Long Term Programme of Renewable Energy Development (NDRC 2007). Actual numbers in 2010 appear in parentheses.

*** The national renewable energy plan sets a mandate of 15% by 2020.

Figure A: Comparison of socioeconomic environmental targets in the 11th and 12th FYP (Li & Wang, 2012, p.521).

On the reasoning behind this change, scholars have not found consensus. However, the majority of the prevalent visions on China’s environmental policies can be placed in the sphere of realist thinking and cost-benefit analysis. The main visions are outlined below.

Firstly, an important question is: who *does* protect the environment? One study by Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013) tackled the assumption that welfare states – perceived as milder, kinder and more social – are leading in environmental protection. They argued that this assumption is based on a spurious correlation: some welfare states spend more, because they have more, not because ‘they care more’. They have, however, found statistical significance for the effect of the degree of openness towards the international system on environmental performance (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013, p.11998). This is evidence for norm

diffusion. Moreover, Bernauer (2013, p.434) stated that, because (social) democracy apparently has a non-effect on GHG emissions, other state characteristics should be investigated. He puts forward that socioeconomic factors, such as income levels, population density and industrial structure, are more important to determine levels of environmental protection. Simply put: domestic context matters.

Hilton and Kerr (2016) stress that the structure of the Chinese domestic economy is a key explanatory variable for China's more positive participation in international climate change negotiations. The authors (2016, p.51) write that the Chinese leadership has already for a long time recognized the fact that the country's economic growth was unsustainable, both in environmental and economic terms. In the Twelfth FYP in 2011 (PRC, 2011) it became clear that China has started to restructure its economy and to gradually shift away from industry and manufacturing. Hilton and Kerr (2016, p.51) call this the 'New Normal' economy. The new policies have a radical shift in economic policy explicitly linked to the tackling climate change. With a move up the value chain and a shift from the production to service sector, less waste in energy and resources will take place.

A large number of authors (for example: Wang, 2016, Li & Wang, 2011, Torney, 2012) stress that an important factor driving Chinese environmental policies is the strategic desire to be energy independent. Wang (2016) proposes the 'strategic localization' model in relation to China's progressive environmental policies. She argues that the PRC strategically localized the norm of international cooperation on tackling climate change, based purely on the need for energy security and furthering the economic transition (2016, p.4). The author used the G20 Compliance Reports to conclude that China only complies in the field of clean energy technology development. However, this does not paint a full picture. She does not account for the partial compliance in the issue area of tackling climate change, nor the leadership role China assumes in climate conferences.

Torney (2012, p.15) argues that transnational norms are important and being diffused to China. The perceived need to enhance China's international legitimacy requires developing climate change policies. The Chinese leadership wants to show its intention of a 'peaceful rise'¹, increase its soft power and show the international community that China can be a responsible member.

Moreover, there is a growing awareness of China's deteriorating environmental quality. Air pollution, water pollution and desertification are significantly decreasing the

¹ Or 'China's peaceful development'. This refers to the official policy by former Party Leader Hu Jintao that was implemented to rebut the 'China treat theory'. In Chinese: 中国和平崛起

livelihood of Chinese citizens. This situation is acknowledged and recognized by the Chinese leadership (Torney, 2012, p.14). However, this is a domestic problem and cooperation in international setting is therefore not necessarily required.

Contributions

This thesis makes several contributions to the above-mentioned literature. Firstly, I shall highlight norm localization in a domestic setting, as opposed to the regional setting in Acharya's work. Secondly, the majority of scholars view China's new environmental policies from a cost-benefit analysis point of view. I will show that China is to some extent adopting the norm while there is no material benefit. Moreover, I will show that cost-benefit analysis, norm diffusion and norm localization are, in the case of China, non-excludable entities. I shall show that neither explanation can fully account for the changes in policy and attitude, but that they all have merit. Lastly, this research will give policymakers and non-state actors deeper insight in climate policy decision-making and compliance behavior of the PRC.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this thesis the change in behavior and attitudes by the Chinese government in tackling climate change will be researched. My research question is:

“To what extent can norm diffusion explain China’s change in environmental policies and attitudes towards international cooperation in combatting climate change, measured from COP-15 in Copenhagen to COP-21 in Paris?”

In this thesis I will take a deductive approach. This entails testing the relationship between theory and data (Bryman, 2001, p.48). I am going to research whether the hypothesized causal relationship between international norms and diffusion of norms into other contexts holds when we look at the case of China and environmental protection. When the research question entails ‘why’ or ‘how’, case studies should be considered the preferred strategy. I do not have any control over the events that I research, because the focus is on a “contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”, and therefore the explanatory research design is most suited (Yin, 1994, p.1). Moreover, Schramm (1971, p.6) writes on case studies that ‘the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result’. This is what I will do as well: analyze the shift in policy and the reasons behind the shift.

Conceptualization and variables

The transnational norm that I research has been established by climate negotiators through the creation of the UNFCCC in the early 1990s. The norm entails that it is ‘good’ behavior for states to engage in international cooperation on tackling climate change (Falkner, 2016, p.1110). This norm on climate protection is the independent variable in my thesis. My dependent variable is the behavior (actions) and views of the Chinese government. Simply put, how (if at all) did the international norm affect the way the PRC views environmental protection?

To determine whether norm diffusion and norm localization are the reasons for the change in Chinese environmental policies, firstly several Chinese norms on international cooperating need to be identified. I have identified three:

The Chinese government (defined as the government of the PRC, also referred to as ‘Mainland China’ and, thus, excluding Taiwan, Macao en Hong Kong)² consistently emphasizes that non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and deep respect for state sovereignty embodies the cornerstone of collective action (Prantl & Nakano, 2011, p.9). This is best done in bilateral agreements. Although the PRC still upholds the nurturing of bilateral relations as the preferred strategy in international relations, the state is increasingly active in multilateral institutions. With China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 the norm started to alter (Womack, 2010, p.223). China is now a member of the African Development Bank, the G20, G77, World Health Organization and the ASEAN +3, among others. We can assume that the norm has been *diffused*, when China is giving up part of its sovereignty by participating in environmental IOs. This norm diffusion will have taken place by the manner of social learning: long-term contact with IOs will ‘teach’ the PRC the initially foreign norm of international cooperation.

Another important Chinese norm on international cooperation is “*a practice of asymmetric international relationships based on an ideology of mutual benefit and practice of negotiations based on acknowledgement of the autonomy of smaller partners*” (Womack, 2010, p.20). This can be traced back to the traditional tribute system, where China requested from states deference to a Sinitic order and not necessarily a specific gain. The tribute states, in turn, received an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of their rule and the implicit guarantee of sovereignty and non-interference by China. Moreover, from this angle the ‘building blocks’ of international relations are assumed to be bilateral relationships between states of unequal status (Womack, 2010, pp.25-27). To conclude, we can establish that China has *localized* the norm on international cooperation in tackling climate change, if China is assuming a leadership role (based on unequal relationships). This norm localization will have taken place because of the strong local norm of (regional) leadership. Moreover, China has an extremely strong sense of self-identity. The norm can therefore not be accepted wholly.

Thirdly, in the post-Mao era, during the market-oriented economic reform, the Chinese Communist Party quickly witnessed a widespread demise in support and communist ideology. Moreover, the basis of legitimacy of the CCP was eroding and Chinese intellectuals started pointing to other possible forms of state organization: Western-style democracy, for instance.

² The government of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are two different entities. However, they are highly intertwined. To illustrate this: Xi Jinping is on the one hand the President of the PRC and on the other hand the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of both Military Commissions. The CCP decides on policy, which will be implemented by the state. Hence, I will use both terms alternately, but will always be referring to official policy lines.

In reaction to this, the CCP secured its legitimacy by intertwining it with the state's economic success. Because political reform would cause the country to collapse into chaos and turmoil, first the economy would be restructured to build a harmonious and prosperous China under the strong leadership of the CCP (Zhao, 2016, pp.1168-1169). Currently, communist ideology is no longer the foundation for political legitimacy, but economic growth is (Joseph, 2010, p.21). The norm has been *diffused* to the PRC if it places the protection of the environment above economic growth. This norm diffusion will take place in two steps: firstly, domestic societal groups will function as norm entrepreneurs and advocate norm adoption. Secondly, the PRC will have strategically chosen to internalize the norm based on self-interest. The PRC will align domestic objectives, such as increasing legitimacy by providing opportunities for green growth and thus increasing economic growth, with the international norm and domestic pressures.

Methods

The reason why I have decided to research the policy shift between these specific two summits is because they are the exemplary for the shift in China's behavior vis-à-vis international cooperation on environmental protection. To quote a famous article from The Guardian on China's behavior during the Copenhagen Conference: "*Copenhagen was a disaster (...). But the truth about what actually happened is in danger of being lost (...). The truth is this: China wrecked the talks (...). How do I know this? Because I was in the room and saw it happen*" (Lynas, 2009). After the Paris Agreement, China was lauded for its positive participation and named as one of the main contributors to the successful outcome (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.48).

I performed a discourse analysis to show how the rhetoric by the PRC changed in relation to international cooperation on climate change. I examined articles published by the state press bureau Xinhua news. I used the database Factiva³ to find articles published during the UNFCCC climate conferences of Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015).

³ <https://global.factiva.com/> is accessible via the Leiden University online catalogue. I searched for articles marked 'environmental news' that contained "哥本哈根" (Copenhagen) and were published between 01-12-2009 and 25-12-2009 (one week before and after the conference) by Xinhua News Agency in simplified Chinese. Then I searched for environmental news containing "巴黎" (Paris) that was published between 22-11-2015 and 21-12-2015 by Xinhua News Agency in simplified Chinese.

2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP-15). Date: 07-12-2009 – 18-12-2009	Before COP-15: Xinhua 1 (07-12-2009) <i>‘Developed countries should ‘pay the bill’ for climate change’</i>
	After COP-15: Xinhua 2 (23-12-2009) <i>‘The international community continues to follow with interest the Copenhagen Climate Conference and ‘Copenhagen Agreement’</i>
2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP-21). Date: 30-11-2015 – 12-12-2015	Before COP-21: Xinhua 3 (29-11-2015) <i>‘The international community praises China for its efforts in answering to climate change’</i>
	After COP-21: Xinhua 4 (14-12-2015) <i>‘China’s wisdom and strength behind the Paris Agreement’</i>

Figure B. Overview of articles used for the discourse analysis.

China’s policy making has a rather opaque nature. In policy-making processes many actors exert influence, such as (local) government branches, ministries and government-affiliated bodies. Moreover, political and economic interests in China are highly intertwined, because of high-ranked CCP members owning and working at state-owned enterprises (SEOs) (Helleiner and Kirshner, 2014, p.16). This particular domestic context creates a ‘black box’ of Chinese policy making that is difficult to untangle.

I have therefore chosen to focus mainly on press releases by the state press bureau Xinhua News Agency to deduct the standpoint of the Chinese political leadership on environmental reform. The articles are aimed at a larger and more general audience and are, therefore, more likely to represent broader government attitudes (Olczak, 2016, p.13). Moreover, the articles I have analyzed are in Mandarin Chinese⁴ and are, thus, less intended for an international audience – or to please an international audience. Lastly, Xinhua is “*the most loyal political and ideological instrument of the CCP and the world’s largest propaganda machine*” and the news agency has been, since it was founded in 1931, the ‘mouthpiece’ of the CCP (Hong, 2011, pp.378-382). For all these reasons I have chosen the analyze articles by Xinhua and not another Chinese news agency.

To support the conclusions I have drawn, I have used other sources. Firstly, since the 1990s, the State Council of the PRC (the executive branch) has published White Papers to inform the global and national public on official policy stand and government objectives. The articles are available in English and therefore also meant for non-Chinese nationals. With the

⁴ All translations are my own and can be referred to in the appendix.

limitation for using Xinhua News being its status as propaganda machine, the limitation for using White Papers is that it might be written to please to international community. Secondly, since 1953, China publishes FYPs. These FYPs show the official policy line and shift in focus per five years. I will use the 11th FYP (2006-2010), 12th FYP (2011-2015) and 13th FYP (2016-2020). The limitation of using the FYPs is that they *only* show official policy line. Because of non-emotional and official language in the FYPs and the restriction of certain topics, FYPs alone are not enough for my research. The last limitation of these other sources is that they were not published during the same time as COP-15 and COP-21. As the research topic is the policy shift, the other sources will not show the starting point or endpoint, but progress in between. Lastly, the limitation for the speech of President Xi is that it is meant to please the international audience as well.

Secondly, to analyze the actual compliance by the PRC, I used the G20 Compliance reports on environmental protection by the G20 Research group of the University of Toronto⁵. The reason I use the G20 commitments to analyze the level of cooperation of China is because during the G20 summits statements were made that reiterated the groups of countries' commitment to the agreed outcomes of the previous UNFCCC summit. Therefore, the compliance of states to commitments made during the G20 summits *and* to the UNFCCC conferences is measured. I use this dataset to analyze whether the PRC only makes verbal (and 'hollow') commitments or truly follows up.

⁵ <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/index.html#commitments>

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To analyze whether the shift in policy and attitudes towards international cooperation on climate change can be attributed to norm diffusion, I have stated three criteria. Firstly, the shift will be established per criterion and after this the causal mechanisms by which the norm has been diffused shall be described.

Participating in international organizations

The first criterion for analyzing the extent of norm diffusion is whether China is giving up part of its sovereignty to engage in IOs to tackle climate change.

In the Copenhagen articles a lot of emphasis is put on whose responsibility it is to solve the climate change issue. Authorities are cited that the responsibility should be placed on the shoulders of the polluters: “*De Boer [UNFCCC Executive Secretary in 2009] explicitly mentioned the names of the European Union, Japan and the USA, (...) they do not only have the responsibility to respond to climate change, but also have more capability in providing funds in comparison with the vast majority of developing countries*” (Xinhua 1, 2009). It is clear that the norm brought up a lot of resistance. In the set of articles on Paris it is not mentioned that the developed countries have initiated modern-day climate change. It is, however, still multiple times stressed that the international community should adhere to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. This means that ‘*states have common responsibilities to protect the environment and promote sustainable development, but because of different social, economic and ecological situations, countries must shoulder different responsibilities*’ (Ladly, 2011, p.65). This principle acknowledges the shared obligation, but denies equal responsibility. The importance China gives this principle is also reiterated multiple times in the 12th and 13th FYPs (PRC, 2011, pp.29-30) (PRC, 2016, pp.136-138).

The next topic in the discourse analysis is the differentiation between developed and developing countries. In Xinhua 1 (2009) it is stressed that the demand to develop is a “*legitimate*” demand by poor countries and that the developed world should realize this. In addition to this, strong language is used to describe the behavior of developed countries: “[developed countries] *attempt to make countries in development covertly “pay the bill” for climate change*” and “*but in reality, when money needs to be taken out, yet all are bashful, and continuously they have not taken out funding programs that make the international*

community feel satisfied” (Xinhua 1, 2009). This illustrates that the PRC was significantly fed up with developed countries’ behavior.

In the period leading up to the Copenhagen summit, in particular the EU pushed for measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements to apply to commitments made by developing and developed countries (Torney, 2016, p.133). The Chinese negotiators resisted binding emission targets and international checking, because it was a possible constraint on development (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.50). The international engagement did not succeed in changing the position of the PRC. However, during the Paris agreement China was willing to commit and agreed, for the first time, that the emission reductions would be subject to MRV (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.50). This action indicates that China is giving up sovereignty and accepting intervention from the international community. This change in stand is also visible in the discourse. A critical statement from 2015 read: *“The developed countries, even though they put forward the commitment until 2020 to annually provide 100 billion USD for countries in development (...) currently there still exists a huge gap between promises and implementation (...) funding issues will be the main issue”* (Xinhua 3, 2015). The current behavior is still not acceptable for the PRC, but there is a much softer tone used and it is immediately mentioned that the problems can be overcome during negotiations.

Another change in discourse is China’s view on international cooperation. Every time international cooperation is mentioned in the Xinhua 1 and 2 (2009), words that stress the difficulty are used: *“through rough negotiations”* and *“through hard consultation and collaboration, by all parties, finally”* (Xinhua 2, 2009) [emphasis added]. This shows that the norm on international cooperation on tackling climate change brought up a lot of resistance by the PRC. In the articles on the Paris Agreement, there is increased mentioning of how the international community should work together to tackle climate change. Not only is increased and tighter cooperation advocated, China is also prescribing how this cooperation should take place. Moreover, China is besides participating in IOs, also funding them (Xinhua 3, 2015). Lastly, president Xi stated in his speech during the opening session of the Paris summit:

“We should create a future of win-win cooperation, with each country making contribution to the best of its ability. For global issues, like climate change, a take-more-give-less approach based on expediency is in nobody’s interest. The Paris Conference should reject the narrow-minded mentality of “zero sum game” and call on all countries, the developed in particular, to assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes” (Xi, 2015).

There are two other indicators that show that China is increasingly becoming active in international organizations and adopting the norm. Firstly, during the Copenhagen summit

China had successfully resisted international pressures to pledge to a peaking year for global and domestic emissions (Torney, 2016, p.112). In November 2014, there was a significant development when president Xi announced, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing, the intention to peak GHG emissions ‘around 2030’ (Torney, 2016, p.128). Secondly, in the compliance reports on commitments made during G20 summits, it is stated that China complies better to climate commitments with UNFCCC reference (Warren, 2016, p.4). This shows that China is adopting the norm and attaches importance to the UNFCCC.

The causal mechanism by which this shift took place is normative diffusion by social learning. Torney (2012; 2016) has interviewed high-level PRC officials and they stated that because foreign leaders repeatedly had climate change so high on the agenda when they met Chinese leaders, it became a national priority. Because of the level of centralization of the PRC, high-level international dialogue is of significant influence on policy. After the Copenhagen summit the EU started placing their international relationship with China on a more secure, institutionalized political footing by upgrading climate change talks to a ministerial level (Torney, 2016, p.112). Moreover, the frequency of climate related summits and the quantity increased: for example, in 2009 the G8 group altered itself to the G20 and annual meetings occurred from then onwards with the PRC as full member.

In conclusion, the first criterion is met. China has increasingly become active in IOs and is giving up sovereignty to combat climate change.

Leadership role in international cooperation

The second criterion is whether China has localized the norm by assuming a leadership position in international cooperation on climate change.

In the Xinhua articles a lot of time is spent on China’s actions. However, the parts in the Xinhua articles on Copenhagen that I have highlighted with ‘China’s actions on tackling climate change’ all express non-binding commitments and encouragements. For example: “*The greenhouse gas reduction objective that China declared is a ‘very ambitious objective’*” and “*China brought up proactive carbon reduction goals*” (Xinhua 2, 2009). In the second set of articles, more is written on China’s actions and actual investment plans are mentioned. “*In 2030, CO₂ emissions in comparison to 2005 will have decreased ranging from 60% to 65%, non-fossil energy resources take up a proportion of approximately 20% in primary energy consumption*” (Xinhua 4, 2015). This same difference can be witnessed in the FYPS. In the 12th FYP most energy, environmental and climate targets have been classified as mandates and therefore indicate the central government’s determination in answering to climate change

(Li & Wang, 2012, p.520). In the 11th FYP the climate related topic was only classified as an objective and (purposely) vague (World Bank, 2008, p.7).

This relates to another distinct topic in the articles: how China is viewed by the international community. In the first set of articles a lot of emphasis is put on how unfairly China is treated and viewed, naturally making international cooperation more difficult. “*In response to the remarks from a few days ago in relation to China ‘hijacking’ the process of negotiations from the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference*” and “*it is not fair to point to China*” (Xinhua 2, 2009). In the articles on the Paris Agreement it becomes clear that China is positioning itself as a leader of the developing countries – and to a lesser extent the world – in the fight against climate change: “*China is using its own practical actions to support developing countries to raise their capabilities in answering to climate change*” (Xinhua 4, 2015). Moreover, China is positioning itself next to hegemon US: “*President Xi Jinping also called with president Obama of the US and expressed the strong political desire to reach agreements*” (Xinhua 4, 2015). In the 2008 environmental White Paper of 2008, China “*actively participated in*” and “*is an official member of*” international cooperation on climate change (State Council of the PRC, 2008). In the 2013 White Paper the assumed leadership role becomes clear as specific paths are laid out for cooperation with different groups of countries and the specific actions initiated by China are mentioned: “[China] *offered technology training to professionals from developing countries*”, “*organized and attended*” meetings of multilateral institutions (State Council of the PRC, 2013). The fact that these plans are laid out per country group also indicates the wish of the PRC to have relationships based on unequal status: not only unequal in relation to the PRC, but also unequal in relation to other country groups. Lastly, it is constantly expressed in Xinhua 3 and 4 (2015) how China is ‘praised’ by authoritative figures and the international community for its cooperative attitude.

The causal mechanism by which this norm diffusion took place is norm localization. China has an extremely strong sense of self-identity (Torney, 2016, p.136) and has strong local norms, such as the practice of asymmetric international relationships, that are foundational to the group. The norm on international cooperation in combatting climate change was an imperfect fit for the domestic context of China. An active process started and the norm was molded to gain congruence with local norms. China has now been able to internalize the norm, because it was no longer ‘foreign’, but adjusted to local circumstances.

In conclusion, the second criterion is met. China has shaped the international norm to fit the domestic requirements and is now assuming a leadership role in unequal relationships.

Putting the environment above economic growth

Firstly, it is clear that the PRC could not be classified as a climate ‘skeptic’ or ‘denialist’ in 2009. The PRC expressed a fact-based, rational and non-emotional response to climate change as such (Jylhä, 2016, p.18). In Xinhua 1 (2009) it is stated that “*nowadays [there are] already unavoidable influences of climate change*” and a paragraph is dedicated to the development of greenhouse gas emissions. This shows that, even though China admitted to the existence of climate change, the response to tackling climate change did not follow suit.

In the 1996 environmental White Paper it was only tacitly accepted that reducing carbon emissions would be beneficial to the environment. It was not until the 2008 environmental White Paper that the topic of climate change was directly addressed. This White Paper elaborated on the ways that climate change will affect China in the fields of agriculture, forestry, ecosystems, water resources and socio-economic development as a whole (State Council of the PRC, 2008).

Even though China was not a climate skeptic, stopping climate change was not a priority. In the 2008 environmental White Paper it is stated that the PRC is “*taking economic development as the core objective*”. This is because the legitimacy of the CCP is nowadays rooted in economic growth. This would give reason to the argument that the PRC does not combat climate change, but instead focuses its attention and resources on economic growth. I will therefore now look at China’s compliance on climate related commitments.

The G20 Research Group has tracked the compliance of G20 members on all commitments made from the first summit in 2008 until now. China’s performance is measured in three issue areas concerning environmental protection: climate change, fossil fuel subsidies and clean energy technology. From 2008 to 2016, 53 politically binding, future-oriented and collective commitments have been made during the summits in the leaders’ name (Warren, 2016, p.1). China has mixed results and considerable variance over time. For example, China still provides the highest levels of government fossil fuels subsidies in the G20: approximately 80 billion USD (and other 20 billion USD by public finance) (Hsu et al., 2016 p.107). Per individual member, China scores averages on compliance with a score of 64%. China belongs to the component group BRICS⁶ with the lowest overall average of only 54% (other groups are OECD⁷, G7⁸, MIKTA⁹). However, China is leading among its BRICS peers (Warren, 2016, p.2).

⁶ The BRICS group consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

⁷ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization with 35 member states. Its members are considered to be the developed countries.

A trend that can be witnessed is that most members have a better compliance rate on commitments with reference to the UNFCCC or green growth. Moreover, it is more facile to cooperate in the field of green growth commitment, because these commitments tend to be more vague and leave room for interpretation and, therefore, implementation (Warren, 2016, pp.7-13).

In Table 1 the compliance scores China has been assigned in the issues areas of climate change, fossil fuel subsidies and clean energy technology over time are given. The general guidelines for compliance scoring are as followed: -1 (no progress toward compliance or actions counter to compliances), 0 (partial compliance with the stated goals of the commitment) and +1 (complete or near complete compliance with the stated goals of the commitment) (Kirton et al., 2016, p.26).

People's Republic of China	Climate Change	Fossil Fuel Subsidies	Clean Energy Technology
		-1	+1
2011		+1	+1
2012	+1	+1	
2013	-1		+1
2014	0	-1	+1
2015		0	
2016 (interim)	+1	0	
Average Score	+0,25	0	+1

Table 1: China's compliance performance on climate change, fossil fuel subsidies, and clean energy technology (Wang, 2016, p.18).¹⁰¹¹

We can see that China has received a score of 1 on clean energy technology, which indicates full compliance from 2009 onwards. On fossil fuel subsidies China receives an average score of 0, which fluctuating scores between 2010 and 2016. This indicates 'inability to commit' or

⁸ This is the predecessor of the G20. Exists of countries with high national wealth and high Human Development Index (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, US, UK, [EU]).

⁹ MIKTA is an informal partnership between the foreign ministers of Australia, Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea.

¹⁰ The empty brackets represent that the issue area was not selected in the compliance reports in the respective year and, therefore, no data is available.

¹¹ The table by Wang (2016) was not complete, because it did not contain the data of 2016. I have added the Compliance Report by the G20 Research Group of the 2016 Hangzhou Summit and have recalculated the average scores. This was the Interim Compliance Report, because the final compliance report has not yet been published.

‘work-in-progress’. Lastly, China receives a score of +0,25 on climate change indicating partial compliance with a positive outlook. As stated by Wang (2016, p.17):

“As a proxy, China’s partial compliance with its G20 commitments is not an equivalent to China’s climate actions for two reasons. First, the G20 commitments generally become stronger annually which indicate that G20 member countries, including China, have improved their compliance with climate and energy issues. Secondly, China has taken its own strategic approach to climate change and energy development in recent years, which is not always in line with G20 commitments.”

All in all, it can be concluded that China is cooperating in the majority of issue areas and feels the obligation to comply with UNFCCC commitments. There is, however, micro-variance visible: the slacking progress on cutting fossil fuel subsidies can be traced back to its domestic context. The strong domestic resistance by SOE’s and its employees and the domestic development agenda are key explanatory factors for this variance.

The causal mechanisms behind this shift to put the environment above economic growth, needs to be understood as a process in two steps. Firstly, domestic pressures initiated the norm diffusion process. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s increasing international journalistic and scholarly evidence showed the growing problems of environmental deterioration. The public’s tolerance for environmental related problems started to decrease (Li, 2016, pp.51-21). Chinese citizens do not directly vote, but have other effective measures to pressure their government. The rise of the Internet and emergence of more liberal newspapers are increasing the awareness and opportunities to gain influence on the political agenda. Moreover, since social stability is one of the core objectives of the CCP, particularly local officials are inclined to address the demands for a greener society (Zheng, Kahn, Sun & Luo, 2013, p.62). Moreover, in 2014 the Chinese government received 100.413 letters of complaints on environmental problems. Public participation through direct complaint or indirect protest has proven to play an important role (Zheng & Shi, 2016, pp.295-301). This bottom-up approach of pressure groups targeting local governments is the first step of the causal mechanism.

The second step is decision of the national government to align domestic objectives with demands from the public and the international norm. It has long been recognized that the double-digit growth was unsustainable, both in economic and environmental terms (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p.51). In the 13th FYP this was phrased as followed: “*At the same time, we must be soberly aware that China’s development model is inefficient; uneven, uncoordinated, and unsustainable development continues to be a prominent problem*” (PRC, 2016, pp.12-13).

The domestic objectives are achieving a continuance of economic growth (legitimacy) and becoming energy independent. “Green development” and innovation have become new core values to shift the economy into a sustainable direction (Geall, 2016). This priority adjustment can be deducted from the compliance scores of the G20 research group. The issue area where China consistently scored full compliance is green growth.

In conclusion, the third criterion is met. The PRC has strategically chosen to internalize the norm based on self-interest by aligning domestic objectives with demands from domestic social pressure groups and the international norm on environmental protection.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Conclusion

This research has shown that the norm of international cooperation in tackling climate change at first brought up a lot of resistance in China. During the Copenhagen climate conference China was an unwilling partner and reluctant to cooperate internationally. After the discourse and policy analysis, I was able to conclude that there is a clear difference in standpoint during COP-15 and COP-21. In the last eight years, China has shown a different attitude towards international cooperation in combatting climate change.

In answer to my research question, the following can be concluded: there are three PRC norms on international cooperation that did not align with the transnational norm. The first norm, the reluctance in giving on sovereignty and working in international institution, has been altered by normative change. By a process of social learning, China is now actively cooperating within the UNFCCC and has higher compliance scores on commitments made during these summits. Moreover, China has for the first time made pledges for a peak year in emissions and is subjected itself to international MRV.

The second norm entails that cooperation needs to take place in unequal relationships in which China assumes a leadership role. Because of the strong sense of self-identity and the existence of this fundamental local norm, the transnational norm could not be accepted wholly, but rather altered to fit the domestic context. The PRC is now positioning itself as the leader of developing countries by initiating projects, offering trainings and making investments. Moreover, different paths for cooperating with specific country groups are laid out. The norm is no longer 'foreign' due to a process of localization and China has now internalized the norm.

The third norm entails that economic development is the core objective and that environmental protection takes a second place – not in the least because the legitimacy of the CCP is rooted in economic growth. However, it has long been recognized that the economic growth was unsustainable, both in economic and environmental terms. This is the part where it becomes clear that cost-benefit analysis and norm diffusion are two non-excludable entities and that norm diffusion therefore cannot fully account for the shift in policy and attitude. The PRC has strategically internalized the norm by aligning its domestic objectives (becoming energy independent and sustained economic growth) with the transnational norm. This norm has not yet been completely diffused. China still seems hesitant to stop funding fossil fuels.

This is highly correlated with the domestic context: SOEs exert great influence on policymaking and are dependent on state funding. However, one could argue that although the PRC is dealing with domestic pressures by the SOE's, the fact that they are funding clean energy initiatives could point to a way in which it will eventually circumvent the domestic pressures and will continue the process of norm internalization.

Discussion

Firstly, every discourse and policy analysis has its limitations, because they do not show the thinking process of policy makers. Moreover, due to time limitations I chose to analyze articles of the two UNFCCC summits that were most exemplary for the shift in the behavior and attitude. It could be fruitful to carry out a discourse analysis of all G20 and UNFCCC summits and highlight the incremental changes. In addition to this, interviews with Chinese policy makers could provide even more insights.

A second limitation was the diversity and size of the Chinese state. I have now treated China as a unitary entity and this does not paint a full picture of the situation. Some provinces and province-level municipalities are much more progressive in their environmental policies and open to the international system. While I addressed the bottom-up influence of societal groups, the internal politics between provinces and the central government might also provide some valuable insights in Chinese environmental policy making.

Thirdly, I contributed to the literature on norm localizing by testing it in a domestic setting, as opposed to regional, but this is at the same time the pitfall: the external validity of this research is relatively low. It is difficult to extrapolate my findings to compliance behavior of other states, because the domestic context will be fundamentally different. However, the criteria I have provided for testing norm localization could be used to test for norm diffusion of other norms in the PRC, such as Human Rights.

Lastly, more research should be done on the relationship between the economic and domestic interests of the PRC and international cooperation in combatting climate change from a constructivist perspective. I have found that most authors use a realist perspective to explain China's behavior in international relations. However, I have found that norm diffusion does play an important role and it would be beneficial for international cooperation to conduct more research on this topic. As for this research, I have provided a deeper understanding of the PRC's standpoint on climate change and compliance behavior. This will help international policy makers and representatives to better comprehend China's intentions and will help predict behavior, possible breaking point and implementation results.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. *International Organization*, 58(2). 239-275.
- Baldwin, D.A. (1993). *Neorealism and neoliberalism, the contemporary debate*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Bernauer, T. (2013). Climate change politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16(1). 421-448.
- Bernauer, T. & Böhmelt, T. (2013). Are economically “kinder, gentler societies” also greener? *Environmental science & technology*, 47(21). 11993-12001.
- Bryman, A. (2001). *Social research methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Checkel, J.T. (2001). Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. *International Organization*, 55(3). 553-588.
- Falkner, R. (2016). The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics. *International Affairs*, 92(5). 1107-1125.
- Finnemore, M. (1993). International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and science policy. *International Organization* 47(4). 565-597.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). *National interests in international society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. *International organization*, 52(4). 887-917.
- Geall, S. (03-06-2016). China’s 5-year plan to meet environmental goals. *World Economic Forum*. Retrieved (on: 05-06-2017) from: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/chinas-5-year-plan-to-meet-environmental-goals>
- Gilardi, F. (2012). Transnational diffusion: norms, ideas and policies. In: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. Simmons. (Eds.). (2012). *Handbook of international relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 453-477.
- Grundig, F. (2006). Patterns of international cooperation and the explanatory power of relative gains: an analysis of cooperation on global climate change, ozone depletion and international trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(4). 781-801.
- Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. *Science*, 162(3859). 1243-1248.
- Harris, P.G. (2011). *China’s responsibility for climate change: ethnics, fairness and environmental policy*. Bristol: Policy Press.

- Helleiner, E. & Kirshner, J. (2014). *The Great Wall of money: power and politics in China's international monetary relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hilton, I. & Kerr, O. (2016). The Paris Agreement: China's 'New Normal' role in international climate negotiations. *Climate Policy*, 17(1). 48-58.
- Hodgson, A. (2011). *Climate of change: A foreign policy analysis of China's participation in international environmental agreements*. (Master's thesis). Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas.
- Hong, J.H. (2011). From the world's largest propaganda machine to a multipurposed global news agency: factors in and implications of Xinhua's Transformation since 1978. *Political Communication*, 28(3). 377-393.
- Hsu, A. et al. (2016). *2016 Environmental Performance Index*. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
- Hua, C.Y. (01-06-2017). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on June 1, 2017. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC*. Retrieved (on: 11-06-2017) from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1467100.shtml
- Joseph, W.A. (Ed.). (2010). *Politics in China: an introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jylhä, K.M. (2016). Ideological roots of climate change denial. *Digital comprehensive summary of Uppsala dissertations from the Faculty of Social Sciences*, 128. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- Kirton, J., Kokotsis, E., Guebert, J. & Bracht, C. (2016). Compliance coding manual for international institutional commitments. *G7 and G20 Research Groups*. Toronto: University of Toronto.
- Ladly, S.D. (2011). Border carbon adjustments, WTO-law and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. *International Environment Agreement: Politics, Law and Economics*, 12(1). 63-84.
- Li, A.H.F. (2016). Hopes of limiting global warming? China and the Paris agreement on climate change. *China Perspectives*, 1(1). 49-54.
- Li, J. & Wang, X. (2011). Energy and climate policy in China's twelfth five-year plan: a paradigm shift. *Energy Policy*, 44(1). 519-528.
- Lipson, C. (1984). International cooperation in economic and security affairs. *World Politics*, 37(1). 1-23.
- Lynas, M. (22-12-2009). How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas>

- Maclean, D. (2015). Prisoner's Dilemma, intergenerational asymmetry, and climate change ethics, in: M. Peterson. (Ed.). *The Prisoner's Dilemma*. (219-242). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oh, C. & Matsuoka, S. (2013). Localized norms in Asia, brewing normative contestation to global climate change regime. *Earth System Governance Tokyo Conference*.
- Olczak, N. (2016). "A shared mission for mankind": The Chinese government's changing attitudes to international cooperation on climate change. (Master's thesis). *Leiden University*.
- Prantl, J. & Nakano, R. (2011). Global norm diffusion in East Asia: how China and Japan implement the Responsibility to Protect. (NTS Working Paper Series 5). *Centre for non-traditional security studies*.
- PRC (People's Republic of China). (2006). *Eleventh Five-Year Guideline for National Economic and Social Development*. Beijing: State Council of the PRC.
- PRC (People's Republic of China). (2011). *Twelfth Five-Year Guideline for National Economic and Social Development*. Beijing: State Council of the PRC.
- PRC (People's Republic of China). (2016). *Thirteenth Five-Year Guideline for National Economic and Social Development*. Beijing: State Council of the PRC.
- Schramm, W. (1971). Notes on case studies of instructional media projects. (Working Paper). Washington DC: *Academy of Educational Development in Washington DC*.
- Shambaugh, D. (2013). *China goes global: the partial power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- State Council of the PRC (People's Republic of China). *Environmental protection in China*. (1996). Retrieved (on: 02-05-2017) from: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/environment/index.htm>
- China's policies and actions for addressing climate change*. (2008). Retrieved (on: 02-05-2017) from: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7055612.htm
- China's policies and actions for addressing climate change (2013)*. (2013). Retrieved (on: 02-05-2017) from http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7193982.htm
- Torney, D. (2012). Assessing EU leadership on climate change: the limits of diffusion in EU relations with China and India. *Working paper for Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The transformative power of Europe"*. Berlin: Berlin University.
- Torney, D. (2016). *European climate leadership in question: policies toward China and India*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Wang, J. (2016). Strategic Localization: China's Climate Governance. (Master's Thesis). *Vancouver: University of British Columbia*.

- Warren, B. (2016). G20 Climate change commitments and compliance. *G20 Research Group*. Toronto: University of Toronto.
- World Bank. (2008). Mid-term evaluation of China's 11th Five Year Plan. *Poverty reduction and economic management unit, East Asia and Pacific Region: World Bank*. 1-184.
- Womack, B. (2010). *China among unequals, asymmetric foreign relationships in Asia*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company.
- Xi, J.P. (2015). *Work together to build a win-win, equitable and balanced governance mechanism on climate change*. UNFCCC. Retrieved (on 17-05-2017) from: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_china.pdf
- Xinhua News Agency.
- Xinhua 1: 黄堃. (2009年12月7日). (应对气候变化) 短评: 发达国家理应为气候变化“埋单”. *新华社中文新闻*.
- Xinhua 2: 王舟舟. (2009年12月23日). (对应气候变化) 综合消息: 国际社会持续关注哥本哈根气候大会及《哥本哈根协议》. *新华社中文新闻*.
- Xinhua 3: 张琳. (2015年11月29日). (巴黎气候变化大会) 综合消息: 国际社会赞扬中国应对气候变化的努力. *新华社中文新闻*.
- Xinhua 4: 杨骏. (2015年12月14日). (巴黎气候变化大会) 特稿: 《巴黎协定》背后的中国智慧与力量. *新华社中文新闻*.
- Yin, R.K. (1994). *Case study research: design and methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Zhao, S.S. (2016). The ideological campaign in Xi's China: Rebuilding regime legitimacy. *Asian Survey*, 56(6). 1168-1193.
- Zheng, D. & Shi, M.J. (2017). Multiple environmental policies and pollution haven hypothesis: evidence from China's polluting industries. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 141(1). 295-304.
- Zheng, S.Q., Kahn, M.E., Sun, W.Z. & Luo, D.L. (2014). Incentives for China's urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: the role of the central government and public environmentalism. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 47(1). 61-71.

APPENDIX

Four articles by Xinhua News Agency: one before and after COP-15 and COP-21 respectively. All translations are my own.

Coding system:

- Responsibility for climate change
- China's actions on tackling climate change
- General information on climate change
- Difference between developed and developing countries
- Actions by the developed countries on tackling climate change
- How international cooperation should take place
- How climate change should be tackled
- How China is viewed by others
- China as leader of others

<p><i>Article 1: COP 15. Copenhagen, Denmark.</i> <i>Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)</i> <i>By: Huang Kun (07-12-2009)</i></p>	
<p>(应对气候变化) 短评：发达国家理应为气候变化“埋单”</p>	<p>(Answering to climate change) Short comment: developed countries should “pay the bill” for climate change</p>
<p>“请问您认为应对气候变化需要多少钱？”“这些资金应该如何提供？”在6日下午的哥本哈根气候变化大会会前新闻发布会上，各国记者连番问起“钱”的问题，谁该为气候变化“埋单”受到高度关注。</p>	<p>“May I ask something, how much money do you think is needed for answering to climate change?” “How should these funds be provided?” On the press conference on the afternoon of the 6th before the Copenhagen Climate Change Convention, journalists from different countries repeatedly asked the “money” questions, who should received a high degree of attention to “pay the bill” for climate change.</p>
<p>《联合国气候变化框架公约》执行秘书伊福·德布尔回答说，为帮助有关国家适应目前已经无法避免的气候变化影响，今后</p>	<p>The United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Executive Secretary Yvo De Boer answered and said, to help concerned countries adapt to the nowadays already unavoidable influences of</p>

<p>3 年每年至少需要 1 0 0 亿美元，长期来看更是需要按千亿美元计算的巨额资金。</p>	<p>climate change. After today for three years, every year, at least 10 billion USD is needed, in the long run is needed a huge amount on money of a trillion USD based on calculations.</p>
<p>这些钱由谁来掏？德布尔明确提到欧盟、日本和美国的名称，这些经济最发达的国家和地区，不仅有责任应对气候变化，与广大发展中国家相比也更有能力提供资金。</p>	<p>Out of whom is this money going to be dredged? De Boer explicitly mentioned the names of the European Union, Japan and the US, these are the countries and regions with the most developed economies, they do not only have the responsibility to respond to climate change, but also have more capability in providing funds in comparison with the vast majority of developing countries.</p>
<p>实际上，上述问题的原则性答案早已明确。《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京都议定书》都说明了发达国家应该提供资金帮助发展中国家应对气候变化。原因很简单，工业革命以来发达国家排放了大量温室气体，是气候变化问题的主要责任者。</p>	<p>In fact, the principled answer to the above-mentioned questions has already for a long been clear. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both illustrated that developed countries should provide funds to help countries in development answer to climate change. The reason is very simple, from the Industrial Revolution onwards the developed countries have emitted large quantities of greenhouse gasses, this is the main thing to blame for the problem of climate change.</p>
<p>研究数据显示，从 18 世纪西方工业革命到 1950 年，在人类燃烧化石燃料释放的二氧化碳总量中，发达国家的排放占了 95%。从 1950 年到 2000 年的 50 年中，发达国家的排放量仍占总排放量的 77%。即便在今天，占世界人口约 22% 的发达国家仍消耗全球 70% 以上的能源，排放 50% 以上的温室气体。多数发达国家人均温室气体排放量远远高于世界平均水准。而发展中国家多数是气候变化的受害者，一些小岛国甚至可能因此遭受“没顶”之灾。</p>	<p>Research data shows that, from the 18th century Western Industrial Revolution until the year 1950, of the total amount of carbon dioxide that was released by mankind burning fossil fuel, developed countries emitted 95% of it. In the 50 years from 1950 until 2000, the amount emitted by developed countries still makes up 77% of the total amount emitted. Even today, the developed countries that make up approximately 22% of the world population are still consuming more than 70% of the world's energy and emitting more than 50% of the world greenhouse gasses. The per capita quantity of greenhouse gas emissions of the majority of the developed countries is far higher than the average of the world. And developing countries are mostly the victim of climate change, and some small island states may even because of the disaster of 'no top'</p>

	suffer.
在道义的压力下，发达国家近来虽然口头上表示愿意出钱帮助发展中国家应对气候变化，但在实际掏钱时却都扭扭捏捏，一直没有拿出让国际社会满意的资金方案。	Under the pressure of morality, developed countries recently, even though they have orally expressed the desire to give money to help countries in development to answer to climate change, but in reality, when money needs to be taken out, yet all are bashful, and continuously they have not taken out funding programs that make the international community feel satisfied.
一些发达国家甚至无视“共同但有区别的责任”原则，企图让发展中国家变相为气候变化“埋单”，要求发展中国家也强制减排。发展中国家代表之一的东南亚国家联盟（简称东盟）在哥本哈根气候变化大会前专门发表声明，重申对发展的正当要求，并敦促发达国家提供资金应对气候变化。	Some developed countries even ignore the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and attempt to make the countries in development covertly “pay the bill” for climate change. An Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (abbreviated to: ASEAN) specialist, one of the representatives of developing countries, before the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, expressed and explained, reaffirmed the legitimate demand for development and urged development countries to provide funding to answer climate change.
地球是一个大家庭，一些成员在先行致富的同时损坏了整个家庭居住的“大房子”，那么，出钱维修难道不是略有良知的成员都应该做的事情吗？（完）	The earth is one big family, some member firstly went and become rich and at the same time damaged “the big house” in which the whole family lives, is then paying to repair not a thing that all members that have a little intuitive knowledge should do? (The end)

<p><i>Article 2: COP 15. Copenhagen, Denmark.</i> <i>Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)</i> <i>By: Wang Zhouzhou (23-12-2009)</i></p>	
(应对气候变化) 综合消息：国际社会持续关注哥本哈根气候大会及《哥本哈根协议》	(In answer to climate change) Comprehensive analysis: the international community continues to follow with interest the Copenhagen Climate Conference and ‘Copenhagen Agreement’
新华社北京12月23日电综合新华社记	Xinhua News Agency in Beijing on the 23 rd of December publishes a report by Xinhua News Agency foreign-based reporter: United

<p>者驻外报道：联合国气候变化大会经过各方艰苦磋商和共同努力，最后发表了《哥本哈根协议》。尽管大会已于19日闭幕，但国际社会连日来仍持续关注气候变化问题，不断就相关话题发表看法。</p>	<p>Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, through hard consultation and collaboration by all parties, finally released the 'Copenhagen Accord'. Although the big meeting already ended at the 19th, but the international community continues for days on end to remain closely following the problem of climate change, continuously publishing viewpoints on related issues.</p>
<p>第64届联合国大会主席阿里·图里基22日说，《哥本哈根协议》的达成是联合国气候变化大会取得进展的重要标志。尽管有些国家对哥本哈根会议的成果不太满意，但是“我们必须以现实的态度来看待会议的成果”，这是各方经过艰苦谈判取得的成果，“确实具有积极意义”。</p>	<p>Chairman of the 64th United National General Assembly Ali Toryki said on the 22nd: the accomplishment of the Copenhagen Agreement is an important symbol of the achieved progress of the United Nations Climate Change Conference. Although some countries were not too satisfied with the results of the Copenhagen Conference, “we must look at the results of the Conference with a realistic point of view”, this is obtained result through rough negotiations by all parties. “it really has a positive meaning”.</p>
<p>国际能源机构22日发表公报，对《哥本哈根协议》的达成表示欢迎，称该协议为下一步的气候变化谈判提供了指导。公报说，《哥本哈根协议》呼吁发达国家作出承诺，从财政上支持发展中国家适应气候变化。国际能源机构估计，发展中国家每年约需2000亿美元的投资，才能在2020年前建立起一套对碳依赖相对较小的能源体系，而发达国家在协议中承诺的资金援助将有助于实现这一目标。</p>	<p>The International Energy Agency issued a communiqué on the 22nd; it expressed welcome for the reached agreement of the Copenhagen Accord, called the before mentioned agreement as having provided guidance for the next step in climate negotiations. The communiqué stated: The Climate Agreement calls on developed countries to promise to start undertaking support, on a financial level, for countries in development to adjust to climate change. The International Energy Agency estimates countries in development every year need approximately 200 billion USD in investments, only to be able to before 2020 to establish a series of energy systems that relies relatively little on carbon, and developed countries in the Agreement promised to undertake fund support to contribute to the realization of this one goal.</p>
<p>代表巴西参加哥本哈根气候变化谈判的迪尔玛·罗塞芙表示，哥本哈根大会是解决气候问题的重要途径。她说，哥本哈根大会期间，中国、印度、南非和巴西代表举</p>	<p>The Brazil delegate to the Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations Dilma Rousseff stated that the Copenhagen Conference is an important channel to solving the problem of climate change. She said that during the Copenhagen Conference</p>

<p>行的“基础四国”会谈“富有成效”，四国互相尊重，本着解决气候问题的目的交换意见，中国提出了积极的减排目标。</p>	<p>the ‘fundamental four countries’ talks that the delegates of China, India, South Africa and Brazil organized were full of results, the four countries respect each other, and in the light of the objective of solving the problem of climate change, they exchanged visions. China brought up proactive carbon reduction goals.</p>
<p>美国进步中心高级政策分析师黄立安认为，《哥本哈根协议》至少有三个原因令人乐观：中国、印度等主要发展中国家首次在国际协议中承诺采取减缓行动；协议对“透明度”等焦点问题作出规定；协议规定了发达国家要承担向发展中国家、特别是受气候变化影响最严重的国家以及穷国提供财政援助的义务。他表示，中国在哥本哈根大会期间发挥了积极的、建设性作用。例如，中国一直大力推动发达国家立即向小岛国以及最不发达国家等最易受气候变化影响的发展中国家提供财政援助。</p>	<p>The senior policy analyst of the American Progress Center Huang Li’An stated that the ‘Copenhagen Agreement’ has at least three reasons to make people feel optimistic: China, India etc. namely countries in development for the first time in an international agreements promised to adopt actions of slowing down: the agreement put out guidelines for the focus point problems of transparency enz: the agreement stipulated that developed countries must bear the obligation for provide assistance to countries in development, especially the countries that will receive the most impact by climate change, and to poor countries. He expressed that China, during the Copenhagen Conference, exhibited a function that was proactive and constructive. For instance, China continuously with vigor pushes developed countries to immediately provide financial assistance towards countries in development that will most easily be influenced by climate change, small island states and the least development countries et cetera.</p>
<p>针对日前有关中国“劫持”哥本哈根气候变化大会谈判进程的言论，挪威气候研究中心主任克努特·阿尔夫桑说，这一说法“有失公允”。在应对气候变化方面，“中国做得比美国好多了”。他认为，中国宣布的温室气体减排目标是“一个雄心勃勃的目标”，中国在建设富足社会的同时实现减少排放，“把矛头指向中国是不对的”。</p>	<p>In response to the remarks from a few days ago in relation to China ‘hijacking’ the process of the negotiations from the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, the head research director of the Norwegian Center for International Climate and Environmental, Knut Alfsen, said that this statement fails in ‘fairness’. At the respect of dealing with climate change “China has done much better when compared to the United States”. He thinks that the greenhouse gas reduction objective that China declared is “a very ambitious objective”, and that while China is busy building an affluent society, realizes reducing emission: “it is not right to</p>

	point to China”.
挪威环境与外援大臣埃裏克·索尔海姆日前也表示，哥本哈根气候变化大会未能达成具有约束力的协议，不能归咎于中国。 (完)	The Norwegian Foreign Aid and Environment Minister, Eric Solheim, has also expressed the other day that [the fact that the] Copenhagen Climate Conference failed to reach an agreement with binding force, cannot be attributed to China. (The end)

<p><i>Article 3: COP 21. Paris, France.</i> <i>Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)</i> <i>By: Zhang Lin (29-11-2015)</i></p>	
(巴黎气候变化大会) 综合消息：国际社会赞扬中国应对气候变化的努力	(Paris Climate Change Conference) Comprehensive news: The international community praises China for its efforts in answering to climate change
新华社北京 11 月 29 日电综合新华社驻外记者报道：世界自然基金会下属的“全球气候与能源倡议”负责人萨曼莎·史密斯日前在接受新华社记者采访时表示，中国在全球应对气候变化行动中的努力值得赞扬。法国外交部长法比尤斯 28 日表示，中国正在采取的行动为各方在巴黎达成新的全球气候协议增加积极信号。	On 29/11 the Xinhua News Agency in Beijing published a comprehensive report by Xinhua News Agency Foreign Affairs reporter: Sam Smith, leader of the Climate and Energy Initiative by World Wide Fund (WWF) recently stated during an interview by a Xinhua News Agency reporter, that the efforts of China in the global response to climate change are worth to be praised. The French foreign minister [Laurent] Fabius stated on the 28 th that the actions that China is in the process of taking increase the positive signals for all parties in Paris to accomplish a new global climate agreement.
巴黎气候变化大会将于 11 月 30 日至 12 月 11 日召开，史密斯将作为非政府组织代表出席大会。她认为在巴黎达成协议“非常有可能”，因为尽管目前各国对协议内容的要求还不尽相同，但几乎所有国家都希望达成某种形式的协议。	The Paris Climate Change Convention will take place from 30/11 to 11/12, and Smith will act as the representative of non-governmental organizations to attend the meeting. She believes that reaching an agreement in Paris “is very likely”, because, despite that currently the respective countries’ demand are not exactly the same on the contents of the agreement, but almost all countries want to reach some form of agreement.
史密斯对中国限制温室气体排放及坚持《	Smith expressed praise that China puts restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions as

<p>联合国气候变化框架公约》(下称《公约》)中提出的“共同但有区别的责任”原则表示赞赏。她说,中国虽然是发展中国家,但在应对气候变化方面通过“国家自主贡献”等方式作出了巨大的承诺,还宣布将出资200亿元人民币建立“气候变化南南合作基金”。</p>	<p>well as upholds the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that was stated in the UNFCCC (hereafter referred to as “the Convention”). She states that China, although it is a developing country, has put forward great commitments in respect to answering to climate change, through ways such as the “country’s own contributions”, and also announced to invest 20 billion yuan to establish the “China Climate Change South-South Cooperation Fund”.</p>
<p>反观发达国家,虽然作出了到2020年每年向发展中国家提供1000亿美元气候援助的承诺,但史密斯表示目前这个承诺与落实之间还存在巨大差距。她认为,资金问题将是巴黎气候谈判中的首要挑战。</p>	<p>In contrast, the developed countries, even though they put forward the commitment until 2020 to annually provide 1000 billion USD for countries in development for climate aid, Smith stated that currently there still exists a huge gap between the promises and the implementation. She believes that the funding issue will be the main challenge during the Paris Climate negotiations.</p>
<p>史密斯说,在应对气候变化方面,一个可喜的进展是关于全球变暖是否存在的争议已经减少,能源领域也出现由化石燃料向可再生能源转变的革命性趋势。她说,以中国、印度为代表的发展中国家在利用可再生能源方面也作出了重要贡献。</p>	<p>Smith said, in respect to answer to climate change, a heart-warming progress is that the controversy has already been decreased on whether global warming exists or not. The energy sector also seems to have a revolutionary trend to change from fossil fuels to renewable energy. She said, taking China and India as representing the developing countries, have, in respect to using renewable energy also showed important contributions.</p>
<p>法国外交部长、巴黎气候变化大会主席法比尤斯28日表示,中国正在采取的行动为各方在巴黎达成新的全球气候协议增加积极信号。</p>	<p>The French Foreign Minister and the Paris Climate Change Convention President, [Laurent] Fabius states on the 28th that the actions that China is in the process of taking increase the positive signals for all parties in Paris to accomplish a new global climate agreement.</p>
<p>法比尤斯说,他担任法国外长后会11次访华。在访华时,他真实地看到,中国正坚定地采取应对气候变化行动。</p>	<p>Fabius said that after he was the French Foreign Minister, he made 11 state visits to China. During these visits, he really saw that China was taking firm action to answer to climate change.</p>
<p>“中国称之为‘生态文明’,”法比尤斯说,</p>	<p>“China calls it an “ecological civilization””, said [Laurent] Fabius, even though currently</p>

<p>尽管目前各方围绕气候变化新协议谈判在责任区分、资金、承诺修改等方面仍有众多分歧，但积极信号不断显现。中国采取的行动便是其中之一。</p>	<p>all parties center on the negotiations of the new agreement on climate change, there are still numerous differences in the fields of distinguishing response, funding and the altering of commitments among other things, positive signals are continuing to appear. The action that China is taking is one of them.</p>
<p>他说，法中两国本月初发表了一份联合声明，其中涉及有关气候协议谈判的一些建议，希望这些建议能被更多国家接受。</p>	<p>He states that China and France issues a joint statement earlier this month, with in it a couple of recommendations that relate to the negotiations of the climate agreement, and that the hopes that these recommendations can be accepted by even more countries.</p>
<p>《公约》秘书处执行秘书菲格雷斯 28 日表示，目前许多国家向联合国提交了自己的减排计划，在大会前，应对气候变化行动得到如此多国家的参与已经是一种成功。(完)</p>	<p>The executive secretary of the Convention, Figueres, said on the 28th that currently many countries have submitted their own plans on reducing carbon emissions to the United Nations and, before the Conference, that the actions in answering to climate change has reached the joining of more countries in this way is already a success. (The End)</p>

<p><i>Article 4: COP 21. Paris, France.</i> <i>Xinhua News Agency Chinese News (Simplified)</i> <i>By: Yang Jun (14-12-2015)</i></p>	
<p>(巴黎气候变化大会) 特稿：《巴黎协定》背后的中国智慧与力量</p>	<p>(Paris Climate Change Conference) Feature: China's wisdom and strength behind the Paris Agreement</p>
<p>世界目光聚焦巴黎。当地时间 12 日晚，有关 2020 年后全球应对气候变化行动安排的《巴黎协定》终于破壳而出。</p>	<p>The sight of the world is focused on Paris. Local time in the evening of the 12th, the Paris Agreement, that plans in detail the action against climate change in relation to the world after 2020, has finally broken its' shell and come out.</p>
<p>巴黎气候变化大会，13 天、近 200 个缔约方，催生《巴黎协定》的谈判密集而艰苦。作为全球应对气候变化事业的积极参与者，中国方案、中国行动与中国智慧</p>	<p>The Paris Climate Change Conference, 13 days, nearly 200 parties, intensive and hard negotiates that birthed the "Paris Agreement". As an active participant in the global response to climate change undertakings, China's case, China's actions</p>

<p>，为大会成功作出不可替代的贡献。</p>	<p>and wisdom make a contribution to the results of the conference that cannot be replaced.</p>
<p>(小标题) 贡献中国智慧</p>	<p>(Subheading) Contributions and China's wisdom</p>
<p>一份成功的国际协议既要解决当下矛盾，也要引领未来。正基于此，中国国家主席习近平在参加巴黎气候变化大会时对巴黎协定提出了四点建议：有利于实现公约目标，引领绿色发展；有利于凝聚全球力量，鼓励广泛参与；有利于加大投入，强化行动保障；有利于照顾各国国情，讲求务实有效。</p>	<p>A successful international conference must solve both the current contradiction and must also lead the future. Precisely based on this, Chinese President Xi Jinping when attending the Paris Climate Change Conference brought forth four recommendations to the Paris Agreement: it is beneficial to realize joint pledge goals, show the way in Green Growth; it is beneficial to aggregate the forces of the whole world and encourage broad participation; it is beneficial to increase investments, strengthen action guarantees; it is beneficial to pay attention to the specific conditions of every county, to be particular, pragmatic and effective.</p>
<p>这些建议既立足当下，又面向未来，既坚持原则，又体现灵活，既勾勒出聚同化异、相向而行的现实路径，也包含著标本兼治、绿色发展的长远谋划，因而得到广泛支持和赞同。</p>	<p>Those proposals do not only have a foothold on the present, but are also future-oriented. They do not only hold on to the principles, but also embody flexibility. They do not only outline 'poly-assimilation' and the actual path of going in opposite directions, but also tackling root causes simultaneously and the long-term plan of green growth. And, therefore, receive broad support and approval.</p>
<p>“巴黎大会应该摒弃‘零和博弈’狭隘思维，推动各国尤其是发达国家多一点共享、多一点担当，实现互惠共赢。”习近平主席的讲话，为国际社会深入思考和探索未来全球治理模式、推动人类命运共同体建设贡献了中国智慧。</p>	<p>The Paris Conference should abandon the narrow-minded view of a 'zero-sum game', and promote that every country, especially the developed countries share a little bit more and undertake a little bit more, to realize mutual benefit and win-win. The speech of president Xi Jinping, for the international community to thoroughly ponder and explore manners for future global governance and to promote the construction of a human destiny community, has contributed to Chinese wisdom.</p>
<p>作为世界最大的发展中国家，中国也正用</p>	<p>As the world biggest country in</p>

<p>自己的行动与智慧，为其他发展中国家“带路”——探索一个可资借鉴的绿色发展模式，助力全球应对气候变化和向生态文明转型。</p>	<p>development, China is also currently using its own actions and wisdom to act as a guide for other countries in development¹² - to explore a green growth model that can be used as reference to help the global response to the climate change and towards an ecologically civilized transformation.</p>
<p>中国经济快速发展，人民生活发生了深刻变化，但也付出了资源环境方面的代价。在中国这片土地上，既有天人合一、道法自然等思想积淀，更有“绿水青山就是金山银山”等认识上的飞跃。</p>	<p>The Chinese economy has developed rapidly, profound changes have taken place in people's lives, but also a price in respect to natural resources and the environment has been paid. In this piece of land in China, exists the theory that man is an integral part of nature and exists the accumulated wisdom of Taoist and other natural thought. Furthermore, there is a leap in the knowledge that "nature is the true treasure"¹³</p>
<p>(小标题) 为全球做表率</p>	<p>(Subheading) To set an example for the world</p>
<p>法国作家雨果说：“最大的决心会产生最高的智慧。”中国正是以最大的决心、最高的智慧走绿色发展之路：</p>	<p>The French writer [Victor] Hugo said: “the biggest determination shall produce the highest wisdom”. China is currently taking the biggest determination and highest wisdom to talk the path of green growth.</p>
<p>“十二五”期间，中国以前所未有、全球罕见的力度，治理污染保护生态环境。如今，中国已是世界节能和利用新能源、可再生能源第一大国。</p>	<p>During the “12th Five-Year Plan”, China, by unprecedented and globally rare efforts, brought pollution under control to protect the ecological environment. Nowadays, China is already the first power in global energy saving, new energy resources and renewable energy resources.</p>
<p>面向未来，中国将把生态文明建设作为“十三五”规划重要内容，落实创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享的发展理念，通过科技创新和体制机制创新，实施优化产业结构、构建低碳能源体系、发展绿色建筑和</p>	<p>Looking at the future, China will take the ecological civilized construction as the most important content of the 13th Five-Year Plan. To implement a development vision that is innovative, harmonized, green, open-minded and shared, by means of innovation in science and technology and innovation in institutional mechanisms, to implement a set</p>

¹² This is a reference to the new Silk Road: the One Belt One Road initiative [一带一路]

¹³ This phrase combined two sayings: ‘green waters and fresh mountains’ (绿水青山) are equal to ‘gold mountains and silver mountains’ (金山银山)

<p>低碳交通、建立全国碳排放交易市场等一系列政策措施，形成人和自然和谐发展现代化建设新格局。</p>	<p>of policy measures to optimize the industrial structure, to construct a energy system low on carbon, to develop green buildings and low-carbon transport, to establish a national carbon emission exchange et cetera and to form a new modernized and constructive pattern of harmonious development between man and nature.</p>
<p>中国在巴黎大会召开前提提交的国家自主贡献文件中，提出将于2030年左右使二氧化碳排放达到峰值，并争取尽早实现，2030年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年下降60%到65%，非化石能源占一次能源消费比重达到20%左右，森林蓄积量比2005年增加45亿立方米左右。</p>	<p>In the country's self-contribution document submitted before the convocation of the Paris Conference, China put forward that in approximately 2030 it would reach the peak in carbon dioxide emissions and will strive to realize this as early as possible, in 2030 carbon dioxide emission (per unit?) in comparison to 2005 will have decreased ranging from 60 to 65%, non-fossil energy resources take up a proportion of approximately 20% in primary energy consumption, the volume of forest reserves will increase by 4.5 billion cubic meters.</p>
<p>这些做法获得了国际社会的好评。《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处执行秘书克里斯蒂娜·菲格雷斯不久前在一个记者会上回答“哪个国家的应对气候变化行动可称榜样”时点名提到了中国。她说，中国采取了“非常令人印象深刻的”行动，中国在对待气候变化问题上“非常非常认真”。</p>	<p>These ways of doing things has received the praise of the international community. The executive secretary of “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, Christina Figueres, answered, when she was at a press conference not long ago: “which country's answer to climate change action should be called an example” and she mentioned China. She said that China has adopted action “that really gives people a profound impression”. China, in the matter of the approach to the problem of climate change, “is taking it very, very seriously”.</p>
<p>除此之外，中国还为南南气候合作增添动力。在今年9月宣布设立中国气候变化南南合作基金的基础上，习近平主席在巴黎大会上进一步宣布，2016年将启动在发展中国家开展10个低碳示范区、100个减缓和适应气候变化项目及1000个应对气候变化培训名额的合作项目。中国以自己的实际行动支持发展中国家提高</p>	<p>In addition to this, China is also for the South-South climate cooperation adding motive power. On the basis of the announce in September this year to establish the China South-South Cooperation fund, president Xi Jinping went at the Paris Conference one step further and announced cooperation programs that in 2016 will be launched, in developing countries there will be launched ten low-carbon demonstrations areas, 100 slow-down and adapting to climate change programs and 1000 training places on climate change. China is using its own practical actions to</p>

<p>应对气候变化能力，敦促发达国家向发展中国家提供更多的技术和资金支持，进而推动气候变化全球行动的进程。</p>	<p>support developing countries to raise their capabilities in answering to climate change and urges developed countries to provide even more technology and financial support for developing countries, and then promotes the process of global action against climate change.</p>
<p>(小标题) 凝聚各方共识</p>	<p>(Subheading) Gathering the common understanding of all parties.</p>
<p>巴黎气候变化大会具有里程碑意义。为推动全球携手共进，凝聚各方共识，中国作出了自己的努力。</p>	<p>The Paris Climate Change Conference is a milestone. To promote the world joining hands and moving forward, to aggregate consensus of all parties, China has made its own efforts.</p>
<p>中国国家气候变化专家委员会副主任何建坤介绍说，巴黎大会前，中国与美国、法国、印度、巴西等主要经济体分别发表了应对气候变化的多个联合声明，气候谈判中的法律约束力、资金、力度等焦点问题在这些联合声明中都有描述，这为巴黎大会的成功奠定了基础。</p>	<p>He Jiankun, deputy director of the China National Climate Change Experts Committee, introduced and said, before the Paris Conference, that China and the US, France, India, Brazil, the major economies have separately issued multiple joint statements with responses to climate change. The key issues of intensity, capital, legal binding during climate negotiations had all been described in these joint statements; this established a basis for the success of the Paris Conference.</p>
<p>大会伊始，习近平主席同其他与会领导人坦诚、务实沟通协调，引导各方着眼大局、坚定信心、相向而行，最大程度凝聚共识。对各方关切的问题，习近平主席强调共同但有区别的责任这一基本原则依然有效，同时应推进合作共赢，各尽其能共同应对挑战，发达国家尤其应切实履行向发展中国家提供资金和技术转让的义务。这些主张巩固了应对气候变化的国际合作基石。</p>	<p>At beginning of the conference, President Xi Jinping together with other leaders that participated in the conference communicated openly and pragmatically, led all parties to concentrate on the overall situation, strengthen confidence and to move together, to harmonize the greatest degree of aggregated consensus. In regards to all parties' concerns, President Xi Jinping emphasized that the guiding principle of "common but differentiated responsibility" was still valid and at the same time promised to promote cooperation and win-win, that all respectively should export their capabilities to answer the challenges together, that developed countries, in particular, must conscientiously fulfill the task of providing funds and technology transfers to countries in</p>

	<p>development. These propositions have strengthened the cornerstone of international cooperation in answering climate change.</p>
<p>在大会闭幕前夕，习近平主席还与美国总统奥巴马通电话，表达了达成协定的强烈政治意愿。大会期间，中方团队本着负责任、合作精神和建设性态度参与谈判，为促成《巴黎协定》达成作出了重要贡献。</p>	<p>On the eve of the closing of the Conference, President Xi Jinping also called with President Obama of the United States and expressed the strong political desire to reach agreements. During the Conference, the Chinese team, in line with responsibility, the spirit of cooperation and a constructive attitude participated in the negotiations, in order to help to bring about the accomplishment of the “Paris Agreement” has brought about important contributions.</p>
<p>中国气候变化事务特别代表解振华说，本次大会上，在与各国共同努力的过程中，中国为推动达成协定作出了建设性的贡献。中国始终坚持协定是落实《联合国气候变化框架公约》、加强行动的阶段性成果，坚持“共同但有区别的责任”原则，最终达成的协定也体现了发达国家和发展中国家的区分。（完）</p>	<p>Xie Zhenhua, China’s Climate Change Special Representative said that during this conference, during the process of shared efforts with each individual country, China has, in order to promote the reaching of an agreement, made a constructive contribution. China has, from beginning to end, upheld that the agreement is fulfilling the “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” and strengthening the step-by-step achievements of the actions and China has adhered to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. The final agreed upon agreement also embodies the distinction between developed and developing countries. (The end)</p>