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From a Buyers to a Sellers Market:

A study on the influence of the Sharpeville 'crisis' on Dutch emigration policies regarding South Africa between 1960 and 1965

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[1] People running away from the shooting police, 21 March 1960, Sharpeville. *Source:* *www.cbsnews.com/news/sharpeville-massacre-marked-turning-point-in-south-africas-history/*

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Introduction

On Thursday 28 April 1960, Dutch and Flemish immigrants met in Johannesburg, South-Africa. According to *Die Transvaler*, a South African nationalist newspaper, 500 people amassed to discuss the coverage of the Dutch press regarding recent events in the Union of South Africa.[2] They wanted to approach the Dutch embassy to clarify what steps it would undertake to prevent the 'one-sided and tendentious reporting about South Africa in the Dutch press'.[3]

The catalyst for the gathering was the Sharpeville massacre a month earlier. What started as a demonstration instigated by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) against the *pass laws* – which forced all 'black' South-African citizen to carry a passport which restricted their movement within 'white' areas – unfolded in the police shooting at the crowd, killing 69 and injuring 180 people.[4] The aftermath of Sharpeville was severe. Within South Africa, it let to more nationwide demonstrations, resulting in the Afrikaner South-African government declaring a state of emergency. The government subsequently arrested 18.000 people and banned the African National Congress (ANC) and PAC, labelling them as criminal organisations.[5] The international community protested against the crisis that unfolded in South Africa. This protest resulted in a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 1 April 1960, stating that the Apartheid regime in South Africa caused segregation and racial discrimination and was a danger for international peace and security.[6] From then onwards, Apartheid in South-Africa would become a human rights issue. The international community pressured South-Africa demanding change.[7] As such, the Sharpeville massacre marks the start of the global anti-Apartheid movement worldwide.[8]

The shooting at Sharpeville has become the symbol of a turning point in South Africa's history. The aftermath resulted into a severe crisis for the South African government. There were domestic struggles with public order, pressure from the international community

[2] *Die Transvaler* 'Immigrante rig Protes teen Beswaddering' (29/04/1960); National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Directorate of Immigration,access number 2.15.68. inv. no. 2604 report Consulate-General Johannesburg about the meeting to the Embassy in Pretoria 02/05/1960 (Henceforth NL-HanA, SZW/Emigration, 2.15.68 inv. no.).

[3] Own translation: 'ter voorkoming van eenzijdige en tendentieuze berichtgeving over Zuid-Afrika in de Nederlandse pers', NL-HanA, SZW/Emigration, 2.15.68 inv. no. 2604, report Consulate-General Johannesburg about the meeting to the Embassy in Pretoria 02/05/1960.

[4] For a detailed reconstruction of the Sharpeville shootings see: Tom Lodge, *Sharpeville an Apartheid massacre and its consequences* (Oxford 2011), chapter 3: 75-109.

[5]Lodge, *Sharpville an Apartheid massacre and its consequences*, 235-236; Stefan de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto. Nederlands regeringsbeleid ten aanzien van Apartheid, 1960–1977* (Den Haag 1999) 81.

[6] UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1960*, [questions relating to the situation in the Union of South Africa], 1 April 1960, S/RES/134 (1960). Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/134(1960)

[7] Barbara Henkes, 'Shifting Identifications in Dutch-South African Migration Policies (1910-1961)' *South African Historical Journal* 68:4 (2016) 641-669, 664.

[8] Adrian Guelke, *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (London 2005) 101.

concerning human right issues, and a widespread global denunciation of their racial politics. This re-shaped their relation with foreign states and led to recurring clashes within the United Nations. Furthermore, the withdrawal of foreign capital after Sharpeville set in motion a domestic economic recession.[9] Along this, Sharpeville proved to be a critical moment for governments with close ties to South Africa. Because of significant media attention and domestic political pressure, governments were forced to take a stance in the matter.

The impact of the Sharpeville shooting and the subsequent changing attitude towards South Africa affected migration. In the 1950s, South Africa was an important country for post-war European emigrants. Thousands of western-Europeans moved to South Africa in search of a better life. In the year of the Sharpeville shooting, for the first time in 15 years, South Africa saw more people leaving the country rather then entering.[10] The number of immigrants fell significantly in 1960, and only recovered slightly in the next years. Great Britain, The Netherlands and Germany were the main European providers of immigrants for South Africa. Graph 1. shows that after 1960 the numbers reach an all-time low for all three countries.



Based on appendix of immigration towards South Africa per country in: Sally Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants: National Identity and South Africa's Immigration Policies 1910–2008* (Johannesburg 2009) 270-274.

[9] For a concise overview of the Aftermath of Sharpeville in South Africa see: Lodge, *Sharpeville an Apartheid massacre and its consequences*, chapter 5, 163-234.
[10] 9,789 would enter the country, while 12,612 would leave it, Based on Anexure D in: F.G. Brownwell, *British Immigration to South Africa, 1946*-1970 (Pretoria 1985) 163.

When looking at the numbers in detail, it is clear that emigration from the Netherlands showed a significant decline in 1960. In 1958 and 1959, respectively 1,940 and 1,722 Dutch emigrants moved to South Africa. In 1960 and 1961, this decreased, and only 476 and 346 people would emigrate. Although the overall number of Dutch people moving to South Africa was low, this was a considerable decline. This is even more the case when considering there was a slight upsurge in emigration since 1957.

As the gathered Dutch emigrants already hinted, the Sharpeville massacre was widely covered in the Dutch press. The media reported extensively about the Sharpeville shooting and its aftermath. It took on an opinionizing role and started to question Apartheid as a way to govern a country. Political parties started to question bilateral relations with South Africa, and pressured the Dutch Cabinet to take a stance. Furthermore, civil society initiated gatherings, organised protest marches and founded anti-apartheid movements. It seemed that Dutch society was turning against the South African government and demanded appropriate action from the Dutch government. Taken this into account, it is not a strange thought to link the decline of Dutch emigration to South Africa with the commotion following Sharpeville in Dutch society.

However, historians have never critically assessed this connection between the crisis following the Sharpeville shooting and migration policies in the subsequent years. The steep decline in emigration hints towards such a connection. If relations between South Africa and other nations were re-aligned after the Sharpeville crisis, a change in migration policy is not a strange alteration. This relationship between crisis and policy change forms the base of this thesis. Do crises lead to a sudden policy change, or does policy change in a more incremental manner, barely affected by crises? How did this manifest itself in the Dutch (e)migration policies of the 1950s and 1960s? By exploring the Dutch emigration policies concerning South Africa before and after the Sharpeville massacre, this thesis tries to discern if there was a policy change after the Sharpeville 'crisis'. Can this possible change, or lack of change, provide a plausible explanation for the decline in emigration towards South Africa between 1960-1965? This thesis will answer the following question: *Did the crisis that emerged after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 lead to a change in Dutch emigration policies concerning South Africa between 1960-1965, and if so, how and why?*

Some historians have argued that the Sharpeville massacre had such a detrimental impact on Dutch-South African bilateral relations and conjointly the public perception about South Africa, that the steep decline of Dutch emigration towards South Africa after Sharpeville

is a consequence of this turn of events.[11] Their major explanation for the decline is the simple fact that the Dutch did not want to emigrate to South Africa anymore, because of its racist policies.[12] This thesis will pursue a different explanation. Another answer for the decline could be the involvement of the Dutch government in the process of emigration. The worsening bilateral relations between both countries after Sharpeville must have had an impact on the process of emigration. When the public opinion turned against South Africa, a crisis was at hand, and the government responded to the public outcry in a way that would have decreased the emigration towards South Africa. The Dutch state invested money and resources in emigration, so it was in its interest that the emigrants would succeed in their new country.[13] However, there were doubts about the feasibility of emigration towards South-Africa. When, through the rapidly changing situation in South Africa, the success of emigration was not so secure anymore, surely the Dutch government would have taken policy measures to prevent emigration towards South Africa after March 1960. This would explain the steep decrease in emigration after 1960.

By using the Netherlands as a case study, this thesis tries to offer a new perspective on the implications of the Sharpeville massacre. What happed at Sharpeville is widely seen as a significant turning point in South African history, but research has not focused on the migration perspective. Most literature discussing the Sharpeville massacre and its aftermath take the decline in emigration in the years following the massacre as an evident consequence of the changing perceptions of South Africa, and place it in a holistic hypothesis of general denunciation.[14] By closely discerning the societal and political debate in the Netherlands, this thesis tries to demonstrate how this crisis situation affected several policy areas and demanded a response from the Dutch government. It was a response that included reconsidering emigration policies regarding South Africa. This thesis will then try to analyse if there was a change in emigration policy, and if this change could have affected the emigration flow towards South Africa.

[11] Henkes, 'Shifting Identifications', 663-666; de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*; Herman Obdeijn en Marlou Schrover, *Komen en gaan, Immigratie en emigratie in Nederland vanaf 1550* (Amsterdam 2008) 224; Slaa 'Revitalising Stamverwantschap', 512.
[12] Henkes, 'Shifting Identifications', 663.
[13] Marlou Schrover and Marijke van Faassen, 'Invisibility and Selectivity: Introduction to the special issue on Dutch overseas emigration in the nineteenth and twentieth century', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 7:2 (2010) 3-31, 27.
[14] Henkes, 'shifting identifications in Dutch- South African migration policies', 663-664; Lodge, *Sharpeville and Apartheid massacre and its consequences*, 171; Coffey, *Does the Daily Rule Brittania*, 191-192; Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en Gaan*, 224; Sally Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 241-242.

Although this thesis focuses on the Netherlands, it is embedded in its historical context and takes into consideration all aspects that could have affected the Dutch case. Therefore, there will be a strong emphasis on the immigration policies of South Africa, which intertwine with the emigration policies of the Netherlands. Remarkably, in migration research emigration and immigration policies are often viewed in a singular dimension. This research will show how the emigration policies of the Netherlands were interdependent on the immigration policies of South Africa, and vice versa. By looking at how both policies and institutions were shaped and responsive to each other, this thesis offers a unique view on how governance of the same flow of migration can include different perspectives while having the same outcome.

The term governance is used as a signifier to cover and describe the performance of institutions, organisations and agents in carrying out the wishes of a governing political entity, while also paying attention to the wishes of that political entity.[15] Within this thesis governance is used to describe a mode of governing, a conceptual way to portray how the Dutch government dealt with emigration and as a political entity shaped, exerted and implemented its formal power through different institutions and actors.

The Netherlands proves to be an interesting country for this case-study. Historically, the Netherlands and South Africa had a special bond since the seventeenth century. This bond existed through a perceived kinship between the Afrikaner population and the Dutch. Afrikaner was the term (first used in the early eighteenth century) to describe a group of people in South Africa who descended from Dutch, German and French settlers in the seventeenth century.[16] Within the Netherlands and South Africa there was a notion of a so-called *stamverwantschap* (tribal ties) between both populations. This idea had its origin in the late nineteenth century when there was a widespread belief that every nation descended from a specific ancestral group or tribe in history. Fuelled by national sentiments during the Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-1902), the Afrikaners were considered as a group of farmers (*Boeren*) that descended from Dutch settlers at Cape of Good Hope in the seventeenth century. As such, they were seen as descendants to the population in the Netherlands. Besides this perceived ethnical ties, Afrikaners were also considered culturally connected to the Dutch. This connection was noticeable through similarities in language and shared religious and cultural conducts derived from Dutch Protestantism. When the Afrikaner population gained political power in South

[15] Francis Fukuyama, 'What is Governance', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration, and Institutions* 26:3 (2013) 347-368, 350-351.
[16] Fransjohan Pretorius, *A History of South Africa: From the Distant Past tot he Present Day* (Pretoria 2014) 224-225.

Africa halfway through the twentieth century, Dutch- South African bilateral relations increased and strengthened under the notion of *stamverwantschap*.[17]

Historiography

Historical research on post-war European emigration towards South Africa never gained the same attention as the emigration to Canada, Australia and the US. Research concerning Dutch post-war emigration is not an exception to this.[18] The lack of attention becomes most evident in an article written by historians Marlou Schrover and Marijke van Faassen who discuss the current state of historical research on Dutch overseas emigration. In their article, the South-African perspective on overseas migration is completely missing.[19] Their lack of attention is not unusual when reviewing the literature on Dutch emigration towards South Africa. There is only a relatively small corpus of historical research that focuses on the emigration from the Netherlands towards South-Africa.[20]

Historical research regarding the Dutch response to the Sharpeville massacre, widely acknowledge that this event was a turning point in Dutch-South African relations.[21] Emigration is sometimes integrated in this explanation. Obdeijn and Schrover connect the Sharpeville shooting with the decline in Dutch emigration towards South Africa in their book about Dutch immigration and emigration since 1550.[22] Barbara Henkes claims in an article on Dutch- South African migration policies that the Sharpeville incident was a clear marker that the Dutch government could not support emigration towards South-Africa anymore, since this supported racist nationalism. She also argued that the decline in numbers of emigrants shows that Dutch citizens were reluctant to emigrate to South-Africa because of racist politics.[23] Although she makes a strong argument, she only focuses on the way the Dutch government formally abstained from encouraging emigration towards South-Africa after Sharpeville, not on how they governed it. A monograph written by Stefan de Boer deals with Dutch government policy

[17] Bernard Slaa 'Revitalising Stamverwantschap: The Role of the *Nederlands Zuid-Afrikaanse Wergemeenschap* on Dutch-Afrikaner Relations in the Twentieth Century' *South African Historical Journal* 65:4 (2013) 504-525, 505-506, 509.
[18] There are several great articles and monographs on Dutch post-war emigration to South Africa. For a concise overview see: Schrover and van Faassen, 'Invisibility and Selectivity', 3-31.
[19] South Africa is only represented in a graph that shows the numbers of emigration from the Netherlands; Schrover and van Faassen, 'Invisibility and Selectivity', 19.
[20] Sally Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*; Wayne Graham Hendrickse, *Die Betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 1946–1961* (PhD diss., University of the Western Cape [UWC] 1984); Henkes, 'Shifting identifications'; A.P Du Plesis, *Die Nederlandse emigrasie na Suid-Afrika* (Amsterdam 1956).
[21] de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*; Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan,* 224; Bernard Slaa 'Revitalising Stamverwantschap, 511-512; Henkes 'Shifting identifications', 664.
[22] Herman Obdeijn and Marlou Schrover, *Komen en Gaan,* 223-224.
[23] Henkes, 'shifting identifications', 663.

regarding Apartheid between 1960-1977.[24] The focus of this monograph lies more in political and societal analyses of the situation, then that it focuses on emigration policies. Regardless, he sees emigration as an essential factor within the bilateral relations. The same holds for a dissertation by W.G. Hendricks that – although not very recent – provides detailed information about the response of the Dutch government during and after the Sharpeville massacre, but not how this was carried out on a policy level.[25] In general, the scope of the specific literature on emigration towards South-Africa is towards bilateral relations and shows a lack of attention for the way emigration was governed.

To tackle the lack of literature on this specific topic, a more general scope is needed to review the Dutch approach of emigration governance. Thus far, the most important work concerning this topic is the comprehensive book by Marijke van Faassen on the Dutch emigration system between 1945-1967.[26] Unfortunately, she does not focus on the Dutch-South African case separately as she does with Canada and Australia. To get an overview of the South African immigration policies, an authoritative work by Sally Peberdy proved essential. Her book: *Selecting Immigrants: National Identity and South Africa's Immigration Policies, 1910-2008* was vital for interpreting the South African immigration policies, the attitude of the government towards immigration, and the eventual interconnection with the Dutch emigration policies.

Ultimately, this thesis will serve as an addition to the literature concerning Dutch- South African post-war migration, which – as shown above – is small in scope and depth. South Africa proves to be a compelling case though. Despite the relatively low number of emigrants moving there during the 1950s and 1960s, the Dutch emigration apparatus – which consisted of governmental departments and non-governmental organisations – treated it as an important country of destination. Dutch authorities had policies and practices in place to help potential emigrants with their move to South Africa, and, they concluded extensive agreements with the South African government that favoured emigrants. It is precisely this strong involvement and investment in an emigration that was numerically unimportant that makes the South African case so compelling, especially from a policy perspective. The little scholarly attention for this topic creates an opportunity to assess the available literature in depth and fill gaps by using

[24] De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*.
[25] Hendrickse, *Die Betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika*.
[26] Marijke van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie. Het Nederlandse emigratiebestel in internationaal perspectief 1945-1967* (Groningen 2014).

primary sources. By exploring the Dutch governance emigration to South Africa during and after the Sharpeville crisis, this research creates a novel perspective on this matter.

Theoretical Framework: the crisis-policy change hypotheses

The main theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the relationship between crises and policy change. What coherently constitutes a crisis has been defined and redefined within the academic literature.[27] Currently the consensus is that what constitutes a crisis is context-dependent. In the first place, a crisis can be caused by exogenous factors. These are triggered by natural forces (tsunamis, epidemics, hurricanes, earthquake) or by deliberate actions caused by 'enemies' inside or outside the society (terrorists, international conflict, large scale disturbances, disruption of public order).[28] However, crises also manifest through 'malfunctions of a society's socio-technical and political-administrative systems'.[29] In this case, established institutions, policies and practices are contested and evoke resentment from the general public, the media, politicians and other stakeholders.[30] This thesis will explore the Sharpeville massacre as a crisis explained by the latter typology.

Because of the high impact of crises on affected societies, some scholars see them as causal drivers for significant and sudden, non-incremental policy change.[31] In this scenario, a crisis presents policymakers with a 'window of opportunity' in which there is potential for policy change.[32] Although a crisis, resulting in a 'window of opportunity, can create an opportunity for sudden and abrupt policy changes, there are also cases in which a crisis does not lead to policy change at all. Within the fields of public administration and political science, this is explained through the hypothesis that the complex nature of institutionalism, with many rules, practices and stakeholders, makes it extremely difficult to change policies and institutions, even in the wake of a crisis.[33] Some scholars argue that instead of a sudden change, policy and institutional change follow a specific path of incrementalism in which small adjustments over a more extended period will slowly create a more substantial policy change.

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[27] Arjen Boin, Allan Mcconnell and Paul't Hart, 'Governing After Crisis' in: Arjen Boin, Allan Mcconnell and Paul 't Hart (eds.), *Governing After Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning* (Cambridge 2010) 3-30, 3.
[28] Boin,'Governing After Crisis', 3.
[29] Boin, 'Governing after crisis', 3.
[30] Daniel Nohrstedt and Christopher M. Weible, 'The Logic of Policy Change after Crisis: Proximity and Subsystem Interaction', *Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy* 1:2 (2010) 1-32, 3.
[31] Nohrstedt, 'The logic of policy change after crisis', 3.
[32] Fleur Barbara Alink, *Crisis als kans? Over de relatie tussen crises en hervormingen in het vreemdelingenbeleid van Nederland en Duitsland* (Amsterdam 2006) 32.
[33] Boin, 'Governing after crisis', 5.

To explain the discrepancy between both scenarios, scholars have tried to theorise how crises manifest in different manners. They see the situational and contextual factors as essential elements to explain the impact, response and outcome of a crisis. As such, the scope and nature of a crisis play a decisive role in how a crisis can facilitate change. To clarify this, Boin et al. have distinguished three types of crises that require different responses and therefore facilitate possible change of policy differently.[34] Firstly, there are *incomprehensible crises* (9/11, Fukushima) which are so high in impact and unique in character that it leaves political space to frame the crisis in particular ways. The exogenous factors of these crises make it easy for governments to respond in an authoritative manner. The second form of crisis is a *mismanaged crisis*, which is characterized by failures within institutions or on a policy level. These failures might be real, but could also be mere allegations. They create a weakness in the legitimacy of the ruling elite, which, as a result, can be exploited by political opponents, the media and other stakeholders. The last type of crisis is an *agenda-setting crisis*. These form of crises 'hit a nerve' and expose broader societal issues and fears. Often, this type of crisis will lead to a spill over, which moves beyond the incident and will instigate a broader debate covering multiple policy domains. As will be argued in the remainder of this thesis, the Sharpeville massacre will serve as an *agenda-setting* crisis for the Dutch government. The bloodbath in Sharpeville set in motion a broader societal debate that covered several policy domains, including that of migration.

As there are different types of crises, Boin et al. also differentiate between several ways that policy can change after a crisis. Firstly, there can be a *paradigm shift*, which implies a radical change of policies, organisations or even political systems. Such a shift is a rare occurrence, with just a few examples over the past decades. A different way in which policy can change after a crisis is *policy reform*. This change occurs when policy principles and institutional values become subject to a fundamental change which would not have occurred under normal circumstances. In this case, a crisis serves as a window of opportunity in which change can suddenly take place. There can also be incremental change after a crisis, which they call *fine-tuning*. This change implies modest alterations in policies, procedures and practices in the wake of crises.[35] Although not explicitly mentioned by Boin et al., the lack of policy change after a crisis can also be an outcome while exploring the relationship between crises and policy reform. This lack of change can be the result of a so-called *historic record* of a policy area. It supposes that some institutions and policies are change-resistant due to their proven track

[34] Ibidem, 5.
[35] Boin, 'Governing after Crisis', 16-17.

record. They retain funding, support and trust, even if a crisis exposes them.[36] In this case, policy does not change in the wake of a crisis because the institution is averted to such measures. Ultimately, these four forms of policy change in the wake of a crisis are not fixed directions; they provide just several broad possibilities on how policy change after a crisis is observable.

When discussing policy change through crises, it is crucial to explore the possible role that individual actors with a high degree of authority play in this process. Some scholars have argued that during a crisis, so-called *policy entrepreneurs* '…bring policy, politics and problem streams together, and then trigger policy change…'.[37] During a 'window of opportunity', when there is a higher chance of receptivity from other actors and stakeholders, they have a chance to successfully advocate for policy change as a solution to the problem at hand.[38] Although it is unproven that *policy entrepreneurs* have a significant influence on the outcome of policy change after crises, scholars agree that change is improbable if high officials are not in favour of change.[39] In other words, if high officials within the Dutch emigration system did not support or instigate policy change after Sharpeville, it was likely that change would not occur.

The crisis-policy change hypothesis will serve as the common thread throughout this thesis. Using contemporary insights from the social sciences within historical research can be a precarious undertaking. However, when researching governmental, institutionalised policies in the 1950s and 1960s, the mechanisms at play are seemingly very similar nowadays. By using this contemporary hypothesis and engaging with it in a historical context, it can, to the contrary, offer a novel insight for the social sciences as well as for historical research.

Methods & Materials

This thesis consists of three chapters, each with a different emphasis on method and material. The first chapter provides a background, discerning the historical context of the Dutch-South African emigration flows, politics and policies surrounding them. For this first chapter, mainly secondary literature has been used, while some information comes from primary sources.

The second chapter analyses if the Sharpeville massacre, and especially its aftermath, could be seen as a crisis for the Dutch government. An analysis of the public debate, as shaped by the media, politics and civil society was undertaken to clarify this. The response of the media is dissected with a quantitative and qualitative method. For the quantitative side, the historical

[36] Ibidem, 19.
[37] Sabine Sauruger and Fabien Terpan, 'Do crises lead to policy change? The multiple streams framework and the European Union's economic governance instruments', *Policy Sciences*, 49 (2016), 35-53, 36.
[38] Sauruger and Terpan, 38.
[39] Alink, *Crisis als kans*, 41.

database of digitised Dutch newspapers named *Delpher* was used. Although this database does not contain all the printed press in the Netherlands – many regional newspapers are not included –, it covers all the major national newspapers. This makes it a useful tool for newspapers analysis on a national scale. The database offers a novel way to review the role of the media on a public debate by analysing quantitative data. Within *Delpher*, there is a possibility to search for keywords within a specific time frame. The search results show how many newspaper articles have been published mentioning the keywords within that specific timeframe. This method has been used to create a comprehensive overview of the number of Dutch newspapers articles about the Sharpeville massacre, South Africa and Apartheid. Working with keywords in a database can provide a distorted image of the reality. Some newspaper articles only mention a keyword once within in a different context, while others can be a long read about the topic you are aiming for. Taking this into account, *Delpher* is still a useful tool to analyse how often the Sharpeville massacre, South Africa and Apartheid saw coverage in the Dutch printed media over a specified period. By combining keywords and cross-checking results, it is possible to create an accurate quantitative analysis.

The third chapter analyses if the Sharpeville massacre led to a change of Dutch policy regarding emigration. For this analysis, archives in the National Archive in The Hague were used to assess how Dutch emigration policies were shaped and possibly changed over time.[40] In these archives, reports, personal letters, internal communication, official agreements, year-reports, council minutes, agendas and much more is preserved. The vast scope of these archives made a methodological approach necessary to reconstruct if the Dutch emigration bodies changed their policies regarding South Africa after Sharpeville. A top-down approach was used to achieve this. As mentioned earlier in the theoretical section, it is likely that policy change only occurs when high officials are instigating or at least supporting change. As such, this top-

[40] National Archives, The Haque, Dutch Embassy in South-Africa [Pretoria] and the Consulate-General in Johannesburg and Cape Town, access number 2.05.268 (Henceforth NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268 inv. no.); National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Directorate of Immigration, access number 2.15.68 (Henceforth NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68 inv. no.); National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Dutch Emigration Service, access number 2.15.72. (Henceforth NL-HanA, SZW/ Dutch Emigration Service, 2.15.72 inv. no.); National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Council of Emigration, access number 2.15.71. (Henceforth, NL-HanA, SZW/ Council of Emigration, 2.15.71 inv. no.); National Archives, The Hague, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Emigration Board, access number 2.15.70. (Henceforth, NL-HanA, SZW/ Emigration Board, 2.15.70 inv. no.); National Archive The Hague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Code Archive 1955-1964, access number 2.05.118 (Henceforth NL-HanA Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Code Archive 1955-1964, 2.05.118, inv. no.)

down approach merely means that in the initial analyses of the archival material, the policy 'making' bodies were given priority.

Chapter 1: South African immigration and Dutch emigration policies in historical perspective (1945-1960)

This first chapter provides the historical context of this thesis. To analyse policy change after a crisis, it is necessary to first establish what policies were in place and how these policies came about before the crisis. Firstly, there will be a thorough review of South African's state steered immigration policies, the reasoning behind these policies and changes that took place throughout the years. Secondly, the Dutch emigration policies after the Second World War and throughout the 1950s will be analysed. Within this analysis, there will be an emphasis on the objectives of the Dutch government, and the policies and institutions that were created to secure these objectives.

1.1 South Africa's immigration policies 1945-1960: The creation of an Afrikaner nation-state

Although it would be interesting to give an in-depth overview of the history of South-Africa since the seventeenth century leading up to the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, this will not serve the purpose of this research. Therefore, the historical overview in the twentieth century, with a strong emphasis on immigration policies.

When reviewing the immigration policies of South Africa in the twentieth century, it is noticeable that race and nationhood played an important role. The 1913 Immigrants Regulation Act cemented – by excluding 'non-white' immigrants – the racial division firmly within their immigration policy, and made clear that South-Africa was supposed to be a majority 'white' nation.[41] In the decades that followed, this idea of 'whiteness' and the building of a white nation through immigration would become even more restrictive. Prospective 'white' immigrants needed to be related to, or from, what they saw as the 'original stocks' of the country, being British and Afrikaner. Others, while being 'white', could contaminate these 'original stocks'. They were a potential danger to the nation-state and the national identity. To tackle this issue, the South African parliament adopted the Aliens Act in 1937, which installed an Immigrants Selection Board tasked with granting and refusing residence permits. Although the new Act hindered immigration towards South-Africa for almost everybody, the primary purpose of this

[41] Peberdy, *Selecting immigrants*, 85.

Act was to prevent Jewish migration to South Africa, which was increasing after Hitler came to power.[42]

During WWII, overall immigration numbers dropped well below a thousand a year, but the South African economy grew immensely due to the development of the industrial sector fuelled by the war. The economic growth meant that there was a shortage of labour, especially for gold mining- and manufacturing industries. At that time the ruling government, led by prime minister Jan Smuts of the United Party, started to envision an inclusive immigration policy to tackle the labour shortage. In July 1946, Smuts asked his officials to develop a policy that would administer 'suitable means by which the European population of South-Africa could be increased through immigration'.[43] According to this policy the country needed immigrants to support the growing economy and to counterbalance the growth of the black population. It recommended the establishment of an immigration council and immigrants selection committees in London, The Hague and Rome. These measures were undertaken to foster the recruitment of immigrants in countries of origin, and efficiently arrange employment, transport and settlement for the new immigrants. The government wanted to preserve the 'stocks' from which the 'white' population descended, so they primarily wanted to increase immigration from The Netherlands, since the Dutch were *stamverwant* to the Afrikaners. However, the Dutch government was not keen to comply with this plan. They did not actively promote and facilitate emigration of farmers and skilled labourers because they were deemed necessary to rebuild the country.[44] Belgians and Germans were also seen as suitable immigrants by the South African government. However, Belgium had a similar attitude as the Netherlands and Germans were classified as 'enemy aliens' until 1948 and could not apply for permanent residence in South Africa. [45]

The way that South Africa dealt with immigration during the 1950-s went hand in hand with the emergence of the Apartheid system during the rule of the National Party (NP) after 1948. As Sally Peberdy strikingly argues:

[42] Brownwell, *British immigration to South Africa*, 16.
[43] As referenced by Peberby, *Selecting Immigrants*, : SAB A326 Box 3 Item 7, "Memorandum" from D.D. Forsyth, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, 10/7/1946.
[44] van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie*, 56.
[45] Brownwell, *British Immigration to South Africa*, 26.

> ‘Unlike the United Party, which saw immigration as a way of shortening up the numerical imbalance between white and black and strengthening white South Africa, the National Party saw immigration as a threat to its national aspirations, its visions of (white) South African national identity and possibly even the implementation of Apartheid.’[46]

The National Party saw immigration as a danger to the domestic job- and housing market. White immigrants were taking jobs, monopolising higher-paid positions, and were unwanted competition on the housing market.[47] As winners of the 1948 election, the NP would utilize their power to start an Afrikaner nationalist nation-building project. This project would eventually lead to the well-known Apartheid system.

When reviewing the overall immigration numbers in the 1950s, it is notable that the NP began to implement more restrictive immigration policies. Firstly, the control of emigration reverted back to the Department of Interior making immigration a domestic affair. Secondly, a new bureaucratic apparatus was established, which introduced new policies, procedures and practices regarding immigration. These measures would re-align the focus of the government on recruiting skilled Dutch and German immigrants while applying more restrictive measures on British immigrants from entering. Thirdly, new citizenship legislation affected British immigrants who were already in South Africa. An internal report of the Department of Interior critiqued the privileged status of British immigrants originating from their exemption of the 1937 Alien Act. The report concluded that British subjects should undergo the same treatment as other aliens.

This hostile attitude of Afrikaners towards the British dates back to turn of the twentieth century when two wars between the Boer (Afrikaner) republics and the British Cape Colony resulted into the annexation and later unwanted incorporation of both republics into the Union of South Africa in 1910. The Union was part of the British Commonwealth, which meant that there was a strong British influence in the country. Although Afrikaans was a recognised official language in the Union, and their rights were firmly acknowledged within the British dominion, there was a strong antagonism from the Afrikaner population towards the English speaking population. The cultural and religious differences were seen as insurmountable and

[46] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 95.
[47] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 96.

were continuously contested. Furthermore, the Afrikaner population – who were devout Calvinist – showed a strong aversion towards British liberalism and their belief in a free-trade economy. As such, when the NP came to power, they did everything in their power to strengthen the Afrikaner population and contain the British influence.[48]

In August 1948, the new government outlined its renewed immigration policy. This new policy aimed to protect the white population from threats posed by immigrants. It was supposed to protect 'the composition of the European population and its way of life' and stay aware of 'a world-outlook and an outlook on life foreign to that generally current in South-Africa'.[49]

The new immigration policies were not received well by the political opposition. They disagreed with the reserved stance towards immigrants and claimed that there was a huge demand for white skilled labour from abroad. Furthermore, the opposition saw immigration as the only way to address the imbalance between the black and white population in the country. The shortage of white labour was obstructing economic growth, a problem felt in the private sector. The estimation was that by 1955 there would be a shortage of between 86,000 – 90,000 white skilled workers. Eventually the South African government acknowledged the labour shortage and would start to actively recruit immigrants from abroad in 1953.[50]

This more open approach towards immigration, bolstered by active recruiting activities, did not lead to a significant upsurge in immigration. Concerns about the danger of immigration and the subsequent strict selectivity of the government led to a conservative immigration flow. As shown in graph 2. below, there is no growth in overall immigration numbers after 1953. Furthermore, there is no considerable higher number of immigrants from the Netherlands or Germany. The British immigrant remained dominant during this decade. It seems that the recruiting activities of South Africa in The Netherlands and Germany did not attract more people to South Africa.

[48] For a concise overview of the Afrikaner-British strugles see: Pretorius, *A History of South Africa,* chapter 13: 'Afrikaner Nationalism', 286, 301-305.
[49] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 97.
[50] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants,* 103-104.



Based on appendix of immigration towards South Africa per country, in: Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 270-274.

Throughout the 1950s, South Africa maintained a protectionist approach towards immigration. The Afrikaner South African government was concerned with the absorptive capacity of the society after which large scale state-supported immigration would emerge. Through the eyes of the Afrikaner government, immigrants were a possible threat to the character of the South African state. Prospective immigrants should fit into the national pattern and way of life. This was a way of life that was dominated by Afrikaner nationalism and celebrated a 'free and independent existence for Afrikanerdom'.[51] The Afrikaner nation-building project led to a narrative in which there were certain countries of 'origin' (the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium) who could provide suitable immigrants. The British – who before 1948 had belonged to these countries of 'origin' – were seen as a threat to the newfound state because of their imperialism, egalitarian liberalism and Anglican Protestantism. However, because South Africa was part of the British Commonwealth, British citizens had legislative privileges which meant they could not be easily refused as immigrants.[52]

After 1948, the new Afrikaner rule in South Africa led to economic growth and a demand for white skilled labour from abroad. In the mid-1950-s, forced to solve the labour shortage, the government tried to set up policies to recruit, assist and support immigration from the countries of 'origin'. These new policies were not especially effective and failed to recruit

[51] T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley 1975) 15.
[52] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 90-91.

sufficient skilled labour that was required to fill the vacancies. It seemed the South African government rather ignored the labour shortage than to open up the borders as Smuts' government had done after the Second World War.

1.2 The Dutch emigration objective

The Dutch emigration policies in the 1950s were a state-steered affair, with non-governmental and semi-governmental organisations playing an essential role. Emigration policies were constructed and executed in a system based on two fundamental objectives. The first objective was to maintain good relations with all the receiving countries because the Dutch government wanted emigration possibilities to increase.[53] The government wanted to make sure that there were plenty of opportunities for the potential emigrants. This multitude of options created a strong negotiation position when discussing terms and conditions with the receiving countries. As a result, the Dutch state negotiated extensive bilateral emigration agreements with receiving countries and made sure they sustained good relationships with them.[54] Canada, Australia and the US were the most popular destinations for Dutch emigrants. South Africa was the fourth destination and was considered as an important country for emigration. Graph 3. below shows that the peak of Dutch emigration was in 1952 and slowly decreased thereafter.

[Graph 3.] Dutch emigration in total, and per most important receiving countries between 1950-1965



Source: NL-HanA, SZW/Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. nr. 186-187. Statistical year reports on emigration and immigration numbers by the Central Bureau of Statistics (1950-1965).

[53] Schrover and van Faassen, 'Invisibility and Selectivity', 24.
[54] Ibidem, 22.

Despite this decline from 1952 onwards, the Dutch authorities still wanted to keep the emigration possibilities alive. Albeit relatively small in numbers, this was also the case for emigration to South Africa.[55] As a result, the Dutch government had extensive agreements, policies, and institutions in place that guided the emigration process towards South-Africa, before and after the emigrants arrived.

The second objective within this emigration scheme was to ensure the success of the emigrant in their new country. Emigration was seen as a solution to unemployment, and the perceived threat of overpopulation during the late 1940s and early 1950s made it so that the Dutch government invested money and resources in the successful emigration of its citizens. They did not want emigrants who could not support themselves financially or repatriated after a short period of time.[56]

The people that emigrated during the 1950s were considered undesirable. These undesirables were mainly people who could work in sectors where there was unemployment or people with an agricultural background who had no chance of owning a farm.[57] In the case of Dutch migration to South Africa, Dutch collaborators with the Nazi regime form an interesting group. These collaborators were seen as undesirable by the Dutch state. South Africa stance against Nazi-Germany during the Second World War was ambiguous. Although South Africa was part of the Allied forces during the Second World War, many Afrikaner nationalists had sympathised with the Nazi regime. Therefore former Nazi collaborators thought South Africa was an attractive destination.[58] The archival material provides some clues that point in that direction. Right after the Second World War, the Dutch government labelled these collaborators as undesirable and tried to make a deal with South Africa to send them there as emigrants. A letter of the Commissioner of Emigration towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1946 shows that the South African government was not very fond of the idea that the Dutch government encouraged collaborators to migrate to South Africa.[59] The ruling pro-British government led by Smuts did not want them.

Although undesired by both states, the archival material shows that some collaborators ended up in South Africa in the 1950s. Correspondence between the Dutch ambassador in Pretoria and a Dutch immigrant in 1954-55 provide some details about this matter. On 12

[55] Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan*, 223-224.
[56] Henkes, 'Shifting identifications', 667.
[57] Schrover and van Faassen, 'Invisibility and Selectivity', 22-23.
[58] Henkes, 'Shifting identifications', 658.
[59] NL-Hana, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2611. Letter from Visser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28/12/1946.

October 1954, a letter was sent by A.E Koenes to the ambassador. Koenes was an old inmate of *Kamp Amersfoort*, a German concentration camp in the Netherlands during the Second World War. In the letter Koenes described that at a Dutch gathering welcoming the Dutch prince Bernhard on a visit to South-Africa, he recognised a former collaborator. He was displeased with this and wrote that it would give him and others great pleasure if the Dutch government would try to prevent collaborators from emigrating to South-Africa.[60] The Dutch ambassador replied by stating that he hoped that the so-called collaborator learned from his punishment and would become a respected citizen again. He also stressed that the Dutch government could not prevent collaborators from emigrating because they were free to do so.[61] A week later the ambassador received a letter from the supposed collaborator Van Weele requesting a conversation with him.[62] What happened during that conversation becomes clear in another letter that was sent to Koenes two days later. It seemed that Koenes and his friends had tried to vilify Van Weele at his employer, which endangered his job. Losing his job could have implications for his livelihood, which would mean the Dutch state would need to take care of him; he was still a Dutch citizen after all. The ambassador requested Koenes and his friends to leave Van Weele alone and to let him build a successful life in South-Africa.[63]

This example provides some information about former collaborator's emigration towards South Africa. It also shows that the Dutch authorities indeed tried to ensure that the emigration of its citizens would be a successful undertaking. If van Weele lost his job, there was a good chance that the Dutch state had to take care of him. This was a highly undesirable situation. The ambassadors claim that it could not prevent collaboratos from emigrating to South Africa is doubtable. Dutch authorities thoroughly investigated all potential emigrants.[64] This investigation included a judicial and political background check. Such a background check was demanded by several receiving countries as an entry requirement. The Dutch government agreed to this because they wanted to prevent the secret services of the receiving countries to gather this intelligence on Dutch soil themselves.[65] Given this thorough background check, it is likely that the Dutch authorities knew they were sending former collaborators to South Africa.

[60] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no.124. Letter A.E. Koenes towards the ambassador, 12/10/1954.
[61] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no.124. Letter Ambassador to Koenes, 12/10/1954.
[62] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no.124. Letter van Weele requesting an audience with the Ambassador, 19/10/1954.
[63] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no.124. Letter Ambassador to Koene, 21/10/1954.
[64] van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie*, 105-106.
[65] Ibidem, 107.

1.3 The Dutch post-war emigration apparatus 1945-1960

Since this thesis is concerned with policy change within the Dutch state-steered emigration system, it is important to explain how this system functioned and had its origin. This paragraph discerns the multi-faceted institutionalisation of emigration in The Netherlands after the Second World War.

The contours of the Dutch emigration system were shaped at the end of the Second World War. The Dutch government in exile started to explore the idea of emigration as a way to deal with social-economic issues in the reconstruction years right after the war had ended. A report written by the *Study Group for Reconstruction Problems* in June 1944, claimed that emigration was necessary and that the government should actively encourage and facilitate this after the most important post-war restoration was completed.[66] The importance of the post-war restoration led to a reserved stance regarding emigration in the years right after the war. Large scale emigration of farmers and skilled labour was unwanted; they were needed to rebuild the country. This attitude was abandoned in 1949, and the government started an active emigration policy. As a result of economic setback, the Dutch government decided to implement a new socio-economic scheme around two pillars: further industrialisation and large-scale emigration. The fear of post-war unemployment rates and the threat of overpopulation led to the belief that structural unemployment could only be solved with state-steered emigration.[67]

Before this state-steered emigration went into effect, Dutch emigration had been organised in The Dutch Emigration Law of 1936. This law was meant to ensure the quality of future emigrants' transit conditions, make it unlawful to unjustly inform prospective emigrants regarding employment chances, or to coerce them into agreements that they did not comprehend.[68] As a result, every advisory service regarding emigration required a permit. These permits were granted by the *Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland*, a governmental organisation. This organisation had several tasks. It provided advisory services, supported emigrants before and after they left, and conducted research regarding residence possibilities and labour opportunities abroad. Furthermore, they dealt with the administrative matters surrounding emigration.[69] After the Second World War, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) emerged to represent and help prospective emigrants. Besides new NGOs, existing NGOs started to open up emigration bureaus within their organisations. These were, for

[66] Report as cited by: van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie*, 51.
[67] G. T. H. J. Delfgaauw, 'Emigratie als bijdrage tot vermindering van de bevolking van Nederland', *De Economist* 101:1 (1953) 337-359; Henkes 'Shifting identifications', 667. van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie*, 53.
[68] Delfgauuw, 'emigratie als bijdrage tot vermindering van de bevolking van Nederland', 357.
[69] van Faassen, *Polder en Emigratie*, 61, 81.

instance, agricultural organisations, but also religious organisations, both protestant and catholic. After 1946 the *Rijksarbeidsbureau* (government labour department), part of the Ministry of Social Affairs, would establish an emigration department to serve as a bridge between the domestic side of emigration and the emerging international issues. In 1951 the Minister of Social Affairs suggested the creation of an emigration system with different bodies, in which a mixture of private initiatives, organisations and government bodies was represented. This new system went into effect after the adoption of the new Emigration Law in 1952.[70]

Within this new system, three administrative bodies were implemented; a Commissioner of Emigration, a Council of Emigration and an Emigration Board.[71] The Emigration Board was tasked with arranging the practical side of this new state-steered emigration.[72] For this practical part, the board would install an executive bureau: the *Nederlandse Emigratie Dienst* (NED). This Dutch Emigration Service would be concerned with the executive branch of the new law. They were tasked with coordinating advisory services, and process applications and make selections. Furthermore, the NED was responsible for transit towards the new host-countries, and the actual dealings within the new host countries.[73] Specialised departments in the host countries provided services abroad.[74]

After 1952, emigration had become a state-steered affair in which private organisations played an important role. Through provisions in the new law, government- and private organisations were forced to cooperate and create a consistent practice of governing emigration. Within this new constellation, the NED was the main bureau which selected, processed and guided citizens willing to migrate. Besides the NED, NGOs continued to play a vital role in the recruiting and guiding of potential emigrants, and it was involved in the policymaking surrounding emigration.

1.4 Conclusion

When reviewing Dutch migration to South Africa in the 1950-s from both an immigration and emigration perspective, it becomes clear that migration was an important policy area for both governments. Using legislation and policies, both tried to control who was entering or leaving the respective countries. In the 1950s, both governments saw migration as essential to the construction and reconstruction of their nation-state. Although economic growth demanded an

[70] Ibidem, 58-60.
[71] Ibidem, 68.
[72] Ibidem, 69.
[73] Ibidem, 69.
[74] Ibidem, 105-106.

influx of skilled labour from abroad, the South African government worried that a massive influx of migrants could pose a threat to their Afrikaner nation-building project. As such, there were restrictions on immigration. Only those who were an asset to the nation-building project were allowed into the country.

The Dutch government saw emigration as a way to solve the post-war economic and demographic struggles. As a result, the Dutch created a multifaceted emigration system in which governmental and non-governmental organisations cooperated to make emigration a successful undertaking for its citizens. Within this system, roughly 400,000 Dutch left the Netherlands in search of a better life abroad. Many of these Dutch emigrants, who were deemed as undesirable by the Dutch authorities, were seen as desirable by the Afrikaner South African government. As *stamverwanten* they were seen as potential assets to the country. Although this sounded like a match made in heaven, the number of Dutch citizens who emigrated towards South Africa stayed relatively low. There were two reasons for this. Although the South African government needed skilled labour from abroad, they still maintained a cautious and conservative stance towards immigration. This resulted in low investment recruiting activities abroad. Because immigration controls were still strict, this did not lead to a vast influx of Dutch immigrants. This strict control becomes apparent when reviewing a complaint sent by the emigration attaché in February 1960 to the immigration department of South-Africa. This letter shows that the Dutch authorities had many more prospective emigrants waiting to move to South Africa than were let through by the South African immigration authorities. Between 1956-1959, 9,838 Dutch citizens were willing and cleared to move, but the South African authorities only let 6,653 enter the country.[75]

Australia, the US, Canada and New Zealand made it difficult for South Africa to attract the desired Dutch emigrant. The recruiting efforts of the other countries were more successful than South Africa's and the Dutch emigration system made sure that prospective emigrants had a multitude of possible destinations.

Nevertheless, there was still a significant emigration to South Africa in the 1950s. Graph 4 shows there was a slight upward trend in emigration starting in 1957 before falling drastically in 1960.

[75] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 124: Report emigration attaché towards the South-African immigration department,16/02/1960.



Based on appendix of immigration towards South Africa per country, in: Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 270-274.

This notion of an upward trend is emphasised by the aforementioned letter from the emigration attaché, which claimed that not all of the applications were approved by the South African government. Despite this seemingly upward trend, these numbers would fall drastically in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre.

Chapter 2: The aftermath of Sharpeville in the Dutch public domain; a crisis at hand?

To determine if there was a crisis for the Dutch government after Sharpeville, this chapter analyses the responses to the event in Dutch society. By analysing what happened in the media, politics and the public domain, it seeks to establish in what manner the events at Sharpeville resonated in the Dutch public debate, imposed a crisis, and could have influenced the Dutch government in revising their emigration policies.

2.1 Dutch perspective on South Africa's Apartheid system (1950-1960)

In the 1950s the Dutch public opinion about South Africa and its Apartheid regime was ambivalent. There were humanitarian objections against the racial segregation but also concerns about what would happen to the white population when Apartheid was abolished.[76] The leading thought was that abolishment of Apartheid would lead to chaos, the downfall of the white population, and an expansion of the communist sphere.[77] South Africa's government and their stance against notions of human equality were seen as an important bulwark against Communism and communist influence in Africa.[78] Contrary to this, the black nationalist movement in South Africa was seen as sympathising with communist ideas, and they were thought to have strong ties with the second world.[79] South Africa with its racial segregation was a perfect example for the Soviet Union which claimed that choosing capitalism meant choosing racism.[80]

When the black nationalist movement in South-Africa gained ground in the late 1950s, the attitude in the Netherlands shifted in favour of abolishing Apartheid. The fear grew that sustaining racial politics would endanger the white population of South Africa.[81] At the end of the 1950s, both Apartheid and emigration found their way into the parliamentary and public debate repeatedly.[82] In February 1957, the Dutch Senate discussed whether the Dutch government should continue to subsidise emigration to a country where human rights were violated.[83] This did not lead to a change in policy. Despite pressure from within Parliament and

[76] De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 86.
[77] Ibidem, 86.
[78] Guelke, *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 189.
[79] Ibidem, 81.
[80] Meredith L. Roman, 'Forging Freedom, Speaking Soviet Anti-Racism: African Americans and Alternate Strategeis of Fighting American Racial Apartheid, *Journal of Socialist Theory* 39:3 (2011) 365-383, 366.
[81] De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 86.
[82] Henkes, 'Shifting identifications', 662.
[83] Kamerstukken I, 1956/57 4500 XII nr. 65, minutes plenary session on 08/02/1957, page 6.

the Senate, the Dutch government always maintained a neutral stance regarding Apartheid in South Africa. It was seen as an internal affair. This neutral stance was also taken when South Africa was discussed on global level in the United Nations.[84]

The conservative attitude of other Western states with regards to South-Africa influenced the Dutch position. This was unacceptable for representatives from the Dutch colonies Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, who had a predominantly black population. As part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and thus with a vote, they kept advocating for a formal denunciation within the United Nations.[85] Continuously pressured by these delegates, the Dutch delegation abstained from a vote in a special political commission of the United Nations in November 1959, but they added a critical explanation of the vote which stated that they:

> '…could not accept how the whites in South-Africa regard their black fellow-creatures.'[86]

Although pressured by Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, the Dutch government would keep this ambiguous stance towards South-Africa because they had significant economic interests in South-Africa. These interests, according to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisted of valuable industrial and commercial ventures and the increase of trade and shipping. Besides commercial and economic benefits, the Ministry also underlined the importance of South-Africa as an emigration country.[87]

2.2 Media

The media assumed a vital role in the aftermath of the massacre Sharpeville and the subsequent global-denunciation of Apartheid. Their extensive treatment of the massacre and the Apartheid system fuelled the global anti-Apartheid movement increased pressure on the South African government.[88] The day after the massacre, the Western media mainly reported on the violence that occurred during the protest. The media protested against Apartheid as a system to rule a country. Throughout the world demonstrations were held and anti-Apartheid movements emerged.

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[84] de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot* Soweto,197.
[85] Ibidem, 169.
[86] Ibidem, 79-80.
[87] Ibidem, 80.
[88] Coffey, *'Does the daily rule Britannia'* 192, footnote 11.

Dutch media used a similar discourse as that of the other western countries. They were crucial in steering the public debate towards a denunciation of Apartheid. A quantitative analysis using the newspaper database *Delpher* shows that the Sharpeville massacre gained considerable traction within the national daily press in the Netherlands. The local and regional printed press are included in this analysis. Within a year after the Sharpeville incident, there were 457 newspaper articles published mentioning Sharpeville.[89] More than half of these (235) were published within the first month after the incident. This averages over 7 articles per day in the first month.

When taking a broader scope of reports about South Africa, a total of 4,003 newspapers articles was published that mentioned South-Africa during that year. 1,047 of these articles were published in the first month after Sharpeville. Although the subject of these articles may vary in terms of relevance to this subject, it is safe to say that in the first month after Sharpeville at least 22 per cent of the articles about South-Africa were related to what happened in Sharpeville.[90] When reviewing a longer period, the number of newspapers articles containing 'South Africa' between 1952-1964 show a steep increase surrounding the Sharpeville massacre (graph 5 and graph 6).[91]

[Graph 5.] Newspaper articles containing 'Zuid Afrika' or 'Zuid-Afrika' between 01/01/1952 and 01/01/1964.



Source: Delpher.nl

[89] Search term 'Sharpeville' between 21/03/1960 and 21/03/1961; https://www.delpher.nl/nl/kranten/results.
[90] Search term 'Zuid-Afrika' between 21/03/1960 and 21/04/1960; https://www.delpher.nl/nl/kranten/result.
[91] This graph is somewhat distorted and shows the limitations of Delpher in providing a graphical illustration of data. It seems that there is a steady incline of newspaper articles about South-Africa between 1959-1960. When looking closer at that time period, there is actually a decline in articles during that year. It looks like this because technically it cannot make such a steep line towards early 1960. Although distorted in such a way, this graph shows clearly that before 1960 there was a somewhat steady reporting of around 2000 articles a year about South-Africa.

[Graph 6.] Newspaper articles containing ‘Zuid-Afrika’ or ‘Zuid Afrika’ between 12/06/1959 and 31/05/1960



Source: Delpher.nl

What is also notable when reviewing the printed press before and after Sharpeville, is that Apartheid gains more attention in the media after Sharpeville. This fits in the broader scholarly interpretation that Sharpeville sparked a global denunciation of Apartheid. In the first year after Sharpeville, 970 newspaper articles were written mentioning ‘Apartheid’. As shown in graph 7, Apartheid was barely mentioned in the Dutch newspapers during the 1950-s. After the Sharpeville shooting, there is a considerable increase in the coverage of Apartheid when writing about South Africa.

[Graph 7.] Newspaper articles containing ‘Apartheid.’ Between 01/01/1950 and 01/01/1970.



Source: www.delpher.nl

This brief analysis makes clear that the Sharpeville massacre drew attention from the printed press and that it increased reporting about South Africa and Apartheid in the following months and years. The number of articles published about South Africa almost doubled in 1960 when

compared to the previous years. Right after the incident, there is a steep rise in coverage about South-Africa. Of these articles, a little over a fifth dealt with what happened at Sharpeville. Furthermore, Apartheid becomes a more recurrent theme in the newspapers, a theme that was not so prominent before the Sharpeville massacre. As such, the Sharpeville shooting increased interest in South Africa, which mainly focused on the Apartheid system.

2.2.1 Reporting about Sharpeville

The media's extensive coverage of Sharpeville could have influenced the public debate in the Netherlands. This influence becomes evident when reviewing what the Dutch newspapers wrote about South Africa and Apartheid after Sharpeville. The newspapers that were analysed form a representative body of the nationally published daily newspapers. They have been selected in such a manner that they cover all political affiliations within the Dutch society at that time. The newspapers that were used for this analysis are: *Algemeen Handelsblad* (liberal right-wing), *De Telegraaf* (right-wing populist), *Het Vrije Volk* (ties to the Labour Party; Partij van de Arbeid), *De Volkskrant* (Catholic; Katholieke Volks Partij), *Trouw* (Protestant-Christian), *De Waarheid* (Communist newspaper of the Communist Party) and *het Parool* (social-democratic).

Right after the massacre, *Algemeen Handelsblad* reported that the 'bloodbath' might lead to a civil war.[92] *Trouw* adhered to this thought and saw the happenings at Sharpeville as the bankruptcy of the Apartheid politics. They found it unheard of that 80 per cent of the population was ruled by a 20 per cent minority, especially in a continent that saw freedom and self-determination as an emerging fact.[93] *De Volkskrant* called it a battlefield with a significant loss for the ruling government. They fully supported the protesting black population who were living under tyranny. If the government continued on the same foot, it would commit suicide.[94]

Het Vrije Volk and *De Waarheid* took a different approach. At first, they emphasised personal stories in their reports about what happened in Sharpeville.[95] A week after the massacre, *Het Vrije Volk* requested that the Dutch government voted against the discriminating race policies of the South-African government in the United Nations. By trying to influence government policy, *Het Vrije Volk* took a clear stance against the South African government.[96]

[92] 'bloedbad in Zuid-Afrika' and 'Zuidafrikaans drama', *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 22/02/1960.
[93] 'Blank en Zwart', *Trouw*, 24/03/1960.
[94] 'Teken aan de Wand, *De Volkskrant*, 23/03/1960.
[95] 'bloedig' and 'Negers in Sharpeville dachten dat de politie een grapje maakte', *Het Vrije Volk*, 22/03/960, 26/03/1960; 'Ieder fatsoenlijke mens is woeden over massamoord', 'Twee Journalisten waren ooggetuige van het bloedbad in Sharpeville', *De Waarheid*, 24/03/1960, 30/03/1960.
[96] 'Lawine', *Het Vrije Volk*, 30/03/1960.

The right-winged newspaper *De Telegraaf* was the only newspaper publishing a different opinion. Just as the other newspapers, they saw the Apartheid rule as a problem, but they wrote that it would be a crime if the white population would be overrun by the black population. They called upon the people of the Netherlands not to join the international opinion against the South African government so that they 'in this possibly decisive period could call upon one friend when in need'.[97]

Overall, the analysed Dutch national newspapers took a clear stance in the debate emerging directly after Sharpeville. Despite their seeming ideological differences, they almost all conveyed a similar message. They emphasised that there was a high possibility of violent conflict between the black and the white population of South-Africa after Sharpeville, a conflict that needed to be averted. Almost all newspapers showed support for the black protesters and what they stood for: freedom and equality. Within these articles, there is a threefold of attitudes of the newspapers with regards to Sharpeville. *Algemeen Handelsblad, De Volkskrant, Het Parool* and *Trouw* all reported on a more factual basis about South Africa and Sharpeville. They questioned the Apartheid regime and saw a dangerous situation emerging in South Africa. They showed impartiality in their reporting, but denounced the South African government for their racial politics. *De Waarheid* and *Het Vrije Volk* embraced a more advocative role in their reporting. They emphasised personal stories of the black population, took a clear stance against the South African government, and called upon the Dutch government to take a clear stance against South Africa. *De Telegraaf* was the only newspaper who took the side of the South-African government and saw a clear danger for the white population in South Africa if things went wrong.

2.2.2 Reporting about emigration towards South Africa

Over the following months, Dutch newspapers would keep reporting on South Africa and its Apartheid regime. Dutch emigration towards South Africa would become a topic of interest as well. Newspapers connected emigration towards South Africa with the racial politics, Apartheid and the unrest in the country.

Delpher reveals that the reporting on emigration to South Africa increased in the month following Sharpeville. Of the 109 newspaper articles mentioning emigration during this month, 38 were also mentioning South Africa.[98] The whole year before, there were only 36 articles

[97] 'opdat Zuid-Afrika in deze misschien beslissende periode althans op één vriend in nood kan rekenen'; 'Zuid-Afrika', *De Telegraaf*, 02/04/1960.
[98] Search term 'Emigratie' and 'Zuid-Afrika' between 21/03/1960 and 21/04/1960 via https://www.delpher.nl

published about emigration and South Africa. In the year following the Sharpeville shooting, of the 625 newspapers articles mentioning emigration, only 54 also mentioned South Africa. This shows that at first the happenings at Sharpeville drew greater attention to the emigration to South Africa, but also that these reports were not followed up upon in the months after Sharpeville. This was the case with articles mentioning 'South Africa' and 'Apartheid'.

The articles shed a light on the attitude of the newspapers regarding the emigration policies, and about the role of emigration in the public domain. A few days after the Sharpeville shooting, *De Volkskrant* reported on the decline of emigration towards South Africa due to their Apartheid regime. The numbers had been drastically decreasing since January 1960. The president of the *Katholieke Emigratie Centrale* (KEC), the Catholic NGO helping Dutch emigrants, saw the racial struggles within South Africa as a possible reason for the decline. They took a cautious approach when informing prospective emigrants about South Africa: 'we warn people about the racial struggles the same way as we warn the people about the Canadian winter'.[99] Another NGO, the general *Algemene Emigratie Centrale* (AEC), proclaimed in the same article that they also were cautious in how they shared information about South Africa.[100]

Het Parool reported on 30 March that despite voices for change, there would be no changes in the emigration politics by the Dutch government. The newspaper quoted a message from the minister of Social Affairs in the Dutch Senate. The prospective emigrants were free to choose their destination, without interference by the government. 'It would be a mistake if the government would use emigration as a political instrument'.[101]

A column by Johan Luger – who wrote daily under the pseudonym Pasquino – in *De Telegraaf* on 1 April 1960, questioned the support for emigration towards South Africa by the Dutch government. He condemned the racial politics of South Africa and saw the Dutch support for emigration to that country as a remarkable inconsequence.[102]

On 6 April, a day after a debate about South Africa in the Dutch Parliament, all the newspapers summarised the most notable moments. They all quoted Prime Minister Jan de Quay stating that 'emigration was the responsibility of the emigrant' and that all government facilities surrounding emigration towards South Africa would remain unchanged.[103]

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[99] 'Wegens Apartheidspolitiek: Emigratie Zuid-Afrika loopt snel terug', *De Volkskrant,* 26/03/1960.
[100] Ibidem.
[101] 'Zuid-Afrika: geen wijziging in emigratiepolitiek', *Het Parool,* 30/03/1960.
[102] 'Verboden … maar niet te straffen', *De Telegraaf,* 01/04/1960.
[103] 'Nederlandse kamer doet ernstig beroep tot bezinning parlement Z-A', *Algemeen Dagblad,* 06/04/1960; 'Tweede Kamer neemt motie aan', *Het Parool*, 06/04/1960; 'Regering wil Verwoerd ontzien', *De Waarheid,* 06/04/1960; 'Tweede Kamer stuurt motie naar Kaapstad', *De Volkskrant*, 06/04/1960; 'Kamermotie: „stop rassendiscriminatie'': Beroep op Z.-Afrika', *Trouw*, 06/04/1960; 'Kamer: Beroep op Z.-Afrika – geen protest', *De Telegraaf*, 06/04/1960; 'Ongewenste steun', *Het Vrije Volk,* 06/04/1960.

In July 1960, a new wave of reports about the emigration towards South Africa was published. The reason was a press conference by the commissioner of emigration B.W. Haveman, who stated that the government could no longer encourage emigration towards South Africa. He said that 'Those who want to emigrate to South Africa are free to do so, but should make this decision on their accordance'. *Algemeen Handelsblad* also quoted Haveman saying that Dutch citizens in South Africa were 'laughing about the concerns showed within the Netherlands about South Africa'. They did not share the opinion in The Netherlands about the volatile situation in South Africa and saw the recent disturbances as controllable and temporary.[104] In October 1960, *Het Parool* and *Trouw* reported on the discussions in Parliament concerning the state-steered emigration policies. Point of discussion was the support for the emigration to South Africa which was deemed as unwanted by some political parties.[105] The government emphasised that it was of the utmost importance to keep the continuity of the emigration policies intact, and this included the policies regarding South Africa.

What stands out in the the newspaper articles outlined above is the repeated mentioning of a decline emigration towards South Africa. This is mentioned right after Sharpeville and also in several articles in the months following the shooting. In these articles, the newspapers often tried to put what was happening in perspective by stating that the emigration to South Africa was in decline since 1960 because of their racial politics. Not only the press, but also the emigration supported NGOs were quoted stating that the Sharpeville shooting was a catalyst of a decline in emigration to South Africa. At first glance, this seems to be a correct assumption. The emigration to South Africa drastically declines in 1960 which makes the presumption of a 'Sharpeville-effect' convincing. But there are some indications that can offer a different perspective on this. In December 1959, there was a string of articles already mentioning the decline in emigration to South Africa.[106] As it turned out, especially for South Africa and Canada there was a considerable decline in applications. The US was the only country that showed a massive increase in Dutch immigrants, as a result of 11,000 repatriates from Indonesia being allowed into the country.

That the newspapers mentioned a decline in applications before Sharpeville, is precisely the reason why it is precarious to see a 'Sharpeville effect' in the decline in 1960. Emigration

[104] 'Regering moedigt emigratie naar Zuid-Afrika niet aan', *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 23/07/1960.
[105] 'Steun emigratie Z.-Afrika niet gewenst: afbreken relaties immigratielanden niet gewenst', *Het Parool*, 22/10/1960; 'Continuïteit van emigratiebeleid van grote betekenis', *Trouw*, 17/10/1960.
[106] 'Minder emigranten naar Zuid-Afrika', *De Waarheid*, 10/12/1959; 'Emigratie Loopt Terug: vooral Canada en Z.-Afrika minger in trek', *Trouw*, 10/12/1959; 'Dalende tendens in Emigratie, *Het Vrije Volk*, 10/12/1959; 'Emigratie loopt terug', *De Volkskrant*, 10/12/1959.

is a process that takes time. The decision to emigrate is not something done over the weekend, and there is a substantial amount of time between the decision, the application and the actual move abroad. There should be a delay in the so called 'Sharpeville-effect'. The further decline of emigration in 1961 (only 346 emigrants) would be a better indicator to link the decline of emigration to South Africa to the happenings at Sharpeville.

In general, most reporting about the emigration to South Africa after Sharpeville seems to be instigated by what was going on in the political arena. When the matter was discussed in Parliament or the Senate, almost all the newspapers reported about it. By doing so, the newspapers held the attention of the public towards South Africa and were constantly reminding them about the political discussions on emigration.

2. 3 Politics

As the newspapers showed, the Sharpeville shooting did not go unnoticed in the Dutch politics. Although the Dutch government wished to remain impartial concerning the domestic affairs of South Africa – with which the Dutch cherished good relations regarding trade, emigration and culture – some members of Parliament started to question the government's attitude with regards to South Africa after Sharpeville.[107] The leader of the social-democrats (Partij van de Arbeid) J.A.W. Burger requested a formal statement from the government two days after the Sharpeville massacre.[108] They government said it would not take further actions regarding South-Africa, because they deemed it as an internal affair in which the Dutch government should not interfere.[109] Burger did not leave it at that, rather he debated prime-minister Jan De Quay (Katholieke Volks Partij) at the next plenary session. Burger wondered how the Dutch government could support the race politics of South-Africa and questioned the support for emigration to a country with no future.[110] The Prime Minister stated that the government followed the public debate about Sharpeville with great interest, that they saw the massacre as a direct result of the Apartheid politics, and that the government rejected any form of discrimination based on race, including the Apartheid in South-Africa.[111]

Emigration policies also became a part of the debate in Parliament. Regarding emigration, Prime Minister De Quay stated that people are free to choose where they emigrated

[107] de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 129.
[108] Letter is mentioned in: Handelingen II 1959/60, 4119, 29 March 1960,919-942, 919.
[109]Handelingen II 1959/60, 4119, 29 March 1960, 919-942, 920.
[110]Handelingen II 1959/60, 5364, 5 April 1960, 945-960, 948.
[111] Handelingen II 1959/60, 5364, 5 April 1960, 945-960, 955-956.

to, it was their own decision.[112] After deliberation, Dutch parliament came with a motion stating that South Africa should reflect upon itself and create a political situation in which racial discrimination was excluded; and the motion condemned the violation of human rights.[113] The motion was accepted forcing the Dutch government to proclaim that it saw the violation of human rights and the racial division in South Africa as worrisome and asked the South African government to deliberate if this was the way to proceed as a country.[114]

Parliament had pushed the Dutch Cabinet in a corner. As mentioned before, the Cabinet did not want to openly speak out on matters concerning South Africa, since it could damage the bilateral relations. The cultural bond between South Africa and the Netherlands through the idea of *stamverwantschap* created a unique closeness between both countries. There were voices within Dutch politics who thought that the *stamverwantschap* should be cherished and that this could be used to critically discuss the racial politics of South Africa. The close bond could be used to nudge them away from a fatal direction.[115] Besides this, the Dutch government had not forgotten the support of South Africa during the struggles in Indonesia a few years earlier. After Sharpeville, South Africa was expecting sympathy, help and support from the Dutch government in return. However, the public perception of South Africa after Sharpeville meant that the Dutch government could not provide this unconditionally. In contrast to the expectations of South Africa, there was a firm foreign lobby going on – most notably from the United States, Ethiopia and the anti-Apartheid movement in England – to get the Dutch government to take up their responsibility and use their historical ties to put pressure on the South African government. This had no success. When the Dutch government tried to mention the matter during bilateral meetings, this was met with indignation and protest by the South African government.[116]

Considering the importance of South Africa as a cultural and economic partner, it makes sense that the Dutch government tried to stay out of it the best it could. When this proved to be nearly impossible as a result of the domestic societal pressure, the bilateral relations between the Netherlands and South Africa subsided.[117] This meant that the Dutch government did not proactively reach out to the South African government concerning human rights in the country, an attitude similar to other Western countries.[118] South Africa and its Apartheid politics

[112] Handelingen II 1959/60, 5364, 5 April 1960, 945-960, 956.
[113] Ibidem, 952.
[114] Ibidem, 958.
[115] de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 85.
[116] Ibidem,129-132.
[117] Ibidem, 130.
[118] Ibidem, 133.

remained a sensitive matter for the Dutch government, a matter that needed to be addressed with great care.

Despite some voices within the political arena, emigration and emigration policies remained a somewhat far away aspect within the discussions about South Africa and their Apartheid politics. The firm stance of the Dutch cabinet to not change any policies, did not make it a recurring theme within the political arena. The Dutch government saw emigration to South Africa as necessary and did not want to stop it. Emigration was the responsibility of the emigrant, and they were free to move there. All the Dutch government and the responsible institutions could do was inform Dutch citizens about emigration towards South Africa the best they could and offer the same facilities and services as any other emigrant would receive.[119]

2.4 Society

Civil society also got involved after Sharpeville. Political parties gathered their members, condemned the Apartheid politics and requested that the government to take an official stand against South-Africa in the UN. Furthermore, church-based organisations wrote letters to affiliated congregations in South-Africa to plead for reconciliation. Additionally, protest marches were held in The Hague and Amsterdam at which between 500 and 1000 people participated. In protest, the South-African embassy and the South-African institute in Amsterdam were both vandalised multiple times.[120] This period saw a rise of a broad Anti-Apartheid movement in the country. The newly founded South-Africa Committee (*Comité Zuid-Afrika (CZA)*) became an important actor and started to inform people about the violent nature of Apartheid. It gathered support for this from a broad political spectrum because it wanted to represent the whole society.[121] After Sharpeville, the CZA send a letter to all Members of Parliament with a request to henceforth vote in favour of any anti-Apartheid resolution in the UN. Not only did they try to influence the government, Parliament and the public opinion, they also approached the South African ambassador in The Hague.[122] One of the most remarkable actions of the CZA was their call for a boycott of Outspan oranges, South African wines and canned fruit in 1964. The boycott got press coverage and started a public debate about the effects of these forms of protest. Would this help the cause of the black nationalist movement?

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[119] NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Report from the Commissioner of Emigration to the Emigration Attaché discussing his visit with Naudé, 06/07/1960.
[120] De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 84.
[121] Henkes, 'Shifting identifications', 664; De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, 121.
[122] De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto* 122.

The aftermath of Sharpeville heralded the beginning of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (*Anti-Apartheidsbeweging Nederland)* in the Netherlands, which had many similar movements in other countries.[123] By continuously demanding attention for Apartheid, and their lobbying efforts to get it discussed in parliament, these anti-Apartheid organisations where agenda-setting actors who regularly reminded society about the racist politics and the violation of human rights that was institutionalised in South Africa.

2.5 Conclusion.

This chapter showed that the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre caused a stir through Dutch society, -media and -politics. This stir required an appropriate response from the Dutch government. However, can we speak of a crisis for the Dutch government? According to the theory outlined in the introduction, a specific form of institutional crisis emerges when public opinion turns against existing structures and practices. As shown, this was the case for the Dutch ruling government after Sharpeville. The media, political parties, and civil society all started to doubt the Dutch attitude towards South Africa which had been, to say the least, very reserved. A so-called *agenda-setting crisis* emerged for the Dutch government. The massacre at Sharpeville put the Apartheid regime of South Africa high on the political agenda and instigated a broader debate about the Dutch-South African relations. As a result, several policy domains got affected by this upsurge in attention for South Africa, including the area of emigration.

Regarding emigration, questions were raised about the moral implications of supporting and facilitating emigration towards a country that institutionalised racism. This held true for most newspapers and most politicians. Furthermore, there were questions about the support of migration towards a country that was becoming more dangerous and where a racial civil war might break out. The dominant thought was that this would not end well for the white population in South Africa, including for the Dutch emigrants residing there, or emigrants moving there in the near future.

Some newspapers and NGOs hinted to a so-called 'Sharpeville-effect' regarding the decline of emigration to South Africa. Although there clearly was a downward trend in emigration to South Africa, in 1960, this could not be entirely ascribed to the happenings at Sharpeville and the subsequent reluctance of Dutch citizens to emigrate to South Africa. The archival material showed that in the case of South Africa, the time between lodging the application to emigrate and the actual movement took time, sometimes several years.

[123] Henkes, 'Shifting identifications', 664.

Reviewing this from a governance perspective, shows a more nuanced explanation for the downward trend then a 'Sharpeville effect' would suggest. Strengthened by the fact that the South African government had a strict immigration policy and were thoroughly reviewing every application, it makes sense that the actual movement could be months or even years after the lodging of the application. The earlier mentioned complaint by the Dutch emigration attaché early 1960 showed that there was a massive backlog regarding Dutch applications for the South African immigration department. If so, many people were still waiting to migrate, there is a high possibility that the organisations aiding the aspiring emigrants would inform them about the situation, or even discouraged people lodging an application if they wanted to emigrate sooner rather than later. As such, the decline that already started in 1959, is better explained by the consequences of the backlog and pending applications, then by a Sharpeville-effect. This is an indication that the emigration apparatus had a strong influence on the actual emigration towards South Africa. It is more likely that the so-called Sharpeville-effect occurred later, when the decline of emigration to South Africa would continued in 1961.

As a result of the crisis following Sharpeville, the Dutch government saw itself trapped in a complex web of opposing interests. It did not want to worsen relations with South Africa given its role as an important cultural and economic partner, but they also felt pressure from the international community to take a stance against South Africa. With regards to emigration, the government publicly announced that it did not actively support emigration towards a country that institutionalised racism, but, that they could not forbid people to move there. They would keep supporting emigrating Dutch citizens the best way they could, even if they decided to emigrate to South Africa.

However, was this true? Did nothing change with regards to their emigration policy after Sharpeville? Also, were the newspapers right in claiming that the massive decline in emigration towards South Africa was merely the case of the unwillingness of Dutch citizens to migrate there? How did the Dutch emigration apparatus respond to Sharpeville? Why did the number of emigrants dropped to an all-time low between 1960–62, and only slowly recovered again during the 1960s? The next chapter looks into this.

Chapter 3: Post-Crisis: The Dutch governance response

This last chapter seeks to answer the question if there was a change in the Dutch emigration policy after the Sharpeville crisis.

3.1 The response after Sharpeville within the emigration system

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were concerns about the sustainability of South Africa as a nation-state. This situation had an impact on the reputation of South-Africa as a suitable emigration country. As it turns out, these concerns were already discussed before the Sharpeville massacre in a meeting of the Emigration Board in January 1960. During this meeting, one of the board members raised the question of whether it was still appropriate to support emigration towards South Africa when the political problems on the whole continent were growing. Furthermore, the board member noted that there was a high probability that the racial differences would lead to disturbances in the country. Several other board members agreed and were concerned about the migrants already in the country.[124]

In the concluding report of Haveman's visit to South Africa in May 1960, he wondered if there was any future in South Africa. In this report he sketches a scenario where Dutch emigrants are saving money for a possible turn of events. This possible turn of events would make them consider migrating to Australia, or returning to the Netherlands. He also wrote that if South Africa did not move towards a multi-racial and peaceful society, there would not be any perspective for emigrants to move there.[125] This is an alarming message from one of the highest-ranking and most influential official in the emigration apparatus. Interestingly, parts of this message did not correspond with what he said during a press conference in July of 1960, discussed earlier. There he stated that the Dutch emigrants were laughing about the way South Africa was treated as a big issue in the Netherlands and that they showed no concerns whatsoever.

Despite contradictory statements, his report led to a special meeting of the Emigration Board on the 4 August 1960. When reviewing the minutes of this meeting, it surprisingly did not discuss the future of South Africa as an emigration country. The meeting focused only the racial issues in South Africa and how this could turn out in the long run. The Emigration Board

[124] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 125. Report about the meeting send tot he emigration attaché in Pretoria (17/02/1960); NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv.no. 8. Minutes of the meeting of the Emigration Board, 14/01/1960.
[125] NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Report Haveman about the state of South-Africa, 30/05/1960.

found it hard to imagine that the 'white' and 'black' population would live in harmony together any time soon. One of the major problems was that the 'white' population of South Africa did not have a country to return to as the Belgians had in Congo and the British in Rhodesia. Although hard to imagine, they saw a truly multiracial society based on equality and cooperation as the only way forward.[126]

Although mentioned by Haveman in his report, and discussed within the Emigration Board, there was never an explicitly mentioned fear that people in South Africa holding Dutch citizenship would return to the Netherlands. Three years earlier, Dutch citizens who choose to remain in Indonesia after the independence were expulsed by the Indonesian authorities. Between December 1957 and March 1958 almost 24.000 Dutch citizens were forced to leave Indonesia.[127] At that time, this posed a immense problem for the Dutch government. However, the archival material does not show that the authorities had fears of a similar scenario unfolding in South Africa. It is also unclear how many people lived in South Africa that had Dutch citizenship, so it is difficult to put the South African situation in perspective.

In the months following the Sharpeville shooting, the Emigration Board and Commissioner Haveman were not alone in their concerns regarding South Africa and the feasibility of emigration. When reviewing reports from the Council of Emigration, similar messages can be discerned. In their annual report published in November of 1960, the Council of Emigration saw the recent political happenings as detrimental on the willingness of people to migrate there.[128] Besides the Council of Emigration, the emigration attaché in Pretoria also created annual reports about emigration and South Africa. Unfortunately, the reports of 1960 and 1961 are missing in the archive. They would probably have provided a detailed observation of the situation in South Africa and emigration matters after Sharpeville. When reviewing the annual report for 1959, the emigration attaché already mentions – albeit briefly – the political situation of South Africa as a reason for the decline in emigration.[129] The annual report for 1962 observes that politically and economically, the situation in South Africa is more stable and favourable for emigration than in 1961. This implies that the yearly report for 1961 – and probably also 1960 – painted a more negative picture of South Africa and the feasibility of emigrating there.[130]

[126] NL-HanA, SZW/Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv.nr 8. Special Meeting Emigration Board regarding South Africa, 04/08/1960.
[127] Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan,* 237.
[128] NL-HanA, SZW/ Emigration Board, 2.15.70 inv. no.28. Report by the Council of Emigration regarding emigration policy, November 1960 (published in July 1961).
[129] NL-HanA, SZW/Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2586. Yearly report emigration attaché 1959.
[130] NL-HanA, SZW/Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2586. Yearly report emigration attaché 1962.

Concerns about the feasibility of emigration towards South Africa also reached one of the NGOs that were helping aspiring emigrants in the Netherlands. The *Christelijke Emigratie Centrale* (CEC) was a major Protestant application organisation. In October 1960, the Board of the CEC held a special meeting to discuss the Dutch emigration towards South Africa. During this meeting, they regarded the riots at Sharpeville and the subsequent unrest in the Netherlands as a sign of discouragement of emigration towards South Africa. Although it had objections against Apartheid, it was decided that it would support emigration towards South Africa. It would provide objective advisory service to prospective emigrants as to what it meant to live in a segregated society.[131]

Despite these concerns throughout different levels of the emigration apparatus, it seemed that the Dutch emigration policies with regards to South Africa were not weakened, but rather strengthened after Sharpeville. When visiting South Africa, Haveman also had a meeting with the South African minister of Internal Affairs J.F.T. Naudé. He was the minister responsible for immigration policies. A memorandum of this meeting provides insight into the way in which the Dutch wanted to proceed with regards to emigration to South Africa after Sharpeville. The memorandum explains that Naudé was trying to increase the 'white' migration to South Africa and that they favoured immigrants from the Netherlands.[132] According to the memorandum, Haveman does not seem so defeatist about emigration towards South-Africa as his report to the Minister of Internal Affairs suggested. During the meeting, he made it clear to Naudé that the Dutch government would not encourage and promote emigration towards South-Africa until the current situation changed. However, he also mentioned that the South-African government was free to promote and encourage emigration in the Netherlands, since the Dutch government would not do this anymore.[133] Haveman also states that the Netherlands has changed from a 'seller's market' to a 'buyer's market'. Consequently, South-Africa needed to actively promote the country as emigration friendly and make sure that aspiring emigrants would feel welcomed. To do this it would be wise if the South African government would take care of a substantial part of the transit costs, and provide the new emigrant with work and accommodation. When the relationship between both countries was favourable again, a renewed migration treaty would be drawn up, one that would be beneficial for both countries.[134]

[131] NL-HanA, SZW/ Dutch Emigration Service, 2.15.72 inv. no. 45, report COC, 14/10/1960.
[132] Ibidem.
[133] NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Haveman's report about the state of South-Africa, 30/05/1960.
[134] NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Haveman's report about the state of South-Africa, 30/05/1960.

As it turned out, Haveman was negotiating a renewed migration treaty with favourable financial conditions for aspiring emigrants. This shows that even after Sharpeville emigration towards South-Africa was considered very much alive for the Dutch government.

Although emigration opportunities towards South Africa were ostensibly enhanced, Sharpeville did have an impact on the way emigration towards South Africa was being governed after March 1960. In a seemingly informal correspondence with F.Q. den Hollander, who at that moment was the president of the League of Dutch Employers a lobbying organisation for Dutch entrepreneurs, Haveman acknowledged the impact of Sharpeville on Dutch attitudes regarding emigration to South-Africa. The correspondence was started by Den Hollander, who found it troublesome that the Dutch government was not promoting emigration to South Africa because it had such a promising entrepreneurial environment.[135] Haveman countered by stating that the minister stood firm against severe pressure from Parliament after the Sharpeville 'incident' to end the emigration to South Africa. However, it was not unusual that under these circumstances the Dutch government could promote the emigration towards South Africa.[136] Therefore, they would continue with a wait-and-see attitude.[137]

This wait-and-see attitude did not last long and in the following year a renewed emigration agreement between the Netherlands and South Africa was signed. This agreement was favourable for the Dutch government and lucrative for the Dutch emigrant moving towards South Africa. In October 1961 the Dutch and South-African authorities agreed that South-Africa would pay 60 South African Rand (ZAR), which was approximately 150 Dutch Guilders, for each incoming migrant to cover the transit costs.[138] This amount was double of what a Dutch emigrant would receive from its own government as *landingsgeld*.[139] The agreement also established that South Africa would take care of transportation and temporary accommodation

[135] NL-HanA, SZW/Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Letter den Hollander to Haveman ,09/09/1961.
[136] NL-HanA, SZW/Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Response Haveman to den Hollander, 17/12/1961.
[137] NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2604. Another letter from Haveman to den Hollander, 8/10/1961.
[138] According to a historical currency converter (that accounts for purchasing power parity) created by the International Institute of Social History, 150 Guilders back in 1961 would be worth approximately €450 today: http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate.php. When the Rand (ZAR) was introduced in February 1961, it had a fixed rate of 1.40 to a US Dollar until 1971. In March 1961 the Dutch Guilder stood at 3.6 to 1 US. Dollar, Source: Centraal Bureau van Statistiek, *maandstatistiek van het financiewezen 1961*, August 1961, 309; https://www.historisch.cbs.nl/.
[139] A form of allowance every emigrant received from the Dutch government upon arrival. This was meant as an incentive to emigrate and could provide the emigrant with some pocket change to get started in the first few weeks.

upon arrival.[140] This was a considerable upgrade from the stipulations in the previous agreement signed in 1957. Before, the South African government would only pay 30 Rand to cover the transit, and only if the new emigrant was employed in a government or semi-government organisation. The new deal created an increase of 33.3 per cent in funding for a prospective emigrant. This agreement was renewed in 1962, 1963 and 1964.[141] From 1962 onwards the compensation from the South-African government for transit costs was raised to 80 Rand.[142] In this new agreement, the Dutch authorities put more responsibility with the South-African government to secure the success of the emigration. The market for Dutch emigrants had turned from a 'sellers' into a 'buyer's' market.

While the new emigration agreement was formalised, the NED implemented a restrictive policy measure that prevented Dutch emigrants in South Africa from securing a loan through the *Rijksredietgaranstelling voor emigranten*. This was a new policy in which the Dutch state provided a guarantee for emigrants to secure loans in their new countries of residence. Thhe emigration attaché in Pretoria showed concerns as to whether this new *Rijkskredietgarantiestelling for emigrants* should be promoted for emigrants in South Africa. The emigration attaché reported to the commissioner that he found it inopportune to promote this new policy for emigrants in South Africa. The current weak financial situation in the country caused by the exodus of foreign capital after Sharpeville, which meant that it was not a favourable time to secure a loan in South Africa. In order to regain control over the financial situation, the South African government was awaiting a credibility evaluation by IMF for a loan. With this evaluation pending, banks in South-Africa had decided that they would restrict individual loans and mortgages.[143] Only a few untrustworthy credit institutions would still provide these financial services.[144] The volatile financial situation of South Africa meant that it was risky to get a long-term loan at this moment. To promote the *Rijkskredietgarantiestelling* in South Africa would mean that Dutch emigrants could possibly end up with loans that they could not repay. If this happened, the Dutch state would be responsible for the loans, and that was an undesirable prospect. The commissioner for emigration agreed and gave clearance for not promoting the policy. He also made sure that the committee responsible for approving

[140] NL-HanA Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Code Archive 1955-1964, 2.05.118, inv. no.12276, Report of the Minister of Social Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs containing the details of the new agreement, 20/10/1961.
[141] NL-HanA Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Code Archive 1955-1964, 2.05.118, inv. no. 12276. Report from the South-African governments about the new deals in 1962,1963 and 1964.
[142] Ibidem.
[143] NL-HanA, SZW/ Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 2659. Report Emigration Attaché towards the Commissioner of Emigration, 24/05/1961.
[144] Ibidem.

Rijkskredietgarantiestelling would enforce a stricter inspection of applications made by emigrants in South-Africa.[145] Although this policy measure was not meant to prevent emigration towards South Africa, it was a response to the situation that emerged in the aftermath of the Sharpeville shooting. This measure needed to protect the Dutch state from losing money and prevent emigrants running financial risks. This clearly shows how the Dutch emigration system was ensuring that emigration was a successful undertaking. It would support emigrants in getting a loan because this could improve their situation abroad. But it also ensured that there was a limited risk in supporting these kinds of loans.

Despite all the commotion both domestically and internationally, not much changed in the way the emigration was organised by the Dutch state. The archives show that there were concerns about the feasibility of emigration towards South Africa throughout all levels of governance, but these concerns were never acted upon through policy measures. This becomes evident when reviewing the minutes of the monthly meetings of the Emigration Board in the years after Sharpeville. After the special meeting on August 5, 1960, the Emigration Board showed little attention to South Africa in the years that followed. South Africa was seldom a topic on the agenda. Besides a visit from the Emigration Attaché in 1962 and some concerns about financial implications of a new emigration agreement in 1963, South Africa was not discussed in detail during the monthly gatherings of the board.[146] Although it was not an essential topic within the Emigration Board, it seems that the situation in South Africa after Sharpeville was being used to secure more favourable agreements with Pretoria regarding the conditions of future emigration. For the Dutch emigration apparatus, the emigration towards South Africa was very much alive, and the new agreement was meant to reduce the cost and effort on the Dutch side and enhance the effort and cost for the South African side.

It can be argued that the Sharpeville 'crisis' provided a 'window of opportunity' for the Dutch government to negotiate a better deal with South Africa regarding emigration. The crisis after Sharpeville made emigration towards South Africa controversial. This controversy was used in their favour by the Dutch delegates during the negotiations. When they realized that the South African government wanted immigrants, their negotiation position became even stronger.

As a result, the decline in emigration towards South Africa can not be explained by a change in policy from the Dutch emigration apparatus. The only element that seemingly

[145] NL-HanA, SZW/Directorate of Emigration, 2.15.68, inv.nr 2659. Response letter from the Commissioner of Emigration towards the Emigration Attaché, 01/05/1961.
[146] NL-HanA, SZW/Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 10. Meeting South African attaché, 29/08/1962; NA, [146] NL-HanA, SZW/Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. no. 11. Meeting finances, 16/10/1963.

changed was their efforts to promote South Africa to prospective emigrants. As the archival material showed, it was stated multiple times by officials that they would still inform prospective emigrants about what moving to South Africa meant, but that they would stop actively promote South Africa. This was merely a modest alteration in attitude, but nothing changed from a practical standpoint. All the existing policies would remain in place and were used if people wanted to emigrate to South Africa. As such, this can not be seen as a policy change as discussed within the crisis-policy reform theses.

Ultimately, the message the Dutch government was trying to send to South Africa was apparent: if they wanted Dutch immigrants, they needed to come and recruit them themselves. This was something the South African government was willing to do after the events at Sharpeville in 1960.

3.2 South Africa's immigration policies after Sharpeville

Although Sharpeville was an important event in 1960, two other events made it a remarkable year for the future of South Africa. On February 3, 1960, UK's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan held his now famous 'Winds of Change' speech in front of the South African parliament in Cape Town. In his speech, Macmillan supported decolonisation throughout Africa and criticised Apartheid in South Africa.[147] His speech paved the way for South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and the subsequent founding of the South African Republic. Through a referendum only accessible for the 'white' population on the 5 October 1960, South Africa voted to leave the Commonwealth and became a republic. This departure ended all political ties with Great Britain, an essential step for the South African nation. With this severance, the South African government envisioned that the English-speaking population of South Africa, and future British immigrants, would become true Afrikaners loyal to South Africa only.[148] True loyal Afrikaners was precisely what South Africa needed at that moment.

The culmination of the already simmering black resistance at Sharpeville in March 1960, made the white fear of the black resistance more tangible than ever. This resulted in a massive outflow of white South Africans towards Europe, North America and Australia.[149] The upsurge in resistance against Apartheid caused fears among the white population that South Africa became part of the decolonisation process already happening in other parts of Africa.

[147] Full speech can be found in: Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961* (London 1972) Appendix 473-482.
[148] Peberdy, *Selecting immigrants*, 110.
[149] Ibidem, 115.

The South African government's response, must be seen in this context. As black resistance grew, the government tried to regain control by declaring a State of Emergency. This massively expanded the executive powers of the government. This resulted in the ANC and PAC being banned and pushed underground. Nationwide, demonstrations were brutally put down, and thousands of people were arrested. After having been pushed underground, the armed wings of the ANC and PAC would begin a sabotage campaign, making over 200 attacks on public installations, railways and electricity lines between 1961 and 1963.[150]

With the black resistance growing, many Afrikaner nationalists began to see immigration as a lifeline to preserve the 'white' South African nation.[151] The crisis unfolding after Sharpeville made it clear that an increase of the 'white' population was needed. There was an urgency for immigrants who understood the 'colour problem'. Furthermore, to keep up with the economic growth – which slightly halted after Sharpeville due to the retraction of foreign capital – a significant influx of white skilled workers from abroad was seen as the only solution to maintain a growing economy. Ever since the 1950s, the industrialists had been lobbying for less restrictive immigration policies to keep up with the economic growth and the demand for labour. A commission formed in 1959 to investigate policies to protect the South African industrial economy, estimated that at least 25,000 skilled immigrants were needed annually, to reach its full potential. To solve this issue, a drastic change in immigration policy was necessary.

It seemed that the crisis after Sharpeville, and other simultaneously intertwined developments, provided the South African government with a 'window of opportunity' – or more a 'window of necessity' – to make considerable changes to the existing immigration policy. A less restrictive form of immigration policies had already gained public support from the worried Afrikaner nationalists. The Afrikaner nation was ready to open up for immigration. Before the referendum, a policy document created by the Minister of Immigration in May 1960, stated that South Africa needed to 'expanding the white population of our land with suitable available white immigrants'.[152] A month later, the Immigration Council estimated that 30,000 immigrants annually were necessary, all of whom should get financial assistance.[153] To set forth this new immigration scheme, the Department of Immigration was re-established in 1961, right after South Africa became a republic. This department was responsible for the new state-steered

[150] Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (Boston 1983), 235-236.
[151] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 111.
[152] SAB A326 Box 1 Item 2, unauthored departmental document "More immigrants to South Africa'T 'Meer immigrante na Suid-Afrika", 15/5/1960, p. 10 as quoted by: Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 120.
[153] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 120.

immigration program. It was tasked with recognising sectoral needs, recruitment of needed workers and processing applications. Additionally, it provided assistance and financial aid to immigrants and arranged reception, placement, settlement and integration for the newly arrived.[154]

The immigration department also developed new policies aimed to promote South Africa abroad and attract immigrants. Informative brochures and pamphlets were being printed in seven European languages to promote the country in Western Europe. These brochures contained information about education, employment, taxation and other subjects aimed to persuade and prepare prospective immigrants.[155] In 1962, a few of these brochures were translated, printed and distributed in the Netherlands.[156] Furthermore, to bolster their new recruiting policy, the Department of Immigration opened new offices in twelve different European countries, besides the already existing office in The Hague.[157]

[154] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 120.
[155] NL-HanA, SZW/ Council of Emigration, 2.15.71, inv. no.29, meeting emigration board, 29/08/1962; Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 121.
[156] NL-HanA, SZW/ Council of Emigration, 2.15.71, inv. no.29 , meeting emigration board, 29/08/1962.
[157] Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 120.

3.3 Emigration to South Africa during the 1960-s: a comparison.

The new immigration scheme seemed to be highly effective. Although the total numbers remained relatively low in 1960 and 1961, they started to grow from 1962 onwards. Despite this apparent successful assisted immigration policy, the emigration of Dutch citizens towards South Africa would stay reasonably low, especially in comparison with Germany and the UK.



Based on appendix of immigration towards South Africa per country, in: Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 270-274.

Graph 8 shows that after 1961 the UK, and to a lesser extend Germany, would overcome the relatively low emigration numbers of 1960-1961. Germany, in the 1950s the third provider of immigrants to South Africa, would surpass the Netherlands inthe 1960s. The UK remained the main European provider of immigrants for South Africa.

What is interesting about the flow of emigration towards South Africa in the 1960s, is that there was a massive emigration from within Africa. Other British colonies were feeling the 'wind of change' blowing through Africa, which made many white people leave the decolonising countries. Immigrants came mainly from Rhodesia – nowadays Zambia and Zimbabwe –, Kenya and Mozambique. Between 1960 and 1965, these countries would provide the most immigrants for South Africa (graph 9). After the establishment of the Republic of South Africa, these numbers increased considerably. The upsurge did not take long. After 1965 Europe became the primary provider of immigrants again.



Source: Appendix of immigration towards South Africa per country in: Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrantws*, 270-274.

That such an enormous flow of immigrants came from Africa itself makes sense when put against the context of that time. As mentioned earlier, what MacMillan was talking about in his 'wind of change' speech was an observation of what was happening at that moment. After Asia, Africa was becoming the next continent in which the sounds of freedom, majority rule, and the subsequent process of decolonisation set forth. The white population of several British colonies was worried about these events and saw their privileged positions endangered. When South Africa proclaimed itself an independent republic and firmly established its 'white' minority Apartheid rule, 'white' people living in other African countries saw South Africa as a haven in which they could continue the life that they had become accustomed to. Although these immigrants were mainly English speaking, they were the perfect immigrants for South Africa. As former residents of other colonies in Africa, they were used to the 'way of life' in a segregated society. As such, they did not endanger the nation-state the Afrikaners envisioned. Furthermore, a high percentage of these inter-African immigrants held the South African nationality, so they were returning to their homeland. Although holding the same nationality,

South Africa saw these people as immigrants. They were seen as returning 'trekkers', or, refugees forced to flee from communism and black nationalism.[158]

3.4 The decline of Dutch emigration towards South Africa explained from a policy perspective

The question that remains is how the emigration from the Netherlands diminished after 1960, while other countries showed only a temporary dip in emigration. This becomes especially interesting when considering that South Africa was pursuing a less restrictive and active immigration policy from 1960 onwards. The active immigration policy included recruiting and promotion abroad. In the Netherlands, this recruiting and promotion proved to be harder than expected by the South African government. Although the South African immigration department made some efforts to recruit in the Netherlands, it seems they were against the procedures and practices laid out by the Dutch emigration bodies. When reviewing a newspaper article by *De Volkskrant* on 13 March 1964, titled 'The Hague towards South Africa: No private recruiting of emigrants', some of these problems become clear.[159] An employee of the South African Immigration Department had approached somebody at the Dutch emigration attaché to gather information about the possibilities and conditions of South African recruiters active in the Netherlands.[160] This news had reached the newspaper and it asked for a comment from the NED. A high official responded by proclaiming that by Dutch law any prospective recruiting mission or recruiting agency required permission from the Minister and that it would be highly unlikely this would be given to a foreign private organisation.[161] A letter from the Commissioner of Emigration to the emigration attaché in Pretoria seems to define the stance of the Dutch emigration apparatus with regards to South Africa perfectly:

> 'It is well known that the emigration towards South Africa is a topic of which the represented organisations within the Emigration board have a difference in opinion. Because of the attitude held by a part of the Dutch society with regards to South Africa,

[158] Peberdy *Selecting Immigrants*, 124.
[159] *De Volkskrant*, 'Den Haag tot Zuid-Afrika: Geen particuliere werving van emigranten', 13/03/1964.
[160] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 2627. Request head of emigration attaché in Pretoria to gain information about alleged approach South African official regarding recruiting activities, 9/04/1964.
[161] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 2627. Copy newspaper article Volkskrant and response of the high official, 16/04/1964.

it is highly possible that these gatherings would have a contra-effect on the recruitment of emigrants .'[162]

The minutes of this particular meeting of the Emigration Board in June 1964 underlines the message of the Commissioner of Emigration and shows a considerable reluctance to let South Africa undertake recruiting endeavours in the Netherlands.[163]

The South African immigration authorities persisted, and, in cooperation with the NZAV and CEC, organised a dozen of meetings throughout the Netherlands in 1964 and 1965. They informed about what emigration towards South Africa meant, show films about ordinary day-to-day live in South Africa and hand out textbooks for learning Afrikaans.[164] These were legal recruiting activities because they were organised by the NZAV and CEC. There is a slight increase in emigration towards South Africa in 1964-65. If this had something to do with these information meetings can not be established.

The reluctance of allowing foreign recruiting activities by the Dutch authorities gives us a possible reason for why there were so few emigrants heading to South Africa after 1960. Since becoming a republic, South Africa had a less restrictive immigration policy and was actively trying to recruit immigrants abroad. This did not happen in the Netherlands. Before 1964, there were no active recruiting efforts by the South African immigration department in the Netherlands. As a result of this, they relied on informing, promoting and recruiting by the already existing NGOs in the Netherlands. After 1960, only one of these organisations – the A.E.C. – declared that they did not support emigration to South Africa.[165] Other larger and more important NGOs continued with informing prospective emigrants about the possibilities of emigrating towards South Africa. During a meeting of the Emigration Board late June 1964, the represented recruiting organisations expressed their doubts about South Africa as a destination country, but decided that it was more important to give objective information to prospective emigrants.[166] The dominant thought was that the emigrants were free to choose

[162] Own translation of: *'Zoals bekend is de emigratie naar Zuid-Afrika een onderwerp, waarover in de Kringen van de in het Emigratiebestuur vertegenwoordigde maatschappelijke organisaties nogal verschillend wordt geoordeeld…Gezien de opinie over Zuid-Afrika bij een deel van het Nederlandse publiek is het zeer wel mogelijk, dat dergelijke bijeenkomsten veeleer een contra-effect teweeg zouden brengen'* in: NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 2627. Letter van Doorn to Korndörffer, 4/04/1954.
[163] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 2627, meeting emigration board, 11/06/1964.
[164] NL-HanA, SZW/ Dutch Emigration Service, 2.15.72, inv. no. 402. Letter CEC to Directorate of emigration showing the dates of the meetings, 18/09/1964.
[165] NL-HanA, Embassy and Consulate-General South-Africa 1955-1974, 2.05.268, inv. no. 2627, meeting emigration board, 11/06/1964.
[166] Ibidem, meeting emigration board, 11/06/1964.

their destination and if they were heading to South Africa, it was in their best interest to get help and information from one of the Dutch NGOs.[167]

The quarterly reports of the NZAV (Nederlands Zuid-Afrikaanse Vereniging), which was only concerned with emigration to South Africa and Rhodesia, shows that despite their promotion efforts, the organisation was having trouble finding people willing to emigrate to South Africa.[168] Despite great optimism the director of the NZAV shows in every report, it is highly likely that other organisations, who also helped in organizing emigration to other countries and could provide alternatives, had the same issues. The claim by the CEC that they would inform people honestly about South Africa and what it meant to live in a segregated society, also suggests that the information given to interested emigrants was not really inviting and probably made them more interested in other destinations such as Canada and Australia. It is likely that the claim of historian Barbara Henkes who said that Sharpeville sparked a lack of interest from the emigrant – which was possibly partly steered by the recruiting organisations – is indeed one possible reason for the decline in emigration towards South Africa.[169] As discussed earlier, emigration overall had been steadily in decline for over a decade already. South Africa was never the most popular destination for Dutch emigrants, and if nobody – except maybe the NZAV – was actively promoting the country, only the emigrants who already decided to move there, were persistent in their decision and possibly had no other alternatives, would do so.

In addition to this lack of interest, there is another possible explanation for the decline in emigration towards South Africa. The impotence of the South African immigration department to try and regain interest in their country seems to be another reason. This was not entirely South Africa's fault though. The refusal of the Dutch authorities of South Africa setting up recruiting activities shows how institutionalised emigration was in the Netherlands. The Dutch emigration system had a complex structure with many departments, rules, practices and stakeholders. It was a system that could not be easily changed. Although led by the Minister of Social Affairs, all stakeholders had a say in how the emigration was organised through representation in the Emigration Board and the Emigration Council. In both bodies, the NGOs had a seat at the table and could influence policy. After its creation in 1952, the system had become a well-oiled machine that send many Dutch emigrants overseas. Why would a system,

[167] Linda van Putten, *"Een emigratieland apart". Het Nederlandse emigratiebeleid ten aanzien van Zuid-Afrika in de periode 1952-1978*. Doctoraalscriptie sociale geschiedenis (Universiteit Leiden 1997) 65.
[168] NL-HanA, SZW/ Emigration Board, 2.15.70 inv. no. 43. Quarterly reports NZAV 1960, 1961 and 1962.
[169] Henkes, 'Shifting Identifications', 663.

that had proven its worth over the last decade, suddenly change because South Africa opened their immigration policies and wanted to recruit in the Netherlands? Why would it allow recruitment for a country that was highly controversial within the Dutch society at that time? Although the Commissioner of Emigration had suggested this was possible when visiting in South Africa, the system did not allow for it. If they allowed active recruitment of South Africa, they would need to allow this for other countries as well, and this would make the prospective emigrants vulnerable to propagandistic recruitment campaigns. After all, the goal of the Dutch emigration system was to secure the success of every emigrant abroad. When it was not in control of the narrative in which the decision making took place, it was creating possibilities for future troubles.

4. Conclusion

Do crises lead to policy change, and was this the case after the Sharpeville massacre? As already outlined in the introduction, a multitude of case studies have shown that policy change is context dependent. Sometimes crises open up a specific 'window of opportunity' for policymakers that suddenly accelerates the process of change. Other times, institutions are not affected by a crisis and show a gradual, incremental process of policy change throughout time. Could policy change – as observed through the crisis/policy reform hypothesis – provide an explanation for the sudden drop in Dutch emigration towards South Africa after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960.

The second chapter showed that Sharpeville created a problematic situation for the Dutch government. It proved to be an 'agenda-setting' crisis which affected several policy areas for the Dutch government, including that of emigration. For the South African government and Afrikaner nationalists, Sharpeville turned into a *mismanaged crisis* that made clear that the 'white' population needed to be strengthened. This strengthening could only be achieved through immigration. The Sharpeville shootings and the following crisis created a sense of fear amongst the 'white' population in South Africa. Supported by their severance of the Commonwealth, this provided a 'window of opportunity' – or as I argued a 'window of necessity' – for the South African government to change their immigration policy to be more open. In this case, crisis did lead to *policy reform* regarding migration policies.

In the case of the Netherlands, crisis did not lead to a clear policy change. On paper, not much changed regarding the governance of emigration to South Africa. All the structures and policies that were in place remained the same. The renewed migration agreement signed in 1961, is a clear sign of this continuation in policy. This showed that – despite the domestic upheaval – emigration to South Africa was still viable for the Dutch emigration apparatus. The Sharpeville crisis and the changing perspective of immigration by the South African government offered the Dutch with a 'window of opportunity' to negotiate a better deal for prospective emigrants choosing South Africa. This clearly fitted in the objectives of the Dutch emigration apparatus: provide as many possibilities for prospective emigrants and ensure that the emigration was a successful undertaking.

In retrospect, the lack of policy change after Sharpeville is remarkable. It is easy to argue that Sharpeville proved to be a 'window of opportunity' to actually end the state-steered emigration to South Africa. The country was small receiving country in a time when the overall number of emigrants was in decline rapidly. When South Africa and its Apartheid regime was

so contested after Sharpeville, this was – politically – a right time to stop facilitating emigration to South Africa. However, the institutionalisation of emigration in the Netherlands made that even the smallest receiving countries were deeply embedded in the emigration apparatus. A multitude of policies, attachés, agreements, processes and people had been put into place since 1952 to facilitate the emigration to South Africa. To suddenly end this would require a massive change within the organisation. It was logical and more convenient to keep everything in place and functioning. It seems there was a form path dependency within the emigration apparatus in which the *historic record* of certain policies and structures were by itself a valid reason to reproduce it.

Despite the observation that, on paper, there was no policy change after Sharpeville, there is a noticeable change in attitude with regards to emigration to South Africa. Because of an overall decline in emigration, the Netherlands went from a buyers to a sellers market in the 1960s. This made the emigration authorities not as assertive in sending people abroad anymore. As a consequence, countries that wanted to attract Dutch immigrants needed to provide them with good conditions – hence the new migration agreement between both governments – to persuade them to move to their country. The fallout after Sharpeville made South Africa a less suitable destination for emigrants. The NGOs supporting prospective emigrants were reluctant to send people towards South Africa, but, would help them if they really wanted to go. This resulted in South Africa needing to actively recruit the desired Dutch immigrants.

The recruitment efforts by the South African authorities were unsuccessful. Dutch law did not allow recruitment activities by a foreign power. This meant that South Africa depended on the Dutch emigration system and their emigration organisations to provide them with immigrants. Again, the seemingly *historic record* of the emigration system had made it change-resistant. It had proven its worth throughout the years and did not suddenly change its directions because of the political upheaval in South Africa, on the one hand, and the new recruiting efforts by the South African authorities on the other. Despite the disturbances in South Africa, it did not change its emigration governance regarding South Africa. This institutional sturdiness of the emigration apparatus, along with the general decline of emigration, and the diminishing interest in South Africa as an emigration country creates a plausible explanation for the significant decline in emigration towards South Africa between 1960-1965.

This study has shown that the response after a crisis is indeed context dependent. It also demonstrated that the same crisis can have different outcomes. This strengthens the thought that the response of governments, institutions and private companies faced with a crisis, depends on the context in which the crisis is endured. Furthermore, a historical case study can

be used to test contemporary theories, and, that those contemporary theories can be insightful in explaining historical processes.

By viewing Dutch emigration to South Africa primarily from a governance and policy perspective, this study has shown some interesting aspects that the previous literature on the post-war Dutch-South African migration had not yet shed light on. A first perspective is the importance of the interdependence of both countries migration policies when trying to explain migration flows. Although the Netherlands was actively recruiting immigrants for South Africa, and Dutch immigrants were seen as 'desirable' by South Africa, the Dutch open emigration policy was still dependent of the South African immigration policy to make their emigration policies towards South Africa successful. South Africa had a relatively closed migration policy during the 1950-s. This immediately puts the relatively small flow of Dutch emigrants to South Africa – in comparison with Australia and Canada – in a different perspective.

The literature mostly connects the massive decline of emigration after 1960 with the changing perspective of South Africa after Sharpeville. By analysing this from a policy perspective, the decline in emigration is better explained by a multitude of factors, then by a single event alone. It is undeniable that Sharpeville had an impact on how South Africa was being perceived in the Netherlands. And evidently, this must have discouraged people to emigrate there. However, the structures, policies and practices of the emigration system have been overlooked in this context. They played such an important role on Dutch emigration as a whole, that they also had an impact on the emigration to South Africa. Their power as an institution to control the Dutch emigration proved to be an important factor when trying to explain post-war Dutch emigration to South Africa.

The focus of this research on the governance and policies of the Dutch and South African migration systems makes this study a clear addition to the existing literature. The fallout after Sharpeville on Dutch emigration to South Africa provided a compelling case-study to test the crisis/policy change hypothesis. In addition to addressing this issue, this thesis also showed that this governance perspective on the Dutch- South African post-war emigration provided a different viewpoint which corresponds and also contests with earlier historical research.

Archives and other sources:

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Appendix:

Actual numbers of emigration and immigration that were used for the graphs in this thesis.

[Table 1.] Immigration towards South Africa per respective countries and in total (1950-1965)

	British Commonwealth	**The Netherlands**	**Germany**	**Northern-Rhodesia (Zambia**	**Southern-Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)**	**Kenya**	**Total**
1950	6,258	2,215	1,860	190	-	48	12,803
1951	7,112	2,572	2,406	119	307	56	15,243
1952	8,212	4,478	2,361	172	340	94	18,473
1953	7,090	3,486	2,824	366	696	104	16,257
1954	7,377	3,295	2,113	659	1,361	132	16,416
1955	6,967	2,906	1,877	524	1,282	161	16,199
1956	6,805	1,815	1,598	469	1,032	125	14,917
1957	7,639	1,232	1,144	804	1,178	154	14,615
1958	8,498	1,940	1,245	1,457	1,740	191	14,673
1959	6,918	1,722	1,134	658	1,634	206	12,563
1960	2,292	476	851	702	1,436	360	9,789
1961	2,323	346	824	1,937	3,749	1,331	16,309
1962	4,970	532	1,315	1,785	5,048	1,708	20,916
1963	10,138	706	2,077	6,999	7,645	2,296	37,960
1964	12,807	998	2,936	4,853	7,007	1,130	40,865
1965	12,012	1,322	3,591	2,849	3,494	898	38,326

Based upon appendix of immigration towards South Africa per country in: Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants*, 270-274. She got it from the *Statistics of Immigrants and Emigrants, 1924-1964.*

[Table 2.] Emigration from the Netherlands towards respective countries and in total (1950-1965).

Year	Canada	Australia	U.S.A	South Africa	Total
1950	7,134	9,570	3,637	1,523	44,491
1951	18,519	11,115	3,161	2,782	61,576
1952	21,118	16,200	3,590	4,568	75,834
1953	20,341	8,434	3,633	3,666	61,751
1954	16,071	10,665	3,428	3,625	56,322
1955	7,200	13,797	4,436	3,222	51,626
1956	8,419	11,507	9,722	2,311	56,273
1957	12,365	7,282	10,241	1,767	55,032
1958	8,055	7,746	4,741	2,480	47,421
1959	5,900	8,743	6,323	2,123	46,736
1960	6,110	8,451	9,573	959	50,141
1961	2,212	4,903	7,011	790	39,810
1962	2,302	2,708	7,393	1,012	38,001
1963	2,339	2,480	2,927	1,142	33,009
1964	2,286	3,276	3,150	1,282	36,780
1965	2,646	2,955	2,881	1,980	38,711

Source: NL-HanA, SZW/Emigration, 2.15.68, inv. nr. 186-187. Statistical year reports on emigration and immigration numbers by the Centraal Bureau van Stasistieken (Central Bureau of Statistics), 1950-1965.