

Papuans within Slavery, Slavery within Papuans:

***Traces of the Slavery Past in New Guinea,
1600s-1950s***

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Introduction

‘Soon, after my first arrival in Ternate I went to the island of Gilolo, accompanied by two sons of Mr. Duivenboden, and by a young Chinaman, a brother of my landlord, who lent us the boat and crew. These latter were all slaves, mostly Papuans,...’¹

-Alfred Russel Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*

Slave reservoir. Slaving zones. Victim societies. Historians have used various terms to represent and conceptualise places whence, historically, slaves were obtained. In his cursory treatment of Dutch complicity in the Indian Ocean slavery, historian Marcus Vink uses the last term to speak of New Guinea, a region at the periphery of their enterprise in the East Indies.² His use of ‘victim societies’ to refer to New Guinea is hardly surprising, until the nineteenth century various actors obtained slaves from New Guinea.³ What Wallace observed in the nineteenth century was part of a continuous historical pattern that began centuries earlier.

As a matter of fact, Papuans, a designation to inhabitants of New Guinea, were marked by slavery since their first foray into written history. In 724 CE, a Papuan girl was given as a present from the king of the Sumatran polity Sriwijaya to the Chinese court.⁴ Papuans also appeared in 1680 when delegates from the Chinese emperor who were visiting Batavia requested permission to buy two Papuan slaves from the VOC slave quarter to present as objects of rarity to the emperor.⁵ Their dark complexion and curly hair, in addition to the fact that their origin (New Guinea) were quite distant made Papuans a rarity, especially in the Chinese court. Knowing the apparent continuity of this pattern, it is only logical for Vink to describe Papuans residing in New Guinea as ‘victim societies’.⁶ But what does that mean? And how did slavery contribute to the experience of living in New Guinea? In this thesis I answer these questions by looking at the historical pattern that enabled Papuan enslavement

¹ Alfred R. Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago* (Penguin Books, 1869(2014)): 337.

² Marcus Vink, ‘The World’s Oldest Trade: Dutch Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century’ in *Journal of World History* 14(2): 155-156.

³ Dirk Vlasblom, *Papoea: Een geschiedenis* (Mets & Schilt, 2004): 14.

⁴ Vlasblom, *Papoea*: 14. See also Charles E. Farhadian, *Raising the morning star: a social and ethnographic history of urban Dani Christians in New Order Indonesia* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 2001): 33. The origin of this Seng-k’i’ girl was a source of debate in the first half of the twentieth century, see for example Edwin W. Smith, ‘Presidential Address Africa: What Do We Know of It?’ in *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 65: 64n. The generic argument of historians is presented by James Hornell, ‘Indonesian Influence on East African Culture’ in *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 64: 305-332. See also Isidore Dyen ‘Review: Malgache et Manjaan: Une Comparaison Linguistique by Otto Chr. Dahl’ in *Language* 29(4): 577-590 for the succinct linguistic take on the connection between Malay and Malagasy language. Edwin Smith argues for an Occam’s razor approach for the debate; there is certainly a connection between Malagasy and the Malay world but to argue that the connection exists as early as the eight century is a bit of a stretch. As Smith aptly argues, ‘there were black people nearer to Sumatra than Africa.’ However, historians on both side of the debate agree that Seng-k’i’ is a Sinicisation of the Javanese word ‘jenggi’ which denotes individuals with dark skin and fussy hair.

⁵ S. Kalff, *Slavernij in Oost-Indië* (Hollandia-Drukkerij, 1920): 5. Also in Reggie Baay, *Daar werd wat gruwelijks verricht: Slavernij in Nederlands-Indië* (Athanaeum—Polak & Van Genneep, 2015): 40.

and by looking at the societies with a history of entanglement with slavery. Is a long history of exporting slaves synonymous with victimisation of a society? What is this victimisation and how does victimisation speak to the experience of Papuans in New Guinea? It is instructive to begin by discussing ‘victim societies’.

Conceptual Underpinnings

‘Hier, te Depok, heb ik geleerd, dat de slavenhandel is afgeschaft. Bij ons op Nieuw-Guinea wist men daarvan niet. Niemand had daar een bevel gegeven, dat men niet rooven mocht. Daar was geen ambtenaar, zoodat er geen bestuur was. In 1897 pas kwam in de buurt van Mansinam een ambtenaar wonen, die bevelen uitdeelde.’⁷

-Petrus Kafiar, *Van slaaf tot evangelie*

‘Overig kan gezegd worden dat de inheemsche bevolking rustig is, dit geldt natuurlijk slechts van die gebieden waarmee het Bestuur direct contact heeft of onderhoudt. Wat in de verre binnenland gebeurd in dit zoo uitgestreeke gebied? Wie kan dat zeggen, doch dat slavernij, pandelingschap enz. er welig tieren is voor mij een vaststand feit.’⁸

-W. van de Graaff

Victim societies

This thesis engages with victim societies, test its applicability to New Guinea, and see how the concept can be expanded. This is not to dismiss the value of the concepts of slave reservoirs and slaving zones, they are simply not of use for this research because it does not allow for distinction in its formulation. The idea of slave reservoir hinges on a vast space whose populace were the source of labour and manpower for the more powerful political unit nearby. Similarly, in his conceptualisation of slaving zones, Fynn-Paul argues that monotheistic bloc ‘had to rely more strongly on external source of slave supply, and the result was an increased pressure on the slaving zones at their peripheries.’⁹ Both concepts prioritise the dynamics among the military-superior political units and inadvertently neglects the dynamics within this zone or reservoir. This research investigates the zone and the monolith, making those two conceptions obsolete. New Guinea was a region that where one obtained slaves, but in order to find nuance I engage with things beyond the Papuan monolith. Furthermore, the majority of New Guinea populace were heathens until early in the twentieth century periphery, and hence external to the monotheistic bloc. From a distant

⁷ J. L. D. van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist: Petrus Kafiar* (Uitgave van het Zendingsbureau, 1920): 27. Van der Roest retold the narratives of Petrus Kafiar in the first person perspective, hence the naming credit in the quote.

⁸ NA Ministerie van Koloniën/ Memorie van Overgave 372 *Afdeeling Noord-Nieuw-Guinea Memorie van Overgave Juni 1925 Assistent-Resident van de Graaff*: 8.

⁹ See Jeff Fynn-Paul, ‘Empire, Monotheism and Slavery in the Greater Mediterranean Region from Antiquity to the Early Modern Era’ in *Past and Present* 205: 5. Fynn-Paul demonstrated the connection between the strong centralised polities and its connection with the effective elimination of slaving within the boundary of empire, and the pressure it inflicts on societies surrounding the empire. In page 35-40, Fynn-Paul argues that the rise of those monotheistic blocs explained the importance of Russia and Africa as slaving zones. I was unable to find whether a conceptual formulation has been made with regards of the idea of ‘slave reservoir.’

view, it appears as a vast space of prospective slaves, but a close investigation reveals New Guinea to be a site full of fragmented societies.

That New Guinea was full of fragmented societies is not a novel idea. Reid connects this fragmentation to the regular flow of people from New Guinea.¹⁰ But Jack Goody provides an operative concept to this process through his formulation of the victim societies. Goody was a social anthropologist and began his career by working with societies in the north-western region of Ghana, but in the paper formulating victim societies he makes an effort to discuss slavery through time and space. Victim societies is result of his interference in the debate on slavery in Africa before the advent of the European trade. Consequently, the concept is not extensively elaborated, but what we have is promising to this research.

In his formulation, Goody observes the conditions in Africa which accommodated the creation of slaves in Africa. It is unclear from which specific African polity he draws his conclusion, although from his mentions of the Kingdoms of Akan and Gonja (both in modern day Ghana), Benin, and occasional mention of Sudan and Maghreb, it appears like Goody is arguing that this dynamic existed throughout Africa. From this observation, he concludes a collection of fragmented societies living around each other was not enough to ensure the creation of slaves who were outsiders, prisoners of wars, etc. They had to be in the proximity of one society with a superior military or economic position in relation the groups that surrounded them in order to be the source of slaves.¹¹

Goody speaks of societies that ‘produced’ slaves in Africa. Slaves were produced from ‘processes a through which one group exercises temporary domination over another by use of force. These societies, were target because their economic and or military inferiority to the dominant group. This inferiority, was most common where ‘states existed side by side with zones inhabited by ‘uncontrolled’, stateless or tribal peoples, whom they could raid for human booty without fear of reprisals.’¹² In other words, the process that turned people into slaves, relied on a sustained imbalance of power in these zones.

The formulation of ‘victim societies’ by Goody is especially significant because the absence of an expanding state. The military and economic dominance, did not lead to the consolidation of a state which absorbed outsiders into its fold. Victim societies, as explained by Goody, are groups consisted not of subjects but of outsiders who could be dominated by force.¹³ This formulation is excellent because it does not suffer from a teleological frame of mind, it stops and simply contemplates the role of domination in inter-societal relations in producing slaves. Enslaved bodies were physical evidence of the continuous imbalance of power, because violence was needed to maintain the production of slaves.¹⁴

The advantage of differentiating societies for Goody is apparent in his ability to prove the existence of slavery among various African societies and disprove the apparent of an African monolith. However, in his effort to reengage with slavery in the Americas, Goody

¹⁰ Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680. Vol. I: The Lands below the Winds* (Yale University Press, 1988): 133. He added that this was a common pattern in the former Dutch East Indies.

¹¹ Jack Goody, ‘Slavery in Time and Space’ in *Asian & African Systems of Slavery*, James L. Watson (ed.) (University of California Press, 1980): 24.

¹² Goody, ‘Slavery in Time and Space’: 24-27. This was merely one example among two, the other being mobile pastoralists lived near sedentary farmers who were unable to escape them.

¹³ Goody, ‘Slavery in Time and Space’: 31.

¹⁴ Goody, ‘Slavery in Time and Space’: 41-42.

focuses on the victimisation of weaker societies by the (seemingly) constantly military-superior polities which eventually fed the Atlantic slave trade. Consequently, he sets aside the dynamics among societies who were more or less equally strong.¹⁵

Still, his idea of victim societies has explanatory power. The issue that remains hazy is his use of the word 'victim', a word that conjures up the utter lack of agency and helplessness. I wish to suggest a more complicated reading of Goody's work, one that thinks of victimisation as a slave-producing process. I offer this reading instead of victimhood as a position of a society completely at the mercy of other societies. I will show how this victimisation operates among Papuan societies and reflect on this further in the conclusion of this thesis.

Stripped down to its essentials, Goody's formulation consists of two separate elements:

- 1) A collection of fragmented societies living in proximity with each other.
- 2) One society having a superior military or economic position in relation to other groups.
- 3) Slaves were produced mostly through the exploitation of weak societies by a strong society. (see figure 1




Figure 1 The slave-producing process among societies as formulated by Goody.

Time and slavery

I wish to address two important issues before moving forward. The first issue is connected to the temporal dimension this thesis covers. This thesis begins with the mention of a slave in the eight century, and ends with the mention of slave in the early twentieth century. I especially focus on the period between the 1600s until the 1950s, a decision that lends itself to explanation. There are two separate reasons for the use of this timespan. For one, the regular periodisation for Indonesian history in this period (the Portuguese colonisation, the VOC period, the British interregnum, etc.) does not correspond with the historicity of Papuans.¹⁶

¹⁵ Goody, 'Slavery in Time and Space': 39.

¹⁶ I follow Ranajit Guha's idea of historicity which he defines as the true historical existence of a man in the world is, see Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History* (Columbia University Press, 2002): 3.

Instead, in this thesis I would only use two separate historical periods; 1600s-1898 and 1898-1950s.

The Dutch opened their first permanent posts in New Guinea in 1898, a fact that I will mention ad nauseam throughout this thesis for various reasons. 1898 matters because it connotes the beginning of the colonial intrusion into Papuan lives, an intrusion that slowly ended the historical pattern which turned Papuans into slaves. The stress I place on 1898 is not evidence that Papuans have no history prior to the arrival of the Dutch. 1898 is a useful divider between the era when colonialism was simply claimed and actually acted upon. It goes without saying that the use of this periodisation needs to be evaluated based on the research topic.

Let me reconcile the point I want to make regarding the argument of the perpetual descend of Papuans into slavery and the historicity of Papuans in New Guinea. I have no intention to portray the historicity of Papuans as mere slaves-in-waiting, although this thesis may paint that picture. Said warns us of one particular mistake the Orientalists have committed throughout the Renaissance; that of conveying the sense of timelessness, as if the Other is static and unchanged.¹⁷ Similarly, treatment of Papuans as a vast space with prospective slaves has to avoid giving the idea that nothing changed for two centuries. I have no doubt that change occurred to distinct groups of Papuans; societies were made and unmade, rose and declined, leaders were born and died. However, the historical circumstance I wish to study here, the circumstance which enabled the change of free Papuan into slaves was pervasive and persisted until at least 1898.

Hence, I foreground this study in the differentiation Braudel draws between short term history and long term history (the *longue duree*). Papuans were turned into slaves not as result single historical events; the processes that turned Papuans into slaves were embedded within the structure of Papuan history. Summarising social observers of his day, Braudel writes that the word structure implies “an organisation, a degree of coherence, rather fixed relations between realities and social masses. For us historians, a structure is.... a reality that time can only slowly erode, one that goes on for a long time.”¹⁸ Braudel detects this structure in the traits of merchant capitalism, a trait which traversed four or five centuries until the end of the eighteenth century and the Industrial Revolution. Similarly, the enslavement of Papuans was embedded in a structure. This historical structure was constituted of low-level endemic warfare between different social groups intent on securing their own interest. Societies were united and split, but there is no indication that a single society in the Bird’s Head Region (or alliances among societies) were ever able to consolidate power and end the waring. Like their counterparts along the coast, hinterland Papuans were adamant on keeping their independence and liberty.¹⁹ Papuan groups were not subjected to an intrusive, militarised, and centralised power obsessed with establishing order until the advent of the Dutch (more in chapter two and three). Until that moment however, this structure infused the short term

¹⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books, 1978(2003): 73.

¹⁸ Fernand Braudel, ‘History and the Social Sciences: The *Longue Durée*’ (transl. by Immanuel Wallerstein) in ‘*The Longue Durée and World-system Analysis*’ ed. Richard E. Lee (State University of New York Press, 2012):155-159.

¹⁹ J. Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581-1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf and Seram’ in *BKI* 150 (1): 130-131.

history/events (*histoire événementielle*) in New Guinea; by which I mean that historical events (wars, disasters, famine, etc. if any) led the movement of people to the coast, whence Papuans left New Guinea.

The second issue is connected with the aftermath of this history. The scarcity of source makes it impossible to track the changes through time as an effect of the raiding and trading practices. What the sources allow us to do is see how the societies were when the colonial administration settled, and treat what it depicts as an accumulation of all the experiences instead of a direct consequence of a specific experience or event. In the absence of written records that would definitively confirm the raids and or continuous slave trade, proof of the position of New Guinea as home to victim societies was embodied in the slaves. Slaves with Papuan origins were interspersed through the Dutch realm, making their way in and out of the coloniser's attention and the archives.

That slavery in Dutch East Indies had a reputation of being more benign than slavery in the Americas is beside the point. The anecdote that Wallace provides depict a situation wherein the Papuan slaves were able to demand their master to follow their will.²⁰ But there is also report of a Rev. Jacobus Burenus who in 1670s was sent to Batavia because he abused his slave to the point of killing his slave.²¹ Different experiences of enslavement lived side by side, lending credence to the contention by Reid that for the slave, 'the real relative deprivation was of neither his liberty nor his welfare, but the possibility of being sold to some distant land where a more terrible fate might await him.'²² The possibility of being sold to a distant land as the possibility of being sold to a cruel master was a source of vulnerability in the lived life of a slave.

Previous Studies and Geographical Setting

Until now historiography of New Guinea and slavery is concentrated on two different research paths. On the one hand are historiographies on slavery in Southeast Asia, which never failed to mention New Guinea as a slaving ground.²³ On the other hand, there are historiographies on trading networks in the region, which confirms the status of New Guinea as an exporter of slaves. This thesis investigates the point where these two historical studies intersect. And as a starting point I want to use the paper by maritime historian A. B. Lopian, *Masalah perbudakan dalam sejarah Indonesia; hubungan antara Maluku dan Irian Jaya*.²⁴ Lopian states a common wisdom in the region; slaves were a fundamental force, connecting Maluku and

²⁰ Wallace, *The Malay Archipelago*: 337-338.


²¹ Kalf, *De Slavernij in Oost-Indië*: 7. The Reverend was apparently later on released from charged and later placed in Ternate.

²² Reid, 'Introduction': 24.

²³ See for example Anthony Reid, 'Introduction'; Vink, 'The World's Oldest Trade'; Baay, *Daar werd wat gruwelijks verricht*; and James F. Warren, *The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: The dynamics of external trade, slavery, and ethnicity in the transformation of a Southeast Asian maritime state* (NUS Press, 1981).

²⁴ A. B. Lopian, 'Masalah perbudakan dalam sejarah Indonesia; hubungan antara Maluku dan Irian Jaya', paper presented in the *Seminar tentang Penelitian Maluku dan Irian Jaya*, LEKNAS-LIPI, Ambon, 23-28 Januari 1984.

New Guinea. This connection is subject to various studies on the actors who connected these two regions, and also explains the geographical scope of this thesis.



Map 1 Former Dutch New Guinea

Papuans along the coast of New Guinea were the actors behind the connection between New Guinea with the Moluccan world. Accordingly, Papuan slaves were mostly obtained from societies on the coast or societies with sustained contact with the societies on the coast. Hence, the spatial scope of the research is important to clarify. This research takes a closer look at societies living in western and north-western New Guinea. This area encompasses Raja Ampat Island in the west and the northwest and stretches to Onin Peninsula in the south, and Biak Islands in the East. To put it succinctly, I am referring to the Bird's Head region. It goes without saying that these boundaries are not strict; it would be an anachronism to affix these societies to a geographical location.

Hence, I trace the scope of this research by identifying points where slavery was most visible and then expand radially to where these two types of victimisations coalesced. The starting points of the research are Raja Ampat Islands and Onin Peninsula. These two areas were known to be important centres of trade and their trade was centred on slavery.²⁵ Studies

²⁵ Jaap Timmer, 'Cloths of Civilisation: *Kain Timur* in the Bird's Head of West Papua' in *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 12 (4): 384. See also Martin O'Hare, *Majapahit influence over Wwaning in New Guinea in*

on these two regions exist, but they are mostly localised to actors from one of the regions because of the different character of their connection with the Moluccan world. Raja Ampat islands were vassal of the Tidore Sultanate, while the connection between the Onin rajas and the Moluccan world was mostly mediated by traders in Seram. The historical distinction between these two regions permeate the historiography of these region.

For the sake of clarity, when speaking of actors from Raja Ampat, I am referring to a unit that was also known as Papua Islands. The islands are called Raja Ampat (which literally translates to ‘four kings’) because four kings from this region resided on these islands. As reported by a VOC Governor Pieter Rooselaer reported in 1706, the four kingdoms were Misool, Waygamma (both resided in Misool island), Salawati (resided in Salawati Island) and Waigeo (resided in Waigeo).²⁶ The kings from Raja Ampat Islands were vassals of Tidore Sultanate, with whom the VOC formed a treaty in 1657.

Their connection with the Moluccan word is part of a study by historian Leonard Andaya in his book. The study investigates the ties that bound the Moluccan sultanates and its peripheries (in Raja Ampat). Andaya argues that the tie was found in myths and was annually confirmed by tributes. Papuans who became slaves were part of this tributary system and their bodies were evidence of connections and loyalty.²⁷ As token of loyalty, the rajas of the Raja Ampat Islands annually sent slaves to Tidore as tribute. The tribute they presented to the sultan was obtained through raids, which confirms the point Lapien makes on the centrality of Papuan slaves in the Moluccan-New Guinea connection. As long as this connection existed, the need to obtain slaves persisted.

However, as Muridan Widjojo demonstrates it is important to not overstate the influence Tidore exerted over the region.²⁸ The connection between the sultan and its vassals was always intended to be mutually beneficial and subject to continual assessment.²⁹ The rajas usually acted in their own interest. The obedience of the supposed subjects was quite conditional; hence the reluctance of the sultans to discourage them, fearing it might lead them to terminate their vassalage and knowing it would not deter their raiding activities.

The rajas in Onin are numerous, but in this thesis when I speak of Onin I am speaking of the rajas who were most intertwined with the Moluccan world (and hence slave trade), namely the rajas of Roembati, Patipi, Fatagar and Ati-Ati. Thomas Goodman studies these communities of rajas in his dissertation, *The Sosolot: An Eighteenth Century East Indonesian Trade Network*. These communities sosolot communities were based in Southeast Seram, and the name sosolot was taken from their practice of dividing bays and anchorages along the coast.³⁰ His study addresses the connection between New Guinea and the Mollucas but bases it on

the 14th century (Sub-thesis, ANU, 1986): 36-37. O'Hare pointed out that people in fourteenth Java were aware of New Guinea because trade in slave.

²⁶ For detailed explanation see ANRI Ternate 134 *Korte beschrijving van alle sodanige landen, eilanden en plaatsen onder de Moluccos*: 48-57. The raja of Misool was the vassal of the Bacan sultanate in the sixteenth century, but after that he was vassal of Tidore.

²⁷ Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period*. (University of Hawaii Press, 1993).

²⁸ Muridan Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making and Local Resistance in Maluku, c.1780-1810* (Brill, 2009): 5-6.

²⁹ Andaya, *The World of Maluku*: 110. As far as tributaries go, the kings were in the habit of rendering tributes to the sultan of Tidore on an annual basis, and on occasions did profess to be its vassals.

³⁰ Roy Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2003: 101.

activities in Onin, instead of Raja Ampat. His work demonstrates the sociality which underpinned the trading practises and network connecting the communities in the Onin Peninsula and Seram.³¹ He finds that their success in exporting this system to New Guinea hinged on their sustained contact and intermarriages with the local populace. This region was nominally within the realm of the Tidore sultanate until 1768, but their entanglement with the Moluccan world were only operative through their close ties with the sosolot communities. In 1768, they were nominally handed over to the VOC, but the role of the sosolot communities as mediator and connector remained.³²

The position of the sosolot communities in the Peninsula and the Raja Ampat Islands in the Moluccan world needs clarification. After all, the different lanes through which New Guinea was connected to the Moluccan world explains the parochialism of the aforementioned studies. The book *On the Edge of the Banda Zone* by the anthropologist Roy Ellen places the different networks which were active contemporaneously, by introducing different levels in the networks. Ellen lays the foundation to argue for the existence of different networks in the Moluccan world which in times of crisis were a source of alliance (cf. Widjojo).³³

These rajas dominated the gates through which Papuans poured outside of New Guinea. And the influence they had over New Guinea continued throughout the centuries, perhaps subject to its own waxing and waning, yet persistent until the colonial intrusion into New Guinea rendered their activities impossible. Their connection to the outer world was built on commodities, the most prevalent of which slaves.³⁴ All these works confirm Lapien's argument on the slavery underpinning of the Moluccan connection, but mostly focus on actors complicit in this enslavement and the dispersal of Papuan slaves. It is still true that the issue of slavery in New Guinea remains at the margins of these studies.

Through the aforementioned studies we know how Papuan slaves moved through the networks, and the actors involved in the activities. And through those works we know that the emergence of Papuan slaves and their displacement was result of those connections, but the issue of Papuan slaves and their societies remains untouched. I wish to place the historical entanglement of Papuans with slavery at the centre of my study.

Organisation of Study

I organise this thesis as a build-up to the final chapter on the legacies of slavery. In a way, I write this thesis the way a person deduces an argument; I begin by addressing the big picture (tracing the existence and movement of Papuan slaves outside of New Guinea) and end by addressing the particulars (seeing what those experiences meant to daily life). In short, this thesis is divided into three separate chapters.

³¹ Thomas E. Goodman, *The Sosolot: An Eighteenth Century East Indonesian Trade Network* (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2006)

³² Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 1-5.

³³ Roy Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2003).

³⁴ John D. Conroy, 'The informal economy in Monsoon Asia and Melanesia: West New Guinea and the Malay world' in *Crawford School Working Paper* 13(4): 19.

The first chapter dwells on the reputation of New Guinea as the home of victim societies. It asks how did New Guinea gain this reputation and the implications of this reputation. I also reflect on the importance of investigating victim societies.

The second chapter discusses how Papuans became slaves. It discusses the historical circumstances in New Guinea that enabled the enslavement of Papuans and their transportation to areas away from home. It asks what was it about New Guinea and or Papuans that allowed for the longevity of this historical pattern.

The final chapter asks what this history meant to Papuan societies and how they dealt with their engagement of slavery. How did slavery leave its mark? Using Maurice Halbwach's conception of collective memory, I ask what can a society remember. Building on that I use terms ('hazard',³⁵ 'vulnerability' and 'adaptation') from studies on climate change, to ask how Papuan societies learned to live with the slave-producing processes. I especially use the differentiation between two forms of adaptation: *anticipatory adaptation* (the increase of the adaptive capability to anticipated hazard) and *reactive adaptation* (which transforms adaptive capacity into action based on immediate hazard).³⁶ I use these formulations to ask how were Papuans affected by slavery and what type of strategies Papuans developed to avoid kidnapping (which lead to enslavement). I see attacks and kidnappings as the hazard, and the effort to minimise the kidnapping as a form of adaptation by the societies.

Papuan lives were shrouded in vulnerability because of how susceptible they were to these attacks. In the conclusion, I reflect on what this history means for Papuans and their agency in history.

Sources

I connect what is so far two separate fields of research by using various types of sources. The conventional archives produced by the VOC and the Dutch colonial power are useful in documenting moments when Papuan slaves inevitably made their way into the administrative realm of the colonising enterprise.

In the VOC period, this was most conspicuous through the *akte van transporten*, notarial records which documented the permit of slave-transporting and on occasions recorded the transactions of the slaves. This record suffers from a list of weakness that Raben has mentioned for Batavia *Daghregister*: it does not cover the fact that a large number of slaves

³⁵ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) define hazard as:

'the *potential occurrence* of a natural or human-induced physical event that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, and environmental resources.'see IPCC, 'Glossary of terms' in: *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation* (Cambridge University Press, 2012): 560. On the other hand, 'Vulnerability' is the susceptibility of a community towards this hazard.

³⁶ An expert on human geography, William Adger and his colleagues define adaptation as:

[a]n adjustment in ecological, social or economic systems in response to observed or expected changes in climatic stimuli and their effects and impacts in order to alleviate adverse impacts of change or take advantage of new opportunities. See W. N. Adger, N. Brooks, M. Kelly, S. Bentham and S. Eriksen, *New indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity* (Tyndall Centre, 2004):78. The difference between these two adaptations is in the temporal aspect, it is a difference between planning and developing defence to avoid harm and the automated response to this hazard.

were smuggled and the port of departure of ships transporting slaves would not necessarily have been in their country of origin.³⁷ Nevertheless, the *akte van transporten* is a good starting point in trying to see the movement of slaves in their realm, as far as VOC was aware of. The *akte van transporten* is kept in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) in Jakarta.

In New Guinea, the presence of the Dutch began when slavery was technically already abolished. The opening of colonial posts in New Guinea began a period of colonial intrusion with the intent to civilise Papuans, and it end slavery and other forms of bondage. Hence, the *Memorie van Overgave* (henceforth only *memorie*) are indispensable. The *memorie* from the residents and assistant-residents in the region was intended to give a basic know-how for their successors. They are indispensable because they provide a diachronic description of the region, and from time to time a look into a few years before the writing of the *memorie*. These memories are kept in the National Archief in The Hague.

I use travelogues to fill the blanks within the archives. The observations made passers-by in the region; William Dampier, Thomas Forrest, Alfred Wallace, and so on would be used. As far as complementary material, these type of sources have disadvantages. As opposed to the *memorie*, this type of source is mostly based on brief observation but it has the advantage of being written contemporaneously. The advantage, is admittedly, somehow undercut by the publishing aspect of the travelogues (especially editing), but the basic premises of the observation still gives it a use value.

Beggars can't be choosers. The marginal position of both New Guinea and slavery lends itself to the limitation to this research. The constraint this research faces is not solely that of time, but also that of the infinite possibility of information being housed in different sets of archives. Even in all the archival research already mentioned above, the fact that the research is limited into the archives of the VOC and the Dutch colonial is already guilty in presuming that the power of Dutch surveillance in their realm, and seem to close any possibility of historical agents with penchants of disregard for borders and authority. It is also guilty of only being able to use the tools in disposal to see the movement of Papuan slaves within the realm of the VOC. Being transportable, slaves could end up anywhere, outside the reach of VOC and their archives.

With all that in mind, this research intends to at least begin a discussion on Papuan slaves and reconnect them to their point of origin, and begin by something that is counter-instinctive; by mentioning the persistent presence of Papuan slaves in places far from home.

³⁷ Remco Raben, 'Cities and the slave trade in early-modern Southeast Asia' in Peter Boomgaard, Dick Kooiman and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds), *Linking destinies. Trade, towns and kin in Asian history. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, land- en Volkenkunde 256* (Leiden: KITLV Press 2008): 126-127.

Chapter I OCCUPANTS OF THE MARGIN

Papuans and New Guinea in the Colonial Eye, 1500s-1898

Writing the national history of Indonesia without a single mention of either New Guinea or its inhabitants is easy. The region and its people did not enter the national discourse in an unavoidable way until 1950s when the region needed to be ‘liberated’ from the Dutch colonial yoke. Both New Guinea and Papuans occupied the margins in the national history. This marginality was and is not result of a deliberate erasure; it was rather a consequence of the role the region and its people occupied in the colonial enterprise.

A marginal region. For a long time, New Guinea was simply an unwanted addition to the colonial enterprise around the Moluccan archipelago. Throughout centuries of colonial presence in the surrounding regions, New Guinea was mostly ignored like the rest of the Oceania, and later important as a buffer between the competing colonial powers. New Guinea was not a profitable region, it had no trading entrepôt, it was quite far from the trading centres of the day and it had no desirable, exotic commodity. Even worse, the region was inhabited by small kinship groups with no united and effective centralised structure that the Dutch colonial power could tap into. New Guinea was not worth the trouble occupying or colonising.

A marginal people. The inhabitants of New Guinea mostly occupied roles that were either expendable (slaves) or roles that the colonial administration would rather not deal with at all (pirates). In his scathing indictment of the Indonesian national historiography, Gadjah Mada University historian Bambang Purwanto criticised national historians for their obsession with big men, at the expense of other actors in history. Even in instances where pirates were central, these ambiguous actors have been casted as heroes rather uncritically.³⁸

This tradition also made for the skipping over of slaves. Baay observes that slavery in East Indies has not been part of a mainstream discourse of colonial history, both in former East Indies and in the Netherlands.³⁹ But, even in instances where slaves in the Dutch East Indies become a central topic of research, Papuans slaves were still at a disadvantage. As Stamford Raffles stated, Papuans were not the most common of slaves.⁴⁰ The uncommonness of Papuans was a disadvantage in a world where a people were validated based on the act of seeing. In order to be visible, even in the margins, Papuans had to be subjects of the seeing eye of the colonial authorities.

This chapter intends to use the presence of Papuans in the Dutch realm as proof of Papuan long history of entanglement with slavery and reflect on it. It will discuss the persistent movement of New Guinea and its populace into the Dutch colonial field of vision.

³⁸ Purwanto, ‘Historisisme.’: 37-38. Purwanto's criticism is also echoed by maritime historian J. N. F. M. a Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion: Representations of Piracy in Colonial Indonesia 1816-25’ in *JSEAS* 34 (2): 200- 201.

³⁹ Baay, *Daar werd wat*: 12-17.

⁴⁰ T. S. Raffles, *The history of Java* (Oxford University Press, 1817 (1988)): 234 in Sandra Khor Manickam, ‘Africans in Asia: The Discourse of ‘Negritos’ in Early Nineteenth-century Southeast in *Responding to the West: Essays on Colonial Domination and Asian Agency*, Hans Hagerdal (ed.), (Amsterdam University Press, 2009): 78.

It will discuss the methodological problem inherent in the research; the fact that both New Guinea and Papuans, are somewhat exonyms and connect it with the conditions of slavery.

1.1. Interloping the colonial field of vision

There are at least two records of free Papuans outside of New Guinea. The VOC office in Fort Nassau, Gorontalo signed a letter on June 30, 1758 clarifying that Hatibi Papoea had arrived in Gorontalo and brought with him a woman by the name of Clarinda, a slave of Thomas Thornton.⁴¹ In 1826 an unnamed Papuan young woman (*vrije Papoesche meid*) was sentenced to twenty rattan lashes (*rottanslagen*) for abuse.⁴² These two reports need to be savoured because how rare they are; Papuans show up in most of the records as either slaves or pirates.

Hence, this thesis states that Papuans have a long history of entanglement in slavery, and mentioned the gifting of a Papuan girl in 724 CE as a starting point. This was repeated in 813 CE when Papuan slaves were presented by the Javanese polity Ka-ling.⁴³ This record seems far-fetched, until one remembers that in the same century Sriwijaya sent a paradise bird to the Chinese court.⁴⁴ This paradise bird, a majority of whose species is native to New Guinea, attests to the incredibly long history of trading networks in the Malay archipelago. These networks do not prove that there was a direct connection between New Guinea and Sriwijaya. But, it does prove that commodities were able to move through different short-distance network circuits long before maritime technology allow us to think this is even possible. Papuan slaves were moved through these networks and eventually end up within the Dutch realm.

Johan A. Schilling, governor of Amboina, received regular reports from Banda listing the deaths of company slaves. Between the 21st June of 1788 and the 29th October of 1791, twelve slaves passed away due to natural causes in the perk *Bejauw*, two of them were Papuans.⁴⁵ During the dissolution of a short lived polity in east Seram in 1832, 108 Papuan children were confiscated from the court and transported to Banda.⁴⁶ In 1918, there was a report of a Salawati official who was dismissed for having 143 slaves.⁴⁷

The list of occurrences can go on and on, and it confirms that New Guinea, Papuans and slavery have a long history of entanglement. A specific and close look into the presence of

⁴¹ ANRI Schepenbank 1097 *Transporten van slaven 1695-1767* 'Hatibi' is a position and not a name, a title for a religious leader, the leader of a mosque. See Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: xvii (glossary).

⁴² ANRI Ternate 170 Register van der Handelingen van de Magistraat 1826.

⁴³ J.H.F. Sollewijn Gelpke, *Heady Perfumes of Spice and Gold: The Secret Portuguese-Spanish Struggle over the Moluccan and New Guinea 1490-1570* (S.I., 200?): 23. Sollewijn Gelpke was referring to the Sang-chu slaves, as quoted in the work of W. P. Groeneveldt, 'Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca' in *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* XXXIX: 14 note 5.

⁴⁴ Harsja W. Bachtiar & Koentjaraningrat, *Penduduk Irian Barat* (Penerbitan Universitas Jakarta, 1961), as quoted by Bernarda Meteray, *Nasionalisme Ganda Orang Papua* (Penerbit Kompas, 2012): 4.

⁴⁵ ANRI Banda 48/6, *Berita tentang Budak 1791-1792*. Of the twelve individuals who passed away, six were from Timor, three were local (Banda), two from Papua, and one from Bugis.

⁴⁶ H.C. van Eijbergen, 'Geschiedkundige aantekeningen omtrent de Noord-kust van Ceram, van af het jaar 1816 tot 1832' in *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 17: 504.

⁴⁷ Jelle Miedema, *De Kebar 1855-1980: Sociale structuur en religie in de Vogelkop van West-Nieuw-Guinea* (ICG Printing BV, 1988): 8.

people with Papoea, Papoua or a variety thereof in their name confirms that there was a constant trickle of Papuans into the colonial realm. Their entry into the colonial realm, raised exponentially the possibility of Papuans being seen and recorded by the colonial officials. This is striking because until 1898, the colonial governance of New Guinea was only based on irregular patrols along the coasts, which means that the Dutch were more familiar with Papuans than the geography of New Guinea.

This was of course not extraordinary; you can keep a territory out of sight, but you cannot keep markers of the territory from entering into your sight. For decades, the trickle of Papuans entering the colonial records betrayed the long history of their entanglement in the pre-existing network in the region, but they remained in the margins. The permanent colonial presence in the hub had a central goal, and by determining the central goal they inadvertently what it meant to be in the margins, both geographically and socially.⁴⁸ The colonial presence occupying the region deemed trade and the safe sailing to accommodate trade as their central practice. Consequently, piracy and smuggling were turned into a marginal and unlawful practice.

The marginality of slaves was not a result of any change caused by the colonial presence. Rather, it was a result of the different perspective regarding slaves. The VOC was always in search of labour, but this does not negate the idea that slaves were expendable. In most of the local structure of the region, one's slave (and bondsmen) was the source of social influence and social support.⁴⁹ The VOC however, only needed slaves for labour; their standing and influence did not hinge on the number of slaves they own. The Dutch administration acquired slaves to mostly fulfil their thirst for labour and established their influence through different channels.

Marginal in the colonial eye and the post-colonial historian does not mean that Papuans were unnoticed among other native populace of the East Indies. In areas with sustained contact with Papuans, this history of entanglement left its mark on their language use. Among the Oirata population residing in Kisar Island (northwest off Timor), the word Papua was synonymous with pirates because of their experience of being subjects to Papuan raids.⁵⁰ Maritime historian A. B. Lapien quoted an 1879 *Memorie van Overgave* by the leaving Ternate resident P. F. Laging Tobias, in which he reported that in Tidore, the word Papua was a synonym for slave.⁵¹ The interactions with Papuans had a Janus-faced nature

⁴⁸ This is not to say that it was all well and good before the arrival of the Europeans, just that slavery and piracy was part of business as usual, and not a disruption of order. On the prevalence of violence in Amboina and its surrounding see G.J. Knaap, 'Headhunting, Carnage and Armed Peace in Amboina, 1500-1700' in *JESHO* 46 (2): 175- 181.

⁴⁹ See Peter Boomgaard, 'Human Capital, Slavery and Low Rates of Economic and Population Growth in Indonesia, 1600-1910' in Gwyn Campbell (ed.) *The Structure of Slavery in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia*. (Frank Cass, 2004): 85-88.

⁵⁰ J. P. B de Josselin de Jong, *Oirata, A Timorese settlement on Kisar* (Uitgave van de N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1937) in Adrian B. Lapien, *Orang Laut Bajak Laut Raja Laut: Sejarah Kawasan Laut Sulawesi Abad XIX* (Komunitas Bambu, 2009): 128.

⁵¹ ANRI (number not stated) *Memorie van Overgave van het bestuur der residentie Ternate van den Resident P. F. Laging Tobias aan den Resident O. M. de Munnick, Ternate 17 april 1879* as quoted in A. B. Lapien, 'Masalah perbudakan dalam sejarah Indonesia', paper presented in teh 1984 Seminar Penelitian Maluku dan Irian Jaya in Ambon: 14.

and the other native populace formulated their own conceptions on Papuans based on their own experience, separate from the colonial administrations.

Papua meant different things based on local history of interactions with Papuans. To the people inhabiting the eastern archipelago, Papuans were a feature of residing in the region. The constant trespassing of Papuans into the colonial vision, meant that the Dutch colonial engaged with and formulated ideas about them. But since New Guinea was not occupied, what was known about New Guinea grew through their experience with Papuans. The development of colonial knowledge went hand in hand with the colonial interest in New Guinea, and this was a slow process.

1.2. Papuans and New Guinea: a connection in the making

Aryani Mei Sitorus sparked a conversation and vitriol recently when she represented Papua in the 2016 *Putri Indonesia*. Putri Indonesia is an annual beauty pageant whose winner will represent Indonesia in the Miss Universe pageant.⁵² The backlash was not connected with the common complaints on objectification. It had undertones that were racial, for lack of a better word. Sitorus, whose name indicated her parents' root in North Sumatra, was 'not Papua'. Straight hair, fair skin tone. She is the antithesis of what Papuans have taken to be the physical markings of a Papuan self; wavy/curly hair, dark skin tone. Sitorus is Indonesia.

One can use this as a jumping point for a discussion on the politics of identity among migrants. Or, as an indicator of an identity-making process that is, for all intents and purposes, done. In an essay responding to this issue, young educator Gracia Mambrasar chose to see it as a result of misunderstanding if not callousness, committed by both Sitorus and the Putri Indonesia convener.⁵³ Mambrasar surmised that the major point of contention is the fact that Sitorus represented Papuans, even though she is not an indigene and does not look Papua. Furthermore, he argues that the vitriol was caused by the Putri Indonesia convener overlooking the tension between the indigenous population and the migrant population in New Guinea. Hence, in an event that could have been an opportunity to represent 'Papua' in the national stage, the representative was a person who is 'Indonesia' instead.

For this research, the debacle is important because it revealed the state and substance that 'Papua' has now. The connection between Papuans and New Guinea is more self-evident now than it was in the sixteenth century when the written mentions of Papua began. The criteria of 'Papuan' has acquired a more specific form now with the progress of time. Recent history and the politics of identity has dictated the form and exclusivity around which the idea

⁵² See more in NN, January 25, 2016, "Matahari selalu terbit dari Timur: Puteri Indonesia Papua 2016–Aryani Mei Juventina", taken from <http://www.puteri-indonesia.com/index.php/news/247-matahari-selalu-terbit-dari-timur-puteri-indonesia-papua-2016-aryani-mei-juventina> accessed sunday, april 3 2016, 19:10.

⁵³ Gracia J. J. Mambrasar, n.d., "Ada apa dibalik Penolakan anak muda Papua terhadap Arya Mei Sebagai perwakilan Papua di Puteri Indonesia 2016" <http://www.ysealiindonesia.com/p/blog-page.html>, accessed April 3, 2016 20:00.

of the meaning of being a Papuan is built, but to project the specificity of the concept today to the past would be anachronistic and dangerous to any historical study purporting to study the plight of Papuans in the past.

Even accepting Mambrasar's threshold of what constitutes Papuan would be not helpful in tracing the past movement of Papuans.⁵⁴ Gerrit Knaap states that the term Papuans was also used to refer to subjects of the Sultan of Tidore residing between Halmahera and the Bird's Head region; which encompasses inhabitants of Maba, Weda, Patani and Raja Ampat (Waigeo, Gebe, Misool and Salawati).⁵⁵ It is obvious that the use of the term Papuans has become more discriminate throughout the centuries coinciding with the expanding knowledge about New Guinea.

To understand this process, we have to discuss the history of the term Papua. The history will clarify the origin of 'Papua' and will shed some light into how the term was later deployed to denote a group of people from various tribes and language groups. In a study of New Guinea as part of Melanesia, historian Clive Moore suggests applying the process that Edward Said dubbed Orientalism to see how Melanesia as a construct was made and developed.⁵⁶ Conducting a similar exercise on Papua would clarify its history and confusion regarding the connection between Papuans and New Guinea.

Most historians today accept that colonial officer-cum-historian J. H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke offers the best explanation of the origin of the name 'Papua'. In his article 'On the origin of the name Papua' Sollewijn Gelpke reviewed the uses of 'Papua' before coming to the conclusion that Papua was a name that predated the presence of Europeans in the region.⁵⁷ In the article he dealt with and then dismissed the previously conventional wisdom that the etymology of 'Papua' is to be found in the Malayan and or Javanese word '*puah puah*' meaning frizzly-haired.⁵⁸ Sollewijn Gelpke is convinced that the word 'Papua' has a regional origin because it had a limited and specific use.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Mambrasar allows for three criteria on what makes a Papuan a real Papuan; family name, dark skin and curly hair. Mambrasar allows that fulfilling at least one of the criteria makes you Papua. Mambrasar, n.d., "Ada apa dibalik...". The position advocated by Mambrasar is quite inclusive; the more restrictive definition of a Papuan identity has the added caveat of requiring both parents of indigenous decent and or being Christian.

⁵⁵ Knaap, G. J., *Kruidnagelen En Christenen: De Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie En de Bevolking van Ambon 1656-1696* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1987): 58. See also Muridan S. Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780-1810*, TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-European Interaction; Vol. 12 (Leiden etc: Brill, 2009): 95. Knaap went further to place the '*Papuase Zeerovers*' into question; pointing out that both the label Papuans and pirates was used quite indiscriminately.

⁵⁶ Clive Moore, *New Guinea Crossing Boundaries and History* (University of Hawaii Press, 2003): 6,7.

⁵⁷ J. Sollewijn Gelpke, 'On the origin of the name Papua' in *BKI* 149 (2): 318-332.

⁵⁸ Sollewijn Gelpke, 'On the origin of...': 320. In p. 319 he took the time to briefly address and discarded some bizarre suggestion on how 'Papua' emerged, among which that the word originated from the word '*papaya*', the Amboinese Malay word '*papoewa*' meaning tangled, the Sundanese word '*poea*' meaning ants' or squirrels' nest, 'the Biak word '*papus*' meaning riches, or the imported by the Iberians 'Pappua' based on a mountain in Numidia.

⁵⁹ Sollewijn Gelpke, 'On the origin of...': 329. Sollewijn Gelpke concluded that Papua was already an existent name, and that the Portuguese simply followed suit in using the term. He also believes (and I fully agree with him on this) that this explains the fact that Papua remains a somewhat separate and specific entity, and not just a label given to all other indigenous population from eastern Indonesia.

Australian National University historian Chris Ballard succinctly summarises the argument of Sollewijn Gelpke. In short, Papua began as a vague location, which came to identify ‘a fixed set of locations and then the inhabitants of those places, before assuming its final reference to the physical attributes of black skin and frizzly hair’.⁶⁰ The work by Sollewijn Gelpke has two historical moments that need a closer look. First, the connection between Papua(n) and New Guinea can be clarified by addressing the European knowledge from the first encounter with the Iberians in the mid of the sixteenth century. This was a state that continued until the eighteenth century. The second moment began in the nineteenth century, when corresponding with the dawn of science of race, Papua as a location became fixed and the appearance of its inhabitant helped in fixing this geographical location. These two moments will be discussed below.

1.2.1. Papua as the marker of colonial unfamiliarity

The most common confusion regarding the name Papua, is why it exists at all? Considering that New Guinea was named in the sixteenth century (1545 to be exact), why were its inhabitants not addressed as New Guineans? Before the late President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) officiated the renaming of the Irian Jaya province in 2000, Papua did not really correspond to a fixed point on a modern map.⁶¹ The research by Sollewijn Gelpke clarifies this by answering whether Papua began as a toponym or a populace.

Through a look into the Malay language, Sollewijn Gelpke concludes that the name ‘Papua’ was both a toponym and a reference to the population. The answer to this ambiguity was found in the Malay language where such toponym ‘occurs substantially, but only as modifier qualifying a preceding noun designating a territory, race or products.’⁶² The Europeans who arrived in the region followed their local interlocutors in believing in the existence of Papua. Hence the slaves with the attributive ‘*van Papoea*’ were actually literally true for a while, because Papua was understood to be a place by the original users. That a person from Papua was a Papuan is self-evident due to the Malay language. Hence, clarifying the origin of Papuan has to begin by identifying where Papua was. The vagueness of the location ‘Papua’ is connected with the state of European knowledge until the nineteenth century.

The idea of imaginative geography provides a helpful framework to understand this. Said has used this term to address the practice of a collective that have defined the imagined markers a collective imposes on geography, with a boundary which separates them from ‘the others’. A collective that invents and together imagined a space that is their own and believed that the boundaries of the space to exist objectively.⁶³ The vacillation of the geographical

⁶⁰ Chris Ballard, ‘“Oceanic Negroes:’ British anthropology of Papuans, 1820-1869’ in Chris Ballard & Bronwen Douglas (eds.), (*Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750-1940*, ANU E Press, 2008): 162.

⁶¹ Exceptions of course have to be made throughout history, an issue that Sollewijn also tackled in this paper. The most obvious one is the unambiguous designation by Anthonie Haga in his 1884 book, *Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden*, in which he differentiated mainland New Guinea and called Raja Ampat Islands (which he called the Papuan Islands).

⁶² Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘On the origin of...’: 324. Think for example of *orang Papua*, *kain Timur*, etc. where the latter words to explain the noun.

⁶³ Said, *Orientalism*: 54.

location that the toponym Papua experienced stood in perfect contrast to the consistent idea of what a Papuan body constitutes. Said provides an answer, in imaginative geography;

.... this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that *can be* entirely arbitrary. I use the word "arbitrary" here because imaginative geography of the "our land—barbarian land" variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in our own minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, ..."64

Said was, of course, speaking of a different context, of the feeling at home that a collective made and then felt. In the empire, things are a bit different, as historian Ranajit Guha argue. Speaking of the experience of the British colonial, Guha exposed the ambivalent colonial situation which wanted to make a home of its territory, even when maintaining otherness was part of its formula. In the face of the unhomely empire, the officers ran to their English clubs which seek to replicate the familiar feeling of home. Unlike Said, Guha spoke the Aristotelian language of limit, beyond which looms the unimaginable, things which were beyond the comprehension of the colonial officers.⁶⁵

Guha astutely observes the impossibility of feeling at home among the colonial officers, but that feeling cannot be an absolute state. Even in the heyday of colonialism, some places in the empire were more familiar than others. That way, grounds with fortresses are always more familiar than the wilderness in the colonial, be it on land or even more on waters. Time and time again, the Dutch were reminded that they are unfamiliar with the land they inhabit in Ternate, in Amboina, in their entire realm. But some places were more unfamiliar than others. And if danger could spring in areas they know (i.e. Amboina), the areas they knew nothing about had a potential for even more danger. And this was true of New Guinea until 1898, when the Dutch colonial administration opened posts and conducted explorations intent on familiarising them with their colony.

For centuries before that, the Dutch were in suspended animation with regards to New Guinea. They were in an area they claimed to own without feeling familiar to it, resulting in a challenge which was more than a simple ours versus theirs. The Dutch presence faced different degrees of 'they', some more familiar than others. And New Guinea and its inhabitant were treacherous and unfamiliar. But New Guinea was not the only region determined by its unfamiliarity, all areas that were connected with the label Papua was unfamiliar. Papua was unfamiliar, especially compared to the forts in Ternate, Amboina or Banda.

To connect Papua(ns) with the unfamiliar may seem to be a stretch, but this idea does hold up to scrutiny. As Sandra Khor Manickam contends, the unfamiliarity of a region translated to a lack of access which meant that the Europeans had to depend on their local informants to understand Papua and its inhabitants.⁶⁶ The Europeans knew that Papua

⁶⁴ Said, *Orientalism*: 54.

⁶⁵ Ranajit Guha, 'Not at Home in Empire' in *Critical Inquiry* 23(3): 482-4.

⁶⁶ Manickam, 'Africans in Asia': 72.

existed, they simply did not know where. Hence, as quoted from Knaap in the above, Papua was also used to refer to people from Maba, Weda, and Patani, locations on the east coast of Halmahera.⁶⁷ Sollewijn Gelpke's reading of the map by Francisco Rodrigues in 1513, concurs with this idea. Rodrigues' map pointed to an area as Papua island, the location of which is present Halmahera. The idea that Papua was located and performed in Halmahera and eastward of Halmahera was respectively, shared by Tomé Pires, and later on by Martín de Uriarte in 1527.⁶⁸ A glimpse of a map nowadays would confirm that this knowledge was not far off, but the lack of specifics and the speed with which the knowledge expanded revealed how little the Europeans knew then, and their lack of interest in New Guinea.

As a geographical location, Papua was defined based on Halmahera. Halmahera was the boundary of the familiar for the colonial.⁶⁹ While the empire was never homely, the region beyond Halmahera presented more of a challenge since it was an area completely unknown. And in this region, the potential degree of otherness was revealed. Here the imaginative geography of the colonial administration made its boundary, not between us and they but between 'they' with different degrees of otherness; the they that the colonial administration were familiar with, and the they that reside in territories that were beyond colonial map and with it, the colonial vision and the colonial reach.

This does not negate the fact that the colonial administration had blind spots in regions where they were more securely stationed; it merely makes clear that the unknowable surrounding the territory 'Papua' magnified this feeling of being unhomely. To Papuans it magnified their status as outsiders, as people coming from a region that remained for a while unspecified. During the course of the growing intensive contact with New Guinea, this label was also applied to inhabitants of New Guinea.⁷⁰

1.2.2. The physicality of Papua

The unfamiliarity of Papua as a location was obvious because the contrast between the confidence in stating the physical characteristic of a Papuan and the constant vacillation in the geographical location of 'Papua.' This situation changes in the nineteenth century, catalysed not only by expanding cartographical knowledge of the Dutch but also the dawn of science. The nineteenth century was the heyday of the scientific explorers, who solidified the idea of Papuans. And here I am following Ballard's reading of John Crawford (1783-1868), George Windsor Earl (1813-1865) and A. R. Wallace (1823-1913). These scientists continued in the steps of earlier travellers who were equally perplexed with Papuans. The navigator William Dampier in his 1699 voyage had already made this comparison, saying that the New Guinea Negroes are different in comparison to Indians and Mindanayans.⁷¹ They solidified this in their works and integrated this into the science of the day, hence Papua was, to borrow

⁶⁷ Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen*: 58.

⁶⁸ Sollewijn Gelpke, 'On the origin of..': 322-323.

⁶⁹ See Sollewijn Gelpke, 'On the origin of..': 323-326.

⁷⁰ Sollewijn Gelpke, 'On the origin of..': 330.

⁷¹ William Dampier, *A Continuation of A Voyage to New Holland, &c. In the Year 1699* (W. Botham, 1709): 100.

the formulation by Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, result of centuries of categorical identification.

Brubaker and Cooper speak of categorical identification as a process during which one identifies oneself or others ‘by membership in a class of persons sharing some categorical attribute.’⁷² In regards to Papuans, their formulation is important because it addressed the (colonial) state as source of an authoritative and external identification.⁷³ The nineteenth century explorers were the mediator between the earlier travellers and the anthropologist-cum-colonisers who would continue this tradition later on.

And these nineteenth naturalists focused on Papuan bodies and intent on finding parallels between Papuans and Africans. Hence, the presence of Papuans was noticeable to the European eye; the eye that was reminiscent with the familiar Africa. The obsession with the physical appearance of Papua, according to Manickam, was connected with the intent to find Africa in Asia. Manickam argues that this was part and parcel of the scientific endeavour the day to argue for a connection with Africa (migration), and by making parallels between Papuan and African condition (enslavement and inferiority). Manickam illustrates that there was a deep fixation on reinforcing the link between slavery, blackness and Africanness.⁷⁴ This mind-set made Raffles more attuned to the Papuan slave, even when he admitted that that they were not common slaves.⁷⁵ This focus on the African-like physical characteristic of Papua was compounded by ‘the cardinality of comparison’.⁷⁶ Chris Ballard uses the term to explain and prove that the trajectories of travel was decisive in deciding the terms of comparison applied to Papuans. The physical feature of Papuans was defined through comparison with the Malays in the west, rather than Oceania populace in east. This explains why Papua was so other, and the fixation on the physical aspect of Papuans in time made this aspect the foundation of what a Papuan is, and where Papua is.

The nineteenth-century ideas of the origin and the meaning of Papua reveals a lot on the way Papuans were understood. Sollewijn Gelpke has convincingly disproved the previously accepted etymology of Papua, -- namely the idea that Papua is from a European corruption of the word *puah-puah* meaning ‘frizzly haired’.⁷⁷ To dispute the etymology, however, does not negate the meaning of the word at that time. It would be presumptuous to think that the maker of the nineteenth century dictionaries did not understand the meaning of the word at that time. The dictionaries that Sollewijn Gelpke studied (H. von de Wall’s 1880 *Maleisch-Nederlandsch woordenboek* and J. Crawfurd’s 1852 *Grammar and dictionary of the Malay Language*) reveal the state of ‘Papua’ at the time. The result of his investigation can be seen in Table 1.

Dictionary	Entry	Meaning
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⁷² Roger Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, ‘Identity’ in *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* Frederick Cooper (University of California Press, 2005): 71.

⁷³ Brubaker & Cooper, ‘Identity’: 71-73.

⁷⁴ Manickam, ‘Africans in Asia’: 69-78.

⁷⁵ Raffles, *The History of Java*: 234 as quoted in Manickam, ‘Africans in Asia’: 78.

⁷⁶ Ballard, ‘Oceanic Negroes’: 160.

⁷⁷ Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘On the origin of...’: 320.

<i>Maleisch-Nederlandsch woordenboek</i> (by H. von de Wall)	‘papoewah’	1. New Guinea 2. woolly, frizzly, frizzly-haired person
<i>Grammar and dictionary of the Malay Language</i> (by J. Crawfurd)	‘papuwah’ (Jav. and Mal.) on p. 126	1. frizzled 2. a negrito of the Indian islands 3. an African negro ⁷⁸
	‘papuwah’ on p. 135	1. frizzled 2. the island of New Guinea 3. an inhabitant of that island being of the negrito race
	‘puwah-puwah’ on p. 148	1. frizzled or woolly 2. a negro 3. it is applied to anything with a frizzled or woolly coat. Thus a particular variety of the common fowl is called ayam puwa-puwa

Table 1. ‘Papua’ in two nineteenth century dictionaries (taken from J. Sollewijn Gelpke’s ‘On the origin of the name Papua’: 320-322).

The resilience of the label Papuans and the fixation on finding Africans in Asia lend credence to the suggestion that the name Papua predated the colonial presence and that it was a regional label. Sollewijn Gelpke correctly argues that the most convincing argument regarding the origin of this term is the fact that “‘papua’ has never been used in connection with the frizzy-haired population of Timor and other parts of eastern Indonesia.”⁷⁹ The fact that Papua was a regional label is important to keep in mind because it is notable in itself. Papua as a name was (and is) neither an exonym nor an endonym. The origin of the name, if we follow Sollewijn Gelpke’s line of argument, reveals the fragmented nature of societies living in Papua. Sollewijn Gelpke supports F. C. Kamma’s opinion that the name Papua was derived from the phrase ‘*sub i babwa*’ meaning ‘the land below.’⁸⁰ This phrase is from Biak language, lending credence to the idea that the name was an endonym among the Biak community, but an exonym to all other societies residing in New Guinea.⁸¹

The process through which ‘Papua’ became a label so readily accepted is a given among historians. After all, the idea that a label created and or solidified by during the colonial period and later on acquired a life on its own is by no means unique.⁸² The specific substance of this label however, was a continuation of the previous knowledge, now with armed with the confidence to pin down an exact geographic location to what was previously

⁷⁸ In the English Malay list on p. 119, Crawfurd gives a different entry for ‘Negro (African)’: Habsi, zangi, kafri, while the Papuwah and puwah-puwah was a translation from the entry ‘Negro of the Indian islands’. And Crawfurd did admit that the dictionary was built upon the work of William Marsden’s 1812 dictionary, see Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘On the origin of...’: 320.

⁷⁹ Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘On the origin of...’: 329.

⁸⁰ Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘On the origin of...’: 326- 327, 329 Kamma suggested that the name Papua was taken from the pronunciation Biak speakers residing in of Raja Ampat. I tend to agree with this line of thinking because it provides reasonable explanation on the prevalence of this term in the face of the colonial ‘naming regime’.

⁸¹ G.N. Appell. The Dusun languages of Northern Borneo: Rungus Dusun and related problems’, *Oceanic Linguistics* 7:1-15 as quoted in Anton Ploeg, “De Papoea’: What’s in a name?” in *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 3 (1): 77.

⁸² And here I am talking about at least the politics of identity of the Malays as pointed out in Henk Maier, *We are playing relatives* (KITLV Press, 2004): 7.

vague. As Ballard illustrated ‘Papua’ became a racialized toponym, where Papuan bodies became markers of the geographic Papua,⁸³ echoing the suggestion by Sollewijn Gelpke that the area which was considered as Papua expanded on areas where Papuans were later found.⁸⁴

By the late nineteenth century there was no question where Papua was, what continued was the solidification of Papua as an identity. Anthropologist Anton Ploeg discusses the role of Dutch anthropologists-cum-colonisers in solidifying Papua as a concept. His study convincingly proves that the Dutch colonial administration was not a pioneer in this endeavour. They continued and proliferated the use of the term Papuans. They continued to mostly used the term Papua with negative connotations.⁸⁵ The negative connotations of Papua occurred in more than one sense; ‘Papua’ was based on things they lack, and identified with characteristics that confirmed their inferiority.⁸⁶ True Papuans were identified with isolations and primitiveness.⁸⁷ People who did not conform with this assumption, were deemed not Papua. And through this all, inhabitants of New Guinea (at this point their status as Papuans unquestioned) were portrayed in the entirety.⁸⁸

To say that the colonial anthropologists were unaware of the differences among Papuans would be a stretch. After all, while Bijlmer was making all those blanket statement on Papuans in 1935, Ploeg contends that there was a working knowledge that the label was not representative of a homogenous cultural group.⁸⁹ This explains also why even in the height of specificity, the definition of Papua was (and is) vague at best. Papuans were not identical, but they were similar *enough* that they can be categorised (and hence governed) as one. To briefly return to Brubaker and Cooper, the entrance of the anthropologists-cum-colonisers proves the position of the colonial state as powerful identifier because it had resources to impose the categories which then dictate the conduct and governance of the state.⁹⁰

The operative aspect of the Dutch colonial state as an identifier was seen in their policies, and this point will be elaborated further in the following chapters. The connection between the anthropologists making the case for a ‘Papua’ and the operative element which reified the idea of Papua was embodied by the former governor of New Guinea Jan van Eechoud.⁹¹ Under his supervision the first generation of Papuan *ambtenaars* were educated. These first generation of *ambtenaars* were the first Papuan elites, and the first generation of Papuan nationalists. The most obvious result of this work is the current Papuan nationalism

⁸³ Ballard, ‘Oceanic Negroes’: 165.

⁸⁴ Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘On the origin of...’: 330.

⁸⁵ Ploeg, ‘De Papoea’: 75-80.

⁸⁶ Held: 2, 18 in Ploeg, ‘De Papoea’: 79. Ploeg quoted the 1951 work by Held, in whose work Papuans are quoted as not using metal, not growing rice, not practising weaving and not being Muslims.

⁸⁷ Ploeg, ‘De Papoea’: 79.

⁸⁸ Ploeg, ‘De Papoea’: 80. Ploeg was specifically referring to the work of H. Bijlmer in W. C. Klein (ed.), *Nieuw Guinee*. 3 Vols. Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, Vol. 1, pp. 219-70.

⁸⁹ Ploeg, ‘De Papoea’: 76.

⁹⁰ Brubaker & Cooper, ‘Identity’: 72-73.

⁹¹ Richard Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaptation* (East-West Center, 2005): 37-47. Chauvel went as far as to say that these *ambtenaar* were the first to call themselves Papuans (p. 44). While this is true in that they were the first Papuan in the modern sense, this sentiment in itself is not completely accurate. Ploeg quoted the 1905 article of J. W. van Hille 1905, ‘Reizen in West-Nieuw-Guinea’, wherein van Hille relayed meeting people in Onin Peninsula, who called themselves Papoea.

which has a Pan-Papuan identity which overrules all the differences among the diverse societies, with a strong ethnic undertones attached to it.⁹²

1.3. A Knot of Contingencies

Pulau-pulau Maluku lainnya, terutama Halmahera (Jailolo), Seram dan Papua memainkan peranan yang amat kecil atau bahkan tidak berarti sama sekali di dalam perputaran sejarah regional kawasan ini..... Papua yang dihuni oleh suku-suku primitif hanya menghasilkan sedikit kayu cendana, kulit penyu dan rempah-rempah yang diproses secara serampangan. Tetapi Papua tetap tidak dikenal oleh orang luar kecuali oleh para pedagang budak dari Tidore dan sesekali ada operasi militer Belanda untuk menindak kegiatan para bajak laut dan penganiayaan (potong kepala) di sana.⁹³

Historian Des Alwi, *Sejarah Maluku: Banda Naira, Ternate, Tidore dan Ambon*

In the previous subsection I address the contingent connection between Papuans and New Guinea. I have explained that since the seventeenth century, if an individual from New Guinea entered the colonial record, it was as a Papuan. This certainty did not go both ways; in the seventeenth century the Dutch also used the term Papuan to indicate people from Halmahera. This changed in the nineteenth century when, in accordance with the developing science of race, we can be more confident that Papuans in the contemporaneous records were from New Guinea. The need to address this uncertainty is more than simply a need to address the elephant in the methodological room. It also relates to the stubborn intent of this thesis to connect Papuan slaves with the experience of their original societies. Let me address the former point first.

The changing names of slaves makes the task of tracing Papuans (and the origin of any slave) highly complicated. From time to time, *Transportbrieven* recorded changes in names of slaves, indicating the malleability of slave identification. For example, Kerry Ward quotes a report regarding Harman van Cabo de Goede Hoop whose alias was Aron Papoea.⁹⁴ The change of name leads Ward to suggest that Harman was perhaps born at the Cape, but his homeland was New Guinea. It is possible that some Papuan slaves, did not retain names that would indicate their origin and allow us to connect them with New Guinea.

⁹² Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism*: ix-x. Chauvel credited this development to four different factors; the shared historical grievances; rivalry between the Papuans elite and Indonesian official; the territory's economic and administrative development with Papuan sense of differences; and the demographic transformation of Papua through the influx of Indonesian settlers.

⁹³ Des Alwi, *Sejarah Maluku: Banda Naira, Ternate, Tidore dan Ambon* (Dian Rakyat, 2005): 293. Literally translated: Other Moluccan islands, especially Halmahera (Jailolo), Seram and Papua played a very small or nonexistent role in the historical flow of the region..... Papua, which was inhabited by primitive tribes, only produced a little sandalwood, turtle shell and carelessly processed spices. But Papua remained unfamiliar to outsiders except for slave traders from Tidore and once in some while military operations to suppress piracy and headhunting.

⁹⁴ NA VOC 9391 in Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge University Press, 2009): 115.

Another complicating factor is that Papuans were moved through networks that were not always visible to the colonial eye. Papuans were mostly kidnapped and given as tribute to regional ruler or sold to foreign traders. There was no point during the Dutch colonial period when the VOC had a grip on slave markets in New Guinea. The movement of Papuans into the colonial realms does not negate this, it rather confirms the suggestion that the entire VOC realm was connected by interlocking circuit of sea trade, over some of which the VOC had no control (more in next chapter).⁹⁵

All the previous points are also disclaimers on the method this research uses. History research always demands a certain level of doubt, but the challenges of this research are manifold. Still, in the research, I will consider any Papuan slaves as individuals who originally had familial and or kinship ties in New Guinea. In spite of the aforementioned challenges, I still wish to argue for the use of this type of research and insist that Papuans have to be a focus of research because what societies in New Guinea experienced is not unique.

The experience of people removed from their society and their original society are closely connected. Patterson uses the term 'social death' as an inherent quality in an enslaved person. I do not subscribe to his entire idea, but I think his thoughts regarding the initial phase of the enslavement is particularly relevant to a discussion about Papuans and New Guinea. In his seminal work on social death, Patterson argues that there are three transitional phases a slave undergoes; (1) violent removal from their milieu, (2) desocialisation and depersonalisation, and finally (3) the introduction of slave into their master's community as a non-being.⁹⁶

The first two phases especially resonate with the experience of Papuan slaves in various hubs. The further they went the more removed and alienated they were. The emergence of Papuan slaves in hubs outside of New Guinea attests to the removal from their milieu and the removal of Papuans from a place where they belonged and their family. That their removal from their original society means a that Papuan slaves were desocialised is obvious, but it is in the circumstance where slaves were valued as source of manpower that the true depersonalisation (i.e. the removal of any recognition of their personal qualities) of Papuan slaves took place.⁹⁷

It is important to speak of the alienation of Papuan slaves and connect it to their original society in New Guinea. The plight of Papuans is shared among societies who historically went through the same experience; the plight of societies left behind. Even more, it is a plight of a society that seemed monolithic because of their connection with slavery, because their only contribution to 'proper' history was as a supplier of slaves. Slaves had a subordinate position, and the archives recorded the slaves in the vein of their own interest. A person from New Guinea could only be incorporated into the colonial system of knowledge by this act of erasure. The Dutch did not care about the sense of self of an individual slave, instead they relied on categories which provided guidance on what to expect from a Papuan slave. I have no doubt that most Papuan slaves still knew their original society and perhaps

⁹⁵ Jean G. Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (Yale University Press, 2003): 139.

⁹⁶ Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Harvard University Press, 1982): 38-39.

⁹⁷ Numerous historians have mentioned the importance of not overestimating the social death Patterson argues for since it does not seem to allow for agency. For a summation see Vincent Brown, 'Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery' in *American Historical Review* 114(5): 1231-1249.

some managed to thrive in their new society, but what of their society of origin in New Guinea?

This brings me to a point I wish to make regarding the impact of this alienation to the societies in New Guinea; the alienation of Papuan slaves also robbed the original society from their historicity. The differences among Papuan slaves were something the slaves themselves were aware of but archival records suggest that this was ignored. Consequently, societies whose member left did not receive any mention in the records. Furthermore, the slave owners gained a nameless, depersonalised person from New Guinea, while the society left behind lost a member of theirs. The slaves left behind their kin and family, a community where they belonged and had to enter a new society and find their place in it. The alienation of Papuan slaves, their desocialisation, and their depersonalisation is also a process that inadvertently dispossess Papuan societies of their member. In itself, this dispossession seems harmless, but the quote by Des Alwi above indicates the little amount of historical role credited to slave-exporting societies. These societies suffer the same fate with their alienated members, they are both thought to be dispensable and of no importance in history.

I believe that this dispossession is retraceable by scrutinising societies who demonstrated their past through action (see chapter 3). I will not prove this by playing the numbers game, i.e. trying to guess how many Papuan slaves left New Guinea for a few reasons. The available sources do not allow for such an investigation, and the nature of Papuan entanglement in slavery (in the regional, non-Dutch networks) do not make things easier. What I propose instead is seeing the ways in which the slave-generating process forced Papuan societies to adapt. And the issue with this approach is that the adaptation strategies is not related with the amount of people who left. The strategies to adapt are useful because it reveals the continuity of the slave generating processes and the level of vulnerability of a society. More importantly, the strategies, I argue, are proof that the societies left behind remembered. And I believe this is true not only for societies in New Guinea.

Conclusion

This chapter uses the presence of Papuans in the Dutch realm as proof of Papuan long history of entanglement with slavery. Papua as a label was originally made from afar, but the expansion of colonial knowledge and interest added with the presence of the naturalists meant that by the nineteenth century Papua was a fixed entity with its baggage. In the end, I admit that the exonym may cause uncertainty, but this problem itself is result of the alienation of slaves and the lack of knowledge is the fate of the victim societies (i.e. slave-producing societies).

Chapter II DISPLACING PAPUANS

Papuan Paths to Enslavement, 1600s-1900

In the previous chapter, I discuss the connection between Papuans and New Guinea. The main goal of this chapter is to explore the ways through which Papuans became slaves. At the beginning of this thesis, the insecurity of slaves as the baseline of their victimhood and their status as outsiders has been addressed.

How did Papuans become slaves? To answer briefly: By being raided or being traded. That answer, however, leads to a need to explain. This chapter intends to do exactly that, as it plays directly into the two manners of victimisation that Jack Goody made prerequisite of 'victim societies'; military and or economic inferiority. This chapter will approach these two paths to enslavement by investigating the prominent actors in their (more or less) localised and historical setting. Hence, the conduct of raids in New Guinea will be narrated first with a focus on the notorious rajas from Raja Ampat islands. Then the focus will shift to the rajas who ran the market of Papuan slaves at the Onin Peninsula in New Guinea. The chapter will conclude with problematising this dichotomy by placing the actors and their conduct within its regional setting.

2.1. New Guinea: Everyone's Hunting Ground

There is a simple truth in stating that New Guinea was a slaving ground. New Guinea was, after all, regularly subjected to raiding activities. The frequent raids and the focus thereon directly summon the sense of 'victimisation' in the mind. This stands in contrast to economic inferiority, both on a societal and individual level, which lends itself to a more nuanced sense of predation by economically stronger societies. Raids embodied a more visceral aspect of predation. The image of pirates attacking settlements and kidnapping people, sometimes laying waste to the settlement is as old as time. The Vikings in Europe gained their infamous reputation through these kinds of activities. Military superiority (and inferiority) cannot be demonstrated more clearly than a group attacking and taking away members of another group. To be subjected to this frequently is a testament of weakness, and of perpetual victimhood.

The images of the predatory expeditions in Southeast Asia has been portrayed most thoroughly by James Warren in his study on Sulu Zone, which introduced the Vikings of Southeast Asia, --the Iranun and Balangingi. For the former Dutch East Indies, the task of investigating pirates and their raids has been taken up separately by A.B. Lapien and more recently by G. Teitler with his colleagues. Lapien and Teitler attributed a major part of their work on the interaction between piracy and (proto)statehood, an issue that will be dealt with in the final part of this chapter (2.3).

Reid provided a brief sketch on the reign of different groups of raiders in the Dutch East Indies. In the sixteenth century it was Aru in Sumatra and Onin, in the seventeenth century it was the Buton, Sulu and Tidore, and in the eighteenth century, it was the Sulu.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Reid, 'Introduction: Slavery and Bondage': 31.

The work by Warren, however, mentioned New Guinea as a part of the Iranun and Balangingi raiding itinerary, and as such is a great place to begin.

The Iranun and the Balangingi were the most notorious group of pirates from the Sulu zone and New Guinea was part of their annual raids itinerary.⁹⁹ What Warren revealed is important to reflect on before moving further because it indicates that as a slaving ground, New Guinea was victimised by various groups with superior military power. The Iranun and Balangingi were in the prime of their activities in the second half of the eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century, and in this period, there is no doubt that New Guinea had to pay the price of being the den of weak societies.

The Iranun and Balangingi were hardly the only ones guilty of predatory behaviours in New Guinea. Luis Váez de Torres in his voyage in 1606, kidnapped twenty people along the southern coast of New Guinea.¹⁰⁰ After a skirmish along the northern coast of New Guinea, Jacob le Maire and Willem Schouten kidnapped a young man.¹⁰¹ That incident occurred in 1616 and suggests that this was a regular practice among the European voyagers. The fate of the people kidnapped by Torres and Schouten is unknown.¹⁰² There is not enough evidence to prove that these people were enslaved, but this does not negate the point that people from the coast were kidnapped, an experience that is eerily similar to raids.

The rajas in Raja Ampat led the most active and frequent raids of the coast of New Guinea. The frequency and their reputation has contributed to and later on reinforced by the *Papoesche roovers* trope mentioned in the previous chapter. Lapien noted that in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, these rajas were the dominant force in the region, causing never-ending frustration to the VOC.¹⁰³ New Guinea was their slaving ground, and prove of this is more easily found in accounts of the Papuan slaves they sold rather than stories of their raids.

For a long time, the story of the exploit of the Raja Ampat raiders were recorded in a limited and irregular manner. The nineteenth century military officer and historian Anthonie Haga relayed a report from 1696, when pirates from Misool (part of the Raja Ampat group) attacked Kei and the coast of Onin.¹⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, a considerable part of Haga's early mention of Raja Ampat has to do with the raids in the region. These accounts however, do not relay the experience of people subjected to those raids, for that we must turn to the missionary F. C. Kamma.

⁹⁹ James F. Warren, *The Sulu Zone 1768-1898: The dynamics of external trade, slavery, and ethnicity in the transformation of a Southeast Asian maritime state* (NUS Press, 1981): 147. Due to the archives this research uses, this avenue will unfortunately will not be pursued.

¹⁰⁰ Anthonie Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden: Historische Bijdrage, 1500-1883* (1884: W. Bruining & Co.): 22.

¹⁰¹ Willem C. Schouten, 'Journael ofte Beschryvinghe vande Wonderlicke Reyse, ghedaen door Willem Cornelisz Schouten van Hoorn, in de Jaren 1615, 1616, ende 1617' in *De Ontdekkingsreis van Jacob le Maire en Willem Cornelisz. Schouten in de Jaren 1615-1617*, W. A. Engelbracht & P. J. van Herwerden(eds.) (Martinus Nijhoff, 1945): 174.

¹⁰² And while Schouten kidnapped the young man to use him as a mediator, I have no knowledge of him beyond Schouten's note. I do not know for certain Torres' motive to kidnap the twenty individuals.

¹⁰³ Adrian B. Lapien, *Orang Laut Bajak Laut Raja Laut: Sejarah Kawasan Laut Sulawesi Abad XIX* (Komunitas Bambu, 2009): 131. Lapien suggested that the era of the Papuan pirates was the seventeenth and eighteenth century. He argues that the end of the Nuku's rebellion as a sort of watershed moment after which the pirates from Tobelo took over the reputation as the most feared and aggressive pirates in the region. This issue will be addressed in the final part of this chapter.

¹⁰⁴ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 131.

Kamma offered the most detailed explanation on how one of these raids proceed. The *hongitocht* he conveyed took place in between April and September 1790, began in Waigeo (one of the Raja Ampat group) and went as far as Wali island (on the north coast of New Guinea, eastward of the Kumamba Islands).¹⁰⁵ During this journey, this group of raiders stopped and raided at least ten separate settlements. When the group arrived back in Patani on September 25, having finished their mission, they have managed to amass one hundred and seventy-eight prospective slaves.

Through the account of Kamma we learned that the process of amassing slaves involved skirmishes, murder, kidnapping and laying waste to entire villages.¹⁰⁶ Raiding enterprise was a collective enterprise, and a complicated undertaking at that. But it was mostly successful, after all military power was on the side of the raiders, and their confidence was built upon decades of experience raiding settlement along the coast. The motives behind these raids were manifold; they were conducted not only in order to get commodities, but also to enforce political alliances. Both of these themes will be explored later.

In the 1930s, Kamma documented the collective narrative of the raiders. He quoted lines from a song: *Snonsja nggo mun, binsja nggun* which translates to ‘we kill the men and the women we take with us.’¹⁰⁷ This line was taken from a folksong of the Omkai, a group of people from the Schouten Islands, who moved away and settled in Waigeo and later on moved to Batanta. The Omkais were Biak-speaking people, people from the Schouten and Padoai Islands, who settled in Raja Ampat islands and were dominant actors behind raids in the entire region.¹⁰⁸ Their collective narrative does not only account for the raiding practices, but also their connection with the Moluccan world.¹⁰⁹

The experience of raid from the other side is provided by narratives of people who were raided. The story of Petrus Kafiari, an enslaved-turned-evangelist, is a specific example. Kafiari was kidnapped from his village Maudorri in Biak by people from a neighbouring village when he was twelve years old.¹¹⁰ He recalled the night he was kidnapped:

‘...In den nacht, terwijl wij allen sliepen, werden wij plotseling gewekt door een groot geschreeuw en lawaai. Brandende toortsen verlichtten plotseling ons huis, en een groote bende drong naar binnen.

Ontzettende angst maakte zich van ons meester.

¹⁰⁵ F. C. Kamma, ‘De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoeze eilanden in legende en historie, IV’ in *Indonesië* Vol. 2 (3): 256-257. Kamma surmised that this island is Loeki Island (perhaps present day Liki Island).

¹⁰⁶ Leupe, *t.a.p.*: 246, 249 in Kamma, ‘De verhouding tussen Tidore en...’: 257. Kamma embarked on a sort of post-mortem analysis; beside the prospective slaves, there were 53 Papuans killed, and three villages destroyed. Two of the raiders were killed, two others went missing and many injured.

¹⁰⁷ F. C. Kamma, ‘De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoeze eilanden in legende en historie, I’ in *Indonesië* Vol. 1 (4): 367.

¹⁰⁸ Alongside Kamma, there is a consensus among historians on the Biak origins of the settler of Raja Ampat. J.H.F. Sollewijn Gelpke connected the enterprise of the Biak-speaking raiders into the Raja Ampat islands with the origin of the name Papua, (see J.H.F. Sollewijn Gelpke, *On the origin*: 326-327). A.B. Lapien spoke of the Biak migrating to the Raja Ampat, occupying the strategic position and influencing the local leadership structures (see A. B. Lapien, *Orang Laut Bajak Laut Raja Laut*: 128)

¹⁰⁹ See F. C. Kamma, ‘De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoeze eilanden in legende en historie, II’ in *Indonesië* Vol. 1(6): 536-541. See also Andaya *The World of Maluku*: 47-55.

¹¹⁰ J. L. D. van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist: Petrus Kafiari* (Uitgave van het Zendingsbureau, 1920): 20.

Elk trachtte zich te redden door de vlucht; sommigen werden onmiddellijk gedood; verlamd van schrik als zij waren, konden en beproefden zij zich niet eens te redden. Van de verwarring, die er heerschte, maakte ik gebruik om te vluchten en ik was reeds buiten; plaste in het water om het bosch te bereiken en dacht reeds in veiligheid te zijn, toen twee, drie mannen mij grepen, vastbonden en in hun vaarttuig wierpen. Het was een oogenblik werk en eer ik goed wist, wat er met mij gebeurde, roeiden zij met mij weg.¹¹¹

This happened in 1885, after this kidnapping Kafiari became slave to a man in the neighbouring village.¹¹² The neighbouring village took an opportunity to ambush this village in a moment of weakness. Kafiari's father was a village chief and just passed away and the village was still mourning.

Kafiari's father himself was a village chief (a sangaji) affiliated with the raja of Waigeo, one of the Raja Ampat. His affiliation was reaffirmed by the provision of slaves, and this entails launching slaving expeditions.¹¹³ Kafiari spoke of the fierce reputation his father had and the raids he conducted when he was alive. The slaving expeditions no doubt played a significant role in the reputation he gained. After his death, Kafiari and his village was subjected to the same expedition. Kafiari's retelling is consistent with the collective narratives relayed by Kamma above, demonstrating the extent to which these stories were internalised in the collective psyche of societies living around Biak.



The narrative by Kafiari reveals two points this. Firstly, it reveals that raids were commonplace and part of the ordinary, an issue that would be addressed in the final part of this chapter. It also reveals that the actors behind the raids on the New Guinea coast varied, and were not exclusively from a certain group. New Guinea was an equal opportunity hunting ground, where any group with military superiority could raze settlements and kidnap people to be enslaved.

It is important to briefly return the point Reid made regarding the reign of different group of pirates in the Dutch East Indies. The fact that Kafiari was kidnapped from his village by a neighbouring village is evidence that raids were not the monopoly of one specific group, it was rather an activity any group would practise if they had enough military power. On the other hand, superiority in economy was visible through the transactions in which people were traded into slavery, and this will be addressed in the next section.

¹¹¹ van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 21-23.

¹¹² van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 22-23. The dating of this event was provided by Rev F.J.S. Romainum, see F. J. S. Romainum, *Guru Petrus Kafiari: Orang Nieuw Guinea pertama menjadi pembawa suluh Kristus* (Kantor Synode Umum G.K.I. Berg en Dal): 10-11.

¹¹³ van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 14-16, 19



Map 2 Roy Ellen's map of the regional networks around New Guinea (taken from Ellen, *On The Edge of the Banda Zone*: 10).

2.2. Buying Slaves in New Guinea

“Het is een al oude manier van de Papoea's in het binnenland “beschaving” te gaan halen bij de stammen langs de kust, tot wie zij opzien als tot hun meerderen en beteren. Die menschen, die immers geleerd hadden van vreemdelingen uit rijkere landen, van Chineezzen, Arabieren, Cerammers, Boegis, wisten en hadden van allerlei, waarvan de binnenlanders nog nooit vernomen hadden. Zij aten beter voedsel, zij gebruikten beter werktuigen, hun leven was gemakkelijker. Graag kwamen zij daarom naar de kust met hun troepen buitgemaakte slaven, hun massooi, hun paradijsovogelhuiden en hun damar.”¹¹⁴

– Augusta de Wit, *Natuur en Meenschen in Indië*

Papuans were mostly raided in the northwest coast of New Guinea and sold in the west coast of New Guinea. The rajas in the Bomberai Peninsula (among which the most famous settlement was Onin), especially had a long, historic reputation of being slave providers. It is their activities that build up the resilient market whose remnants were visible when de Wit wrote her book in 1914.

Roy Ellen has provided the most comprehensive study on trading networks in which west and northwest New Guinea was embedded (see map 2). The map gives an idea on the connection between New Guinea and the Moluccan archipelago, and the different corridors it had. As the first chapter of this thesis had explained, the presence of Papuans in various hubs in the Dutch East Indies is testament to the overlap between the different networks. These different networks were active intermittently, and reflect the regular way through which commodities moved.¹¹⁵

The vignette by Augusta de Wit provides an impression into how prospective slaves made their way from the interior to the coast. The coast functioned as a market, and for the enslaved the beginning of a journey to the completely unknown. The vignette also provides an explicit evidence of the role of economic inferiority in ensuring the sustained flow of prospective slaves to the coast from the hinterland. Onin and the Bomberai Peninsula embodied the economic victimisation experienced by societies in the hinterland, per Jack Goody. Hence this type of asymmetry is better labelled as exploitative trades. The societies in the hinterland had to constantly choose between civilisation and retaining Papuan bodies in their proximity, either their own kin or enemy groups by waging wars or kidnapping them. And so, Onin endured.

There was a moment in the 1650s when the VOC placed a lot of effort to gain control over Onin. Their intent was to become the sole buyer of slave in the market of Onin. After decimating Banda's political structure and gaining control of the islands, the VOC found themselves in need of labour. Onin was eyed because of its relative proximity to Banda. Monopsony was the ultimate goal, and some expeditions were launched in order to achieve this. In 1636, the then governor of the VOC, Anthony van Diemen sent Thomas Gerritsz. Pool to New Guinea to explore the possibility of a profitable trade, whereby he was referring

¹¹⁴ Augusta de Wit, *Natuur en Meenschen in Indië* (Uitgave W.P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1914): 472.

¹¹⁵ The map also succinctly explained the prominence of the Raja Ampat in *The World of Maluku* by Andaya and *The Revolt of Prince Nuku* by Muridan Widjojo, and the relative absence of Onin in their narrative. It goes without saying that these networks were not strict, Ellen mentioned various occurrences in which people from hubs belonging to separate networks traded with each other.

to massoi bark and slaves.¹¹⁶ Pool failed in his endeavour; he was murdered in New Guinea gruesome manner. But the VOC was undeterred; in 1657 Johannes Keyts was sent to New Guinea for the same purpose.¹¹⁷ Keyts was more successful, he managed to wrangle a deal from the rajas in Onin, and he returned alive.¹¹⁸

Keyts was not the first one to make this deal, even though he was involved in an intense negotiation for a written agreement. Verbal agreements were also made in 1654, with the help of translators from Gorom.¹¹⁹ In the years that follow, the VOC would launch some expeditions to Onin to act upon those agreements and buy Papuan slaves. They learned very early that commitments, both made verbally and in writing did not apply beyond the date in which they were made. The *Generale Missiven* spoke of the promise; the possibility of obtaining two hundred to three hundred slaves the next year for a low price.¹²⁰ The same missive depended on that promise, because some traders from Seram Laut were there just then and had bought all of the slaves for sale in Onin.

The statement, that the VOC were too late and that some other trader was there earlier and had bought all the slaves, would be repeated ad nauseam. Kamma relayed the experience of Willem Buys, who in 1662, arrived in Onin with the intent to buy slaves, only to find out that traders from Makassar and Gorom had been there and bought all of the slaves.¹²¹ One could take these statements as diversionary tactics, an excuse to not sell slaves to the Dutch. This assumption, however, does not account for the times when they actually *did* sell slaves to the VOC.

The difficulty in establishing sustained trade with Onin and rajas in the Bomberai Peninsula was a problem to the VOC. Even warm welcome in these communities were not something guaranteed. To the VOC, the difficulty in establishing a permanent trade was caused by the treacherous nature of the rajas in the Onin Peninsula. Haga spoke of the history of contact with New Guinea, which taught the Dutch to be aware of *deze plotselinge veranderingen van gezindheid*.¹²²

Recent research suggests that the conundrum was result of the lack of willingness to invest on establishing and maintaining social relationship on the side of the VOC. The problem the VOC faced was a result of their status as outsiders, rather than sudden change of whims among the rajas. Ellen comments that the trade relation within the networks were always constrained as well as facilitated by other social relation.¹²³ As Ellen infers, one did not

¹¹⁶ Baay, *Daar werd wat gruwelijks verricht*: 40. For an extended story of Pool's demise see P.A. Leupe 'De Reizen Der Nederlanders Naar Nieuw Guinea En De Papoesche Eilanden in de 17e en 18e Eeuw' in *BKI* 21(?): 10-38.

¹¹⁷ For an extended and more contextual explanation see also J.H.F. Sollewijn Gelpke, *Johannes Keyts; In 1678 de Eerste Europese Bezoeker van de Argunibaa in Nova Guinea* in *BKI* 153 (3): 381-396.

¹¹⁸ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 107.

¹¹⁹ F.C. Kamma, 'De verhouding tussen Tidore en de Papoeze eilanden in legende en historie, II' in *Indonesië* 1 (6): 554.

¹²⁰ W. Ph. Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel II* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1960): 749.

¹²¹ Kamma, 'De verhouding tussen Tidore en...II': 554. Over the course of six months, Buys eventually accepted five hundred slaves.

¹²² Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 85.

¹²³ Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone*: 18.

simply trade with the rajas in Onin. Thomas Goodman developed this suggestion even further, providing a more comprehensive explanation for the conundrum.

Goodman used the term ‘trade sociality’ to explain the rationale behind trading activities in this region. Trade sociality, Goodman suggested, bridge the lack of centralised trading and the monopoly regional traders seemed to enjoy in this region.¹²⁴ The networks of rajas residing in the Onin Peninsula relied on ‘a highly personal and mobile form of political tradition linked to the process of trade and exchange itself.’¹²⁵

Trade sociality partially explains the logic behind the preferential treatment toward the Makasarese and Goromese traders. Equally important in the success of Dutch are mediators from Archipelagic Southeast Seram.¹²⁶ Another factor is practicality, i.e. the logistics involved in housing hundreds of prospective slaves had to be daunting, so much so that waiting for the next Dutch ship the traders neither could nor would afford.

The Dutch were outsiders in a system of trade networks which hinged on personal connections. Goodman convincingly showed that in a world where trade and personal connections were a cycle that mutually reinforced each other, the Dutch were outsiders. Personal connections take time, and the trade networks retaining the slave markets in the Peninsula built on this over centuries.¹²⁷ One did not simply enter the market in the Peninsula and dominate it, as a matter of fact, having a dominating actor is antithetical to Goodman’s trade sociality. But this has to be left out for a later discussion in the next subchapter.

It is necessary to spend some ink discussing the way Onin functioned as a market and a hub within its regional network. The embeddedness of Onin in the network was result of the expansion of Seram. Ellen spoke of an expanding periphery, due to an increasingly specialised centre. This specialisation, spurred by the increasing demand on specialised products, led to the need to import starch products and or exchange items for the requirement of the centre’s food consumption.¹²⁸ Onin was incorporated into the greater Moluccan trading network through the rising demand of spice.

A pivot to the issue of commodities is necessary. After all, the VOC was very interested in a commodity Onin provided, i.e. slaves. The problem was of course what the VOC could offer in return, and therein lied another complicating factor. When the VOC intended to enter the networks, they were arguably more in need of the commodity the rajas could provide than the other way around. Hence, the VOC had a lower bargaining position.

Throughout the centuries, Onin was a market that supplied and demanded different things. Goodman spoke of three main commodities that underpinned the trade of Onin and Seram; slaves, massoi bark and sago.¹²⁹ Onin supplied the first two commodities, and were in need of the third one. The rajas in Onin had sustained contact with the groups living in the

¹²⁴ Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 10.

¹²⁵ Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 5.

¹²⁶ And here I am borrowing the term and definition from Roy Ellen. Although after reading Goodman, one has to wonder whether the mediator was *the* sole factor deciding the success in trading with these rajas.

¹²⁷ Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 24- 25. Goodman estimates (rather conservatively) that the networks began at the latest around the sixteenth century, since studies investigating the connection between Majapahit and Wwanin (cf. van Frassen & O’Hare), suggest that there might be ground to believe the networks began in the 1400s.

¹²⁸ Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone*: 18-20.

¹²⁹ Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 98-110.

interior who procured massoi bark. The same contact also assured and sustained the movement of prospective slaves into the coast. In the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century, this market provided paradise birds as de Wit observed above.

Sago was one of the commodities that Onin needed, and one of the commodities which influenced the formation of the network. Ellen spoke of Banda as a sago-poor centre that with the growth of demand grew increasingly dependent on its periphery.¹³⁰ One of this peripheral regions was Onin, which from time to time were also source of sago. Onin itself was not subsistent, and imported sago from both the sosolot network and the Vogelkop hinterland.¹³¹

In order to obtain the commodities to sell, these Onin rajas supplied the societies in the hinterland with commodities that marked civilisation; knives, iron, kain timur.¹³² People in the hinterland paid a high price for this commodity; if twentieth century Kebar provided an indication, people were transported to the coast in order to obtain these commodities in return. The rationale behind this decision was 'the fetishisation of the foreign', as anthropologist Danilyn Rutherford called it.

Rutherford observed this fetishisation among the coast settling Biaks and it was manifest in two related manners. Historically, this fetishism was manifest in the way 'porcelain bowls, silver bracelets, imported clothing and cash, and other ceremonial valuables were valued for their exoticness, as were the Tidoran honorary titles...' ¹³³ The fetishisation of the foreign also revealed itself in the respect commanded by a local known to have sojourned in a distant land.¹³⁴ In Biak, the appreciation of foreign items created rivalry, in which rivalling parties would attempt to obtain specialised items from as far as possible lands in order to avoid shame.¹³⁵ Some evidence suggests foreign fetishism was not limited to the Biaks, but was also found among people living in the hinterland of the Bird's Head region.¹³⁶

It is imperative to connect fetishism and trade to the exploitation of Papuans settling in the hinterland by their coast-settling counterparts. During his stay in Doreh in 1775, the navigator Thomas Forrest investigated his informants with the intend to learn more about people living in the hinterland (so-called *haraforas*).¹³⁷ He noticed that the coastal inhabitants were keeping the haraforas under oppression by monopolising contact with foreigners and their objects. People in Doreh did not have gardens, and depended on the haraforas for their sustenance. The sustenance was paid once in form of an axe or a chopping knife; and thereafter the haraforas, their land or labour, were 'subject to an external tax of something or

¹³⁰ Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone*: 58-59.

¹³¹ Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 89-92.

¹³² Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 121-126.

¹³³ Danilyn Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners* (Princeton University Press, 2003): 33. A close scrutiny of the supernatural power and origin of kain timur among the Kebar would suggest that there were layers to this fetishisation (see, Kamma, 'De verhouding tussen Tidore en...II': 536). See also Andaya, *The World of Maluku*: 108-110.

¹³⁴ Rutherford, *Raiding the Land*: 16-17, 33.

¹³⁵ Kamma, 'De verhouding tussen Tidore en...II': 537.

¹³⁶ J. Miedema, 'Anthropology, demography and history: Shortage of women, inter-tribal marriage relations, and slave trading in the Bird's Head of New Guinea' in BKI 144 (4): 494-495. See also NA Ministerie van Kolonien/Memorie van Overgave 442 *Nota van Overgave van de afdeling West Nieuw Guinea A. R. Dumas* 22 Jan 1911: 10, wherein Dumas reported that in Mimika and Kapia jewelry and clothes (*sieraden en kledingstukken*) were in high demand.

¹³⁷ Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas from Balambangan* (G. Scott, 1779): 116.

other for its use.¹³⁸ This type of exploitative interaction was also observed by the Dutch officials and missionaries in the twentieth century. Speaking of the same region (north coast of New Guinea), the missionary van der Roest vaguely referred to the influence of coast dwelling populace exerted over the hinterland populace through trade.¹³⁹ The same was said of the Onin rajas, who the colonial were eager to do away with due to their (alleged) habit of exploiting Papuans. J. Seijne Kok, who acted as Assistant Resident to West Nieuw Guinea between 1917-1919, recorded the conduct of the *raja moeda* from Roembati who traded a large amount of sago with a little bit (*klein beetje*) tobacco.¹⁴⁰ The colonial and the missionaries intended to end this, van der Roest saw education as a way to empower the hinterland populace, while the Dutch saw this as one more obstacle to their work.

The reports reveal the problem with taking economic exploitation as a form of victimisation because it can potentially begin a philosophical debate about freedom and or free will. In those two instances, there was no coercion on the side of the coast settling populace. Yet, what they offered was so desirable and necessary that it left their trading partners with little choice but to concede to their terms. Furthermore, one should not underestimate the importance of being validated and ambitions for mobility, which meant that this was still an exploitative trade relation. A look on the conduct of the Onin rajas, with their recorded penchant for violence suggest that we should not rule out the possibility that from time to time the economic superiority was also combined with a demonstration of military superiority.

The rajas of Raja Ampat should also be seen in the same light. Petrus Kafiar spoke with pride of his cloth-wearing father.¹⁴¹ A sangaji in the service of Waigeo, the tribute he gave to the raja of Waigeo revealed the other side of a prone-to-plundering raja; a power broker who bestowed authority. It also reveals the ability of the raja to engage in trade with coast settling populace. The rajas from Raja Ampat were more than just raiders, they were also traders.

The involvement of some rajas from the infamous Raja Ampat islands in slave trade is important to briefly mention. In spite of their notorious reputation as raiders, the rajas also engaged in trading of the slaves they obtained through the raids. In a report compiled in 1706, Pieter Roselaer listed two rajas who were involved in the slave trade; the rajas of Waigama and Salawati.¹⁴² It is reported that in 1703 people from Patani went to Salawati and Misool to exchange spices in favour of slaves.¹⁴³ Similarly, rajas from Onin also went to Salawati to obtain slaves. The rajas from Raja Ampat were traders, as much as they were raiders. This issue will be addressed in the following section.

¹³⁸ Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea*: 116.

¹³⁹ van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 34.

¹⁴⁰ NA MvK/MvO 444 *Nota van Overgave West-Nieuw-Guinea door J. Seijne Kok (assistent-resident)* 15 maart 1919: 59-60. Raja moeda was a post given to a relative of the rajas (usually his younger brother), and usually with this came a post within the rajas' sphere of influence.

¹⁴¹ van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 14.

¹⁴² ANRI Ternate 134.

¹⁴³ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 156.

2.3. The Thin Line between Raiding and Trading

As indicated by the last paragraph in the previous section, the dichotomy between the raiding Raja Ampat rajas and trading Onin rajas does not hold in a closer investigation. The paragraph mentioned instances during which rajas from Raja Ampat were acting as traders rather than the malignant raiders they were reputed to be. A closer investigation would reveal that the conduct of the actors from those regions were not so distinct from each other.

Similarly, there were records of the trading rajas from Onin involved in piracy practices. In 1684, a raja from Onin (Roembatti, to be exact) was involved in looting the vessel of a Banda resident.¹⁴⁴ Four people were killed in this encounter, while the three survivors were sold as into slavery.¹⁴⁵ Another report from 1684 mentioned five Onin *cora-coras* kidnapping forty-five people from Aru, and taking them to Keffing, East Seram.¹⁴⁶ Early twentieth century records observed the existence of communities which still conducted murderous raids in the region as far as 1911.¹⁴⁷ After an incident in 1664, the VOC undoubtedly understood the violence the rajas in Onin were able to exercise.

The anecdotes revealed that both actors were adept at trading and raiding activities, and the conditional nature of these conducts. The differentiation in the reputation seemed to be more connected with the different nature of their connection with the Moluccan world. Goodman suggests the reputation was result the more onerous Tidorese tribute demands that drove slaving fleets from the Raja Ampat to the Onin coastline.¹⁴⁸ Raids were part of the ordinary, and Haga summarised the situation of the region quite well:

Rooftochten en moorden bleven aan de orde van den dag en waren zoodanig ingeweven in de zeden der zeerovende volkeren, die het onderwerp van dit schrijven uitmaken, dat zij hoegenaamd geen licht verspreiden over de politieke verhoudingen der verschillende stamen of staatjes.¹⁴⁹

The observation matched the depiction of seventeenth century Amboina Utrecht historian Gerrit Knaap offered. Knaap spoke of Ambon as a region where war was endemic, a consequence of the ‘slowly changing patterns of alliances and newly kindled animosities.’¹⁵⁰ A reading of the conducts of actors from Raja Ampat and Onin as portrayed above reveals the applicability of this statement in speaking of dominant Papuan actors in north and west New Guinea. Moreover, this was not a problem limited to the Mollucan world, à Campo has

¹⁴⁴ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 128-129.

¹⁴⁵ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 128.

¹⁴⁶ W. Ph. Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, Deel IV* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1971): 713.

¹⁴⁷ NA Ministerie van Koloniën/Memorie van Overgave 442: 4.

¹⁴⁸ Goodman, *The Sisolot*: 108. Goodman contrasted this with the taking of captives and resale to other communities, which connected villages and foreign settlements in Ambon and Banda in a form of debt and credit relationship.

¹⁴⁹ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 128.

¹⁵⁰ G.J. Knaap, ‘Headhunting, Carnage and Armed Peace in Amboina, 1500-1700’ in *JESHO* 46(2): 172, 175-181.

stated that the scale and intensity of these practices in the archipelagos of Southeast Asia were ‘a function of the fragmentation and instability of the native political system’.¹⁵¹

Knaap suggested more explicitly that the lack of a centre in the area was a determinant in the lack of order.¹⁵² The absence of a somewhat permanent and effective centre was a feature of the region. Goodman observed that the archipelagic environment in eastern Indonesia was a space where the grip of royal centres on local polities were weak.¹⁵³ Hence, the lack of peace and order was a fixture of the region, and with it issues of competition, alliance and rivalry. In an area without a centre, with constantly changing allegiance and competing interests, peace is almost an anomaly.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the endemic conflict and the violence it entails conveys the image of a region which needed a Hobbesian intervention in the form of a state.¹⁵⁵ In the nineteenth century the Dutch colonial presence were willing to play the role of a state, the VOC, however, was not willing to fully invest in playing this role.

Historians have debated whether the VOC was a company or a state, and what this entails to both metropole and colony. For the purpose of this research, the argument by Knaap regarding the conduct of the VOC is relevant. Knaap observed that the VOC conducted itself as a state, pointing out the inherent political and military aspect in the VOC enterprise overseas.¹⁵⁶ The presence of the VOC was constantly contested in their entire realm and thus they were almost always involved in a war somewhere in their territory. But summoning their penchant for war and violence is not enough to retroactively label the VOC as a state in the Moluccan world. For one, the VOC inadvertently undermined their allies’ capability of maintaining peace by their demands.¹⁵⁷ Second, and most importantly, the VOC was quite profit-oriented in their management of the region.¹⁵⁸ The characteristic of

¹⁵¹ à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 210.

¹⁵² Knaap, ‘Headhunting, Carnage and Armed Peace’: 188.

¹⁵³ Goodman, *The Sosolet*: 8. Goodman was not merely speaking of the Moluccan world (per Andaya’s definition), he was also referring to polities in North Sulawesi, see David Henley, ‘A Superabundance of Centers: Ternate and the Contest for North Sulawesi’ in *Cakalele* 4: 40-45.

¹⁵⁴ The divided nature of the society in Amboina has been thoroughly described by Knaap in ‘Tjengkeh, kompeni, agama: hoofdlijnen uit de geschiedenis van de Ambonse eilanden, 1500-1800’ in *Sedjarah Maluku*, (eds.) G.J. Knaap, W. Manuhutu & H. Smeets, (Van Soeren & Co and De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1992): 20-21. See also Knaap, G.J. ‘Robbers and Traders: Papuan Piracy in the Seventeenth Century’ in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* eds. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (IIAS & ISEAS, 2010) wherein Knaap elaborates how Papuan trader-cum-pirates were called in as reinforcements during times of conflict.

¹⁵⁵ Martin van Gelderen, ‘The challenge of Colonialism: Grotius and Vitoria on Natural Law’, *Grotiana* New Series 14/15: 3-36.

¹⁵⁶ See G. J. Knaap, *De ‘Core Business’ van de VOC: Markt, macht en mentaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief*, Oration given during his instatement of Professorship in the Overseas and Colonial History in Utrecht University on November 10, 2014: 16. Knaap reproduced a chart and showed that there were only two years between 1596 and 1759 in which the VOC was not involved in war.

¹⁵⁷ Andaya, *The World of Maluku*: 179 See also Ch.F. van Fraassen, ‘Ternate and its dependencies’ in *Halmahera and Beyond*, ed. L.E. Visser (KITLV Press, 1994): 24-27, in which van Fraassen elaborated the effort of the VOC to establish permanent alliance in the region, thereby establishing a fixed local power structure.

¹⁵⁸ John Ball, *Indonesian Legal History: 1602-1848* (Oughtershaw Press, 1982): 76. Ball argued that the VOC were equally selective in their interaction with the indigenous people. Interest in relations with the indigenous people depended on whether they could increase trading profits or when they were vital to VOC interest.

the VOC as a commercial enterprise, and the effort of the apparatus to remain so as much as possible hindered their transformation into a fully acting sovereign state.

The procurement of slaves by the VOC in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, reveals the gradual development of ideas regarding state and governance.¹⁵⁹ Arakan provides an effective starting point. Throughout the seventeenth century, the VOC favoured the sustained low-scale conflicts in Arakan (present day Myanmar) because it justified the continuous slave raids which would bring in slaves for the VOC.¹⁶⁰ The entire Moluccan region provides a counterpoint; the region was tumultuous by nature, but the VOC was not able to use this to their advantage. In the contrary, the VOC was repeatedly blindsided by the violence directed toward them, and their enterprise repeatedly disrupted.¹⁶¹ The VOC wanted peace in the Moluccas, and selectively exercised a form of sovereign authority, meddling with local rulers and their internal affairs in order establish peace, with varying degree of success.¹⁶²

There is an irony in what this exercise of sovereign authority entailed; the exercise revealed how similar the VOC and the local communities actually were. Haga especially provides a revealing material to assess VOC's conduct in this region. On September 1678, Johannes Keyts and his crew experienced a fatal encounter during a voyage along the west coast of New Guinea. His navigator, a man by the name Goosen, and some member of the crew went ashore to obtain water in the vicinity of Namatotte, and were brutally murdered by the locals.¹⁶³ Keyts and his remaining crew member retaliated; they destroyed the settlement and the *prauws* around. In 1783, the VOC expedition mounted on a village named Tomalau to avenge the massacre of their employees. The expedition to Tomalau was preceded by visits to Tahula and Gomaffu, which were 'razed to the ground.'¹⁶⁴ After laying siege on this village, the village was laid waste and more than a hundred persons were captured, while one thousand Tidorans were killed in battle. This was hardly different from an incident in 1809 when the people of Wosso and the English landed at Weda and having failed to win the support from its inhabitants, proceeded on burning the houses after seizing anything transportable.¹⁶⁵ Or Prince Nuku and his allies who in 1796 attacked Makian using thirty vessels, plundered and burned the villages, killing inhabitants who did not dare to join him in his revolt.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁹ For an overview of the Dutch and slavery in the Indian Ocean, see Vink, 'The World's Oldest Trade'.

¹⁶⁰ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Slaves and Tyrants: Dutch Tribulations in Seventeenth Century Mrauk-U' in *JEMH* (1)3: 210-213.

¹⁶¹ Beside the example experienced by Pool, the war in Ambon which lasted almost one hundred years, and various small incidents, one should remember the Patanese wars in 1720s (see Leupe, 'De Reizen der Nederlanders': 253-255) and the revolt of Nuku in 1780-1805 (see Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 52-88).

¹⁶² Andaya, *The World of Maluku*: 179. Andaya argued that the presence of the VOC actually induced war among some pockets of communities (which previously lived in relative peace) in the area, especially in the case of Ternate and Tidore who lost their legitimacy in the eyes of their subject. See also Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 40.

¹⁶³ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 119-120.

¹⁶⁴ Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 62.

¹⁶⁵ Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 92

¹⁶⁶ Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 75.

Scrutinising the conduct of the VOC reveals the degree to which they were similar to the local actors.¹⁶⁷ There was a back and forth rhythm pattern to the raids. If a village was attacked and raided, either the village will wait and attack the attacker when they became strong enough. In most cases, their stronger ally would later enact the revenge.¹⁶⁸ Any group could 'punish' or retaliate an act of violence. Violence was not the monopoly of a certain group, it was simply the most antagonistic form of interaction between diverse and competing groups in the region. The raids and enslavement of Papuans took place in this setting, when being a weak community was a liability, with no stable centre to appeal for protection. Indeed, the idea of protection was not a factor, instead there were tributes and alliances.¹⁶⁹

The development of a colonial state is intimately connected with the decline of slavery in the Dutch East Indies. During this process, the state 'increasingly demanded that control over all its people in the areas of law, policing, military service and taxation which the system of bondage had left to individual patrons.'¹⁷⁰ Hence, there are two different things to disentangle before they are reconnected to the fate of the victim societies in New Guinea. The end of the displacement of Papuans into the Dutch colonial field of vision coincided with the movement of the Dutch into the visions of Papuans in New Guinea.

The idea of protecting subjects was part of a more advanced formulation of a (colonial state), and was absent throughout the reign of the VOC in the Moluccas. In 1696, 'the *Compagnie* did not need to concern themselves with the raids in Onin, because the contact with that land has been broken since the hostilities in 1664.'¹⁷¹ The VOC had no scruples over this selective protection and instead pushed these types of responsibility to their allies, along with the responsibility to stop the raids. The nature of this region meant that Papuans were still raided and traded as long as there was no centre with an effective monopoly of violence. Hence, an inquiry into the evolving nature and presence of the Dutch is necessary.

The changing role of the Dutch (both the VOC and later the colonial government) and what this entailed to New Guinea could be observed directly in the Moluccas. The Dutch arrived in the region in 1600, and was in the beginning only an ally, albeit an overbearing one. Their relation vis-à-vis their allies evolved in a long process during which the Dutch slowly gained the upper hand, allowing them to indirectly rule the centres for centuries. The zeal which drove the formation of the colonial state brought to fore the competition between the colonial actors versus the local actors and their respective interest.

The expansion of the colonial state gradually undermined the space of local actors to act in their own interest. In 1780, Prince Nuku as a local actor was able to mount an effective resistance to the VOC by using the volatile Anglo-Dutch relation and their dependency on local actors against them. Spatially, he was able to use the latter to enter and exit the VOC field of vision, and thereby the reach of their governance. A resistance so effective would have

¹⁶⁷ And for that matter, Widjojo illustrated that all colonial powers who were ever present in the region, be it the English, Spanish, Portuguese and the Dutch were involved in this cycle of violence.

¹⁶⁸ Knaap, *Headhunting, Carnage and Armed Peace...*: 175- 181.

¹⁶⁹ See Henley, 'A Superabundance of Centers': 42, Andaya, *The World of Maluku*: 71, 110-112; Widjojo, *The Revolt of Prince Nuku*: 42.

¹⁷⁰ Reid, 'Introduction: Slavery and Bondage': 33.

¹⁷¹ Haga, *Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea*: 64.

been harder to mound a century later (say, 1880) because of the development in the nineteenth century.¹⁷²

The advent of the colonial state brought to fore the notion of a legitimate violence and consequently, illegitimate violence. Historian Joseph à Campo traced the beginning of this idea with regards to piracy in the period between 1816 and 1825.¹⁷³ The division between legitimate/illegitimate acts of violence was made through the labelling of certain groups as pirates, placing their practices in the realm of the illegitimate thereby criminalising them.¹⁷⁴ The consolidation of the colonial state was a process during which legitimacy of violence was taken away from local actors. The *papoesche zeerovers* trope suggests that the VOC in the sixteenth century was already trying to delegitimise and criminalise violence by local actors. The colonial state took this practice to next level and connected the practice to policies.

The 1816-1825 period foregrounded the later perception and policies the Dutch colonial administration on piracy. In 1820, Governor-General van der Capellen instructed H. J. van de Graaff and G. J. Meylan to conduct an inquiry into the problem plaguing the Moluccas, including piracy.¹⁷⁵ In the report van de Graaff and Meylan accused the VOC of exacerbating the problem in the region through their policy of compulsion and monopoly.¹⁷⁶ The recommendations from this report was implemented by Governor Merkus in 1824, but failed to improve the situation and rid the region of the so-called pirates.¹⁷⁷

Through their engagement with pirates, the Dutch slowly came to understand that there was in fact no ontological category of ‘pirates’ at all; people moved freely between piracy and many other activities.¹⁷⁸ Haga wrote on piracy in 1884, and as a career officer in the *Oost-Indische Leger* he was directly involved in this enterprise.¹⁷⁹ The presence of piracy continued to be an obstacle to the intent of the colonial administration to the monopoly of violence until 1890s.

Relevant to this line of thinking is the statement by à Campo that the colonial state ‘must be seen as a structure that embraced the native states and tried to penetrate, dominate transform them from above.’¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, the creation of a proper colonial state required the subjection, subordination and incorporation of the native states. The increase of patrols

¹⁷² And hereby I am speaking of, at least, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the 1884 Berlin Conference, various conferences and treaties among European powers structured how the colonial states were supposed to be governed. On the political context on the early settlement of New Guinea, see P. J. Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze* (Boom, 2005): 29-32.

¹⁷³ à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 201.

¹⁷⁴ à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 207-209, herein à Campo brilliantly investigated the problems involved in the creation of piracy as a social construct.

¹⁷⁵ G. Teitler, A. M. C. van Dissel and J. N. F. M. à Campo, *Zeerof en Zeeroofsbestrijding in de Indische archipel (19^{de} eeuw)* (De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2005): 61-64.

¹⁷⁶ H. J. van de Graaff and G. J. Meylan ‘De Moluksche eilanden, Rapport 1820’ in *TNI* 17: 338-343 as quoted in à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 205.

¹⁷⁷ à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 205-206.

¹⁷⁸ Eric Tagliacozzo, ‘Kettle on a Slow Boil: Batavia’s Threat Perceptions in the Indies’ Outer Islands, 1870-1910’ in *JSEAS* 31(1): 71-74. Tagliacozzo suggested Aceh War as the concrete starting point of a colonial orientation which began in 1860s. See Teitler, van Dissel and à Campo, *Zeerof en Zeeroofsbestrijding*: 17, which mentioned the 1856 Treaty of Paris as an impetus among the participating states to centralise state power by among others, ending the deployment of privateers.

¹⁷⁹ “Haga, Antonie” in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek* (Deel 2): 539. He later became the Commander of the Oost Indische Leger in 1887-1889.

¹⁸⁰ à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 209.

which came with governance meant a shrinking space for the local actors to proceed as usual. In New Guinea, this process began when the Dutch opened their post in 1898 and established a permanent presence. While sporadic resistance occurred, mostly in an effort to fight this intrusion, they were fighting a losing battle. This evolved phase of the Dutch colonial made everyone on their side of the border part of their business, engaging with the actors indiscriminately, with the intent on turning them into subjects.

The last decades of the nineteenth century saw the intensification of the state building process in the eastern front of the Dutch East Indies. Haga was involved in this process in more than one way; in 1898 the two officers who were going to be the pioneering assistant-resident in New Guinea, were given this book as part of their required reading, preparing them with knowledge New Guinea.¹⁸¹ His work should not be dismissed because it actively influenced the first colonial officials who permanently settled in New Guinea.¹⁸² After all, he was aware that Papuans were both pirates and subjected to piracy.¹⁸³ But he reveals the interest embedded in legitimising violence by the Dutch when he used the word ‘punishment’ (*straf*) to the violence VOC meted out to ‘deserving’ settlements.¹⁸⁴ At the same time, he expressed doubt of the claims of the local rajas when they claimed that the raids were exercises of sovereignty, i.e. punishments to disobedient subjects.¹⁸⁵ Haga retroactively justified the violent acts of the VOC by mustering the framework of sovereignty of the moment. This was indicative of what à Campo has called ‘a self-complacent vision which totally ignored the fact that the new regime was imposed by violence’.¹⁸⁶

This was certainly part of the experience in New Guinea, and the establishment of a permanent post by the Dutch addressed the overt and organised attacks to Papuans. The increasing activity of the colonial administration constituted an indiscriminate engagement with Papuans. This resonated in the *memories* from the *afdeling* West-New Guinea, which was centred in Fak-fak. F. H. Dumas, who was Assistant Resident to the *afdeling* between 1908-1911 wrote of the absence of a regional power strong enough to as an arbiter in the region.¹⁸⁷ He saw this as part of the role of the Dutch colonial power, and this meant ‘pacification’, the removal of defiant elements among the local Papuans and bringing them into the reach of *bestuur*.

The posts of the colonial state embodied the intrusion which ended the historical pattern of producing slaves, by ending raids and slowly ending the exploitative relations among societies. And in New Guinea, the first two posts were established in Manokwari and

¹⁸¹ ANRI Algemeene Secretarie *Grote Bundel Besluit (GBBT)* 593.

¹⁸² On the political context on the early settlement of New Guinea, see Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze*: 29-32.

¹⁸³ Haga, *Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea*: 147. “*Tidore’s naam toch wordt in verband met die kusten slechts een paar malen genoemd, wanneer er sprake was van rooverijen, waarvan de Papoes van Nieuw-Guinea nu eens de auteurs, dan weder de slachtoffers waren.*”

¹⁸⁴ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 82-84, 120.

¹⁸⁵ Haga, *Nederlandsch-Nieuw Guinea*: 133. The raid of Kei and Onin in 1696 by the raja of Misool mentioned was justified by the Sultan of Tidore as a punitive act, rather than a mere motiveless malevolent act. The Sultan of Tidore informed the then governor of Ternate Pieter Rooselaer, that this raid was a punishment for the preceding violent acts by the residence of Onin.

¹⁸⁶ à Campo, ‘Discourse without Discussion’: 213.

¹⁸⁷ NA MvK/MvO 442: 2, 4-6

Fak-fak, the two gates whence for centuries a majority of Papuans left New Guinea, mostly involuntary and never to return.

Conclusion

This chapter built on the first chapter by discussing the actors involved in the ‘victimisation’ of Papuans. Consistent with Goody, Papuans became slaves because they were victims of military and economically superior societies. But Papuans were equally susceptible to attacks from rivalling societies who were their equal. More pointedly, the rajas in Onin were able to let the conflict in the hinterland facilitate the movement of prospective slaves to the coast in exchange of commodities that symbolised civilisation. This slave-producing processes (i.e. victimisation if we follow Goody’s language) had a long history which predated the presence of the VOC, and continued until the end of the nineteenth century. In nineteenth century, the Dutch were behaving more and more like a modern state, which lead to active efforts to monopolise violence and end piracy. After centuries, New Guinea and Papuans were eventually subjected to the colonial intrusion committed to gain full control of their subject.

Chapter III THE COLONIAL AMONG US

Papuan Lives and the Colonial Intervention, 1898-1950s

In the previous chapter I connect the displacement and flow of Papuan slaves from New Guinea with the lack of an effective centre. The displacement of Papuans was not result of a flawed system; it was a function of a regional system packed with intergroup rivalry. This intergroup rivalry was pivotal in maintaining the status quo which hindered the accumulation of power around a single centre. The Dutch was only one among many groups in the region and their presence did not change the intergroup dynamics until the nineteenth century.

This changed in the nineteenth century when the colonial policy slowly evolved slowly. Throughout this century, the European thirst for colonial expansion and the conceptualisation of an ideal colonial state (one capable of controlling its subjects) shaped policies intent on centralising power around the Dutch.¹⁸⁸ The Dutch was making an organised effort to establish themselves as an effective centre by acting as a state, including in New Guinea. In effect, this stopped the slave-producing processes. It is revealing that slavery and its legacies was so embedded in Papuan lives that a discussion on the colonial intervention into Papuan lives and the end of slavery are inseparable. This chapter discusses how the process occurred, beginning from the way Dutch evaluated Papuans and connect this to their duty as a proper state. The chapter then discusses how Papuan way of life posed challenges to the colonial effort to ‘civilise’ them and how this influenced the colonial project.

3.1. Seeing Like the Late Colonial State

*De tijd spoed voort voor de mens die tijd aan verandering kan meten. Voor Nieuw-Guinea bestond geen tijd; Nieuw Guinea bleef in de duisternis der tijden zichzelf gelijk. Zijn sterrenhemel ontspant hetzelfde beeld als vele eeuwen geleden. Een boom viel om door ouderdom een nieuwe groeide op; een mens stierf, een nieuw werd geboren; het beeld veranderd niet.*¹⁸⁹

- Jan van Eechoud, *Vergeten Aarde*

The opening of government post was an integral part of the Dutch consolidation the state. It commenced with the opening of colonial posts in Fak-fak and Manokwari in the 1898, but this was just the beginning of this expansion. Those two posts act as headquarters, and the Dutch commissioned explorations to areas in the hinterland (‘their frontiers’) to gain more knowledge about the newly explored region. The knowledge collected from this exploration was used to determine where the next colonial post had to be established. The next post would be used as a starting point for another, and so forth.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Tagliacozzo, ‘Kettle on a Slow Boil..’: 70.

¹⁸⁹ Jan van Eechoud, *Vergeten Aarde* (1952): 5.

¹⁹⁰ For an overview see of this period see, J. A. Overweel, *The Archival Sources Netherlands New Guinea 1901-1921*, (DSALCUL/IRIS, 1995): 1-3.

It is important not to overlook the consequence of the numerous explorations to Papuan lives. The colonial expansion was charged with a zeal to 'civilise' Papuans and this turned the Dutch into an inherently disruptive force to the Papuan lives. In order to civilise Papuans, the Dutch needed to bring Papuans into the embrace of the *bestuur*. The bestuur, through the growing posts and *ambtenaars*, enabled the Dutch to exert political control of Papuans. The posts made the colonial administration difficult to avoid, and their persistent presence facilitated the process of making Papuans legible. Through the lens of Papuans, the opening of the posts was the beginning of a process James C. Scott called the enclosure.

As defined by Scott, the enclosure is (and was) a state project to integrate (and monetise) people, lands and resources of the periphery.¹⁹¹ New Guinea was peripheral to the Dutch colonial enterprise for centuries before that, and the intensification of Dutch activity in New Guinea was the beginning of the enclosure in the periphery. A modern state seeks to eventually extract revenue through the enclosure. For the Dutch as a colonial state, the objective of these activities were mixed. In terms of rhetoric, the expansion of the Dutch (both in terms of space and activity) was said to be in the name of civilising mission (i.e. improving Papuans), in practice the need to establish political control was a more pressing issue. It is undeniable that the extraction of revenue was a long-term goal, but political control was the main propeller of this project. The periphery was a zone where the colonial state was previously present in word only, hence construed as a threat to the colonial state; the expansion ended the rhetoric-only phase.

For the colonial state the enclosure lessened the challenge the peripheries posed to the state and subjected them permanently to the colonial eye and control. The opening of posts made the colonial administration difficult to avoid; their proximity and their persistent presence facilitated the process to make Papuans familiar and legible. Through their presence amidst Papuans, the colonial apparatus could observe and improve Papuans. The expansion of the colonial state in New Guinea came at the expense of the autonomy of Papuans and their lives, because their ability to ignore the state and proceed as usual were diminished. More importantly, the expansion of the colonial state meant that the ability of Papuans to escape and evade the state were diminished.

To briefly address the rhetoric of the civilising mission, the believe in progress underlies this colonial project is undeniable, as historians Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben suggested. Following their lead, it is important to remember that this project was ambiguous and pathetic. Ambiguous because this project could not succeed without the use of violence, and pathetic because it did not tolerate any challenge.¹⁹² I have alluded in the previous chapter the Dutch use of authority-laden words when recording violent conducts (i.e. punish, *straffen*); the memories share this characteristic. We should not be fooled by the impression that this civilising mission was peaceful.

A close reading of the memories reveal that the mission to civilise Papuans consisted two separate yet closely connected activities: the assessment of social reality in New Guinea and the effort to improve them. These two activities did not represent different stages of the

¹⁹¹ James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (Yale University Press, 2009): 4-5.

¹⁹² Marieke Bloembergen & Remco Raben, 'Wegen naar het Nieuwe Indië 1890-1950' in *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië, 1890-1950* (KITLV, 2009): 13.

colonial activity in New Guinea, they took place simultaneously and influenced each other. The assessment of the state of Papuan lives were filtered through the intent to improve the situation, and this assessment provided bases for the ideals and policies devised by the Dutch.

That the Dutch observed Papuans through the intent to civilise them as a filter is important to remember because it directly influenced the things they reported. The intention to improve Papuan lives required the colonial officers to be critical of New Guinea and Papuans and focused on aspects that Papuans lacked. Knowing this, it is not surprising that, as Ploeg summarised, Papuans were distinguished based on its negative attributes.¹⁹³ There was a consensus among the Dutch that pure Papuans were the ones who did not use metal, grow rice, or practice weaving. Pure Papuans were believed to be primitives who were devoid of foreign and civilising influences. The Dutch was predisposed to notice lacks and absences and saw it as their duty to fill the lacks and absences. It was the things that Papuans lacked that proved their primitiveness, and all the things that they lacked were consequence of isolation. The use of metal, rice cultivation and consumption and the practice of weaving was result of contact with the modern world, and this modern/ foreign influence was also a civilising influence.¹⁹⁴ The Dutch saw theses absences and took it as the bases for their mission (as the civilising influence) to bring Papuans into the 'modern age' by filling the perceived lacks.

Another consequence of the focus on civilising Papuans (and by extension, their primitiveness) was the impression of timelessness. Jan van Eechoud imparts this impression loud and clear in the quote above. The consensus on the undeveloped state of Papuans led to the conviction that Papuan lives had experienced no change at all since time immemorial. This conviction was caused by the shared believe in linear progress and the stages of development. The believe in stages of development was an inherent part of the colonial project, and we saw this in their treatment of Papuan societies in their records. The Dutch saw the primitive state as a transitory state; a state that societies were supposed to eventually leave. This view, as indicated by the memories, was shared among Dutch officials. According to Eechoud and his colleagues, change (by which he means progress) enabled humans to differentiate time and since Papuans were stuck in the primitive state and had not undergone any change, they had essentially lived in a timeless space until the Dutch arrived.

It is imperative to remember the two points above as the framework in which the records of Papuan lives were produced. The legacies of slavery among Papuans and New Guinea was also recorded in this framework. This framework was used to explain the perpetual victimisation of Papuans to various hazards, and it was this lack of agency (i.e. the inability to rise beyond the challenges to live in New Guinea) that was used to define the condition of Papuan lives. The fact that Papuans lacked technology and had not progressed enough to mitigate the challenges of nature was a symbol of primitiveness to the Dutch. In itself this would not be problematic, the problem with this assessment is that primitiveness was seen to be a bad thing in the colonial perspective. I believe this negative belief attached to primitiveness also permeated judgments on Papuans, which means that Papuans cannot win in the eye of the Dutch.

¹⁹³ Ploeg, 'De Papoea': 79.

¹⁹⁴ This does not mean that the Dutch viewed the Malay in a favourable light, just that they thought the Malays were more developed, especially compared to Papuans.

The shared conviction regarding Papuans and their primitiveness played perfectly in favour of the Dutch because it legitimised their role as civilising agents to both the external worlds and to themselves. The consistent reference to the vulnerability of Papuans (as consequence of their primitiveness) to various hazards is especially consequential if we view the modernity project as an effort to minimise human vulnerability to hazards. The primitiveness of Papuans and the demography in New Guinea were something the colonial state believed they could address through their policies. The effective presence of the state was designed to be able to interfere into Papuan lives; the aggressive colonial agents disrupted traditional systems which enabled slavery and wars while the presence of the more benign colonial agents would address illness and infant mortality. I address the last point in the final part of this chapter.

The consequence of slavery to New Guinea is difficult to measure on the scale of demographics, but focusing on the actions of Papuans as expressions of the consequence provides a viable venue of investigation. I want to connect the behaviours of Papuans with their past victimisation by bringing to fore the notion of collective memory formulated by the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. In the book that pioneered memory studies book, Halbwachs argues that individuals belonging to the same group, have to own the habit and capacity to think and remember as member of the group.¹⁹⁵ Consistent with Durkheim, Halbwachs focused on the influence of a social group to an individual. He identified the importance of a social group in maintaining memories, and even went further to argue that the members have to adopt the same view point and the conceptions of the fellow members. Memory makes and constantly remakes the group.¹⁹⁶ Papuan societies in New Guinea integrated the possibility of enslavement in their daily lives and devised strategies to adapt to that type of life in their shared memory (more below).

It is obvious that the work of Halbwachs is important for its articulation of the collective element of memory. However, there are two more additional points I would like to draw from his formulation to further my argument in what follows; the character of collective memory and the way it is transmitted across generations (more below for the latter).

In his articulation of collective memory, Halbwachs differentiates the type of memory a collective chooses to retain and distinguishes it from historical memory. According to him, collective memory prioritises resemblances, unlike historical memory (i.e. the realm of historians) which focuses on change. The group with the memory feels strongly that it has remained the same, and aims to perpetuate the feelings and images forming the substance of its thought. The greatest part of a collective memory spans time during which nothing radically changes.¹⁹⁷ To put it in a more concrete way, collective memory are constituted of

¹⁹⁵ Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (transl. by Francis J. Ditter, Jr & Vida Yazdi Ditter), (Harper Colophon Books, 1980): 27.

¹⁹⁶ Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*: 25-27, 30-34 and Erika Apfelbaum, 'Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory', in *Memories, Theories, Debates*, Susannah Radstone & Bill Schwarz (eds.) (Fordham Univ. Press, 2010): 81. Troubling as that may be for some research, this does not pose a problem for this study. The space Halbwachs provided for the individual and collective is not a problem. For one thing, the colonial archive has an inherent problem when documenting their subjects, i.e. the habit of speaking in collectives rather than in terms of individuals. A lot of scholars have addressed this issue, and I have alluded at this issue by speaking of stereotypes in the first chapter.

¹⁹⁷ Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*: 85-86.

non-events, things that were and still lived and it is tinged with the sense that this is the way it has always been. This point concurs with the issue of timelessness conveyed by the records and collective memory. The beginning of this thesis explained the justification for the long timespan covered by this research by referring to Braudel's notion on the historical structure, but it bears repeating and clarifying in light of the ensuing argument regarding the historical manifestation of the Papuan past. The existence of these actions and these behavioural legacies betrayed the historical entanglement with slavery. These actions and behaviours should not be construed as proof that nothing has changed in New Guinea. Like elsewhere, Papuans experience historical events and processes; the introduction of foreign goods and dealing with the fluctuation of its value, conflicts between and within communities, intra group alliances made an unmade, etc. Through the centuries however, there was a consistent historical pattern which enabled the transportation and enslavement of Papuans. This pattern constituted a historical structure of New Guinea.¹⁹⁸

If the Dutch with its civilising mission and state conduct were completely successful this historical structure would have been upended, but the nature of Papuan lives and their history challenged this project. The Dutch confused lack of progress with lack of history, believing that they could address everything Papuans lacked through policies. They did not recognise Papuan historicity and their memories, but the collective memories revealed itself repeatedly through actions of Papuans and obstructed the colonial project.

3.2. Collective memory of slavery and its historical manifestation

*In 't leven van den Papoe is heel veel, wat hem beangstigt. In de eerste plaats is hij bang voor dieren en voor menschen....Alleen zijn eigen familieleden en verdure stamgenooten vertrouwt de Papoe. Menschen van 'n anderen stam, van 'n ander eiland wantrouwt hij.*¹⁹⁹

- F.J. F. van Hasselt, *In het land van de Papoea's*

Now, I wish to address the point regarding the transmission of collective memory across generation as formulated by Halbwachs. It is not enough that the historical pattern consisted of a slave-generating process, it is the transmission of collective memory that explains the persistence of the strategies developed to deal with the historical pattern. In Goody's parlance, the perpetual victimisation itself is not enough to explain the responses to it. The persistence of the strategies and behaviours developed to respond to the historical pattern is best explained by assuming that Papuan groups transmitted their memory to their young members. Halbwachs addresses these two points when he argues that lived experience is the better way for individuals to internalise the collective memory, rather than simply learning

¹⁹⁸ In the second chapter I explain the circumstances in New Guinea which generated Papuan slaves. It is likely that more Papuans become slaves because of the circumstances embedded in the historical structure, rather than solely through historical events. That being said, a research of the hinterland on past wars and disasters (things that would constitute historical 'events') would reveal moments when an increase in the number of slaves are to be expected.

¹⁹⁹ F.J. F. van Hasselt, *In het land van de Papoea's* (Kemink & Zoon, 1926): 147.

them.²⁰⁰ This point corresponds with the importance of the historical patterns in ensuring the ability of young individuals to internalise the collective memory. In the same breath Halbwachs also argues that the importance of a historical event has to be placed within a group viewpoint to enable the young to view the event as truly is, imbued with concerns, interests, passions of a nation. In other words, a group decides which memory they retain and this memory traversed generation with the help of the group who have conditioned their young to view the past in a certain way. A deeper research into this is necessary, but for now I believe it is reasonable to argue that Papuan social groups verbally transmitted their memory and their history. The difference between the internalisation which Halbwachs suggests is connected with the experience in New Guinea lies (again), in the difference between a historical event and a historical structure. Unlike the young in Halbwachs' hypothetical and relatively stable milieu, for groups in New Guinea memory had a very direct utility value, i.e. survival. The persistent wars and other slave-generating processes means that the importance of memory was constantly validated. Hence, collective memory permeated the daily lives and actions of this process.

Monash archaeologist Ian McNiven provides evidence of this process in his study on the Torres Strait Islanders and their historical dealings with foreign traders. His research reveals through three documented encounters from their growing capability of navigating trade. In 1830s, the Islanders revealed an ability to set the terms of trade, a skill which was developed through experiences in engaging with various traders.²⁰¹ The ability to conduct trade across cultural lines was built on decades long experience of contact trades, one-time trades that happened between the coast inhabitants and the foreign passers-by (taking place either on beaches or on boats). The core of McNiven's argument is that beach settlers were more adept at cross-cultural trade than their Europeans counterpart. I believe that this argument is also applicable to Papuans living along the coasts, as we can learn from Dampier. During his voyage in 1699, Dampier was involved in various contact trades along the north coast of New Guinea. On one occasion (he did not specify the name the location), he traded axes with a group of people only willing to give away coconuts in exchange.²⁰² This ability to decide the terms of exchange, following McNiven, shows a level of skill that was built on repeated contact trades with other foreigners before Dampier. This reading of McNiven is useful for two reasons; its admission that Papuans have a history of encounters with non-European strangers and its treatment of Papuan actions of and conducts as rational. In sum, experience, codified and transmitted as collective memory, built the capability to trade amicably with strangers.

The same way peaceful trade instilled the capability to trade, I believe raids also built the capability to deal with violence. The previous chapter discusses the fact that New Guinea was a regular hunting ground and raids were part of the ordinary in the entire region. For centuries, Papuans, especially along the coast, had to constantly be on guard. Papuans lived

²⁰⁰ Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*: 57-58.

²⁰¹ Ian J. McNiven, 'Torres Strait Islanders and the maritime frontier in early colonial Australia' in *Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies*, ed. Lynette Russell (Manchester University Press, 2001): 178-179, 187-190.

²⁰² Dampier, *A Continuation of A Voyage*: 135-140.

in uncertainty because the element of surprise was as important to the success of raids as military superiority. It stands to reason that Papuans had to adjust to living with this hazard.

The hazard Papuans experienced is obvious; the looming possibility of enslavement. This possibility of enslavement was experienced both individually and collectively. This collective memory had an operative element because the immediacy of the hazards was so great that it demanded Papuans to adapt. This is why adaptations directly reflected the historical engagement of Papuans with slavery. The strategies developed to adapt and deal with this hazard was manifest in three ways to be described below; hostility, fear and decisions on housing. Broadly, these strategies fall into two types of adaptation; reactive adaptation and anticipatory adaptation. The first two legacies of slavery fall into the category of the reactive adaptation, i.e. adaptations to the immediate possibility of slavery. The final strategy falls into the category of anticipatory adaptation, i.e. a long-term strategy developed to alleviate the possibility of slavery. It will become obvious that the distinction between these two adaptations mutually influenced each other.

Hostility

Historians have used hostility and violent receptions as evidence of the slavery past in spite of its ambiguity. After Japan surrendered to the Allies during the Second World War, a teacher from Ambon visited Raja Ampat to learn about their opinion on Tidore, in light of a possible East Indonesian state. The answer was unambiguous; a Tidorese was beaten to his death by Papuans residing in Waigeo. Kamma attributes this incident to the deep-rooted hatred Papuans harboured toward Tidore, but he does not provide evidence for this conviction.²⁰³ In light of the difficulty to maintain trade with Papuans, these type of events in the past cemented the murderous reputation of Papuans. Kamma, Goodman and McNiven suggest a deeper investigation into these actions.

Kamma argues that the murder was consequence of an extensive history of antagonistic relation between Papuans and their enemies. His assessment of the situation is revelatory because it was the presence of the Dutch which enabled a more nuanced and charitable reading of violence by Papuans. There was an internal logic to the rampant violent in New Guinea, and the Dutch were only (partly) privy to this after they settled permanently. This explains the 1925 *memorie* wherein the departing Assistant Resident S. J. van Geurs recounts an incident from 1676. In 1676 hundreds of Misool raiders were lured into one of the inland sea by the island Oegar, before they were ambushed by the hinterland settlers (*alifoeroe's*) of the Kapaur Peninsula and every one of them murdered.²⁰⁴

Two points have to be analysed based on the anecdotes. The event in 1676 illustrated the ability of Papuans to organise an effective confrontation to act on their hatred, and because of its target, it definitively proves the animosity felt toward the raiders. On the other hand, Kamma tries to extract a historical reasoning behind the 1940s murder but his argument suffers from lack of evidence. During the intensification of Dutch activity in New Guinea, expressions of mutual dislike between Papuans and Moluccans due to their shared

²⁰³ Kamma, 'De verhouding tussen Tidore en...', I: 361.

²⁰⁴ NA MvK/MvO 446 *Aanvullende Memorie Afdeling West Nieuw Guinea door A.R. titulair S. J. van Geurs 31 december 1925*: 30.

history occasionally appeared, but outright murder seemed to demand a more direct impetus.²⁰⁵ While his claim is plausible, it still is a weak claim.

Support for the argument by Kamma is based on a general pattern of interaction in the region. Papuans were known to have a deep distrust of strangers, which was expressed in two ways: violence and fear. There was a general policy of attack first, ask no questions later, and this motivated people approaching the beach to announce themselves from afar. Goodman attributes the paranoia about unknown ships on the beaches to a history of endemic inter-village warfare.²⁰⁶ McNiven argues that the Torres Strait Islanders may have been suspicious of Europeans due to a previous violent encounter with outsiders.²⁰⁷ Again, this argument is equally applicable to Papuans living along the coast.

Reports on which we can confidently speak of hostility as expression of collective memory (such as the 1676 incident) are incredibly rare. For a long time, encounters were recorded by Europeans, and only relayed their side of the story. Hence, an explanation of this string of violent receptions does not have the luxury of confidently using these events as evidence of prior victimisation.

Collective fear, organised defences

The second behavioural evidence of the slavery past is manifest in the fear Papuans expressed towards ships sailing along and approaching the coast. This visceral expression was mostly observed along the coast, although it was later also found in the hinterland. The Dutch ship *Circe* joined a Tidorese fleet in 1849/1850 in a voyage along the coast of New Guinea. Throughout this voyage, the sight of the *kora-koras* sent the inhabitants along the coast into flight. Even when the crew of *Circe* were already accepted amiably, the sight of the *kora-koras* still had the same effect.²⁰⁸ This occurred both in the north and west coast, revealing the extent of horror associated with the *kora-koras*. The distrust of strangers and habit of running away from foreigners was also found inland. In 1940 the controller of the *onderafdeling* Midden Vogelkop H. van Dijk was frustrated when during his incursion, people were only peeping and watching him from afar, fleeing when he and his troop approached them.²⁰⁹

While fear was common, adaptations to it varied based on the level of centralisation of the social groups. In Kokas, Hamis Karamandondo, an elder-cum-interlocutor informed Thomas Goodman in a 1999 interview that people of Arguni and the surrounding villages used to flee to a small, cliffy island near Arguni (named Pulau Bunbun) when an attack

²⁰⁵ Jan Pouwer, 'The Colonisation, Decolonisation and Recolonisation of West New Guinea,' *The Journal of Pacific History* Vol. 34(2): 162-163.


²⁰⁶ Goodman, *The Sosolet*: 87.

²⁰⁷ McNiven, 'Torres Strait Islanders': 183.

²⁰⁸ Kamma, 'De verhouding tussen Tidore en..., IV': 258-259. For an extensive narrative of this voyage see Haga, *Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea*: 97-100.

²⁰⁹ NA MvK/MvO 492 *Algemeene Memorie van Overgave van de Onderafdeeling Midden-Vogelkop samengesteld door den Kapitein der Infanterie H. van Dijk 1940*: 16. In MvK/MvO 444: 23 the Dutch colonial went as far as to surveille the individuals who left the kampong in search for sago and fish, fearing that they may start a new temporary settlement, which may lead to a dispersal of subjects anew.

seemed imminent.²¹⁰ In Onin, the rajas constructed mutual defence networks to address their problem with raids.²¹¹ These confederacies built forts made of coral stone and bamboo-ringed villages called *kotas*.²¹² And in cases where this was not enough, the sosolot communities still had a backup plan; by 1581 they had a community fund maintained by four official ‘treasurers’, which paid for ransoms and the employment of mercenary fleets from northwest Seram for defence against attacks and reinforcements during war.²¹³



Map 3 Birds Head region and its surrounding

Onin was not alone in its use of alliances and the fortification effort as defence mechanisms against raids. Warren observes that along the coast of the Philippines between 1778-1850s the Spanish and their subjects devised various ways to fight the Iranun raiders. Armed patrols along the coast were among the efforts that the Spanish administration developed in order to stop raids, but ultimately it was the most locally-based forms of defence,

²¹⁰ Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 59 (note 40). For a brief explanation on the effort of the Onin to handle the problem with raids see Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 67-70.

²¹¹ Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone*: 34-36. The establishment of the alliance groups *seri-tahun* and *tutu* in Southeast Seram made its way to their fellow sosolot trading partners in Onin.

²¹² J. Röder ‘Ergebnisse einer Probegrabung in der Hohle Dudumunir auf Arguni, MacCluer Golf (Holl, West Neuguinea)’, *Nova Guinea* 4: 1-10, as quoted in Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 68.

²¹³ J. Sollewijn Gelpke, ‘The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581-1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf and Seram’ in *BKI* 150 (1): 130-132. Goodman argued that this ransoms were also part of this delayed system of exchange which helped to avoid the escalation of violence into an all-out war among the maritime communities see Goodman, *The Sosolot*: 68-70.

fortifying and arming the villages with cannons, that was more successful. The presence of friars with their authority and ability to mediate between the Spanish administration and their colonial subjects were pivotal in the formation of an effective defence.²¹⁴

Papuans who lived along the (north) coast had difficulty adapting and developing an effective defence against the raiding groups because of their shortcoming as compared to the other groups. Most settlements in coastal New Guinea did not develop a more complex system of defence. Instead, they ran into the forest when raids occurred. The system that Onin developed was result of a string of confederate communities which were embedded in an 'embryonic process of political centring'.²¹⁵ In contrast, the more effective mechanisms used by the Filipinos (for lack of a non-anachronistic term) required the presence of an effective colonial power and figures with the ability to raise beyond inter-village dynamics and act as mediator. In spite of the differences in regime, the mechanisms required coordination, somewhat permanent communities and alliance (not to mention a foreign influence). The alliances enabled the communities to develop a more resource-intensive defence mechanism. This concurs with the analysis that adaptivity depended on the availability and attainability of response options.²¹⁶ Centralisation expanded the array of response options. Most of the communities along the coast of New Guinea did not have the centring, the alliance and by extension the defence mechanism. Hence they resorted to more simple tactics which were not so time and resource-intensive; they ran into the forest and on higher ground in the face of raids or they settled inland. These tactics contributed to the twentieth century idea that Papuans were not a home-loving populace (*hokvast*) and had not much attachment to a site.²¹⁷

To settle or not to settle

The third behavioural evidence is the one that provided the strongest challenge to the Dutch. The earliest observations in the *memories* of both *afdelings* (North New Guinea and West New Guinea) of New Guinea, were in agreement that the people living in the hinterland were sparser, and were housed in unexpected places, if they had any house at all.

It is important to begin by reflecting on the belief that Papuans were not *hokvast*. This idea gained purchase especially because the shared conviction that Papuans were primitive, and the inherent belief in sedentariness as markers of progress. There was a glaring problem with the belief: it begs the question that if people were not as attached to land, why did they not migrate *en masse* to the coasts and settle there? This question resonates because there was an agreement among earlier observers that people in the hinterland were in the clutches of the coast-inhabiting populace.²¹⁸ Nijmegen anthropologist Jelle Miedema states that there was a subtle stratification of people living along the north-eastern region of the Vogelkop. In

²¹⁴ Warren, *The Sulu Zone 1768-1898*: 171-177.

²¹⁵ V. Valeri, 'Reciprocal centers: The Siwa-Lima system in the central Moluccas' in *The attraction of opposites*, eds. D. Maybury-Lewis and U. Almagor (University of Michigan Press, 1989): 137 as quoted in Ellen, *On the Edge of the Banda Zone*: 34.

²¹⁶ John Smithers & Bary Smit, 'Human adaptation to climatic variability and change' in *Global Environmental Change* 7(2):130.

²¹⁷ van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 39.

²¹⁸ van der Roest, *Van Slaaf tot Evangelist*: 34.

this region (Miedema calls it the Kebar plains, see Map 3), groups and their level of civilisation were stratified based on their proximity to *harta* (foreign goods), and it was no coincidence that by this formula, the further inland one group lived, the lower their position in the stratum.²¹⁹

Yet there was no massive exodus to the coast, both the coast and the hinterland were populated. Part of the explanation is perhaps the convention regarding collective land ownership; land was not divided merely to give entitlement to settle, it was divided mostly to give rights to exploit the resources available on land.²²⁰ This discouraged people from simply moving. The frequent raids along the coast was another factor. Settling along the coasts was a decision that needed to be backed up by military power, otherwise the group was doomed to be victim of any marauding group rather than a group with chances to be an equal partner of foreign traders.²²¹ J. Seijne Kok writes of a coastal region along Triton Bay which in 1919 was sparsely populated. This region was the place where the Dutch attempted to build a fort in 1828, and based on that experience he writes:

De kustgebied beoosten Kaimana moet vroeger sterker bevolkt zijn geweest; de bezetting van Fort du Bus, aan de Tritonbaai, had telkens ‘moeilijkheden met Cerammers die met vloten van tot 21 vaartuigen en benden van 600 á 700 man het fort verontrusten’. Thans is het gebied dier groote baaien en ook van de bijbehorende eilanden uiterst dun bevolkt. De kleine stammen van de Etnabaai en Lakahia schijnen vrijwel uitstarvende of gedeeltelijk reeds uitgestorven, zijn in allen gevalle zeer in sterkte achteruitgegaan. De vroegere hongitochten en slavenjachten, in later tijd nog onderlinge twisten met snel-partijen, en ook veelvuldige dronkenschap moeten tezamen den ondergang van deze zwakke niet aaneengesloten stammen, die vaak opgejagd, een armzalig bestaan leidden, hebben nabij gebracht.²²²

This confirms the importance to bring up slaving expeditions, among others, as a demographic factor. It also reveals that civilisation was a double-edged sword. Settling along the coast was a potentially profitable but risky endeavour. Settling itself was risky because it raised the vulnerability to a group. It meant exposing oneself to predatory groups, knowing that they were able to attack in moments and was most clear in the effort of some groups to

²¹⁹ J. Miedema, ‘Anthropology, demography and history: Shortage of women, inter-tribal marriage relations, and slave trading in the Bird’s Head of New Guinea’ in BKI 144 (4): 500.

²²⁰ See for example NA MvK/MvO 447 *Memorie-(vervolg) van overgave van de onderafdeeling West Nieuw Guinea van den Gezaghebber bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur A. L. Vink (20 October 1929-5 September 1932)*: 14. According to Cator, in spite of the success of persuading people from diverse groups to settle at a centralised settlements along coast, people still went back to their own land (*oude beschikkingsgebied*) to look for resources. See also NA MvK/MvO 476 *Memorie van overgave van het bestuur over de onderafdeling Teminaboean (voorheen Ajamaroe) over de periode van 17 juni 1953 tot 1 september 1955 bij Controleur J. Massink*: 13. Massink spoke of strict territorial division of land among the clans which in principle prohibited people from opening a garden outside the area of their own clan. Massink noted however, that the clans could give outsiders right to exploit their land and when asked for permission, most of the time this permission was granted.

²²¹ See NA MvK/MvO 448 *Bestuurs-Memorie der Afdeling West Nieuw Guinea door den aftredenden Assistent Resident Dr. W. J. Cator (November 1936-April 1939)*: appendix, page 5. Cator recounted an intergroup competition between the Onin rajas; this broke out in a war which ended in 1878 when Raja Fatagar moved away because of the attacks by the rajas of Roembatti dan Ati-ati.

²²² NA MvK/MvO 444: 28.

avoid this, at the risk of remaining ‘uncivilised’. The notion of civilisation and its connection with the foreign brings back the dichotomy between the coast-settling versus the hinterland-dwelling Papuans. As we saw above, the coast-settlers were believed to be more civilised than their hinterland counterparts, yet even they had difficulty to develop an effective defence mechanism the coastal settlers were able to develop. The situation seemed bleak for the less civilised people living in the hinterland, who had no direct access to supply of foreign goods (cannons, etc.) to help them to protect themselves.

Through a reading of the memories, I find that the hinterland-dwelling populace developed different strategies to adapt to the precarious lives. In the absence of advanced weapons and technology, the hinterland-dwelling populace were inventive in the way they modified their housing. For example, Kaibus inhabitants had lived around inaccessible marshes, purposely making themselves difficult to reach before they moved to a new village set up by the Dutch in the first decade of the twentieth century.²²³ Papuan groups in the hinterland were dealt with the hazard by working with the tough terrain, and the inhabitants of Kaibus was only one among many groups to choose this approach.

J. Seijne Kok is among the most descriptive of officials, in his report he mentions repeatedly the houses he encountered in myriad places throughout the *afdeling* West New Guinea. In his report, Seijne Kok describes kampongs which were only accessible through a narrow steep stone blocks, providing no protection to groups intending to attack. Other kampongs (in the north coast of MacCluer gulf) were settled on lowlands but surrounded by mud banks which made reaching them considerably more troublesome. A variation on the same theme was found on kampongs located along shallow creeks, which made the kampongs only accessible by small *prauws*.²²⁴ Seijne Kok believes the decisions to live in such places were made due to security reasons, i.e the need to avoid surprise attacks.

Other groups found a way to make their houses secure, even if the location is easy to reach. Seijne Kok identifies a few types of houses which was created with the intent to be invisible (*bestemd om te verdwijnen*).²²⁵ In this category he places treehouses and hole houses (the latter more below). The treehouses were built high above the ground, equipped with long ladders which were retracted every night. H. van Dijk also reports having seen such treehouses in his administrative area, around the Middel-Vogelkop.²²⁶ We do not know when the habit of building such treehouses began. Seijne Kok and van Dijk observed the treehouses in 1910s and 1940s respectively, but there is evidence to suggest that this habit had a long history. In 1775 Forrest described the housing of the hinterland dwellers as he learned from his interlocutors as follows:

‘...they (the hinterland settling populace, LG) built generally on trees, their houses to which they ascended with great agility, by a log notched by sticks and often pulled their ladders after them to prevent followers.’²²⁷

Forrest was in Doreh Bay, which means that the closest hinterland settlers were found

²²³ NA MvK/MvO 442: 6

²²⁴ NA MvK/MvO 444: 24.

²²⁵ NA MvK/MvO 444: 33.

²²⁶ NA MvK/MvO 492:16.

²²⁷ Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea*: 109-110.

in Kebar Plains. In sum, this means that the habit of building treehouses was found throughout the Bird's Head region. These treehouses, I believe, are long-term adaptation, developed by societies in the region to minimise the possibility of being kidnapped and displaced. That such an adaptation existed is evidence that the groups were vulnerable to the possibility of enslavement. But here I wish to expand on the point made by Goody regarding the strong society and the power it has over weaker societies. I believe that the treehouses are evidence that societies in New Guinea were not only affected by their connection with strong societies (most of which lived along the coast), but also by their connection with their neighbours (with whom they were more or less equal in strength). Because of the vulnerability to all kinds of group, either stronger or equally strong, groups decided to keep themselves hidden or secure so they were able to avoid the strong groups and avoid surprise attacks from other groups. The kidnapping of Kafiar (see chapter 2.2.) illustrated the danger from an equal group to the other and the ability of a group to use a moment of weakness to their own advantage. Hence, an effective adaptation by Papuans cannot be measured solely from their ability to stave off strong societies, but also their ability to stave off all societies regardless of its relative strength. Furthermore, the treehouses were effective because they minimised moments of weakness and allowed the groups to choose with whom they wish to engage. If Kafiar lived in a treehouse, the neighbouring village could not have kidnap him and use the element of surprise because to attack his village they have to climb a treehouse. The same applies to permanent houses in obscure places, the houses made it difficult for enemy groups to approach quietly. Settling on land made societies vulnerable, hence the move to obscure places or the building of treehouses to reduce this vulnerability.

The problem with the relative safety of permanent houses was that once an individual left their home for fishing etc., they were once again vulnerable to attacks from other groups. Hence, even temporary housing was expected to reduce vulnerability, and it is the tricky temporary housing that Seijne Kok noticed during his tenure. He uses the term 'hole-houses' to indicate natural crevices which were used as temporary resident, e.g. caves, caverns, and holes on the ground. The hole houses were usually temporary housing of the nomadic groups, or individuals who were away from their group.²²⁸ It is testament of how vulnerable the societies were (not to mention their awareness of this vulnerability), that even during short enterprises they had to anticipate attacks from strangers.

There is a possibility that it was the extent of modification of surroundings to ensure safety during temporary ventures that developed the reputation of Papuans as non-sedentary societies, but this point needs further research. But the Dutch viewed these modest efforts to adapt to the vulnerabilities with the pre-existing framework; it was simply another proof of primitiveness and was simply an obstacle to civilisation. The strategies Papuans developed were only annoyances that stood in the way of the Dutch civilising mission. These strategies were to the Dutch only obstacles to be removed so civilisation can take root.

²²⁸ NA MvK/MvO 444: 35.

3.3. The Legacies of Slavery and the Colonial Intervention

*Van de organisatie der binnenlanders is zeer weinig te zeggen. Vele leven in kleine groepen, die dikwijls groepen van vier grootere eenheden schijnen te vormen. Onze kennis van stam en klasseindeling is al even gering als die over de afkomst en wordt het hoog tijd een grondige studie te doen maken, van volk, taal en land voor het te laat is, temeer nu Nieuw Guinea zo in het middelpunt van de belangstelling staat en grote maatschappijen gaan exploreren en exploiteren en het land door bestuur en militairen wordt opengelegd.*²²⁹

- K. Th Beets, Asst. Resident of the *onderafdeling* North New Guinea 1935-1938

I mention in the beginning that the legacies of slavery were recorded by the colonial officials with a certain framework, which is their intent to civilise Papuans. The three legacies of slavery mentioned above presented a direct challenge to this colonial project; the hostility, fear and the scattered settlements meant Papuans were not cooperative. Since the notion of progress and bringing civilisation was central to the colonial project, these legacies were faced head on.

The hostility and fear was something the Dutch solved by engaging with Papuans either directly or through mission. The effort to civilise Papuans meant making Papuans cooperate with the colonial state. The opening of the colonial posts facilitated the civilising intent because proximity allowed colonial state to observe (and ultimately, control) Papuans. Papuans who lived in small groups and apart from other groups made the colonial project difficult and expensive. Efficiency and costs was related to the project because it was operated by non-Papuan *ambtenaars* (who need to be paid, etc.) and needed the construction of hospitals and schools. It was obvious to the Dutch that they had to work in settlements (kampongs), where they can place all their resources.²³⁰

The opening of settlements was strategically advantageous not only because it was efficient, but also because for the long term, it would lead to sedentarisation among Papuans. James C. Scott argued that this sedentarisation (that is making the nomadic populace sedentary) was an important first step in the state projects, because it will make societies more legible before the state can improve these societies.²³¹ What follows will see how the colonial state applied this logic in New Guinea.

The lack of a centralised political unit meant that when the Dutch arrived in New Guinea they had to begin their project from almost zero. As far as the Dutch were able to see, they only saw numerous Papuans living in groups whose distinctness from each other was not always obvious to them. The distinctness and manifold of social groups stood in the way of this centralisation, and did not provide the Dutch a template to develop. This process, as Scott mentioned needed an administrative ordering of societies, a process which will enhance state capacity.²³² Hence, the Dutch were intensively creation kampongs within their realms to

²²⁹ NA MvK/MvO 373: 6.

²³⁰ See for example NA MvK/MvO 373: 59; MvK/MvO 444:23; MvK/MvO 447: 9-10 and MvK/MvO 449: 24.

²³¹ James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998): 2.

²³² Scott, *Seeing like a State*: 3-4.

enable an efficient path to civilising Papuans. They required different groups to settle within schools, but also to live in proximity with each other. The effort to sustain the existence of kampongs went as far as to monitor the individuals who left search for sago and fish, because there were fears that they may start a new temporary settlement, which may lead to a dispersal of subjects anew.²³³ This centralisation of Papuans into hubs within the reach of the Dutch and their civilising mission ended the state of war that made New Guinea a slave-generating region. Eventually, the increasing strength of the colonial presence and their capability to control societies would end the status of New Guinea as a den of ‘victim societies’. But in order to do that the Dutch had to understand the societies first.

The Dutch tried to find *the* logic or template behind the separation of social units but they did not succeed. Beets wrote about people in Numfor (one of the Biak Islands) in the 1930s:

...Elke kampong was vroeger waarschijnlijk in hoofdzaak woonplaats van keret, zodat de keret tevens een locale groep was. Aan het hoofd stond de vertegenwoordiger van de oudste linie uir de clan, zodat het familiehoofd tevens kamponghoofd was. Thans vindt men echter vaak in een kampong mensen van verschillende kerets wonen. Behalve de indeling naar standen, kerets en kampungs, bestond er vroeger een duidelijk leeftijds groepering.²³⁴

In the 1940s van Dijk was repeatedly frustrated when he asked Papuans the tribe to whom they belonged and received no clear answer. Instead, people living in Middel-Vogelkop answered by referring to a region, a river or a natural landmark. Van Dijk listed the languages spoken in the region, but that did not help him to differentiate them into separate societies either.²³⁵ East from the administrative realm was Kebar Plains, a region where identity and belonging was also not divided along language or tribal lines. Miedema contends that in this region memories and the intricacies of slavery forged a sense of distinctness among the two groups live in a single language and culture area.²³⁶ In the 1950s Massink, the controller of Teminabuan divided the groups based on their language line, and discovered through this formula that Maybrat speakers were spread around in three separate districts.²³⁷ In sum, using people and their identification as basic template on which to build centralised settlements was impossible.

This difficulty was compounded by the fluid sense of identity Papuans held. Historically, people (mostly children) in the region were given as gifts, fine or looted. The aforementioned instances show the level of mobility of Papuans in the region. The idea of rigid boundaries which closed off a society should be met with the same skepticism as drawing New Guinea as a den of completely open societies. In the hinterland the populace were living

²³³ NA MvK/MvO 444: 23.

²³⁴ NA MvK/MvO 373: 6.

²³⁵ NA MvK/MvO 492: 17. K. Th. Beets, who was assistant resident of the North New Guinea mentioned the poor state of knowledge the Dutch had on the classifications of Papuan societies, see NA MvK/MvO 373 *Memorie van Overgave van den Asst-Resi 1e kl K. Th Beets 27 juli 1935- 26 april 1938*: 6.

²³⁶ J. Miedema, ‘Anthropology, demography and history: Shortage of women, inter-tribal marriage relations, and slave trading in the Bird’s Head of New Guinea’ in BKI 144 (4): 502.

²³⁷ NA MvK/MvO 476: 11.

in distinct groups, but their lives were still entangled through inter-marriages.²³⁸ Through marriages, women were undoubtedly the most common transgressors of the boundaries of societies. Among the Vogelkop populace, women usually left the group through marriage, and became member of a different group.²³⁹

Historically, slaves also transgressed this societal boundary, although they began as outsiders in the new group. Long before children were sent to Fak-fak for education, it was child slaves which added to the population of the coast. Around Onin, the Assistant Resident A. R. Dumas found slaves (mostly children) that remained with their masters until 1919.²⁴⁰ The slaves usually had a good life and did not go back to their home, most probably because they must have forgotten their own group. This was exactly why child slaves were an especially desired commodity; they were not as attached to their social group yet and the collective memory of their original groups had not taken root yet. In the parlance of Maurice Halbwachs, they were no longer members of their previous collective, because the ease with which they shed their previous memory and embraced their new collectives. In the early twentieth century, the raja from Kapia sent his son to Fak-fak, where he lived with a Buginese trader.²⁴¹ Dumas portrayed the life of the son as a well-treated slave (*goedbehandelde slaaf*) even though he was born free. The son later refused to return to his family and hence became part of the society to which he was once an outsider. This movement in and out of a society meant languages spread beyond the space of the original societies, and made the classification based on language use potentially problematic. The porousness of these societies made it very difficult to delineate the groups and classify them and by extension to govern them, as we see from the struggle of van Dijk and Massink.

Pondering this mobility, the Dutch settled on the territorial space to build a centralised settlement. The Dutch planned and created permanent kampongs to increase their capacity to govern Papuans. The kampongs were also planned to be a permanent settlement. In 1911, Dumas mentions a program which moved the inhabitant Bira people to the estuary of Bira river and settled them permanently in this newly-built village named Sigei. Under the same administration, the inhabitants of Rumakoin were moved to a new kampong on the estuary of Dafoer and Kais rivers. These inhabitants had previously withdrawn into an unapproachable sago marsh because they feared attacks from neighbouring communities. The Dutch responded to this by deploying a detachment and made them to move to the new location.²⁴² The ability to move and settle freely was a gesture of autonomy that the colonial state did not allow.

The subjection of Papuans to the colonial state, however, did not strip them of their agency. In 1932, the *gezaghebber* A. L. Vink came to the conclusion that kampongs could not

²³⁸ NA MvK/MvO 492: 17.

²³⁹ Women were leaving for what can only be called 'economic reasons'; the Kebar gave women away in marriage to societies with access to commodities desirable to the society. The commodities are given to the society in exchange as bride price. See Jaap Timmer, 'Cloths of Civilisation: *Kain Timur* in the Bird's Head of West Papua' in *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 12(4): 494-509, and Conroy, 'The informal economy': 19-27.

²⁴⁰ NA MvK/MvO 444: 29.

²⁴¹ NA MvK/MvO 442: 11.

²⁴² NA MvK/MvO 442: 4.

always be built on terrains deemed fitting based on Western standards.²⁴³ More importantly, Vink admits that the cooperation of Papuans is necessary when determining the place where the kampongs should be concentrated. He mentioned the stunted efforts to build kampongs in Kapaur (the hinterland east and southeast of Onin) and proposed dialogues to solve the problem caused by the scattered settlements of Papuans. Papuans had successes in subverting the colonial project. Vink and his colleagues believed in the superiority of their judgement, but could not affect change without the cooperation of Papuans.

Still, the creation of kampongs by the Dutch were intrusive not just because they required different groups to settle within schools, but also because they forced them to live in proximity with each other. Research is needed to see how this affects land ownership and group identity nowadays, because this arrangement had an interesting consequence in the 1930s. During this period, various rajas live in one kampung which did not belong to their realm; the rajas of Wertoe and Sekar resided in Kokas, while the rajas of Fatagar and Ati-Ati resided in Fak-fak.²⁴⁴ Consequently, any individual living in a kampung could potentially live in the neighbourhood of two rajas, but be under jurisdiction of a raja living in a different kampung. This circumstance, odd as it may be, did not faze the Dutch who intended to gradually strip the rajas of their authority in the long term.

I mention above that expanding colonial state was a body which intends to remove native rulers and their authority. This consolidation of power came at the expense of Papuan lives and resulted the increasing intrusion therein. The sedentarisation of Papuan groups and their reachability enabled the Dutch to surveil Papuans and control them politically, an important factor in maintaining a colonial state. This surveillance allowed the Dutch to avoid resistance to their presence and end intergroup warfare, a pattern that historically facilitated the constant supply of prospective slaves to the coast. Put differently, the abolition of slavery was consequence of an effective policing of separate Papuan societies and their relation with each other.

The colonial influence in ending the selling of Papuans was most visible through this policing. The Dutch uses the success in ending inter-group warfare and slave trade to legitimise their presence, using it as evidence of the colonial role to protect weak Papuan groups from the stronger neighbours.²⁴⁵ It is important, however, to not confuse the success in bringing order with the success in bringing peace, since this was still a colonial enterprise at heart and military force was an inherent part of it. The subjection of strong societies was packaged as an effort to stop hong expedition and establish peace, with sentiment that echoed the one uttered by Haga decades earlier.²⁴⁶ Repeatedly, the Dutch military manoeuvres was framed as 'punishments', a legitimate action by a supposedly legitimate state regardless of the violence it involved. More pointedly, the consolidation of power of the colonial state entailed the subjection of Papuans to the colonial state and the removal of old patterns of strong/weak group relations in New Guinea. Indigenous societies and indigenous

²⁴³ NA MvK/MvO 447: 9-10.

²⁴⁴ NA MvK/MvO 448: 6.

²⁴⁵ See for example NA MvK/MvO 371 *Memorie van Overgave van de afdeling Noord Nieuw-Guinea 1924 onderafdeling Sorong*:5 wherein the Asst. Resident C.C. Krom asserted that the replacement of the military detachment with police was cause for the attack of Manokwari from the hinterland. See also NA MvK/MvO 372: 2.

²⁴⁶ NA MvK/MvO 442: 4-5.

individuals were envisioned as being free and equal in their subjection to the colonial state. It is terribly unfortunate that the colonial state itself was based on limitation of freedom and equality.

Conclusion

This chapter discusses how the legacies of slavery was recorded when the Dutch began colonising Papuans. It begins by placing the legacies of slavery within the wider context of the way Dutch evaluated Papuans and their mission as a colonial state. The legacies of slavery were mostly noticed because it made the civilising mission infinitely more complex. The Dutch had to engage with the legacies of slavery throughout their regime, but they addressed it by introducing policies which placed all Papuans under the colonial eye. The establishment of kampongs ended slave-producing processes (e.g. intergroup warfare) and made it safe for groups to live on the ground (as opposed to at obscure places) but it did not address the fear and hostility of Papuans. That legacy of slavery Papuans had to address themselves.

Conclusion

Looking for Papuan Agency in the Slavery Past

The main goal of this thesis was to investigate how their past entanglement with slavery affected Papuans and their daily lives. As a place where slaves were historically obtained, New Guinea is usually left out in studies regarding slavery in the Dutch East Indies. Studies on slavery usually focus on the slave (holding) society, or the condition of enslavement. In itself, these topics are important but it had left New Guinea (and other places where slaves were obtained) at a disadvantage because it treats slaves as socially death individuals; alienated from their societies, his/her offspring forever removed from their original society. The original society lost not only their member, but also traces of their presence throughout history.

The fact that 'Papua' was an exonym perhaps played a role on the difficulty to ascribe agency to the group. The presence of *Papoesche zeerovers* as a trope gave Papuans a malicious if active agency, but the presence of lone Papuan slaves in various hubs seemed to override that. Papuans were only credited with (malicious) agency when they act in groups. Papuans in slavery, especially in Batavia, Makassar and other hubs were alienated from their natural social group, hence they were no threat to the Dutch. It is difficult to not come to the conclusion that the lack of agency usually attributed to slaves also permeates the lack of agency attributed to Papuans. The lack of agency of (Papuan) slaves supports my argument regarding the need to scrutinise Papuans and New Guinea. The idea of Papuans as people bereft of agency can only be maintained until we engage with the history of New Guinea and its inhabitants.

New Guinea was and still is a place where Papuans performed their agency, both individually and in groups. The conception of victim societies by Jack Goody allows us to articulate the circumstances that enabled the movement of Papuan slaves into the Dutch East Indies and everywhere else. I have extracted the circumstances in which societies become victim societies, and these factors are:

- 1) A collection of fragmented societies living in proximity with each other
- 2) One society having a superior military or economic position in relation to other groups

These two factors are useful in explaining the process through which Papuans became slaves in New Guinea and beyond. Various societies in the proximity of Raja Ampat pirates and the Onin rajas (the stronger societies), the actors most responsible for the dispersal of Papuan slaves in the East Indies and beyond. At the beginning of this thesis I marvelled at this formulation because the stress it places on inter-societal dynamics as a slave-generating process. The second chapter of this thesis used this formulation to analyse patterns of raiding and trading in New Guinea, the activities which for centuries turned Papuans into slaves.

The focus on inter-societal relations that Goody inspires also returns agency to Papuans. Instead of taking Papuans as a single unit, a closer look into Papuan societies has revealed the complicity of Papuans in the slave-generating process. The Bird's Head region in

New Guinea was a place where Papuan agency was performed in diverse ways; they kidnapped fellow Papuans, they sold fellow Papuans, they saved fellow Papuans from others, they waged wars, they made peace, etc. Papuans did fell victim to raids from other non-Papuan groups, but this in itself did not mean that Papuans were passive or simply waiting to be attacked. Papuans participated in and were surrounded by processes in which any individual was a potential slave, and a lot of societies adapted to it.

It is only fitting that the legacies of slavery also revealed Papuan agency. The way Papuan societies integrated the possibility of enslavements into their lives was the legacy of their past engagement with slavery. This integration was manifest through the fear and hostility expressed to strangers and more robustly through the tricky ways in which Papuans built houses. These ways of adapting to the precarious life in New Guinea also reveals a need to re-examine one particular aspect of Goody's conception; the requirement of a single




Figure 2 The slave-producing process among societies as formulated by Goody (left) versus the slave-producing process among societies in New Guinea (right).

stronger society to ensure a steady supply of slaves.

Goody believes that the constant victimisation of supply of people to the Atlantic slave trade was maintained mainly through the victimisations of weaker societies by strong societies who were not afraid of retribution (see figure 1). This position seems untenable in New Guinea. For one, the indiscriminate fear, hostility, and houses built to decrease vulnerability illustrated the distrust to *any* stranger Papuan or not. Knowing this, we can only conclude that historically a single Papuan society had to anticipate attacks from societies who were stronger, but also from societies with equal strength. This makes any effort to prioritise one society over others difficult to proof unless numbers are available. Furthermore, the endemic low-level conflict among Papuans meant that the strong societies (i.e. the rajas from Raja Ampat and Onin) could also depend on other societies to bring prospective slaves to the coast because their control of foreign goods. The economic incentives from the strong societies along the coast is an example of the way economic superiority was used, but this was only possible because the existing low level endemic conflict.

These conflicts and exploitative trade practices gradually ended with the expanding and intensification of the colonial presence. Armed with the civilising spirit and the intend to establish political control, the Dutch slowly emaciated the strong societies under the pretext of

protection for weaker societies. Hence slowly, Papuans were freed from the possibility of being enslaved. This came at a high price of the colonial invasion into the lives of Papuans. The Dutch legitimised their actions by referring to the abolition of slavery and other forms of bondage. Papuans though, had to exchange their form of freedom. On the one hand they were no longer subjected to slavery, on the other hand they became subject to the colonial state. And becoming a colonial subject means having to negotiate with the Dutch, an art that both Papuans and the Dutch had to learn to navigate.

The Dutch made their intent operative through the effort to concentrate Papuans in kampongs, a program with varying degrees of success. A success in maintaining kampongs meant that Papuans remained within the vision of the Dutch, easier to observe and to control. The question on how this changed the way Papuans group and ungroup and the long-term consequences of this project is subject for a separate and localised research.

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