

**Comparing Dutch and Austrian Soft Power:
On the Driving Factors of International Cultural
Policy**

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Abstract

International cultural relations connect a countries' foreign policy agenda and their cultural achievements in a unique way. Therefore, this thesis compares the Austrian and the Dutch approach to international cultural relations and explores the influence of its soft power projection in the international political arena. It studies the setup, the methods and the resources of the Austrian Cultural Fora and the Dutch embassies. By analysing the cultural diplomacy frameworks, this dissertation explains the incentives of the two countries to invest in cultural policies abroad. The diplomatic activities present national values and promote a politically and economically beneficial image of the Netherlands and Austria abroad. Despite the aim to establish a coherent approach, the diplomats adapt cultural diplomacy to the political and societal circumstances in the host country to achieve both economic benefits and international cooperation. This research analyses semi-structured interviews with elites working in the field of international cultural relations at the Austrian and the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs as primary sources and supports the findings with secondary literature. The thesis demonstrates that the methods and the institutions of Austrian and Dutch international cultural policy depend on the countries' history and their foreign policy objectives.

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NB: The images show the implementation of policy objectives in practice.

List of Abbreviations

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
CF	Cultural Forum/ Cultural Fora
EUNIC	European Union National Institutes for Culture
FMEIFA	Foreign Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria
ICP	International Cultural Policy
MECS	Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences of the Netherlands
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
NASOM	New Austrian Sound of Music

Introduction

“The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policy.” (Nye 2013)

Combining those three resources is not an easy task, but international cultural policy (ICP) aims to do so. It uses cultural achievements to present a country's political values to an international audience in order to achieve foreign policy goals. Those goals range from preventing conflicts to building bridges between different national cultures, and are achieved by promoting literature, arts, music and dance events. To improve their national image and foster their policy objectives, foreign ministries organise these activities abroad to positively influence the public's perception about the portrayed country. In other words, national diplomatic missions use cultural events such as theatre or musical performances, readings or art and design exhibitions to explain their national way of life, their beliefs and habits, but also their political actions to people abroad. In doing so, the countries involved exchange values and traditions with the host society, while at the same time they also promote national interest and establish socio-political cooperation. Yet, the exact role of culture in global politics remains contested as every country defines the structure and organisation of their cultural institutions abroad individually and there is no outline which suits all actors equally (MacDonald 2016: 282). Nevertheless, most states agree to the unique possibilities and opportunities cultural diplomacy offers, namely providing access to foreign audiences and advancing foreign policy goals (Bound, Briggs et al., 2007: 55).

This thesis focuses on the cultural diplomacy approach of two medium-sized Western European countries - Austria and the Netherlands. Despite the fact that Austria and the Netherlands differ in population size and the size of their geographical area, they are both

classified as medium-sized states when it comes to their political influence and economic position in the world.

Aiming to emphasise the different facets of cultural diplomacy in different national contexts, this thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the different institutions involved, their evaluation methods and the available resources. It explains that the Austrian and the Dutch institutions vary in size, available resources, location as well as in context and content of their activities. The second chapter discusses the framework of the Dutch and the Austrian international cultural policy frameworks, detailing common ideas and different traditions. It particularly focuses on the countries' involvement with the network of "European Union National Institutes for Culture" (EUNIC) and their shared policy approach. The third chapter discusses factors which are either directly or indirectly influencing the countries' ICP. Those range from cultural differences, language restrictions, censorship and funding difficulties to historic reasons and political factors. Hence, the two latter chapters will draw on the empirical evidence I gathered in phone interviews or in personal meetings with Dutch and Austrian diplomats. In addition, the dissertation analyses secondary literature and publications on international cultural policy by the respective foreign ministries to complete the analysis and complement the interviews. It concludes that Austria and the Netherlands both practice a distinct approach of soft power as the states' political, cultural and historic backgrounds influence their cultural diplomatic activities decisively.

Literature Review

The literature review firstly establishes differences in the terminology of foreign ministries and defines the most important terms for this research. Secondly, it differentiates cultural diplomacy from other similar ideas and briefly gives a

chronological overview of its development. Thirdly, this section reviews the existing literature on the topic and summarises the findings of other comparative studies.

To begin with, the term “cultural diplomacy” was coined by French diplomats who still use it today (Wyszomirski et al. 2003; Lane 2013). Australia, Canada and the UK, for example, call the practice “international cultural relations”, whereas Japan’s diplomats exercise “cultural exchange” (Wyszomirski et al. 2003, p.5; Komaki 2009; Dubber & Donaldson 2015). The underlying idea of the concepts, however, is still the original one as introduced by the French showing only slight variations. Nevertheless, even if countries use the same terminology, their approach is usually not the same and foreign ministries define the exact meaning of their terminology nationally (Mark 2009; Gienow-Hecht 2010).

However, the two countries analysed in this thesis, Austria and the Netherlands, use the term “international cultural policy” (FMEIFA 2015b; MFA 2016). For stylistic reasons, this thesis uses both the original term, “cultural diplomacy”, as well as the inherent term in the Dutch and the Austrian approach, “international cultural policy”. I chose to research the ideas of those states since there is a significant gap in the literature as the following paragraphs of the literature review will establish. Whereas the topic of cultural diplomacy conducted by bigger states is well-researched, the activities of smaller and medium-sized states fall rather in oblivion. The example of the Austrian and the Dutch policies, though, show that there are interesting lessons to be learned from them. Even if the two countries use the same terminology, their approaches differ distinctively. Thus, the comparative approach of this thesis offers relevant observations for other states in similar positions.

The terminology the states choose is a hint to the institutional structure and the general approach of cultural diplomacy they are taking. For example, the term “international cultural policy” highlights that the actions are authorised by the national government,

whereas “cultural relations” point rather at the private sector and actors in civil society as driving force behind the activities (Mark 2010). This is indeed true for the Austrian and the Dutch approach as they are primarily sponsored by the respective foreign ministries. Countries which use different terms for cultural diplomacy, such as the UK, finance more than half of their activities with incomes from various partnerships and private organisations and only a smaller share with government funds (Wyszomirski et al. 2003; British Council 2017). Irrespective of the wording, most states practice different forms of cultural diplomacy using cultural means to pursue foreign policy goals. It enables them to promote national interests and strengthen social-political ties with other countries at the same time as the performers exchanges traditions, values and other aspects of their national identity with the society hosting the event (Cummings 2003). This can be done either on a bi- or on a multilateral level (Berger 2008; Gienow-Hecht 2013; Goff 2013).

As states are exercising this influence to reach political goals, they are applying soft power as opposed to hard power. The term “soft power” refers to an idea coined by Joseph Nye (1990) which he defined as the “ability to reach one’s goals through attraction rather than through coercion or material goods”. Thus, soft power is a combination of influence and attraction which is supported by the work of diplomatic representations. Even though the complex concept is widely used in international relations theory, it remains rather hazy and hard to trace (Ferguson 2003; MacDonald 2016). Diplomacy, on the other hand, is easier to document. It is a conduct among international actors using exclusively peaceful means, for example negotiations, to maintain an international system of states (Nicolson 1939, p.17). The actors are often states or other recognised institutions which persuade audiences to advance national interests and pursue foreign policy goals (Powell 2004; Melissen 2005a).

Differentiation from Related Ideas

Even though cultural diplomacy is used to influence people's opinions, it does not equal propaganda. The concept also intends to install a certain image of an issue in people's minds but has a rather pejorative connotation. The idea of ICP is clearly differentiated as it is more about communication and information than propaganda, encouraging mutual understanding and engaging the audience in a dialogue about mutual values (Gienow-Hecht 2010; Cambridge English Dictionary 2018).

Another similar theory is nation branding (Hurn 2016). Aronczyk (2013) defines nation branding as the use of techniques of commercial branding in order to attract foreign capital and to create a stronger and more cohesive sense of national identity. Several scholars purported that cultural diplomacy and nation branding work hand in hand as they both help to develop unique national identities and benefit economic prosperity and social cohesion (Barghoorn 1960; Schneider 2006; Mogherini 2016). Alternative research, however, has argued that it is problematic to summarise the broad scope of traditions and values in a series of cultural performances or marketing campaigns as it is difficult and almost impossible to portray something as diverse and complex as a nation's culture thoroughly. It necessarily excludes minorities and flattens the plurality of a nation (Aronczyk 2013; Iwabuchi 2015). Modern cultural-political practices, on the other hand, aim to address this issue and strive for as much diversity in their projection of the nation as possible (Stoica 2015; MECS 2016). Another distinct feature of ICP compared to nation branding is its perspective which is outward facing. Nation branding, however, is an inward-looking phenomenon which markets the benefits of investing in a country to companies and consumers (Hwajung 2012, p.9). Therefore, the thesis differentiates the two concepts and the analysis does not expand further on the idea of nation branding. It will investigate how cultural diplomacy influences the host society's

perception about Austria and the Netherlands and which factors influence the activities abroad they do in particular. But the thesis will abstain from explaining how Austrian or Dutch national identity and policies are affected domestically.

The last related idea discussed in this thesis is public diplomacy. Most countries manage both departments in their foreign ministries. Public diplomacy, though, uses approaches of public relations and media interaction to explain the government's agenda to both the domestic and the international audience (Melissen 2005a; Mark 2008). Melissen (2011) points out that cultural and public diplomacy do not differ in their end goals, but rather in their means, their way of communicating the message and their method to engage the audience in a dialogue.



Image 1 Tweet by the director of DutchCulture on the importance of cultural diplomacy when elites' political opinions clash (2018). Available at: <https://twitter.com/GraaffC>.

Historical Development

Even though cultural diplomacy has existed for decades, pre-1990 only larger states applied the concept of international cultural relations frequently (Mark 2009; R. Brown 2017; Mulcahy 2017). Diplomats and policy-makers of smaller and medium-sized states previously did not have the resources to regularly use cultural events to pursue policy goals (Cohen 2001; Nye et al. 2007). France, particularly, was the pioneer in this field and started to pursue coordinated cultural relations with other states at the end of the 19th century as they discovered how cultural means benefit their soft power and expand the sphere of influence (Bonfatto 2012; Lane 2013; Mulcahy 2017). Germany, Great Britain and the United States gradually followed the trend in the beginning of the 20th century. Austria and the Netherlands began to implement the first policies targeting international cultural relations in the 1950s (Wyszomirski et al. 2003). During the Cold War though, the policies were implemented half-heartedly, and the approach was not as well-coordinated as today. It was not until the 1990s when the changes in world politics caused countries to reorganise their diplomatic structures. This was when the network of cultural diplomatic institutions expanded substantially and the Austrian and the Dutch ministries gradually developed the institutional structure they administer today (Hurkmans 2008; IOB 2016a; Vavrik 2017). Today, even though the individual approaches vary distinctively, diplomatic representations of both smaller and larger countries organise cultural events to share their values and ideas abroad (Melissen 2005a; Düwell 2009; Gienow-Hecht 2010).

States do regularly update their cultural diplomacy frameworks as they modernise their institutions, respond to upcoming challenges and develop more effective soft power strategies (Bu 1999; FMEIFA 2001; Melissen 2005b; Nye et al. 2007; Cours des Comptes 2013). The Dutch framework was thoroughly analysed and rewritten in 2014 (Eijgenraam

2018), whereas the Austrian international cultural policy paper was re-established a few years earlier, in 2010 (Eichtinger 2017). France presented some changes to their approach to soft power in 2011 and introduced a new structure of the Institut Français (Lane 2013). China also wanted to catch up with the leading countries in the field of soft power and expanded their cultural institute extremely. From 2004 until 2013, the Chinese government founded more than 300 Confucius Institutes in over eighty countries and increased the country's sphere of influence by promoting their national culture and language (Pan 2013).

Existing Research

There are a few academics who have chosen a comparative approach in the past to analyse cultural international relations similarly to this thesis. Robert Fox (1997), for example, summarises the cultural diplomacy practices of Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Canada and the United States (US) and found that the first three countries focus their programme particularly on language education, whereas Canada and the US prefer other activities. Robert Williams (1985), on the other hand, compared the cultural diplomatic activities of Canada and Australia exploring the interconnection between diplomacy and achieving strategic political objectives. Another very important comparative scholar is Simon Mark (2008), who wrote his PhD thesis in 2008 analysing the Canadian, Indian and New Zealand approach to cultural diplomacy. His study highlighted the opportunities to include the traditions of minorities into ICP to avoid a biased presentation of states' national culture. In a later report he reduced his scope and exclusively looked at New Zealand and Canada. This report also included suggestions on how to represent cultural sovereignty through diplomatic means (Mark 2010). The most recent comparative work was published last year and adds to the vast literature on German and French external cultural relations (R. Brown 2017). In contrast to the well-researched

topic of cultural diplomacy conducted by bigger states, this thesis describes and analyses the approaches of two medium-sized countries to highlight successful policies and create valuable insights for other similarly sized states aiming to expand their international cultural relations.

This is particularly interesting and valuable for comparatively smaller states as there is substantially less literature on their cultural activities abroad compared to the numerous studies about American, French, Chinese, Canadian, German and British efforts. While those countries have been active for several decades or have developed very successful approaches to increase their soft power, the activities of smaller and medium-sized states have been side-lined in academic studies, not to mention in comparative research. Several interviewees mentioned the Swedish, Irish or Danish institutions as models of comparable size and organisation, but only a few of them have been studied in academia in the past (de Graaff 2018; Eijgenraam 2018; Nijman 2018). The Scandinavian cultural institutions, for example, are often analysed as a group, even though the Danish approach is more independent than the Swedish or Norwegian one, which are both traditionally more focused on the countries' rich history (Lending 2000; Popa 2015). Lithuania, on the other hand, employs cultural diplomacy to build a coherent national identity for their diaspora communities and organises cultural activities abroad to stress the common bond of traditions, arts and heritage with their country of origin (Dirmaite 2015). Vietnamese and Japanese cultural diplomacy aims to increase the countries' soft power influence in the region, counterweighing the regional hegemon China. Besides forming a distinct national cultural identity, they focus mainly on building international cooperation (Komaki 2009; Iwabuchi 2015; Rawnsley & Ngac 2015).

Other scholars, namely Kampits (1990) and Beer (1997), published articles on the Austrian approach to ICP, detailing its structure and rationales. However, this thesis

explains that the country's international cultural activities and institutions have substantially changed since the 1990s. Overall, the literature suggests that identity building, membership in international organisations as well as economic advantages are the main incentives for smaller and medium-sized countries to prioritise international cultural relations in specific regions or with particular activities (Bound et al. 2007; Singh & MacDonald 2017). This thesis confirms these findings as well as adds other decisive factors such as a country's history or their current foreign political agenda.

Mainly, this dissertation elaborates on a phenomenon which received increased scholarly attention in the 1990s when most Western countries reoriented their foreign policy strategies due to the far-reaching changes in world affairs. The end of the Cold War was an event with far-reaching consequences on national stability and security, leading several scholars to discuss the developments and the inclusion of culture in international politics. For example, Huntington's (1993) ideas are well-known today as he argued that states start to increasingly define their identities and interests through culture. Laqueur (1994) and Bu (1999), on the other hand, were inspired by the failure of traditional diplomacy to fight political threats and became fierce supporters of cultural diplomacy. Johnston (1995) developed Laqueur's initial idea into a more definite concept and introduced the idea of strategic culture to achieve policy goals. Cohen (1997) similarly emphasised the importance of skilful cross-cultural communication in order to gain an influential position in world politics, whereas Katzenstein (1996) pioneered with framing culture and national identity as a security issue. Adler (1997) and Belanger (1999), two constructivist scholars, adopted his idea and stated that mutual understanding fosters security and stability. Their writings established culture as a relevant topic for executing foreign policy strategies and national security issues. Lastly, Shapiro (2004) concluded that cultural governance is crucial for all modern politics in order to influence social behaviour and ideologies. This

this thesis agrees largely with the ideas of Cohen, Adler and Belanger. However, security is not the main reason for the Netherlands and Austria to practice ICP - economic prosperity has become the major driving factor. Moreover, this thesis shows how the initial idea to use culture to attract investors and gain political influence has grown, resulting in states proactively building ICP frameworks and monitoring their coherent implementation.

Research Question and Methodology

The following section establishes the research question this thesis aims to answer and clarifies the applied research method and its limitations. Austria and the Netherlands are two medium sized countries in Europe whose economies are both expanding and blossoming (Worldbank 2018). Moreover, the two countries are member states of the European Union (EU) and their cultural diplomacy is rather unknown compared to the English or the French approach. Thus, the countries offer common factors to base the comparative case study on, but also enough arguments to explain the differences in the outlines of their cultural diplomatic institutions.

Therefore, the fundamental research question this thesis is going to answer is “*Which factors decide the international cultural policy approach of Austria and the Netherlands?*”. In order to do so, the research addresses the following three sub-questions:

- How do the Austrian and the Dutch Foreign Ministry define and practice cultural diplomacy?
- How do the countries determine their thematic and geographic priorities?
- To what extent do political events influence Austrian/Dutch cultural diplomatic activities?

The first chapter addresses the first sub-question and outlines the institutions involved in the approaches of the two countries. It moves on to discuss the ministries’ evaluation

methods of cultural diplomacy as well as the budget attributed to it. The second and most extensive chapter aims to answer the second sub-question comparing the respective ICP strategies. It begins by establishing the priorities of the countries' approaches separately and continues to highlight similarities and differences by comparing them with each other. Lastly, the chapter addresses the main shared cultural initiative of the EU member states and analyse its role in portraying a common cultural heritage. The third chapter, in turn, analyses the last sub-question and focuses on external factors influencing cultural policy, such as political issues, conflicts, history, language barriers and governmental restrictions by the host country.

I conducted interviews with elites specialising in the field of cultural diplomacy at the Austrian and at the Dutch Foreign Ministry and highlighted their recurring themes by doing a critical discourse analysis. The questions I have asked are included in the appendix. I chose this inductive research approach to identify which factors shape cultural policies according to those who apply them. This qualitative approach draws the attention particularly to the dynamics foreign ministries follow when directing cultural policies and their underlying motivation.

The sample of interviewees was chosen according to the priority countries of the Dutch and the Austrian ministry for foreign affairs. In total, I contacted 36 officials working at the ministries in The Hague, Vienna and at embassies abroad via email. Slightly more than half, namely 20 people, replied and 15 of them were willing to answer my questions via phone, email or through a personal meeting. This resembles a positive response rate of roughly 42 percent. In addition, I included three interviews with Austrian diplomats, which I collected at an earlier date in 2017. Overall, I interviewed eight Dutch and ten Austrian diplomats who gave me a great insight into their national cultural diplomatic practices (N=18).

Even though there is a small margin in the number of respondents from either country, the thesis assesses both countries' policy practices to the same extent as it also includes policy frameworks, ministerial publications and government reports. Analysing multiple conversations with elites working on the same issue in the same region, but with different national backgrounds, offers an interesting opportunity to explain different approaches to soft power and increases the validity of the conclusion. Moreover, the combination of the first chapter, focusing on the initial comparison of the institutions and their resources, and the latter two chapters, which discuss the theoretical and practical influences, strengthens the core argument.

Due to the fact that the data was collected in semi-structured interviews, the thesis cannot produce standardised data to formulate generalisations. Nevertheless, it gives valuable insights into the practices of two Western European countries and the factors influencing foreign policy objectives and thus cultural relations. I chose to interview elites individually either face-to face, via phone or via email in order to answer questions that are left unaddressed in the literature research and to gather more specialised information on certain issues, which is not available in other publications. This means, however, that the elites' subjective opinions might have biased the research project. Moreover, due to the prevalence of respondents who are based in Eastern European countries, the research might be geographically biased as many of the examples given refer to that region. The dissertation acknowledges and aims to counterbalance these constraints by consulting academic literature and policy frameworks throughout all three chapters.

Since all interviewees are official representatives of the Netherlands and Austria, some of them echoed the official government statements rather than expressing their personal opinions. I experienced that some interviewees rephrased their statements to make it more neutral and diplomatic. Some diplomats, however, spoke quite freely about their

experiences and their stance on the policies as they perceived me as an academic researcher and neutral observer. This is also the standpoint I aim to take throughout this thesis since I merely highlight shared as well as distinct traditions and potential lessons for other actors and refrain from judging either country's practice.

Another limitation to the research was a slight language barrier. Even though most of the analysed policy documents are available in English, some of them are published only in Dutch or German. Since my Dutch language skills are not as advanced as my mother tongue German, the analysis of the German documents might be more detailed than the one of the Dutch texts. The interviews were also conducted either in English or German, but the written and oral communication was not restricted due to an apparent linguistic obstacle. Considering ethical issues, all of them are recorded and transcribed with the authorisation of the interviewees. I explained the purpose of the research and asked every individual for permission to cite them either by name or anonymously.

Chapter 1: International Cultural Policy in Practice

As established in the literature review, the end of the Cold War and the consequent restructuring of world politics caused an increase in importance for cultural diplomacy. Globalisation and the consequent interconnectedness of states is an additional factor which triggered smaller as well as bigger states to invest in ICP. The development forced diplomatic elites to portray a distinct positive and favourable image of their country to compete to attract foreign investors, students, tourists and skilled migrants (Mark 2008, p.227). Globalisation has brought more competition as well as interdependency between states leading to a stronger focus on economics in cultural diplomacy. Moreover, since national borders increasingly blur, domestic factors such as the political situation, social changes and economic difficulties do not only affect one country but a group of states. Therefore, governments use cultural diplomacy to influence other countries to cooperate and act in their favour (MFA 2016, p.2). They employ diplomatic representations to regulate the fast flow of information and address common prejudices, generalisations and perceptions about their country in cultural activities.

As this chapter will explain, diplomats mainly act as curators and facilitate artists' involvement with international galleries, agencies, production companies, publishers or museums. However, globalisation also means that issues become more complex and affect several states at the same time. During this process, ICP became especially important for smaller states as it represents opportunities to deal with new challenges caused by globalisation and digitalisation. Successful international cultural relations effectively correct image in international politics and hence boost their economic development (Dubber & Donaldson 2015, p.2).

Firstly, this chapter highlights the differences in the institutional setup of the Austrian and Dutch cultural diplomacy departments. Secondly, it compares their budgets and their

methods of policy evaluation, emphasising the different rationales behind the countries' traditions. Overall, Austrian and Dutch international cultural policy differ thematically as well as in their funding principles and their institutional structure. Even though the foreign ministries are the main coordinators of international cultural policy, the approach includes additional institutions and groups to win hearts and minds of the foreign audience and advance national policy goals successfully. Hence, when organising cultural activities, the ministries rely on their supportive network of non-governmental organisations and private businesses as well as on the performing artists which are preselected by their foreign ministries most of the time (Dobbs 2016).

1.1 Main Actors

The leading actors coordinating Austrian and Dutch international cultural policy are the “Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria” (FMEIFA) and the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands” (MFA). Therefore, the foreign ministries have also the strongest influence on the policy agendas (Zöllner 2009, p.263). However, depending on the project and the type of collaboration, there may also be other ministries or departments involved, such as those responsible for education, sports, research and science, arts and culture or economic affairs (MECS 2013, p.12). Thus, the institutional structure of cultural diplomacy is continuously changing and regularly updated. New institutions are found, others are merged, and some are disbanded (IOB 2016b, p.54).

Austria

In Austria, there are three main institutions involved with cultural diplomacy: ‘Cultural For a’ (CF), ‘Austrian Libraries’ and ‘Austria Institutes’. These organisations put the policies into practice, while the foreign ministry merely facilitates the structure of the

policies and coordinates their budget (FMEIFA 2015b, p.3). Out of the three institutions, the network of 29 CF expanding over 27 countries is the main contact point for artists performing abroad, the administrator of partnerships and the organiser of cultural events (FMEIFA 2018b). This approach is comparable to the Dutch idea of priority countries as the CF also differ in size and are positioned strategically around the globe according to the geographic emphasis of Austrian foreign policy. The CF's number of employees varies from eight people working on cultural projects in bigger and logistically more important countries to two people employed at a CF in smaller countries (Meisel 2017). Except for a few exemptions, the CF is based in the same locations as the respective local embassy or consulate general. In countries where there is no Cultural Fora, the diplomatic representations step in and represent national literature, arts and music to pursue international cultural relations beyond the network of cultural institutes (Eichtinger 2017, p.7).

The Austrian cultural institution with the most branches abroad, however, is called Austrian Libraries. The first library opened in 1986 in Krakow, Poland, and the network has expanded to 65 libraries in 28 states until today (Austria Libraries 2018). Most of these are situated in Central and Eastern Europe and work closely with local libraries or universities to foster cultural exchange. The libraries were initially founded to represent Austrian culture in (smaller) cities and expanded the network of institutions also outside the capital cities of the host countries. The third organisation exercising cultural diplomacy is the Austria Institute. The Institute hosts nine local branches which offer German language courses and consequently convey national values by teaching the students specific Austrian vocabulary and introducing them to traditions (Austria Institutes 2018). The institutes are located in Europe or in countries where there is also a Cultural Fora, again emphasising the regional focus of the country's foreign policy.



Image 2 Tweet by the Director of the Austrian CF in Budapest on a book presentation in the Austrian Library (2018). Available at: <https://twitter.com/reginarusz>.

Despite the fact that there are three organisations jointly implementing ICP, the FMEIFA is still the main coordinating actor which is also administering policies' thematic focus. By publishing lists from which the directors of the Cultural Fora choose artists they are going to invite, the ministry assures that the issued policy framework is implemented cohesively around the globe. For example, one of those publications is the New Austrian Sound of Music programme (NASOM), which is issued every other year listing young musicians selected by national experts (FMEIFA 2018d, p.2). The equivalent publication for young authors is named SchreibART. The lists guarantee a coherently presented image of Austria and are helpful means for diplomats to keep them updated about current developments in the arts (Indjein 2013, p.26). Since they live and work abroad, they might miss upcoming talents in their home country (Meisel 2017). Even though the publications recommend inviting writers and musicians which are preselected by experts and by the ministry, the directors of the CF are still free to invite other artists who apply to their

institutions individually. This guarantees an ICP which is suitable and adaptable to the respective host countries (Anonymous 2018).

The Netherlands

The Dutch ICP approach, however, is structured differently. After decades of arguing about the main coordinating role, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stood up to the Ministry of Education, Cultural Affairs and Science (MECS). Consequently, the Netherlands established international cultural policy as an instrument for achieving foreign policy objectives rather than a mean to represent intrinsic national art abroad (ten Wolde 2018). However, the Dutch ministry renounces from maintaining formal cultural institutes such as the CF and works with a system of priority countries instead. Thus, the MFA decides every two years on twenty to thirty Dutch embassies and consulates general which receive extra funding dedicated to international cultural policy for a two-year period. In order to be selected and to effectively implement ICP, the embassies have to possess a certain number of staff and a minimum of financial and time resources available (Eijgenraam 2018). The foreign ministry's priority lies either on neighbouring states such as Belgium and Germany, on former colonies such as Indonesia, or on strategically chosen partners in cooperation with the Dutch Regional Development Department, e.g. in the North Africa, Eastern Europe, Turkey or Russia (Eijgenraam 2018). Even though the Netherlands do not have a network of cultural institutes abroad, the embassies in priority countries still focus on similar objectives, align with Dutch foreign policy goals and organise cultural events just as diplomats in cultural institutes do (IOB 2016a, p.3). Thus, a Dutch cultural attaché is a diplomat who fulfils the same responsibilities as a director of an Austrian Cultural Forum.

An exception of the Dutch institutional structure, however, is the Erasmus Huis founded in 1980. Located in Jakarta, Indonesia, it is the only cultural event centre with an affiliated

library and an exhibition hall maintained by the MFA (2018a). It displays mainly Dutch culture, but hosts also Indonesian exhibitions, musical acts and literature events. From 1957 to 2013, the MFA also maintained a cultural centre in Paris, France, called the Institut Néerlandais. It focused on Dutch language education in France, but also offered exhibitions, film screenings and literature events (Institut Néerlandais 2014). The institute closed five years ago in 2013 when the ministry introduced a new approach to Dutch ICP, which focuses on the economic opportunities of culture and excludes language education. The successor of the institute became the Atelier Néerlandais, whose concept correlates better with the new ideas and provides a network for aspiring Dutch designers to enter the French market (Atelier Néerlandais 2018).

Another important pillar of Dutch ICP is DutchCulture, a shared initiative of the MFA and the MECS, funded by the ministries but registered as a non-governmental and independent organisation (DutchCulture 2017). Several offices such as the Foundation for International Cultural Activities (SICA), Mediadesk, Transartists and Cultural ContactPoint merged into this organisation in 1998 as the MFA aimed to establish a more coherently coordinated ICP approach. Since then, the organisation is the main contact point for international artists coming to the Netherlands and Dutch artists going abroad (IOB 2016b, p.37). On the one hand, diplomats can refer international artists to DutchCulture to exhibit or perform in the Netherlands (DutchCulture 2018). On the other hand, the initiative cooperates closely with the Dutch embassies abroad and supports them by maintaining a database which offers information about upcoming Dutch artists as well as about artists who performed abroad in the context of international cultural relations in the last two decades. The office of the initiative is situated in Amsterdam and has currently 25 fulltime employees (de Graaff 2018). By referring preselected artists to the embassies, DutchCulture improves the cohesion of policies and creates a more coherent

picture of the Netherlands abroad. Hence, the initiatives' database resembles the Austrian publications as both screen the domestic art scene for interesting performances.

Overall, despite their distinct setup, both institutions, the Austrian Cultural Fora and the Dutch embassies in priority countries, use comparable frameworks and pursue similar objectives (see also paragraph 2.1). They host cultural events, display literature, theatre, arts, films and music and export their national culture. Moreover, most events are free of charge for the audience (FMEIFA 2015b, p.310; MFA 2018a). The institutions' main aim is to coordinate international collaboration in different forms and establish the Netherlands and Austria as independent, forward-striving and innovative countries. In doing so, international cultural relations benefit the countries economically, socially as well politically and form an crucial aspect of modern foreign policy agendas (Melissen 2011, p.6). In chapter 2 and 3, this thesis expands on the effects of the different institutional structures when it comes to the implementation of policies.

1.2 Evaluation of Failure and Success

The impact of cultural policies is hard to demonstrate as the consequences do not show immediately and have to be assessed with a combined approach of qualitative and quantitative methods. Hence, states have to commit to ICP for several years before the first results can be evaluated as cumulative effort (Laqueur 1994, p.157). Even though some factors of international cultural relations can be assessed with hard numbers, e.g. the number of institutional branches or the amount of money spend on policy goals, they do not express the impact policies have on people's minds. The ultimate goals remain difficult to capture, such as a shift of opinion, the creation of international networks and partnerships, or a rise in mutual understanding and dialogue (K. Brown 2017). As the institutions had to find a way to justify their spending and further improve their activities, the policy outcomes are translated to a system of measurable facts and numbers in order

to assess them in a standardised manner (Goff 2013, p.433). Therefore, Austria and the Netherlands evaluate their policies by combining a quantitative assessment with qualitative standards based on the ideational impact on the audience. The quantitative assessment includes performance indicators such as media coverage, social media appearances, number of people attending an event or resulting collaborations. Furthermore, the respective institutions set goals which have to be achieved within a certain amount of time after the initial implementation of the policy (Hartig 2017, p.260). The qualitative aspects are assessed for each activity individually, for example by conducting personal interviews with cultural attachés and reviewing their first-hand impressions and the feedback they have received from the audience (Eijgenraam 2018).

The evaluation of international cultural relations is crucial for improving the policies and for avoiding failures in the policy-making process or in the set-up of the actual programme (McConnell 2016, p.673). A failure of cultural policy might result in a wrong perception of the country abroad (Wimmer 2014, p.2). This causes an economic decline as international investors to refrain from giving money, or a decrease of influence in world politics (Komaki 2009, p.7). Thus, diplomats aim to prevent failure by scattering the activities broadly: inviting a range of artists, attracting a wider audience, talking about different issues and performing at various locations (Meisel 2017).

The MFA as well as the FMEIFA evaluate their policies regularly and adjust them when necessary. Until 2015, the Austrian ministry published an annual report, not only about its cultural activities, but generally about its foreign policy activities in Europe and around the globe (FMEIFA 2015a). The cultural activities, however, are still listed and reviewed separately in a yearbook which discusses new developments and evaluates last year's projects. The most recent report was published in 2016 and is available in German only (FMEIFA 2016). The Dutch ministry, on the other hand, does not release an annual report

on their activities. Their last major evaluation was conducted over the period of five years from 2009 to 2014 and resulted in the rewriting of their policy framework (IOB 2016a). The resulting report “Culture as a Chance” is available in both English and Dutch.

Despite the fact that both ministries regularly issue an evaluation report, the Dutch government does not make them available for the public as the Austrian ICP department does. The policy evaluation department in the Hague (in Dutch: IOB) intends the report rather for internal improvements and thus includes additional policy guidelines. The guidelines describe obligatory criteria for the organisation of events abroad such as the involvement of local institutions or the ministry’s maximum funding amount per project (half of the amount of the project’s overall costs). Those criteria guarantee that the projects are not isolated from the cultural scene in the host society but rather support trust and cultural exchange as parties from different backgrounds collaborate and get to know each other (MFA 2018b).

Moreover, the ministries apply a combination of assessment methods due to the various forms of cultural diplomatic events which portray popular as well as high national culture. High culture describes dance, literature, theatre, music and visual arts performances. According to Singh and MacDonald (2017, p.82), those forms of culture are promoting soft power decisively as they boost country’s influence in international politics and attract foreign investment. However, modern cultural diplomacy also includes popular culture, which generally attracts a broader audience compared to high culture (MECS 2016, p.2). Especially when embassies invite young popular artists, it casts a different light on the country and the public adopts a newer, more innovative image of it (Meisel 2017). Therefore, the approach of displaying all forms of culture reaches the hearts and minds of the widest possible audience. Nevertheless, the institutions do not actively dictate the content of the presentation or performance; it is up to the individual embassy or cultural

forum to select the performing artist and thus choose which image of their countries is promoted to the host society. By accessing this scope of action, the executing institutions are able to adopt a country-specific or thematic approach (see Chapter 3).

In conclusion, this section on the evaluation of international cultural policy stated that the ministries combine a quantitative approach, counting press articles or attendance of events, with a qualitative assessment of the subjective ideational impact of cultural events. This approach enables the institutions to accommodate high cultural as well as popular cultural activities and extends the assessment over a longer period. The standardised evaluation is necessary to justify the spending and make future policies more effective. While the Dutch government uses the results of the assessment to issue further guidelines for a more coherent implementation of the policy, the Austrian ICP department makes the reports available for the public to increase accountability and transparency.

1.3 Budget

Since the foreign ministries coordinate Austrian and Dutch international cultural policy, they are also in charge of the dedicated budget. Interestingly, the sums countries attribute to cultural diplomacy vary decisively. Countries which traditionally advocate ICP, such as the United States, do not necessarily spend the most on it (Schneider 2005, p.161). Several US representatives mentioned how cultural and educational resources support their diplomatic objectives in public speeches, for example. Practically, they never walked the talk though. This might be due to the fact that US-American culture is already often portrayed in popular culture and does not require extra support by foreign cultural missions (Arndt 2005, p.378).

Wyszomirski and his colleagues (2003, p.24) specifically mention the Netherlands as a small country which spends a great amount of resources on international cultural

relations. Every year the MFA spends €0.5 million on cultural diplomacy in their set priority countries, specifically on the third objective of their ICP framework (see paragraph 2.1.2) (MFA 2016, p.19). This amount is spent exclusively on the operationalisation of cultural activities as the maintenance of separate institutes does not apply to the Dutch approach (see paragraph 1.1). However, the total expenditure of Dutch ICP is difficult to assess as the budget is fragmented and difficult to pin down in one figure. As the second chapter explains, the ministry deploys additional funds which benefit cultural activities abroad indirectly and extend the actual budget substantially. The grants are not exclusively attributed to cultural diplomacy though and support a broad range of developmental, economic and cultural policies abroad (IOB 2016a, p.3). The annual budget for the initiative DutchCulture of €700.000 is also divided between domestic and international activities, making a clear break down impossible (de Graaff 2018).

The Austrian budget is easier to determine. For example, in 2015 the Austrian foreign ministry spent a total of € 5.6 million on cultural activities abroad (FMEIFA 2015a, p.306). This figure shows the mere operational budget for the 29 CF and other committed embassies, which was spend solely on the organisation of cultural events representing Austria internationally. The amount both countries spent on international cultural policy is not set in stone though and varies every year, mainly depending on domestic factors such as priority setting of the current government or radical social changes, such as an unforeseen national crisis (Holden & Tryhorn 2013, p.185).

Compared to France or Germany, the Austrian and the Dutch budget are relatively low. The German and the French ministries are Europe's biggest spenders on cultural policies abroad (Cours des Comptes 2013; German Federal Foreign Office 2016). Both countries maintain very well-known institutions abroad in a vast number of countries, namely the

Goethe Institute and the Institut Français. However, if you divide the budget of Austria through the number of the country's inhabitants and do the same for the French or the German case, the numbers are very similar. This proves that Austria stresses international cultural relations as much as the two leading European countries in that respect. Due to the scattered Dutch budget, their spending per capita is not exactly predictable.

Even though the Austrian and Dutch taxpayers are the main sponsors of ICP, they are usually unaware of how much money is dedicated to ICP exactly. This is due to the fact that the issue is rarely publicly discussed in the media. (McConnell 2016, p.681). Since the policy attracts foreign investors and tourists, it returns and even multiplies the public's money which justifies the use of taxes (British Council 2017, p.2).

1.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the first chapter explained the different institutional structures of Austrian and Dutch international cultural relations. They both aim to show the country's best cultural aspects to the public abroad but use different tools to do so. Austria has institutionalised their cultural activities abroad in Cultural Fora, Austria Institutes and Austrian libraries. The Dutch, on the other hand, use a different institutional set-up. They maintain only one cultural institute, the Erasmus Huis in Jakarta, and appoint priority countries in which a cultural attaché implements the ICP framework. The different structures hint that the two foreign ministries prioritise various aspects of cultural diplomacy and cause also the differences in the evaluation reports and the composition of the respective budgets.

Regarding the methods of evaluating cultural policies, both countries developed a standardised assessment process and joined qualitative and quantitative variables to create a full picture of the policies' impact. Lastly, the chapter highlighted the composition of

the Austrian and the Dutch budget. Looking exclusively at international cultural activities abroad, the Austrian ministry spends more money on them. However, the budgets are difficult to compare as the Dutch one is scattered on different institutions making it hard to define the exact amount of money spent on cultural diplomacy.

Chapter 2: Analysis of International Cultural Policy Frameworks

TV and popular culture focus on distinct features of Austrian and Dutch culture which are usually commonly known stereotypes about the two countries. By organising cultural diplomatic events, the foreign ministries aim to present aspects which are less popular, but still valuable additions to their national cultures. Compared to popular culture which reaches a much broader audience, the influence of ICP is minor. However, the coordinated cultural activities are a valuable addition to the national image as they bring economic advantages. They also focus on interacting with the host society, build sustainable relationships and foster cross-border interaction.

Austria and the Netherlands both opt to actively improve their cooperation with other states with cultural diplomacy and issue ICP policy programmes running for a period of either three or four years. They define the details of the distribution of the budget, the emphasised regions as well as the thematic focus. First, this chapter analyses the respective frameworks and discuss the different ways in which the countries use soft power to achieve their individual foreign policy goals. Secondly, this chapter explains the structure of the EUNIC network which is a shared initiative of the 27 EU member states. The Austrian Cultural Fora and the Dutch embassies are both actively involved in the network, working towards a shared European ICP which emphasises common European values and traditions. Lastly, the chapter concludes that Austrian and Dutch international cultural policies are similarly successful even though the two countries' thematic and geographic priorities as well as their methodology differ in many aspects due to their distinct foreign policy goals.

2.1 Summary

The following paragraphs discuss the Austrian and Dutch frameworks for international cultural policy separately and summarise their objectives which are determined by the

respective ministries of foreign affairs. The diplomatic representation implementing the policies have little influence on them since the ministries in Vienna and The Hague determine their thematic and the regional emphasis.

2.1.1 Austria

The Austrian International Cultural Policy Concept for the period of 2015 to 2018 was published in 2015 and signed by the Foreign Minister at that time, Sebastian Kurz. He is a member of the conservative Christian democratic People's Party. It is a document of fourteen pages which sets out the policy goals for cultural diplomacy for three years.

The framework describes Austria's neighbouring states and the Western Balkan countries as geographic priorities. This geographic focus draws on the historic connection of the Western Balkan states to Austria which dates from the time of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. One of the guiding principle of the policy states also "With history in mind", emphasising the existence of German-speaking minorities in Eastern European states which belonged to the empire and the Austrian responsibility to protect and support them. The thematic focus, on the other hand, lies on film and the new media, architecture and dance as well as on "Austria As a Centre for Dialogue" and "Women in Art and Science". The last theme is particularly important for the ministry in Vienna and therefore the number of female artists is evaluated in the annual statistics. The ministry's end goal is an equal gender representation of performers overall (Indjein 2013, p.26).

Furthermore, the policy framework details three primary objectives which the cultural institutes have to fulfil:

- Presenting Austria on the international stage as an innovative and creative nation that is historically diverse and rich in culture and scientific know-how

- Contributing pro-actively to promoting the process of European integration (“unity in diversity”)
- Making a sustainable contribution to building trust and securing peace on a global level by launching initiatives in the field of intercultural and interreligious dialogue (FMEIFA 2015b, p.4).

The first objective aims to portray the country in the best way possible and increase people’s awareness about Austria. The second objective, on the other hand, distinguishes the country clearly from other European countries as it emphasises their cultural sovereignty, but also highlights their willingness to cooperate on common interests and strategies. The catch phrase of the document summarises also the third objective perfectly, “sustainable dialogue”. In the context of ICP, sustainability is understood as the additional value the events create. This value is conveyed in different forms of follow-up activities such as other cultural events or consequent collaborations between artists. All of them foster a transfer of ideas and abilities and represent new network opportunities and contacts to decision-makers for diplomats (Anonymous 2018).

Moreover, towards the end of the policy framework, Kurz responds to the roles of the various institutions and mentions the interaction between Cultural Fora, Austrian libraries, foreign trade centres and German language departments at universities which are funded by the Austrian government. The division of tasks is distinct to the Austrian approach and targets the broadest possible audience. Even though the network of Cultural Fora remains the main executive organisation coordinating most of the projects, the other institutions and local partners in the host country play also a crucial role in implementing the policy and broadening the scope of activities (FMEIFA 2015b, p.12).

2.1.2 The Netherlands

The Dutch International Cultural Policy Framework 2017-2020 was published in 2016 and details their approach on nineteen pages. The Foreign Minister at that time was Bert Koenders from the social-democratic Labour Party. The framework was elaborated after an extensive review of Dutch ICP in the period from 2009 to 2014, which assessed the policy's relevance, coherence and effectiveness.

The MFA appointed three main objectives for ICP for the period from 2017 to 2020:

- a strong cultural sector, the quality of which will increase through international exchange and sustained cooperation
- more room for cultural contribution to a safe, just and sustainable world and
- putting culture to effective use in modern diplomacy (MFA 2016, p.9).

Every objective focuses on different priority countries which makes the Dutch approach very comprehensive. However, only the third objective describes traditional cultural diplomacy as it is also practiced by the Austrian government (Eijgenraam 2018). The evaluation methods and the budget described in the first chapter, for example, refer exclusively to the last goal.

The first objective, implemented in cooperation with the Ministry for Education, Culture and Sciences, helps to establish a larger network for Dutch artists, designers or cultural institutes. Furthermore, it aims to stimulate international exchange of expertise and increases the visibility of Dutch artists on the market for culture, making it a rather domestically orientated goal which does not directly address an international audience (MFA 2016, p.9). The second objective, in turn, is funded by the MFA in cooperation with the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation focusing on social cohesion and a more open society in four of neighbouring countries of the EU; namely

Egypt, Morocco, Turkey and Russia. The initial document also lists Lebanon, Mali and the Palestinian Territories as priority countries for the second objective. However, the three countries were withdrawn in the final version after discussions in parliament (Eijgenraam 2018). In Russia, for example, the four country-specific thematic pillars are “Museum as a Meeting Place”, “Modern Use of Heritage”, “My City, My Space” and “Mind the Millennials” (de Kat 2018). The diplomats working on the second objective are called ‘development cooperation attachés’ in contrast to cultural attachés. The MFA develops a separate programme for each of the selected countries.

The FMEIFA has a similar department which is called Austrian Development Agency (ADA), but its objectives are not included in the Austrian ICP programme (ADA 2018). Since humanitarian aid remains the core task of the developmental departments, cultural aspects are only of peripheral concern for their work. However, since this thesis is focusing on cultural diplomacy, it will not go into more detail about the first two objectives of the Dutch policy framework but will focus on comparing the third objective to the collective Austrian ICP objectives.

The Dutch policy framework summarises the MFA’s thematic emphasis in the paragraph on action areas. The policy attaches importance to technological achievements and innovation (particularly e-mobility), but also to climate consciousness, sustainability and human rights (specifically freedom of expression and democracy). These topics are classified either as focus on “Shared Cultural Heritage” or “Creative Industries” (MFA 2016, p.15). The first topic describes the country’s focus on their connection with other European states as well as their former colonies, whereas the second one stresses the Dutch emphasis on architecture, design, innovation and film.

2.2 Institutions

Despite the fact that the two approaches might look similar at first sight, they have very distinct assets. One of the most apparent differences between the two policy frameworks is that Austria includes more different institutions into their approach than the Dutch. The libraries, the cultural institutes as well as the language centres represent different aspects of the country, e.g. literature, language or arts. Even though the Dutch approach is very comprehensive, it does not work with that many different institutions. Depending on the activity or the objective to be fulfilled, the ministry gets support from other organisations or various initiatives of the ministry for culture and education as well as the ministry for trade. The embassies remain the sole official institution implementing Dutch ICP, though. Furthermore, naming is an important aspect in the comparison. Even though the institutions work in roughly the same number of countries and are both geographically selective, Austrian ICP is more apparent as it is notably separated from the regular diplomatic representations. The Dutch ICP departments, on the other hand, are included in the embassies, except the Erasmus Huis in Jakarta. Evaluations showed that the country's ICP is more apparent and better known if cultural institutions are notably differentiated from the embassies or consulates general (IOB 2016b, p.77). This is also the approach pursued by the UK, France and Germany. The Netherlands, however, decided not to establish a network of separate institutions, but rather equip their embassies in priority countries with additional funding. This underlines their comprehensive, but low-key tradition in ICP.

Austria's institutional network is also similarly structured to the French, German or British one. It works with the traditional top-down approach in which the foreign ministry in Vienna decides how Austrian culture is presented abroad. This approach has been established for years and has proven successful as the resulting policies are relatively

coherent and collectively represent the image of Austria which the ministry strives for (Bound et al. 2007, p.79). Compared to other more experimental approaches, the Austrian one is easier to evaluate as the policies are cohesive and standardised (Lane 2013, p.118). The Dutch Ministry on the other hand trusts a rather new idea of a bottom-up approach and aims to spread their influence through artists' collaboration. The ministry still leads the initiative and is responsible for the policy framework and the funding of activities, but private organisations and artists become crucial partners for the embassies to cover a broader range of topics.

Compared to the hierarchical Austrian approach, the Dutch system follows the idea of an "arm-length principle" enabling the cultural attachés to work more independently of a strict policy framework (Hurkmans 2008). Even though DutchCulture suggests artists to the diplomatic representations, the respective cultural attachés are free to choose the performances, readings or exhibitions which are best suitable for the country. Thus, the resources are used in a more flexible way and cause a less-monitored deployment of soft power (de Graaff 2018). This approach resembles those of other European states such as Denmark, Sweden or Lithuania (Fisher 2013, p.143).

2.3 Geographic Priorities

Since cultural diplomacy actively supports countries' foreign policy agenda, the frameworks mirror the key aspects of national foreign policy (Gürer 2018). On the one hand, cultural activities deepen relationships between countries which already cooperate on a regular basis and create additional, different opportunities of exchange. On the other hand, ICP manages to build bridges between states where relations are absent and establishes new partnerships (Singh & MacDonald 2017, p.28). The emphasis of the Austrian institutions is on the country's neighbouring states as well as on the Western Balkans (FMEIFA 2015b, p.3). The ministry realises the objective by strategically

locating their cultural institutions and appointing an emphasis country for cultural diplomacy every year. All diplomatic representations are encouraged to invite artists from that country to perform at their premises, cooperate with the local embassy of that country or stress the country's cooperation with Austria in their general programme. In 2015, the emphasis country was Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016, Croatia in 2017 and Albania in 2018 (FMEIFA 2016, p.13). This initiative aims to put one country in the limelight for a year and to increase and strengthen Austria's connections with the respective emphasis country. This year, for example, there are several Albanian artists invited to Austria as well as there are a series of special cultural events in Albania sponsored by Austria (Irschik 2018).



Image 3 Tweet by the Austrian Embassy in The Hague about the Austrian-Albanian Culture Year (2018). Available at: <https://twitter.com/AustriainNL>.

Since the Dutch priority countries differ according to the objective, the foreign ministry chooses them strategically. They consider economic and cultural aspects such as the international significance of the country in question, developmental advantages or the existence of cultural networks (MFA 2016, p.10). The Dutch priority countries are more scattered around the globe compared to the Austrian CF, including locations such as Russia, Venezuela, Germany and Indonesia (Eijgenraam 2018). While Austria stresses their cultural relations with European countries, the Netherlands have noticeably more priority countries overseas. Ten Wolde (2018) suggested that this is due to the colonial history of the Netherlands which has caused the country to develop a foreign policy approach which includes development support and emphasises exchange with countries around the globe.

Interestingly, both countries emphasise cultural relations with countries which are the origin of their largest immigrant groups (Irschik 2018). Besides the large percentage of German immigrants in Austria, the majority of immigrants comes from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Serbia and Russia (Statistics Austria 2018). The largest groups of Dutch residents born outside the country are Turkish, Indonesians, Germans, Moroccans and Surinamese (Statistics Netherlands 2018). The countries listed correspond exactly to the locations of CF and Dutch priority countries. Hence, the countries aim to strengthen mutual understanding with those countries where there is already an ongoing exchange of ideas, knowledge and people. Yet, the largest immigrant groups also link to the country's colonial or imperial history which still affects modern foreign policy objectives as seen in the two examples at hand.



Image 4 Tweet by DutchCulture on funding for policies on shared cultural heritage (2018). Available at: <https://twitter.com/dutchculture>.

2.4 Methods

Regarding their activities, both national institutions traditionally organise similar cultural activities. Both support dance, literature, music, architecture and film events and cooperate with local university departments which have a reference to Austrian or Dutch culture. However, Austria focuses more on language education than the Netherlands do. The Austrian Institutes are language schools which teach German and focus particularly on including Austrian vocabulary or lessons about the country's traditions (FMEIFA 2015b, p.11). Since Austria is often perceived as the smaller neighbour of Germany with whom they share a language, the foreign ministry uses linguistic varieties to distinguish their country from Germany. Austrian, the language as written and spoken in Austria, is a variety of Standard German and part of the country's identity and traditions. In some cases, Austrian representations collaborate with the German and Suisse institutes to promote their common language with readings and other literature events. But the

emphasis remains on the Austrian version of German and on the translation of texts by Austrian writers (Bouwman 2018). The Netherlands, on the other hand, use their common language with Belgium to emphasise similarities between the two neighbours and organise a series of literature events together. In 2016, for example, the Dutch and the Belgium representations in Germany cooperated to organise a Flemish-Dutch pavilion at the Frankfurter Buchmesse and promoted the works of authors who write in their shared language (Ruhe 2018; Vermeij 2018).

Since the evaluation department introduced guidelines which regulate the maximum amount of funding, the Dutch system strongly relies on private actors and additional sponsors (MFA 2018b, p.2). The activities often cooperate with already well-established artists and react to inquiries sent to them rather than proactively inviting artists to perform abroad (Ruhe 2018). This leaves the Dutch embassies in the role of supporters rather than curators of Dutch cultural events abroad (ten Wolde 2018). The Austrian ministry, however, sees themselves very much as curators creating the conditions for artists to work internationally (Mraz 2018). The director of a CF actively approaches artists whose performances are well-suited for the respective host country. This is a great chance especially for young, upcoming talents as the Austrian ministry bears all the expenses of a cultural event and allows them to perform abroad in front of an international audience (FMEIFA 2015b, p.1).

Dutch and Austrian cultural attachés can also refer to the ministries' databases and publications for suggestions which writers, musicians, dancers, painters and directors are interested in performing or exhibiting abroad. The main aim of the NASOM publication and the DutchCulture database is to create a more coherent and integral presentation of their countries by monitoring, comparing and adjusting the events. Even though both institutions pledge not to judge the artists' performances, they are preselecting artists

which represent the country's values in a suitable way. The representations have no influence on the works themselves as arts and culture are completely free in terms of content. Yet, they regulate their approach according to the host country and invite performers which fit to their thematic priorities (MECS 2016, p.3). In doing so, cultural attachés and directors of CF are free to choose performances who are not listed or recommended by the ministries.

2.5 Incentives

The underlying reasons for modern ICP are classified as either utilitarian effects or broader benefits (Holden & Tryhorn 2013, p.33). Utilitarian effects are economic development, trade deals and increased tourism as the policies result in additional income and jobs. School and university exchanges or language education primarily target the broader benefits of cultural relations such as mutual trust and knowledge transfer. However, the two groups are intertwined. Better education and increased trust also promote trade and business cooperation which help the country to grow economically and strengthen the country's position in world politics (Serodes 2014, p.7).

This phenomenon becomes even clearer when reading the Dutch and the Austrian policy frameworks. Both documents mention the economic benefit of culture as well as its social value theoretically. When looking at the Dutch approach in practice though, the diplomatic representations seem to stress economic principles over the broader effects. Even though the policy framework mentions a range of different thematic priorities, especially the smaller Dutch embassies are unable to organise events which cover all topics. Since the tasks of most Dutch cultural attachés include also public and economic diplomacy or press work, they stress activities which achieve economic benefits and convey their national traditions at the same time (Nijman 2018; Ruhe 2018; ten Wolde 2018). They regularly invite curators, exhibitors and museum directors to ICP events, for

example, to display their cultural achievements on the one hand, but also establish a network which is financially beneficial for the cultural scene in the Netherlands. This leaves the audience with the impression that the Dutch institutions primarily organise short-term projects which quickly achieve an economic advantage for the Netherlands.

The Austrian objectives do not prioritise the economic advantage of ICP as openly as the Dutch and describe their main goals with rather flowery phrases such as “building bridges”, “creating open and dynamic societies” and “encouraging dialogue and societal learning” (FMEIFA 2016, p.117). Since Austria splits the tasks between several different cultural institutes, every institution focuses their capacities on a specific area making the approach more specialised and detailed. The CF do not have to consider economic strategies for example since there is a separate network of departments focusing solely on economic affairs. Those offices work globally and are maintained by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce (2018). This allows the Austrian diplomatic representations to focus their human and financial resources almost exclusively on international cultural relations, resulting in a higher number of implemented policies in total compared to the Dutch institutions (Katzenstein 2002, p.27).

However, the Austrian government will soon introduce a new ICP framework as the current strategy ends in 2018. Since the new government, which was elected in 2017, pursues a different foreign policy agenda than the previous one, the new policy might represent significant changes and modifications to the current approach. Since the strategies have to adapt to newly arising challenges, domestic changes and the multifaceted nature of foreign policy, the frameworks only commit to relatively short time periods of three or four years. This guarantees that ICP can dynamically and flexibly support the countries’ changing foreign policy agendas (Goldstein & Keohane 1993, p.37).

2.6 EUNIC Cooperation

A core value of both frameworks is the cooperation with the EUNIC network, which is a joint cultural initiative of different European cultural institutes. Both countries proactively contribute to the initiative, regularly preside local clusters and are members of the board of the EUNIC General Assembly (Eichtinger 2017; de Kat 2018; FMEIFA 2018c). The network was established in 2006 as part of the EU's information and communication strategy (European Commission 2018). Hence, the European Commission is the institution which determines the policy framework for the network and action plans regarding a common European ICP. With the latest reforms, the Commission aimed to expand the network and create more coherent policies which are also more persuasive and successful (Michalski 2005, p.138).

The network is divided into so-called clusters, which are local offices coordinating the collaboration of at least three cultural institutions of EUNIC member countries. A cluster does usually not have a separate office space or staff though. The cultural diplomatic staff already present in the country takes turns in the presidency of the cluster and organises platforms for the cultural institutes to cooperate in one specific city or even in the whole country (EUNIC 2018). Since a cluster combines several different national institutions, it does not represent the individual ideas of the involved institutes, but rather the cultural diversity and common values of the 27 EUNIC member states. For example, joint activities avoid religious topics as they take a neutral stance on issues which divide the member states. Only some countries link their cultural values to their religious identity (de Graaff 2018). The European motto "unity in diversity" remains the catch phrase for the network, e.g. when the clusters celebrate the European Day of Languages (Serodes 2014, p.6).

The countries decide on a case-by-case basis which projects add value to their soft power and if they want to participate (Nijman 2018). By pooling resources, the EUNIC network enables smaller states which do not maintain their own cultural institutes to implement cultural policies and strengthen their influence abroad. The clusters are opportunities to learn about different methodologies, share expertise and address a broader range of topics as well as a wider audience (Irschik 2018).



Image 5 Tweet by UNESCO EU on the importance of culture for international relations (2018). Available at: <https://twitter.com/unescoeu>.

2.7 Conclusion

In summary, the analysis explained the similarities and differences between the Dutch and the Austrian policy frameworks. The most apparent difference between the two countries' ICP approach is the setup of their cultural institutes which also leads to distinct methodologies. The Austrian foreign ministry practices a traditional top-down approach

modelled on the German, British or French cultural institutes. The Netherlands' cultural diplomacy, in turn, is more adventurous and low-key, as the country applies a bottom-up approach in which the embassies cooperate with local institutions and focus on artists' collaboration.

The Dutch framework is slightly longer and includes two objectives which exceed a traditional cultural diplomacy approach as they incorporate development work and actively establish international networks for artists. The Austrian approach, on the other hand, includes language teaching, which focuses on the Austrian version of German, and funds a broader range of activities which the CF curate independently. The analysis showed that both countries adapt the policies to their foreign policy objectives which mirror their thematic and geographic priorities.

Austrian and Dutch ICP are both motivated by similar incentives such as political influence, mutual understanding, economic prosperity and development. Due to their institutional organisation, however, the Netherlands prioritise utilitarian arguments and Austria stresses the social effects of intercultural collaborations. Lastly, the chapter summarised the work of the EUNIC network in which both states are actively involved. By supporting the platform, the countries share their common values and enable smaller states which do not maintain their own local cultural institutes to practice international cultural relations effectively.

Chapter 3: Challenges to International Cultural Policy

National governments can determine the policy frameworks and the theoretical conditions for international cultural policy, but some factors remain almost uncontrollable and lie outside their sphere of influence (Henrikson 2008, p.5). Thus, this chapter expands on those factors which influence cultural diplomacy such as elections, history or international conflicts. However, political events and ICP are interdependent and foreign diplomats also impact on local political challenges. They influence the audience's opinion in their favour and advance their own national interests by channelling information and presenting different aspects of their culture (Asgard 2010, p.28). This is not only achieved with artists' performances per se, but also in meetings and conversations before or after the event when people share their experiences, values and concerns (FMEIFA 2015a, p.4).

Thus, ICP fosters a dialogue about issues which are primarily of a cultural nature and establishes a network which also only secondarily expands on a political level. Scholars and diplomats disagree about this topic, however. Mark (2010, p.64), for example, purports that ICP has a strong underlying political interest. Diplomats, on the other hand, argue that cultural events are separate from politics and that their measures, are at most, indirectly political (de Valk 2018). This thesis compromises by claiming that the indirectly political activities have an apparent influence on world politics which helps states to achieve their foreign policy interests.

This chapter critically discusses the factors driving Dutch and Austrian ICP. Length constraints preclude the account presented herein from being exhaustive. Instead the discussion centres around the most important aspects affecting foreign policy agendas in the established academic literature. The chapter firstly expands on the interconnection of domestic and foreign policy and explains the conditions which have to be met in order

for ICP to prosper. Secondly, it discusses the thematic impact of daily politics on cultural diplomacy referring to European crises such as the Refugee Crisis or the Economic Crisis. Thirdly, the chapter elaborates on the influence of modern history and societal values on Dutch and Austrian cultural diplomacy. Lastly, it demonstrates that some international events complicate communication between countries, where ICP is an effective way of reinstating amicable conversations and supporting mutual understanding.

3.1 Politics

Out of 17 interviewees, only two agreed to the question that political events such as elections or international crises affect international cultural relations to a certain extent (Nijman 2018, ten Wolde 2018). Pfeistlinger (2018), for instance, explained that political events influence cultural diplomacy at most indirectly. The events do not propagate a political message to the official diplomatic circle but affect the host country's government through changing the perceptions of their electorate (Kang 2015, p.436). After attending the cultural events, the public associates the portrayed country with advantageous values and tends to sympathise with their policy agenda. However, since ICP uses exclusively non-military and indirectly political instruments, their impact is not immediately visible. Combined with other forms of cooperation, cultural activities support the solution of conflicts, but they do not resolve the issue by themselves.

3.1.1 Thematic Influence

Elections

ICP usually supports either political topics, which are not salient to daily politics, or international political problems, which prove difficult to be solved (Wood & Peake 1998, p.19). Rather than discussing everyday politics, e.g. elections, the implementing country addresses situations when they chair an international committee, participate in cross-

border cooperation or become part of a well-established organisation (Ang et al. 2015). For instance, countries' presidency of the Council of the European Union ICP is a regular topic of ICP. Both the Dutch and the Austrian governments organised such events in 2016 and 2018, respectively. During their six-month presidency of the Council, they used cultural activities to multilaterally present their foreign policy plan (Austrian Federal Chancellery 2018, p.11). Thus, the current Austrian presidency and the corresponding policy programme are the topic of several discussions and lectures organised by the Austrian CF and embassies around the globe from July to December 2018 (Gürer 2018).



Image 6 Post by DutchCulture on cultural activities addressing the European Refugee Crisis (2018). Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/DutchCultureOnline/>.

Crises

Less positive topics, such as European crises, also affect ICP as the states use cultural activities abroad to offset stereotypical or negative thoughts stemming from unpopular policy choices or unflattering portrayals in the media (Goff 2013). The EUNIC as well as the individual countries have implemented several policies which discuss their stance on the European Debt Crisis of 2008 or the Refugee Crisis of 2015. The media covered both issues extensively and observed the roles of Austria and the Netherlands critically. Consequently, the countries adapted their geographical and thematic emphasis and their cultural activities abroad addressed issues such as social cohesion, immigration policies or austerity measures to re-establish their good international reputation (Hartig 2017, p.260). The public tends to be very receptive for those interventions since ICP presents opportunities to engage open discussions. Hence, these activities are more positively perceived than explanatory diplomatic meetings behind closed doors (Finn 2003, p.15).

Conflicts

Hence, ICP facilitates a fruitful dialogue with important sectors of society even when other forms of communication with the host country are strained and more difficult (de Kat 2018). It adapts to the host country's geopolitical climate and becomes an essential part of the broader bilateral agenda (Page & Jacobs 2005, p.112). Even though cultural activities do not directly interfere with local political events in the respective host countries, they act as mediators and represent a starting point for talks and discussions. As the audience reflects on the values discussed in the performances, they approach the antagonised group and set a more amicable environment to start conversations in the future. Moreover, the activities can introduce the citizens to different opinions for conflict resolution. The consequent discussion in the news or on social media can encourage

political leaders to consider alternatives and prioritise the discussed issue in their political approach (Iyengar & Kinder 1987, p.39).

However, this theory is not applicable to the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 according to the Dutch and the Austrian representatives in Kyiv and in Moscow. All of them confirmed that the event has not influenced the ICP strategy in those countries specifically. Despite the fact that both governments disagree with the annexation and support economic sanctions against Russia, their cultural activities do not deal with the topic and abstain from a direct confrontation with the political situation in Ukraine and Russia (Eichtinger 2017). The diplomatic missions rather show alternative conflict solutions as they stress the Ukrainian relations to European Union member states or support local artists who aim to build bridges between the Russian and Ukrainian governments (de Valk 2018, Nijman 2018). Instead of actively taking a side in the conflict, Austria and the Netherlands promote events which trigger positive associations with the community of EU member states, their culture and their values. These activities support collaborations between artists, musicians or dancers for example and achieve a deeper and sustainable basis for future cooperation between the conflicting states on the one hand and the host and the implementing country on the other hand (Dubber & Donaldson 2015, p.3).

History

Furthermore, the interviewees repeatedly named the history of Austria and the Netherlands as one of the driving factors for the current thematic and geographical emphasis of the countries' ICP. Rusz (2018), who is based in Budapest for example, stated that Austria is geographically close to Eastern Europe, but also has a historically grown tradition of very strong cultural, political and economic ties to the region. She particularly refers to Eastern European states such as Slovakia, Romania or Czech

Republic, but also to Italy, of which parts belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian empire and which are home to German-speaking minorities until today. In those locations, the Austrian foreign ministry maintains Austria Institutes and emphasises the cultural aspects of language and education (Anonymous 2018). In doing so, the country pursues their primary foreign policy goal for the Western Balkan states, which is to create stability and to include them into the European integration process (Irschik 2018). The EUNIC network promotes cultural activities particularly in Eastern European countries which have signed Association Agreements (AA) with the EU, such as Montenegro, Ukraine, Albania or Macedonia (Troy 2015, p.644). Since the AA enable states to participate in European cultural funds and apply for them, the local cluster representatives support the newly developing opportunities for cultural collaborations with member states (de Valk 2018).

As explained in 2.3, the Netherlands' history as a colonial empire has a similar effect on their ICP today as the country has noticeably more priority countries overseas than Austria. In countries such as Indonesia and Surinam, the Dutch embassies also base their activities to a large extent on shared cultural and linguistic heritage (ten Wolde 2018). Interestingly, those discussions, book presentations or film screenings about historical events attract a wide audience and are often some of the most successful (Gürer 2018; Ruhe 2018).

3.1.2 Methodological Influence

Both local and international politics influence the financial resources, the underlying legal framework and the conditions for ICP in the host country. In other words, the country implementing cultural diplomacy as well as the host society can impose restrictions and rules on the events organised by the cultural institutes. Firstly, the respective national foreign ministries have to support ICP in principle and subsidise it on a national as well

as on an international level (ten Wolde 2018). Their behaviour depends mainly on the domestic political situation of the implementing country and the current government in power. Right-wing governments tend to be less supportive of cultural diplomacy as they attribute less importance to cultural values than left-wing parties (Kegley et al. 2007, p.69). For example, the Austrian ICP approach was significantly cut back in 2001 when a new policy framework was introduced while a conservative right-wing coalition was in power (FMEIFA 2001, p.5).

Depending on the location, the country hosting the cultural activity might also be a variable which influences ICP. Some states require that diplomatic missions register their events and want to approve the events' content, translation, artists or location. The diplomats interviewed mentioned cases where countries did not allow female artists to enter the stage, objected to the publication of a translated book or censored a short film on display (Meisel 2017; Anonymous 2018). The host country deemed the values portrayed at the events as provocative and saw a conflict with their national identity. Thus, the unauthorised events had to be cancelled. In those cases, it falls to the Austrian and the Dutch cultural institutes to decide whether to adapt the programme to the audience and the local circumstances. De Graaff (2018) emphasised that the Netherlands do never adjust the content and rather accept to cancel the performance. However, this is only a problem in countries where culture is generally monitored by the local government (Stoica 2015, p.10).

3.2. Society

General foreign policy as well as ICP are typically based on established societal norms and values, for example those, enshrined in a country's constitution (Beasley et al. 2012, p.207). Since cultural attachés adapt the policies to the respective audiences, they consider both their national frameworks and the societal sentiments of the host country.

Therefore, ICP is able to overcome barriers caused by miscommunication, unaddressed issues or lack of knowledge about the other party and helps the implementing country to establish flourishing international partnerships.

3.2.1 Thematic Influence

Since issues such as environmental sustainability, trade liberalisation, human rights and cultural sovereignty require policy responds which involve several states, they are often the topic of ICP. By introducing other states to the Dutch or the Austrian ideals and values, the countries assess potential partners for future cooperation (Mark 2008, p.34). Depending on the host society's preferences, Dutch and Austrian diplomats implement distinct cultural policies for the same audience. For example, the Dutch Embassy in Russia emphasises human rights (see picture below) whereas the Austrian foreign ministry opened the latest Austria Institute in Moscow and emphasises once again language education (Grilj 2017; de Kat 2018).



Image 7 Post by the Dutch Embassy in Russia on Human Rights (2018). Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/DutchEmbassyRussia/>.

3.2.2 Methodological Influence

Cultural institutions study the audience's collective mentality as they aim to adapt the policies to the socio-cultural environment to attract and persuade the local audience (IOB 2016a, p.6). Depending on the circumstances, the cultural institutes address either current topics, use social media to target specific groups or foster collaboration in educational institutions (FMEIFA 2018a, p.70). The size of the audience is insignificant if the event does not appeal to them. A professor teaching a few students about Austrian literature over the course of several years might trigger an equal exchange of ideas as a one-time event which attracts a larger number of people (Mraz 2018). Nevertheless, every cultural institute also organises a certain number of more exposed projects which attract more media attention than the gentle and consistent work at universities or non-governmental organisations. The crucial factor which determines the success of cultural policies is the engagement of the audience (Jora 2013, p.49). Thus, cultural institutes tend to organise discussions, workshops or exhibition in connection with receptions as those events directly engage the public (de Kat 2018). The experience becomes more memorable for the host society and the policy more effective.

Another obvious obstacle when it comes to building bridges in an international environment is language. ICP, however, dodge this barrier with visual arts or music events which break through language barriers easily and hence attract a broader audience (Gürer 2018; Mraz 2018). The Dutch embassies do even more so than the CF, which encourage the public to attend German language courses in the Austria Institutes. Thus, Austrian artists perform or read usually in German (Ruhe 2018). The Dutch policies tend to be more inclusive and independent of linguistic communication. Hurkmans (2008) suggested that Dutch cultural attachés spend a third of the ICP budget on visual arts and

music performances and roughly forty percent of the subsidies on events about photography, theatre, dance design and architecture.

3.3 Conclusion

In summary, Dutch and Austrian diplomats consider political and societal challenges in their ICP approach and adapt the policies accordingly for the circumstance in order to achieve their set foreign policy goals. The first section of this chapter argued that both the Dutch and the Austrian foreign ministry do not include issues of daily politics in their cultural activities abroad. Even though some of the events might suggest a political agenda, the message is only indirectly political. Since the ministries establish their policy frameworks for a period of three or four years, the emphasis lies on rather general issues and it is up to the CF's director or the cultural attaché to decide which artists represent the country's image abroad. In some countries, the local government also affects ICP as they require the cultural events to be registered and authorised which leads to the cancellation of some activities.

Moreover, the thesis discussed the influence of political events on the topics presented in cultural activities and found that elections, international crises, conflicts and history impact ICP to a certain extent. Out of the four variables, history is the most influential for a country's foreign policy agenda as it shapes their political interests which are pursued by cultural diplomacy. Elections and resulting government changes also affect the government's political agenda and thus the funding or the thematic and geographic emphasis of ICP. Conflicts or crises rather act as topics of policies as countries present their point of view on those issues to a foreign audience. The last section of this chapter highlighted the impact of societal factors, such as the audience's mentality or language. The Austrian CF stress language education to foster mutual understanding, whereas the Dutch embassies compensate linguistic differences by organising events mainly centring

around visual arts and music. In conclusion, this chapter emphasised that ICP engages people of different cultural backgrounds in a dialogue, dodges traditional obstacles with cultural achievements and thus effectively supports countries' foreign policy agenda.

Conclusion

This thesis analysed the similarities and differences in the international cultural policy approach of two medium-sized European countries, emphasising their institutional features and various foreign policy priorities. Austrian diplomats stress the broader advantages of cultural diplomacy whereas the Dutch diplomatic elites take a more business-oriented approach and emphasise the utilitarian aspects mentioned in their policy framework. Since Austria maintains several different institutes which organise a range of different events, they are able to curate projects themselves and dedicate more resources to strengthening the country's soft power. The Dutch approach, on the other hand, relies more on non-government funded actors, creating less cohesive policies and splitting the resources of embassies on both economic and cultural issues. A common feature of both approaches is the active membership in the EUNIC network which shows that their national traditions are in line with shared European values, such as creating a more stable and secure environment and fostering cross-cultural collaboration.

The first chapter of this thesis described the distinct institutional outline of the two institutions in order to set the ground for the further analysis. The Dutch and the Austrian foreign ministry are the main coordinators of ICP and are responsible for the individual approaches and the applied methods. Whereas the FMEIFA funds 29 cultural fora, nine Austria Institutes and 65 libraries in several countries, the Netherlands directly distribute additional cultural funds to the respective cultural departments in their priority countries. Both institutional outlines are suitable to achieve their set goals and consistent with the national budgets attributed to cultural diplomacy. However, the respective institutional setups already suggest the Austrian and Dutch diplomats prioritise various aspects with their cultural activities.

Both countries analyse their policies on an annual basis comparing the results over the course of several years. They use a combination qualitative methods and quantitative standards as numbers alone are not able to represent a full picture of cultural policies' success or failure. Events with only a limited number of guests can be equally as successful as events with a high attendance rate as long as the activities support Dutch and Austrian foreign policy objectives and improve the countries' position in world politics.

In the second chapter, this thesis discussed the respective ICP frameworks which explain the guidelines for a coherent cultural diplomacy approach. It illustrates how the various tools and programmes are tailored to the countries' geographic emphasis, their methodology and their underlying motivation. The Austrian CF as well as the other cultural institutions are concentrated in the Western Balkans promoting the country's foreign policy interests and stability in the region. The Dutch priority countries, on the other hand, are strategically scattered around the globe corresponding to the Netherlands' economic and developmental goals and their shared cultural heritage. Whereas Austrian diplomats include primarily aspects of "high culture" in their approach, the Dutch representatives prioritise activities about design, human rights and climate consciousness making the results of ICP less hazy and more tangible. Both countries use the EUNIC network to develop policies with other EU member states and advance their soft power by highlighting shared values of the European community.

The third chapter mentioned potential obstacles the countries face when implementing their policies. The political and societal circumstances of the hosting as well as of the implementing country explain the countries' rationale for pursuing specific ICP approaches. While daily politics are almost insignificant for cultural diplomacy as the policies work towards long-term goals, the thesis described several examples of cultural

activities which were triggered by different political events. This is either the case when events support an international organisation, when they represent a historic connection with the host country or when events clash with foreign traditions and artists are not permitted to perform. Both the implementing as well as the receiving government influence the content and the available financial resources for policies to a certain extent. Even though the policies are never directly responding to current political issues, most artists' performances represent a message about core values supported by the Austrian or the Dutch government. Since their foreign policy agendas tend to be subtler and less concrete on specific events, they do not directly tackle the solution of crises and conflicts. Yet, cultural activities deal with those political events and diplomatically suggest alternative solutions which are favoured by the implementing government.

This thesis found that countries' history has the most impact on cultural diplomacy as it shapes the traditions and norms of the represented country as well as their international political goals. It explained that history explains Austria's interest in the Western Balkans and the Dutch involvement in Indonesia and Surinam. Besides the political factors, diplomats also adjust cultural policies according to societal factors such as language or the people's mentality. By engaging the audience in a dialogue, ICP overcomes the barriers of traditional foreign policy and opens new opportunities for cooperation and prosperity for the Netherlands and Austria.

In conclusion, this thesis compared the Austrian and the Dutch approach to international cultural policy which use different tools to achieve their individual foreign policy goals. It explains that a top-down as well as a bottom-up approach work for medium-sized states to implement ICP successfully when the tools are fitted to the respective local circumstances. The Austrian and Dutch diplomats who supported this research consider societal values, membership in international institutions and their country's history to be

the most decisive factors for their cultural diplomacy approach. The end goal of ICP is to support the achievement of the countries' foreign policy agenda. Therefore, the Austrian and the Dutch foreign ministries pursue international cultural policy as it promotes both economic prosperity and an open and dynamic society through international cooperation.

15,970 words

Appendix

List of Interviewees

Name of interviewee	Date	Place	Institution
Martin Meisel	March 14 th , 2017	Via phone	Former Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum in Warsaw, Poland
Martin Eichtinger	April 12 th , 2017	Via phone	Austrian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, former Director General for Cultural Policy at FMEIFA
Natascha Grilj	April 21 st , 2017	Vienna, in person	Director of Department for Dialogue of Cultures at FMEIFA; Former Director of Cultural Fora Prague, Czech Republic and Ljubljana, Slovenia
Anonymous	April 6 th , 2018	Via phone	Director of Austrian Cultural Forum
Heidemarie Gürer	April 10 th , 2018	The Hague, in person	Austrian Ambassador in The Netherlands
Daria Bouwman	April 10 th , 2018	The Hague, in person	Cultural Attaché at the Austrian Embassy in The Hague, the Netherlands

Wilhelm Pfeistlinger	April 11 th , 2018	Via email	Director Austrian Cultural Forum Bratislava, Slovakia
Maarten ten Wolde	April 12 th , 2018	The Hague, in person	Cultural Attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Vienna, Austria
Gilles de Valk	April 16 th , 2018	Via email	Policy Officer at the Dutch Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine
Regina Rusz	April 17 th , 2018	Via email	Director Austrian Cultural Forum Budapest, Hungary
Marianne Eijgenraam	April 18 th , 2018	The Hague, in person	Policy Officer at the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague
Simon Mraz	April 26 th , 2018	Via phone	Director Austrian Cultural Forum Moscow, Russia
Ida de Kat	April 26 th , 2018	Via phone	Cultural Attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Moscow, Russia
Johannes Irschik	April 30 th , 2018	Via email	Director Austrian Cultural Forum Belgrade, Serbia
Luuk Nijman	May 11 th , 2018	Via phone	Cultural Attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia
Cees de Graaff	May 23 rd , 2018	Via phone	Director of the initiative DutchCulture, Amsterdam.
Monique Ruhe	May 24 rd , 2018	Via phone	Head of Cultural Diplomacy Department at the Dutch Embassy in Berlin, Germany

Peter Vermeij	June 21 st , 2018	Munich, in person	Consul General at the Dutch Consulate General in Munich, Germany
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Interview Questions

- What role do you have in devising/implementing cultural diplomacy?
- How do you define cultural diplomacy?
- Which individuals and government departments 'do' cultural diplomacy?
- Which countries act as examples of best practice in cultural diplomacy?
- How much money does Austria/do the Netherlands spend annually on cultural programmes abroad?
- Who is the target audience of those policies?
- How does the Foreign Ministry measure the failure or success of cultural diplomacy?
- Could you name a particularly successful cultural event of the Austrian Cultural Forum/the Dutch Embassy? Why was it so successful?
- Do political events such as elections or international crises affect cultural diplomacy, and if so how?
- How do cultural differences affect cultural diplomatic activities abroad?
- Why does the Foreign Ministry appoint priority countries/ emphasise certain regions?

NB: All transcriptions as well as the translations of the interviews are available on request.

Interview with Gilles de Valk

- Could you name a particularly successful cultural event of the Dutch Embassy?
Why was it so successful?

The Dutch Embassy in Kyiv had an active role in the Eurovision Song Contest 2017, which took place in Kyiv. Another example is the annual GOGOLFEST, a festival with music, theatre, art, and cinema, which attracts Dutch artists every year.

More generally, the Dutch cultural diplomacy in Ukraine is successful, because there is a lot of cultural exchange happening; NL artists come to Ukraine and the other way around. This also happens without organizational involvement of the Embassy. In these cases, the Dutch Embassy promotes the events where an exchange of Dutch and Ukrainian culture takes place.

- Did the political events in Ukraine 2014 affect Dutch cultural diplomacy, and if so how?

The Embassy's activities and relations regarding cultural events already existed before 2014. In general, they tend to be separate from politics. However, Ukraine's turn to the West – think about the EU and the Association Agreement – encouraged more collaboration. For example, Ukraine can participate in EU cultural funds and applications. The Embassy supports the Days of Europe in Kyiv, 2018, by financing an educational program of the Kyiv Lights Festival.

Translated Interview with Regina Rusz

- How does Austria define cultural diplomacy and how do they implement their policy framework?

The Austrian International Cultural Policy Framework aims to strengthen and expand the Austrian presences in international cultural relations. We emphasise the advancement of young artists, who take an important role in communicating artists' accomplishments. Cultural diplomacy represents a modern picture of Austria. The worldwide network of cultural fora, embassies and other Austrian institutions offers possibilities for international cooperation and partnerships. International exchange is represented in the development of art and culture; thus, it can create new and creative ideas and impulses.

- How does the Foreign Ministry measure the failure or success of cultural diplomacy?

Success and failure are often difficult to measure in statistical data. Yet, we publish every year an annual report which include an evaluation of events. The number of people attending an event are one criterium to determine the success of a cultural programme. Other parameters are an event's news coverage, the subjective feedback of the audience as well as the artists, the assessment of opinion leaders or the perception of a cultural programme in social media. Every event is evaluated individually and separated from other activities.

- Why does the Foreign Ministry emphasise cultural diplomacy in the Balkans and in neighbouring EU countries?

Cultural diplomacy needs priorities – the are set thematically as well as geographically. Austria emphasises politics with neighbouring countries, the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe. International cultural relations request to have knowledge about historical events and their importance for the present. Austria has this knowledge also due to the geographical proximity. Cultural exchange strengthens and further develops close relations to those countries.

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