


The Black Man and the Bomb

The interconnection between racism and anti-nuclear protests in South Africa and the United States.



MA Thesis - Political Culture and National Identities

Leiden University

22.997 words

Name: Max Tiel
Student number: s1909983
Thesis supervisor: Giles Scott-Smith
Email: m.w.tiel@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Date: June 16th 2017

Cover Image: Book Cover of *The Nuclear conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches (Nairobi 1977).

Summary

The 1970's are commonly known as a period of *détente*, or ease of tensions during the Cold War. But despite that, existing nuclear powers as the United States were still developing new weaponry and enlarging their nuclear arsenal whilst new nuclear powers such as South Africa entered the world stage. This created a situation in which large groups of peoples felt the need to start protesting the nuclear developments again, and a new wave of anti-nuclear protests started halfway through the 1970's. A particular group of peoples participated in these protests: black anti-nuclear protesters. But to what extent were racism and anti-nuclear protests interconnected in the United States and South Africa between 1976 and 1981? This thesis provides a comparison of the black protest movements in these two countries to provide a starting point for an international research on the interconnection between racial discrimination and anti-nuclear protests.

There is an interconnection between racial discrimination and anti-nuclear protests. Both African Americans and black South Africans felt a feeling of injustice and felt racially discriminated due to the nuclear policies of their countries. For the African American protesters, the investments in the nuclear programme were unacceptable because they had very poor living conditions, much worse than white Americans. For the South African black protesters, the nuclear developments by the white minority government had to be stopped since this provided much military strength for the government. In their opinion, the racist apartheid laws could never be ended if the government gained such a strong position in Africa.

David Meyer's theory of Political Opportunity Structure explains that successful protest groups in the past managed to become part of the political system and step into the political space, instead of just showing their dissatisfaction with the government policy. Being well institutionalized in society would make it easier to step into the political space that was present in the *détente* period. But for the South African protesters this was much harder than for the American protesters since they could only institutionalize themselves in a revolutionary organization such as the ANC, or in church organisations such as the AACC. This resulted in a great difference in the way the protest movements were organized in the United States and South Africa, and in the protest methods they used.

Both the American and the South African protesters were aware that the nuclear developments in their countries were dependent on foreign allies or enemies, and although the movements were very different, both relied heavily on international allies. There was also contact between the South African and the American protesters, but this did not result in a clear transfer of ideas.

Table of Contents

Summary	3
Index of mentioned anti-nuclear movements and allies	6
Introduction	7
Chapter 1: (Inter) national Context	16
1.1 Working towards the breaking point: United States	16
1.2 African-Americans: segregation and poverty.....	19
1.3 Working towards the breaking point: South Africa	20
1.4 Black South Africans: majority population but minority position	22
Chapter 2: The American Case	25
2.1 Intro: The motives of the African-American anti-nuclear movement	25
2.2 Institutionalisation of the anti-nuclear movements	27
2.3 Protest methods	32
2.4 Message & Rhetoric.....	38
2.5 Religion.....	41
2.6 Spatial relations	43
Chapter 3: The South African Case	46
3.1 Intro: the motives of the South African anti-nuclear movement.....	46
3.2 The Institutionalisation of the Movement.....	49
3.3 Protest Methods.....	52
3.4 Message and Rhetoric	58
3.5 Religious influence	61
3.6 Spatial relations	62
Conclusions	64
Recommendation for further research	71
Bibliography	72

Index of mentioned anti-nuclear movements and allies

African Brotherhood Church

All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC)

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

Bible Society of South Africa

Blacks against Nukes

Church of the Bretheren and the Menonites

Clamshell Alliance (CA)

Conference of European Churches

Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD)

Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa

Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR)

Mobilization for Survival (MFS)

Movement for a New Society (MNS)

National Anti-Klan Network (NAKN)

National Conference of Black Mayors

National Council of Churches (NCC)

Organisation of African Unity

Presbyterian Church of East Africa

SANE

Sojourner Truth Organization (STO)

South African Council of Churches (SACC)

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)

The Washington Office on Africa

United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid

War Resisters International (WRI)

War Resisters League (WRL)

Witness for Survival (WFS)

Women's Pentagon Action (WPA)

Women Strike for Peace (WSP)

World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa

World Conference for Action Against Apartheid

Introduction

In 1977 the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) published a little yellow book with the secretive title 'The Nuclear Conspiracy'. The AACC, a fellowship of hundreds of churches throughout Africa, sounded the alarm on the critical situation in South Africa. Decades earlier already, with help of the United States and other Western countries, the South African government had been able to explore the possibilities of uranium mining. But halfway through the 1970's, there were rumours that the South Africans were secretly using the obtained technologies to build their own atomic weapons.¹

According to the AACC, South Africa's possible ability to produce nuclear weaponry created a very unwanted situation for black South Africans. The AACC was not opposed to the production of nuclear power because of environmental reasons or a pacifist ideology. Their main argument was that this brought 'a most dangerous and unwarranted escalation of the racial tension in Southern Africa, especially in the light of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of that region to liberate themselves from white racist minority rule'.² In other words, the AACC was afraid that a government in possession of nuclear technology would strengthen apartheid and would give the ruling white government in South Africa an even greater power over the oppressed black inhabitants.

The situation in South Africa was poignant for the AACC and their nuclear resistance. South Africa's nuclear policy could strengthen the racial segregation in the country. But their situation was not entirely unique. In the highly tensed Cold War background, the United States witnessed a similar situation. The 1960's and 1970's marked a turbulent period in the United States because of, amongst other things, African-Americans who were fighting for their human rights. The possession of nuclear arsenal by the United States government was a recurring element in their protests. Well-known protagonists of the American black minority, like Martin Luther King, explicitly spoke out against this nuclear policy: 'Somehow we must transform the dynamics of the world power struggle from the negative nuclear arms race which

¹ Letter from J.S. Wall to Bryan Cartledge, 'South African Nuclear Intentions', September 08, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, UK National Archives (online archive) <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116613>> [01.03.2017].

² *The Nuclear conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches (Nairobi 1977) iv.

no one can win to a positive contest to harness man's creative genius for the purpose of making peace and prosperity a reality for all of the nations of the world. In short, we must shift the arms race into a *peace race*.³ The South African and the American black anti-nuclear movement seemed to be interconnected by the motivation for their anti-nuclear protests: the nuclear policy strengthened racism.

Because the *détente* period has often been regarded as a less dangerous period than the previous decades, the anti-nuclear protests in this era have to be viewed in a different context than the protests in the 1960's. Some of the black anti-nuclear movements were already active for many years before the protests of the 1970's, but others were fairly new. David S. Meyer explains in his article *Protest Cycles and Political Process* the theory of Political Opportunity Structure, which 'refers to the institutional and political factors that shape social movement options'.⁴ This refers to the way in which a political space, or a political chance, comes into being when public opinion is not aligned with government policies, and already existing groups are not able to address this non-alignment. In the situation studied here, an opportunity was created for the anti-nuclear activists to reach a wider audience. This might also enable the movements to institutionalize further.⁵ Even more this is the case for the black anti-nuclear groups, who tried to address both the nuclear policy and segregation. The main motivation of these anti-nuclear movements was a racial one, instead of an environmental or pacifist one. The black anti-nuclear protest movements are intersectional. They were not just anti-nuclear movements; they were also social rights movements.

But in what way did the black social rights movements in the United States and South Africa protest against the nuclear policy of their countries between 1976 and 1981? And what caused these movements to be founded in the first place and who were their allies? What is the value of the use of the political theoretical position of the Political Opportunity Structures theory in historical research of anti-nuclear movements? And how did the racial context affect the protests against the bomb in the two countries? In short: to what extent were racism and anti-nuclear protests interconnected in the United States and South Africa between 1976 and 1981?

³ *Martin Luther King Jr. - Nobel Lecture: The Quest for Peace and Justice*, Nobel Media AB 2017 (undated) <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-lecture.html> [05.03.2017].

⁴ David S. Meyer, 'Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age', *Political Research Quarterly* 46:3 (1993) 451-479, there 455.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

In this MA thesis, I will compare the efforts made by both the South African and the United States' black population to protest the nuclear policy of their countries in the second half of the 1970's. During this period, anti-nuclear protests in the United States and South Africa started looming again, since they had been pushed to the background in the previous years due to the Vietnam War.⁶ The protests also became more widespread throughout the countries, which makes it possible to focus in more detail on specific aspects of the protests.⁷ But despite this wide range of protests, source material on this matter is still scarce. Authors who have written articles or books on this topic, such as Intondi and Wittner, have used a wide variety of primary source material in order to interpret this phenomenon. I will take a similar approach, by analysing a wide variety of primary source material as well. By doing so I am able to provide a complete overview of the most important protest movements and the protests they conducted.

In contrast to numerous other studies on anti-nuclear groups, I will not focus on the direct influence of such groups on the nuclear policy. The focus of this thesis is on the groups themselves and their motives and means. A comparative study between American and South African anti-nuclear movements is unique and has not been conducted yet. This is remarkable, since these two movements are similar due to their subordinate role in society. This thesis takes a first step in the direction of a transnational history of anti-nuclear protest movements who were motivated by a racial struggle. In doing so, I will determine and explain the efforts that were made by these anti-nuclear movements and to what extent race and nuclear developments were interconnected.

Détente and the second wave of anti-nuclear protests

A trend in literature on the study of anti-nuclear protests during the détente period evolves around the different views on the détente period and on the origin and timeframe of the second big wave of anti-nuclear protests. There were protests going on in both South Africa and the United States in the mid 1970's but various scholars are still divided about the question whether the anti-nuclear protests started again during, or after this period. As well, the question whether the détente period should,

⁶ Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb*, 25.

⁷ Marco Giugni, *Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective* (Lanham 2004) 43.

or should not be regarded as a period of declining nuclear threat is a point of discussion.

According to Lawrence Wittner, the greater share of anti-nuclear protests has taken place from the 1940's to the 1960's. As Wittner notices in the third part of his extensive trilogy *The Struggle Against the Bomb* 'during the mid-1970s, nuclear weapons went largely unnoticed.'⁸ Wittner is however, very clearly in stating that the anti-nuclear protests grew again from 1975 onwards. In many countries, the anti-nuclear movement grew steadily and resulted in a new worldwide wave of protests between 1975 and 1978.⁹ In South Africa there had been no previous wave of anti-nuclear protests since the developments of nuclear weaponry had only started recently. There, protests started in 1976, with the discovery of this programme. Vincent Intondi agrees with Wittner and argues that the anti-nuclear protests started blooming again around 1976. As he states in his book *African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement*: 'Despite of all the treaties and agreements however, the development of nuclear weapons actually *increased* in the 1970s.'¹⁰ Due to the increasing nuclear weapon stockpile, and the development of new weaponry, such as the neutron bomb at the end of the 1970's, the many poor minorities in the United States believed that their bad economic and social position was created by the development of such programs.¹¹ As well, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 marks the starting point of an increase in anti-nuclear protests, instead of anti-war protests. The anti-war movements shifted their focus to anti-nuclear efforts. Black South Africans were in a similar position as the African Americans, with apartheid being still present and the white minority government pushing nuclear developments. Protests against the South African nuclear programme started around the same time as the protests in the United States because the African Americans and the black South Africans both felt that their subordinate role in society was even getting worse due to the nuclear developments.¹²

⁸ Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb: Volume 3. Towards Nuclear Abolition* (California 2003) 1.

⁹ Lawrence S. Wittner, 'The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1975-78', *Journal of Peace Research* 40:4 (2003) 435-456, there 435.

¹⁰ Vincent Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement* (Stanford 2015) 87.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Ibidem.

Besides Intondi's argument that the détente period was not necessarily a period of disarmament, there is another reason to take a closer look at this period. Meyer mentions that the second half of the 1970's mark the start of a new international wave of big anti-nuclear protests, just like the ones that happened in the 1960's. Such waves are distinguishable by the size of the protest movements. During such waves, the anti-nuclear protests went beyond the local area and sometimes even mobilized people throughout the whole country.¹³ The combination of such a wave of protests and the position of the black Americans and South Africans provides a context in which racism and the nuclear developments are interconnected. This wave of protests has not yet been looked into from such a context.

Mario Del Pero provides a nuance in the idea of anti-nuclear revival in the 1970's. In *We Are All Harrisburg*, Del Pero argues that to understand the novelty of the protests in the mid 1970's, the combination between lobbying in politics and local activism is of great importance. This is due to four factors that paved the way for anti-nuclear protests: a growing awareness of ecological results from the growing nuclear industry, a shattered trust in politicians and nuclear technocrats as part of the worldwide 'anti-authoritarian mood of the late 1960s and early 1970s', a series of mistakes made by the utilities, and a growth in regulations for the nuclear power industry, as a result of growing environmental awareness.¹⁴ Grass-root movements proved to be very successful in benefitting from these circumstances because 'the loss of public faith in the nation's elites and the expansion of public participation in government decisions permanently expanded community control over nuclear issues.' As well, these factors provided people with leverage to bring their problems with the nuclear industry into the political debate.¹⁵

However, there are scholars who tend to argue that the second wave of anti-nuclear protests did not start in the halfway through the 1970's. Scholars such as David Cortright and April Carter tend to argue that the anti-nuclear protests on a great scale started in 1979. Carter dedicated two chapters to this in her book *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945*. According to Carter, there was a 'strong groundswell of public opposition to nuclear weapons after

¹³ Meyer, 'Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age' 452.

¹⁴ Mario Del Pero, 'We Are All Harrisburg: Three Mile Island and the Ultimate Indivisibility of the Atom', *RSA Journal (Rivista di Studi Americani)* 26 (2015) 143-173, there 149-150.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 151.

a period of apparent apathy towards the dangers of nuclear arsenals'.¹⁶ The second wave of anti-nuclear protest was the result of a growing consciousness about environmental issues. But according to Carter, the direct reason for the new wave of protests can be appointed to the decisions from NATO to deploy new types of missiles in Europe. New protests started in Western Europe due to this decision and later on started in the United States and other continents as well.

Cortright agrees with Carter on the starting date of the new wave of protests in 1979. As he notices, 'the antinuclear campaigns of the late 1970s were rooted in environmental consciousness and growing public concerns about radiation and the fragility of nuclear technology.'¹⁷ According to Cortright, existing disarmament treaties, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), did no longer create the desired situation. This caused a rise in fear for nuclear disasters during the first years of the 1980's, even worse than in any other time during the Cold War. This caused an increase in anti-nuclear protest in both Europe and the United States.¹⁸

Nina Tannenwald provides a different view on the détente period as a period of less nuclear tensions. In *The Nuclear Taboo*, Tannenwald argues that it did not matter that the nuclear disarmament wasn't effective in the 1970's. According to Tannenwald, there was a taboo on the use of nuclear weaponry from the Second World onwards. When people witnessed the horrors that a nuclear weapon could bring, it became impossible for states to use their nuclear weapons 'without incurring moral opprobrium or political costs.'¹⁹ Thus, nuclear weapons have never been used anymore due to the stigmatization of these weapons as very much unacceptable weapons. The operability of these weapons had already ceased to exist before the 1970's.²⁰ Paradoxically, there was still a buildup of nuclear weaponry throughout the world, but this was mainly due to the fact that they could still be used for deterrence. Tannenwald does mention that this normative taboo is present in all states. She emphasizes that the taboo is mainly present in open democratic states, but can be less present in nondemocratic countries. This would mean that the theory could be less applicable to South Africa in contrast to the United States.

¹⁶ April Carter, *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945* (London 1992) 108.

¹⁷ David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (Cambridge 2008) 140.

¹⁸ Ibidem, 141.

¹⁹ Nina Tannenwald, 'The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use', *International Organization* 53:3 (1999) 433-468, there 463.

²⁰ Tannenwald, 'The Nuclear Taboo', 433.

Although there is a discussion on whether the wave of protests started halfway through the 1970's or later, active protests were conducted from 1976 onwards in both the United States and South Africa. A racial view on anti-nuclear protests has been underdeveloped in the field of anti-nuclear research studies. Although Vincent Intondi provides a great starting point for this racial point of view, many other studies seem to neglect the fact that this can be of importance for the general view on anti-nuclear protests. Besides that, his study has a very broad focus in terms of African American activism (not only on nuclear weaponry), but does not connect this to other countries with similar developments. The chosen period of study provides a good timeframe for an international study on efforts with a racial motivation in anti-nuclear protests.

Structure

To be able to make a good comparison between the anti-nuclear movements in these two different nations, it is important to provide a general context. Therefore it needs to become clear how the nuclear weaponry of these nations became symbols of power, and why there were movements protesting this, before the actual analysis can be made. This context will be provided extensively in chapter one. After having established the reasons for the protests, I will provide the analysis of the protest movements themselves. Chapter two will be devoted to the first part of the analysis: the American case study. This chapter will start with a short introduction on the particular protest movements, followed by the analysis of the protests. The analysis consists of the following components: the institutionalisation of the movements, protest methods, message and rhetoric, religious influence and spatial relations. For the analysis of the American case I will make use of primary sources by the various black anti-nuclear movements, in combination with newspaper articles and governmental documents.²¹ The third chapter will deal with the South African case study. This chapter will have the same structure as the second chapter to provide a solid comparison of the two case studies. The analysis in chapter three will be largely based on publications by the various movements, and the national archives in which

²¹ The most consulted archives are the following: Archive of the War Resisters International at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam; The United States National Security Archive (online); African Activist Archive (online); ANC archive (online); Global Nonviolent Action Database (online); Swarthmore College Peace Collection (online); and primary source material from the AACC. A detailed overview of the used sources is listed in the bibliography.

these protests are mentioned. As well, source material from the United Nations and American governmental documents will be used. After the analysis, the results of the comparison will be presented in the conclusion and there will be confirmed whether there was a transfer of ideas between the South African and the American black anti-nuclear movements.

Pitfalls

I have taken into account various principles provided by Stefan Berger to assure that the comparison will be successful. As he states: ‘For comparative history to succeed, it is essential (...) to make it an integral part of a theoretically aware analytical history, rather than a specialist sub-discipline’.²² To make sure that I have provided a ‘theoretically aware’ analysis I have provided some limitations to my comparison.

To start with, I have based my analysis of the black anti-nuclear movements and their protests on both internal documents and external interpretations of their activities. I am aware of the notion that internal sources from the movements may be biased and have thus added external sources to make sure that the argument in this thesis is solidly grounded. The source material coming from the various protest movements, especially from the South African movements, often have a political purpose. Because of that, they should be looked into with a critical view. Often, such sources can be used for propaganda against the government.

Besides that, I have taken into account that a national analysis might be too broad. Because of that I have added local aspects of the protests movements as well. As Berger recalls, regional comparisons are ‘less vulnerable to reductionism’ because the researcher will be able to look into ‘the totality of structures, experiences and values’.²³ The interpretation of the activities on a national scale, in combination with more local initiatives, can provide this totality. Susanne Schregel provides a good example for a similar research on anti-nuclear groups in the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s, in which this spatial dimension is of great importance. Schregel compared the protest movements of grassroots nuclear-free zone initiatives in different continents. According to Schregel, various protest groups were protesting

²² Stefan Berger, ‘Comparative History’ in: Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore eds., *Writing History: Theory and Practice* (London 2003) 161-180, there 162.

²³ *Ibidem*.

because they questioned the ‘legitimacy or effectiveness of national defence strategies based on nuclear deterrence’.²⁴ In her research Schregel gave a great attention to the spatial dimension because the protests were not only supposed to have local outcomes, but were as well meant to have a more global effect. In this thesis, I take a similar approach since the protest movements protested their nations’ policies by acting at the local level. Because of this, I will also briefly look at international allies of the American and South African black anti-nuclear movements. This is what Schregel describes as ‘global micropolitics’.²⁵

Since I will mainly be looking for unifying factors between the two protest movements, I will look into similarities between the two movements. It will be, of course, impossible to make a comparison without taking into account the differences of the two movements as well, but since I want to provide an insight into the anti-racist element in anti-nuclear protests, I will try to look for common features. In other words, I am trying to show how similar developments, in this case resisting nuclear weaponry, can produce different results.

A final limitation that is used to make the comparison in this thesis complete and clear is that it won’t focus on all black anti-nuclear groups, but will only analyse the largest and most influential movements that had a large share of black activists or consisted of black members only. There were countless smaller grassroots initiatives, but only in a few cases did the anti-nuclear protests spread wider and actually have an influence on mainstream politics.²⁶ Smaller initiatives are taken into account, as part of the broader movement.

²⁴ Susanne Schregel, ‘Global Micropolitics: Toward a Transnational History of Grassroots Nuclear-Free Zones’ in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke & Jeremy Varon, *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s* (Cambridge 2016) 206-226, there 206.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 207.

²⁶ Meyer, ‘Protest Cycles and Political Process’, 451.

Chapter 1: (Inter) national Context

1.1 Working towards the breaking point: United States

Before it is possible to compare the black anti-nuclear groups in South Africa and the United States, the context of the nuclear developments in these two countries in the 1970's and 1980's should be outlined. Both the United States and South Africa had a different geopolitical position and their nuclear power and policies varied greatly. Looking into the motives of obtaining nuclear weaponry, it becomes clear *what* policy the black anti-nuclear groups were protesting and *why* they did this.

In 1977, William Epstein provided a list of argumentations for states to start building a nuclear arsenal during the Cold War. Not only deterrence was a big motivator for having nuclear weaponry, but also the achievement of military superiority and military independence are also important.²⁷ According to Epstein, the United States initially developed nuclear weaponry to be able to maintain military superiority in WWII. But as WWII ended and the United States entered the Cold War, the motives for the United States to have a nuclear arsenal changed. Preventing enemies from getting even close to superiority over the United States became of great importance. In the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, one of the main targets of the United States was making sure that their nuclear arsenal was bigger than that of the Soviet Union because this was deemed essential for national security.²⁸

During the 1970's, the *détente*, marked by the signing of various nuclear treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in 1968, caused a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.²⁹ But as previously mentioned, authors such as Intondi and Wittner argue that this period was actually a period of increasing nuclear stockpiles. According to Intondi, the goal of the United States was 'negotiating a way to keep nuclear weapons rather than eliminate them.'³⁰

As Ronald Reagan stated in 1976, a few years before his presidency, the United States had become the number two in nuclear power because of the disarmament policy of his predecessor. He was determined to make the United States

²⁷ William Epstein, 'Why States Go – And Don't Go – Nuclear', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 430:1 (1977) 16-28, there 18.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 87.

the biggest nuclear power again, to be able to ‘counter-balance’ the Soviet Union once more.³¹ Already in the second half of the 1960’s, the United States had a double objective in the disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. The goal was to be able to restrict the Soviets as much as possible, but without limiting their own arsenal. Once the Vietnam War would be over, the United States wanted to be able to defend itself against other enemies.³² The results of these developments were huge. Between 1972 and 1977, over 4500 nuclear warheads were added to the already existing nuclear arsenal, counting up to a total of over 9000 warheads, bombs and strategic missiles.³³ So even though the 1970’s are considered as a period of détente, the nuclear arsenal was becoming bigger and bigger.

Although Reagan would not be president for a few more years, new developments in the field of nuclear weaponry, set in motion by his predecessors, started shortly after Reagan’s announcements on his ideas about strengthening the nuclear program. On the 6th of June 1977, *The Washington Post* revealed a story on the American Research and Development Administration (ERDA) budget, which apparently was partly used for the development of new nuclear weaponry.³⁴ In the first half of the 1970’s, President Nixon had started investing in a more powerful nuclear weapon: the neutron bomb. Neutron bombs would be able to have a similar impact as the already existing nuclear weaponry, but without causing as many civilian casualties due to heat and blast reduction.³⁵ The development of the neutron bomb went on, even after President Nixon had to step down as president of the United States to be replaced first by President Ford, after whom Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976. As President Carter was advocating a smaller dependency on nuclear weaponry, he stated that the revealing of the neutron bomb budget in the ERDA came to him as a surprise. Nevertheless, the damage was already done.³⁶ The public announcement of the huge investments was not received well and protests started right away and would continue for years.

Both national anti-nuclear movements and locally active grassroots movements started actively rallying against the American nuclear policy from the

³¹ John Lewis Gaddis, ‘*Strategies of Containment*’ (Oxford 2005) 319.

³² *Ibidem*, 320.

³³ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 87.

³⁴ Vincent Auger, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Analysis: The Carter Administration and the Neutron Bomb* (Maryland, 1996) 16.

³⁵ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 87.

³⁶ Auger, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Analysis*, 35.

mid-1970's onwards. Obtaining a clear overview of the black anti-nuclear protesters in the United States causes various problems. There were almost no particularly black anti-nuclear groups, as was the case in the protest wave of the 1960's. Most groups were mixed-race but had a large group of black members or had certain chapters with a large share of black members. But still it is possible to identify a clear black anti-nuclear movement. Based on existing religious and human rights organisations, the black protesters managed to find a platform to express their own concern about their rights. One of the major organisations that protested the nuclear policy in the 1970's was the War Resisters League (WRL). The WRL had divisions all across the country, with several divisions predominantly formed by black members. One of these major black divisions was The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), founded by Martin Luther King Jr. and several other human rights activists.³⁷ Also, religious organisations like the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and pacifist organisations such as the Clamshell Alliance (CA) and SANE had a big share of black members who mobilised against the nuclear policy.

Looking into the black anti-nuclear movement in the United States in the second half of the détente period, it seems that two different developments were taking place. The first one is the development of older anti-nuclear groups, such as the WRL, FOR and the AFSC. These movements had already established an extensive network of activists throughout the United States and beyond, and used this network to spread their message of nuclear disarmament. Although some of these older and more institutionalised groups had troubles with re-establishing themselves after the end of the Vietnam War, they managed to reset their priorities and regain popularity amongst the population.³⁸ The other development was the dissemination of local initiatives, as done for instance by the Movement for a New Society (MNS), Mobilization for Survival (MFS) and the Women Strike for Peace (WSP). These organisations had a primary goal to enlarge the quantity of their initiatives. Because of these two developments, the anti-nuclear movement in general managed to regain success in the second half of the 1970's, and the black anti-nuclear movement grew along with it.

³⁷ *SCLC History*, SCLC (undated) <<http://nationalsclc.org/about-us/history/>> [09.04.2017].

³⁸ Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb*, 25.

1.2 African-Americans: segregation and poverty

Despite decades of efforts to end segregation and differences in the position of the African-Americans in the American society, African-Americans were far from equal to white Americans. Between the 1940's and the 1960's, both blacks and whites in American society benefited from a higher standard of living. But black Americans remained significantly behind white Americans. Due to economic decline, for the first time since WW II, the earnings of Americans in general declined in 1973. This stagnant economy left many people in poverty. On a national level, around 20% of all children in America were raised in poverty. But among the black population, this percentage was almost 45. The material possessions of blacks in relation to whites declined as well. An important reason for this was institutionalised developments such as residential segregation.³⁹ In the 1950's and 1960's, a clear and institutionalized segregation was present, mainly in the cities throughout the whole United States. Residential segregation resulted in a nation that became more and more a divided society: the black and mainly poor people who lived in the city centres, and the prosperous and predominantly white people who had moved to the suburbs of the cities.⁴⁰

Another main influence on the position of African-Americans in the 1970's was the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War, which ended in 1975, had helped weaken the idea that black Americans were physically inferior to white Americans. Fighting side by side, although not completely unsegregated, the American people could prove themselves 'capable and patriotic warriors'.⁴¹ But although they had proved themselves, this did not make them equal to white soldiers after the war was over. At the end of the Vietnam War it had become clear that most black enlistees had joined the army because of economic reasons. The unemployment rates of the black youth were much higher than the rates of the white youth. When the war ended, these black soldiers returned to the communities with very high levels of unemployment. Almost one-third of the young black veterans were left without a job. Although the Vietnam

³⁹ Gerald David Jaynes & Robin Murphy Williams, *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington 1989) 7.

⁴⁰ Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, 'Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society', *American Sociological Review* 59:1 (1994) 23-45, there 25.

⁴¹ James E. Westheider, *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (New York 1997) 2.

War had done much good to the position of black people in the American army, lots of them returned home disillusioned.⁴²

1.3 Working towards the breaking point: South Africa

The story of South Africa's nuclear weapons development followed a completely different path from the United States. But nevertheless the black anti-nuclear movements in the two countries were interconnected.

In 1957 South Africa became the fourth nation to join the American Atoms for Peace program. This program was initiated by the Eisenhower administration in order to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide.⁴³ With its huge uranium reserves and an economy based on the mining industry, South Africa had great potential for the nuclear industry. In the following decade, South Africa received support from the United States in deploying their nuclear energy programme. With the help of the United States, which provided South Africa with one of their nuclear research reactors called SAFARI I, South Africa managed to build a solid base for their nuclear intentions and they managed to produce several working nuclear plants. But times changed and throughout the 1960's, the South African government was subjected to a growing opposition from the international community to their political situation. Sanctions were imposed against apartheid, which also affected the South African nuclear program. The sanctions deprived South Africa of oil reserves and with the help of nuclear energy the South African government hoped to be able to convert their great coal reserves into gasoline. In combination with rising pressure from communist influences in Africa, the white minority government felt cornered and isolated from their former allies. This situation made the South African government decide that they would not only need nuclear energy, but also nuclear weaponry. With that kind of weaponry they would be able to strategically deter enemies in their region.⁴⁴

In 1977, Soviet satellites over the Kalahari Desert detected a South African nuclear test site. The South African government had used the plant built around the SAFARI I reactor to enrich uranium for the use of nuclear weaponry. To the international community, the security risks that South Africa claimed to have were

⁴² Ibidem, 171.

⁴³ *Atoms for Peace Speech*, International Atomic Energy Agency (undated) <<https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>> [21.03.2017].

⁴⁴ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 89.

questionable. Brian Kaper mentions in his article *Understanding the South African Nuclear Experience and its Application to Iran* that possible security risks for South Africa were almost impossible to solve with nuclear weaponry: ‘The security threats facing the South African government were a mixture of internal or nearby conflicts, which could not be responded to with nuclear weapons, or extremely far fetched scenarios involving nuclear powers.’⁴⁵ South Africa could easily stand up to the weaker countries in their direct surroundings with their conventional military forces. As well, actions against South Africa by the Soviet Union seemed unlikely since the Western powers still had great interests in South Africa. Besides that, the country was geographically too far away for the Soviet missiles to conduct a direct attack.⁴⁶ Apparently it seemed more likely that the South African government was creating nuclear weaponry for domestic reasons: retaining power over its own people. This did not mean that they were directly planning on deploying a nuclear bomb on their own territory, but it did strengthen the hand of the apartheid regime since they now could threaten with using the nuclear weaponry.

Epstein agrees with Kaper and Intondi that South Africa started producing nuclear weaponry to be able to deter enemies within their own borders, or smaller neighbouring countries. Epstein categorizes South Africa as a ‘third-class nuclear power’, as it didn’t really have the capacity to deter other countries on a broader international scale with their small arsenal.⁴⁷ But in the Southern part of Africa, the nuclear weaponry provided a significant advantage since it provides both deterrence as well as a military superiority. In the South African case, the nuclear weapons provided a major deterrence against the black Africans both inside and outside the country; as they were not able to match the military power that nuclear weaponry brought the white South African government.⁴⁸ The South African government was unclear in their intentions with the nuclear weaponry. Whereas they publicly announced that they had peaceful goals with their nuclear programme, they were not willing to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Brian Kaper, ‘Understanding the South African Nuclear Experience and its Application to Iran’, *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 19 (2008) 124-138, there 128.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ Epstein, ‘Why States Go – And Don’t Go – Nuclear’, 19.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ William Epstein does not mention the refusal of signing the treaty. This was mentioned by Vincent Intondi in ‘*African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement*’, 87.

1.4 Black South Africans: majority population but minority position

In 1980, the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, strikingly and critically named the South African government in a report about the South African nuclear program: ‘The regime in South Africa is unique in that it is based on and committed to racism. It has an unparalleled record of defiance of the United Nations and of aggression against neighboring states. It has not flinched from mass deportations of millions of people and massacres of peaceful demonstrators, including little children, in order to maintain the system of racist domination and exploitation.’⁵⁰ This description of the South African government seemed striking at the time. Being governed by a powerful white minority, the black majority of the South Africans were seen as inferior. The South African government, following the victory of the National party in the elections of 1948, introduced the policy of Apartheid. This meant that white and black South Africans were meant to live separately, and were not allowed to have interracial relationships or marriages. From the 1960’s until the 1980’s the South African government decided to relocate large parts of the black South African population into Reserves. Races were classified and particular groups were moved to a designated homeland. In this way, the white government would be able to rule over the greater share of the South African territory, with the black majority being kept on small ‘homelands’, also called ‘Bantu’. Sixteen Administration Boards that reported directly to the white government in Pretoria governed the Bantu. The white government invested a lot of money in the creation of townships in these Reserves, for the black population to be able to resettle, but this did not achieve the desired results since there were many internal disputes in the Reserves.⁵¹

The policy of resettlement was heavily criticized from the beginning. The removal of black people from their homes, the bad condition of amenities in the Bantu, a great lack of jobs and general bad living conditions were unacceptable to many. Strikes and rural unrest had become normal, but halfway through the 1970’s protest grew bigger. Despite being disadvantaged by the great relocations and being forced to start a new life elsewhere, the black inhabitants managed to develop themselves. The black working class had grown and education provisioned by the state had made this group better educated. Thus, this working class was better able to

⁵⁰ Dan Smith, *South Africa’s Nuclear Capability* (London, 1980) preface.

⁵¹ T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History* (London, 1991) 373-376.

organize their protests against the white government. At the same time, the 1960's and 1970's were a time of inflation. Wages of black workers had stagnated and due to inflation, the situation of the working class had worsened and unemployment numbers rose again.⁵²

Despite the nuclear developments in South Africa, just as in the United States, there was a period of détente. In the years prior to 1975, the strategy of the white minority regime was based on two principles: making sure that South Africa would not have neighbours that were hostile to the regime and making sure that they did not have to interfere in these neighbouring countries on a large military scale.⁵³ Throughout the 1960's these two principles, which could be regarded as contradictory, worked together quite well. But in 1974 this situation was no longer possible. It became clear that guerrilla regimes, which were largely left wing, would take over Mozambique and Angola and possibly Rhodesia as well. This would cause a grave threat to the white minority regime and at first they publicly stated they would meet this threat with military action. But instead they chose a different of settling the problems both inside South Africa as in the neighbouring countries. White settlers in Angola and Mozambique staged bloody revolts, showing that South African help was necessary and would be welcome. The South African government used this situation by showing that they were willing to help bring peace to the region and even stated that they would welcome controlled decolonization in neighbouring countries by the western powers. The white minority government presented themselves in a peaceful, cooperative way to the conservative new neighbours. The Bantu's in South Africa had grown very big and there was a chance that they might gain independence from the white minority government. By supporting the neighbouring decolonized governments, the white minority government showed its willingness for the good cause of decolonization. It also hoped to gain powerful support from these new governments to make sure that they would remain the rulers of South Africa: 'South Africa would thus become a great federal patchwork of (moderate) black states and a single, smaller white state which puts its capital and expertise at the disposal of the

⁵² Daryl J. Glaser, *SAGE Politics Texts Series: Politics and Society in South Africa (1)* (Thousand Oaks 2000) 169.

⁵³ Richard William Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (London, 1977) 113.

collective good'.⁵⁴ This was a utopic conception of the situation by the South African government, and the situation would prove to be less simple for them.

Religious and human rights organizations, such as the earlier mentioned AACC, were convinced that the South African government would benefit from having nuclear weaponry because it secured their military superiority and the black South Africans, although being a majority, could never resist the Apartheid regime. Even without actually using the bomb, the deterrence of having nuclear weaponry and demonstrating to other countries that they were not willing to give up apartheid were powerful signals. The international critique of the regime was becoming less effective because of the strengthening position of South Africa. To the black South Africans, it seemed that living in the Reserves would be the only option, unless they were able to effectively resist this policy.

⁵⁴ Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?*, 115.

Chapter 2: The American Case

2.1 Intro: The motives of the African-American anti-nuclear movement

Before looking into the actual protests of the black anti-nuclear movements in the United States, it is important to outline the motives of the protestors more thoroughly. As mentioned in the first chapter, the majority of black Americans felt they were treated as being inferior to white Americans. This chapter will analyse black anti-nuclear movements by looking into the anti-nuclear movement in general, and then focus on the groups that had a large share of black members. The research does not aim to provide a complete outline of the black protest movement. Vincent Intondi has already provided this in detail. The main goal is to analyse the protests themselves and determine what they were protesting against and with what means.

Both anti-nuclear sentiment and the anti-nuclear movement in general were growing between 1976 and 1981. This was different in the first half of the détente period, from 1970 onwards. As the African-American anti-war movement, Sojourner Truth Organization (STO) stated in a document on all American anti-war movements in 1972, around the 1972 elections the anti-war sentiment was growing, but the movements did not grow along with that sentiment.⁵⁵ According to the STO, the anti-war movements were ineffective and issued protest programs that were not able to mobilize the masses in a useful sense.⁵⁶ This ineffectiveness changed halfway through the 1970's, when the sentiment began to fuel a larger movement. As becomes clear from correspondence between the WRL and befriended anti-nuclear movements, at the beginning of the 1980's there were approximately 3000 anti-nuclear movements in the United States.⁵⁷ A large share of them consisted of smaller initiatives or grassroots movements, but this incredible amount does clearly show that there was a large movement present at that time. This success can partly be related to the ending of the Vietnam War in 1975. The Vietnam War was no longer the main subject of anti-war protesters, and the nuclear bomb was brought to the forefront of protests once again. Various anti-war movements changed their anti-war strategy to a specific

⁵⁵*The Anti-War Movement & Elections '72*, Sojourner Truth Organization (online archive) <<http://www.sojournertruth.net/antiwar.html>> [12.04.2017].

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*

⁵⁷ Multiple issues of the magazine *War Resister* were used here. They can be found at: box 479, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

anti-nuclear one and issued statements about the renewal of their priorities.⁵⁸ But the step to a flourishing anti-nuclear movement did not go easily. Letters being sent to members of the WRL and FOR in 1975 shows that these movements were in a serious financial crisis for some time. They saw themselves forced to ask all their members to donate money. The reserve funds were entirely gone because they had to buy buildings to operate from and institutionalize themselves to be able to form a better-organized movement. The number of members decreased around 1975 because of the ending of the Vietnam War. Anti-war sentiments declined because the war that had been protested against for over 20 years was now brought to an end. It took some time before people appreciated that there were other direct threats in the world.⁵⁹ The groups had to shift their focus from protesting the Vietnam War to protesting the nuclear policy in order to avoid their bankruptcy.

For the black protesters in particular, addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament was of great importance. Most of the black anti-nuclear protesters did not belong to entirely black anti-nuclear groups. They belonged to a broader movement of anti-nuclear activists who not only focused on nuclear disarmament, but also fought inequality and racism in American society.

As mentioned previously, the second half of the détente period did not bring a reduced nuclear arsenal for the United States. But for many African-Americans, the 1977 *Washington Post* story on the ERDA budget was the straw that broke the camel's back. Because of bad living conditions and fewer opportunities than white Americans, African-Americans were angry over the news of more government spending on weaponry instead of social issues. In several cities, rallies took place to protest the news. They opposed the neutron bomb and other nuclear developments from the start. Not only did they dislike the development of mass murder weapons in general, they were also convinced that the money spent on the development of the weaponry could better be spent on improving their communities. Living in poor neighbourhoods, they found it unacceptable that many millions of dollars were being put in the nuclear arsenal instead of in improving the daily life of America's own ordinary citizens.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Minutes of the FOR National Council meeting, Apr. 16-19, 1978, F.O.R. Program for the Year Ahead, *Fellowship* 44 (1978) 15, Box 8, Series A-2, FOR (U.S.) Records.

⁵⁹ 1976-1984 File on the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), box 451, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

⁶⁰ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 88.

In the year prior to the *Washington Post* article there had already been some resistance to the nuclear policy. September 1976 was marked by one of the greatest anti-nuclear protest marches in the American history. The War Resisters League (WRL), a nationwide anti-nuclear group, organised the Continental Walk for Disarmament and Social Justice to bring their disarmament protest from town to town.⁶¹ The WRL had divisions all across the country, with several divisions predominantly formed by black members.⁶² Being regarded as one of the first major protests in the new wave of anti-nuclear efforts, the motives for organizing this march provide a starting point for looking into the motives of the black anti-nuclear protesters further onwards. The protesters believed that if they could unite various races and sexes, they would be able to alter US nuclear policy. African-Americans who participated in the march stated that the United States was killing its own citizens by spending money on weaponry instead of on better living conditions.⁶³

The anti-nuclear motivations did not only come from private persons. President Carter's own UN ambassador, the African-American Andrew Young, opposed the neutron bomb and the nuclear weapons policy from the beginning of his appointment in 1977. Together with other politicians and grassroots activists he eventually managed to cancel the further development of the neutron bomb in 1978. But as Intondi states, 'For Young, the connection between nuclear disarmament and the black freedom struggle was much deeper.'⁶⁴ And he was not the only one who felt that way. In 1976, numerous anti-nuclear groups gathered on hearing the announcement by the UN that the major nuclear powers agreed on having a Special Session on Disarmament. Various spiritual and human rights groups such as 'Witness for Survival' organised protests in support of the session on disarmament. Their aim was 'to highlight the discrepancy between the elaborate sums spent on nuclear weapons and the paltry sums allocated for the poor.'⁶⁵

2.2 Institutionalisation of the anti-nuclear movements

As addressed in the introduction already, David S. Meyer provides a theory of Political Opportunity Structures, which provides an explanation on why the black

⁶¹ Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb*, 25.

⁶² Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 85.

⁶³ Continental Walk for Disarmament and Social Justice Coordinating Committee, meeting minutes, March 29, 1976, *The Continental Walk News*, June 15, 1976, p. 1, Box 1, WSP Papers, SCPC.

⁶⁴ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 89.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, 91.

anti-nuclear protesters had the opportunity to reach a wider audience by protesting for their cause from 1976 onwards. This opportunity could as well enable the movements to institutionalize further to be able to be better organized and thus secure their progress more tightly.⁶⁶ As mentioned in the introduction, Political Opportunity Structures According to Meyer, protesters tend to search for the most direct lines to be influential if they are opposed to a certain policy. People who are farther away from the decision makers are more dependent on their decisions and are less likely to make a difference to the policy without having to use extreme methods to draw the attention. This also applies to the black anti-nuclear protesters. Because of this, the political choices that the protesters made were based upon the distance to the decision makers and their response to the protest actions. As Meyer notices, groups that successfully challenged the government in the past did usually not make a real political change, but ‘emphasized entrance to and legitimation within the political system’.⁶⁷ They managed to become part of the political system and legitimized their problems for the politicians who were able to make a change for them. Because of this, it is important to look at the institutionalization of the black anti-nuclear protesters to see whether they were able to step into the political space that came into existence during the détente period.

A great share of anti-nuclear organisations, not only in the United States but in other Western countries as well, belonged to an umbrella organization called the War Resisters International (WRI). The WRI was founded in 1921 in the Netherlands, and the previously WRL was the large American chapter of the WRI. The WRL had a large share of black members, especially in the Southern States. Working together with various other anti-nuclear groups such as the FOR they were actively trying to build an institutionalized and well-organized movement. The WRL had ties with African-American human rights movements and anti-racist movements as well. For example, from 1979 onwards, the WRL was part of the National Anti-Klan Network (NAKN). This was a group organizing against the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and against racism in general. This cooperation with the NAKN was actively shown by the WRL in their newsletters.⁶⁸ The AFSC also was an umbrella organisation for other, smaller anti-nuclear and human rights movements. Being one of the oldest

⁶⁶ Meyer, *Protest Cycles and Political Process*, 455.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, 457.

⁶⁸ Correspondence with the War Resisters' League. 1975-1979, box 479, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

protest movements in the United States, the AFSC was an already-existing stable institution. Awarded the Noble Peace Prize in 1947, the AFSC had already proven their effectiveness decades before the 1970's.⁶⁹

For some of these older protest movements, the end of the Vietnam War jeopardised their existence. Although organisations like the WRL, AFSC and FOR had grown very large during the war, they were dependent on the continuing willingness of their members to mobilise. As becomes clear from letters by the FOR and the WRL, the movements lost members with the ending of the war. The letters that were being sent to members and friends of the organisations give a clear insight in the situation of the movements. The WRL was actively collecting money because all capital had been put into obtaining a new headquarters, to properly establish the organisation. In combination with the amount of people who unsubscribed at the end of the Vietnam War, this resulted in an urgent need for money.⁷⁰ The decision to prioritise the abolition of nuclear weaponry caused the number of members to increase once again.

The cooperation of politicians and important church leaders provides an indication of to what extent the anti-nuclear groups were embedded in the political and ecclesiastical institutions. Some powerful members of the anti-nuclear movement managed to successfully raise the issue of nuclear policy, whilst making a connection with social injustice for minority groups. Andrew Young was probably the highest government politician that openly sympathised with the black anti-nuclear protesters and even helped them. As he stated in a 1985 interview, he was actively advocating non-violent action against nuclear weaponry. Before starting his career in politics, Young had cooperated with various black human rights groups as Executive Director of the SCLC. Being in a powerful position as US ambassador at the UN from 1977 onwards, Young had a vital role in organising some of the anti-nuclear initiatives.

American politics included many supporters of nuclear disarmament like Young. Not all were so outspoken in their opinions about disarmament, but there certainly people who were opposed to the increasing nuclear stockpile. High officials like Zbigniew Brezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, were not entirely negative about the protest movements. Brezinski stated in an interview that

⁶⁹ *Nobel Peace Prize*, American Friends Service Committee (undated) <<https://www.afsc.org/nobel-peace-prize>> [11.04.2017].

⁷⁰ Correspondence with the War Resisters' League. 1975-1979, box 479, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

the nuclear groups had been helpful on several issues. He had to admit that the movements had been annoying sometimes, but in general they did good work in addressing problems regarding the nuclear policy.⁷¹

There were also important figures in ecclesiastical institutions that supported the anti-nuclear movement. Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen announced that, like many others, he would support the anti-nuclear movement by refusing to pay taxes. According to Hunthausen, the continuing nuclear arms race provided a situation in which it had almost become an obligation to disobey the law in order to show that you did not support the on-going development of nuclear weaponry.⁷²

Having well known supporters of anti-nuclear policy in vital positions, the black anti-nuclear movement was able to strengthen their initiatives. People like Young and Hunthausen provided an important example for many protesters, by showing that there were people in the political establishment who supported the fight against the government policy. According to David S. Meyer, such people managed to bring the anti-nuclear protest to the foreground once more, adding to the widespread support for the movement during the second half of the détente period: 'Only when elite actors have legitimated criticism of government policy have strong movements emerged.'⁷³

Various anti-nuclear movements established themselves as publishing companies, besides their regular activist activities. Organisations like the MNS and FOR issued journals, newsletters, articles and books on their activism.⁷⁴ The MNS sent out flyers advertising their new publications to the public. They included various books on human rights, black rights, gay rights and the anti-nuclear protests.⁷⁵ By doing so, they managed to create another stream of income that was not based on gifts from the members, but on sales of literature. This would benefit the stability of their income and their ability to create a secure institutionalized basis.

⁷¹ Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb*, 47.

⁷² The New York Times, *Seattle Clergy Support Tax Protest Against Nuclear Weapons*, July 13, 1981 (online archive) <<http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/13/us/seattle-clergy-support-tax-protest-against-nuclear-weapons.html>> [04.11.2017].

⁷³ Meyer, 'Protest Cycles and Political Process', 473.

⁷⁴ *Movement for a New Society Records, 1971-1988*, Swarthmore College Peace Collection (date unknown)

<<https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG151-175/DG154mns.htm#Accession:90A-002>> [04.05.2017]; *How We Work*, FOR USA (undated) <<http://forusa.org/>> [04.05.2017].

⁷⁵ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

Another important method for the anti-nuclear movements to grow and to establish a nationwide network of institutes was by advocating the establishment of local protests. Both the FOR and the WRL used various media to raise awareness for the importance of establishing local networks. Information was distributed on events organised by the anti-nuclear groups and a great share of flyers by the WRL, FOR, AFSC, MNS and other groups provided instruction on how to find your own local anti-nuclear movement.⁷⁶ Since most black anti-nuclear protesters were part of larger anti-nuclear movements, to them this was an important aspect of their protests. The FOR went very far in this, sending even whole instruction kits to high schools across the country with instructions. Sometimes they sent representatives of the movement as well to give lectures on starting a movement as well.⁷⁷ Finding a local movement was for many anti-nuclear movements a way of connecting people to their organisation. Such local movements would consist of a smaller group of people, taking actions in their own surroundings. A way of doing so was for instance by showing students how to organize lectures on their own schools, or letting them declare a nuclear free zone in their own back yard. With this, people could show their discontent on a small scale, but combined, all these smaller initiatives could lead to larger support for the anti-nuclear movements as a whole.⁷⁸

Not only the FOR and the WRL addressed the importance of starting local initiatives. This was done by almost all anti-nuclear groups in the second half of the détente period. MNS, an anti-nuclear group in the northeast of the United States, was even based solely on local initiatives. In various flyers, they called themselves ‘a network of autonomous groups working for nonviolent social change.’⁷⁹ Only after the détente period ended by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1981, the MNS started putting effort in strengthening the already existing collectives, instead of just focusing on creating more local initiatives. The MNS was a movement that actively promoted social change by advocating the abolishment of nuclear weapons and ending unequal treatment for black people and women. By educating

⁷⁶ Correspondence with the War Resisters' League (WRL), box 509, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

⁷⁷ Printed material of the War Resisters League (WRL), the WRI- section of the USA. 1984-1989, box 524, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

⁷⁸ Ibidem; File on War Resisters' League (WRL) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation section Britain (FOR). 1970-1984, box 451, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

⁷⁹ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

people about their rights, and encouraging them to spread this message further, the MNS tried to initiate a non-violent revolution.⁸⁰

A similar development happened in 1977 with groups like WSP and the Mobilization for Survival. WSP gave a great deal of attention to the education of women from all races and cultures concerning the importance of nuclear disarmament.⁸¹ Mobilization for Survival organized over 200 teach-inns, which drew thousands of people. With these teach inns, the Mobilization for Survival was informing people about the dangers of nuclear weaponry and linking this to the importance of improving human needs.⁸²

2.3 Protest methods

The black-anti nuclear protesters in the United States used a wide variety of methods to show their dissatisfaction with the American nuclear policy. This section will deal with the most important protest methods and their implications.

Coming together and forming a movement can already be regarded as a method of protesting nuclear policy. This is here taken for granted, and researching the formation of the various anti-nuclear movements is not the focus of this study. The analysis of the protest methods that have been used by the protesters involves dividing the methods into two sub-categories. The first one is protest methods that are based on a sense of civil disobedience. For a lot of black-anti nuclear groups, opposing the law could be a useful tool for raising awareness of the injustices of government policy. Movements like the WRL and the AFSC were continuously encouraging their members to engage in actions in which disobeying the law was the main concern.⁸³ But not all protest methods were based on civil disobedience. There were also various methods that happened within the rules of the law, or with special permission. These methods will be the second category in this paragraph.

One of the most common methods to protest nuclear policy was a form of civil disobedience by marching. Anti-nuclear marches already happened in the 1960's, and were still commonly organised through the 1970's and 1980's. As previously mentioned, at the start of the new wave of anti-nuclear protests in 1976, one of the largest marches in American history was held: The Continental Walk for

⁸⁰ Ibidem.

⁸¹ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 88-89.

⁸² Robert Moore, 'letter to the editor', *BAS* 37:61 (1981) page number absent.

⁸³ Printed material of the War Resisters League (WRL), the WRI- section of the USA. 1984-1989, box 524, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

Disarmament and Social Justice. The march was a combined effort of various anti-nuclear groups, but initiated by the WRL. From San Francisco, New Orleans and Boston, people started walking in large processions throughout the whole country, ending in Washington DC.⁸⁴ The SCLC, a black human rights group founded by Martin Luther King Jr., organised the ‘Walk’ in a few Southern states, where the majority of the protesters was black. The SCLC and WRL stated in a call to various peace leaders at the beginning of the march, that they were marching ‘to demonstrate how global and domestic and economic problems are interconnected with militarism and the causes of war’.⁸⁵ The WRL and the SCLC were convinced that issues of unemployment and inequity were interconnected with the public money being spent on nuclear weaponry. Pictures of the end of the march, in Washington DC, show both black and white people walking together and demonstrating against the nuclear policy. They were openly protesting both the nuclear policy and black human rights.⁸⁶

Although the SCLC stated its intention to conduct peaceful protests only, some protesters were arrested. For the African American protesters it was very important to publicly state their disagreement with the nuclear weapons program. During the march, being black wasn’t easy as well. Although marching was not forbidden in the United States, for the African American protesters it was clear that this was the reason that they were being arrested. As SCLC’s information director Tyrone Brooks stated in news magazine *Jet*, the protesters were very much dedicated to the cause: ‘The walk from Georgia to Washington took five months and we were jailed in six states for marching.’⁸⁷ That is why marching had such an appeal to the black protesters. They were openly protesting and simultaneously showing that they would not accept on-going discrimination. They were able to show all across the country that they were black people who opposed both the nuclear policy and the social implications of this policy. As Andrew Young stated in an interview, the black protesters in the Southern US were conducting a non-violent way of protesting, but this was often met with a violent response from the police. The Southern protests

⁸⁴ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 85.

⁸⁵ Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Continental Walk for Disarmament and Social Justice Collected Records Series II: The Call to the Walk and Signers, Box I (online archive) <<http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG100-150/dg135cwdsj.htm>> [07.05.2017].

⁸⁶ Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Photographs of Dorothy Marder, (online archive) <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit3_files/MarderExhibit3.html> [07.05.2017].

⁸⁷ Gregory Simms, ‘Who Speaks For Blacks Now? New Voices Are Heard’, *Jet Magazine* (November 11, 1976) 44-47.

included many young people and women who were often treated very aggressively: ‘for a group of unsuspecting women and children to be suddenly fired upon with teargas and then a group of big burly Alabama State Troopers start beating them with billy clubs, ah, just produced a sheer mass panic.’⁸⁸ Clearly, the protests did not always evolve as peaceful as intended.

The black anti-nuclear protesters used marching as a tactic more often. To them, it provided a helpful tool to bring their message to a greater public. Although the 1976 walk for disarmament never received the expected media attention, in May 1977 the black anti-nuclear protesters had more success. Witness for Survival organised various events that eventually lead up to the huge demonstration in New York City, as a response to the previously mentioned United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.⁸⁹ For the black anti-nuclear protesters, this was a good moment to show their dissatisfaction with the implications of the nuclear program for human rights and to prove the societal cogency of the movement. The Witness for Survival movement was formed by local leaders from various different religions who tried to draw attention to the poor living conditions of large groups of Americans. In doing so they wanted to make clear why the nuclear developments should be stopped. Before the protest march started, the religious leaders had visited poor neighbourhoods in New York to show the poor living conditions to the press.⁹⁰ On the day of the protests, tens of thousands of people walked through New York, eventually coming together in front of the United Nations headquarters. Although the special session on disarmament did not influence the nuclear policy of the United States, the protesters had shown that they were able to unite different races and classes for a shared goal: nuclear disarmament.

But marching was not the only instrument used to bring anti-nuclear protesters together. There were other forms of mobilizing the masses that were successful as well. The female anti-nuclear group WSP was very active in the second half of the 1970’s and had a large share of African American followers. After hearing of Carter’s plans for the neutron bomb, the WSP organized a benefit show in New York to raise money for education about the dangers of the weapon. The figurehead of the campaign was the black actress and Broadway performer Vinie Burrows. The WSP

⁸⁸ *Interview with Rev. Andrew Young*, Washington University Digital Gateway Texts (undated) <<http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb/you0015.0111.115revandrewyoung.html>> [07.05.2017].

⁸⁹ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 90.

⁹⁰ Witness for Survival, South Bronx, flyer, FOR Papers, Programs, Series J, Box 1, SCPC.

had already protested against the nuclear policy for years, but with the benefit show, the group was not only protesting, but was also actively working against the specific policies of President Carter. The group informed women about a change in the law, which made the transportation of radioactive materials through city centres more common.⁹¹ The benefit show was for them a way to mobilize the masses and at the same time provide an instrument for the members to spread the word of the dangers of nuclear weaponry by informing others.

Earlier in 1977, female protesters had held a similar gathering to mobilize their members. The WSP was part of a National Women's Conference, organized by Congresswoman Bella Abzug. Present at the conference were women from all American states and regions. Photographs from the conference show black and white women, protesting government policies together by holding up signs during the conference.⁹² For these women, being from different backgrounds, protesting together and addressing the dangers of the nuclear policy altogether was a major step. The women's protest groups were actively supporting equal rights for both black and white, and men and women.

In 1980 and 1981, a nation-wide protest group called Women's Pentagon Action (WPA) also addressed the issues of race and nuclear policy among their reasons to protest. The WPA issued a Unity Statement, in which they drafted their reasons for protesting the nuclear policy. The document, which was decorated with little drawings of white and black women, addressed the huge costs of government spending on the nuclear policy. The document linked this spending directly to the big unemployment rates under black and Hispanic youth, and inequality in general. According to the WPA, the authority that nuclear power had given the men in charge of ruling the United States make them more racist: 'Racism has offered privilege and convenience; women often fail to see that they themselves have bent to the unnatural authority and violence of men in government (...). We refuse that separation. We need each other's knowledge and anger in our common struggle against the builders of jails and bombs.'⁹³

⁹¹ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 88-89.

⁹² Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Anti-Nuclear Proliferation (online archive) <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit3_files/MarderExhibit3.html> [09.05.2017].

⁹³ *Ibidem*.

For the black anti-nuclear protesters, another major way of showing their dissatisfaction was by refusing to pay taxes. This form of civil disobedience was of great importance for the black protesters since one of their main arguments for nuclear abolition was the fact that the money being spent on the nuclear program could be better spent on the poor black neighbourhoods. Jim Forest, secretary general of the FOR, stated in a letter to President Ford on April 15, 1976 that the families of the members of the FOR would stop paying taxes. Using a biblical reference to the story of Jesus being forced to the cross by soldiers with swords, Forest declared that they would not contribute to buying the 'swords' of their own day, and neither did they want other people to have to use these 'swords' in their name. Jesus had told his disciple Peter, who tried to defend Jesus, to put away his sword. Forest echoed that message. On Holy Thursday, Christians still yearly remembered these events. In 1976, Holy Thursday turned out to be on the same day as tax day in 1976, and Forest addressed this coincidence to show how terrible the position was of many poor Americans. As he stated, 'The cost of our defence system is not simply the 100-billion in the present budget, or the 112-billion for next year. It is in the cities left to decay. (...) It is the cutting off of poor families from food stamps and other vital services'.⁹⁴

There were other cases of civil disobedience by refusing to pay taxes. In 1978, various church groups like the AFSC, Church of the Brethren and the Menonites, involving hundreds of thousands of protesters, issued a statement similar to the one by the FOR. According to local newspapers, the members of the church groups disagreed with the increased government spending on the military: 'Are we going to pray for peace, and pay for war?'⁹⁵ Tax refusal remained an important method of protesting the nuclear policy and military spending in general throughout the whole Cold War era.

The political efforts of the black anti-nuclear protest movements were an important method to influence the nuclear policy of the government. Political efforts can be regarded as efforts that were being made by black anti-nuclear protesters to lobby for political change. As mentioned before, even in American politics there were people who protested the nuclear policy. Andrew Young was a great example of

⁹⁴ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

⁹⁵ The Free Lance Star, *Protestant groups eye war-tax resistance*, Sep. 23, 1978, 24 (online archive) <<https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=9fRKRCJz75UC&dat=19780923&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>> [10.05.2017].

somebody who was close to the President, but still opposed the policy of increasing the nuclear stockpile. The Washington newspaper *Washington Afro-American* stated that Young was ‘black America’s most influential person at the White House’, and a ‘political martyr’.⁹⁶ Young had managed to put the issues of the black anti-nuclear movement on the political agenda, even when this didn’t benefit his own political career. In 1979, Young was asked by President Carter to resign due to a disagreement, but he successfully recommend another fighter of the black anti-nuclear cause to President Carter: Donald F. McHenry. Just as Young, McHenry would continue the humanitarian work for the black community that Young had started, but as Carter hoped, would ‘melt furious black criticism of him for the ouster of Young who was black America’s most influential person at the White House’.⁹⁷ The efforts by Young, in combination with the anti-nuclear protests, had resulted in the abolishment of the policy of developing the neutron bomb. At first, not many national security officials knew about the development of the neutron bomb, but due to the efforts of the protesters this matter became known to a wider public. Due to this, President Carter stated that the news had ‘generated a great deal of controversy’, and thus decided to cancel the production.⁹⁸

The black anti-nuclear movements tried to lobby as well to be able to accomplish a change in government policy. Clear examples of such efforts were the letters that were written by leaders of the anti-nuclear movements to politicians. Letters were written to the President, such as the earlier mentioned letter by FOR secretary general Jim Forest, but as well to foreign leaders. For example, an anti-nuclear statement by the WRL was sent to various heads of state such as Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini to show the dissatisfaction with nuclear progress in various countries outside the United States as well.⁹⁹ In these letters, the anti-nuclear protesters provided the heads of state with arguments to sign nuclear non-proliferation treaties or encourage them to stop their efforts in developing nuclear weaponry. The letters were also used as statements to make announcements of upcoming protests and to indicate how widely the anti-nuclear protests were supported. Issuing such

⁹⁶ Washington Afro American, *Andy’s Top Man Picked by Carter*, Sep 4 1979, 1-2 (online archive) <<https://news.google.com/newspapers/p/afro?nid=BeIT3YV5QzEC&dat=19790904&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>> [10.05.2017].

⁹⁷ Ibidem.

⁹⁸ Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb*, 25.

⁹⁹ Printed material of the War Resisters League (WRL), the WRI- section of the USA. 1984-1989, box 524, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

statements was an activity conducted by almost all anti-nuclear groups.¹⁰⁰ The archives of the WRI, the international umbrella organisation of the WRL, show clearly how widely certain statements were supported. An international declaration on disarmament issued by the WRI in 1981 was signed by hundreds of organizations to show their dissatisfaction with the American nuclear policy.¹⁰¹ Each of these signatures under the declaration represented a larger group, and thus the WRI was able to show widespread support across society. The real success of the declaration remains unclear since it is not possible to attribute any changes directly to these efforts. 'Success' can be claimed in that these messages provided a clear signal of how extensive the protests against the nuclear policy were. Showing publicly how widespread the support was for the anti-nuclear cause could influence government policies since it became harder to ignore the protests, as the example of the neutron bomb had shown.

2.4 Message & Rhetoric

As described in the previous paragraphs, the black anti-nuclear protesters had their own motives to protest the American nuclear policy. Due to this, they had a specific message as well, which was often different from the message of other protesters. As a black clergyman in the protest stated: 'We are now turning out one nuclear bomb in the U.S. every 8 hours, while every hour eight families die of starvation'.¹⁰² This illustrates the most important message by the black anti-nuclear protesters. To illustrate this main notion, the protesters used various messages and symbols during their protests.

Iconic symbols known from the transnational anti-nuclear movement and symbols that relate to the United States in particular were being used in external communication. The archives of these materials show that they used a relatively small variety of symbols to signify the cause of nuclear disarmament.¹⁰³ American flags,

¹⁰⁰ The United Nations issued lists of statements, letters and appeals that were sent to their office. These lists can give an overview of how often various groups sent out statements and letters: *Communications Received Relating to Disarmament, October 4, 1982*, General Assembly United Nations, (online archive)

<[https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/bd4350074d952dd8852577c00068b287/58dc43f7ef1e8113852577ba0053c8e2/\\$FILE/A-INF-S-12-2-Add%201.pdf](https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/bd4350074d952dd8852577c00068b287/58dc43f7ef1e8113852577ba0053c8e2/$FILE/A-INF-S-12-2-Add%201.pdf)> [10.05.2017].

¹⁰¹ Signed statements with documentation on the statement "Declaration on Disarmament". 1981-1982, box 482, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

¹⁰² Ibidem, 85.

¹⁰³ *Women Strike for Peace, 1961-1975*, Swarthmore College Peace Collection (online archive) <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit1A_files/Mar

white doves, and Uncle Sam were depicted in flyers and posters by for instance the WRL, FOR and the AFSC.¹⁰⁴ During various protests, people even made meters-high puppets, depicting white doves and the statue of liberty.¹⁰⁵ On buttons, banners and t-shirts, the protesters made these symbols publicly visible as well. Such visual sources are of great importance for getting a clear overview of the message that the black anti-nuclear protesters wanted to share and the rhetoric that they used. Pictures of protests, flyers, magazines, buttons, and T-shirts all give a clear sign of what the protesters aimed for: the abolishment of the US nuclear weapons policy. By using typical American elements in their communication, the protesters spread a message that although they opposed their government's nuclear policy, they were Americans. This policy was according to them not in line with the American values and human rights. For the black protesters this was an important notion, because they were American but a minority as well. They wanted to be heard and to bring their issue of being poor due to the spending on nuclear weaponry to a wider public. The American symbols were often used in a mocking way. On flyers issued by the FOR in 1978, you could for instance see a picture of Uncle Sam, with on his hat the text: 'In arms we trust?' The FOR flyers stated that 'The Department of Defence says we must spend hundreds of billions of dollars to buy security. Others think that what we are buying is poverty and the chance of annihilation. Look at the figures in this folder and decide for yourself.'¹⁰⁶

Another iconic symbol that was often being used by the protesters was a drawing of the planet earth. This symbol was used to show that the black anti-nuclear protesters wanted to unite people to address a common cause. The WRL for instance

derExhibit1A.html> [11.05.2017]; *Women's Liberation and Peace*, Swarthmore College Peace Collection (online archive)
<https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit4_files/MarderExhibit4.html> [11.05.2017].

¹⁰⁴ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History; Printed material of the War Resisters League (WRL), the WRI- section of the USA. 1984-1989, box 524, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

¹⁰⁵ Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Anti-Nuclear Proliferation (online archive)
<https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit3_files/MarderExhibit3.html> [13.05.2017].

¹⁰⁶ File on War Resisters' League (WRL) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation section Britain (FOR). 1970-1984, box 451, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

used a lot of such drawings to show that they were willing to unite different races and religions to protest all together.¹⁰⁷

The black protesters also made use of their own specific symbols. Quite often, the protesters referred to famous black human rights activists such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. These men had fought the nuclear policy as well, in the previous wave of protests, and become icons for peace in the process. Since these men had a great influence in the human rights movements in the United States, and even died whilst fighting for their rights as black men, the protesters claimed they were continuing their fight. As Jim Forest stated about the anti-nuclear protests: ‘we honor Dr. Martin Luther King and all those others, black and white, who found in civil disobedience a way to dramatize the struggle against racism and the possibility of change coming about in a nonviolent way’.¹⁰⁸ The WRL even issued flyers with a call for action that had a picture of Martin Luther King and the words: ‘Jobs Peace Freedom’, and below that: ‘We still have a dream’.¹⁰⁹ They organized events annually to celebrate the birthday of King, clearly stated in the calendars that were sent to their members.¹¹⁰

There is no indication that the message or the rhetoric of the black anti-nuclear protesters significantly changed between 1976 and 1981. In 1977 there was more of an emphasis on the neutron bomb, which provided new input for the protesters. The issue of public money being spent on weapons instead of social improvements had been heard before, for instance during The Continental Walk for Disarmament, and this only became stronger in 1977 with the news on the neutron bomb. The main difference was that the protesters had another clear example of a money-consuming government project, which would make the position of black Americans even worse. But besides this slight change, the message of the protesters remained consistent. The humanitarian motivation of the protesters remained the most important aspect of the black anti-nuclear protests. In a large protest march in front of the White House in 1980, the main message of the protesters was still the poverty of the black people in

¹⁰⁷ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History; Printed material of the War Resisters League (WRL), the WRI- section of the USA. 1984-1989, box 524, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

¹⁰⁸ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

¹⁰⁹ Printed material of the War Resisters League (WRL), the WRI- section of the USA. 1984-1989, box 524, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

the United States, which was according to them, partly caused by the investments in the nuclear programme. The chairman of the National Conference of Black Mayors, an organisation that took part in the protests, stated that ‘The nation’s poor and unemployed are out of work, out of hope, and out of cash.’¹¹¹ The protesters accused the President of giving more attention to nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union than the well being of his own people.¹¹²

Not a real change in the message of the black anti-nuclear protesters, but merely a strengthening of the message occurred in 1981, after the election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States. Reagan opposed every form of anti-nuclear protests and even called them communists and spies. He did not hide his plans to build up the nuclear stockpile even further.¹¹³

2.5 Religion

Religion was important as an inspiration for the anti-nuclear movements from the beginning. Faith was part of the motivation for the protests. Marches were often called ‘pilgrimages’, referring to pilgrims who walked for a religious cause.¹¹⁴ The white dove with an olive branch in its mouth, a symbol that was often used in anti-nuclear protests, originates from Christian tradition as well. For the United States, this religious motivation went even further. The idea that the United States is a divine country and that its destiny is determined in a covenant with God is embedded in American history and culture.¹¹⁵ Because of this a big part of the black anti-nuclear protest movements was based on religious organisations. They saw it as their duty as Christians to bring peace to the country and oppose nuclear developments, and a lot of ecclesiastically organisations were humanitarian organisations as well. Opposing nuclear weaponry from a religious pacifist point of view added to the idea that the black anti-nuclear protesters had a great humanitarian motivation, as living conditions were often worse than the conditions of white Americans, as shown in chapter 1. The religious anti-nuclear movements considered it their duty to support the poor, and in this case, nuclear policy only increased poverty.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 92.

¹¹² Ibidem.

¹¹³ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 93.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, 91.

¹¹⁵ L. Bruce van Voorst, ‘The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence’, *Foreign Affairs* 61:4 (1983) 827-852, there 827.

¹¹⁶ Ibidem; Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 90; International Religious Convocation for Human Survival, press release, FOR Papers, Programs, Series J, Box 1, SCPC.

For black churches, the religious involvement in the anti-nuclear movement was of great importance. As Christian organisations, they considered it their duty to resist nuclear developments in order to stand up for the interests of the poor black people in the United States. Due to this, church groups and Christian ministers were often the initiators of anti-nuclear protests.¹¹⁷ Groups such as AFSC, FOR, SCLC, STO, MFS and MNS were based on religious values, and operated in the light of that principle. Together these organisations represented a big part of the black protesters. Other organisations such as the WRL, the Clamshell Alliance and SANE were based on secular pacifist roots, but worked together with the religious organisations. The fact that many black anti-nuclear protesters were represented by religious organisations had an impact on their motivations for protest. They were often willing to conduct their protests in a peaceful manner, which resulted in peaceful protest methods such as marching or issuing statements.

The Southern part of the Continental Walk on Disarmament, that had the largest percentage of African Americans, was organised by the SCLC and a few other Christian organisations, which walked for the well being of their fellow Christians.¹¹⁸ Many more protests were conducted for similar goals. In 1977 and 1978 many major protests with large amounts of African American protesters were conducted from a religious viewpoint. MFS, consisting of hundreds of peace and religious groups, held hundreds of gatherings and teach-ins to address the dangers of the development of nuclear weaponry. Local churches played an important role in the founding of local anti-nuclear movements, since church buildings were often the sites of gatherings of anti-nuclear activists. As Coretta Scott King, wife of the late Martin Luther King Jr., stated prior to the 1978 protests in support of the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament: 'We must change this reality. The religious community must raise a passionate cry, end our complacency, and act against the threat of nuclear destruction.'¹¹⁹ Not much later, the various religious groups started protesting under the earlier mentioned name Witness for Survival. Religious leaders went into

¹¹⁷ Paula Herbut, Church Groups Bolster Antinuclear Movement, *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1983 (online archive) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1983/05/21/church-groups-bolster-antinuclear-movement/a9eaac7d-e9b2-4f99-af3f-f3ab22ef367f/?utm_term=.4adc359e95ee> [19.04.2017].

¹¹⁸ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 85.

¹¹⁹ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 90; International Religious Convocation for Human Survival, press release, FOR Papers, Programs, Series J, Box 1, SCPC.

impoverished neighbourhoods to draw attention to the poverty of many Americans in contrast to the money being spent on nuclear weaponry.¹²⁰

Besides church groups who initiated anti-nuclear protests, a great share of individual African American religious leaders participated in the anti-nuclear protests. Clergymen and representatives from various church organisations often took the lead in the protests from a religious viewpoint. As the president of the National Council of Churches (NCC), the largest church council in the United States, stated in a statement prior to a big protest in 1980: ‘Jesus Christ stands in direct opposition to everything nuclear weapons represent.’¹²¹ In previous years, the NCC had issued various similar statements, making clear that they directly opposed the nuclear policy of the United States.¹²² Other black clergymen such as Martin Luther King Jr., James Orange, Bernard Lee and Herbert Daughtry had taken a major role in various black anti-nuclear protests throughout the country.

As becomes clear, the black anti-nuclear protests were heavily influenced by religious motivations. This was also displayed in the protest rhetoric and symbols.

2.6 Spatial relations

Since this thesis is set to provide a first start in an intercontinental analysis of black anti-nuclear protesters, it is important to highlight the most important international partners and associate groups of the American and South African black anti-nuclear groups. Most allies have been already mentioned in previous paragraphs, so this paragraph provides a short overview of the most important allies to be able to provide a clear insight in the international relations. The black anti-nuclear protesters in the United States were in direct contact with other anti-nuclear groups around the world. As well, they had close contacts with various human rights- and religious groups.

The AFSC, WRL and the FOR found it important to spread their anti-nuclear message across the American country borders. These organisations held close contact with anti-nuclear protesters in the Soviet Union. In correspondence between the anti-nuclear protesters, it becomes clear that they were working together to stress the importance of a declining nuclear stockpile to ensure that humanitarian needs are

¹²⁰ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons*, 91; ‘Witness for Survival, South Bronx,’ flyer, FOR Papers, Programs, Series J, Box 1, SCPC.

¹²¹ Lawrence S. Wittner, ‘Religion and Nuclear Disarmament’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 9, 2007) < <http://thebulletin.org/rebirth-anti-nuclear-weapons-movement/religion-and-nuclear-disarmament> > [20.04.2017].

¹²² Ibidem.

being funded more properly. The AFSC was in close contact with Soviet anti-nuclear groups to be able to discuss both military and civilian nuclear energy use. Not only letters were sent, there were even members of the WRL who visited members of the Russian anti-nuclear groups.¹²³ Since the Soviet Union was the second largest nuclear power in the world, and the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States made it impossible to abolish nuclear weaponry, the contacts with protesters there were of great importance. Only by a mutual agreement a change could be made. So together the protesters spoke of ways to put pressure on their governments and end the nuclear racism.

The anti-nuclear protesters in South Africa can be regarded as an ally of the African American protesters in the United States. The American anti-nuclear protesters were in touch with South African movements because they were all against apartheid and as well against the uranium mining that made the nuclear developments in both countries possible. As Intondi mentions, for the African American protesters, the issues with the white minority government in South Africa were of importance as well. It showed that colonialism and nuclear policy were linked.¹²⁴ American black action groups such as Blacks Against Nukes and The Washington Office on Africa were lobbying and campaigning against collaboration between the United States and South Africa. They were opposed to apartheid and valued all efforts made against the white minority regime. In their opinion, 'South Africa is an important source for uranium, mined by blacks earning low wages under extremely unhealthy conditions.'¹²⁵ These protest groups were opposing the discrimination that was brought upon black people by nuclear developments in both the United States as in South Africa. In their opinion, protesting the collaboration between the two countries was the only way of doing so. The United States' support to South Africa increased racial discrimination of the black population because they would have to be in the uranium mines and the apartheid regime could keep their power and status alive. And the uranium that was provided to the United States by South Africa kept the United States' nuclear programme running.

¹²³ File on the Movement for a New Society. 1971-1979, box 481, War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.

¹²⁴ Intondi, *African Americans Against the Bomb*, 92.

¹²⁵ Black Enterprise, 'The Nuclear Controversy: The Black Point of View', *Black Enterprise* (June 1983) 215-218, there 216.

The international ties between the African Americans and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa are not included in this overview. Although the African Americans did support the abolishment of apartheid and the ending of the South African nuclear program, this is not part of the United States' black anti-nuclear movement, nor of the South African black anti-nuclear movement. These movements were against apartheid in general, not just against the South African and United States' nuclear policy. The nuclear policy was not one of their spearheads. That is why these ties are not taken into account in this overview.

Chapter 3: The South African Case

3.1 Intro: the motives of the South African anti-nuclear movement

The South African anti-nuclear movement was closely connected to the large anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and should thus be looked into in the context of the anti-apartheid movement. Just as in the United States, the abolishment of the nuclear programme was not a loose objective, but it was connected to other humanitarian and political goals. The protesters often wanted to address a broader framework of problems. The black anti-nuclear protesters had a greater whole of anti-discrimination objectives.

The South African anti-nuclear protest movement was much smaller than the movement in the United States in 1976. In South Africa, the whole anti-nuclear movement seems to be closely tied to the anti-Apartheid movement since the nuclear developments were mainly negative for the black South African majority. The movement itself did not consist of many different groups as in the United States. But the few groups that did participate in the anti-nuclear protests were large and complex.

Meyer's theory of Political Opportunity Structures is also applicable to the South African black anti-nuclear movement and thus provides a good basis for some parts of the analysis of this movement as well. Just as in the American case study, the various options that the protesters had, and the particular manners they decided to use to protest the nuclear policy of their government can be explained by their political opportunities. The South African protesters conducted different and more violent means of protest, which can be explained by the theory of Political Opportunity Structures. Because the South African protesters were subjective to the racial laws of the apartheid, they were not able to get in contact with the white minority government. According to Meyer, people look for the most direct means to gain influence on the political processes, and for the black anti-nuclear protesters this was by acts of violence.¹²⁶ For the American protesters this was less necessary since the African-Americans already managed to have spokesmen in the American political system and thus enlarged their political opportunities already. Their success could be

¹²⁶ Meyer, 'Protest Cycles and Political Process', 457.

achieved by political means, whilst the South African protesters had no such means to make a change in the nuclear policy.

As in the United States, in South Africa the black anti-nuclear movements were closely connected to human rights activities. For the black protesters, the atomic weaponry of their governments was a symbol of oppression because it even worsened the bad living conditions of the black population and affirmed the power of the white government. They spoke of a 'racist nuclear bomb', because they saw the weapons as an extension of the racist government.¹²⁷ But nevertheless the South African black anti-nuclear movement had a lot of differences compared to the United States. Amongst other things, due to the racist legislation of South Africa, the black protesters were not able to show their dissatisfaction in the same way as the American protesters.

One of the main actors in the South African anti-nuclear movement was the African National Congress (ANC). Founded in 1912, the ANC was fighting against apartheid and the oppression of black South Africans. The ANC was banned in South Africa from 1960 onwards and thus operated as an illegal organisation. They were supported by the Soviet Union because they had communist affiliates as well. From 1978 onwards, the ANC issued a new policy against the white minority government, based on the objective to 'weakening the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action.'¹²⁸ In essence this new policy mainly caused an increased amount of violent actions and acts of sabotage. Most of these actions were committed by the armed department of the ANC, called Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), or Spear of the Nation.¹²⁹ Besides that, in 1979 a highly classified MK Special Operations Unit (SOU) was founded. This small unit was supposed to initiate strategic attacks in order to limit the white minority government in military and economic developments, such as sabotaging the nuclear power installation.¹³⁰ As the ANC stated, they were opposing the nuclear development of the South African government because this would provide

¹²⁷ *Statement by the National Executive of the ANC on South African Defence Force 'Deserters'*, African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-anc-south-african-defence-force-deserters>> [26.04.2017].

¹²⁸ *The ANC's second submission to the TRC: Umkhonto we Sizwe operations report*, African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/ancs-second-submission-trc-umkhonto-we-sizwe-operations-report>> [29.04.2017].

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁰ Jo-Ansie van Wyk, 'Nuclear terrorism in Africa: the ANC's Operation Mac and the attack on the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in South Africa', *Historia* 60:2 (2015) 51-67, there 59.

the white minority government with greater power in the Southern part of Africa. Even without using the nuclear weaponry the government would be able to put pressure on other nations if they would threaten the apartheid regime, which would result in the prolongation of the violation of black human rights. Being motivated by their strife to end the apartheid regime, the abolishment of the nuclear policy provided an important factor in obtaining the final goals of the ANC.¹³¹

Besides the protests from the ANC, the black anti-nuclear movement consisted largely of religious organisations such as the earlier mentioned AACC. This organisation had close ties with the ANC since they had shared goals in their battle against the apartheid regime. As well, since the AACC was a fellowship that represented hundreds of churches throughout Africa, it was closely related to various other church groups who supported the anti-nuclear efforts. Not all of these church groups were based in South Africa. Churches in neighbouring countries also opposed the nuclear aspirations of the South African government since they felt threatened by the growing power of their neighbouring country and were as well negatively influenced by the existence of the Apartheid regime.

Right after hearing the statements by the ANC on the nuclear capabilities of South Africa, the AACC started their opposition against these developments. Being already active in the struggle for liberation from the apartheid regime, the AACC was closely tied to human rights issues and regarded the nuclear capabilities as a grave threat to black human rights. As AACC Chairman John Gatu addressed in a telegram to German bishop Helmut Class, they took the matter very seriously: ‘This development will serve certainly to reinforce iniquitous apartheid policies of South Africa and we warn that this could lead to most dangerous escalation of the racial conflict in South Africa into possible full scale nuclear war on our continent’.¹³²

In short, the motive for the black anti-nuclear protesters to oppose the South African nuclear program was dual. They had an internal and an external reason to protest. In the first place they opposed the developments because it could be used ‘as a means of intimidating black South Africans and lessening the risk of internal unrest while boosting the morale of the beleaguered whites.’¹³³ And in the second place, they

¹³¹ *Statement by Oliver Tambo at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-oliver-tambo-international-conference-eec-and-south-africa>> [04.05.2017]

¹³² *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 1.

¹³³ Van Wyk, ‘Nuclear terrorism in Africa’, 58.

opposed the developments because the South African government would now be able to put pressure on regimes that were a potential threat to the apartheid regime. As John Gatu stated, ‘the whole continent is now subjected to nuclear blackmail.’¹³⁴

3.2 The Institutionalisation of the Movement

The AACC was very well institutionalized as a fellowship of churches that had affiliates throughout the whole continent of Africa. Their headquarters was based in the city centre of Nairobi, Kenya, and there were various other bases throughout the whole continent of Africa. The fact that the AACC was a religious organisation made a solid institutional base easy in a Christian country like South Africa. Consisting of many churches, the religious organisations formed a widespread network of communities that were able to come together in already existing church buildings. The AACC had around 115 of member churches throughout the whole African continent. Many of them were missionary churches such as Anglican or Baptist churches, but they had as well independent churches such as the African Brotherhood Church. Besides that, many Christian communities throughout Africa were members of the AAC. In South Africa, one of its members was the South Africa Council of Churches, of whom reverend Desmond Tutu was the Secretary General. Various bible societies were also part of the AACC, such as The Bible Society of South Africa.¹³⁵

The AACC was, and still is, a hierarchical organization with various levels of decision-making. The highest authority is the General Assembly. This assembly meets every five years to outline the policy for the coming five years. As well it elects The General Committee, which meets every 18 months. In its turn, the General Committee elects The Executive Committee that executes the policy made on the higher levels but is also allowed to be act on behalf of the higher levels. Under the Executive Committee there are two more departments, The Finance and Personnel Committee, and The General Secretariat, who run the daily policy and runs the offices from day to day.¹³⁶ Being such a hierarchical organisation, the AACC managed to interfere in different levels of politics, both on a local city-to-city scale, but on a national and even international scale as well. Its highest officials, like chairman John Gatu, were involved not only in international ecclesiastical meetings, but they also

¹³⁴ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, v.

¹³⁵ *Directory Repertoire of AACC Member Churches*, All Africa Conference of Churches (*Regional Office of Lome 1981*) 12-13, 206, 213.

¹³⁶ *Governance Structure*, All Africa Conference of Churches (undated) <www.aacc-ceta.org/en/about/governance-structure> [04.05.2017].

were in close contact with politicians in for instance the NATO and the United Nations¹³⁷ In a letter, written to John Gatu by the chairman of The Special Committee against Apartheid Jeanne Martin Cisse, The Special Committee pledged full support to the anti-nuclear actions taken by the AACC. They also stated that they looked forward to an even more increasing cooperation with the AACC. This letter was a response to letters by John Gatu, which brought news that was regarded as being quite important.¹³⁸

One of the departments of the AACC that is not mentioned before was the *Department of Faith and Selfhood of the Church*. This department dealt with various issues regarding evangelism, theological research, training of church personnel and research for the church identity.¹³⁹ One of the main goals of this department was ‘Study, comment and dissemination of theological research and information from different Christian/Ecumenical bodies to churches in Africa’.¹⁴⁰ Because of these goals, the AACC had almost 40 theological institutions for education on advanced and diploma level throughout the whole African continent. 18 of these institutions were located in South Africa. In addition, there were many institutions with a Certificate Level, according to the AACC, too many to count.¹⁴¹ These theological institutions strengthened the institutionalisation of the AACC, since they were not only present in the churches, but as well in universities and other educational institutions. Thereby, the AACC could broaden its network of support in academics circles.

Since the ANC was a political organisation it had a different way of institutionalizing and also had a different infrastructure from the AACC. But since the ANC was officially banned, and the MK was even regarded as a terrorist group, they could not participate in the national politics but instead had to build their politics and actions in illegality instead. Within the ANC, the National Executive Committee was and is the highest authority and is in charge of the ANC. The National Executive Committee can only be overruled by decisions being made in National Conferences. The National Executive Committee has dozens of subcommittees that help with the policy development and the execution of the daily tasks. On a provincial level, the

¹³⁷ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 9.

¹³⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁹ *Directory Repertoire of Theological Institutions in Africa*, All Africa Conference of Churches (Regional Office of Lome 1981) 105.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 2-4.

ANC has executive boards that will execute the policy made by the National Executive Committee on a provincial level.¹⁴² Just like the AACC, with this hierarchy the ANC was involved in different levels of the anti-nuclear protests. Not only was it present at international conferences from the NATO and the Socialist International, it could also operate on a provincial level and show its support for local initiatives and protests.

Within the South African government there was no support for the black anti-nuclear movements. But this did not mean that there was no political support for the black anti-nuclear movement. As becomes clear from letters between the AACC and the Organisation of African Unity, there was a wide support from politicians. In South Africa itself these politicians came from the ANC, and although this was an illegal organization, they still could conduct their political activities on a level right below the national government.¹⁴³ Being able to correspond with politicians from other countries, not only in Africa but also in European countries and the United States, the South African politicians received recognition for their political activities. This validated their role as politicians, despite their inability to participate in the national politics of South Africa.

Most of the black anti-nuclear protesters were Christians, and support from religious leaders was of great importance to them. John Gatu, chairman of the AACC was a clergyman himself and had been the General Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa. Leaders from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa also related to the anti-nuclear cause of the AACC. As pastor and President of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southwest Africa Dr. J.Lukas de Vries wrote in 1976, that the church should be independent and should mediate between political parties and protesters. He opposed the nuclear policy and argued that the church should play a role in dismantling the nuclear programme.

Just like the American anti-nuclear movements, the AACC, ANC and MK had institutionalized themselves even further by finding their own publishing companies. By doing so they had a platform to publish their ideas on the government policies and

¹⁴² *The National Executive Committee*, The African National Congress (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0>> [06.05.2017]; *NEC subcommittees and the Teams of Deployees*, The African National Congress (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/officials/nec-subcommittees-and-teams-deployees-0>> [06.05.2017]; *Provincial Leadership*, The African National Congress (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/provincial-leadership>> [06.05.2017].

¹⁴³ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 85.

show their dissatisfaction to a wider public. For the ANC and MK this was of great importance, since they were regarded as illegal. By publishing their own works they could still spread their ideas. The AACC was able to publish their books and other printed materials themselves. For instance, they published policy programs of the AACC and books containing research studies of the issue of nuclear collaboration between South Africa and foreign countries.¹⁴⁴ For the ANC, publishing its own books was much more difficult. The greater part of the ANC publications was funded and published by foreign supporters. It did publish their own statements and memorandums and later on started publishing its own magazines.

3.3 Protest Methods

The protest methods that were used by the black anti-nuclear protesters in South Africa can, just as their counterparts in the United States, be divided in acts of civil disobedience and other forms of protest. In theory, all actions by the ANC and the MK can be regarded as acts of civil disobedience since they were forbidden in South Africa. But to make the comparison with the American case study more valid I have chosen to regard only the actions that caused social unrest as acts of civil disobedience.

Sending out both letters and official statements was one of the main protest activities of the black anti-nuclear protesters in South Africa. For the ANC, being unheard in politics, this was one of the vital means of bringing their message to a wider public. For the AACC, being able to address a broad network of Christians worldwide, this was an easy manner of spreading their ideas on the developments of the South African nuclear programme. At the end of 1975, the ANC managed to publish secret documents on the collaborations between the South African government and Germany in the fields of nuclear power development. Already at that time it recognized the possible threat of this collaboration for the black South Africans. The message by the ANC was heard throughout the whole world and proved the success of this method. Newspaper mentions, and official statements by other countries that referred to the ANC statement showed this.¹⁴⁵ As more news about the nuclear developments of South Africa became public, the ANC issued many more statements about their opinion on this issue, to various international institutions

¹⁴⁴ Several of these books, such as *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, are used as source material in this thesis and can be found in the bibliography.

¹⁴⁵ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 24-43.

such as the United Nations and the European Economic Community.¹⁴⁶ This made them widely heard throughout the world. By issuing statements on the South African government policies to South Africans themselves, the ANC wanted to emphasise that a conflict was inevitable, but that the white minority government was the only party that could do something about the intensity of the conflict. The ANC wanted to show all South Africans, black and white, that South Africa was descending to an absolute low in its history. In a statement issued in 1976, ANC member Umntwana Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi drew attention to the growing power of the white minority government, and its refusal to accept the black majority as equal, made a revolution inevitable. The ANC tried to show that the black majority tried to protest peacefully, but that the government made this impossible: 'It is entirely up to White South Africa whether the revolution that is unfolding will be peaceful or bloody'.¹⁴⁷

For the AACC as well, already in 1976 it was of great importance to show its dissatisfaction about international collaborations with the South African government to improve its nuclear energy programme. The AACC issued statements as well, but was even more active in sending letters to affiliated parties and government authorities. In an official press release from August 18th, 1976, the AACC turned directly to the South African government and their Western allies. As they stated, the South African government had to 'initiate immediately the machinery for dismantling of apartheid', and the Western countries had to stop providing nuclear technology which 'turned South Africa into an impregnable fortress of oppression'.¹⁴⁸

But the AACC did not only direct themselves to political institutions. By sending letters to church communities throughout the whole world, the AACC managed to show their concerns about the nuclear developments in South Africa to other Christians. Having such a worldwide network to express their concerns, the board members of the AACC managed to get wide support for their cause from Christians throughout the whole world. In a letter to the Conference of European Churches in 1976, the AACC pointed out the danger of a possible cooperation between French industrial firms and the South African government. As becomes clear from their reply, the European churches were willing to draw the attention to this

¹⁴⁶ *Statement by Oliver Tambo at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-oliver-tambo-international-conference-eec-and-south-africa>> [09.05.2017].

¹⁴⁷ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 96.

¹⁴⁸ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 89.

cause: 'We have decided to give the widest possible publicity to your cable and issue an appeal for such actions as may be possible.'¹⁴⁹

But issuing statements was not the only means by which the black anti-nuclear protesters brought their issues to the attention of a larger public. The main methods that were used by the black anti-nuclear protesters were various forms of diplomacy. On August 23th, the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, shared the opinion of the ANC to the *World Conference for Action Against Apartheid*. According to Tambo, the European and American powers bolstered apartheid by supporting the white minority government 'who value their self interest above human aspirations'.¹⁵⁰ As Tambo made clear, the Western powers had clear interests in bolstering the apartheid regime because the white minority government could secure their interests in South Africa, including the exploitation of South Africa's uranium mines. But even worse, with the support for South Africa's nuclear programme, a new level of security risks for the black majority in South Africa was reached: 'these countries [The Western Powers] have in fact been working to make the racists self-sufficient in military hardware.'¹⁵¹ According to Tambo, the apartheid regime would never come to an end as a result of these new developments, since it would become too powerful and was supported by various world powers.¹⁵²

An important aspect of the diplomatic efforts was to draw attention to the problems of the black South Africans in the international community. Since the South African nuclear program was developed in cooperation with first the United States and later France and Germany, it was of great importance for the black protest movements to show the outside world what the implications would be when the white minority government would be able to build nuclear weaponry. A clear example of this policy can be found in the efforts of the ANC. At congresses and international political meetings, the ANC officials held numerous speeches on the impact of foreign support of the white minority government. As Oliver Tambo stated at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa that the EEC played an important role in the 'struggle for national and social emancipation of the oppressed

¹⁴⁹ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 77-79.

¹⁵⁰ *Crucial stage in the struggle for Liberation of Southern Africa*, *Speech by Oliver Tambo at the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/speech-oliver-tambo-world-conference-action-against-apartheid>> [10.05.2017].

¹⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵² *Ibidem*.

black majority in South Africa, and indeed southern Africa as a whole.’¹⁵³ Going even further, Tambo clarified that the collaboration with the EEC countries caused a ‘rapid nuclearisation of South Africa’ and should thus be held accountable for maintaining the apartheid policy.¹⁵⁴

A similar approach was issued by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa that was launched by one of the founders of the Anti Apartheid Movement, Abdul Minty. According to Minty, providing information to the outside world was not enough. He encouraged the Western Powers to take public action and put pressure on the South African government.¹⁵⁵ The AACC followed a similar line of diplomatic protest but it combined its efforts to mobilize foreign politics against the apartheid regime with the efforts in the ecumenical community.

The AACC tried to lobby for support at church groups that supported the apartheid regime by showing how this regime affected the church in general. Talks between the AACC and the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD) for instance show that the AACC members pointed out the issue of racist German Lutherans in South Africa. According to the AACC, the EKD supported the white minority government by paying their white preachers way more than black preachers earned. On top of that they refused to invite black preachers in the German churches in South Africa. Both the AACC and the EKD agreed that the relationship between the African and the German Lutherans had to be improved and should not be in favour of a racist policy.¹⁵⁶ Since the German government provided the nuclear technology that the South African regime used, the relationship with the German churches was of great importance. The anti-nuclear protesters tried to encourage the German churches to put pressure on their government to make them stop supporting the South African nuclear developments. In telegrams between reverend John Gatu and chairman of the Council of Bishops Helmut Class this issue was made very clear: ‘We therefore earnestly urge that (...) the Evangelical Church in Germany will do everything possible to bring pressure upon your government and German industrial firms to desist from enabling

¹⁵³ *Statement by Oliver Tambo at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa*, The African National Congress, (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-oliver-tambo-international-conference-eeec-and-south-africa>> [10.05.2017].

¹⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁵ *Report of United Nations Seminar London*, United Nations, (London 1979) 7.

¹⁵⁶ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 63-64.

the apartheid regime in Pretoria to be in a position to threaten the entire African continent and world peace'¹⁵⁷

Another way for the ANC to bring its message to the public was the illegal distribution of flyers under the South African people. Young members of the ANC were trained by the movement to be able to produce, duplicate and distribute propaganda in favour of the ANC and black majority rule, and against the white minority government. The flyers were being spread in a unique way, using 'leaflet bombs': 'These were hardly 'bombs' in the real sense of the word but simple timed explosive devices for throwing bundles of leaflets high into the air in order to spread them over a large area where a target crowd of people were gathered.'¹⁵⁸ The leaflets bombs, which had a timer attached to them were successful because they could spread flyers without anyone being caught. The flyers not only contained anti-government messages but also encouraged people to join the ANC.

A widely conducted act of civil disobedience by South African protesters was the refusal of military service. According to Sjollema, between 1975 and 1978, a lot of conscripts had a 'crisis of conscience', due to various acts of repression against the people of South African countries in which the army had to participate.¹⁵⁹ As well, as mentioned in a press statement by the ANC in October 1979, 'an avalanche of political crisis' was increasing the distance between the rulers and the civilians even further in South Africa.¹⁶⁰ For the ANC members this meant a stronger opposition to the white minority regime, manifested in public protests and strikes. The ANC even spoke of taking 'stones and spears to arms'.¹⁶¹ Since the South African army was a racist institution as well, military conscripts put down their work. According to the ANC the number of army deserters rose quickly and caused worries for the white minority regime. Protests started as well after the news became public that BOSS, the Bureau of State Security from the white minority government hired more spies to spy amongst the black South Africans. The protests were met by the government with an

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem, 2.

¹⁵⁸ *Escape from Pretoria*, Tim Jenkin (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/escape-pretoria-html>> [10.05.2017]; *Statement of the National Executive Committee on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the ANC*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-committee-occasion-60th-anniversary-anc>> [10.05.2017].

¹⁵⁹ Baldwin Sjollema, *Isolating apartheid: western collaboration with South Africa: policy decisions by the World Council of Churches and church responses* (Geneva 1982) 28.

¹⁶⁰ Statement by the National Executive of the ANC on South African Defence Force 'Deserters', The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-anc-south-african-defence-force-deserters>> [11.05.2017].

¹⁶¹ Ibidem

immediate march of army trainees and an unofficial nuclear bomb detonation on the South African shore. According to the ANC this was a clear show of force against the black protesters and army deserters.¹⁶²

The idea that the nuclear test was a response to the protests by the military conscripts should be questioned because the political purpose of such statements by the ANC should always be verified. The South African government has not admitted such a connection, and even the event of the test in general remains questionable. Recent declassified sources from the American National Security Archive however confirm that the detected signals of the nuclear test 'were unique to nuclear shots in a maritime environment.'¹⁶³ For the ANC however, the tests were a clear response to their unrest and to them this confirmed the bad intentions that the white minority government had against them with their nuclear program.

The black anti-nuclear movement in South Africa organised public gatherings or marches very often. The years prior to the announcements on South Africa's nuclear developments were characterized by brutal actions against anti-apartheid protesters by the South African government. In 1976 for instance, over twelve thousand school children boycotted their classes and marched the streets due to a pro-apartheid language policy in their schools. The government issued the police to fire at the schoolchildren, which caused a bloodbath.¹⁶⁴ In the months following, many more protesters were killed and almost 400 deaths were confirmed. As well, thousands of black protesters were detained and many Black Consciousness movements were banned.¹⁶⁵ Due to all this violence and the banned movements, it was difficult and dangerous to stage public protests in South Africa.¹⁶⁶

This did not mean, though, that there were no public actions being organized. Many protests and violent attacks were staged, not only by the ANC or MK, but also as local initiatives, to show the dissatisfaction with the policy of the white minority government and apartheid in general. Almost none of these, mostly violent, protests

¹⁶² Ibidem.

¹⁶³ William Burr & Avner Cohen (ed.), *The Vela Incident: South Atlantic Mystery Flash in September 1979* Raised Questions about Nuclear Test (08.12.2016) < <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb570-The-22-September-1979-Vela-Satellite-Incident/> > [12.06.2017].

¹⁶⁴ Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Indiana University Press 2004) 97.

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem, 98.

¹⁶⁶ *1962-1990 Conflict*, African National Congress (online archive) <<http://archives.anc.org.za/institutional-violence/>> [12.05.2017].

had a direct focus on the abolishment of nuclear weaponry. Only one violent attack was specifically aimed at the nuclear policy. Under the name *Operation Mac*, in 1982 members of the ANC bombed the Koeberg nuclear power plant. As previously mentioned, in 1979 the ANC had announced a new and more violent phase in its actions against the white minority government. This attack was part of the new phase.¹⁶⁷ Although the ANC members managed to plant the bombs in the highly secured plant, and all four bombs that were planted went off, the action was not totally successful. The ANC had managed to damage the plant, but nevertheless it was still possible to repair the damage. A few months later, the plant was fully repaired already.¹⁶⁸

3.4 Message and Rhetoric

Just like the American protesters, the South African black anti-nuclear protesters as well had a specific message in their protest efforts. But although both the American and South African protesters felt they were discriminated against by the nuclear developments, both movements had a very different message. As John Gatu stated in 1977, ‘the Pretoria regime will not hesitate to pull the nuclear trigger when it feels that its abominable system of apartheid is being seriously threatened.’¹⁶⁹ This quote was exemplary for the message that the protesters tried to spread and provided a clear motivation for their actions as well: making sure that the rest of the world was aware of the nuclear developments in South Africa and show the white minority government that they did not agree with this.

An often-used symbol for the AACC is a drawing of the African continent, in various ways. Since the AACC represented churches not only in South Africa, but in the rest of the continent as well, they depicted the continent often with a big cross on top of it. This was exemplary for the religious unity that they could bring with their actions.¹⁷⁰ Another variation on this symbol that was used by the AACC to address their cause was a drawing of Africa with two explosions on it, which was made on behalf of the AACC. The centre of the explosions depicted the Western powers that, according to the AACC, exploited South Africa by helping the white minority regime with the development of their nuclear power plants. The red surroundings of the

¹⁶⁷ Van Wyk, ‘Nuclear terrorism in Africa’, 52.

¹⁶⁸ *The Nuclear Controversy: The Black Point of View*, Black Enterprise (location unknown 1983) 215-218, there 216.

¹⁶⁹ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, vi.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, i.

explosions are a metaphor for the actual nuclear explosions in South Africa, which could cause 'bloody and tragic consequences not only on Southern Africa but on all of Africa and the entire world.'¹⁷¹

As previously mentioned, for the South Africans who did not agree with the policies of the white minority government, it was hard to express their protests in public. Besides, they would not have any access to the mainstream media. Due to this, putting up posters in public places was an important method to communicate messages amongst each other.¹⁷² The South African government was often depicted in a very negative way. On a poster from the ANC that encourages people to end army conscription, a white army commander was depicted; looking at a soldier whose head was depicted as a hand grenade, ready to explode. This was a message to the people that the white government would only use the black conscripts to use for its own defence.¹⁷³ The government was as well being depicted on posters as just a helicopter or a military vehicle, often in relation to a helpless black civilian, to show the power relations between the two.¹⁷⁴ But many of these public messages were not solely directed against the nuclear policy of South Africa, but against the repression of the black people in South Africa in general. Banners that were held up during protests had messages in favour of freedom for the people and were directed against police terror. A raised fist was often used to depict the act of standing up to the government and no longer accept the oppression.¹⁷⁵ As well, chains and bandages were used to address the way in which the black South Africans were tied up by the white minority government. Broken chains depicted the way in which the protesters would bring an end to this tied up life.¹⁷⁶ These messages were not directly related to the nuclear policy but mostly to the militarisation of the South African government in general, of which the nuclear policy was a part of.

Just like in the United States, the South African protesters used politicians as symbols for peace in their protests. The protesters mentioned men like Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko as examples of the terror of the white minority government.

¹⁷¹ Ibidem, 1.

¹⁷² *1962-1990 Conflict*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://archives.anc.org.za/institutional-violence/>> [14.05.2017].

¹⁷³ *1962-1990 Conflict*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://archives.anc.org.za/mannetje-didnt-they-tell-you-2/>> [14.05.2017].

¹⁷⁴ *The Future is Ours: Commemorating Youth in the Struggle*, South African History Archive (online archive) <<http://saha.org.za/youth/gallery.htm>> [14.05.2017].

¹⁷⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem.

Memorial meetings were held to commemorate the death of Steve Biko, who died whilst he was in police custody for protesting against the racist government.¹⁷⁷

An often-made comparison by the protesters was between the white minority government and the German Nazi regime in Europe. As John Gatu stated, there was little difference between the nuclear aspirations of South Africa and the six million Jews that were killed in Europe. With this, he meant to say that most people did not foresee the danger of the Nazi regime until it was too late. By emphasizing the dangers of the nuclear developments in South Africa, Gatu clarified that everybody should see the danger of the nuclear developments immediately, before it would be too late too.¹⁷⁸ Pictures of South African streets show graffiti's of swastikas and after fights between government commando's and ANC members in 1981, helmets with drawings of swastikas were found.¹⁷⁹ The comparison with the Nazi regime provides an insight in the severity of the conflict, and the expected implications of South Africa having nuclear weaponry. The protesters were under the assumption that an escalation of this situation could end up with the death of millions of peoples too.

The fact that the South African protesters were convinced that the conflict was very serious and could escalate quickly is also borne out by the way in which they drew attention to the dangers of the nuclear developments to the outside world. In their communication efforts, the South African protesters often emphasized what the implications of the programme could be, not only for South Africa, but also for the neighbouring countries, the whole continent, and even the whole world. In a letter by the AACC to the United States National Council of Churches, the AACC clearly emphasizes the worldwide dangers. According to the AACC, the nuclear developments in combination with the 'racist regime' would 'result in a most dangerous escalation of the increasingly violent racial confrontation in Southern Africa.'¹⁸⁰ This could cause a ripple effect that could threaten peace in the rest of Africa and as well in the rest of the world. The ANC drew attention to a similar danger. According to Oliver Tambo, the nuclear weaponry added to the isolation of South Africa from world politics. The isolation of 'the regimes of terror in southern

¹⁷⁷ *1962-1990 Conflict*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://archives.anc.org.za/steve-biko-memorial-meeting/>> [14.05.2017].

¹⁷⁸ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, vi.

¹⁷⁹ *1962-1990 Conflict*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://archives.anc.org.za/increased-aggression-2/>> [14.05.2017].

¹⁸⁰ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 67.

Africa' caused growing potential for aggression, which could result in 'a very real threat to world peace'.¹⁸¹

The message of the ANC and the MK was more extremist than the message of the AACC. The ANC and the MK were in favour of bringing the apartheid regime down by using violence. This was also seen in the intensity of the protests and the message. The MK aggravated the white minority rule 'by frequent combat confrontations with well-trained, ever victorious ubiquitous units of MK', who literally fought the regime with all weapons at their disposal.¹⁸² The AACC on the other side was a peaceful organisation, but it too was aware that it might not be possible to overthrow the white minority regime without the use of violence whatsoever. According to the AACC, it was up to the white minority government whether the struggle for freedom would end in a bloody or a peaceful way.¹⁸³

3.5 Religious influence

Since a great share of the black anti-nuclear protests in South Africa came directly from church groups or groups affiliated to the church, the religious influence in general is quite clear and already mentioned multiple times in the previous chapters. But still it is useful to look into extent into some details of this religious aspect, *precisely* because it is of such importance in the South African anti-nuclear movements. Too the black South African anti-nuclear protesters, religious influences were very much present. The AACC consisted of different Christian churches. It united Catholic churches, Orthodox churches, Missionary churches and many independent churches.¹⁸⁴ Almost 75% of the South African population in 1981 was Christian and of that, 73,8% was protestant.¹⁸⁵ But ecclesiastical interference got even bigger due to the fact that the AACC felt the duty to be a part of the active protests.

As stated in a mutual agreement between the AACC and a German church, the EKD, both the AACC and the EKD agreed that being Christian; they would always have a common objective and responsibility, 'to ensure that the created earth

¹⁸¹ *Statement by Oliver Tambo at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-oliver-tambo-international-conference-eeec-and-south-africa>> [15.05.2017].

¹⁸² *Statement by the National Executive of the ANC on South African Defence Force 'Deserters'*, The African National Congress (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-anc-south-african-defence-force-deserters>> [15.05.2017].

¹⁸³ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, vi.

¹⁸⁴ *Directory Repertoire of AACC Member Churches*, All Africa Conference of Churches (Regional Office of Lome 1981) 29-30.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 122.

continues to be safe for the creatures of God.’¹⁸⁶ Also, it was their ‘apostolic calling to respond in a prophetic way’ to the political and humanitarian issues that occurred because of the policy of the white minority regime.¹⁸⁷ Because of this they did not just support the protesters, but were very active as well in starting their own protests against the South African nuclear developments.

For the ANC, religious influences were very important too. The ANC considered the most black South African churches as their allies because they also opposed the apartheid regime and were considered enemies by the white minority government.¹⁸⁸ Most members of the ANC were Christians and the ANC was even founded with the help of various church groups. Because of this, they were closely related to Christian institutions such as the AACC.

3.6 Spatial relations

The South African black anti-nuclear movement had a broad support from the international community. Not only ecclesiastical organisations from different countries supported the cause of the protesters, also many political institutions. Because the South African regime needed the help of the United States and European countries to be able to develop their nuclear power plants, the international allies had a main role in the South African anti-nuclear protests. The ANC and the AACC both cooperated with international allies, who could possibly pressure the governments that supported the South African minority government. The protesters had three main allies: the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, United States’ anti-nuclear protest movements, and German and French ecclesiastical institutions. In the following paragraphs, the ties with these four allies will be discussed.

The most influential supporter of the South African protesters was the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. This special commission was an important ally because it could function as a bridge between the South African protesters and international parties who opposed the white minority government. As a part of the UN, this special committee was in a position to address the issues of the South African protesters to the rest of the world. In a letter to the AACC, in response

¹⁸⁶ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 52.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸⁸ *The ANC's second submission to the TRC: Operations Report*, *The African National Congress* (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/ancs-second-submission-trc-operations-report>> [16.05.2017].

to the messages on South Africa's nuclear developments, the special committee pledged its full support to the efforts of the AACC against the white minority government.¹⁸⁹ The committee was aware of the dangers that the nuclear weaponry could bring to the black South Africans and to other countries in the region as well. The international community could put pressure upon the South African government, with, for instance, diplomatic or economic sanctions. Since the protesters themselves were unable to impose sanctions to their government with the same influence, this ally was of great importance.

The black anti-nuclear protesters in the United States could also be valued as international allies of the black South African anti-nuclear protesters. As mentioned in chapter two, the South African and United States' governments needed each other's help and resources to be able to keep their nuclear programme running. The South African protesters were not only in touch with the protesters from the United States. They also tried to get in touch with the American politicians to pressure the political decisions by themselves. By sending letters to them, the South African protesters tried to give the American politicians an insight in their terrible living conditions and the worsening of these that the South African nuclear programme brought along.

By getting in touch with the German and French ecclesiastical institutions, the protesters tried to stop the nuclear development at the start. In the correspondence with these churches, measurements were discussed to stop the German and French help to the South African nuclear programme.¹⁹⁰ When the German and French churches would be able to put pressure upon their governments, they might be able to stop the South African nuclear developments program. This was something that could not be done by the South African protesters since they had neither the contacts, nor the status to get the ear of these governments. The correspondence between these ecclesiastical movements has already been discussed in previous chapters, but nonetheless it is important to show that they were real allies in the sense that the French and German churches stood behind the South African black anti-nuclear protesters and were willing to put effort in helping them by putting pressure on their own governments.

¹⁸⁹ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, All Africa Conference of Churches, 9.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, 1-6.

Conclusions

Although the period between 1970 and 1981 is commonly known as a period of an ease of tensions between the nuclear powers, or *détente*, many anti-nuclear protests were conducted in these years. Although there were many talks on nuclear proliferation, and many treaties signed, the nuclear stockpile actually increased instead of declined. Many governments, like the American and the South African government, kept on developing and testing new weaponry, resulting in very high spending on the defence policies. These developments created a sense of racial discrimination for black peoples in these countries. But to what extent were racism and anti-nuclear protests interconnected in the United States and South Africa between 1976 and 1981?

The comparison between the black anti-nuclear movements in the United States and South Africa has provided a framework to answer this question. There was a clear connection between the South African and American nuclear weapons programme and the sense of discrimination of black South Africans and black Americans. Both anti-nuclear movements protested against the nuclear weapons policy of their governments because in their opinion this policy strengthened discrimination. But, although the black anti-nuclear protesters shared the same sense of injustice due to the discrimination by their governments' nuclear weapons programs, they had very different means of showing this dissatisfaction.

The results of the comparison between the American and South African movements are listed below, per theme.

Context of the protests

The United States' government was increasing their nuclear stockpile and was developing new weaponry at the same time. In the mid 1970's white Americans had far better living conditions than African Americans. Institutional racism caused residential segregation, unemployment rates were very high under the African Americans and many African American children were raised in poverty. The Vietnam War, which ended in 1975, left many African Americans who had joined the army, mainly for economical reasons, in despair. For many African Americans, the investments by the American government in more (nuclear) weaponry were

unacceptable. According to them, the government could not spend millions of dollars in these weapons and at the same time neglect the terrible living standards of its own people. With the news on the government's investments in the development of the neutron bomb being made public in 1976, a new wave of anti-nuclear protests started which included a great share of African American protesters.

In South Africa, the differences between the black and the white populations were even bigger. Although being a majority in South Africa, the black population was being heavily oppressed by the white minority government. Racist laws ruled the country, and black people were forced to live together in Reserves, or Bantu's, where living conditions were very bad. With the news made public in 1976 that the South African government was secretly developing nuclear weaponry, human rights, political and religious organizations started protesting against the nuclear policy of their government. In their opinion, the racist apartheid regime could never be abolished once the white minority government was able to use nuclear weaponry, even if the weapons would only be used for deterrence.

Institutionalization

A great difference between the American and South African black anti-nuclear movements was present in the way the movements were organized. The movement in general was larger in the United States. But more importantly, in South Africa there were less small organisations that protested against the nuclear policy. In America, the anti-nuclear movements encouraged people extensively to find their own movement. By enlarging the amount of protest movements, the already existing protest movements had more support for their cause throughout the whole country. In South Africa, the protest movements were encouraging people to join the already existing groups. This difference can also be accounted to to the political freedom in the United States, in opposition to South Africa. Due to the fact that the American protesters could freely state their opinion on nuclear policy, many anti-nuclear groups were founded throughout the years. The end of the Vietnam War brought many pacifist organizations in problems since people unregistered because the organisations were no longer necessary. Such pacifist organisations often changed their focus from specific anti-war policies to anti-nuclear policies. They did not only do this because the nuclear developments were the greatest threat for them, they also tried to make sure that the existence of their organizations was guaranteed in the future. Because of

this, the movement was not based on the size of the individual organisations, but on the amount of organizations. By the amount of movements, the protesters could show how widespread the anti-nuclear ideas were.

In South Africa it was very hard to find a new movement because this would cause conflicts with the white minority regime. Therefore the already existing organizations, such as the ANC and the MK, encouraged people to join their movement. This benefited their cause since it was hard to run an organization that was illegal in South Africa, and having more members would make it possible to put more pressure on the white minority government and could show the outside world how widespread the support for the anti-nuclear cause was.

Besides, the differences in the institutionalization of the American and South African black anti-nuclear movement are largely to assign to the fact that their country's law oppressed the black South Africans.

Meyer's theory of Political Opportunity Structures can be applied well to various aspects of the research on the black anti-nuclear protesters because it structures the analysis of the interconnection between the anti-nuclear protesters and the way in which their ideas were echoed in politics. Due to this, the theory provides an explanation on why the movements started in the détente period and as well how they managed to draw attention to their cause. According to the theory of Political Opportunity Structures, successful protest groups in the past managed to become part of the political system and step into the political space, instead of just showing their dissatisfaction with the government policy. Being well institutionalized in society would make it easier to step into the political space that was present in the détente period. But for the South African protesters this was much harder than for the American protesters since they could only institutionalize themselves in a revolutionary organization such as the ANC, or in church organisations such as the AACC. By violent and diplomatic means, the ANC could become an important institute in politics, but still under oppression.

Religious organizations were very important in both the American as the South African anti-nuclear protest movements since many of the black protesters were religious but more important; the religious institutions had humanitarian goals besides their religious work. In South Africa, this was even more important than in the United States since the government did not particularly ban religious organizations. Due to

this, organizations such as the AACC were able to use diplomacy to make themselves valuable in the anti-nuclear efforts.

The South African anti-nuclear movement had less support from high politicians and church leaders, which did not further their institutionalized position. This can also be assigned to the racial laws. In the United States, it was legal for politicians and church leaders to openly sympathize with the protesters. But in South Africa, this was not possible.

Methods

Although there were similarities in the methods of the South African and the American black anti-nuclear protesters, there were mainly differences in these methods. One reason for this is the difference in Political Opportunity Structures in the two countries. In the United States, the black anti-nuclear protesters had more freedom than in South Africa. Although racism was not absent in the United States, there were no racist laws and legislations. The American protesters were able to organize themselves against the government policy and demonstrate on the streets. In South Africa this was not possible because the black protesters were being oppressed by the white minority government. They had to limit themselves on the one hand to diplomatic efforts and on the other hand to violent acts of civil disobedience. For example, the anti-nuclear marches that were often held by the American anti-nuclear protesters were impossible in South Africa. The protesters would be beaten down right away and, due to the distance that they had to their government and their subordinate position, they would be hardly listened to. The American protesters, although they sometimes had to endure police violence from time to time, had freedom of speech and were able to express their opinion while protesting on the streets, even in their capitol city Washington.

The diplomatic efforts in South Africa were the result from the notion that the South African nuclear programme heavily depended on news from international allies. When these allies would yield under the pressure of the anti-nuclear protesters, the South African nuclear programme would have to be abolished immediately. By conducting diplomatic efforts, the protesters tried on the one hand to raise awareness for the dangers of the South African nuclear weapons development in general and their own cause of oppression by the weapons. And on the other hand, they tried to get their international allies to take action against their own governments to stop

supporting the South African government. The violent actions were the result of the distance between the protesters and the South African government. According to Meyer, such a situation limits the Political Opportunity Structures, which can cause an increase in violent actions because it was the only possible means to fight for their cause. From their poor position in society, many of the black protesters had no way of reaching their government, unless they used violent attacks.

Another factor that explains the differences between the protests in South Africa and the United States is the fact that the American black anti-nuclear protesters had their ideas represented in the government by people such as Andrew Young. Such advocates of nuclear decline in the government brought a close tie to the American president, which made it easier for the protesters to have their opinions represented on the highest levels of decision-making. To the American black anti-nuclear protesters, it was not only important to ask for attention for their cause both inside and outside the United States, but they also wanted to show the government officials that the anti-nuclear thoughts were very broadly supported. They were able to unite many different people who were strongly opposed to the nuclear weapons program.

Message and Rhetoric

Both the American as the South African protesters displayed a similar sense of injustice in their message, but the message of the South African protesters was more violent than that of the American protesters. This was the result of the distance between the protesters and politics in South Africa, as shown accordingly to the previously mentioned Political Opportunity Structures. The violent actions of the ANC and the MK were accompanied by violent speech, and the protesters did not shy away from using violent and revolutionary language. To them, this was the only way of being able to draw attention to their message. Although the AACC advocated peaceful means of protesting, they were closely tied to the ANC and supported their actions. The South African protesters for instance often compared the white minority regime with the German Nazi regime during the Second World War. To them, the situation was similar because they felt oppressed in a way the Jews were oppressed by the Nazi's.

Both the American and the South African protesters used depictions of the United States, sometimes mocking, other times real representations of the country. The South African protesters however, often used pictures of the whole continent of

Africa as well. By doing so, they wanted to depict the unity they were willing to bring to the continent, which had many oppressors. For the American protesters it was important to show that they were Americans, although being African Americans. They had the same values as other Americans and to them; the government policies were not in line with these American values. For the South African protesters, the whole regime was not in line with the values that were South African. The white minority government represented oppression, instead of a political representation of their own values. Only by the total abolishment of the regime, a true representation of their values could become reality.

Both the American and the South African protesters used important fore fighters of black human rights as a symbol for their struggles. There were differences though, in the kind of fore fighters they used. In the United States, depictions and texts of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X were used for instance. These men had died for the cause of equal rights for all people and religions, and were used to address that racism was still present in the United States. In South Africa, people such as Nelson Mandela were used to draw attention to the struggle, but were still part of the struggle as well. Mandela was a member of the ANC and was thus used as an example for the lack of freedom of speech in the country.

Religion

Both the American and the South African protesters were largely Christian. They saw it as their duty to protest the nuclear policies because it was their calling as Christians to make sure that the earth and the people on it would be protected from such evil. For the Christian protesters all people should be equal, just as stated in the bible, and thus a policy that exacerbated racism and inequality, should be stopped. For the American protesters, the religious motivation was even stronger than for the South African protesters. Since they often viewed the United States as a divine country that had its destiny determined in a covenant with God, they saw their cause as a divine one and one that was of immense importance.

Due to this large religious influence, in both America and South Africa the church was an important factor in the protests and provided an important meeting place. More than in the United States, in South Africa the protesters were often dependent on such places since their actions could be viewed as illegal. The church could be a safe meeting place in such instances. As well, in both the United States and

South Africa, church leaders played an important role in the protests. They helped with organizing the protests but were mainly active in diplomatic efforts. Because the Christian churches often had a worldwide network, they managed to gain support for their cause from over their country's borders. For the South Africans for instance, the contacts with the German churches were of great importance. The Political Opportunity Structures can explain the importance of these efforts. The churches managed to decline the gap between the protesters and politics and thus managed to create more opportunities for the protesters. Church leaders often had peaceful intentions and were thus good spokesmen for the protesters.

Spatial relations

Both the American and the South African protesters were aware that the nuclear developments in their countries were dependent on foreign allies or enemies and although the movements were quite different, both relied heavily on international allies. The American nuclear build-up would only stop when the Soviet Union would stop with their nuclear developments as well. That is why the Soviet anti-nuclear protesters were important allies for them. The South African nuclear programme was heavily dependent on technology and knowledge from Germany and France, and thus, anti-nuclear efforts from these countries were of great importance for them as well. By keeping contact with these international allies, the protesters would be able to put pressure on these foreign governments.

Closely connected to the anti-nuclear movements in South Africa were the anti-apartheid movements. The UN Special Committee against Apartheid for instance, was not directly a party dedicated to the anti-nuclear cause. But because the nuclear developments could strengthen the apartheid in South Africa, they remained closely connected to the AACC.

Transfer of ideas

Although the movements in the United States and South Africa had largely the same feeling of injustice, and the same goals, there was no real transfer of (political) ideas. The protesters wanted to raise awareness for their cause on a national and international level. There has been contact between American and South African organizations in during the second half of the détente period, but there are no clues that there was a real transfer of ideas. The differences between the two countries were

very large and because of this, it was not possible to take over and implement each other's ideas on their own cause. It seems that the contact between the two countries was largely the result of worldwide networks of anti-nuclear and anti-apartheid organizations. Instead of providing each other with ideas on how to organize their protests, they mainly just pledged support to each other's cause.

Recommendation for further research

Further research on the topic of discrimination due to national nuclear policies will be possible. Whereas the comparison in this thesis is between two countries, this comparison can also be made with more countries. The United Kingdom, France, China, India, Israel and many other states had nuclear weaponry or were conducting nuclear tests in 1976 already. By broadening the comparison and compare more countries the link between discrimination and nuclear policy can be strengthened. There will be a better understanding of the anti-nuclear protesters with a sense of discrimination as well.

Bibliography

Primary source archives

- African Activist Archive (online)
- FOR (U.S.) Records
- Global Nonviolent Action Database (online)
- History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, UK National Archives (online)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (online)
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection (online)
- Sojourner Truth Organization (online)
- The African National Congress (online)
- The Free Lance Star (online)
- The New York Times (online)
- United Nations (online)
- United States National Security Archive (online)
- War Resisters International archives, International Institute of Social History.
- Washington Afro American (online)
- The Washington Post (online)
- Washington University Digital Gateway Texts (online)
- WSP Papers, SCPC.

Online primary source material

- Burr, William & Cohen, Avner (ed.), *The Vela Incident: South Atlantic Mystery Flash in September 1979 Raised Questions about Nuclear Test* (online archive) <<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb570-The-22-September-1979-Vela-Satellite-Incident/>>.
- General Assembly United Nations, *Communications Received Relating to Disarmament, October 4, 1982* (online archive) <[https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/bd4350074d952dd8852577c00068b287/58dc43f7ef1e8113852577ba0053c8e2/\\$FILE/A-INF-S-12-2-Add%201.pdf](https://disarmamentlibrary.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/bd4350074d952dd8852577c00068b287/58dc43f7ef1e8113852577ba0053c8e2/$FILE/A-INF-S-12-2-Add%201.pdf)>.
- History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, UK National Archives *Letter from J.S. Wall to Bryan Cartledge, 'South African Nuclear Intentions', September 08, 1977* (undated) <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116613>>.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, *Atoms for Peace Speech* (online archive) <<https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>>.
- Nobel Media AB 2017, *Martin Luther King Jr. - Nobel Lecture: The Quest for Peace and Justice* (undated) <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-lecture.html>.

- Paula Herbut, Church Groups Bolster Antinuclear Movement, *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1983 (online archive)
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1983/05/21/church-groups-bolster-antinuclear-movement/a9eaac7d-e9b2-4f99-af3f-f3ab22ef367f/?utm_term=.4adc359e95ee>.
- Sojourner Truth Organization *The Anti-War Movement & Elections '72* (online archive)
<<http://www.sojournertruth.net/antiwar.html>>.
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection, *Anti-Nuclear Proliferation* (online archive)
<https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit3_files/MarderExhibit3.html>.
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection, *Continental Walk for Disarmament and Social Justice Collected Records Series II: The Call to the Walk and Signers, Box I* (online archive)
<<http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG100-150/dg135cwdsj.htm>>.
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection, *Photographs of Dorothy Marder*, (online archive)
<https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit3_files/MarderExhibit3.html>.
- The African National Congress, *Crucial stage in the struggle for Liberation of Southern Africa*, *Speech by Oliver Tambo at the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid* (online archive) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/speech-oliver-tambo-world-conference-action-against-apartheid>>.
- The African National Congress, *Statement by Oliver Tambo at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa* (online archive)
<<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-oliver-tambo-international-conference-eeec-and-south-africa>>.
- The African National Congress, *Statement by the National Executive of the ANC on South African Defence Force `Deserters`* (undated)
<<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-anc-south-african-defence-force-deserters>>.
- The African National Congress, *Statement of the National Executive Committee on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the ANC*, (online archive)
<<http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-national-executive-committee-occasion-60th-anniversary-anc>>.
- The African National Congress, *The ANC's second submission to the TRC: Umkhonto we Sizwe operations report*, (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/ancs-second-submission-trc-umkhonto-we-sizwe-operations-report>>.
- The African National Congress, *1962-1990 Conflict*, (online archive)
<<http://archives.anc.org.za/institutional-violence/>>.
- The Free Lance Star, *Protestant groups eye war-tax resistance*, Sep. 23, 1978, 24 (online archive)

<<https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=9fRKRCJz75UC&dat=19780923&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>>.

- The New York Times, *Seattle Clergy Support Tax Protest Against Nuclear Weapons*, July 13, 1981 (online archive) <<http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/13/us/seattle-clergy-support-tax-protest-against-nuclear-weapons.html>>.
- Washington Afro American, *Andy's Top Man Picked by Carter*, Sep 4 1979, 1-2 (online archive)
<<https://news.google.com/newspapers/p/afro?nid=BeIT3YV5QzEC&dat=19790904&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>>.
- Washington University Digital Gateway Texts *Interview with Rev. Andrew Young*, (online archive)
<<http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb/you0015.0111.115revandrewyoung.html>>.

Books

- All Africa Conference of Churches, *Directory Repertoire of AACC Member Churches* (Regional Office of Lome 1981).
- All Africa Conference of Churches, *Directory Repertoire of Theological Institutions in Africa* (Regional Office of Lome 1981).
- All Africa Conference of Churches, *The Nuclear conspiracy* (Nairobi 1977).
- Auger, Vincent, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Analysis: The Carter Administration and the Neutron Bomb* (Maryland, 1996).
- Carter, April, *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945* (London 1992).
- Cortright, David, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (Cambridge 2008).
- Davenport, T. R. H., *South Africa: A Modern History* (London, 1991).
- Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford 2005).
- Giugni, Marco, *Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective* (Lanham 2004).
- Glaser, Daryl J., *SAGE Politics Texts Series: Politics and Society in South Africa (1)* (Thousand Oaks 2000).
- Intondi, Vincent, *African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement* (Stanford 2015).
- Jaynes, Gerald David & Williams, Robin Murphy, *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington 1989).
- Johnson, Richard William, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (London, 1977).
- Nesbitt, Francis Njubi, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Indiana University Press 2004).
- Sjollem, Baldwin, *Isolating apartheid: western collaboration with South Africa: policy decisions by the World Council of Churches and church responses* (Geneva 1982).

- Smith, Dan, *South Africa's Nuclear Capability* (London, 1980).
- United Nations, *Report of United Nations Seminar London* (London 1979).
- Westheider, James E., *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (New York 1997).
- Wittner, Lawrence S., *The Struggle Against The Bomb: Volume 3. Towards Nuclear Abolition* (California 2003).

Articles

- Berger, Stefan, 'Comparative History' in: Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore eds., *Writing History: Theory and Practice* (London 2003) 161-180.
- Black Enterprise, 'The Nuclear Controversy: The Black Point of View', *Black Enterprise* (June 1983) 215-218.
- Bruce van Voorst, L., 'The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence', *Foreign Affairs* 61:4 (1983) 827-852.
- Epstein, William, 'Why States Go – And Don't Go – Nuclear', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 430:1 (1977) 16-28.
- Farley, Reynolds & Frey, William H., 'Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society', *American Sociological Review* 59:1 (1994) 23-45.
- Kaper, Brian, 'Understanding the South African Nuclear Experience and its Application to Iran', *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 19 (2008) 124-138.
- Meyer, David S., 'Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age', *Political Research Quarterly* 46:3 (1993) 451-479.
- Moore, Robert 'letter to the editor', *BAS* 37:61 (1981).
- Del Pero, Mario, 'We Are All Harrisburg: Three Mile Island and the Ultimate Indivisibility of the Atom', *RSA Journal (Rivista di Studi Americani)* 26 (2015) 143-173.
- Schregel, Susanne, 'Global Micropolitics: Toward a Transnational History of Grassroots Nuclear-Free Zones' in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke & Jeremy Varon, *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s* (Cambridge 2016) 206-226.
- Simms, Gregory 'Who Speaks For Blacks Now? New Voices Are Heard', *Jet Magazine* (November 11, 1976) 44-47.
- Tannenwald, Nina 'The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use', *International Organization* 53:3 (1999) 433-468.
- Wittner, Lawrence S., 'The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1975-78', *Journal of Peace Research* 40:4 (2003) 435-456, there 435.
- Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie, 'Nuclear terrorism in Africa: the ANC's Operation Mac and the attack on the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in South Africa', *Historia* 60:2 (2015) 51-67.

Online secondary source material

- All Africa Conference of Churches, *Governance Structure* (undated) <www.aacc-ceta.org/en/about/governance-structure>.
- American Friends Service Committee, *Nobel Peace Prize* (undated) <<https://www.afsc.org/nobel-peace-prize>>.
- FOR USA, *How We Work* (undated) <<http://forusa.org/>>.
- Jenkin, Tim, *Escape from Pretoria* (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/escape-pretoria-html>>.
- SCLC, *SCLC History* (undated) <<http://nationalsclc.org/about-us/history/>>.
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection, *Movement for a New Society Records, 1971-1988* (date unknown) <<https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG151-175/DG154mns.htm#Accession:90A-002>>.
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection, *Women's Liberation and Peace* (undated) <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit4_files/MarderExhibit4.html>.
- Swarthmore College Peace Collection, *Women Strike for Peace, 1961-1975* (undated) <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/Dorothy%20Marder/MarderExhibit1A_files/MarderExhibit1A.html>.
- The African National Congress, *NEC subcommittees and the Teams of Deployees* (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/officials/nec-subcommittees-and-teams-deployees-0>>.
- The African National Congress, *Provincial Leadership* (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/content/provincial-leadership>>.
- The African National Congress, *The National Executive Committee* (undated) <<http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0>>.
- Wittner, Lawrence S., 'Religion and Nuclear Disarmament', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 9, 2007) <<http://thebulletin.org/rebirth-anti-nuclear-weapons-movement/religion-and-nuclear-disarmament>>.