Egypt's Sinai since the Uprising 2011
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Explaining the Differences in the Amount of Violence between North and South

Thesis

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Abstract:

Why do people who face rather similar situations sometimes resort to violence and others do not? While structural factors are often assumed to be of high explanatory value for explaining the occurrence of violence, more recent approaches focused more on local dynamics and the specific position of agents in the political and economic system. Case studies entangling the specific reasons why people engage in violence are suited to gain further insight into these dynamics. Based on a comparison of the cases of North Sinai and South Sinai which show very different levels of violence despite sharing many similarities, this thesis shows the diversity of motives for individuals to engage in violent activities in North Sinai. At the same time it illustrates the importance of a shared interest that increases societal cohesion in the South of the peninsula and allows the people there to maintain nonviolent discipline.

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction

People do not naturally and without any hesitation resort to violence. Political restrictions, psychological thresholds, personal risks and other barriers constitute strong arguments against violence. Those barriers against the commitment of violent acts are being differently pronounced in the various political and social contexts as well as over time but they are, everywhere and at any time, ultimately and in principal, flexible and can be overcome – violence constitutes a global and timeless phenomenon. As Peter Imbusch formulates, "No society, no region of the world, no culture is free of violence: the peaceful savage of earlier civilizations turned out to be a myth just like the expectations of a violence-free modern age (Keeley, 1996; Joas, 1994)" (Imbusch 2002). In most cases of political violence however, as Jochen Hippler points out (2007), it is the case that this violence is a symptom of social, economic or political crises, which is often also reflected in ideological or spiritual shifts. The decision to engage in acts of violence is influenced amongst other things by arising opportunities, feared repressions, available legitimization strategies and individual and collective acceptance of violence (Enzmann 2013).

While there is on the one hand no automatism behind the occurrence of violence, there is on the other hand also no single universally accepted explanation for the occurrence of political violence (Enzmann 2013). Two theoretical approaches have emerged in recent decades as dominant in the aspiration to explain the occurrence of violence. On the one hand, theoretical literature on revolutions has focused above all on the structural conditions that lead to revolutions and civil war (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991). On the other hand, theories of social movements focused on structural characteristics of movements, and emphasized mobilizing structures and the political context that determines the mobilization and trajectories of social movements (McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 2004), while at the same time focusing on the effects of collective action frames (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988). However, accepting the complexity of violence, academia nowadays has partly abandoned mono-causal and structural approaches and proceeded on to focus

instead on multidimensional approaches and local dynamics (Ibid.). Within this newer approach, groups or movements are not seen as monolithic actors anymore; rather, the individual motives, the dynamics at the local level, and the direct political and economic environment of agents is analyzed. Accordingly, as Brigitte Enzmann points out in the 'Handbuch Politische Gewalt' [English: Handbook Political Violence] (2013), theories regarding individual forms of violence and small-n comparisons from one time frame or region are dominating the research field at the moment. This thesis will consist of precisely such a study and compares two, in many characteristics, similar cases – North Sinai and South Sinai – in regard to the different amounts of violence occurring there.

The Egyptian peninsula of Sinai constitutes one of the strategically most important areas for the country – given the economic importance of the Suez canal, tourism in Sinai, and the peninsula's function as buffer zone to Israel – and for decades its indigenous people's interests have been largely ignored by the central authorities in Cairo who systematically advantaged the Nile Valley People (NVP). The terrorist attacks in Sinai in 2004, 2005, and 2006 as well as more recent outbursts of violence in Sinai are said to be "symptomatic of major tensions and conflicts in Sinai and, above all, of its problematic relationship to the Egyptian nation-state" and "unless these factors are addressed effectively, there is no reason to assume the terrorist movement can be eliminated" (ICG 2007: 3). While most of the international attention since February 2011 has been focused upon Cairo where, admittedly, the most important events within this development took place, and where the critical decisions regarding the future of the country were and will be made, the situation in Sinai has been steadily deteriorating (NPR 2012). The international community and neighboring countries, in particular Israel which shares a long and strategically essential border with Sinai, perceived "Egypt as losing grip over Sinai, transforming the peninsula into a theater for the region's competing new forces" (Pelham 2012). Sinai's function as a buffer between the regional heavyweights Egypt and Israel is said to be endangered. A report of the Israeli domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet arrived at the conclusion that while Egypt's new government is preoccupied with

safeguarding their power and stabilizing the country, "governance in Sinai is not high and this allows smugglers to operate almost without hindrance" (Reuters 13.05.2011). An Israeli columnist, Ron Ben Yishai, wrote that the Bedouins hold "huge depots of heavy machine guns, RPG rockets and launchers of all types, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as advanced Grad rockets and worse" and suggested they were "getting trained from Palestinian terrorists from Gaza as well as from Global Jihad members" (Lina Attalah 04.07.2012). Even an article in Haaretz, a leftist Israeli newspaper stated that "even though Cairo doesn't admit to it officially, all involved have already come to understand that the desert peninsula has become a no-man's land, over which Egyptian authorities don't bear even the slightest pretension of control" (Haaretz 05.04.2012) As Nicolas Pelham puts it: "With multiple internal and external factors eroding its ties to the center, Sinai's indigenous population greeted President Mubarak's February 2011 resignation as an opportunity to shrug off Egypt's internal security yoke and push for communal empowerment" (Pelham 2012: 5).

However, a closer look at the developments in Sinai since 2011 reveals a stark difference between the opposition to the central authorities in North and South Sinai. While North Sinai indeed witnessed repeated outbursts of violence, the southern part of the peninsular remained fairly calm and opposition to the central authorities was expressed almost exclusively in nonviolent ways. Why do people who face rather similar situations remain nonviolent and others not?

Based on a cross case analysis of North and South Sinai, I argue that both internal and external factors are essential for preventing the people in South Sinai to take up arms and engage in violent action. Both structural conditions and a variety of individual motives have to be considered to understand current developments in Sinai. In North Sinai, what is often perceived as political (radical Islamist or tribal) movements engaging in violence against the state are in fact multiple disconnected actors with a variety of agendas and motives. In South Sinai, it is the societal cohesion that prevents individual spoilers from engaging in violent actions against the Egyptian authorities and foreigners in the region. This societal cohesion, or the lack thereof, can be traced back on the

one hand to the differing demographic structures in North and South Sinai, and even more strongly on the other to the different economic dependencies of the respective populations and the direct environment they live in. Furthermore, the varying historic experiences of the indigenous Bedouin population under Israeli occupation following the 1967 war provides an important explanatory factor.

The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical independent variables will be outlined based on the theoretical literature on nonviolence. Then, I will briefly introduce the reader to the historical context of Sinai, beginning with the Israeli occupation of the peninsular in 1967. In the following section I will illustrate the similarities between South and North Sinai which facilitate the occurrence of violence in both areas. Subsequently, I will provide an overview over the developments in Sinai between February 2011 and February 2013 and show the stark differences in the occurrence of violence between North Sinai and South Sinai. These acts of violence will then as far as possible be grouped into different types. This serves as a foundation to enter into the explanatory section, focusing on the question of how the almost complete nonexistence of violent incidents in South Sinai can be explained.

2. Existing Explanations

Violence in this thesis is defined in a very narrow way as the purposeful, direct physical damaging of people by other people conducted in the public sphere (Enzmann 2013). The application of this definition offers several advantages, as a result of which it is applicable in political science. First, the focus on physical violence significantly narrows down the range of incidents under analysis, but – important for example in the case of Sinai – also includes forms of violence like kidnappings. At the same time, the definition is broad enough to include more than political violence just understood as extremist violence and terrorism. In order to explain the differences in the dependent variable – the occurrence of violence – between North and South Sinai,

a broad corpus of theoretical literature will be used to identify possible variables. The theoretical literature can be divided into two parts; firstly, the part focusing on the structural factors facilitating violence; and secondly, into the the literature focusing on the micro-dynamics and the individual choice of actors to engage in violent activities. The key difference is that in the first approach, individual interests are ignored and all actors are treated similarly, whereas the second approach gives far more attention to individual motives of agents and their location within the political and economic system for engaging in specific actions. For this thesis, theories are drawn first from the literature on the occurrence and reasons for civil war and its key independent variables will be outlined. One of the problems in regard to this part of the literature is that it usually focuses on cases of actual civil war, defined as "an internal conflict with at least 1.000 combat-related deaths, with both an identifiable rebel organization and government forces suffering at least five percent of these casualties (Collier 2002: 3). These categories are not fulfilled in neither North Sinai nor South Sinai as casualties thus far ranged far below the 1.000 threshold. However, the identified independent variables are still relevant for this research and the situation in North Sinai in several ways resembles that of a civil war – or perhaps that of an emerging one. First, there are from time to time intense battles involving machine guns, mortars, RPGs, tanks, and a range of other weapons. Furthermore, there are several distinct radical Islamist movements active in the North of Sinai, and also the number of casualties on the government side by far exceeds the five percent threshold of the aforementioned definition. Within this literature, above all Paul Collier (1998, 2002), Stathis Kalyvas (2003), and Jochen Hippler (2007) provide the literature based on which the independent variables will be identified.

Furthermore, independent variables will be drawn from the literature on the inverse of political violence, nonviolent resistance. Again, the cases analyzed in this thesis do not entirely fit the theory, as for example in South Sinai there is not really a specific movement representing one particular group. Instead, since 2011, Egypt's political system has been a multi-party system.

Considering that independence is not one of the goals of local Bedouins or Palestinians, nonviolent action with the particular goal of "social change and increased justice through peaceful means" is adequate for this thesis (Lederach 1995: 15). In such a situation, Cunningham (2013) separates three forms of action people can take. "They can press their demands through conventional political channels, such as engaging in electoral politics, petitioning the state, or pursuing legal recourse" (Cunningham 2013: 292). Alternatively, "groups can also resort to irregular (or unconventional) politics. This means strategies … which operate outside or normal institutional channels. Irregular politics can involve either violent challenges or nonviolent tactics" (Ibid.). Within the literature, there is a basic distinction between principled nonviolence and pragmatic nonviolence, with the latter as the focus of this thesis (Dudouet 2011: 242). Principled nonviolence describes approaches which promote the adherence to nonviolence for "religious, moral or philosophical reasons, or in other words, by conviction rather than by expediency" (Ibid: 243). Within this cultural approach explaining nonviolence as shaped by non-instrumental factors (McAdam 2000), many argue that something in Arab culture or Islam predisposes the respective groups to violence (Pearlman 2012: 26). Given that the Bedouin in both North and South Sinai belong to a similar ethnic group and share the same religion and traditions, this thesis will focus on strategic nonviolence and the pragmatic choice for this approach in the South, compared to the more violent approach in the North. The literature offers a broad corpus of comparative studies of past nonviolent campaigns (e.g. Sémelin 1993; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Zunes et al. 1999; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Sharp 2005; Schock 2005; Roberts and Ash 2009) as well as statistical studies (e.g. Bond 1994; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Stephan and Chenoweh 2008) which identified a number of factors facilitating nonviolence (Duduouet 2011: 244). In the following sections, the theoretical literature will be summarized, and subsequently independent variables and according hypotheses will be outlined. In general, two approaches can therefore be distinguished. On the one hand, based on a structural approach, scholars argue that specific characteristics of a state in general lead to

violence and political upheaval. On the other, more recent scholars argue that there is no automatism connecting structural deficits and non-state violence. The choice to engage in violence is described as a rational decision based on assumed costs and benefits of such a behavior.

2.1.   Structural Factors

Following John Galtung's definition of structural violence in his paper "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" (1969), the research on violence until the late 1990s was dominated by the tendency to understand the term as broadly as possible (Enzmann 2013). According to Galtung, "when the potential is higher than the actual is by definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, then violence is present" (Galtung 1969: 169) and refers to a form of violence where some social structure or institution may harm people by preventing them from reaching their theoretical potential. The term was often used in order to illustrate "the extent and in which partly subtle ways people in modern societies are injured, harmed, or oppressed" (Enzmann 2013.: 44). Based on this approach to violence, theories have long emphasized how "economic, political, and demographic change alters class relations and state structures to produce revolutions (e.g. Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991)" (Schock 2013: 281).

It is argued that one of the decisive factors for engaging in violent strategies or not is the degree of exclusion from the political system. Even if groups face tensions with the government, "there is variation in the degree to which they are included in governance and in their relative economic position in the state (Hechter 1975; Gourevitch 1979)" (Cunningham 2013: 296). Some groups are better connected to the center by being included in the government, having beneficial relations with it, or possessing more local control over their territory while others are entirely excluded. These groups then are supposed to apply to more institutionalized channels to voice their grievances. Groups that are less connected to the state are less likely to rely on institutionalized

political channels to achieve their goals. The reason for this is the lack of trust in official channels and their perception of being intentionally disadvantaged by the ruling classes. The economic position of a group also affects their motivation for engaging in violence against the state. If groups are significantly poorer than the average citizen they are likely to have greater grievances as a result of perceived economic discrimination. These grievances, coupled with the awareness that others are better off than oneself, lead to violence against those benefiting of the existing structures. As Cunningham points out, "there is significant evidence that more aggrieved groups are more likely to rebel" (Cunningham 2013: 296). Collier's 'grievance' model (2002) examines inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious divisions as causes of conflict (Collier 2002: 1). The question in this approach is, to what extent can the initiation of a rebellion be predicted by differences in objective grievances (Ibid.: 12). Tobias Debiel argues that the behavior of the state in regard to its people – in particular in regard to its minorities – is the decisive factor which predetermines the occurrence of political violence. "Part of the structural reasons for violence and one of the most essential issues of conflicts are in particular the ongoing threatening of cultural identity by repression of the state, the exclusion of the exertion of power on the state level, the persistent refusal of regional autonomy or local self-determination" (Debiel 2004: 6). "If under such circumstances the collective feeling of discrimination or oppression connects with the organizational capacity of the affected groups, violent conflicts are sort of preassigned" (Ibid: 7). In regard to the Arab dictatorships, Hippel in 2007 remarked that these states are so focused on maintaining their power that they fail entirely on the fulfillment of fundamental state tasks (development, rule of law, participation,...), not even trying to resolve them (Hippel 2007).

According to Schock (2005), comparable to the repertoires of actions available to the dissidents, the state also faces the option of reacting in different ways to the posed challenge. Generally speaking, four types of state response can be identified. First, states can choose to ignore the challenges posed to them. Whereas in democracies it is almost impossible to ignore a challenge

once it received a certain amount of support, in non-democracies "almost any non-institutional political action may be construed as regime-threatening; therefore, ignoring a challenge is a less likely response" (Schock 2005: 30). A second option for the state lies in the symbolic use of gestures to conciliate the challengers and acknowledge that something has to change (Ibid.). Third, the state can engage actively in reforms and make concrete concessions which actually alter the social or political situation of the challengers (Ibid.: 31). Last but not least, the state can attempt to repress the challenges by restricting political or civil liberties (Davenport 2000: 6). Within the theoretical literature it is usually argued that mobilization increases if challenges are simply ignored because the actual motivation for challenging the state is not lowered, nor are there any negative repercussions for dissidents. Also if concessions are made, mobilization usually increases because of bandwaggoning or the so called threshold effect (Francisco 2000; Lichbach 1995; Tocqueville 1998). Regarding repression, the outcome is more complicated to predict. On the one hand, effective repression can decrease mobilization by raising the costs for challenging the state authority. On the other hand, repression can increase peoples' grievances and thereby increase their determination to oppose the state. However, violent oppression of challengers increases the risk of individuals or small groups dissenting from the nonviolent strategy and resorting to violence. Thereby they can function as spoilers and undermine nonviolent discipline as a whole. Although I argue that the structural deficits for the indigenous population are present to a large degree in both cases, the following two Hypotheses will be included in order to analyze whether there are differences in regard to them that provide further insight into the puzzle.

H1: Violence is more likely the more groups are excluded from political participation.

Observable Evidence: If so, then we should see significant differences in the degree of political exclusion of the local population between areas with violence and areas without violence. People in North Sinai should be less represented in the political center and maintain weaker relations to the

NVP in their area.

H2: Violence is more likely the more groups are economically disadvantaged.

Observable Evidence: If so, then we should see significant differences in the degree of economic exclusion of the local population between areas with violence and areas without violence. People in North Sinai should be significantly poorer than those in South Sinai and more excluded from the formal economy.

2.2.   Rational Choice

The structural approach and the resulting theories without doubts are useful to identify contexts in which countries in general are "prone to violence" (Shellman 2013: 333). However, to unravel the puzzle why people facing similar contexts engage in different forms of actions requires an increased focus on the local dynamics and the tactical choices made by individual actors. Focusing on the political and economic disadvantages of parts of the population in a given country is a useful approach for understanding general preconditions for conflict, but it is ill-suited to address the precise dynamics leading to violence as these conditions "are essentially static" (Moore 1995: 132). There is no automatism behind these structural conditions leading to violence, in other words, "there is no inherent link between conflict and violence" (Calestino 2013: 389). Kathleen Cunningham (2013) examines the determinants influencing the strategic choice "by analyzing how a variety of factors affect the costs and benefits of conventional political strategies, mass nonviolent campaign, and civil war" (Cunningham 2013: 291). She argues that groups pick their strategies "based on the costs of those strategies and their anticipation of achieving success through them" (Cunningham 2013: 292). To sum up, in contrast to the above-mentioned cultural approach, the pragmatic school of nonviolence depicts the motivation behind nonviolent tactics not as a principal

commitment, but as a rationally chosen strategy as the   most efficient and least costly way (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 17), or because of a lack of alternative options (Sémelin 1993: 30).

Costs and Benefits

The costs or benefits resulting from a chosen strategy stems from two sources. On the one hand, groups or individuals engaging in violence thereby provoke some form of state reaction, such as increased oppression. Kathleen Cunningham for example argues that one factor that fundamentally affects the anticipation of costs is "the capacity of states to punish irregular tactics" and that "states with high capacity can repress dissent and make groups more likely to use whatever institutional channels are available rather than pursuing more risky strategies" (Cunningham 2013: 292). If people can anticipate severe oppression and a strong response of the state then engaging in violent actions becomes more risky which hinders them from choosing to do so. Equally, regular economic activities can be disrupted leading to economic costs for the population in the respective area. Violence in many ways decreases regular economic activity. For example, checkpoints slow down the movement of goods and people or investors and visitors are deterred. Collier (1998) identifies four variables – initial income, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, the amount of natural resources, and the initial population size as significant and strong determinants of the probability of civil war (Ibid.). First, he found that the higher the per capita income in a specific region, the lower the risk of civil war (Ibid.: 571). Second, natural resource endowments have a non-monotonic effect and initially increase the risk of war, but at a high level start to reduce the risk of it (Ibid.). Third, greater population increases the risk of war (Ibid.). Last but not least, contrary to common opinion which often cites ethnic division as a reason for civil war, Collier found this explanation to be incorrect (Ibid.). In line with this economic risk model, Collier further elaborated on the factor of greed, focusing on the sources of finance for potential rebels (Collier 2002: 1). For the occurrence of civil war, "the critical parameters are the financial opportunities for rebels, the social and

geographic constraints which they face, and the financial capability of the government to provide defense" (Ibid.: 35). His model is based on utility theory and he argues that rebels "will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion" (Collier 1998: 563). Benefits relate to two things. On the one hand, benefits can occur in the form of achieving political goals of the respective group. In this case, the violent acts are effective tools in pressuring the government to give in to demands of the perpetrators who thereby achieve their goal. On the other hand, benefits can be of an economic nature, meaning that the commitment of violent acts increases the income of a group. For example, violent acts against the government can serve the purpose of gaining control over specific sources of income like taxation in an area or access to natural resources like diamonds or gold. Similarly, groups or individuals who are engaged in economic activities which are opposed by the state can use violence to protect their income source.

H3: The bigger the economic costs expected to result from violence, the less likely violence.

Observable Evidence: If so then we should see distinct differences in the potential economic losses as a result of violence between areas experiencing violence and areas without violence. People in North Sinai should have less to lose in financial terms from engaging in violence than people in South Sinai.

H4: The bigger the political costs expected to result from violence, the less likely violence.

Observable Evidence: If so then we should see distinct differences in the capacity for state repression against violent actors between areas experiencing violence and areas without violence. The state should be less able to oppress the violent agitators in North Sinai than in South Sinai.

## 2.3.	Group Cohesion

Movement-internal factors long dominated the research on nonviolence and a considerable amount of literature addresses this factor. Wendy Pearlman emerged as one of the leading scholars on NVR and focuses in particular on movement cohesion as independent variable that determines violence or nonviolence as outcome (Pearlman 2012). According to Pearlman, the main explanatory variable is "a movement's internal political cohesion, or its inverse, fragmentation" (Ibid.: 27). Political cohesion as independent variable can be measured by evaluating three factors that facilitate or hinder the cooperation within a group: "leadership, organizational structure, and a sense of collective purpose" (Ibid.: 28). The causal logic behind Pearlman's argument is "that a movement's cohesion systematically affects its protest strategy because different forms of protest have different organizational requirements" (Ibid.: 29). Accordingly, "broad-based participation, discipline, and strategic coherence are beneficial for the success of either violent or nonviolent tactics" (Ibid.). However, group cohesion is far more important for nonviolent resistance than for violent resistance because the potential risks for a nonviolent strategy posed by individual spoilers engaging in violent actions are immense. Therefore, only if a movement is able to maintain cohesion, "it can obtain the organizational capacity to enlist large numbers of participants, design and implement coherent strategies, and maintain discipline" (Ibid.). Adria Lawrence (2010) also identified group cohesion as critical element for nonviolent protest. Based on an analysis of opposition to the French Colonial empire, she argues that "violence resulted from internal contestation among nationalist actors" (Lawrence 2010: 90). Violence broke out as a result of fragmentation of the opposition movements bringing about situations in which "a leadership vacuum created an opening for new nationalist actors to compete for local power" (Ibid.) In those situations, opposition members "used violence to demonstrate their commitment to the nationalist cause, consolidate control over particular localities, and eliminate rivals" (Ibid.). Marianne Dahl similarly argues that "between group competition tend

to increase the likelihood of a shift from non-violent to violent strategies" (Dahl 2012). Where, however, " nationalist movements remained centralized, mobilization remained primarily peaceful, relying on strategies such as protest, diplomacy, and party formation" (Lawrence 2010: 90). The problem in Sinai with this approach is as mentioned above the lack of specific movements and accordingly the lack of factors like leadership or organizational structures. However, this is dealt with by focusing on the one hand on societal cohesion as variable – the cohesion of the society inhabiting each of the two theaters as a whole – and on the other hand, on the sense of collective purpose, or shared interest, as main indicator.

Stathis Kalyvas (2003) argues in a similar direction and further builds on the greed and grievances distinction of Collier. He argues that a binary perspective on civil wars is misleading. As Kalyvas argues, a characterization of conflicts along these lines is far more complicated than anticipated because of the usually present "perplexing combination of identities and actions" which turns their characterization "into a quest for an ever-deeper 'real' nature, presumably hidden underneath misleading facades" (Kalyvas 2003: 476). He therefore argues for an understanding of the conflict's "dynamics as substantially shaped by local cleavages" which "is also fully consistent with recurring suggestions that master cleavages often fail to account for the nature of the conflict and its violence" (Ibid.: 479). Assuming a simple Bedouins versus the state cleavage as suggested by the above-mentioned tribal studies is therefore ill-suited to really understand the dynamics behind the occurrence of violence without looking at the dynamics at the local level.

Bakke et al. (2012) focus on internal fighting of opposition groups, instead of violence against the state or other not movement-internal actors, but arrive at a similar conclusion regarding the correlation between group cohesion and the occurrence of violence. While much of the previous research assumed "stable group boundaries and identities, moving (with more or less justification) from a challenge to state authority to the existence of relatively unified movements acting on behalf of bounded, nonstate groups", "recent work regards actors not as unitary or coherent challengers,

but as a shifting set of actors who share a central identity but who have malleable allegiances and potentially divergent interests" (Ibid.). Similar to Lawrence (2010) and Pearlman (2012) who relate increased fragmentation to increased violence, they argue that "in an extremely fragmented movement with many organizations, weak institutionalization, and decentralized power, the probability of violent infighting is very high" (Ibid.: 13). The problem in regard to Sinai is similar to the general one in regard to group cohesion as Bakke et al. focus on movements. Again, this will be dealt with by focusing on fragmentation and resulting infighting of the society as a whole.

H5: The greater the cohesion of a group, the less likely individuals or small groups engage in violent actions.

Observable evidence: If true, then the areas not experiencing any violence should be characterized by a higher degree of cohesion than those areas experiencing violence. Furthermore, there should be common agreement between the inhabitants of the respective area that nonviolence as a strategy constitutes the most beneficial (or least costly) option. The contrary should be the case in areas of violent opposition, where the population is assumed to be far more fragmented, thereby not acting under a common guidance.

3. Methodology and Case Selection

Although studies analyzing large-N quantitative data are well suited to identify links between independent and dependent variables, they tend to "say little about the links between cause and effect" (Mampilly 2011: 18). Instead, I will apply qualitative methods and engage in process tracing to illustrate the causal mechanisms that link the above-mentioned independent variables to the different outcomes. In particular, I will apply a process orientated analysis in order to acquire a deeper understanding of how the different independent variables facilitated nonviolence in South

Sinai, while North Sinai sled into violence. Heuristic approaches of this sort are an adequate method for further developing theories, which seems particularly suited for this thesis. Heuristic refers to experience-based techniques for problem solving, learning, and discovery. Where the exhaustive search is impractical, heuristic methods are used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution; mental short cuts to ease the cognitive load of making a decision. This enables one to "inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths" (George and Bennett, 2005 : 75). Considering that information on the developments in Sinai is fairly scarce, only few in-depth studies are available, and traveling to the Northern part of the peninsular is not possible for security reasons, a heuristic approach is adequate to disentangle the puzzle on the basis of the available information.

This thesis will consist of a cross case analysis of two cases and compares the situation in North Sinai with that in South Sinai. The peninsula constitutes of two governorates – North and South Sinai – which are each considered to be one case. The research objective is to answer the question why there is no violence in South Sinai, while North Sinai since February 2011 experienced significant outbursts of violence. The two cases offer themselves for a comparison because they share many similarities which facilitate the occurrence of violence in both areas. The research therefore is conducted in the framework of the method of differences which attempts to identify different independent variables associated with different outcomes between rather similar cases. The strength of such an approach is above all twofold. On the one hand the application of existing theoretical frameworks tests them for their explanatory value in specific cases. Furthermore, the process oriented approach focusing on only a very limited number of cases allows for the identification of possible other independent variables which are not adequately represented within the existing corpus of theoretical literature. Thereby, new angles for future research can possibly be identified. On the other hand, several limitations result from this approach. Obviously North Sinai and South Sinai do not constitute perfect cases for Mill's method of difference which

aims at identifying the one decisive variable shaping the outcome. Rather, several different independent variables will be identified. However, it is impossible to be sure that all possible and relevant variables have been identified. Furthermore, it is difficult to generalize the findings of such a small-n study, in particular given the number of independent variables. The evidence upon which the explanatory part of the thesis will be based on is threefold. First, political as well as anthropological and historical secondary studies on Sinai and the region will be incorporated. Second, a large corpus of articles has been collected. Egypt Independent (the platform was unfortunately closed down by the Egyptian government in March 2013 but all information is still available online) fortunately not only provided own articles and analysis, but also provided translated articles from Al-Masry Al-Youm and MENA as well as news articles from DPA, AP and AFP. Third, a small fieldwork study in South Sinai was conducted during which several discussions with local Bedouins and NVP were held. These discussions however were of very informal nature and will only on some occasions been incorporated in this thesis. Rather they served as sources of underlying information and helped to identify the relevant dynamics.

There is also a practical motivation for choosing Sinai as a case study. The developments in Sinai are still unfolding and this thesis therefore deals not with a historic case, but a contemporary political question. Considering the importance of Sinai for Egypt and Israel it is of high importance to actually understand properly why people in North Sinai resort to violence. On the one hand, this allows for the identification of possible political approaches to solve the crisis. Furthermore, although South Sinai so far has not experienced any larger outbreaks of violence, it is questionable whether is going to remain the case. By understanding why people in South Sinai remain nonviolent, it is also possible to identify what has to be done to maintain that stability and whether it is likely that the nonviolent discipline in South Sinai can be upheld.

4. Historical Context of Sinai 1967 until 2011

Sinai until the end of Israeli Occupation 1982

Aside from constituting the land bridge between Africa and Asia, Sinai gained sudden strategic importance after the Suez canal was opened 1869. Shortly after coming under British administration, Sinai was officially integrated into the Egyptian territory in 1902 and the borders to Northern Territories, back then the Ottoman empire, were specified (ICG 2007). The Sinai peninsular returned to international prominence in 1956 after the new Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal against the will of Great Britain and France who, based on the old lease agreement, still controlled the Canal and its shores. Subsequently, Israeli troops invaded the peninsula as part of a British-French plot to instigate a reason for intervening between the Egyptian and Israeli Forces and thereby regaining control of the canal. Following international pressure in particular from the US and the Soviet Union however the non-Egyptian troops had to retreat and the first international UN-Peacekeepers in Sinai (UNEF I) were installed; they remained in Sinai until 1967.

1967 constitutes a key date for the entire Middle Eastern region and Sinai in particular. Following increasing tensions between Israel and the Arab states, and the UNEF I troops leaving Sinai as demanded by Nasser, the third Arab-Israeli war shook the region. Israel launched a preventive attack against Syria and Egypt in particular and dealt a crushing defeat to its Arab adversaries. This led to the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai peninsula. The peninsula was then under Israeli control for fifteen years before the October War of 1973 initiated a series of negotiations which finally led to the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and the return of Sinai to Egypt in 1982.

Sinai returns to Egypt 1982 – 2011

Although Israel also emerged victoriously from the 1973 war and succeeded in crossing the canal into the Egyptian heartland – thereby encircling a whole Egyptian army group around the city of Suez – the initial successes of in particular the Egyptian offensive across the Suez Canal forced the parties back to the negotiation table. Sinai in particular stood in the center of the negotiations at Camp David under the supervision of the United States. The essentials of the Camp David Agreement are as follows. Sinai was to be returned to Egypt in exchange for a peace agreement. Furthermore, large parts of the peninsular had to be demilitarized which had a long-term impact on the state's capacity to exercise authority in Sinai. More precisely, Sinai and the border region with Israel was separated into four zones with different levels of Egyptian military presence (ICG 2007). Zone A, the east bank of the canal, still hosts a significant number of Egyptian soldiers due to the need to guarantee a safe passage through the canal and an infantry division of approximately 22.000 men is located there. In Zone B, the Egyptian police – who are responsible for most of the security in Sinai – are supported by four Egyptian Army battalions. In Zone C, which consists of the Egyptian side of the border and the east coast of Sinai, only Egyptian police are allowed. Furthermore, the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) is stationed in this region to supervise the maintenance of the agreement. Last but not least, the Israeli side of the border constitutes Zone D, in which Israel has four Infantry divisions to protect its side of the border. Since Israel unilaterally retreated form the Gaza strip, questions of border control between Egypt and Gaze reemerged as critical, and 750 Egyptian soldiers are allowed there to maintain order and support the police in their tasks (ICG 2007). Israel has since 1975 (Kissinger Interim Agreements 1975) retreated step by step from Sinai, with Taba, to the South of the Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat, being the last city returned to Egypt only in 1989. The peace agreement without a doubt constitutes one of the essential elements in explaining the current developments in the area and led to a difficult situation for both the Egyptians and the Israelis. Israel on the one hand expected the Egyptian

government to effectively control its southern side of the border and prevent attacks on Israeli territory from there, as well as the smuggling of arms into Gaza. On the other hand Israel intended to prevent Sinai from ever becoming a launchpad for a possible Egyptian attack which led to the stark limits regarding Egyptian military presence there.

This left Egypt in a difficult position. The state wanted to gain effective control over the peninsula after 1982, however, this was not possible by simply placing military forces there. At the core for the Egyptian government stood the question, aside from how to maintain security in general, of whether to "regard the Bedouins as fellow Egyptians returning from exile or as treacherous collaborators" (Lavie 1984). The Egyptian government in general opted for the latter and saw the indigenous people in Sinai as a potential fifth column (Pelham 2012). This resulted in control over the local people mainly by a migration policy, supporting the relocation of Nile-Valley-People (NVP) to Sinai which significantly altered the demographic structures in North and South of Sinai. For maintaining control, the state also relied on a strict and widely hated security regime that oppressed large parts of the population (Pelham 2012). Although huge amounts of money went into Sinai to develop the tourist infrastructure, the mining, oil and gas industries, the Bedouins – as well as the Palestinian refugees in and around Al Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed – were as far as possible excluded from this development. Accordingly, except for areas in the South where Bedouins were successful in taking part in the tourist industry, there were few legal means of providing ones own income. As Mossab Abu Fagr, a Bedouin activist from North Sinai puts it, "The Egyptian government does not offer us anything. Even out water is bad and our customs and tribal laws have been ruined so it's no wonder that many people here have turned into outlaws over the years. All of this is because of the absence of any real development plan that the government should have presented as soon as they regained Sinai" (Al Jazeera 2010).

The region's importance for Egypt is twofold: economically and strategically. Economically, firstly, Sinai hosts several famous tourist locations like Sharm El-Sheikh and the Santa Katarina

monastery and prior to the revolution produced about 30% of Egypt's incomes stemming from tourism (Egyptian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 2013). Second, gas and oil have been discovered in the peninsular and are increasingly being exploited. Discoveries of oil reserves are still ongoing, and in June 2011 the discovery of a new oil field in South Sinai was announced (Israel National News 11.06.2011). Third, Sinai constitutes the east bank of the Suez canal, which is another main income source to Egypt. The Suez canal of course is also of immense strategic importance to Egypt, its allies and international trade in general and the guaranteeing of a save passage through the canal is essential. Furthermore, the security in Sinai – and therefore at Israel's southern border – is of utmost importance for the maintenance of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and, in relation to that, also to the ongoing flow of American aid, above all to Egypt's armed forces.

5. Shared Characteristics between North and South: similar opportunities for violence?

North and South Sinai are treated here as most-similar cases as they share a number of characteristics. They share similar terrain characteristics, an NVP and Bedouin population, the local population's interests in both parts have been largely neglected by the central government, the particularly disadvantaged situation of the indigenous Bedouin population, similar levels of demilitarization, the availability of guns, and similar targets available to potential attackers. Also, suffice to say, they are in the same country and thereby in the same context of general political change and instability. These similarities allow for an analysis of the two as most likely cases.

The first and most obvious similarity between North and South Sinai is the similar opportunities and constraints enforced upon the actors by the terrain. The terrain of the peninsula is above all characterized by empty and deserted mountains, both in the North and the South. Mountainous terrain is generally seen as facilitating the occurrence of rebellions or civil wars given

the difficulty for the state to control the territory. The territory is largely uninhabited and the majority of the population, as well as the centers of state control, are limited to several towns and the checkpoints along the few streets connecting the different centers. In particular in the mountains, the state has almost no presence and truly controlling the territory there is almost impossible for Egyptian security apparatus given the restrictions of the peace agreement with Israel. While this lack of control is a common theme in the reporting on Northern Sinai, the lack of control also constitutes a reality in the South.

A second similarity can be found in the general neglect of the interests of local people by the ruling Egyptian elites. Instead, the question of how to deal with Sinai was subjected to an ongoing securitization of the issue. Both the governors of North Sinai and South Sinai since 1982 are former military generals whose expertise accordingly is not in the fields of health care, education, or rural development but security and military issues. As a result of the securitization the actual needs of the local population – education, health care, and legal opportunities to make an income – are not adequately addressed. This reality is also reflected in the locals' opinions in the South of Sinai. An owner of one of the tourist camps to the North of Nuweiba (an area that is still resisting the big scale plans of foreign hotel companies) remarked regarding the Development plans from Cairo for Sinai, "They are useless, nobody asked me and I don't know anybody who was asked. The actual concerns and needs of the local population are not at all incorporated into these plans from Cairo" (Interview 1). Although development of Sinai appeared on the agenda of Egypt's new rulers after the revolution (Metwali and Mansour 17.08.2011), those promises did not materialize afterward.

The Bedouins, which constitute the indigenous population of Sinai in particular are disadvantaged by the Egyptian government. Aside from oppression by the security regime and the exclusion from legal sources of incomes, land ownership constitutes a major issue with "Bedouins constantly complaining about … land ownership procedures and NVP receiving preferential treatment" (DPA 21.09.2011). Former Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri for example met with

Sinai tribal elders in spring 2012 and "agreed to projects for agriculture, railroads and landownership" (Al Masry Al Youm 13.02.2012). Only shortly later, also the military leadership, represented by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, promised that the armed forces would allocate 250 million Egyptian pounds (about 27 million Euros) "toward implementing urgent development projects in the peninsula (Egypt Independent 27.05.2012). Despite plans of this sort – from both civilian and military representatives – to reform the land ownership laws and further develop the peninsula to everybody's benefit, not much progress has been achieved in this regard.

Amongst the Bedouins, opinions on whether they are truly Egyptian differ widely. While one Bedouin for example fiercely resisted to any distinction, "The Upper Egyptians, The Sahara people, the Nile Valley people, the Fellahin (farmers), the Bedouins, we all together are the Egyptian people" (Interview 2), others only a few kilometers away did not hesitate to tell about their mountains, in which Egyptians don't dare to set foot (Informal Discussion 1). Clearly however, by the government they are perceived more as a threat to Egypt than as fellow Egyptians. Osama al-Ghazali Harb, president of the Democratic Front Party strongly criticized the ousted regime for "insisting on marginalizing Sinai and looking down on Bedouins to the point of oppressing them" (Egypt Independent 16.03.2011). Bedouin tribal leaders during one of the first conferences of tribal leaders in Sinai after the end of Mubarak's rule in particular called for "the abolition of restrictions on investments in Sinai, the implementation of a genuine development program in Sinai, and the reversing of rulings issued against Sinai residents" (Ibid.). Furthermore, "allowing Bedouins land ownership and treating them on equal footing with Egyptians" were key demands brought forward (Ibid.).

After 1982, distrust against the Bedouins and their perceived cooperation with Israel was high. In this regard it is important to highlight that the political reality in Sinai during the last century was marked by repeated shifts of authority – from British dominance to Egyptian, to Israeli, and back to Egyptian – which resulted in the need for the indigenous people to adjust to the

respective rulers. In particular following the overwhelming defeat of the Egyptian forces in 1967, it was all but certain that Sinai indeed would be returned to Egypt and not remain part of Israel, which already hosts a number of Bedouins in the Negev desert (Informal Discussion 2). Generally speaking, studies of tribal societies and their relationship to the modern states argue that there is a permanent tension between the tribes on the one hand, and the state on the other hand. This tension is "dynamic and variable rather than static and stable" (TAC 2009). They identify a "fundamental conflict between any central authority which seeks to impose national unity and the centrifugal forces of a tribal society as a whole whose ideals and way of live depend upon untrammeled freedom from external restraints and demands" (Ibid.). This tension, as said, is not static but depends on a certain balance between the central authorities and the tribes, for example under strong leadership or central authorities with a proper understanding of the tribal society. However, the balance can be destroyed in times of political turmoil or by external intervention. The ousting of Hosni Mubarak and the subsequent power vacuum fit this description. As a study about tribal dynamics goes on, "as soon as they [the tribes] perceive weakness or vacillation on the central government, the tribes would rise in defiance" (Ibid.). During these times, in tribal areas there will be "violent confrontations ranging from local disturbances to civil war" (Ibid.).

Another similarity can be found in the fact that both North and South Sinai constitute parts of the same demilitarized zones. The entire area south of the border (North Sinai), as well as the entire eastern coast of the peninsular (South Sinai) are part of the completely demilitarized zone C. This translates into equal opportunities and constraints for the Egyptian security forces in those parts of North and South Sinai. Similarly it means that possible attackers are presented with similar targets of state authority in both parts of Sinai: police stations, checkpoints, and patrolling police cars.

One more critical issue is the availability of arms to possible attackers. Following the uprising against Mubarak in early 2011 and in particular following the downfall of Muammar al

24

Gadafi in Libya, a strong increase in the influx of arms could be observed (Reuters 22.07.2011). "By mid-2011, tribal leaders in Sinai claimed they had amassed sufficient weaponry – medium-range as well as light arms – to outgun the army" (Pelham 2012: 13). Information in that regard is scarce and intuitively, due to its location next to Gaza, it can be assumed that more weapons are available in the North. However, also in the South light arms are available in a large quantity. One group of young Bedouin in Nuweiba for example did not hesitate to show pictures on their mobile phones of themselves with AK 47 and Cal. 50 Machine guns attached to a pick-up truck. One of the Bedouin explained, "Of course we have guns, the Egyptian state provides no protection and police is lazy or just there to harass us" (Informal Discussion 1). Another one remarked, "All this is in the mountains, that is our land, we play with our toys there and the Egyptians do not dare to come and disturb us" (Ibid.). Without intense research it is not clear as to how many arms, and which kinds are available in the South, but based on some discussions and the information available it is safe to say that at least small arms are indeed available in the South. In a press meeting also South Sinai governor General Khaled Fouda told that the spread of arms among the Bedouin in South Sinai is a major problem and added that disarming them is "impossible" and trying to do so would "drown the area in a blood bath" (Al-Masry Al-Youm 15.04.2012). Considering that most of the attacks in the North are conducted with small arms weapons – and keeping in mind that both parts are equally demilitarized and thereby would offer similar resistance by state authorities – one arrives at the conclusion, that the availability of arms constitutes another similarity.

Last but not least, the proximity to Israel is often pointed out as a big difference between North and South Sinai. No doubt, plenty of Israeli targets are in reach of rockets or even small guns from North Sinai. However, this observation can be misleading because, and despite Israeli campaigns to prevent this, still a number of Israeli tourists is visiting South Sinai, in particular the hippy-style camps to the North of Nuweiba. For example, in one camp alone in May 2013 there were three individual Israeli tourists, as well as one Israeli family including two children, and all of

them were of Jewish, not Palestinian background. Samy Mahmoud, a senior official at the Egyptian Tourist Authority in August 2011 explained in an article in Al-Masry Al-Youm, "nearly 2.000 Israelis had entered Egypt since the unrest began" and added "Israeli visitors are usually indifferent to their government's warnings" (Al-Masry Al-Youm 21.08.2011). Therefore, the availability of Israeli targets constitutes another similarity between North and South Sinai that is often overlooked. Not only are there also Israeli targets available in the South, the unprotected civilians there would constitute far easier targets than those behind the well guarded and walled off border in the North.

6. Developments in Sinai February 2011 until February 2013

In order to address the question why there is more violence in North Sinai, it is first of all necessary to clearly establish that there in fact is a stark difference in that regard despite the above-mentioned shared characteristics. As no comprehensive summaries about violent incidents in Sinai since 2011 are available, this thesis relies on a large number of newspaper articles to establish such an overview. Therefore, about 250 articles about Sinai from the English versions of Arabic newspapers Al-Masry Al Youm, Al-Ahram, Al Jazeera, as well as articles from DPA, AFP and Reuters have been collected. The resulting overview does not claim to comprehend all incidents that occurred in the 24 months between February 2011 and February 2013, but by cross checking the articles against each others I assume that most incidents having actually led to casualties are incorporated. The following brief table lists how many incidents in North Sinai (NS) and South Sinai (SS) occurred in the respective period and to how many casualties they led. Incidents counted are all events involving forms of violence by either side. Casualties are divided into those on the side of the security forces, militants and smugglers, and others (involving Egyptian civilians and Bedouins which cannot be clearly associated with militant groups or smugglers). A complete list of all incidents with a short description can be found in the annex.

	North Sinai	South Sinai
Recorded Incidents	77	14
Security Forces	97	2
Militants and Smugglers	48	0
Others	48	2
Total Casualties	193	4

The results of this overview reveals a clear difference between North Sinai and South Sinai. First, there were more than five times as many incidents counted in North Sinai than in South Sinai (77 : 14). Furthermore, and revealing an even starker difference, the security forces suffered more than 45 times as many casualties in the North than in the South (97 : 2). This strong difference can also be observed in regard to casualties on the side of militants and smugglers (48 : 0) and others (48 : 2). This pattern confirms the suspected differences in regard to the occurrence of violence between North Sinai and South Sinai. In a next step, the recorded incidents are grouped into attacks of different types to gain further insights into the dynamics in Sinai.

Type	North Sinai	South Sinai
Militant or Radical Islamic background	25	0
Fighting between locals	4	1
Kidnappings	2	5
Unclear Fights between Security Forces and Assailants	35	6
Smuggling-related incidents	9	0
Other	2	2
Total	77	14

First of all, it is clear that smuggling plays a major role in the North of Sinai given its location next to the isolated Gaza strip and that the violence deriving from these activities is

unlikely to occur in the South. Also in regard to kidnappings, the available information is quite clear and indicates that the kidnappers both in North and South above all attempted to exercise pressure on the government to release detained relatives or friends. Considering that, as one Egyptian in South Sinai put it, if they kidnap an Egyptian, nobody in the government cares, it makes sense that above all foreigners (tourists in the South, MFO members and foreign workers in the North) are getting kidnapped to exercise pressure on the government (Interview 1). However, none of the kidnapped foreigners was hurt (AFP 19.03.2012). To the contrary, two American women told after their release that "their kidnappers gave them tea and dried fruit and talked about religion and tribal rights" and one kidnapper even "put out his cigarette in the car when a hostage said the smoke was bothering her" (AP 05.02.2012). Most interesting however, considering the striking differences between North and South, are those incidents clearly related to extremism and radical Islam (25 : 0), fighting between locals (4 : 1), as well as the high number of small, largely ineffective and with unclear motives, occurring attacks on security forces (35 : 6).

7. Explaining the differences

I argue that several factors in particular are suited to explain the illustrated differences. When looking at the acts of violence in the North, it is reasonably obvious that most of the violence cannot be traced back to a larger organization engaging in coordinated attacks. Rather the majority of attacks, in particular on the security forces, are uncoordinated and ineffective as only a minority of them actually led to casualties on the side of the security forces. These attacks usually are described in newspaper articles as 'unidentified gunmen attack security forces'.

In the following sections I will engage in evidence gathering and address each of the above-mentioned factors. First, structural elements will be addressed, secondly politically motivated violence, and third economically driven violence. Subsequently – although some elements will have appeared earlier – societal cohesion in South Sinai will be addressed before briefly illustrating the

different experiences with Israeli occupation that provide further insight into the dynamics. I argue that the nonviolence in the South is a rational decision by the people there acting as an entity although they are not really one, whereas the violence in North Sinai is a mix of different actions by different actors with diverging interests.

7.1.   Structural Elements

Socio-Economic Structures

An initial factor to be mentioned here that shapes the different outcomes are the different socio-economic structures. Whereas people in South Sinai are fairly wealthy, poverty is much higher in the North. Although the North has received some development aid and factories were constructed there, only a fraction of the population – mainly the NVP – benefit from the resulting work opportunities while both Palestinians and Bedouins are excluded as far as possible. As Middle East researcher and author Dona Stewart explains, mining for example is one of the main sources of income in the North, but the Bedouin are largely excluded (BBC 12.11.12). "Major cement factories use Chinese workers," she says (Ibid.). The frustration this generates among the local population can be seen for example in the case of the kidnapping of 25 Chinese workers by local Bedouins in January 2012 (Reuters 01.02.2012). An end to unemployment was also one of the main demands of the Bedouin protesters during the uprising of February 2011 (Egypt Independent 20.02.2011). Conversely in the South, while also being excluded often from the job opportunities in the resorts that emerged during the recent decades, the Bedouins have still been able to carve out a niche in the tourism industry and participate to some extent in the wealth created there. Consequently, this increases of course the general level of frustration in the North and therefore opposition to the government, and this also offers increased opportunities for outsiders or criminals to buy off individual locals to cooperate with them.

Political Opportunities and Constraints

A second factor to be considered are the political opportunities and constraints with which the groups in North and South are each confronted. The focus lies here on the system of state oppression. I argue that the security regime in North Sinai was far tighter than in the South and subjected the local population to a brutal regime of oppression. The higher violence in the North therefore, is a consequence of people's higher exposure to violence. Some Bedouins from North Sinai for example were arrested in 2006 and 2007 for alleged participation in the Sinai bombings of the previous years, but remained detained without trial since then (Egypt Independent 20.02.2011). Comparable to the Israeli security in the North and the administrative lens in the South, the Egyptian state followed a similar approach. Given the requirement to maintain stability in North Sinai, in order to maintain the Peace agreement with Israel, and thereby maintaining the flow of American military aid to the Egyptian Army, the state engaged in a harsh oppression regime. In the South, however, this was not possible to such a high degree given the presence of foreign tourists. In the North however, Bedouins involved in smuggling, the Gaza tunnel traffickers, and Islamists were all subjected to the same harsh treatment, in particular following the sweep after the bombings of 2004 – 2006. Michael Hanna said "there is a level of discrimination involved, an adversarial relationship with the Bedouin in Sinai. That dysfunctional relation has produced a security mindset in how authorities deal with the Bedouin" (AFP 18.03.2012). Furthermore, the oppressed groups in the North are more disconnected from the political center as they share no significant ties with the NVP population in North Sinai as a result of the exclusion from the economic system. In the South however, the relationship between indigenous Bedouins and NVP is more pronounced given both groups' participation in the tourism sector.

7.2.   Political Violence

Part of the violence can be clearly traced back to radical Islamist and anti-Israeli motives. Two main reasons can be found for this; firstly, the relations of North Sinai to the Gaza strip and Hamaz and the resulting influence of more radical ideologies. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, North Sinai emerged as a safe haven for fugitives of the state, radicals and criminals. Both elements, which also undermine group cohesion in the North are not present in the South.

The rise of Islamism and radical ideologies in Sinai is more than preventable because traditionally, Bedouin tribal structures with their informal case to case rulings and their adherence to customary law are in stark contrast to radical Islamist ideology and its strict and inflexible application of Sharia law. As Nicolas Pelham points out, the current climate in Sinai, however, fosters the spread of Islamism (Pelham 2012). Following the election victory of Hamas in Gaza in 2006, the new government first had to focus above all on the day to day businesses of governing in the Gaza Strip but since 2008 increasingly became active toward the Sinai. In 2008, and supported by the locals in North Sinai, Hamas unilaterally opened the border to Egypt and allowed its citizens to cross. This however was contained as far as possible by the Egyptian security forces who thereby once more got into conflict with the local population (Pelham 2012). Subsequently, also the trade between North Sinai and Gaza continued to rise and Sinai had replaced Israel as main source of basic goods for Gaza by 2010. This not only increased the amount of interactions between people from the two areas, but also led to a growing dependency of parts of the people in North Sinai on the trade with Gaza. As Nicolas Pelham sums up, "the collapse of Egypt's security regime and Israel's economic retreat from Sinai, coupled with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas influence, undoubtedly created space for the growth of Islamism in the region"" (Pelham 2012: 20). Hamas' precise involvement in North Sinai however remains unclear. While on the one hand it makes sense that radical elements from Gaza play a role in North Sinai, Hamas itself has no real

interest in further alienating the Egyptian state. Following the Arish police station attack in July 2011, Hamas responded to Egypt's demands to crack down on the radical Army of Islam and attempted to arrest their leader Mimtaz Daghmash (Egypt Independent 18.08.2011).

The advantages of Sinai as a retreat for Islamists not only from Gaza, but from across Egypt is rather obvious: low level of state presence in large parts of the territory, difficult terrain, and a population in large parts alienated from the government. Essential in regard to Islamist penetration of the peninsular other than from Gaza, is the so called jailbreak during the Egyptian revolution in early 2011. Many Egyptian Islamists who had been detained by the Mubarak regime got out of prison and sought refuge in Sinai, in the beginning in particular in and around Mount Halal in North Sinai where they could act more or less unhindered by the security forces. "Many jihadists were released from jail bringing into the area many years of experience, knowledge, courage and people who actually do not have anything to lose" said Israeli counter-terrorism expert Nitzan Nuriel in reference to the jailbreak of February 2011 (Reuters 15.09.2011). Despite "more than 2.000 additional policemen and several armored military vehicles stationed around security premises in North Sinai", North Sinai Governor Mabrouk said in August 2011, "the security deployment is for defense purposes only. We are not chasing anyone in the mountains" (DPA 12.08.2011). Israel in this case for the first time since 1979 – except for the 750 soldiers allowed to secure the border crossing in Rafah – gave the green light for additional Egyptian troops in North Sinai (Ahmed Abu Draa 15.08.2011). This environment of course facilitated the movement of further radicals into the region. As mentioned, Bedouins traditionally were worried of radical Islamism, but " the Bedouin's shared experience of Egyptian jail with salafis, a separatist spirit enhanced by opposition to the old security regime, and the new economic opportunities all appear to have helped forge a common outlook, which continued after the 2011 jailbreak" (Pelham 2012: 21).

Subsequently, unhindered by the collapsed security forces, and building on their growing relationship with parts of the Bedouins, "Al-Daawa wal-sunna and other Salafi groups ventured

from the hinterland into the coastal towns, establishing a niche by forming neighborhood committees and offering fledgling Sharia courts as an alternative judicial process in the wake of the collapse of the central authority" (Pelham 2012: 22). Osama Khaled and Salah El Boluk, researchers on Sinai, explain that the Salafi Group in North Sinai, an umbrella organization coordinating different Salafis across North Sinai has announced the establishment of such committees in Rafah, Al-Arish and Sheikh Zuwayed (Khaled and El Boluk 09.08.2011). These committees are also employing force in order to implement its rulings as co-founder of the Salafi Group in North Sinai Suleiman Abu Ayoub confirms. "We will deploy some 6.000 of our youths to implement verdicts by armed force in the absence of the government" (Ibid.). Although the allegations and extent of the influence of Salafi and other radical movements in North Sinai is difficult to confirm, the results of the parliamentary elections in autumn 2011 in Egypt offer one clear indicator for their presence in the North, and also their inexistence in the South. Both North and South Sinai, disregarding their different population sizes, provide four representatives to the Egyptian parliament. In both districts, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood – the Freedom and Justice Party – won two of the four seats. Furthermore the Reform and Development Party, one of the liberal parties, was able to secure one seat. The fourth seat, however, went to quite different groups in the two regions. In South Sinai, the fourth seat was taken by the national liberal Al-Wafd party which as one of their key positions has the maintenance of Egyptian unity and the inclusion of Christians in its party – also represented by the cross and the crescent in its logo. In North Sinai however, the fourth seat was taken by the radical salafi Hisb al-Nour party, which aims at establishing a new Islamic Egypt based on Sharia law and the strict dominance of Islamic values.

The Salafi's position on violence is extremely unclear. Hussein al-Qayem, a member of the Salafi Group in North Sinai in response to the alleged involvement of Salafis participation in the attack on a police station in Arish leaving four dead and numerous injured emphasized "that no innocent Muslim should ever be killed, regardless of the reason" (MENA 02.08.2011). However,

this statement is twofold flawed in regard to the denunciation of violence. Firstly, it relates only to Muslims and thereby excludes the Egyptian Christians. Secondly, the term 'innocent' is entirely open to interpretation. Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate how much control the leading Salafi party, the Hisb al-Nour, actually has in Sinai. At least officially, the party committed to the Camp David Accords with Israel. In an interview with Israeli radio, Yousry Hammad, the spokesman of the Hisb al-Nour stated "the treaty is binding because Egypt has signed it", but added that the Egyptian people are aiming to adjust certain articles to be able to exercise better control in Sinai (Hamdi Dabash 20.12.2011).

The differences between North and South were also visible, for example, during an election campaign tour to Sinai of liberal candidate Hamdeen Sabahhi. While the trip went without problems in the South, the group received death threats when entering the North and a trip to Sheikh Zuwayed was cancelled at the request of tribal leaders there, who were not able to guarantee his security during the visit (Egypt Independent 26.04.2012). The presence of radical Islamist elements in Northern Sinai is also visible in the aggression the Coptic Christian community faces in Northern Sinai. Immediately after the revolution radicals used the security vacuum to instigate first attacks on several Coptic churches in the North. As reported by Reuters, in mid February armed men broke into one church in North Sinai and stole furniture and other equipment while two more such attempts were thwarted by the remaining forces of the Egyptian army as well as locals (Reuters 13.02.2011). The tensions further escalated and the subsequent incidents against Coptic Egyptians in North Sinai, according to political activist Wael Khalil illustrate "the inability and failure of the state to protect its citizens" (Egypt Independent 28.09.2012). The incidents mentioned by Khalil are an increasingly aggressive rhetoric the Coptic minority in North Sinai faces, cumulating in a series of death threats and orders to leave the area (Ibid.). The threats, which were further backed up with concrete action by radicals who "fired at stores owned by Christians" (Ibid.). The threats did not remain without aftereffects and the Egyptian political activist and novelist Mosaad Abu Fagr

reports that he "received 100 percent authentic information that Christians left Rafah in Sinai because of death threats from groups" (Ibid.).

Other incidents that can be clearly traced back to radicals are the repeated attacks on the gas pipeline that transported Egyptian gas to Israel until the agreement was canceled after the fifteenth attack – officially due to a business rather than a political dispute (Reuters 23.04.2012). "We won't allow gas to be exported to Israel" was the message written in sand next to one of the sites attacked (Yousry el-Badri et al. 11.11.2011). Amongst the seven bombers were also two Bedouin (Ibid.). Mohamed al-Teehi, a member of the armed Islamist group Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra was arrested as mastermind behind the attacks on the Arish police station as well as on the pipelines (Reuters 13.11.2011). Residents of Al-Arish confirmed that he was a leading member of a "well-known religious current" (Ibid.). He is also said to have had links to Al Qaeda (Osama Khaled 14.11.2011). That the radicals however not only are a homegrown Egyptian problem, but that a part of their core group also comes from abroad was clearly visible during an incident in Al-Arish as local eyewitnesses told Reuters news agency. The incident occurred in July 2011 when "about 100 armed men rode through the town of Arish on motorcycles and in cars, waving flags with Islamic slogans and firing in the air" (Reuters 30.07.2011). Afterward, they attacked a police station and killed one police officer and three civilians. Although the identity of the attackers is not clearly known as most wore masks, eyewitnesses are convinced that they are not from the area as they "lost their way several times before reaching the police station" (Ibid.). Aref Abu Atta, the leader of the Akkour tribe in North Sinai agrees and said that the "scattered radical groups … have been mostly formed and inspired by elements from outside Sinai, particularly leaders of Islamist groups in Upper and Lower Egypt who detainees from Sinai met in prison" (Lina Attalah 04.07.2012). Several dozen people were arrested in connection with this incident, some of them being Palestinian, but their precise role and the question under whose guidance the attack was planned is still unclear (Salah Elboluk 31.07.2011). According to Egyptian security sources, the perpetrators were members of

Islamist groups as well as smugglers (Osama Khaled 12.09.2011). Subsequently in another raid by security forces, two more radicals were arrested who, according to Egyptian sources, ran a workshop producing explosives (Egypt Independent 17.08.2011). During the raid the security forces "seized eight bombs, three rocket-propelled grenades, black flags with religious slogans, tools used in making explosives such as ball bearings and a jar containing a chemical mixture used in making explosives" (Ibid.).

The key event within this chain of violent incidents is without a doubt the attack of radical militants against an Egyptian border post close to the Abu Salem border crossing in Northern Sinai. The attackers, who according to residents of the surrounding houses, came in three cars, attacked a group of soldiers who were just getting to break their Ramadan feast and killed a total of sixteen soldiers. Subsequently, they stole a military tank stationed at the border post and crossed into Israeli territory, where they were killed by a rocked fired from an Israeli aircraft shortly after crossing the border (Hefa Abify 07.08.2012). The fact that the attackers immediately attempted to cross into Israeli territory and thereby were willing to march into certain death highlights the radical nature of the attackers. The incident at the same time is a striking example of the failure and weakness of the Egyptian state in North Sinai and led to the initiation of Operation Eagle. Operation Eagle was the largest Egyptian military operation in Northern Sinai since 1973 and involved the deployment of heavy tanks, gunship helicopters and fighting jets to the area – against the rules of the Camp-David accords, but with the blessing of the Israeli government. Within one month, 32 radicals were killed and another 58 arrested by the Egyptian army in North Sinai (Ahmed Abu Draa 09.09.2012).

The violent approach followed by some, however, is not at all supported by the whole population, which also leads to conflicts between the more violent groups and those opposing the violence. On the one hand, parts of the Bedouins are actively supporting the Egyptian forces in their crack down, in particular after the 05.08.2012 attacks. On the other hand, radicals commit attacks against those denouncing the violence and supporting the Egyptian state. Only one incident of the

second type – radicals attacking those committed to maintaining peace and nonviolence – could be found in the corpus of newspaper articles and secondary literature; however, this was an important find. Following the 05.08.2012 attacks and in parallel to Operation Eagle launched by the Egyptian security forces, tribal leaders in North Sinai attempted to take action on their own to prevent a further escalation and initiated a dialogue amongst them. This however was of course strongly opposed by the radical elements who reacted in their own manner. "Tribal leader Khalaf al-Menahy and his son were shot dead by militants on their way back from a conference organized by tribal leaders to denounce militancy" a security source in Sinai reported to Reuters (Reuters 13.08.2012).

The attack on an Egyptian border post on August 5th 2012, causing the death of 16 Egyptian soldiers not only constitutes the key event that led to the initiation of the Egyptian military response, as well as seemingly the only large-scale, well organized action by radicals in Northern Sinai. It also illustrates the prevailing loyalty of a large part of the population to the Egyptian state and their opposition to radicalism. Locals, first of all, faced with total inactivity of the Egyptian forces in the region were the firsts to arrive at the scene, treat the wounded soldiers, and bring the wounded to hospital in Al-Arish. Bassam Ouda, one of the locals first at the site complains, "We told the officers to come secure us while we got the injured soldiers. They refused, saying that they didn't receive such orders and couldn't desert their posts" (Heba Afify 07.08.2012). While the military was slow to act, Mohamed al-Moattar, a resident from Rafah reported that actually the "members of local tribes were still chasing the attackers on the loose" (Ibid.). As he puts it, "this has always been Sinai's version of law enforcement, which lacks any reliance on the police" (Ibid.). As Heba Afify, one of the reporters first at the site reported, "locals who witnessed the attack grieved the loss of the soldiers whom, according to Bedouin traditions, they considered themselves responsible to protect" (Ibid.). Also before and after the attack, parts of the Bedouins in North Sinai actively cooperated with the security forces in order to counter the rise of radicalism. Abdallah Gohama, leader of the influential Tarabeen tribe and top tribal leader in Central Sinai said, "that

Sinai Bedouin chiefs warned military leadership about militancy in Sinai before the attack on security forces that left at least 16 dead and seven injured" (Egypt Independent 08.08.2012). Gohama also said that himself and other influential tribal leaders "warned Armed Forces leadership more than four months ago about the dangers of the spread of extremist groups in Sinai and told the authorities that the situation is critical" (Egypt Independent 07.08.2012). Local Bedouins were subsequently integrated by the security forces in their crackdown and also after the end of Operation Eagle joint operations of Egyptian armed forces and local Bedouins have continued. In December 2012 for example, in a joint operation carried out to intercept an arms transport in North Sinai seventeen rockets were confiscated (MENA 24.12.2012). This integration of Bedouins into official security operations was preceded by private companies hiring Bedouins for the protection of their industrial facilities. The companies working in the gas sector and managing the gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan already in summer 2011 contracted Bedouin tribes – through whose territories the pipeline runs – to protect the facilities as North Sinai Governor Abdel Wahab Mabrouk confirmed (DPA 01.08.2011). One last incident that illustrates the escalation of tensions between the different interest groups in the North, and of all incidents recorded by far the most brutal and disturbing, occurred in September 2012 in the Muqatta area in North Sinai. There, Egyptian police discovered the decapitated head "of a man kidnapped by Islamist militants, reportedly for his role in assassinating an extremist" (AFP 01.09.2012). This was confirmed by a Bedouin source who further explained "the militants behind Manazil's [the beheaded Egyptian] kidnapping accused him and several other men of planting a booby trap to assassinate Ouda Bereikat" (Ibid.). Ouda Bereikat was the head of a group of militants in North Sinai, reportedly also responsible for firing rockets on Israeli territory (Ibid.).

7.3.   **Economic**ally motivated **violence**

Another part of the violence can be traced back to economic motives. Those, I argue are a result of the involvement of certain groups in illegal activities in the North, most importantly smuggling of arms and other goods to Gaza, as well as human trafficking – or e Israeli defense wall along the border to Sinai (AFP 12.12.2011), the selling of organs of immigrants who get as far as Sinai but then fall into the hands of ruthless gangs.

The smuggling of goods and arms from Sinai into Gaza constitutes an issue in the area since 1948 and in particular became an issue after Egypt regained authority in Sinai in 1982. Firstly, having few legal sources of income available, smuggling constituted a lucrative business for the people of Rafah and Al Arish. Second, the presence of the Palestinian refugees in North Sinai provided personal links to the buyers in Gaza. Third, the smuggling of arms in particular was not only lucrative, but has also to be seen in the context of Arab struggle against Israel. Smuggling, however, is limited in the amount of money it can provide and a fierce competition over the control of the smuggling routes emerged. Today, most of the smuggling tends to be controlled by several families (Sawarka, Rumaylat, and Tarabeen) who sometimes cooperate with particular factions in Gaza (ICG 2007: 8).

Aside from goods, the North of Sinai constitutes a major route of human trafficking. Africans who get to Egypt try to get to Israeli from here. However, and in particular since Israel finished the construction of its defense wall towards Sinai (Reuters 02.02.2013), more and more of the African migrants who get smuggled into Sinai are held hostage there to blackmail their families for more money or get killed if no further payments are possible. As Sigal Rozen, Israeli NGO worker in the field of immigration put it in an interview in Der Spiegel, "Whole valleys in Sinai smell like death and decay", as dozens if not hundreds of Africans get killed there every year while

trying to escape their imprisonment (Der Spiegel 03.09.2011). According to Israeli sources at least 10.000 African migrants have made their way through Sinai across the border into Israel during recent years (DPA 24.05.2011). The business is again divided between criminal gangs and Islamic militants, who control who is allowed to pass through the mountains of North Sinai and who is not (Ibid.). The illegal economic activities in two ways lead to violence in North Sinai. On the one hand, obviously, some of the shooting at the border can be traced back to confrontations between smugglers and security forces. On the other hand, the activities are also disputed amongst the local population who compete for bigger shares, or try to prevent others from engaging in these activities.

First, violence erupts from clashes between smugglers and security forces along the border between Egypt and Israel. Right after the uprising in 2011, a first member of the security forces was shot when he was trying to prevent a "group of masked smugglers with sacks of drugs attempting to infiltrate Israel" from crossing the border (Egypt Independent 24.02.2011). Not only drug smugglers, but also human traffickers clash with security forces, and October 2011 for example shooting between armed forces and smugglers broke out close to Rafah where an "officer was shot and injured after an encounter with a gang attempting to smuggle African migrants into Israel (MENA 25.10.2011).

Second, these lucrative and illegal activities however are also not undisputed between the different groups controlling them, and also subject to criticism or open confrontation by other – non-involved – tribes. This constitutes one of the drawbacks of the breaking down of the security infrastructure in North Sinai, as the competition for larger shares in the smuggling business between the different tribes escalated, or tribes not involved in the business attempted to take justice into their own hands, while at the same time the tribal structures originally mitigating these conflicts had suffered from increasing erosion as a result of Egyptian state oppression. Subsequently, several tribal feuds escalated in North Sinai. In November 2011 for example, the confrontation between the Al-Tiaha tribe and the Al-Nakhlawa tribe escalated into fierce gun-fighting, with the former

accusing the latter of "smuggling Africans and stealing their organs" (Egypt Independent, 14.11.2011). One Nakhlwa tribesman was shot and another one arrested and handed over to the police following fierce gun battles between the two tribes. A report in the Arabic edition of Al-Masry Al-Youm confirms that "traffickers are stealing the organs of the refugees they kidnap, adding that there were violent confrontations in central Sinai as the Al-Tiaha tribe accused members of the Nakhlwa tribe of stealing organs" (Carr 06.12.2011). Another escalation of tribal tensions occurred in May 2012 in Rafah between members of the Rumailat tribe and the Barahma tribe. Although the precise reasons are unclear, it is likely that conflicts about smuggling fueled the fight over a seemingly unimportant issue – the assumed stealing of a bike. Within hours the small hand-fight had escalated and eyewitnesses "said that machine guns and RPGs were used in the subsequent battle" (Al-Masry Alyoum 31.05.2012). According to Palestinian sources even mortars were used and two shells fell into the Gaza Strip (Ibid.). Illustrating the extent of the inability of the regular security forces in North Sinai to contain these tensions, witnesses reported that "security forces have not intervened to end the clashes" while "pillars of smoke could be seen and shooting heard" several hours into the skirmish (Ibid.). A third incident of significant infighting between different Bedouin tribes in North Sinai was recorded in November 2012. Again, a minor dispute about cutting in line at a gas station sparked a fight which subsequently escalated into a fierce battle in the area west of Al-Arish. More than twenty people were severely injured and at least four Bedouins died in the battle (Al Masry Al Youm 09.11.2012). Those incidents of infighting in the North of Sinai, and the lack of similar events in South Sinai is a strong indicator of the lack of group cohesion, and illustrates the negative effects on the society in the North as a whole of the competition between different families for bigger shares of the informal economic sector.

7.4.   Societal Cohesion

In order to conceptualize societal cohesion in South Sinai I turn firstly to the rather simple indicators of group size and group composition. Then, derived from Wendy Pearlman's paper on nonviolence in Palestine (2012), I borrow parts of the definition of cohesion commonly applied in natural science. There, not the size of the group or number of its members is decisive, rather the focus is put on the forces that bring the members together or tear them apart. Cohesion in this thesis then is understood as the result of those factors. As there is no real movement under specific leadership in Sinai, unlike in Palestine which for example is the case analyzed by Pearlman, the group in North Sinai and South Sinai is considered to consist of the people living in the two areas. The application of cohesion as a variable allows for scholars of political science to "move away from intellectually reifying political collectives and toward identifying the factors that allow that which is not actually an 'it' to act as if it were" (Pearlman 2012, Cox and Shepsle 2007). This approach fits this thesis very well and allows for the identification of the factors that allow the people in South Sinai almost homogeneously acting as a nonviolent group, in contrast to the group in North Sinai which does not possess a similar group cohesion and therefore hosts a considerable amount of spoilers who engage in violence.

A first factor is related to the demographic structures in the two areas, namely population size and population composition. The population in NS is almost three times as big as in South Sinai. The population in Sinai grew rapidly between 1982 and 2012. While in 1982 only about 35.000 people inhabited the peninsular, Sinai today is home to about 500.000 people of which most live in the northern coastal plain. However, due to ongoing migration of people from the Nile Valley, seasonal workers in the tourist sector, and unreliable figures about the precise number of Bedouins, it is difficult to exactly clarify this number. The International Crisis Group in a study of 2007 estimated that the number of Bedouins in the peninsular is about 200.000, Palestinians about

70.000 to 100.000, with the rest being mainly Egyptians from the Nile Valley (ICG 2007). Although Sinai historically was inhabited by above all Bedouins, the demographic distribution has been altered significantly in particular since the mid 1980s. The Egyptian government engaged in a large scale migration campaign of NVP to Northern Sinai in order to maintain control there, without having to place military forces there which is largely prohibited under the Camp David Agreement. Between 1986 and 1996 this led to population growth in North Sinai at an annual rate of 6.7 % (ICG 2007). The population in Sinai, however, is highly unevenly distributed over the peninsula. Also today, increasing the percentage of NVP in Sinai is a major concern for the government. The Egyptian Irrigation Minister Hisham Qandil for example explained that the Egyptian government plans the relocation of another three million citizens to Sinai as part of a larger project to boost the peninsula's population (Metwali Salem 08.09.2011).

Secondly, whereas only two subgroups live in South Sinai – Bedouins and NVP – the Palestinian refugees constitute a third subgroup in North Sinai. Living mainly in and around the cities of Al-Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed, they number up to 100.000 people or about a fourth of the population. The Palestinian diaspora in Sinai also maintained their specifically Palestinian identity and is of course strongly linked to their fellow Palestinians in the Gaza strip. On the one hand, the Palestinian identity is extremely pronounced given the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (ICG 2007: i). Furthermore, the Palestinians in Egypt were always regarded with suspicion by the central authorities, strongly disadvantaged, and not integrated into the Egyptian society. Last but not least, not only are the Palestinians of North Sinai more orientated to the Northeast than to the West, but also the Bedouins in North Sinai have a strong relationship to those Bedouin tribes living in Israel with whom they share the same language and traditions (Pelham 2012).

The two factors combined provide a first element in order to understand why the group in South Sinai is far less fragmented than the one in North Sinai. This cohesion or fragmentation

simultaneously facilitates and respectively complicates the management of relations between the members and the emergence of a sense of group identity.

The likely most important factor facilitating group cohesion and nonviolent discipline in the South is the shared economic dependency of most members of the group upon tourism. In 2003, more than 2.6 million tourists visited South Sinai, which constitutes more than a third of all of the tourists coming to Egypt (ICG 2007) and is based on a rapid expansion of tourist infrastructure along the coast and in the area around Mount Sinai and the monastery of St. Katarina. The number of hotels in South Sinai for example exploded from seventeen in 1994 to over 220 in 2002, most of them located in Sharm el-Sheikh (Ibid.). Considering the immense number of tourists in South Sinai, it is clear that both the state as a whole, as well as the locals in particular have a lot to lose if tourism is disrupted. Although NVP were favored as far as possible by the state in regard to jobs in the tourist industry (ICG 2007), the indigenous Bedouins in South Sinai were able to carve out a lucrative niche for themselves (Goodman 2012). On the one hand, they provide guided tours into the dessert and the mountains, own several of the camps in the north of Nuweiba as well as they were able to establish themselves as hotel owners in Dahab. Additionally, they control the extremely lucrative business of selling drugs – mainly hashish, marijuana and opium – to the tourists in Sharm el-Sheikh, Dahab and Nuweiba. The problem with tourism, in particular mass tourism, is, that most of the popular tourist destinations around the world offer fairly similar opportunities to tourists. Tourists who might fear for their safety in one tourist destination, "might therefore choose an alternative destination with similar characteristics but in a more stable condition" (Neumayer 2004). As outlined by Eric Neumayer in a paper (2004) illustrating the quantitative negative effect of violence on tourism in different countries, in particular prolonged violence leads to further undermining dynamics. "If the violence becomes more widespread and prolonged, official authorities in the countries where tourists originate will start issuing advice against traveling to the destination. Tourist operators will start eliminating tours to the country due to insufficient bookings,

fear of liability suits, and the like and promote other destinations instead" (Neumayer 2004: 260). Tourism by its nature requires a stable and peaceful environment, otherwise tourists, in particular from the West, simply choose other destinations and avoid the troubled region. From February 2011 onward this problem became evident and in March 2011 for example tourism in Sharm el-Sheikh had been down by at least 50 % compared to previous years (DPA 10.04.2011). As one hotel owner in South Sinai also confirmed, in particular European tourism had declined as those tourists like to move freely and without dangers and have a variety of alternative destinations available (Interview 3). Therefore, people in South Sinai have a shared interest of maintaining a situation as stable as possible in order to safeguard their main source of income. As Joshua Goodman puts it, "Sinai tourism is so reliant on political stability that any unrest by either Bedouin or the state would harm the economic interest of all parties" (Goodman 2012).

Furthermore, tourists like to see a presence of security forces. This also hinders locals from attacking police forces, who in turn are prevented from engaging in overly extreme or open acts of repression. Rather, somewhat of an unsaid agreement between all locals as well as the police has emerged, at least to the degree that order is to be maintained. The intention of the Bedouins to not let the political instability in Egypt after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak negatively affect the tourism in Sinai could already be observed immediately following the uprising in February 2011. As Mostafa ElMarsfawy, a journalist for Egypt Independent reported in April 2011, "Sinai Bedouins on Wednesday attacked anti-Mubarak demonstrators who were protesting before Sharm el-Sheikh International Hospital, where deposed President Hosni Mubarak is said to be undergoing medical treatment" (Egypt Independent 13.04.2011). As reason for this the Bedouins did not mention pro-Mubarak sentiments, but that "they wanted to restore calm in the region in order to reactivate tourism" (Ibid.). To be clear, also in South Sinai tensions between the groups and power holders exist, but these do not escalate into violence. As James Purtill adequately sums up:

"Traveling in Sinai, there is a sense of competing powers stepping on each other's toes, yet all are trying

to present a good face to the visitors. If it weren't for the visitors, it would be easy to see how the situation could quickly deteriorate. In private the Bedouin complain about the National Parks authority. The Egyptian government harasses the Bedouin. The Jabaliya Bedouin complain about Wadi Feiran. The non-Bedouin business owners complain about the Bedouin. The Jabaliya Bedouin complain about certain Jabaliya Bedouin taking too large a cut of the tourism profits" (James Purtill 30.04.2012).

Conversely in the North, the three different groups depend on different sources of income. While the NVP are above all working in the few legally provided opportunities – factories, gas and oil industry, and Egyptian tourism to the Mediterranean – the Bedouins are largely excluded from these sectors, as a result of the "prioritization of NVP needs over those of the local population" (Pelham 2012: 9). "By diverting resources and land away from the Bedouins, state planning not only favored Egyptians relocating from the Nile Valley, it also weakened traditional tribal coping mechanisms, such as subsistence agriculture" (Pelham 2012: 9). Instead, like the Palestinians who are also severely disadvantaged by the state in regard to legal opportunities of occupation, they depend on smuggling and other illegal activities. The informal economy consists of the smuggling of marijuana and opium, arms and basic goods, and people and organ trafficking. The tunnel trafficking to Gaza for example is controlled by the three tribes of the Sawarka, the Rumaylat and the Tarabeen (Pelham 2012). Also further in the South of Al Arish, smuggling – here of cigarettes, drugs and migrants from Africa to the border in the North – constitutes a major source of income for the Bedouin. Not only does this mean that the group as a whole has fewer incentives to maintain stability, steep differences in regard to economic opportunities have emerged and split the group into different interest groups. Shootings as a result of these activities between security forces and locals are reoccurring. The large-scale involvement in more or less illegal activities led to a natural antagonism between security forces and large parts of the population. Either security forces in North Sinai complicate business like smuggling, or if they turn a blind eye on it, they ask for their share. Generally speaking, the Egyptian government does not effectively hinder the business. In 2010 for example a study for US Congress estimated that about 7.000 people were working in more

than 1.000 tunnels, most of them "reportedly of a generally high quality of engeneering and construction – with some including electricity, ventilation, intercoms, and a rail system" (Zanotti 2010: 8).

7.5.   Different Experiences during Israeli occupation

The experiences of the local population with the Israelis during the time of occupation varied significantly depending on whether one lived in the North or in the South. The   Israeli occupation of Sinai and its policies there during this time constitute a largely neglected and forgotten part of Israeli history with no in-depth studies, at least in English language, available. However, the recent 30 year anniversary of the forced evacuation of Israeli settlers from Sinai reveals a small glimpse into Israeli policies in the northern part of the region at that time. According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, a policy of forced eviction of indigenous people and subsequent settlement of Israelis took place in the North of Sinai (Haaretz 29.04.2013). There, on the border to Gaza for example, about 1.500 Bedouins of the Al-Rimlat tribe were expelled and the settlement of Yamit which was home to up to 2.500 settlers was established. Oded Lipschits, who together with a group of other Israelis tried to investigate the events wrote, "A group of members from kibuttzim in the region, including me, started to investigate. We went out and toured the area, and were stunned by the dimensions of wreckage and by the number of persons expelled. The IDF and the government denied the facts that we presented and claimed they had merely evacuated a few nomads from state owned lands onto which the nomads had recently encroached" (Ibid.). The forced eviction of locals and subsequent settlement of Israelis illustrates the security lens through which the Israeli government viewed those parts of Sinai directly to the south of its border.

In the South of Sinai, however, the Israeli interests were above all of administrative nature

(Lavie 1984). By accepting in large parts the already existing tribal structures of rule (sheikhs ruling over certain families) where those did not oppose Israeli occupation and furthermore directly supplying families with food and medicine, the Israeli occupation force was able to built a more positive relationship with the Bedouin of Southern Sinai (Ibid.). "The Bedouin who had expected to be dealt with impersonally through the newly appointed sheikhs were astonished by this new, direct style" (Ibid.). This relationship was further enhanced with the providing of basic medical services and the buying of land for settlements instead of the eviction of residents. In particular in the central parts and in some newly established camps along the coast, this was seen as a "shining example of Israeli – Bedouin coexistence in South Sinai" (Ibid.). Last but not least rising numbers of tourists in South Sinai offered considerable, and contrary to smuggling, legal opportunities of income for the indigenous people. "When the Bedouin discovered that the tourists would pay them for food, drinks, and articles of clothing, they quickly grasped that a profit could be made from them" (Ibid.). To sum up the key difference of Israeli policy during the occupation of Sinai in the north and south, while security concerns dominated in the North and led to harsh measures against the local population, the relationship in South Sinai was fairly cooperative and characterized by Israeli tourism, instead of confrontation like in the North. In total, about 7.000 settlers had to be evacuated from Sinai in 1982, about 3.000 of them after violent confrontations with the IDF in particular in Yamit.

8. Findings

Before arriving at a final conclusion, the analyzed processes will be traced back and the findings of this thesis will be related back to the above-introduced hypotheses. Process tracing is understood as "the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator" (Collier 2011: 823). The intention is,

with a focus on the sequence of the different elements within the process to illustrate how the different factors in combination led to the different outcomes. When integrating the above-conducted analysis of each of the factors derived from the theoretical literature, a consistent picture emerges.

The first factor constituting a relevant experience of the local Bedouin population were their differing experiences during the Israeli occupation. While in the North people were left behind in 1982 with a traumatic experience of forced evictions and contacts with radical settlers, the Bedouins of South Sinai were, as a result of Israeli tourism, able to benefit financially from Israeli occupation. Furthermore, they were spared the contact with the radical Israeli settlers of the sort living in settlements like Yamut. The reason for these different experiences lies in the Israeli security focus on the north of the peninsula and the fairly administrative approach to its south. After 1982 then, back under Egyptian authority, the different approaches of the ruling authorities to the peninsula were continued. While the security lens constitutes the main perspective on both North and South Sinai, it was implemented far more rigorously in the North. Not only was the majority of NVP resettled by the Egyptian government allocated to this area, but the security regime was also more tight and brutal here. The indigenous population and the Palestinian refugees were further and further alienated from the Egyptian state. Then from the mid 1980s early 1990s onwards, the key difference explaining the violence in the North, respectively nonviolence in the South, manifested itself. While development in the North was promoted by the construction of some factories, tourism manifested itself as main source of income in the South. Although the Egyptian government in both areas excluded the indigenous population from the development, the Bedouins in South Sinai were able to maintain and expand their involvement in the tourism sector. As a result, a somewhat natural agreement emerged between security forces, Bedouins, and the NVP based on the shared interest to maintain peace and stability to retain the main source of income. In the North to the contrary, Palestinians and Bedouins were pushed further outside of the state into the illegal businesses of

smuggling and human trafficking. What emerged as a consequence in the North was a natural antagonism between Palestinians and Bedouins and security forces. Following the Egyptian uprising of 2011 and the subsequent security vacuum in Sinai, those differences came to bear. In the South, driven by the shared economic interest, locals played their part in maintaining peace and stability and as a rational decision based on the costs of uprising refrained from violence. In the North on the other hand, individual spoilers and the different groups pursuing a variety of economic and political interests increasingly retreated to violence. This provided an inviting context for radicals from other areas, criminals, and Jihadis who had escaped prison, as well as for individual locals to express themselves violently in this environment.

Returning to the above-introduced hypotheses, several results can be summed up. Regarding hypothesis one, political exclusion and oppression by the state in North Sinai was more brutal than in the South and also more prevalent. This led to higher levels of grievances and provides a first factor for the establishment of an environment that favors violence. Also the second hypothesis – economic exclusion – finds support. People in North Sinai live in one of the poorest districts of Egypt whereas people in the South aren't in such financially unstable situations after all. Hypothesis three also finds strong support. The potential losses in the tourism sector that could be expected from more violence in the South explains why people in the South rationally adhere to nonviolent discipline. Hypothesis four does not find much support as the state is equally able to respond in North and South. Hypothesis three is directly related to hypothesis five, as the shared source of income – tourism and related activities – provides the critical explanation for the cohesion of the society in the South. Despite being divided into a Bedouin and a NVP population, the shared interest overrides individual grievances resulting from political exclusion of the Bedouins or the preferential treatment of NVP. Furthermore the lack of such a uniting force in the North equally provides an explanation for the fragmentation of the people in the North and the resulting increased potential for individual spoilers.

One of the problems with such small-n qualitative studies however is the difficulty of concluding which of the factors was more important than others. However, in similar designs like in this case, the key difference in the independent variables is important to explain the difference. Structural preconditions – despite some differences – are rather similar in both cases and set a context that offers considerable opportunities to engage in violent activities without facing, at least initially, too much resistance by the state authorities given their limited presence. The dynamics resulting from illegal economic activities and openness to radical influences explain how the different actors are offered with opportunities to engage in violence. Unfortunately not all incidents can be recorded based on newspaper articles and the empiric evidence is too scarce for any conclusions in this regard without further research. However, basically three main types of violent incidents can be distinguished. About a third of the incidents can be related to radical Islamic motives. Another part, about a fifth on the incidents, is clearly related to criminal activities. A large part of the remaining of the violence however occurs in form of small unconnected events. Neither are these mostly ineffective attacks on security forces related to smuggling, nor are there any political or terrorist groups taking any responsibility. More research and extensive fieldwork – including if possible access to police or military records and talking extensively to people in the North – is necessary to establish a reliable empiric basis for further analysis. The key factor preventing this in the South is the societal cohesion as a result of the Bedouin involvement in the tourist sector. Cohesion alone is not sufficient to explain the nonoccurrence of violence, but in this case cohesion and stability go hand in hand.

9. Conclusion

The occurrence of violence constitutes a complex and omnipresent problem around the globe. The difference in the amounts of violence between the analyzed cases cannot be explained

solely by structural differences or focusing on the assumed master cleavages. Instead, the violence is the result of varying agents with their different interests and motives. This thesis attempted to explain these differences in the occurrence of violence between North and South Sinai. In order to do so, several steps were conducted. First, the theoretical literature on the occurrence of violence was scanned and the relevant independent variables – economic motives, grievances, social cohesion, and geopolitical environment were identified. Second, the chosen cases were introduced and the methodological approach outlined before further introducing the reader to the historical background of Sinai and the generally violence favoring similarities between the two areas. Subsequently, the extreme differences in regard to the dependent variable were illustrated. Afterward, getting into the explanatory sector, the different independent variables and the relevant indicators were further analyzed before the process that leads to the different outcomes was outlined.

The main implications of this thesis – theoretically as well as practically – are as follows. Theoretically, the first point relates to the relevance of the theoretical approaches regarding the occurrence of violence, or respectively the factors that prevent it from occurring. The thesis consisted of a comparison of two very similar cases, North and South Sinai, that however differed in some regards. It seems to be the case that the recent focus of the scholarship on the different drivers of violence is justified, at least the studied cases suggest so. Economic motives, grievances, societal cohesion and local dynamics, and the geopolitical context together explain a large piece of the puzzle as to why the frustration about government ignorance, mistreatment, and undelivered development promises escalated into violence in the Northern part of the peninsula but not in the South. One of the core arguments of this thesis is that there are forces – in this case the shared economic dependency on tourism – that can override ethnic differences, tensions among locals, and the political exclusion of parts of the people. Theoretical approaches focusing on a deeper analysis of the forces that pull the members of ethnically fragmented societies together and thereby increase

group cohesion are of high interest for future research. However, far more research and in-depth process tracing is necessary to investigate how these forces function, and why individual potential spoilers adhere to the nonviolent discipline. This much is obvious, the presence of more than one ethnic group – what is traditionally understood as ethnic fragmentation – does not necessarily mean that those people cannot act as an entity in certain regards. The findings of this thesis therefore support the bulk of literature that argues that it is not different ethnics, but what the state does with them, that makes a situation turn violent. Furthermore, it highlights the importance to view agents as individual actors who each have a position in the economic and political system that strongly influences their behavior.

From a practical perspective, the most important finding is that there is no evidence for the claims of those who describe Sinai as a new base of Al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations, as well as there is no support for claims of an escalating conflict along a supposed master cleavage between the Egyptian state and the indigenous Bedouins. The attacks that occurred were neither well organized, nor supported by the broad public, nor very effective – the exception being the attack on the Egyptian border post on 05.08.2012. Instead of being orchestrated efforts by one or more terror groups, the majority rather seems to be the result of either the illegal economic activities or individual grievances. Claims such as those by Benjamin Netanyahu, "The Sinai is turning into a kind of Wild West which … terror groups from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda, with the aid of Iran, are using to smuggle arms, to bring arms, to mount attacks against Israel" (Reuters 24.04.2012) are disproportionate and a sign of dangerous simplification. Certainly, some attacks can be traced back to radical groups, masked gunmen carrying the black flag of Al Qaeda have been seen several times. Attacks on Israeli and Christian targets were committed, and the fact that some of the actors present in Sinai have a similar target list – Christians, Jews and Westerners – as terror groups in other countries has to be acknowledged. Also the environment of Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict facilitates the labeling of individual acts of violence against security forces as

terrorism or radicalism. However, compared to previous attacks in Egypt – the Luxor Massacre of 1997 that left 62 tourists dead, or the wave of terror hitting the Southern Sinai tourist destinations in and around Taba, Nuweiba, Dahab and Sharm el-Sheikh between 2004 and 2006 that left more than 140 people dead the current outbursts of violence appear minimal and, as said, very unorganized. Furthermore, while the former attacks clearly targeted Western and particularly Israeli targets, a similar pattern cannot be observed at the moment.

Sinai, as mentioned above, functions as a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. If the situation in Sinai continues to erode, it is unlikely that the old security arrangement between Israel and Egypt can be upheld because Egypt would be forced to deploy more own troops to the border area to Israel. This however would face strong resistance from Israel, as demilitarization of Sinai constitutes an essential pillar of their security architecture. To allow Israeli troops to enter Sinai and face the emerging threats there themselves is also not an option, therefore Egypt has to find manners to calm the situation in Sinai without relying on excessive military force. At the root of the current tensions are economic problems resulting from the systematic exclusion of Sinai's indigenous population and the Palestinians and Egypt would be well advised to alter its politics towards the Sinai and its people rather sooner than later. Otherwise, a further escalation is likely, if not even predictable. This was also the case for the current crisis and Lavie and Young in an article on Sinai under Israeli and Egyptian occupation already in 1984 made clear: "Egyptian policies, if actually implemented, will permanently disrupt the fragile balance of the peninsula, and make the Bedouin into marginal migrant laborers in their own homeland. Mistakes made in haste now will certainly be extremely costly to correct and will plague the peoples of Egypt and Sinai for years to come" (Lavie and Young 1984: 43).

10. Appendix: List of recorded incidents

Date	Place	Description of Incident	Participants	Victims	Source of Information
17.01.13	Police kill gunman on Bir al-Abd – Arish road (NS)	Shootout between two gunmen and police when police wanted to check their car	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	One attacker dead, second gunman escaped	Al-Masry Al-Youm
12.01.13	Wadi al-Omar Area (NS)	Shootout between security forces and smugglers	Smugglers, Security Forces	Eight policemen injured, one smuggler dead	Egypt Independent
03.01.13	Abu Redis (SS)	Police car hijacked by armed assailants after fire exchange	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Ahram
25.11.12	Qaseema (NS)	Explosion of bombs planted in partly constructed building of Egy security fources	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	Unclear	Al-Masry Al-Youm
22.11.12	Goura area (NS)	Gunmen fire at car owned by international peacekeeping forces in Sinai	Unidentified Assailants, MNO	Unclear	Al-Masry Al-Youm
22.11.12	Gura Area (NS)	Protesters shoot at checkpoint close to peacekeepers camp, security forces return fire	Locals (likely Bedouins)	One local dead	Al-Masry Al-Youm
14.11.12	Israeli side of the border (Isr)	Four missiles (allegedly fired from Sinai) land in Israel	Unidentified Assailants	None	Egypt Independent
11.11.12	Rafah (NS)	Gunmen attack security forces camp	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Ahram
09.11.12	Bir al-Abed Area (NS)	Tribal feud turned violent	Bedouins	Four Bedouins killed and 20 severely injured	Al-Masry Al-Youm
06.11.12	Arish City	Gunmen attack police	Unidentified	One police	Al-Masry Al-

	(NS)	car in Arish City	Assailants, Security Forces	officer injured	Youm
03.11.12	Arish City (NS)	Unidentified gunmen attack police patrol	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	Three policemen dead, five injured	Reuters
29.10.12	Arish City (NS)	Army shoots at cab trying to run checkpoint	Security Forces, Locals	Cab driver dead, passenger injured	Al-Masry Al-Youm
22.10.12	Abordis (SS)	Gunmen attack gas station	Unidentified Assailants	One policeman injured	MENA
08.10.12	Arish City (NS)	Gunfight between two armed men and security forces	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	One policeman dead, one attacker dead	MENA
28.09.12	Arish (NS)	Gunmen opens fire at Coptic owned store	Unidentified Assailants, Locals	None	Egypt Independent
21.09.12	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Israeli Army shoots three heavily armed gunmen sneaking into Israel	Unidentified Assailants, IA	One Israeli soldier and three gunmen dead	AFP
16.09.12	Sheikh Zuwayed (NS)	Unidentified gunmen attack police station	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	Seven security forces members and three civilians injured	Egypt Independent
14.09.12	MNO camp (NS)	Bedouins storm peacekeeper camp	Bedouins, MNO	Three people injured	Al-Ahram
09.09.12	Operation Eagle Press conference	North Sinai	Operation Eagle to attack militants in North Sinai following 5/8 attack	32 criminals killed, 58 arrested	Ahmed Abu Draa
08.09.12	Sheikh Zuwayed (NS)	Unidentified gunmen attack police department	Unknown	None	MENA
07.09.12	Rayesa Checkpoint outisde Arish	Unidentified gunmen attack checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	MENA

	(NS)				
06.09.12	Arish Airport (NS)	Unidentified gunmen attack checkpoint on Arish-Airport road	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	MENA
05.09.12	Al-Tor (SS)	Gunmen attack police station	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
01.09.12	Sinai (NS)	Egyptian reportedly beheaded by Sinai militants	Bedouin Militants	One local dead	AFP
31.08.12	Arish-Rafah Road (NS)	Rayesa checkpoint attacked	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	MENA
30.08.12	South of Karam Abu Salem border crossing (NS)	Clashes between suspected smugglers and Egyptian security forces	Smugglers, Security Forces	Two soldiers injured	Al-Masry Al-Youm
27.08.12	Arish Checkpoint (NS)	Gunmen fire on checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
26.08.12	Khariza Area (NS)	Explosion kills motorcycle driver, cause unclear (carried explosives, land mine, Israeli airstrike)	Locals	One local dead	Al-Masry Al-Youm
24.08.12	Arish and Sheikh Zuwayed checkpoints (NS)	Masked gunmen open fire on checkpoints	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	MENA
19.08.12	Rayesa Checkpoint (NS)	Unidentified gunmen open fire on checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
15.08.12	Eilat (Isr)	Two powerful explosions in Eilat, rockets allegedly from Israel	Unidentified Assailants	None	AFP
14.08.12	Arish Checkpoint (NS)	Gunmen open fire at a checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Reuters
13.08.12	Border to	Gunmen kill tribal	Unidentified	Two	Reuters

	Israel (NS)	leader and son in Israel	Assailants, Bedouins	Bedouins dead	
13.08.12	Kharouba (NS)	Security forces (supported by local Bedouin) raid arms depot	Security Forces, Militants	Five Militants dead	Al-Masry Al-Youm
12.08.12	Arish (NS)	Militants attack Arish Police Station	Militants, Security Forces	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
12.08.12	Al-Goura (NS)	Shootout between armed forces and militant gunmen	Security Forces, Militants	Seven militants dead	Egypt Independent
12.08.12	Sheikh Zuwayed / Arish (NS)	Several Checkpoints attacked	Militants, Security Forces	None	Egypt Independent
12.08.12	International Road (NS)	Car chase	Security Forces, Militants	Three soldiers dead, four policemen injured	Egypt Independent
08.08.12	Border to Israel (NS)	Military forces and jets kill 20 militants	Security Forces, Militants	20 militants dead	Egypt Independent
08.08.12	NS	Seven checkpoints attacked by gunmen	Militants, Security Forces (witnesses)	One soldier and one local wounded	Ashgan Harb
07.08.12	Wadi-Firan (NS)	16 parked police cars attacked	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
07.08.12	Ras Sidr (SS)	Shots fired at a car belonging to the Education Ministry en route from Cairo	Unidentified Assailants, Government	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
05.08.12	Border to Israel close to Rafah (NS)	Militants attack police station, steal armed vehicle and cross into Israel where they are killed immediately	Militants, Security Forces	16 Egyptian security forces members dead, seven injured, four attackers dead on Israeli Territory	Al-Masry Al-Youm
01.08.12	Egyptian-Israeli	Fire exchange across border between Israeli	Unidentified Assailants, IA	None	Al-Ahram

	border (NS)	Army and gunmen			
27.07.12	Rafah Crossing (NS)	Shootout between security forces and suspected smugglers	Security Forces, smugglers	None	MENA
22.07.12	Central Southern Part of Egy-Israeli Border (NS)	Shots fired at Israeli Army bus from Sinai	Unidentified Assailants, IA	None	AFP
19.07.12	Sheikh Zuwayed (NS)	Gunmen shoot at checkpoint	Militants, Security Forces	Two soldiers dead	Egypt Independent
13.07.12	Nikhil (SS)	Two American tourists and tourguide kidnapped to pressure government (released 16.07.)	Bedouins, Tourists	None	Ashgan Harb
11.07.12	Ramady (NS)	Gunmen storm cement factory and sabotage equipment	Unidentified Assailants	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
30.06.12	Hasna (NS)	Gunmen open fire on army vehicle	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	One soldier dead, one soldier injured	Al-Masry Al-Youm
18.06.12	Egyptian-Israeli Border (NS)	Militants cross to Israel from Sinai, kill one civilian before being attacked by Israeli forces	Militants, IA	One Israeli Civilian dead, one militant dead	MENA
16.06.12	Arava Valley (Isr)	Explosion in Southern Israel, Israel says rocket from Sinai, Egypt denies	Unidentified Assailants	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
31.05.12	Rafah (NS)	Tribal feud between Rumailat and Barahama escalates into battle	Bedouins	Six Bedouins injured	Al-Masry Al-Youm
31.05.12	Dahab-Nuweiba road (SS)	Bedouin kidnap two American tourists to pressure government (released same day)	Bedouins, Tourists	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
07.05.12	NS	10 Fiji Peacekeepers	Bedouins, MNO	None	Reuters

		kidnapped by Bedouin (released one day later)			
06.05.12	NS	Gunmen attack police checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	None	Al-Masry Al-Youm
02.05.12	NS	RPG fired at police checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	One policeman dead	Egypt Independent
15.04.12	Arish (NS)	Gunmen attack police checkpoint	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	Two policemen dead, one injured	AP
05.04.12	Eilat (Isr)	Rocket hits Eilat	Unidentified Assailants	None	Reuters
27.03.12	Rafah (NS)	Fire exchange between Israeli and Egyptian forces following attempt to pursue smugglers	IA, Security Forces	One Israeli dead, two Egyptians injured	Al-Ahram
23.03.12	Rafah (NS)	Gunmen seize police vehicle and torture three soldiers	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	Three soldiers injured	MENA
22.03.12	Nuweiba-Dahab Road (SS)	Czech tourguide kidnapped by gunmen	Bedouins, Tourists	None	Egypt Independent
18.03.12	St. Catherine Area (SS)	Two Brazilian Tourists kidnapped (released after one day)	Bedouins, Tourists	None	AFP
16.03.12	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Israeli troops prevent border crossing	Israeli Army, Smugglers	One smuggler dead, three injured	Egypt Independent
28.02.12	Egyptian-Israeli Border (NS)	Israeli army prevents illegal border crossing	Israeli Army, Militants	One militant dead	AFP
10.02.12	St. Catherine Area (SS)	Three Korean Tourists kidnapped (released unharmed)	Bedouins, Tourists	None	Reuters
08.02.12	Sharm (SS)	Police prevents attempted robbery in Sharm	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	One policeman injured	Al-Masry Al-Youm
31.01.12	(NS)	Chinese workers kidnapped by Bedouin (released after one day)	Bedouins, Tourists	None	Reuters

29.01.12	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Border Guards shot at by smugglers	Smugglers, Security Forces	One soldier injured	MENA
28.01.12	Sharm (SS)	Revenge drive by shooting for killed Bedouin	Bedouins, Tourists	One French tourist dead	Egypt Independent
28.01.12	Sharm (SS)	Bedouin shot by police	PF, Bedouins	One Bedouin dead	Egypt Independent
21.11.11	NS	Gunfight during attempt to arrest members of Jihadi group	Security Forces, Militants	One policeman dead, one injured	MENA
14.11.11	NS	Escalation in fights between Bedouin about organ trafficking	Bedouins	Unclear, at least one Bedouin dead	Osama Khaled
25.10.11	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Police trying to stop smugglers	Security Forces, smugglers	One policeman injured	MENA
12.09.11	Tawil Area (NS)	Gunfire exchange at police checkpoint	Security Forces, Militants	Two policemen wounded	Osama Khaled
19.08.11	Checkpoint 79. (NS)	Suicide bomber attacks checkpoint	Supposedly Bedouin but unclear	One soldier dead, two soldiers injured	Osama Khaled
19.08.11	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Gunfight near border	Security Forces, Unidentified Assailants	One policeman killed, one injured	AFP
19.08.11	NS	Several checkpoints attacked	Militants, Security Forces	Unknown	Ahmed Abu Draa
19.08.11	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Five Egyptian soldiers killed during Israeli attempt to hunt down militants after attack in Israel	IA, Security Forces, Militants	Five Egyptian soldiers dead	Reuters
18.08.11	Southern Israel (Isr)	Three attacks on targets in Israel	Unidentified Assailants	Eight Israelis dead	Egypt Independent
15.08.11	NS	Gunfight between Army and gunmen	AS, Militants	One gunman dead	Ahmed abu Draa
30.07.11	Arish (NS)	Show of strength of militants in Arish,	Militants	One soldier dead, three	Reuters

		subsequent attack on police station		civilians dead	
22.06.11	NS	Police patrol attacked	Unidentified Assailants, Security Forces	Two policemen dead	AP
04.06.11	Arish (NS)	Truck hits checkpoint	Unclear	Three soldiers dead	AP
15.05.11	NS	Sheikh Zuwayed Shrine bombed	Salafi Militants	None	Reuters
06.05.11	Arish (NS)	Gunfight between military and armed gang	Smugglers, Security Forces	One soldier dead, one soldier injured, one civilian injured	Reuters
13.04.11	Sharm (SS)	Bedouins attack anti-Mubarak protesters with rocks and stones to restore order and reactivate tourism	Bedouins, locals	Several locals injured	Mostafa El-Marsfawy
24.02.11	Egyptian-Israeli border (NS)	Gunfight between smugglers and policemen	Smugglers, Security Forces	One policeman dead	Egypt Independent

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Interviews and Informal Discussions:

Interview 1: Interview with Sherif, NVP, Ecolodge owner and founder of several locally active NGOs 20 kilometers from Nuweiba; conducted on 08.05.2013.

Interview 2: Interview with Ahmed, Northern Tarabeen tribe, originally from Al-Arish; conducted 12.05.2013.

Interview 3: Interview with hotel owner in Dahab; conducted 16.05.2013.

Informal Discussion 1: Discussion with several local Bedouins in Nuweiba; conducted 04.05.2013.

Informal Discussion 2: Discussion with elder Bedouin North of Nuweiba; conducted 05.05.2013.