

Leiden University – Faculty of Humanities
International Relations (MA)

Justification for U.S. Military Action in a Post-Cold War Era



**Universiteit
Leiden**

2017-2018

03/07/2018

Abstract

The subject of this thesis is the development of discourses of justification for US military actions after the Cold War. When the Soviet Union fell the United States lost its main adversary. For US officials, defending the world against communist influences could no longer sufficiently serve as justification for US military action. However, US military activity continued. The US is inclined to go to war, on small and large scales. This thesis critically analyses discourse of military justification transmitted by US officials, how these discourses developed after the Cold War and how they attempted to win the public opinion. This thesis is mainly written from a constructivist perspective, which treats language not merely as a transfer of information, but also as a creator of social realities. The purpose of the language analyzed in this thesis is to create sturdy public support so that wars can be protracted for an extended amount of time. I focus on three conflicts and their accompanying discourse. The first one is the Invasion of Panama, the first true post-Cold War military action by the US. The second and third conflicts are the Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both these conflicts were communicated as a being a part of the Global War on Terror. I conclude that the reasoning behind US military intervention seems to be very fluid and changes over time, but that the long-term inclination towards military intervention remains unchanged. It seems that the connection between military political discourse and actual policy is ambiguous at the least. From a normative standpoint it should be questioned if this is acceptable when it comes to world-shaping events such as military conflict.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| <i>Abstract</i> | 2 |
| Introduction | 4 |
| 1. Theoretical framework | 7 |
| 1.1 Constructivism | 8 |
| 1.2 Critical Geopolitics | 9 |
| 1.3 Securitization theory..... | 10 |
| 2. Methodology | 12 |
| 3. Critical Discourse Analysis: Invasion of Panama and beyond..... | 15 |
| 3.1 Background: Operation Just Cause..... | 15 |
| 3.2 Genres of Justification | 17 |
| 3.3 Probing for support? Democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention..... | 20 |
| 3.4 Constructivist perspective and liberal peace..... | 24 |
| 4. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Global War on Terror | 27 |
| 4.1 Bush addressing the Global War on Terror | 27 |
| 4.2 Constructivist perspective | 29 |
| 4.3 US Interests..... | 31 |
| 4.4 Discussion: total transparency and future interventions | 34 |
| Conclusion..... | 37 |
| Bibliography | 39 |
| Appendices | 43 |
| Appendix 1 - George H.W. Bush’s addresses the Nation on the Panama invasion, December 20 th 1989. | 43 |
| Appendix 2 - Secretary Baker’s Adress before the World Affairs Council March 30, 1990..... | 45 |
| Appendix 3 – George W. Bush’s Iraq Ultimatum Speech | 49 |

Introduction

A popular statement is that the United States military budget is larger than the military budget of the next seven countries *combined*. This statement is not a hyperbole. At present, the US Navy deploys twelve extremely powerful nuclear aircraft-carriers, with a new generation upcoming, that are not matched by any other nation. Is war an integral part of US foreign policy and has it always been that way? In this thesis I aim to delve deeper into the question of this 'American Militarism', especially into the development and implications of official discourse that is propagated by the US Government regarding the deployment of military personnel. It would be expected that the end of the Cold War would bring about a decrease of military activity since proxy wars would have become less prevalent and because of the diminished imminent threat of the Soviet Union. However, Western countries are often seen at the heart of the ongoing instability in the Middle-East, with a central position occupied by the US.¹ The same goes for Latin America, in which the U.S. has been extremely active throughout the Cold War but still remains active in different manners.²

From a Cold War perspective, it makes sense for the US to maintain a somewhat interventionist doctrine: The Cold War world was a bipolar world, with two opposing superpowers, wherever the US would lose its influence, the SU would likely gain it. The Truman doctrine was a clear statement, albeit implicit, to the world: wherever countries came under threat of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian rule the US would do everything in its power to assist peoples in maintaining their freedom and independence. He proclaimed: "The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms."³

The perspective described by Truman is often used as the foundation when the subject is US policy during the Cold War. However, according to Doug Stokes this perspective of the Cold War is somewhat orthodox. He proposes a revisionist view on US policy in the Cold War. Such a view has two distinct advantages, according to Stokes. Firstly, it is capable of providing a more nuanced explanation of the underlying motives of the US policy towards the Global South. Revisionists ascribe a larger role to the political economy of the US for Cold War policy, rather than of a policy that was mainly driven by security

¹ Berch Berberoglu, *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability*, (New York 1999), 111-114.

² See Alan L. McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945* (Washington 2006).

³ Henry S. Truman, 'Address Before Joint Session of Congress', 1947.

threats. The argument that follows from this is that the “primary threat to US interests during the Cold War came from *any* form of independent development in the Third World and not just from communist forces allegedly linked to the Soviet Union.”⁴ Secondly, an unorthodox interpretation of US policy in the Cold War era provides an alternative collection of insights on which post-Cold War US foreign policy can be based. If the political economy is seen as a driving factor of the US during the Cold War, the post-Cold War US foreign policy becomes a very clear continuation of the Cold War policy, albeit without clear presence of a counter ideology.⁵ The goal of the US after the Cold War, just as it was during the Cold War, is the preservation of global capitalism with USA as the leading nation.

In this thesis I set out to challenge the orthodox historical interpretation of the post-Cold War policy. I will focus on US military foreign policy and will evaluate and explain the seemingly intrinsic US tendency to deploy troops overseas. In doing so I hope to contribute to a more differentiated vision on the policy discourses surrounding war and military intervention. The US military, in this thesis, is seen as an instrument to project power and secure interests, whether from a security standpoint or from an economic standpoint. Therefore, military action is a clear indicator of policy direction when it comes to issues that concern national interest. To support a more unorthodox historical account of the post-Cold War policies I aim to present a Constructivist account of the post-Cold War justifications given for three post-Cold War military interventions: the invasion of Panama, and the Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Global War on terror. I will research several key speeches delivered by George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. For the analysis of these texts I will be utilizing the methodology of *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA), as described by Norman Fairclough. This methodology emphasizes the ‘meaning-making’ of language and their relationship with (constructed) social realities. A part of CDA is the normative aspect of policy and by analyzing discourse, the methodology can help in opening perspectives of ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ within society.⁶ The question I will be answering in this thesis is as follows: *How did the discourses of justification of military action develop from the end of the Cold War until and including the Global War on Terror?*

In my analyses, the justifications of US military actions seem have a very fluid nature. The messages that are transmitted to the audiences change over time and seem to follow what is most *convincing* rather than what is true. When it comes to justification of war, governments are always looking for frames and how to transmit these to their audiences.⁷ In a Constructivist sense there is no essential meaning to facts,

⁴ Doug Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, (London 2005), 21.

⁵ Ibidem, 21-22.

⁶ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (Second Edition London 2010)* 7.

⁷ Jim A. Kuypers, *Bush's War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age* (Lanham 2006), 15.

but they “take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others.”⁸ Directly after the Cold War it became ‘democracy promotion’, after that Clinton’s ‘humanitarian approach’ appeared, at first the American public were behind this. After their loss in the battle of Mogadishu, (Black Hawk Down), the American people started to put question marks at this discourse as well. After Clinton, 9/11 happened, a new discourse: global war on terror. Initially the people support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this discourse also became worn-out. Here the power of frames can be seen in action. At first when the frame is transmitted it is able to shape the general perception of the conflicts and the necessities of intervention, but when these frames are worn out, other frames will take over, some of which will be challenging the initial framing. The use of military force rarely stabilizes political situation, and if they do, it is impossible to foresee for how long and how structural the stabilization will prove to be.⁹ This makes the fluid and ambivalent nature of discourse of military justification the ‘wrong’ that I try to point out.

I will analyze four speeches on post-Cold War conflicts: the first text is a speech is given by George H. W. Bush, he addresses the nation on the fact that he ordered the US military to invade Panama the night before. The second is a speech by Secretary Baker, also on Panama but some months after the initial invasion. The third and fourth speech are the Afghanistan ultimatum speech given by George W. Bush, shortly after 9/11 and is the Iraq Ultimatum speech given by George W. Bush in 2003. My goal in analyzing these speeches is to emphasize the fluidity of the discourse that accompanies these military actions and that ultimately are also a basis for US’s allies to join their military actions or not.

I argue that the post-WWII justification discourse trends can roughly be divided into three genres or frames: firstly, a *Cold War doctrine*, with a concrete and powerful adversary, the USSR was often times reason enough to make military actions justified or even necessary. The second doctrine gained more ground after the Cold War: *the nobility doctrine*. The US with all its might want to bring peace, stability and democracy to the rest of the world and does not scare away from the sacrifices that are needed to achieve this. The third doctrine is that of *anti-terror*: a doctrine based on global security and the imminent threat that is posed by large and small (foreign) underground organizations (and sometimes regimes as well) on which the US military must respond swiftly and decisively. The doctrine of nobility and the doctrine of anti-terror are used simultaneously on different occasion, when it is best suited to the situation at hand. The bottom-line is the same: American (-led) military intervention.

⁸ William A. Gamson, ‘News as Framing Comments on Graber’ *The American Behavioral Scientist* 33 (1989) 2, 157 in Jim A. Kuypers, *Bush’s War*.

⁹ Rory Stewart and Gerard Knaus, *Can Intervention Work?* (New York 2012).

1. Theoretical framework

One of the central assumptions to this thesis is that there is a certain *American Militarism*. In *The New American Militarism* Andrew J. Bacevich defines American Militarism as follows: “The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys-and is bent on perpetuating-has become central to [American] national identity. More than America’s matchless material abundance or even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation’s arsenal of high-tech weaponry and soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and what we stand for.”¹⁰ The notion of American militarism implies that the tendency to employ military power globally is something of an accepted status quo by both Americans themselves but also other countries worldwide. It maintains that not many countries or even the UN truly oppose or forbid the US to act militarily. The violations of international law that have been committed by the US the last several decades go by unpunished, while similar violations committed by so-called ‘rogue states’ are used by the US as incentive to intervene. The classical Realist approach to the US’s position within the international relations framework is that the US defends its powerful position and its policies are geared towards supporting their own might and to push the balance of power in their own favor. In a Realist sense the different U.S. doctrines will always be seen as an instrument of power and influence. By supporting anti-communists, the U.S. would ensure their ideology would end up dominant and in doing so they were spreading the influence of the U.S. This can be said of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan and even the US involvement in both world wars.

Although the Realist approach is very efficient in laying bare the different power structures and their interactions, it is inclined to give a somewhat one-sided account of reality. Its perspective is that of the politician, or that of the decision maker. Realists can take the words and the explanations of the how and why for granted. From the beginning of the United States as a country until today, the framing of enemies and allies alike has had a large role in shaping the policies that were implemented by US government bodies. After all, the Monroe Doctrine dates back to 1823 and it states that the New World is superior to the Old World. The term Old World can of course be loosely handled and applied on every area that is not to the US’s liking. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has been active on the world’s military stage. But after every major conflict, the U.S. always dramatically decreased the size of their military in a relatively short amount of time. This was the case in the Civil War, The First World War and the Second World War. It has, however, not been the case after the end of the Cold War. Instead, the military spending has been gradually increasing. Mainstream IR has also been criticized for being in favor

¹⁰ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, (Oxford 2013) 1.

of the State. Within (mainstream) IR Theory there is still little room for critical analysis, as Herman Schmid argued in 1968 when writing on peace research: that it is “[...]a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure.”¹¹

1.1 Constructivism

While the mainstream theoretical body of IR is still Realism, Constructivism has gained influence in the past several decades as well. Its main premise is that international politics are dominated by social constructions.¹² It regards international politics as consisting of a framework of socially and culturally constructed truths, that together, form the basis from which decisions are made. Constructivism differs from (neo-)realism in that it defies the notion of one objective reality in which international politics unfolds; it tries to understand *change* rather than status quo on the international level. Secondly, constructivists emphasize the social dimension, like language, norms, values and rules, of international politics. Thirdly, Constructivism claims that the world of international politics is a world made by us; the human interaction of the created reality is paramount. These human interactions can bring social, historical and political realities into being.¹³

If the notion of ‘security threat’ is taken as an example: a western Realist who sees Iranian missile silos on satellite images would call this a threat to the West. Their reasoning is as follows: the Iranian government is not to be trusted and destructive instruments like ICBMs should be kept out of their hands at all costs. A constructivist however, would see the threat of a ICBMs attack by Iran as a socially constructed threat, borne out of the socially constructed reality of the differences between the countries (and hemispheres) and the incompatibility that result from them. The threat is what you make of it, so to speak. After all: missile silos located in France would not be perceived as a threat by most of the Western countries.

Constructivism as a perspective brings both virtues and dangers. The virtues of this perspective is that it focuses on different aspects of IR than the more mainstream theories (although Constructivism has become somewhat mainstream itself), thus it can deliver novel explanations that would otherwise have been overlooked. Constructivism is generally seen as a more critical perspective and when writing about the influence on the world by United States militarism and the used discourse, such a critical perspective can be very helpful. The danger is that constructivist explanations have a tendency to remain somewhat vague and have difficulty to ascent towards a clear theoretical and factual transparency. As a theoretical

¹¹ Herman Schmid, ‘Peace Research and Politics’, *Journal of Peace Research* 5 (1968) 3, 217-232, 229

¹² Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith, *International Relations Theory* (Oxford 2013) 189.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

mode of thought, Constructivism “[occupies] a ‘middle’ position between rationalism and reflectivism”.¹⁴ It is a perspective that seeks to conceptualize the relationship between the material and the discursive, but this relationship is difficult to conceptualize.¹⁵ As Constructivism takes language as a focal point for political analyses, it can provide a critical analysis on political discourse. In the case of military justification discourses it emphasizes the question of the way in which the constructed nature of social reality can be exploited by state-elites through the usage of certain language or the decided framework from which military action is presented.

For this thesis, Constructivism can deliver an analysis that does not necessarily explicitly address the truths and untruths of military political discourse but rather addresses the question of *how did the conflict become possible*.¹⁶ For instance, the question of truths and untruths with regards to the US invasion of Iraq is intrinsically slippery as it is impossible to find out what the ‘true’ intention was, it is impossible to look inside of the heads of those who were involved in the decision-making. A debate on what the ‘real’ motive was, would ultimately boil down to a “battle of interpretation”.¹⁷ Constructivism can look at what was said, and how the discourse was generated and what it ultimately seemed to ‘construct’ or add to the socially constructed reality of a general sentiment. In the case of Iraq, the alleged possession of WMDs and the alleged connection to 9/11 *constructed* the sentiment that a US invasion in Iraq was justified, if not necessary. If political discourse is approached from this perspective it can be emphasized how stated reasons can become almost synonyms to causes, which greatly reduces historical complexity, but it also reduces historical accuracy.

1.2 Critical Geopolitics

Related to Constructivism is an approach called Critical Geopolitics. Critical geopolitics is a subfield of political geography. Critical geopolitics can “[...] investigate how the categorizations and cultural creations through which we come to understand and write in turn shape our political existence.”¹⁸ Classical geopolitics, as a subfield of geography mainly deals with the spatiality: it is ‘the politics of places’.¹⁹ Critical geopolitics tries to ascend the purely spatiality of the global politics by focusing on the social aspect of power, rather than physical and spatial domination. Critical geopolitics criticizes modern geography in that it has

¹⁴ Nazya Fiaz, ‘Constructivism meets critical realism: Explaining Pakistan’s state practice in the aftermath of 9/11’, *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (2014) 2, 491-515, 494.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith, *International Relations Theory*, 198.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second World War: The Discourse of Politics* (London 2016) 173.

¹⁹ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics* (Second Edition London 2005) 113.

“remained remarkably blind to the politics of its own gaze and geographical history for so long.”²⁰ In this thesis the politics of places is mainly focused on the kind of regimes that these places have. By employing this tactic whole regions can be generalized by the fact that, for instance, their governments are not democratic like ‘ours’.

The influence of the United States as a superpower is enormous. The US has been highly active from Africa to South America and from the Middle East to Asia. Many scholars and media seemed to take this role for granted. In IR not many scholars seem to directly oppose the way in which the US handles global politics and foreign policy. Of course, individual presidents and individuals will be criticized but the common thread that has been the main part of US foreign policy seems to be left alone. Now, one could say that it is not the job of the IR scholar to be squarely critical towards a single country. But when a single country has such an influence on the shape of the political landscape worldwide, that statement must be reconsidered. Critical geopolitics reconsiders this statement in a way: it serves as a reminder how the mere locality of a country can be of influence on the way in which it is viewed. For instance, the international reaction to the crisis in Rwanda was somewhat indifferent, it was too little and above all too late.²¹ Would a similar crises have occurred in France, for example, the world would have reacted in a completely different manner.

1.3 Securitization theory

Securitization theory is the theory that upholds that issues can become securitized over time. The securitization of certain issues can push these issues higher on the priority list than they would otherwise ‘organically’ maintain. First coined by Ole Weaver in 1995, securitization is a

[...] speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off. The issue is securitized -becomes a security issue, a part of what is security- if the relevant audience accepts this claim and thus grants the actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind.²²

²⁰ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, 44.

²¹ Alan J. Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’, *International Studies Quarterly* (2008) 52, 49-80, 74.

²² Ole Waever, ‘The EU as a Sovereign Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereign Security Orders,’ in Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community* (London: Routledge, 2000), 251.

It is a related of Constructivism as it implies the power of language usage when it comes to policy decisions. Important to note is that the security issue is not necessarily conceived out of thin air. An example of this is the securitization of International Public Health following the perceived increasing threat of bioterror, or the securitization of migration, following the perceived threat of not knowing who is crossing the border during migration waves.²³ Another example, less founded in reality, is the imposing of import tariffs on the Steel imports in the US, proposed by President Trump in the name of national security. As securitization is seen as a speech-act it must hold some credibility to be accepted by relevant audiences.

When security is placed in a constructivist perspective *identity* becomes an important factor. There are two strands of Constructivism that have a different conception of the relationship between security and identity. *Conventional Constructivism* is focused on the ways in which national identity influences the substance of national interests while *Critical Constructivism* is more involved with outlining how national identity and accompanying paradigms are influential in legitimizing political action.²⁴ Concerning security, this thesis is written from the perspective of Critical Constructivism as it is focused around the *creation* of legitimacy through the usage of language.

²³ See Alexander Kelle, 'Securitization of International Public Health: Implications for Global Health Governance and the Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime', *Global Governance* 13 (2007) 2, 217-235 ; Philippe Bourbeau, *The securitization of migration: a study of movement and order*, (London 2011).

²⁴ Paul D. Williams e.d., *Security Studies An introduction*, (Oxon 2013), 63.

2. Methodology

In this thesis I set out to critically examine an important part of the military foreign policy of the United States of America that has been and still is a *world-shaping* venture. That said, the broadness of this subject calls for a research method that *focuses* on one or more events rather than to try and capture the foreign policy in its entirety. Therefore I have chosen for a discourse analysis. A discourse analysis fits the theoretical perspective of Constructivism I utilize. It is about the creation of images, of threats and of necessities that together justify military action. A fitting, well described methodology of discourse analysis is that of *critical discourse analysis* (CDA). There are multiple different ways in which CDA can be put into practice. The approach I will be utilizing in this thesis is a dialectal-relational approach to CDA, coined by Norman Fairclough as one form of CDA. In this chapter I will present the methodology I will be using in the analysis of a speech given by George Bush on the invasion of Panama and the some relevant texts that were published in the Department of State Bulletin in the same month (December 1989). This method uses four stages that help build a framework from which texts can be analyzed.

Stage 1, *the Wrong*.

Stage 2, *the obstacles in righting this wrong*.

Stage 3, *does the social order 'need' the social wrong*.

Stage 4, *possible ways past the obstacle*.²⁵

CDA is a method that is suitable for bringing a normative element to discursive research. It can reflect on what is *wrong* and what is *right*. This makes it an interesting approach when dealing with political discourse concerning military action. It can help to answer the question whether a nation has the right to conduct violent action, with regards to the possible consequences, but also with regard to a possible violation of sovereignty, or even international law. It can also help with an analysis on how these actions are communicated, how military action is normalized and how the enemy or the purpose of the mission is portrayed. It is an approach that tries to look beyond what happened, and why, but rather at *how* it happened.

²⁵ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (Second Edition London 2010)*, 226.

Norman Fairclough describes CDA as follows:

1. It is not just analysis of discourse (or more concretely texts), it is part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process.
2. It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of texts.
3. It is not just descriptive, it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them.²⁶

CDA is an interdisciplinary methodology and can be used in conjunction with very literal text analyses tools, such as counting word-frequencies or assessing the adjectival nature of textual elements. But it can also be used in conjunction with a more general text analysis, focusing more on the meanings of the texts than on the text itself. Furthermore, it is a method that is concerned with 'semiotic modalities'.²⁷ These modalities include language and imagery. It emphasizes meaning-making and its relational position towards actual policy directions. These semiotic modalities can be used by, in this instance, the US government. By justifying military actions using semiotic modalities such as liberty, democracy and freedom, support among the people is increased. When in other countries these principles are violated, their meaning can be utilized to increase support on the basis of a shared humanity.

Additionally, the dialectical-relational approach is also fitting to the subject of American military action because the military action is always accompanied by extensive language usage, whether it is the President, performing lengthy speeches, the Congress debating on the steps forward, the press analyzing the decisions made and the situations that unfold following American military action or the US allies contemplating to join their interventions or not. All this discourse is inevitably not only describing truths and untruths, but also *creating* sentiments. For this thesis I will focus on this meaning-making and how the discourse used for the meaning-making of military action abroad developed after the Cold War.

Fairclough emphasizes that CDA needs to be seen as a *methodology*, and not as a *method*. Thus, the stages I mentioned above are used largely implicitly as a framework *throughout* the text. CDA is more than "just a matter of selecting from an existing repertoire of methods. It is a theoretical process which constructs an *object of research* (a researchable object, a set of researchable questions) for the research

²⁶ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 10-11.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 230.

topic by bringing to bear on it relevant theoretical perspectives and frameworks.”²⁸. In my thesis this object of research is the development of the discourses of justification concerning US military intervention, and the function of these discourses that do not seem to *inform* but rather to *influence*.

CDA is problem-oriented and focuses on the relation between discourse, the meaning-making of this discourse, and its role in society. The problem with regards to US military policy is that it seems to be able to go unopposed, domestically and internationally. The question of military intervention should be analyzed more critical and with stricter guidelines, because military intervention can have major implications and unforeseen long-term consequences, whether in a Cold War context, a context of humanitarian aid, democracy promotion or the context of the global war on terror. It is important to note that with the coming and going of a multitude of politically heterogeneous administrations, since WWII the overall global policy of intervention has seen little to no change. Whenever strategic interests were deemed vital enough, covert meddling and/or military action seems to be the norm, without radically questioning the consequences or even the interests of those who vouch for such actions.

CDA emphasizes the function of language and how the language ties in to socially constructed realities. It is a methodology that looks at what ideas (political) discourse attempts to *construct, amplify or exploit*. Related to Constructivism, CDA analyses what underlying messages and images discourses try to transmit. Political elites, who are assumed to be knowledgeable of the relevant constructed realities can attempt to exploit these constructs and base their justification on it. When *liberty* as a social institution and a cultural pride is taken as an example for US citizens, American presidents can thus *utilize* the notion of liberty to justify military campaigns, in the name of liberty and democracy.

²⁸ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* 225.

3. Critical Discourse Analysis: Invasion of Panama and beyond.

In the early days of the Cold War the stakes were very clear. In the bipolar world that came after WWII, nations all over the world seemed to have two options: either join the US in taking on a capitalist system with its free institutions and market, or join the Soviet Union with its communist system that promised equality for all. After the fall of the SU, this could no longer serve as a sufficient mode of justification.

The discourse analysis that follows in the following chapters, is inspired by critical discourse analysis (CDA) and is founded in the theories of Critical Geopolitics, Securitization Theory and Constructivism. Important aspects of these frameworks are as follows:

1. Critical Discourse Analysis sees the social reality as consisting of both concrete social events and abstract social structures. The relation between these is mediated by social practices.
2. Language constructs realities on which policymakers base their policy. But language is not merely reactive but also proactive.
3. Territorial assumptions have an enormous influence on policy; they are often reified and taken for granted without too much thought behind it.
4. The broadly accepted discursive constructs are utilized by policymakers to justify their decisions.
5. Securitization is a theory that holds that many issues can be securitized by officials in order to place these issues higher on the priority list. The classification of security issues is thus viewed as a fluid concept that can be altered at will.

3.1 Background: Operation Just Cause

Manuel Noriega, who had been in service of the CIA for several years became *de facto* leader during 1984 and enjoyed an increasing level of freedom pursuing his own personal wealth creation. Noriega was a drug trafficker, arms dealer and intelligence officer for the CIA. But in 1985, after the brutal murder on political activist Hugo Spadafora, which was believed to have been ordered by Noriega, the relation between Noriega and the US deteriorated. In the later years of the 1980's the US-Noriega relationship deteriorated even further as the CIA increasingly considered Noriega as a dog off his leash, lending support to other intelligence agencies without consulting with the CIA. This came to a climax when Noriega blatantly influenced the elections his party seemed sure to lose and remained in power through terror and violence in 1989. The partnership with Noriega was in 1988 was described as follows: "The saga of Panama's General Manuel Antonio Noriega represents one of the most serious foreign policy failures for the United States. Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, Noriega was able to manipulate U.S. policy toward

his country, while skill-fully accumulating near-absolute power in Panama.”²⁹ Noriega was known to be a drug trafficker for many years but he remained useful to the US, due, in part, to his connections with the US backed rebel group called the Contras who were actively opposing the Socialist junta in Nicaragua. When the Iran-Contra affair became blew up in 1986 and the Contras could no longer be supported by the US, Noriega lost his usefulness to the CIA and suddenly became expendable.³⁰ His history with drug trafficking made for a perfect excuse for the US government to join the allegations made by US media and voice disapproval of Noriega and his practices. This became most official when the Senate passed Resolution 239 on June 26, 1987, calling on Noriega to step down from power.³¹ The situation in Panama had suddenly become a first line issue in the US Senate, and Noriega was now called “not a part of the solution- [but] part of the problem.”³²

But Noriega prevailed and remained in power, which was extremely humiliating for the US Government.³³ They had assisted him in getting on top, but they did not seem to be able to pull him down at will. With Noriega, openly being ‘off his leash’ and holding on to power longer than expected, the Torijos-Carter treaties that ensured US control over the Panama Canal until the year 2000 became under threat as well. Furthermore, the tensions towards the approximately 35,000 US personnel that were active in Panama increased. After several incidents President Bush gave the go ahead order for Operation Just Cause. On Tuesday, December 19 the number of US troops in Panama was doubled to 26,000. Within the week, the military forces of Panama were defeated, disbanded or had surrendered and all military objectives were achieved. However, General Noriega had evaded capture and was laying low in an unknown location, but was ultimately captured, trialed and detained in America, France and Panama until he died in a hospital in Panama City in 2017.

²⁹ *Kerry Subcommittee Report: Drugs, Law Enforcement And Foreign Policy*, retrieved from https://archive.org/stream/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras/Drugs%2C%20Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Foreign%20Policy%20%281988%29_djvu.txt, 08-05-2018.

³⁰ Peter Dale Scott & Jonathan Marshall, *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America*, (California 1998) 72.

³¹ Orlando J. Perez, *Political Culture in Panama: Democracy After Invasion* (New York 2011) 78.

³² Congressional Record, *Senate 26 June 1987*, 17769.

³³ John Dinges, *Our Man in Panama* (New York 1990), 299.

3.2 Genres of Justification

Securitization is a theory developed by the Copenhagen School. Its area of enquiry is focused on security as a speech act: the social construction of security. Within securitization theory, security is not regarded as an objective reality, but rather as an outcome of these speech-acts. Issues can become securitized over time in order to place them higher on the priority list. Securitization theory is a critical stance in security studies, as it highlights the way in which the security agendas seem to grow broader and broader to include more than just state and military security. With security viewed partly as a speech act, virtually anything can be securitized and thus the necessity or the urgency of a certain policy object can be manipulated. The US has become very proficient in justifying their military choices towards their own people and also to the leaders of other nations, but usually these justifications are given post ante. In the case of Operation Just Cause, George H. W. Bush addressed the nation several hours after the operations in Panama had started.

Now follows the actual analyses of two texts regarding the Panama Invasion. The first text is Bush addressing the nation to inform that the US army has invaded Panama the previous night and he also states the reasons why.³⁴ The text has roughly three different themes which are addressed by the president in no particular order. The first theme is practical *explanation*, what has happened and what the *casus belli* was that set off the events. The corresponding paragraphs are §1, §3, §5 and §7: the first describes that Bush ordered for an invasion the night before and the third presents that Noriega, dictator of Panama had declared a state of war with the United States and additionally that a number of American servicemen were killed or wounded and that one of their wives was threatened and brutally interrogated. The fifth paragraph briefly addresses some operational information of the US forces and also emphasizes that US personnel has behaved itself “courageously and selflessly”, but that some “Americans have lost their lives in defense of their fellow citizens”.

The second theme *justification*, in §2, §4 and §11. In §2 Bush states what had been the goals of the US policy towards Panama in the past several years: 1) safeguard lives of Americans, 2) defend democracy in Panama, 3) combat drug trafficking and 4) protect the integrity of the Canal treaty. Additionally, he states how, without succeeding, the US has made many attempts to resolve diplomatically, the crisis in Panama. In §4 Bush goes deeper into his obligation to safeguarding the 35,000 American citizens that are living in Panama.

³⁴ See Appendix 1.

The third theme is *future* addressed in §7, §8, §9, §10 and §12. These paragraphs present a positive and opportunistic image of the future of US-Panama relations, and also the relationship with the rest of Latin-America. The function of these paragraphs is to sketch the future of Panama-US relationship now that Noriega is no longer in charge. George H.W. Bush's address to the nation on his decision to invade Panama sketches a very clear, but also an emotional image. It addresses the Panamanian people and their democratically elected leaders as the victims of a terrible autocratic regime. In §3 it is clearly stated by Bush that a line was crossed by the autocratic regime of Panama when they "brutally" murdered US citizens. The way in which this is framed makes it so that the United States was the party under attack by Noriega's Panama and that the invasion that followed was merely a defensive reaction. Together with the assessment of security for US citizens and Panamanian citizens, comes the notion of *freedom and democracy*. This is made clear in §4: "As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed force to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States". It also has a role in §6: "The brave Panamanians elected by the people of Panama in the elections last May, President Guillermo Endara and Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford have assumed the rightful leadership of their country." From a constructivist perspective, these are clear examples of the use of language as a tool for persuasion, trying to touch upon the people's hearts and their devotion to liberty, freedom and humanity.

Liberty is an important and emotional institution in US society. The Statue of Liberty is a prime example of strong semiotic imagery, one that American culture takes great pride in. It is no coincidence that many presidents have used the promotion of liberty, freedom and democracy to justify military action. However, if one would try to disconnect itself with the idealistic and ultimately 'correct' nature of the notion, it becomes clear that the promotion of these values *cannot* be a driving factor behind the US foreign policy. As mentioned before, the times the US has been cooperating with intrinsically undemocratic, inhumane and non-liberal parties are many.³⁵ Noriega himself is a prime example; the US had known for a very long time that he was involved in illicit business and that his methods of leadership were hardly promoting liberty and democracy. The double standard is very apparent, but receives little attention. The fact that the popular approval rating of Operation Just Cause was over 80% underlines the power of the promotion of Liberty.³⁶

³⁵ See Jan Selby, 'The Myth of Liberal Peace-building, *Conflict, Security and Development* 13 (2013) 1, 57-86.

³⁶ Jane Kelleter Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War', *Armed Forces & Society* 32 (2006) 2, 178-201, 195.

Each of the four reasons Bush gives in the statement can be placed into a different 'genre' of explanation. As stated before the reasons are: 1) safeguard lives of Americans, 2) defend democracy in Panama, 3) combat drug trafficking and 4) protect the integrity of the Canal treaty. The first reason can be seen as a reason of intimate *security*. By calling into question the safety of fellow Americans Bush tries to pull the people's heartstrings in so that they would be approving of the action, regardless of the consequences. He also brings this duty to himself personally: "As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed force to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama, and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States."

The second reason fall into the genre of *ideology/nobility*. In this genre he also states that it is what the Panamanian people want: democracy: "The Panamanian people want democracy, peace, and the chance for a better life in dignity and freedom. The people of the United States seek only to support them in pursuit of these noble goals." *This is a* justification that had been used many a times throughout the Cold War. In the Cold War democracy was mainly defended or promoted in a divergence to socialism or communism, but in Operation Just Cause defending democracy by itself is cited as sufficient justification.

The third reason is less clear cut, and has some overlap with the first reason as it tries to bring forward a sense of urgency and necessity by bringing the conflict in Panama closer into the living rooms of the people. It can also be put into the genre of *security*: there is a drug problem in the US, people suffer from this drug problem and many drug related crimes are committed, therefore a grassroots approach to a mere fraction of this drug problem is enough justification to deploy an invasion force. It is a prime example of securitizing an issue to justify military action. No doubt that the global trafficking of drugs is harmful in many ways, but it can hardly be seen as a justification for military action; it is rather an area of enquiry for the DEA. By giving drug-trafficking enough gravity to justify military action, it can be said that it is *securitized*; it is pulled into the sphere of national security. The safety of Americans is something that every American should consider a cause that is worth fighting for. The relative small-scale drug trafficking operation of General Noriega was not nearly influential enough to pose a real danger to any American citizen; the security aspect of this justification is called into being by the *speech act* given by George H. W. Bush.

The fourth reason is from a genre that is most likely closest to the truth most of the time: *strategy*. The Panama Canal is vital for the US government and it is located in a country with a leader who has gone rogue and does not answer to the US government anymore. The Panama Canal must be safeguarded and

military deployment is the only way with which US control over the Panama Canal can be ensured. This reasoning seemed to be central to the operation.³⁷ However, it was not central to the discourse.

There is a fifth genre of justification that is less concretely found in the text: *vilification*. The vilification of General Noriega, who had been a close ally of the US throughout the Cold War, permeates the text on several occasions. The vilification of Noriega is an example of the double standards employed by the US when it comes to foreign policy, but it is also a tool with which the mass media is influenced. The 'heartless criminal' opposing US interests and threatening US citizens makes for attractive headlines. An example of this is CBS's Dan Rather who called Noriega a "swamp rat" who was "at the top of the list of the world's drug thieves and scams".³⁸

These five genres are so different from each other that it is hard to believe that these reasons *together* can form a sturdy basis from which large scale military action can be justified. What it does make clear however, is that the Bush administration tried to employ several modes of justification in the first place, it is as if they thought: "the more reasons, the better". The name of the action is the first example of meaning-making venture of this speech: *Operation Just Cause*. It implies that the US is willing to deploy large scale military action in the name of justice and humanity. The brutality and the criminality of the Noriega regime are seen as a *just cause*. This tone differs from many Cold War conflicts, wherein American interests were paramount, instead of putting a stop to unjust regimes.

3.3 Probing for support? Democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention

Operation Just Cause can also be perceived in an alternative manner. Firstly, President Bush was seen internationally as somewhat soft handed.³⁹ A large scale military invasion could serve as an extremely strong gesture to Latin America, and the rest of the world, that although the Cold War was over, the US was not ready to give up its position as a policing nation and remained willing to use its instrumental power to remain active on the world stage. Secondly, since the US was planning to continue its foreign policy on the basis of its military and economical might, it was looking for a post-Cold War pretext with which they could convince congress, the American people and the international community of the righteousness of their military intent. This explains why the explanations given by Bush were both so concrete but also so heterogeneous. It almost looks like the administration was *probing* what genre of

³⁷ Glenn J. Antizzo, *U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: How to Win America's Wars in the Twenty-First Century*, (Baton Rouge 2010) 62.

³⁸ Wassim Dagherir, 'The Media and Operation Just Cause in Panama', *Journal of Arts & Humanities*, 5 (2016) 5, 51-56, 53.

³⁹ Jane Kellet Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics', 179.

justification would ultimately best serve its purpose and would convince the masses of the righteousness of the operation.

In an April 1990 New York Times article, doubt is voiced over the fact whether the American citizens ever were in real danger, as the military force that was already present in Panama was perceived as large enough already to safeguard citizen lives. Secondly, the justifications of anti-drug trafficking are also doubted, because the scope and size of the action was in no way proportional to the relatively small size of Noriega's drug operation.⁴⁰ In other newspapers similar points were made, in a January 1990 article in the Chicago Tribune, Stephen Chapman discards all of the four 'excuses' given by Bush, however that one single reason did, in some way, prevail: the *nobility* of the US, that was able and willing to go into lengths to right the wrongs of the world and to turn military juntas into exemplar democratic nations, for the good of the suffering people.⁴¹ Although this article does not imply that this mode of thought is enough justification for an invasion, it does end with a somewhat positive note on the whole affair: "the Panamanian people may enjoy deliverance from tyranny. No one should mourn these results."⁴²

The speech that was used by Bush was merely a quick and shallow address to the nation on why the military had invaded a country without it being a real threat. The second text I will analyze can be found in the Department of State Dispatch that was released three months after the invasion. In a speech, Secretary Baker addresses the World Affairs Council in Dallas. His focal point of the speech is American Diplomacy and World Democracy. Baker starts his text off with quite elaborate observations on the concept of democracy. The second part of his text uses these observations to justify and to explain a (at that time) recent foreign policy action by the US: the Invasion of Panama, three months prior.⁴³ Where President Bush gave four reasons for the invasion, one of which was democracy promotion, Secretary Baker uses the invasion solely as a recent example of democracy promotion. From this can be deduced that the reasons behind the invasion were not so clear cut as the president made it seem in the first place. At the time, many observers wondered why the US would suddenly display such a, overwhelming use of force to arrest a 'simple' South American dictator and defeat his relatively small Panamanian Defense Forces, with strength of 6000 combatants.⁴⁴ There has been a long and drawn-out debate on whether

⁴⁰ Wicker, Tom, 'Overkill in Panama' *New York Times* (New York 1990) retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/05/opinion/in-the-nation-overkill-in-panama.html>, 25-05-2018.

⁴¹ Stephen Chapman 'Lofty Motives Don't Excuse America's Panama Invasion', *Chicago Tribune* (Chicago 1990) retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-01-11/news/9001030580_1_panama-canal-bush-aides-falklands-war, 25-05-2018.

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ James Baker, "Democracy and American Diplomacy" in *Department of State Dispatch* 1 (1990) 18, 22.

⁴⁴ Jane Kallet Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics?" 196.

Operation Just Cause was a diversionary war, carried out because of domestic factors in the US and because of President Bush being known as a somewhat soft-handed leader.⁴⁵ To this day no true consensus has been reached but most authors seem to agree on the facts that 1) lives of American citizens in Panama were never truly in danger, 2) Bush was not motivated by democracy-promotion and 3) the invasion did not help to combat drug-trafficking in the region. Furthermore, the integrity of the Torrijos-Carter treaties that would hand over control over the Panama Canal to the Panamanians in 2000 was also not threatened by the military dictatorship under Noriega. Noriega was certainly a criminal and the country was suffering under his control. In the long run it can be argued that the US invasion has had a positive impact on the country's performance. This analysis however focuses on the discourse that accompanied military action at the time and how the given pretexts justifying such actions are hardly ever founded in reality.

The real threat faced by the US on the hands of the Panamanian dictator was questionable at most.⁴⁶ Moreover, the US had been supporting many dictatorial regimes in Latin America throughout the Cold War and never seemed too concerned with possible violations of the principles of liberty and humanity, Guatemala as a prime example. Additionally, General Noriega of Panama himself had been a close ally to the Americans throughout the Cold War. The language used by Bush to justify his extreme show of force with this invasion seems hardly fitting with the policies employed during the Cold War. So what made the Panamanian case a different one?

The Invasion was a symbolic one as it is seen as the first larger scale military action outside of the Cold War framework.⁴⁷ Outside this framework, *democracy promotion* would become the new pretext for military action. In his address before the World Affairs Council on March 30, 1990⁴⁸, Secretary Baker attempts to bring forward the importance of *global* democracy and how it can help the US as a nation. Baker's four observations on democracy and foreign policy are as follows: firstly, he claims that democracy means, for a large part, individual rights and responsibilities. Secondly, that democracy offers political legitimacy like no other system does. Thirdly, he states that democracy can be seen as a triangle of democratic values, economic progress and basic security. Fourthly, he states that "American foreign policy abroad must reflect democratic values."⁴⁹ Baker uses the recent large scale military action against Panama

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Wassim Dagherir, 'The United States' "Realist" Foreign Policy: Operation Just Cause in Panama as a Case Study, *Journal of Arts & Humanities* 5 (2016) 5, 30-36, 33-34.

⁴⁷ Wassim Dagherir, 'The United States' "Realist" Foreign Policy', 31.

⁴⁸ See Appendix 2.

⁴⁹ James Baker, "Democracy and American Diplomacy", 23.

to bring forward the positive effects of democracy. Positive effects for the countries in question, but also positive effects for the world economy, thus for the American economy.

But after the second large-scale military action made by the Bush administration, the First Gulf War, in which Saddam Hussein and his forces were expelled from Kuwait, the notion of democracy promotion was touched upon to a lesser extent. In the victory speech given by George Bush on the First Gulf War he is less concerned with democracy promotion but is particularly concerned with peace and stability in the region. On this matter he is also quite frank to say that for the US the abundance of natural resources in is a primary reason for the continuing military presence in the region. What is interesting however is that the word *democracy* is not found a single time in this speech, while a year prior to Gulf War Both Bush and Baker emphasized the grave importance of a global democracy and how this would benefit the US and the rest of the global economic community. This is another indication that the justifications that are given for war are often generalized as being part of 'a greater plan'. However, it seems that often times there is really not a single common thread from military action to military action, not a public one at least. For instance: both Afghanistan and Iraq were placed under the banner of the Global War on Terror, while in the end only for the war in Afghanistan a strong case can be made that it was in fact waged in service of combatting terrorism. I will focus on the War on Terror in the next chapter.

The key to this analysis is that there are conflicts in which the US and its allies are justified to intervene, whether it is from a humanitarian, strategic or security point of view but there are also many military interventions that do greater harm than good. Again, Afghanistan and especially Iraq in the early 2000s are a prime example of this. There is no single 'grand goal' that brings all these intervention together: goals like democracy promotion, humanitarian aid and global security are almost interchangeably applied by different US administrations. With every new period in US governance new grand goals or small variations are devised and tested for effectiveness among the Americans and their allies. In the case of Panama, the *noble* goal of spreading peace and democracy found the most resonance under the media and the allies, so it stuck. We can see that Bill Clinton continued this genre of justification, with a slight emphasis on the economic aspect of democracy promotion. In the 90s Clinton presented his 'doctrine of enlargement'.

This doctrine, based on the idea of expanding the community of market democracies around the world, embraced free trade, multilateral peacekeeping efforts and international alliances, and a commitment to intervene in world crisis situations when practical (i.e., with little risk and low cost in U.S. lives) and morally defensible. The policy promoted an activist role for America and was

designed to extend and protect basic human and civil rights insofar as it was within the power of the United States to successfully achieve those goals without undermining national security or depleting national resources.⁵⁰

The fact that the early years of Clinton's foreign policy is similar to the second genre as described above: *ideology/nobility* or, democracy promotion further supports the perspective of the Bush's address to the nation as a speech-act designed to *probe* which genre of justification would be most persuasive. From the first days of his presidential campaign to his time in office, Clinton stressed the importance of democracy promotion. In fact, it was one of the three pillars of his grand strategy to address the post-Cold War world.⁵¹ However, this genre of justification lost some of its weight after the disaster that was The Battle for Mogadishu, in Somalia 1992.⁵² When several American servicemen lost their lives and were desecrated on the streets of Mogadishu, the American public started to question whether humanitarian and ideological justifications for military action were sufficient purpose for American sacrifice. This resulted in the US not getting involved with any action in Africa altogether for several years thereafter.⁵³ Only in Bosnia, 1995, the US and NATO conducted airstrikes and in 1999, again airstrikes in Kosovo. The mass killings that occurred in Rwanda, however, were not reason enough for the US or the UN to take preventive action, perhaps because the country of Rwanda did not fit the doctrine of *enlargement*, even though a Rwandan military intervention would have been very much *morally defensible*.

3.4 Constructivist perspective and liberal peace

The main argument that is produced by the discourse analysis I carried out is the following: The *words* used by US officials before, during or after large scale military action are not primarily chosen to *explain* what the US military is going to do, is doing or has done. The words are rather chosen to *create* the utmost support among US public *and* the allies, while attempting to provide *justifications* that are not too far from being truthful and/or credible. As mentioned, the Invasion of Panama was and is seen by some as a *diversionary war*: a war that is designed and carried out to divert attention from failing (domestic) policy.⁵⁴ If the assumption is made that the Operation Just Cause as a diversionary war, the four reasons first presented by Bush were not intended to give an honest answer to the question of military deployment,

⁵⁰ Russel L. Riley, 'Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs', retrieved from <https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs> 26-05-2018..

⁵¹ James D. Boys, *Clinton's Grand Strategy*, (London 2015) 211-213.

⁵² Rod Thompson, *Assymetric Warfare*, (Cambridge 2007) 10.

⁵³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁴ Jane Kelleter Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics?"

casualties, collateral damage and costs. They were intended to *construct* a new post-Cold War form of general acceptance of global military deployment by the US.

A constructivist approach comparable to the above was coined by James M. Skelly in 2002. He wrote that the general approach to Peace Studies had been hindered by its “attempts to mimic the methodological approaches of international relations and political science while valorizing marginal position within those disciplines.”⁵⁵ Skelly also refers back to an earlier (1988) article by himself and Hugh Mehan, in which they advocated a more discursive approach of international relations.⁵⁶ In this paper they take the Nuclear Peace as an example of a ‘war-like’ relation that is primarily conducted in talks, negotiations and discursive performances. This political discourse “responds to something, objects to something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and seeks support”.⁵⁷ Mehan and Skelly apply this to define Cold War negotiations between the two superpowers of the world but it can easily be transferred to the Post-Cold War political performance that was the announcement of the Invasion of Panama. As mentioned before, the four reasons for the Invasion of Panama can be seen as probing the audience of the Bush administration in order to find out what *genre* of justification would provide the most support. The merits of a constructivist approach to the study of peace and war are also outlined by Skelly: “If political discourse is made a part of political action, and vice versa, the ability to cloak violence through the use of language is significantly lessened.”⁵⁸

Another benefit of a constructivist approach, when used to describe and analyze the ongoing Western wars on foreign soils and the accompanying discourse, is that it provides an angle from which the notion of the liberal peace can be challenged. Simply put: the liberal peace thesis is the notion that democracies do not fight other democracies.⁵⁹ The problem with the liberal peace thesis is that it provokes a sentiment of moral righteousness and peacefulness among the Western countries. To a certain extent this moral righteousness can be defended: the West takes great pride in their individual freedom, their functional democracies, their technological advancements, their societal equality and their general prosperity. Countries that do not fit these descriptions can, in a critical geopolitical fashion, be placed in a space of inferiority in people’s minds. Wars against such ‘places’ are more easily justifiable. The thought process can be described as such: “it is their fault that they are not democracy, would they have been a democracy

⁵⁵ James M. Skelly, ‘A Constructivist Approach to Peace Studies’, *Peace Review* 14 (2002) 1, 57-60, 57.

⁵⁶ Hugh Mehan & James M. Skelly, ‘Reykjavik: The Bread and Repair of the Pure War Script’ *Multilingua* 7 (1988) 2, 35-66.

⁵⁷ V. N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge 1986), 95 in: ‘Reykjavik: The Bread and Repair of the Pure War Script’.

⁵⁸ James M. Skelly, ‘A Constructivist Approach to Peace Studies’, 60.

⁵⁹ Michael W. Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005) 3.

and we would not need to fight them, because the liberal peace thesis forbids it.” The wrongs that are committed in those countries *by the hands of democracies* become less important. Or at least, their importance or media-relevance is not as long-lasting to become susceptible to structural change. When dissecting, in a constructivist manner, political discourse that contains justifications for military action *outside* of this ‘liberal peace space’, the reality of distant war and violence and the slipperiness of Western motives can be brought closer to the (Western) audience once more. Some argue that the liberalism and the actions resulting from it should rather be seen as doctrine that perpetrates ‘ferocious violence with which it deploys techniques to penetrate and organize the dispositions of liberal subjects themselves’.⁶⁰ In 1995 Thomas Risse-Kappen argued that “Democracies are Janus-faced. While they do not fight each other, they are frequently involved in militarized disputes and wars with authoritarian regimes.” He further argues that these empirical findings are under-theorized.⁶¹

⁶⁰ J. Reid *War* ‘Liberalism and Modernity: The Biopolitical Provocations of ‘Empire’, *Review of International Affairs* 17 (2004) 1, 63-79.

⁶¹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument’ *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (1995) 4, 491-517.

4. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Global War on Terror

After two terms of Clinton presidency, George W. Bush was elected president in 2001. Bush was in the difficult position of reacting to the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, the deadliest attack on US soil since Pearl Harbor, which was coincidentally often used as a form of meaning-making in and of itself.⁶² The first country that was invaded by the US in reaction to 9/11 was Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were located. Thus, the Invasion of Afghanistan was a direct reaction to the 9/11 attacks.⁶³ In a speech delivered to congress ten days after the attacks, George Bush said the following: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” Thus the Global War on Terror began. He made sure to include the entire world in this new American venture by saying: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” A month later Afghanistan was initially invaded by the US and the UK.

4.1 Bush addressing the Global War on Terror

Two years later, on 18 March 2003, Bush presented Saddam Hussein and Iraq with an ultimatum.⁶⁴ In a threatening speech from the Cross Hall in the White House he informed that the US would be ready to invade Iraq if their demands were not met. The most important demand was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. The words terror, terrorists or terrorism are used ten times in total in this speech. Although Bush does not necessarily present Hussein as a terrorist himself, he does convey him as a terrorist supporter and leader of a ‘terror state’. The other important justification that passes the review in this speech is the alleged Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which he also connects to a looming terrorist threat for the US and its allies.

It is striking how the definition of terrorism was somewhat broadened in his ultimatum speech to Iraq in comparison to the definition of terrorism he utilized shortly after 9/11 in his speech concerning the responsibility of Afghanistan in relation to 9/11. Ten days after the attacks, it seemed that Bush wanted to introduce the world to organized Islamic terrorism. He presented it as being a worldwide network of Islamic terrorist cells, all underground organizations: “Al-Qaeda is to terror, what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people

⁶² Brian T. Connor, ‘9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor? Analogies, Narratives, and Meanings of 9/11 in Civil Society’, *Cultural Sociology* 6 (2012) 1, 3-25.

⁶³ Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond*, (London 2003), 13.

⁶⁴ See Appendix 3.

everywhere”.⁶⁵ This speech was noticeably more focused on terrorist organizations worldwide, with al-Qaeda as its main subject. However, Bush also briefly mentioned that governments who support or harbor terrorists were also the target of the coming Global War on Terror: “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.” In the Iraq Ultimatum speech, the focus is shifted from the terrorist organization, to the terrorism on a governmental level, in this case Iraq.

Like the justification concerning the Invasion of Panama, the justifications given in the Iraq Ultimatum Speech, can also be divided into different genres. The genre that is given most attention this time is *security*. According to the speech, Bush is certain that Iraq is in possession of WMD’s and that there is a real threat of these either being used against the US or other countries by Iraq, or that these weapons will be given to terrorist organizations.

This brings me to the second genre of justification: *the global war on terror*. Introduced in the aforementioned 9/11 speech, it highly focuses on the threat of Islamic terrorist organization: “These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.” In the Iraq Ultimatum Speech, Bush claims that the Hussein regime has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al-Qaeda.” The genre of Global War on The genre of terrorism can be seen as an extension of *security*, but it makes it more concrete and tangible and above all: highly emotional because it reaches back to the trauma of 9/11. It also creates the notion that wars that are fought in the name of the Global War on Terror are *defensive* rather than offensive. With regards to Iraq, the ties to al-Qaeda and the 9/11 far from clear and these allegations have been called into question ever since. Some even claiming that most Islamic terrorist threatening the US were from the US’s closest allies, rather than from states deemed ‘sponsors of terror’ by the US.⁶⁶ In 2005, Pape even claimed that between 1995 and 2003, *none* of Bush’s Terrorist States (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan, pre-2001 Afghanistan) produced a single al-Qaeda suicide attacker that conducted an attack against the US.

The third genre that can be recognized in this speech is again that of *liberty*. When announcing the coming war against Iraq Bush calls it *liberation*, calling back to the liberation of Europe, the heroic history of WWII. Lastly, the genre of *peace* is touched upon. The US is presented as being at the front of a movement that seeks world peace, a movement whose main instrument is war. Peace in this sense is presented as the positive opposite of a world in which dictatorial regimes have possession of WMD’s and

⁶⁵CNN, text of George Bush’s *Speech to a joint session of Congress, 21/10/2001* retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>, 10-06-2018.

⁶⁶ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York 2005) 147.

the willingness of using these weapons and their alleged ties to terrorist organization. Thus, it is also a certain conception of *security*, global security. It can be called the *securitization of world peace*. A dangerous proposition, as world peace is something the world has never seen and will perhaps never see.⁶⁷ To take world peace as a justification for war is to advocate infinite warfare. The power of terms like world peace should not be underestimated. In a utilitarian sense, much harm, damage and violence can morally be defended when it is perpetrated in the name of World Peace. In a sense, world peace is a concept that should not be pursued by world leaders with the might of militaries at their disposal.

4.2 Constructivist perspective

In the past two decades the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their consequences have been tiresomely analyzed, explained and researched. There are no final answers to the questions asked by researchers, public speakers and citizens, but everyone seems to agree on one thing: the consequences were far reaching and the event literally changed the world. Many of today's wars and conflicts are in some ways related to the attacks on New York and Washington.⁶⁸ One of the most striking features of the war on terror is that it has never proven to be effective in eliminating global terrorism in *any way*.⁶⁹ Still leaders and nations around the globe insist on spending enormous sums of money and sacrificing soldier and civilian alike to combat the very phenomenon it seems to just make *even worse*. It is like fighting a fire by throwing petrol on the hottest point. When we consider that Islamist terrorism presently is thought to be the most prevalent or influential form of terrorism (certainly by politicians), it seems unreasonable to wage war (once again) in the Middle-East, the birthplace of many of the largest global Islamist terrorist organizations. When a basic understanding of the dynamics of a-symmetrical warfare is presumed and how threatened underdogs will always scurry for the cover of anonymity and wage war from the underground, the post-9/11 decisions to *intensify* violent conflict and Western military presence in Islamic nations is baffling.

It is not surprising that the 9/11 attacks have spawned an enormous amount of conspiracy theories as they have served to justify a multitude of far-reaching domestic and foreign policy reforms, that have handily resulted in an even larger US military presence around the world. The war on terror showcases the discursive power of 'a common enemy'. The ventures that are related to the war on terror had brought

⁶⁷ See John Orme, *The Paradox of Peace: Leaders, Decisions and Conflict Resolution* (New York 2004).

⁶⁸ See Brian M. Jenkins and John P. Godges, *The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism* (Santa Monica 2011).

⁶⁹ See Paul Rodgers, 'Lost cause: consequences and implications of the war on terror', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6 (2013) 1, 13-28.

the NATO countries closer together once again, as their dependency to each other but mostly their dependency on the US military has been growing ever since the onset of the global War on Terror.⁷⁰

The rhetoric used by George W. Bush after 9/11 was strong at the least. His famous words “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” are a prime example of this. Three days prior that speech a ‘joint resolution’ named the Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) was passed by congress. The resolution decreed that “[...] the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States [...]”.⁷¹ In the second section it specified that this resolution was mainly designed for an easier deployment of US troops world-wide: “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” The tone used by the President Bush showcased a hunger for war and revenge. The resolution, but also the claims made by Bush addressing Congress seem to be designed in such a way that a broad range of interpretation or liberty of policy direction is possible. For instance: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” Such claims can pave the way for a misuse of intelligence. The CIA only needs to ‘prove’ that a certain nation is affiliated with terrorism, and all of a sudden, the US and its allies have the ‘right’ to stampede in with drones or boots on the ground.⁷² In a Realist sense, the discursive qualities of these messages would boil down to the material need for security, to challenge those who challenge the United States, or more broadly, the West. Policy makers inspired by Realist thought *see* a serious thread and feel the need to take *action*. What it fails to take into account, however, is the social and cultural circumstances in which 1) terrorism and anti-Americanism takes place, and 2) what long-term consequences can result from ‘Realist policy’, such as military operations abroad. It showcases how easily the American society is moved into military action when *foreigners* are the ones to conduct even a relatively small-scale attack on US soil.

Another virtue of viewing these statements in a constructivist perspective is that it should be obvious that speaking in absolutes, powerful as it may be, lack, per definition, any form of nuance. Statements like

⁷⁰ See Kyle T. Kattelman, ‘Party Structure, Information, and Coalition Durability: The Relevance of NATO in the Global War on Terror’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39 (2016) 9, 803-818.

⁷¹GPO, ‘Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.’ Retrieved from <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf> 25-07-2018.

⁷² James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (New York 2005).

“you are either with us or against us” serves the sole purpose of muting any ally who would rather have a more distant and well-thought-out approach to the problem of international terrorism. The thought that the terrorists maybe *wanted* the US to invade Muslim countries was given little heed.⁷³ The thought that the US was actually *provoked* by the al-Qaeda to once again attack Middle-Eastern countries was never mentioned in the emotional times right after the 9/11 attacks. If such thoughts would be vocalized back then the broader debate on the correct course of action would have been more prevalent. A constructivist account of terrorism tells us that terrorism is a performative action. It has a social message, a design to instill fear, project power or to provoke a nation (or other groups) into acting. Hardly ever is it an *actual* attack in the sense of structurally damaging society and its dynamics.

4.3 US Interests

To answer the question why the War on Terror was not reconsidered in a more nuanced and less Realist fashion it is important to note what the biggest direct consequences were of the war on terror. Some of these consequences were foreseen, other were unforeseen. The two largest direct consequences that evolved from the war on terror were the war in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom), and the war in Iraq, beginning in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom). For an answer to this question we can take a look at one of the central and apparently eternal motives behind US foreign policy. The American foreign policy of the 20th century is often described as isolationist in the interwar period, to internationalist in the period after WWII. However even with the revival of the notion of American isolationism under Trump, the actual truthfulness of it increasingly challenged by a number of authors.⁷⁴ It is questioned whether the US was ever truly isolationist in the first place.

The US never was economically isolated, but neither was it militarily isolated. Between the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the Attack on Pearl Harbor (1943), the US had a military presence in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Dominican Republic and even in Russia. Although the militaristic nature of US foreign policy involvement really took off after WWII, they were by no means absent in the interwar period. Even the relative calm of the Clinton administration saw military action in Somalia (inherited from the Bush administration), the Invasion of Haiti, a bombing campaign in Bosnia and a bombing campaign in Kosovo. These were all relatively small scale however, so the Global War on Terror and how it was critical for homeland security was a perfect discourse to once again, deploy the US army on a larger scale. The

⁷³ Michael Scott Doran, ‘Somebody Else’s Civil War’, *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002) 1.

⁷⁴ See Bear F. Braumoeller, ‘The Myth of American Isolationism’, *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010), 349-371; Jerel A. Rosati & James Brown Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, International Edition* (Boston 2013), chapter 2.

constructivist perspective on these speeches by Bush looks further than the presented goals and threats. It recognizes the attempts of spreading *ideas, value systems* and *emotions* as a semiotic method of meaning-making. Adam Hodges suggested that the War on Terror Discourse created a *regime of truth* in which discursive micro-level interactions are linked to macro-level discourses.⁷⁵ The result being: a strong sense of urgency and validity of the War on Terror, and an initial public approval of large-scale military action.

Looking at justification discourse from a constructivist perspective can bring forward the existence of hidden agendas. What these hidden agendas are remains unclear and it is almost impossible to determine. Many authors coin the strategic geopolitical importance of an unstable Middle-Eastern region. The abundance of oil is often named as the main factor that keeps Western nations so extremely involved in the region, as they are afraid of a strong and unified Middle-East that would, in the sense of power politics, gain enormous leverage to the rest of the world.⁷⁶ Others point to the 'military industrial complex', for which President Eisenhower warned the world in his farewell speech. It is a concept that holds that there are many US military industries that greatly benefit from ongoing war and global military involvement by the US, and that these industries have immense policy influence.⁷⁷

Although, the material interests brought forward by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy takes the nobler route, claiming in 2014 that the US material interests in the Middle East include:

- Materially supporting countries and peoples that are well-disposed toward the United States.
- Materially supporting pro-reform forces in the Arab and Shia Muslim worlds.
- Preventing the emergence of a hegemonial power from emerging and overwhelming the region.
- Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.
- Preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including the falling of such weapons into the hands of extremist movements.
- Safeguarding the freedom of navigation.
- Destroying al-Qaeda-linked forces, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

⁷⁵ Adam Hodges, 'The Political Economy of Truth in the "War on Terror" Discourse: Competing Visions of an Iraq/al Qaeda Connection', *Social Semiotic* 17 (2007) 1, 6-8.

⁷⁶ See Steven Hurst, *The United States and Iraq since 1979 Hegemony, Oil and War* (Edinburgh 2009) ; Edward Nell & Willi Semmler, 'The Iraq War and the World Oil Economy', *Constellations And International journal of Critical & Democratic Theory* 14 (2007) 4, 557-585.

⁷⁷ Edmund F. Byrne, 'The U.S. Military Industrial Complex is Circumstantially Unethical', *Journal of Business Ethics* 95 (2010) 2, 153-165.

- Expanding and deepening U.S. cooperation with Israel in the intelligence, technology, and military fields.
- Promoting a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.⁷⁸

The interests and goals in the Middle-East pointed out in this list are geared towards the global war on terror, security and peace. The only interest that seems to point towards a hidden motive that benefits from unrest in the region is that of the prevention of the emerging of a hegemonial power in the region. The kind of hegemonial power is not specified in the text but a single hegemonial country, ruling over the rest seems to be what is meant, rather than a close cooperation between the countries in the region. Another problem with these interest arises with the US focus on deep cooperation with Israel, which will always remain a obstacle for when they would want to deepen their cooperation with the Arab states as well.

⁷⁸National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 'U.S. Interests in the Middle East', *American Foreign Policy Interests* 36 (2014), 277.

4.4 Discussion: total transparency and future interventions

Now for the final two stages of this version of the Critical Discourse analysis: the third stage asks whether the 'wrong' is needed for the social order to function.⁷⁹ The wrong in this analysis refers to the interchangeable discourse that accompanies military action, and that somehow, the militarized nature of the American footprint on the world seems unable to be changed. When the US seems to go into a calmer direction, there is always something that pops up, demanding large military dedication. Even when a growing number of voices in America did begin to ask whether the American foreign-policy history was in some ways responsible for the attacks on 9/11 and to reconsider the War on Terror, George Bush was reelected in 2004, interpreted by many as a mandate to continue in the line they had been heading.⁸⁰ In the previous part of this chapter I argued that the discourse used for justifying military actions do not always seemed to be compatible with reality. Different genres of justification are put forward and the one that sticks becomes 'the real one'. Is this a necessity for continuing social order or should a government always be truly transparent?

Total transparency for governments may perhaps not be the best way forward, but when it comes to military interventions transparency should be the norm. The cost in human life, material and money and the unforeseen consequences that always accompany such actions are simply too far reaching to remain vague about. I am not propagating for a non-interventionist, pacifist US. The US has the tools, has the power and has the willingness to bring about positive change. These tools should be employed, but only for the good, and the good that a military action might bring should be well established and supported by evidence. Sometimes, swift decision-making is necessary, for instance in the case of a direct and ongoing attack. But rarely has the US been in such a pressing situation to make an overnight order by the President to invade a country a justified action.

A more critical stance on official discourse employed even by the most progressive politicians should be the norm. The IR scholarly community could take some lessons of critical journalism, especially with the way in which the debate around *policy relevance* seems to stagnate. Viewing justification-discourse in a more constructivist manner should be something of a second nature for politicians, at the least. The US does not operate in a bubble, and for many of their military decisions they also build upon their allies (NATO) or the United Nations. Ultimately, the leaders of the allied countries have as much to say about their own intervention as the US has on theirs. Close and powerful allies such as the EU and Britain should work to function more as part of an external system of checks and balances, judging US policy direction

⁷⁹ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 235.

⁸⁰ David Mauk & John Oakland, *American Civilization: An Introduction* (New York 2009) 174-175.

and decision-making, without falling for the initial discourse attached to it. An obstacle is that since WWII there seems to be a prevalent feeling of dependence on the US in Europe. But these sentiments began to fade somewhat in 2017, following the Trump administration and Brexit, Angela Merkel said in an election speech that Europe should “take its faith into its own hands”.⁸¹

Another factor highlighted by the constructivist perspective on political discourse is that is inherently more critical to the truthfulness or the lack thereof. A term that is gaining traction is that of post-truth or post-reality politics. It holds that the rift between politics and policy is becoming increasingly wide. It is a term that is primarily used within journalism but the scientific community should also take this term seriously. This is especially true for the scientific community whose main activity is analyzing and theorizing international politics. A more critical stance towards the truthfulness of political discourse should provide IR scholars with a more usable toolset of analysis which would also help with the highly debated ‘policy relevance’ of IR.

A continuation of this ‘game of discourses’ was again introduced with the misuse of the so called ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’. In short, this doctrine is a countermovement on the unquestioned sovereignty of states. It is based around a double layer of mandatory state responsibilities. Firstly, a state has the responsibility to protect its own citizens against violence, famine and natural disasters. Secondly, whenever a state is deemed unable to fulfill this responsibility, the responsibility to protect is carried over to ‘the global community’.⁸² This promising doctrine that seemed to carry over the responsibility from the US and the NATO, to the UN was first put into practice during the Libyan intervention. At the request of the Arab League of Nations a US/NATO led coalition was formed to help stabilize the (first)⁸³ Libyan civil war (2011) and to protect its people. But when the coalition once again went further than just the protection that the doctrine demanded and pushed for regime change it is no surprise that the doctrine of R2P has lost much of its initial ‘togetherness’ of the international community. R2P had become yet another discourse of justification for Western-led intervention.⁸⁴

This shows that a careful and critical examination of the discourse of intervention is paramount among Western politicians. When it comes to military intervention, the words and the actions of leaders can

⁸¹ Jon Henley, ‘Angela Merkel: EU cannot completely rely on US and Britain any more’, *The Guardian* (2017) retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/28/merkel-says-eu-cannot-completely-rely-on-us-and-britain-any-more-g7-talks>, 08-0-2018.

⁸² John Holmes, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Humanitarian Overview’, *Global Responsibility to Protect* 6 (2014) 2, 126-145.

⁸³ The Second Libyan Civil being from 2014-present.

⁸⁴ Elizabeth O’Shea, ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future’, *International Human Rights Law Review* 1, 173-190, 180.

rarely be united. Terms like peacebuilding, statebuilding, R2P, the spread of democracy, no-fly zones and stability creation sound very noble and on the 'right side of history'. But these terms are just words, the actual actions that follow up on these words and the reasoning behind them will always stay hidden behind some form of secrecy, perhaps for all parties involved. To recognize this in its initial forms may be a step forward in the right direction.

Conclusion

“There is a kind of violence within liberalism of the Lockean type which goes back to its origins in the violent politics of the Renaissance, in which liberty and warfare (both civil war and international conflict) were bound together.”⁸⁵

The main focus of this thesis has been the post-Cold War justification discourses for US military conflict. This starting point was chosen because the Cold War military actions of the United States are historically bound to the existence of ‘the one other superpower’, the Soviet Union. Some analysts at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union predicted that the US could now finally stop their costly arms race. However, the US military spending and development did not decrease and since the “new world order”, the US has had boots on the ground in three major campaigns and numerous other large- and small-scale military operations. I have attempted to approach the topic of the continuation of America’s military conduct from a discursive and constructive perspective. The question I set out to answer in this thesis was the following: *How did the discourses of justification of military action develop from the end of the Cold War until and including the War on Terror?* I found part of this answer in the analysis of post-Cold War speeches by George H. W. Bush and Secretary Baker that occurred shortly after the SU had fallen. My aim was to analyze in what way a transition was attempted towards different sets of genres or frames of justification with regards to the first post-Cold War military action: the (sudden) Invasion of Panama. The justification discourse that was used for the Invasion of Panama was all over the place and when looking at critical literature concerning the Invasion of Panama none of the stated reasons are seem truly credible. From this I opted the possibility that the discourse on the Panama Invasion was primarily designed to *probe* what genre of discourse would prove to be enduring for public opinion in the long run. In the case of Panama this was the principle of *democracy promotion* which I placed in the genre of *nobility*. The following presidency of Bill Clinton initially made extensive usage of this genre of justification but it ultimately also lost its semiotic power.

That is where the war on terror comes into play. How horrible the events of 9/11 may have been, they did provide for a perfect pretext of US military action in at least the two decennia thereafter, until this day. The accompanying discourse analysis was that of speeches delivered George W. Bush, in which he justifies coming and past military action. Within this context, George W. Bush also utilized different genres

⁸⁵ Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order From Grotius to Kant*, (Oxford 1999), 196.

of justification but it all boiled down to the relatively simple context of the *necessity* of the Global War on Terror.

It is easy to say and think that the liberal states of the West are 'on the right side of history', since it often comes down emotionally to a conflict between the good of democracy and the bad of dictatorial regimes. In this thesis I attempted to put the words of US world leaders that have decided on some far reaching military action, in a perspective that emphasizes their discursive, semiotic and valorizing function within society, rather than the political message they attempt to bring across or the actual truths and untruths of their words. My main focus was not to look how these speeches and justification discourses would hold true, but rather at what kind of sentiments are constructed, created or magnified. I did not look at these speeches from a policy standpoint, but from a social standpoint; how can the public be convinced to become supportive for the initial phases of coming wars?

Whether motives to go to war are strategic, ideational or economical, or all of the above, is hard to tell. It is difficult to find out 'the true' (may there even be such a thing) motives behind military conflict due to the sheer size of organizations involved. We cannot find out whether the securitization discourses real threat of terrorism is consciously designed to convince both the decision makers and the public of the right way forward, a way forwards that seems to usually involve a large role for the military. There is no way to retrace the existence of these discourses back to a particular political body. However, we do can inform both public and policymakers that the *discursive* dynamics are deceptive, and that presented threats should also be considered in a more constructivist perspective. During the writing of this thesis I have also found how difficult it is to find relevant literature within International Relations that focuses on the truthfulness political discourse, or the ethical or moral aspect of policy. That not all the language of politicians should be believed is a generally accepted claim, but the influence of this untruthfulness is hardly ever written about, while it seems such an important part of the information that IR scholars should be using: political discourse. There is a term for this notion of the ambivalence of political discourse: post-truth or post-reality politics and it is gaining traction on a whole. However, more IR research on this topic is needed since it is also an important factor in the 'policy-relevance' debate that is always going on within IR. When politics and policy become more and more disconnected it will become increasingly hard to construct valuable and usable theories and analyses on international politics. These propositions are worthy of more inquiry.

Bibliography

- Antizzo, Glenn J., *U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: How to Win America's Wars in the Twenty-First Century*, (Baton Rouge 2010).
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (Oxford 2013).
- Baker, James, "Democracy and American Diplomacy" in *Department of State Dispatch* 1 (1990) 18.
- Bamford, James, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (New York 2005).
- Berberoglu, Berch, *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability* (New York 1999).
- Boys, James D., *Clinton's Grand Strategy*, (London 2015).
- Braumoeller, Bear F., 'The Myth of American Isolationism', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010), 349-371.
- Buckley, Mary & Rick Fawn, *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond*, (London 2003).
- Bush, George W., 'Transcript of The Iraq Ultimatum Speech', *The Guardian* retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq> 01-06-2018.
- Bush, George H. W., 'Address to the Nation on Panama Invasion', retrieved from <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ghwbushpanamainvasion.htm>, 02-04-2018.
- Byrne, Edmund F., 'The U.S. Military Industrial Complex is Circumstantially Unethical', *Journal of Business Ethics* 95 (2010) 2, 153-165.
- Carse, Ashley, *Beyond the Big Ditch: Politics, Ecology, and Infrastructure at the Panama Canal* (Cambridge 2014).
- Chapman, Stephen, 'Lofty Motives Don't Excuse America's Panama Invasion', *Chicago Tribune* (Chicago 1990) retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-01-11/news/9001030580_1_panama-canal-bush-aides-falklands-war, 25-05-2018.
- CNN, text of George Bush's *Speech to a joint session of Congress*, 21/10/2001 retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>, 10-06-2018.
- Connor, Brian T., '9/11 – A New Pearl Harbor? Analogies, Narratives, and Meanings of 9/11 in Civil Society', *Cultural Sociology* 6 (2012) 1, 3-25.
- Cramer, Jane Kellet, "'Just Cause" or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War"', *Armed Forces & Society* 32 (2006) 2, 178-201.
- Daghrir, Wassim, 'The Media and Operation Just Cause in Panama', *Journal of Arts & Humanities*, 5 (2016) 5, 51-56.

Daghrir, Wassim, 'The United States' "Realist" Foreign Policy: Operation Just Cause in Panama as a Case Study, *Journal of Arts & Humanities* 5 (2016) 5, 30-36.

Dalby, Simon, *Creating the Second World War: The Discourse of Politics* (London 2016).

Dinges, John, *Our Man in Panama* (New York 1990).

Doran, Michael Scott, 'Somebody Else's Civil War', *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002) 1.

Doyle, Michael W. , 'Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace', *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005) 3.

Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith *International Relations Theory* (3rd Edition Oxford 2013).

Fairclough, Norman, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (Second Edition London 2010).

Fiaz, Nazya, 'Constructivism meets critical realism: Explaining Pakistan's state practice in the aftermath of 9/11', *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (2014) 2, 491-515.

Gamson, William A., 'News as Framing Comments on Graber' *The American Behavioral Scientist* 33 (1989) 2.

GPO, 'Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.' Retrieved from <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf>, 25-07-2018.

Henley, Jon, 'Angela Merkel: EU cannot completely rely on US and Britain any more', *The Guardian* (2017) retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/28/merkel-says-eu-cannot-completely-rely-on-us-and-britain-any-more-g7-talks>, 08-0-2018.

Hodges, Adam, 'The Political Economy of Truth in the "War on Terror" Discourse: Competing Visions of an Iraq/al Qaeda Connction', *Social Semiotic* 17 (2007) 1.

Holmes, John, 'Responsibility to Protect: A Humanitarian Overview', *Global Responsibility to Protect* 6 (2014) 2, 126-145.

Hurst, Steven, *The United States and Iraq since 1979 Hegemony, Oil and War* (Edinburgh 2009).

Jenkins, Brian M. & John P. Godges, *The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism* (Santa Monica 2011).

Kattelman, Kyle T., 'Party Structure, Information, and Coalition Durability: The Relevance of NATO in the Global War on Terror', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39 (2016) 9, 803-818.

Kelle, Alexander, 'Securitization of International Public Health: Implications for Global Health Governance and the Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime', *Global Governance* 13 (2007) 2.

Kelstrup, Morten & Michael Williams, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community* (London: Routledge, 2000).

Kerry Subcommittee Report: *Drugs, Law Enforcement And Foreign Policy*, retrieved from https://archive.org/stream/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras/Drugs%2C%20Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Foreign%20Policy%20%281988%29_djvu.txt 18-05-2018.

Kuperman, Alan J., 'The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans', *International Studies Quarterly* (2008) 52, 49-80.

Kuypers, Jim A., *Bush's War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age* (Lanham 2006).

Mauk, David & John Oakland, *American Civilization: An Introduction* (New York 2009).

McPherson, Alan L., *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles : The United States and Latin America Since 1945* (Washington 2006).

Mehan, Hugh & James M. Skelly, 'Reykjavik: The Bread and Repair of the Pure War Script'. *Multilingua* 7 (1988) 2, 35-66.

National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 'U.S. Interests in the Middle East', *American Foreign Policy Interests* 36 (2014), 277.

Nell, Edward, & Willi Semmler, 'The Iraq War and the World Oil Economy, *Constellations And International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory* 14 (2007) 4, 557-585.

O'Shea, Elizabeth, 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future', *International Human Rights Law Review* 1, 173-190.

Orme, John, *The Paradox of Peace: Leaders, Decisions and Conflict Resolution* (New York 2004).

Pape, Robert, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York 2005).

Perez, Orlando J., *Political Culture in Panama: Democracy After Invasion* (New York 2011).

Reid, J., *War 'Liberalism and Modernity: The Biopolitical Provocations of 'Empire'*, *Review of International Affairs* 17 (2004) 1, 63-79.

Riley, Russel L., 'Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs', retrieved from <https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs> 26-05-2018.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 'Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument' *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (1995) 4, 491-517.

Rodgers, Paul, 'Lost cause: consequences and implications of the war on terror', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6 (2013) 1, 13-28.

Rosati, Jerel A. & James Brown Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, International Edition* (Boston 2013).

Schmid, Herman, 'Peace Research and Politics, *Journal of Peace Research* 5 (1968) 3, 217-232.

Scott, Dale Peter & Jonathan Marshall, *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America* (California 1998).

Selby, Jan, 'The Myth of Liberal Peace-building, *Conflict, Security and Development* 13 (2013) 1, 57-86.

Skelly, James M., 'A Constructivist Approach to Peace Studies', *Peace Review* 14 (2002) 1, 57-60.

Stewart, Rory and Gerard Knaus, *Can Intervention Work?* (New York 2012).

Stokes, Doug, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia* (London 2005).

Thompton, Rod, *Assymetric Warfare*, (Cambridge 2007).

Truman, Henry S., 'Adress Before Joint Session of Congress', 1947.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó, *Critical Geopolitics* (London Edition 2005).

Tuck, Richard, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order From Grotius to Kant*, (Oxford 1999).

Volosinov, V. N., *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge 1986).

Wicker, Tom, 'Overkill in Panama' *New York Times* (New York 1990) retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/05/opinion/in-the-nation-overkill-in-panama.html>, 25-05-2018.

Williams, Paul D. e.d., *Security Studies An introduction*, (Oxon 2013).

Appendices

Appendix 1 - George H.W. Bush's addresses the Nation on the Panama invasion, December 20th 1989.⁸⁶

§1 My fellow citizens, last night I ordered U.S. military forces to Panama. No President takes such action lightly. This morning, I want to tell you what I did and why I did it. For nearly two years, the United States, nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have worked together to resolve the crisis in Panama.

§2 The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty. Many attempts have been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by the dictator of Panama, Gen. Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker.

§3 Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day forces under his command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another, arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That was enough.

§4 General Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama created an eminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama. As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our armed force to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama, and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States. I contacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress last night and informed them of this decision, and after taking this action, I also talked with leaders in Latin America, the Caribbean, and those of other U.S. allies Lifting of U.S. Sanctions

§5 At this moment, U.S. forces, including forces deployed from the United States last night, are engaged in action in Panama. The United States intends to withdraw the forces newly deployed to Panama as quickly as possible. All forces have conducted themselves courageously and selflessly, and as Commander in Chief, I salute every one of them and thank them on behalf of our country. Tragically, some Americans have lost their lives in defense of their fellow citizens, in defense of democracy, and my heart goes out to their families. We also regret and mourn the loss of innocent Panamanians.

⁸⁶ George H. W. Bush, 'Address to the Nation on Panama Invasion', retrieved from <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ghwbushpanamainvasion.htm>, 02-04-2018.

§6 The brave Panamanians elected by the people of Panama in the elections last May, President Guillermo Endara and Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford have assumed the rightful leadership of their country. You remember those horrible pictures of newly-elected Vice President Ford covered head to toe with blood, beaten mercilessly by so-called dignity battalions. Well, the United States today recognizes the democratically elected Government of President Endara. I will send our Ambassador back to Panama immediately.

§7 Key military objectives have been achieved. Most organized resistance has been eliminated, but the operation is not over yet: General Noriega is in hiding. And nevertheless, yesterday a dictator ruled Panama, and today constitutionally elected leaders govern.

§8 I have today directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State to lift the economic sanctions with respect to the democratically elected government of Panama and, in cooperation with that government, to take steps to effect an orderly unblocking of Panamanian Government assets in the United States. I'm fully committed to implement the Panama Canal treaties and turn over the Canal to Panama in the year 2000. The actions we have taken and the cooperation of a new, democratic government in Panama will permit us to honor these commitments. As soon as the new government recommends a qualified candidate -- Panamanian -- to be Administrator of the Canal, as called for in the treaties, I will submit this nominee to the Senate for expedited consideration.

§9 I am committed to strengthening our relationship with the democratic nations in this hemisphere. I will continue to seek solutions to the problems of this region through dialogue and multilateral diplomacy.

§10 I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that every other avenue was closed and the lives of American citizens were in grave danger. I hope that the people of Panama will put this dark chapter of dictatorship behind them and move forward together as citizens of a democratic Panama with this Government that they themselves have elected.

§11 The United States is eager to work with the Panamanian people in partnership and friendship to rebuild their economy. The Panamanian people want democracy, peace, and the chance for a better life in dignity and freedom. The people of the United States seek only to support them in pursuit of these noble goals.

Thank you very much.

Democracy

institutionalizing the operation of pluralist political institutions. In our view, the party plenum's repudiation of special political or legal means to preserve the party's monopoly on power was a tremendous step toward democracy in the Soviet Union.

Fifth, we've been exploring with your experts how we can provide technical cooperation in transforming your command-administrative system into one with certain characteristics of a market-based economy. Continuing exchanges will be helpful, but some legal changes need to be made for cooperation to flourish.

We also need to expand and accelerate our cooperation in combating environmental problems that threaten the welfare of all of us.

In these five areas then, I think we can find points of mutual advantage for both the Soviet and the American people. I cannot promise and, of course, no one can promise that our search for cooperation will always be rewarded. But I can say this; the American people and the people of the Soviet Union have great respect for each other's achievements. Each of us is heir to great historical and

cultural traditions. Yet for more than 40 years, we have waged a cold war against each other.

Now is the time, if I might suggest it, to put the legacy of struggle behind us. Today, we face a different struggle, and we face it in a fast changing world. Together, we must try to understand each other. Together, we must try to agree where possible and to work together based on that agreement. And together we must search for opportunities to expand our cooperation.

Now is the time for us to build a new legacy. Now it is time to move beyond the cold war. ■

Democracy and American Diplomacy

Secretary Baker

Address before the World Affairs Council, Dallas, Texas, March 30, 1990

It is a privilege and an honor to address the World Affairs Council in Dallas. This group is part of many such councils established throughout the United States with a great purpose: to inform and to debate. In our rapidly changing world, that can be a tall order. Yet democracy here and elsewhere ultimately depends upon an informed citizenry, citizens able to ponder and then help set the course of international affairs.

Today, I would like to talk about our world, how we understand it, and what we are doing to promote our ideals and our interests.

When the President took office a little over a year ago, he talked about a new breeze blowing for freedom. That breeze has become a gale-force wind. Around the world, the old dictatorships of left and right have been swept away, and the people have been heard. Their wants are basic: freedom to think, freedom to speak, freedom to worship, freedom to work. And all of their freedoms are bound up in the call for democracy—the freedom to choose one's own government.

We all have been surprised at how quickly the long-cherished democratic ideal has been translated into the reality of free and fair elections. Ever since World War II, democratic values have been shadowed by the threat of totalitarian aggression. Now, as the threat is reduced and the shadow recedes, those values are bright and shining and out in the open.

Already a great, new debate—actually a great, old debate—has broken out, an argument as old as our republic. Now that the adversaries of democracy are weaker, some say we should retire, mission accomplished, to tend to our problems at home. I am not among them. In the new world struggling to be born, like the old world now rapidly passing away, there is no substitute for American leadership.

Let me put it this way: Beyond containment lies democracy. The time of sweeping away the old dictators is passing fast; the time of building up the new democracies has arrived. That is why President Bush has defined our new mission to be the promotion and consolidation of democracy. It is a task that

fulfills both American ideals and American interests.

I would like now to make five observations about both democracy and a democratic foreign policy.

The Meaning of Democracy

The first is that democracy means individual rights and individual responsibilities. With all the talk about changing systems, architectures, processes, and structures, it would be easy to overlook the individual. But the essence of democracy is to treat the individual's rights and responsibilities as two sides of the same coin of freedom. Just as each human being has ideal aspirations, he or she also has limits and imperfections. So the process of democracy, as President Havel of Czechoslovakia recently pointed out, is an endless journey in pursuit of our ideals—a journey spurred on by the reality that life is not always as just as we might want it to be.

In ancient times, searching for a perfect order, the philosopher Plato wanted rule by the elite he called Guardians, a group specially trained in wisdom who could decide public issues and guard public morality according to strict ideals. Democracy has a place for wisdom and a place for ideals, but that place is in the hearts and minds and moral character of the ordinary people. We—all of us—are the "Guardians" of democracy. "Trust the people" is the motto of democracy, and "we the people" live by that motto. Democracy is the aristocracy of individual excellence, and individual rights remain the basis of our approach to would-be democracies.

⁸⁷ James Baker, "Democracy and American Diplomacy" in *Department of State Dispatch* 1 (1990) 18.

Democracy Brings Legitimacy

My second observation about democracy is that it offers a unique political legitimacy. Democracy's reliance upon the individual is reciprocated by the individual's consent to the rule of democratic government. That government is, therefore, considered legitimate in the most basic political sense—both lawful and proper.

Unlike many other forms of government, democracy does not rely on a one-time grant of consent. Consent is reaffirmed through regular, fair, and free elections—the “ticket” for the democratic journey. A democratic society also is characterized by the rule of law and by tolerance of diversity, a tolerance that protects individual rights from abuse, whether from an arbitrary minority or a tyrannical majority. Majority rule must uphold minority rights.

There is another aspect to democracy of which we should be aware: its capacity for self-correction.

We know that all too often the ideal of democracy is not found in daily reality. Often in our own country's history, the practice of public life has been at sharp variance with our standards. Yet the reality is that in a democracy, the road to progress is never permanently closed. There is a self-renewal, a self-corrective element in the democratic process which allows us to overcome blunders and correct the course.

Because democracy enjoys such renewable legitimacy, it can operate not only to ensure domestic progress but also to encourage international harmony. Free peoples cherishing democratic values are unlikely to go to war with one another.

The Sides of Democracy

My third observation is that democracy does not stand alone. Geometry teaches us that the triangle is the most solid configuration. The political geometry of successful democracy should teach us that a free society must be upheld by economic progress and basic security. War and poverty are the great opponents of democratic rules, democratic tolerance, and individual rights.

Many of the recent democratic revolutions in Europe began when people understood at last that economic progress depended on freedom in the workplace

and freedom to own property—and that such freedoms in turn depended upon a government responsive to the people. Dogmas, attempting to eliminate the entrepreneurial spirit while commanding the production of wealth, produced neither bread nor freedom.

We must, therefore, build up the economic and security aspects of the new democracies even as the political base is put into place. A people with hope for a better life, at peace with themselves and their neighbors, is a people for whom democracy will be not just a temporary experiment but a permanent course. A strategy of simply applauding elections and then hoping for the best ignores the painful lessons of the past. Only a strategy that buttresses democracy with economic reforms and greater international security can give us the strength for the tough transitions that will transform the revolutions of 1989 into the democracies of the 1990s.

Foreign Policy and Democratic Values

My fourth observation is that American foreign policy abroad must reflect democratic values. This may seem all too obvious. Yet, there are those who would have America, in the name of its ideals, isolate itself from a world too often hostile to democracy. And there are others who argue for a realpolitik that has a place only for economic or military or political interests and leaves our values at home.

We can recognize in this dualism a little bit of ourselves. How often do we strive for the ideal only to fall short? How frequently do we conclude after some self-serving action that maybe it was not entirely the right thing to do?

As individuals, we succeed when we use each side of our nature to help the other, when we do things in this world not for selfish reasons or because we are satisfied with the status quo but in order to change it, guided by our ideals.

In my view, we must adopt the same approach to our foreign policy. America's ideals are the conscience of our actions. Our power is the instrument to turn those ideals into reality. Our foreign policy, our understanding of other nations, is the blueprint for the job.

As we enter a new era of democracy, the old arguments of idealism vs. realism

must be replaced by idealism plus realism. If we do not understand this, then we shall risk the loss of enduring public support for our policies. I think history illustrates amply that the American people will not support for long a policy that violates their sense of humane values, no matter how it is justified as being in the national interest. I am equally convinced that Americans will reject a policy based primarily on moral exhortation which ignores our power to act. As we applaud the new trends toward democracy, we feel good. But those trends are opportunities and challenges, not permanent facts. We have to do more than feel good; we must do good.

Democracy in Diplomacy

My fifth observation is that a policy of democracy is a “force multiplier,” a potent instrument for rallying international action. A policy that draws upon our domestic values and enjoys the support of the American people automatically makes our influence more effective. But a policy centered on democracy is also a “force multiplier” in that we can use it to engage our friends and allies behind a mutual purpose. It can give hope to those peoples still suffering under dictatorships.

It would seem to be common sense for the United States to lead alliances of free market democracies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas in support of democracy and economic liberty. We can use our common values to pool our strength, advancing everyone's interests in a free and peaceful world. That is what we have tried to do in organizing assistance to the countries of central and Eastern Europe. There and also in Central America, we have urged our friends and allies to calibrate their actions along a democratic standard, not just their immediate geopolitical interests narrowly understood. We have done so because we believe that democracy and the national interests of the democracies reinforce each other.

Still, the fact is that some people don't see it that way. Some people prefer a time when the United States had to do it all alone. Others seem to believe that if we are not the biggest contributors, if we do not micromanage every aid program, then somehow America is no longer a leader.

Obviously, that is not our view. Let me tell you why. The 1940s were a great time for American leadership. We had unsurpassed resources and a world in ruins, and we rose to the challenge. We helped to put our allies on their feet and to turn our former adversaries into friends. Now, thanks to these successful policies, carried out by administrations of both parties, we have lots of help in dealing with the world's problems. To work with our allies is not a sign of American weakness; it is a proof of our strength. And that strength should be guided by a wisdom attuned to our times, just as the Americans of 45 years ago used both brain and brawn to deal with very different circumstances. We can lead today even more effectively than we did then because democracy is on the march.

Central America

These observations about democracy and our foreign policy are not speculative. They are rather guide-posts for practice, and they have played a major part both in our thinking and in some of our recent foreign policy achievements.

I would cite as the first example recent events in Central America. When the President took office, US policy toward that important region—our own neighborhood—was in trouble. It was the most divisive issue we faced. Congress and the executive branch had failed to reach any lasting agreement on how to approach the problem, or for that matter, even how to define it. The American people were divided, too—an almost certain recipe for failure.

The only way out of this tangle was to return to American principles. Early last year, the President decided to define democracy as the regional objective and elections as the means to achieve that result. In each case, this turned the focus where it belonged. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas' conduct of their society—an outpost of oppression in a region of democracies—became the central issue, not the Nicaraguan Resistance. In Panama, Gen. [Manuel] Noriega's brutal rejection of a free election verdict stripped him of his claim to legitimate rule and began the difficult trek toward Panamanian democracy. Another free election in El Salvador, conducted despite violence, gave President [Alfredo]

Cristiani the popular mandate to pursue a negotiated settlement to the war and a chance to demonstrate a serious approach to human rights.

An emphasis on democracy enabled us to cut the Gordian knot that prevented bipartisanship. On March 24, 1989, a bipartisan accord was signed at the White House, enabling Republicans and Democrats to join around a common purpose. Outside of Washington, the American people could be rallied in support. The United States was heard at last to be speaking with one voice. Directly as a result, the Congress voted humanitarian aid for the Resistance through February 28, 1990.

We then took the bipartisan emphasis on democracy and approached the Central American countries. The Esquipulas agreement expressed their wish for peace, democracy, and the end of support for bloody revolutions in other countries. What was lacking was an effective mechanism to turn the wish into reality. Then, at Tesoro Beach, the Central American presidents agreed on a joint plan to be developed within 90 days to demobilize the Resistance, and it was widely interpreted as a defeat for the United States. But the other side of the joint plan was a requirement that the Sandinista government hold internationally supervised elections a year earlier than scheduled—February 25, 1990.

This provision helped us to convince our European allies that they should condition their economic aid to Nicaragua on the holding of free and fair elections. They did. In April 1989, a donors' conference for Nicaragua was sponsored by Sweden. President [Daniel] Ortega later admitted that he received only a small fraction of what he had hoped to get before elections.

Finally, we were able to use all of these developments together to take a more effective approach to the Soviet Union. We had the "force multiplier" of democracy to present the Soviets with a growing international consensus on elections. We could and did argue that if Moscow's aid were seen to be sabotaging legitimate governments—whether a freely elected democracy in El Salvador or the elections process in Nicaragua—there would be strong repercussions on overall US-Soviet relations. And we were able to contrast the Soviet feeding

of conflict with their evident desire for a more cooperative relationship in dealing with regional problems. As a result, even before the elections, Moscow publicly agreed to respect both the electoral process and its outcome.

We were prepared to make sure that the elections were as clean—as free and fair—as possible. Congress supported the President's request for money to support election activities, which enabled us to flood Nicaragua with international observers. The National Endowment for Democracy also contributed funds shared by the Nicaraguan parties. We considered that essential because it enabled the democratic opposition, UNO [Unified Nicaraguan Opposition], to compete on at least the minimal level against a Sandinista party utilizing the resources of the entire state. Finally, we protested vigorously and pointed out clearly every instance of unfair and arbitrary procedure. Democracy, we felt, was a fast-growing plant if only the sunshine of publicity could expose those who would kill it at the root. The pressure was on the Sandinistas to play it straight.

I recite all of these facts because I believe they set a context, a climate that was most conducive to democracy in Nicaragua through the voting itself. The individual Nicaraguan—the individual upon whom democratic hopes depended—knew that he or she was not alone. Voting in a free and fair election was not a desperate, lonely act but a step toward a better future.

Now that a democratic government has been elected in Nicaragua, we know that Nicaragua's recovery from years of civil war and the blight of Marxist economics will be costly and painful. There and in Panama, we must help to turn the new hopes into the reality of progress. That is why the President has proposed a new \$800 million fund for democracy—our part of a multilateral effort to put our neighbors back on their feet. This is not charity. It is an investment in the democratic values we share with our neighbors. For we have a broad vista—stretching from Guatemala to Panama—of new possibilities for democratization, demilitarization, and development which offers a bright future for all the peoples of the region. With our help and the help of other democracies, it can and will be done.

Central and Eastern Europe

My second example of how a democratic foreign policy works concerns central and Eastern Europe. Freed of fear and fiercely determined to recover their dignity and their hopes, the long-suffering peoples of those lands behind the Iron Curtain finally pulled it down.

Last December, not long after the Berlin Wall was breached, I visited that divided city. I took a good look through a newly chiseled hole in that ugly wall, and what I saw was a great city striving to be reborn. And beyond it, old nations were alive with new hope. All of that was captured by the simple word "democracy."

While in Prague a month ago, I talked about the consolidation of democracy throughout the region. It was important for the peoples of central and Eastern Europe to know that the challenges they faced were not theirs alone. We, too, have a challenge. We are admired for our democratic values and for the success of our economic system. People look to us for help—not charity—but the help that allows self-help. Training, advice, and sharing our experience counts for more than money. We must be prepared to give it.

Our program of cooperation and assistance concentrates on three areas, not all of them economic.

First, we will press the concept of free and regular elections. The President has proposed that this be adopted as a program by the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). We have also offered and are sending election observers as each Central and Eastern European country takes its first democratic steps. The objective here is to make democracy the legitimizing principle for all of Europe.

Second, we are working with our allies and the Soviet Union to reduce the arms and the armies facing each other in Europe.

Third, we are extending economic support for the painful transition to free market systems. This will be a very difficult task in societies just now beginning to dismantle Marxist-Leninist economic systems and often lacking the basics of a free market. We believe, however, that the United States, our allies in Europe and Japan, and interna-

tional economic institutions can work together successfully to help these countries achieve the progress so long denied them. The purpose of all of these efforts should be to provide a healthy environment for the real motivator of long-lasting growth—vigorous private sector investment and development.

We are tying our assistance to our values and showing how our values can be of assistance. Our support is to be measured by a single test: whether it advances democracy and economic liberty.

I would add here a word about our policy of democracy and its impact on the Soviet Union. We have an interest in *perestroika* that goes beyond geopolitics. If *perestroika* results in a more democratic and open Soviet society, with individual rights and economic progress, the impact on Soviet foreign policy for the long run will be highly beneficial. Democracy in the Soviet Union is, in my view, the best guarantee of a constructive Soviet approach to international problems.

Breaking New Ground

The third and final case I would cite of democracy in action I call "breaking new ground." It has been my argument throughout this speech that democracy serves both American ideals and American interests. Furthermore, democracy is a practical tool of diplomacy, not the only tool, but a particularly valuable one with which to rally support both here and abroad for our foreign policy.

Democracy speaks to universal aspirations—to use those famous old American words, "regardless of race, creed, or color." I reject and I hope America always rejects the view that democracy is for certain societies but has no place in Africa or Asia or South America, or even in the Middle East. I say instead, remember the motto, "trust the people."

Because we trust the people, not only here or in Europe or in central America but everywhere, we are using democracy and elections as valuable tools in helping to end regional conflicts and to bring about national reconciliation. Let me cite briefly a few examples.

- In Namibia, whose independence celebrations I just attended, free and fair elections were a key element in the settlement that freed Africa's last colony, ended a civil war, and launched a new government with a democratic constitution. We believe that free and fair elections can play a similar role in promoting national reconciliation in Angola and South Africa.

- In the Arab-Israeli conflict, we see elections in the occupied territories as a catalyst to bring about a constructive Israeli-Palestinian dialogue that could lead to the peace both peoples so badly need.

- And in Cambodia, the five permanent members of the [UN] Security Council see a free and fair election as the best way to resolve at last the disputed government of that tortured land, giving the Cambodian people their long overdue chance to choose their own leaders.

Let me conclude with this thought. When I studied classics in college, I found to my surprise that most of the ancient philosophers feared democracy. Those who study the 18th century arguments over our Constitution also will encounter this fear. It was a lingering suspicion that the individual would be corrupted, that the ordinary man or woman was simply was not up to the task of self-government.

Our Founding Fathers overcame that fear and left to us a legacy of confidence in the citizen that constitutes our greatest political and moral strength. Our foreign policy has been at its best when it drew from that strength and made of our country a great force for good in the world. Now, after hard years of defending democratic values, our original confidence has been renewed.

Ordinary people are truly the heroes of our time. Ordinary people broke through the [Berlin] Wall. Ordinary people turned out the dictators. Ordinary people voted for democracy in Central America.

As once our Founding Fathers drew upon confidence in the citizens to build a new democratic society, so now our foreign policy must build upon that same confidence to build a newly democratic international society. That is our opportunity and our challenge. With the help of every American, I am sure we will meet it. ■

Appendix 3 – George W. Bush’s Iraq Ultimatum Speech⁸⁸

§1 My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

§2 Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of [Iraq](#). Our good faith has not been returned.

§3 The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men.

§4 Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people.

§5 The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.

§6 The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.

§7 The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep. Recognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to support the use of force against Iraq. America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We believe in the mission of the United Nations. One reason the UN was founded after the second world war was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and early, before they can attack the innocent and destroy the peace.

§8 In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687 - both still in effect - the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will.

⁸⁸ George W. Bush, 'Transcript of The Iraq Ultimatum Speech', *The Guardian* retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq> 01-06-2018.

§9 Last September, I went to the U.N. General Assembly and urged the nations of the world to unite and bring an end to this danger. On November 8, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and immediately disarm.

§10 Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it. Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.

§11 In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They have delivered public and private messages urging the dictator to leave Iraq, so that disarmament can proceed peacefully. He has thus far refused. All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals - including journalists and inspectors - should leave Iraq immediately.

§12 Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.

§13 It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power. It is not too late for the Iraqi military to act with honor and protect your country by permitting the peaceful entry of coalition forces to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Our forces will give Iraqi military units clear instructions on actions they can take to avoid being attacked and destroyed. I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if war comes, do not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life.

§14 And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In any conflict, your fate will depend on your action. Do not destroy oil wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including the Iraqi people. War crimes will be prosecuted. War criminals will be punished. And it will be no defense to say, "I was just following orders."

§15 Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it. Americans understand the costs of conflict because we have paid them in the past. War has no certainty, except the certainty of sacrifice.

§16 Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so. If Saddam Hussein attempts to cling to power, he will remain a deadly foe until the end. In desperation, he and terrorists groups might try to conduct terrorist operations against the American people and our friends. These attacks are not inevitable. They are, however, possible. And this very fact underscores the reason we cannot live under the threat of blackmail. The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.

§17 Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers. Just as we are preparing to ensure victory in Iraq, we are taking further actions to protect our homeland. In recent days, American authorities have expelled from the country certain individuals with ties to Iraqi intelligence services. Among other measures, I have directed additional security of our airports, and increased Coast Guard patrols of major seaports. The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with the nation's governors to increase armed security at critical facilities across America.

§18 Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with panic and weaken our morale with fear. In this, they would fail. No act of theirs can alter the course or shake the resolve of this country. We are a peaceful people - yet we're not a fragile people, and we will not be intimidated by thugs and killers. If our enemies dare to strike us, they and all who have aided them, will face fearful consequences.

§19 We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.

§20 The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth.

§21 Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations - and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.

§22 As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest commitments of our country. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.

§23 The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace.

§24 That is the future we choose. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept that responsibility.

Good night, and may God continue to bless America.