Leiden University MA International Studies Thesis

REBEL-TO-PARTY TRANSFORMATIONS: CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ELECTORAL SUCCESS

On FARC electoral results in the 2018 Congress elections in the Colombian south

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Introduction

In 1999, twenty-five countries were in ongoing civil war. Between 1945 and 1999 around 16,2 million people died in these conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75) and in 2017 68,5 million people were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict or generalized violence (UNHCR 2018, 2). Peacebuilding has become a subject of great interest to scholars and policymakers, due to the cost of conflict for human and governmental security. For the safety and the quality of life of the local civilian population it is highly relevant to have a good understanding of what constitutes a good and sustainable peace process, and to solve the question of how rebels can successfully reintegrate into society. A potentially effective solution is the negotiated settlement, which can produce an enduring peace if it includes power-sharing agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 2-3).

In power-sharing agreements, rebel groups will be given the opportunity to enter post-conflict elections as political parties. In the case of the Colombian armed conflict between the government and the insurgent armed group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP or FARC), political participation was a key pillar of the peace deal that was signed in 2016. The peace negotiations between the government and the FARC had lasted for years and took place in Havana, Cuba in the presence of and with support from the United Nations, after which FARC became a legal political party (Mechoulan and Segura 2017, 24-26).

This transformation of rebel group to political party is a relatively well-known form of conflict resolution. Rebels often have grievances due to political exclusion and will embrace the opportunity to participate, while states perceive a benefit of peace over war and make the rational choice for political inclusion (Söderberg Kovacs and Hatz 2016, 990). Both parties choose an inclusive peace process over a continuation of war when war is more costly than political inclusion and participation. The academic literature on the subject shows that peace processes that include democratization contribute to the durability of that process. Electoral successes of former rebel groups contribute to a lasting democratization but are complicated by past illegal behaviors by the same people that are now politicians (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013; Manning 2007; De Zeeuw 2007; Söderberg Kovacs 2007).

For protracted conflicts like the Colombian one, the peace process and subsequent democratization are complicated, and political inclusion will not always be followed by electoral success. Past interactions between the rebel group and the civilian population during the conflict play a role in the electoral success of a new political party, as does the inner transformation of the party's motivations and structures (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, Rufyikiri 2017). If the political party proves to be non-viable, due to a lack of widespread electoral support, this could be detrimental to the durability of the peace (Reilly 2006; Ishiyama and Batta 2011).

The Colombian Senate elections of March 2018 were the first the Partido Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC) could compete in. The results were disappointing for the party. Only 0,34% of the country's votes went to the post-revolutionaries so one can say FARC has little to no electoral success which could be detrimental to the durability of the peace. However, zooming in on the regional level, there are significant differences in voting behavior. In the southern department of Putumayo, FARC received 3,08% of the votes which is 806% higher than the national percentage and 76% higher than the second highest percentage in a department (Registraduria 2018).

To assess how FARC could gain localized electoral support, which contributes to the durability of the Colombian peace, this thesis seeks to answer the question: What factors contributed to a relatively successful 2018 Senate election result for the FARC's political party in the department of Putumayo, Colombia? This paper will provide an answer to that question by answering the following sub questions: 1) How do guerrilla groups transform from violent non-state actors into political parties with electoral support? 2) What is the historical context of FARC in the Colombian conflict in the twentieth century? 3) How could FARC succeed in gaining relative electoral support in the department of Putumayo?

Methodology

For the completion of this thesis, I was interested in factors that contributed to localized electoral success of the new FARC political party in Colombia, in the 2018 elections. Reading the literature, it became clear that the body of research is still too small to give a conclusive

answer to what factors determine that rebel-to-party transformations conclude with electoral success for the former rebel group. I was intrigued to determine the outlying factor(s) for electoral success for FARC in the department of Putumayo, and to do so, I had to develop tests to examine whether predictive success factors, as formulated in the academic research, were present in Putumayo compared to Colombia, and to a second, historically comparable department, and could therefore explain relative electoral success for FARC in the department. To put the second department in comparison to Putumayo is instrumental for determining the outlying factor for Putumayo specifically.

The thesis relies on the use of hypotheses. A well-known method for social research, a hypothesis can be used when research has already been done on the subject, allowing for a prediction to be made. The body of research that is available for the subject of localized electoral success suggests that there are three main categories of indicators of electoral success for a former rebel group. These three are violence during the conflict, presence of the state and the rebel group in certain regions, and the presence or absence of political competitors in the area. In the literature review, five hypotheses were formulated that are tested in chapter two, based on these three subcategories. Subsequently, in chapter three, this analysis will be discussed.

The following hypotheses followed from the literature review and form the basis for my analysis and discussion:

H1 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where they provided public services.

H2 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where they were able to hold territory for a significant amount of time.

H3 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where violence by FARC was not, and violence by the government was disproportionately directed at the civilian population.

H4 FARC will have more electoral success in areas with high levels of violence in combination with the delivery of public services and benefits.

H5 FARC will have more electoral support in areas where its competitors on the political left are strong.

The levels of violence, for Hypotheses 3 and 4, will be determined on the basis of data sets collected by the Colombian center for national history. These data sets concern different types of violence that occur in a conflict and are very detailed. They contain exact places of occurrence, number of victims, types of victims and perpetrator. The data is therefore useful for determining levels of several types of violence. A comparative analysis of Putumayo and the rest of Colombia will be made, illustrated by graphs. For the other hypotheses, academic articles and news reports are used that describe the situation in Colombian departments, as well as reports by Colombian independent research institutions. These reports and articles often make mention of public services delivered by FARC, as well as provide maps and other types of overviews that depict the presence of armed groups in the different Colombian departments. The information will be used to make an analysis of presence of and public services by FARC, as well as by other actors to the conflict.

Chapter structure

The electoral success of FARC was precipitated by an inclusion of the group as a political party in the Colombian political system after a transformation of the rebel group into such a participant in the electoral field. It is therefore necessary, in the literature review section, to discuss the academic research previously done on the concepts of rebel-to-party transformation and electoral success. Among the relevant issues are what factors contribute to a successful transformation (and when can a transformation be called successful), and what circumstances may lead to (local) electoral success for a new political party that was formerly involved in armed conflict with the government. The literature review will show that a small academic discussion has been active about political transformation and localized electoral success which offers qualitative and quantitative determining factors to explain that success. This discussion will later be used to investigate hypotheses formulated for the Colombian case specifically.

The first chapter will then give a short introduction in the relevant Colombian history, specifically Colombian insurgency, right wing politics and violence, and the peace process, to clarify the context this thesis is placed in. The literature review posits several hypotheses that will, in the second chapter, be tested through the academic literature on the situation in

Colombia and, specifically, Putumayo, as well as through thoroughly and diligently collected data about violence in the department of Putumayo conducted by the relevant actors. This data will primarily concern the use of violence by the FARC, paramilitaries and government, the cultivation and fumigation of coca in the department of Putumayo, and the level of governance and presence of the FARC and the central government. Furthermore, results of the most recent elections, polls regarding support for the FARC through the years, and the 2016 peace plebiscite will be examined. A comparison will be made to a second department that seemingly has a comparable history to Putumayo, but nonetheless showed significantly less support for FARC. The third chapter is a discussion on how the evidence from Putumayo and the compared department uphold or disprove the previously formulated hypotheses. This discussion will help explain how the FARC was able to keep a relatively strong support base in Putumayo even up until 2018. Therefore, the methodology of the thesis will be a combination of quantitative and qualitative empirical analysis, and literature review.

Literature review

The electoral success of FARC was preceded by the inclusion of the group as a political party in the Colombian political system. It is therefore necessary to discuss the academic research previously done about rebel-to-party transformation and electoral success. Among the relevant issues are what factors contribute to a successful transformation, and when can a transformation be called successful, and what circumstances may lead to (local) electoral success for a new political party. Before these questions can be answered, the concepts of civil war and rebel and insurgent groups must first be framed into definitions. The literature review will show that an academic discussion has been active about political transformation and electoral success which offers qualitative and quantitative determining factors to explain that success. This discussion will, in this literature review, be used to investigate hypotheses formulated for the Colombian case specifically.

How do violent non-state actors transform into non-violent political actors with electoral support?

The concepts to be discussed in this paper are the characteristics of violent non-state actors, and insurgencies in particular, the transformation of rebel movements into peaceful political parties, and which factors may contribute to a successful transformation and electoral success. This literature review will outline the available academic literature on those concepts and provide hypotheses to answer the research question, following from the academic literature on localized electoral support for former rebel groups.

Violent non-state actors and civil war

Violent non-state actors have been a topic of interest to many scholars for decades since they pose a threat to the nation state. In the modern world the relevance of the study of these movements becomes even more relevant, since the impact of the groups' violence is often felt across the globe, through media coverage, attacks abroad or domestic with foreign victims (Mulaj 2010, 2). To this date, the longest period of civil war in Latin America has been the Colombian conflict. Since 1948, when *La Violencia*, a period of partisan violence, broke out, the country has seen constantly high levels of political violence (Molano 2000, 23-24). The FARC

insurgency started in 1964 and ended in 2016 with the Final Agreement. The country continues to be subject to violence by FARC dissidents, remobilized paramilitaries in several criminal gangs under the umbrella name *Bandas Criminales* (BACRIM), and narco trafficking groups (Naucke 2017, 458).

Civil wars are defined by Stathis Kalyvas (2011) as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities" (203). Subjected parties, here, are usually state agents - national armies - or rebel groups, where the latter are often the weaker party due to a relative lack of (human and material) resources. Rebel groups usually have the capacity to challenge the state in some way; however, they lack the strength to fight the authority directly and frontally in the field. These conditions lead to confrontations that do not resemble classic warfare, rendering this type of warfare asymmetric as opposed to symmetric, and irregular as opposed to conventional (Kalyvas 2011, 204).

These rebelling groups exist in the form of many different types of actors, collected under the umbrella term violent non-state actors (VNSAs). They are groups that use violence to achieve their goals. Violent non-state actors can have political and non-political goals and they can be divided into the following subcategories (Mulaj 2010, 3-4)

1. Liberation movements confronting an occupying party, seeking to establish a new state or join an adjacent state (Kosovo Liberation Army, Sudan People's Liberation Army);
2. Insurgent guerrilla groups, aiming at destroying or weakening the ruling government (the Colombian FARC, ELN and M-19);
3. Terrorist groups, spreading fear through threat or use of violence, mainly against civilians, for political purposes (Al Qaeda);
4. Militants in the form of irregular but recognizable armed forces, such as paramilitaries and warlords, operating in weak states (various armed groups in Somalia);
5. Mercenary militias (some private military firms).

Insurgent groups, per definition, have political motivations for their rebellion. Often, this includes an original political agenda and the goal to overtake - or be included in - the opposed authority's political system. During the pursuit of this goal, the rebel insurgent group often challenges the government's monopoly on violence by using force to overthrow, reform or secede from a state: there is a politically instrumental use of violence, which further clarifies the difference between insurgent groups and other types of VNSAs (De Zeeuw 2008, 4). The Colombian conflict with guerrilla groups until 2016 was typified by several groups aiming for a full Communist revolution, aiming to overthrow the state by political or military means, and establishing a new government. FARC, besides being an army in active violent conflict with the national army and right wing paramilitaries from 1964 until 2016, has always had political aspirations as is proven by their continuing policy of *la combinación de todas las formas de la lucha*, which translates to "the combination of all forms of struggle" (Phelan 2018, 2). Whenever the political system of Colombia opened to Communist participation, FARC would insert its agents in the electoral race. In 1986, when the FARC-sponsored *Union Patriótica* or UP was allowed to participate in Colombian elections, FARC took the opportunity and its presidential candidate received 4,5% of votes. Furthermore, they maintained an underground political organization called the *Partido Comunista Clandestino Colombiano,* or Clandestine Colombian Communist Party (Phelan 2018, 2).

From rebels to political actors

Conflicts end in one of two ways, either with a military victory for the rebels or the government, or with a peace agreement through a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement. Negotiated settlements have two subcategories, settlements with and without power-sharing provisions, which are sub agreements that anticipate the rebel group's transformation into a political party (Johnson 2015, 64).

Democratic inclusion of VNSAs is increasingly seen as key to democratization and peacebuilding processes, and critical in conflict resolution (Rufyikiri 2017, 222). Ishiyama and Batta (2011, 369) claim that durable peace agreements are formed when former rebel groups receive in the agreement a platform to articulate their interests, through engagement in the political process. By being involved, the groups will have a new interest in remaining peaceful.

Manning, in her 2007 paper, claims a similar argument, stating that "the construction of democracy has been at the center of most peace agreements to end civil wars since 1990" (253), and that democratization is key to building durable peace. Similarly, Curtis and De Zeeuw write in their 2010 literature review on the subject how "power-sharing … increases the incentives that former rebel groups will credibly lay down their arms, since they will benefit from peace" (2). Phelan has argued that the Colombian peace agreement gave FARC means and resources to pursue its traditional goals democratically, while the agreement itself already provides solutions to many of the group's grievances, such as inclusion of marginalized groups and land reform. Simultaneously, the Colombian government benefits from the agreement since the accord strengthens the state's democratic legitimacy, by a democratization and a reconciliation of deeply rooted socio-economic grievances. Not only does the agreement allow space for FARC in the political field, it also politically includes traditionally marginalized Colombian groups such as women and the indigenous (Phelan 2018, 2).

Most civil wars with a negotiated settlement end with a formal democratization process, where the former rebel groups can transform into a democratic party. The quality and durability of the new democratic system then depends largely on the viability of the political parties that compete in the political arena (Manning 2004, 54). For an understanding of how civil wars can end in a durable democratic system with multiparty competition, it is therefore relevant to explain how rebel groups can successfully transform into a political party that will last.

There are many factors that can predict the successful transformation of a former VNSA to a viable political party. Among others, De Zeeuw (2008), Ishiyama and Widmeier (2013), Weinberg and Pedahzur (2008) and Allison (2010) have made descriptions of such predictions. De Zeeuw's (2008, 17) theory focuses on the post-conflict inner transformation of the rebel movement whereas Ishiyama and Widmeier place importance on the transformation of the rebel group and its interaction with the government, as well as the rebel group's behavior during the conflict as predictors for electoral success after a successful transformation.

Therefore, there are external *and* internal dynamics that determine a group's successful transformation.

De Zeeuw has developed a theory that divides rebel-to-political party transformations into four categories, namely successful, partial, facade or failed. The transformation is seen as successful if there has been a demilitarization of organizational structures, development of party organization, democratization of decision-making and adaptation of strategies and goals. If any of these conditions are not met, for example the organization has not succeeded in implementing structural change, there could be a partial transformation, whereas the transformation is a facade if there is, for example, no will to change strategies. Lastly, there has been a failed transformation if the rebel group does not establish itself as a viable political party (De Zeeuw 2008, 16-19). Deonandan, in her 2007 book, similarly evaluates the transition along internal lines, naming as factors the degree to which the party has tried to maintain its original ideological commitment, the extent to which the party has democratized internally, the strategies of the party to rejuvenate its leadership and the factors which help to explain electoral success or lack thereof (232). In summary, researchers agree that the party, in order to successfully undergo the transformation, must undergo democratic change in its decision-making, leadership and strategies and goals, meaning a demilitarization of its structures, while maintaining its original ideology.

FARC was relatively unsuccessful in the 2018 elections, which, following the above theories, puts into question the durability of the Colombian democratization process. Several FARC leaders have continued fighting as dissidents on several fronts and therefore there was no full demilitarization of the party structures, either. Electoral success is an important variable in deciding whether, ultimately, the party transformation was successful. The incomplete demilitarization and lack of electoral success of FARC can predict a failed transformation per the theory of De Zeeuw, since he said that a transformation will be failed when there is no establishment of a viable political party. Building durable peace develops from durable democratization. The interest and relevance of this paper is, therefore, how FARC's relationship with Putumayo is and how it has been able to, there, become a relatively viable political contender which, ultimately, promotes peace in Colombia.

Electoral success

This paper will now provide an overview of the available academic work on the subject, which is still restricted to the work of Ishiyama and Widmeier in an investigation of new political parties' electoral success in Nepal and Tajikistan, and Allison's work on El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras. The article of Ishiyama and Widmeier explicitly focuses on localized electoral support, which excludes several of the variables formulated by Allison. Several factors, mostly those focused on institutions and inner party transformations, are equal throughout the country and therefore do not explain localized party success. This paper will focus in the analysis on those factors that distinguish localities from each other.

Allison and Ishiyama & Widmeier agree that the most important predictors of localized electoral support are violence during the conflict, and the organization and popular support the party had during the conflict, and during its transformation phase. A third factor that they have agreed is a possible predictor for electoral success, is the previous success of political competitors. They have not yet found proof of this factor in their research, but it might still be relevant to the Colombian case (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 532).

Organization and popular support

Capturing territory enables the rebel group to establish so-called bush bureaucracies which can provide benefits and services to a population that was previously underserved by governmental support. These "counter states" are usually restricted to the controlled territory and not country-wide and can, therefore, predict localized electoral support (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 533). In his 2010 research, Allison found a strong link between control and electoral support on the municipal level for FMLN in El Salvador, meaning that, locally, effective rebel control can later lead to electoral support. Municipalities where rebels were absent had lower levels of electoral support for FMLN (Allison 2010, 121). Ishiyama and Widmeier's research into Tajikistan and Nepal shows that area control was a factor in Nepal, but not in Tajikistan. The rebels in Tajikistan had been in exile in Afghanistan and could therefore not provide public services in the area that they had come to control by coercion, which is an indicator that area control means little without the provision of public services. The Nepalese CPN(M), on the other hand, received 13 per cent higher level of electoral

support in areas they controlled than in areas under governmental control. The case Ishiyama and Widmeier took as a comparison from Allison's work, FMLN in El Salvador, shows comparable electoral results to CPN(M) as well as the establishment of bush bureaucracies. The absence of a bush bureaucracy in Tajikistan, and the presence of it in El Salvador and Nepal, combined with higher localized electoral support in El Salvador and Nepal in rebel-controlled areas than in Tajikistan, can indicate that areas under rebel control with public services and benefits will give more electoral support to the new political party (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 545).

The following hypotheses to predict localized electoral success for FARC follow:
H1 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where they provided public services.
H2 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where they were able to hold territory for a significant amount of time.

Violence during the conflict

The academic work that exists on electoral support for former rebel groups in combination with the violent nature of the civil wars they emerged from, is constricted to Ishiyama and Widmeier's work on Tajikistan and Nepal (2013), and that of Allison on El Salvador (2010). Allison writes that rebel groups will often abstain from intentionally targeting civilians in their violent actions since they rely upon their material support during the conflict. He hypothesized that "support for the rebels should be strong in those communities where the rebels infrequently used violence against the civilian population in absolute terms as well as relative to government forces" (Allison 2010, 108). Surprisingly, this hypothesis was refuted in the same article, as well as in Ishiyama and Widmeier's work.

Allison found that, even though there was no evidence that FMLN in El Salvador intentionally targeted civilians on a scaled compared to the country's military, the group did target the country's infrastructure - electricity grids, bridges, dams, water stations, highway chokepoints - frequently. Per their strategy, this should show the inability of the country's government to provide for public services. According to Allison, this could have had a negative effect on the group's popular support since their actions could have made life more difficult, pushing

previously non-aligned civilians to the government's side. Furthermore, the group carried out over 3,000 human rights violations against civilians during the first half of the 1980s and became even more indiscriminate in their violent attacks in the second half of that decennium (Allison 2010, 117). Simultaneously, a faction of the FMLN forcibly recruited combatants and assassinated public officials, possibly resulting in further negative effects upon guerrilla support (Allison 2010, 118). The study, in its establishment of levels of violence per department, does not differentiate in the direction and perpetrator of the violence. A department in which 70% of families had at least one family member killed as a result of the war, but its citizens voted more often for FMLN than those in a department where 38% of families were affected. On the municipal level, Allison came to similar results. Areas of the country more affected by the war provided greater support for the FMLN than areas less affected by the conflict (Allison 2010, 118).

Ishiyama and Widmeier, in their empirical analysis on the conflicts in Tajikistan and Nepal, came to similar conclusions. IRPT in Tajikistan and CPN(M) in Nepal had relatively successful election results in those areas where the level of violence was higher. They find that the districts with the highest level of violence in Tajikistan were mostly affected by government forces (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 545). CPN(M) in Nepal did carry out high levels of violence in areas they controlled but were not punished for this behavior during the elections. Ishiyama and Widmeier conclude that the support for CPN(M) in these areas can be attributed, at least in part, to the bush bureaucracies that were established by the party (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 546).

The following hypotheses follow:
H3 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where violence by FARC was not, and violence by the government was, disproportionately directed at the civilian population.
H4 FARC will have more electoral success in areas with high levels of violence in combination with the delivery of public services and benefits.

Political competition

Allison tested the hypothesis that new political party support should be greater in areas where competitor parties with similar ideological platforms are weak. Allison found that all his hypotheses were refuted by his case study, and Ishiyama and Widmeier found that these hypotheses could not significantly be supported or refuted for Tajikistan and Nepal. The FMLN in El Salvador did well in areas where the political left had performed well previously (Allison 2010, 122). Ishiyama and Widmeier found no significant relationship between the strength of a competitor and the former rebel party (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 546). It is highly interesting to take this - previously unproven - factor into account in the Colombian situation, since the previous prevalence of left-wing political parties that originated in the revolution - *Unión Patriótica* and M-19 - as well as the ongoing presence of left-wing guerrilla group ELN.

The following hypothesis follows:
H5 FARC will have more electoral support in areas where its competitors on the political left are strong.

1. Historical context of FARC in the Colombian conflict in the twentieth and twenty-first century

Che Guevara and Fidel Castro's Communist success in Cuba inspired peasant and intellectual groups throughout the Latin American continent to take up arms and fight civil wars against inequality and poverty. The Cuban revolution of 1959 should be viewed in the context of a centuries long tradition of guerrilla wars on the South American continent. The wars of independence were fought by rebels from the countryside using guerilla tactics (Castro 1999, xvi).

The Colombian context in the 1960s was the perfect environment for insurgency in this Latin American climate. Many of Colombia's provinces had developed largely apart from the capital and seat of government Bogotá. A diversity in terrain throughout the country and a lack of roads and motorized vehicles made it almost impossible for most citizens to travel across the country. The central government was a distant power only visible in armed confrontations and, often, the government would exercise force in rural Colombia to reinforce the country's elites. This isolation caused a distrust, while the government has never had effective control over the entirety of its territory. Simultaneously, the Colombian independence from the Spanish in 1810 had led to a transition of power to a Spanish-Colombian oligarchy which formed two major political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, both of which succeeded in building large support groups in the Colombian countryside through systems of patronage (Leech 2011, 5).

1.1 La Violencia

It is from that oligarchic system that the decades long civil war started. In 1948, Liberal Party leader Jorge Gaitán was assassinated, marking an escalation in the already violent relationship between the Conservative and Liberal parties. A countrywide conflict, simply called *La Violencia*, resulted in the deaths of 200,000 people between 1948 and 1957. A Conservative victory in the 1950 Presidential elections contributed to the formation of Liberal guerrilla squads in rural areas, organizing to retaliate against Conservative farms and villages (Offstein

2003, 101). The Violence finally ended with an agreement in 1957, the National Front. Under this agreement, the Conservatives and Liberals would alternate the presidency every four years. However, during this period many bandit groups had formed in the countryside as self-defense militias, fighting along party lines but also fighting regional disputes concerning family fights, water rights and control of coffee crops. Some groups truly organized as political opposition, presenting alternative party programs and proposing land reforms. The Rojas Pinilla presidential administration opposed these groups violently, only fueling the formation of more revolutionary guerrilla groups, the biggest and most famous of which would become *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC) in 1964 (Offstein 2003, 101-102).

1.2 A period of left-wing insurgency

The first years of insurgency by FARC and other insurgents, such as National Liberation Army (ELN) and Popular Liberation Army (EPL), in the second half of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, were quite unsuccessful for these groups. The government was able to wipe out most active rebels and FARC paused their activities in the first year of their existence. A new uprising by the April 19 Movement (M19), however, confronted the government with an urban guerrilla movement that was able to storm the Palace of Justice in 1985, an action in which twelve judges were killed when the government tried to take back the Palace (Castro 1999, xx).

The formation of guerrilla groups was always a problem for the United States government, and especially the uprisings on the South American continent. The Cold War context, in which communism was spread across the globe, was a problem for US aspirations of maintaining its sphere of influence in the West. The Colombian conflict gained material interest from the Americans, however, in the context of the War on Drugs. In the 1980s, it became clear how the (Colombian) drug industry was affecting the American population. Over the 1990s, the US government spent an approximate amount of $1 billion, attempting to combat drug cultivation and trafficking within Colombia, which was a precursor for the later, more extensive, Plan Colombia (Crandall 2002, 163). Despite the aid, the Colombian coca boom was able to persist and between 1996 and 1999 the total coca leaf production in Colombia rose by 100 percent (Rosen 2014, 16). By 2002, US involvement had extended from the War on Drugs

to the War on Terror. Patterson told that the US strategy "is to give the Colombian government the tools to combat terrorism and narcotrafficking, two struggles that have become one. To fight against narcotrafficking and terrorism, it is necessary to attack all links of the chain simultaneously." (Isacson 2003, 13). The change in vocabulary from "guerrillas" to "terrorists" can be explained from the post-9/11 geopolitical context and the US, from this point, became involved in military aid to the Uribe administration. This administration, as will become clear below, proved very successful in combating FARC by force.

When the two biggest coca cartels, those of Medellín and Cali, were destroyed, drug cultivation and trafficking still did not decrease and it became apparent that FARC, along with many smaller organizations, had filled the void that was left by these cartels being dismantled. The weakness of the central government enabled the smaller organizations (*cartelitos*) to flourish in the Andes and the jungle, since law and order was not established in these regions. Simultaneously, FARC held control over coca plantations in areas they controlled and taxed the peasants who cultivated the leaf, establishing a new source of income for the insurgents. FARC combatant numbers increased rapidly. In 1986, there were 3,600 members and in 1995 those numbers had doubled, and FARC operated on 60 fronts. In 1999, there were 10,000 FARC combatants in the country and between 1999 and 2001 FARC went through its strongest years with an estimate of 17,000 troops (Rosen 2014, 17-19).

FARC maintained a political wing in the form of the Clandestine Colombian Political Party through which they issued documents that outlined the group's political platform. This group was excluded from Colombian elections. However, the election of President Betancur in 1982 offered a possibility of political inclusion for the FARC since a cease-fire was declared, and FARC created, from the Clandestine Party and other left-leaning groups, a coalition called Unión Patriótica (UP) (Grisham 2014, 83). This can effectively be viewed as the first serious attempt at political inclusion and rebel-to-party transformation in FARC history. In 1986 UP entered the elections and was relatively successful with 350 local council seats, twenty-three deputy positions in departmental assemblies, nine seats in the House of Representatives, six in the Senate and 4.6% of the presidential vote (Phelan 2018, 7). After the elections, however, UP became victim to a new wave of right-wing political violence set out by landowners,

political elites and narcotraffickers, and it is estimated that between 1986 and 1990 between four and six thousand UP members were killed, including a presidential candidate. Not only members were targeted, also supporters were killed. This effectively destroyed the party. UP severed all its ties with FARC and eventually the party lost its legal status due to a lack of popular support and violence (Phelan 2018, 7).

1.3 The right-wing answer

The Colombian government had decreed, in 1968, for the formation of self-defense groups, effectively establishing the right for right wing paramilitaries to form bands and these groups continuously gained strength and territory. This was a direct result of the Colombian government being unable to securitize the country through the national army, police and other officials. In 1997 the groups banded together in *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) in an attempt to improve the organization and structure of paramilitaries, to increase its presence in Colombia and strengthen their grip in regions they were active (Hristov 2010, 19). In the 1990s, AUC controlled large portions of the Colombian countryside and committed large numbers of massacres and other human rights abuses (Crandall 2014, 347). The AUC was demobilized in 2006 during the presidency of Uribe, promising amnesty to most of its combatants and protection of commanders wanted in the US for drug trafficking. The AUC did officially demobilize, but their reintegration mostly failed (Angelo 2017, 140). To this day, watch groups are registering non-guerrilla illegal armed groups throughout the country. New types of illegal armed groups are referred to as *bandas criminales* or BACRIM, which formed under former AUC leaders. According to the government, these groups are not self-defense; they are used for the securitization of coca plantations and were accused of working with FARC (Hristov 2010, 19-21).

By 1996, FARC had a strong presence in Colombia, illustrated by the fact that in at least 622 of Colombia's 1071 municipalities they were present, varying in strength from department to department. Political and military control over those municipalities ended up strongest in the southern departments of Caquetá, Guaviare and Putumayo (Vargas Meza 1998, 22). Politicians, police, security forces and members of the army were accused of corruption and having links to guerrillas, narcotraffickers, paramilitaries or all three at the same time. None

of the 32 departments were spared of violence, corruption and political repression while the illicit drug economy was running the countryside. In 1999, a poll was taken in Colombia, asking the question "Do you think it is possible that one day the Colombian guerrillas will take power by force?" and two thirds of the respondents said yes, confirming the strength of the FARC as perceived by civilians (Crandall 2014, 347). President Pastrana attempted a peace offering in 1998 with a liberated zone granted to guerrillas, hoping to make progress in the peace talks. FARC used the zone for recruitment and strengthening of its recruits. In 2002 they were stronger than ever and seemingly unwilling to negotiate peace in good faith, since there were high levels of kidnappings, extortions and terrorist attacks (Crandall 2014, 347-348).

When hardline rightist Álvaro Uribe took office, he made plans for using all the state's powers, including the military, to protect the citizens against illegal violence and eventually made remarkable gains in diminishing FARC strength after its growth in the 1990s (Crandall 2014, 347-350). Around the same time, coincidentally in the beginning phases of the War on Terror, the United States became increasingly involved in counterinsurgency whereas, previously, the country's involvement existed mostly through the counternarcotic department with Plan Colombia. The Bush government wanted Plan Colombia to be an extension of the War on Terror, while the War on Drugs became subordinate. This helped President Uribe execute his policies. President Uribe sought to use Plan Colombia's funding for his Democratic Security and Defense Policy, and *Plan Patriota*, strategic plans to combat FARC, to consolidate territory and therefore to increase the numbers of police and military forces. The presence of the state in rural areas increased but is to this day not enough to even patrol all of the state's territory (Rosen 2014, 54-58).

1.4 The road to peace and democratic inclusion

The political climate under president Uribe was not open to a peaceful dialogue with FARC. Uribe and Santos had formed a movement of multiple pro-Uribe parties when the former was president and the latter was Minister of Defense, under the name of *Partido Social de Unidad Nacional.* Uribe's democratic security policy had led him to have approval rates of as high as 80% and a highly supported constitutional investigation into possible re-election, showed that he would certainly have won, would he have been allowed to run for the presidency a third

time (Posada-Carbó 2011, 138-139). In the 2010 election race, many of the contenders claimed to be in the camp of Uribe and his supporters were waiting for Uribe's endorsement for the presidency. Santos, as Minister of Defense an executive of Uribe's democratic security policy and for the electorate the face of continuity, was a clear frontrunner in the Uribista camp with polls showing he would get 34 percent of the votes (Posada-Carbó 2011, 143). Polls have suggested that Santos eventually won because he was able to project himself as the most capable candidate, to tackle security problems as well as corruption (Posada-Carbó 2011, 146). Uribe supporters welcomed Santos's victory as a chance to consolidate Uribe's policies and some outside researchers claim that he was handpicked by Uribe as his successor (Posada-Carbó 2011, 147).

Santos's previous position as Minister of Defense in Uribe's government, and the ticket he ran on being clearly a continuance of Uribe's democratic security policy, seem to be in contrast with his politics of rapprochement to FARC in his own presidency. During the campaign in 2010, Santos had already proven to be more open to non-conservative ideas in politics by choosing a leftist running mate (Posada-Carbó 2011, 146). From his inaugural address onwards, he repeatedly said he would try to forge peace. Santos had recognized the limits of the military strategy of the previous administration he served under and concluded that the conflict had reached a stalemate and would only continue (Chernick 2015, 144-145). The 2014 re-election campaign was running while the peace talks had already been initiated and Santos took his election as a clear mandate for a continuance of negotiations (BBC 2014).

The final arrival at the 2016 Peace Accord between the Colombian government and the FARC was preceded by years of negotiation in Havana, Cuba with the presence of many international actors. Already in 2010, secret talks between President Santos and the leadership of the FARC were taking place. The talks were made public in 2012 and from 2014 onwards a ceasefire was in place (Mechoulan and Segura 2017, 3). The fact that the peace accord was rejected in the referendum - following a strong "NO" campaign led by former president Uribe - shows that the peace process lacked legitimacy. Uribe's campaign centered around a perceived lack of justice embedded in the peace agreement, as well as the false perception that the costs of reintegration of ex-combatants would be taken out of the budget for pensions, and

benefited from Santos's failure to educate the population about the true specifics of the Accord (Angelo 2017, 136).

After the failed referendum, Santos amended the agreement which would eventually be ratified by Congress without a new referendum. Santos attempted to satisfy both the conservative side and the leftists in these amendments. The Final Agreement was clearer on protections for landowners, a greater mandate for judges to convict rebel drug traffickers and banned FARC participation in congressional elections in new districts in post conflict zones. Peace and justice amendments were not made, since FARC would not sign the agreement had they faced tougher sentences (Casey 2016). Ultimately, the agreement entails six key agenda items: comprehensive rural reform, political participation, ending the conflict, solution to illicit drugs, victims of the conflict and implementation, verification, and endorsement (Phelan 2018, 1).

Following the peace accord, FARC demobilized starting already in 2016. Officially, the cadres of the group have ceased to exist, and FARC now has the same acronym but with a different meaning. From *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército de Pueblo* (FARC-EP, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army) they have transitioned to *Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común* (FARC, Common Alternative Revolutionary Force).

As is often prevalent after civil war, FARC does have dissidents. In September 2018, the UN political mission in Colombia - an aid to oversee the reintegration and demobilization of the FARC combatants - reported that six former commanders in the southwest of the country had abandoned the reintegration camps and a minority of former combatants reject the terms of the peace agreement. They remain armed and still commit abuses in several departments, most significantly in the municipality of Tumaco, Nariño. FARC dissidents, ELN combatants and new paramilitary groups in the form of *Bandas Criminales* (BACRIM) alike are carrying out killings of indigenous, Afro-Colombian and other community activists, especially in the departments of Cauca and Nariño, the area of Catatumbo in the northeast on the border with Venezuela, and the northwestern areas of Bajo Cauca and Urabá (Human Rights Watch 2019). Colombia is still a country in crisis in some of its more marginalized areas.

2. An analysis of circumstances for electoral success for FARC in Putumayo, 2018

One cannot explain the behavior of Colombian citizens nowadays without considering the context of conflict and the cultivation of illicit crops from the 1960s onwards. This chapter argues that in Putumayo, civilian life was affected in the first place by the state and non-state actors that tried to establish sovereignty over the department. The most relevant actors for this department are the Colombian central state and its military and police, the guerrilla groups that were active in the region - most notably FARC -, paramilitary groups united in *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC), peasant farmers concentrated in representative groups and municipal representatives, and the United States of America. This chapter examines the various ways in which state repression, violence and failure of the state to implement development programs and deliver public services left a power vacuum the FARC filled.

In the 2018 elections, the first ever to which the FARC was admitted as a political party by the name of Partido Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común, FARC received only 0,34% of the votes nationally (52.532 votes). However, in Putumayo they received 2.553 votes which is 3,08% of the votes cast in the department, the highest national percentage in one department for the new political party. That 3,08% does not seem significant, but in comparison, that percentage is 806% higher than the national average and 76% higher than the second highest, 1,75% in Caquetá. In only four of 33 departments did FARC succeed in receiving over 1% of votes (Registraduria, 2018). This chapter will analyze whether predictive factors for localized electoral success, formulated by Ishiyama&Widmeier and Allison were present for FARC in Putumayo.

2.1 Historical context: Putumayo in Colombia

It was estimated in 1890 that just a quarter of the country's territory was truly controlled by the Colombian government whereas three quarters belonged to the periphery to which the state's rule of law could not reach, leading to the 1863 Constitution naming those least "national" of areas the "National Territories", signaling the national government's observation of the problem (Torres Bustamante 2012a, 24). The wealth of natural resources in

the Colombian Amazon where Putumayo is located led to the settlement of international extraction companies, first harvesting the medicinal plant quina and later rubber. Soon after the establishment of these companies, in 1887, the Colombian state awarded control of the region to the Catholic church, and specifically gave the mandate to monitor and evangelize Caquetá and Putumayo, departments in which many indigenous were still living (Torres Bustamante 2012a, 25).

The petroleum business brought high numbers of migrants to the Putumayo department. There was a demand for more workers, and many obliged as the Texas Petroleum Company paid three to four times the average hourly salary in Colombia. Small towns developed into respectable municipalities, building necessary infrastructure, and services such as canteens and granaries. Later, in 1978, Putumayo became one of the earliest adopters of coca cultivation in the country and the coca growing economy caused a second wave of colonization, especially in Bajo Putumayo, a region which would later house two FARC fronts and the first narcotraffickers (Torres Bustamante 2012a, 27-29). A department defined by colonization, it had been a forgotten region, a marginalized department with a lack of public service and state security. When the oil fever happened from the mid-60s onwards, however, it became a region of great interest to the central state. Suddenly there was a push for protection of sovereignty, and the southern border region became militarized while colonizers, hoping to work in the industry, settled between the indigenous (Ramírez de Jara 2013, 3).

FARC entered Putumayo in the second half of the 80s (Tate 2017, 169). In other departments under FARC control, such as Caquetá and Guaviare, the group was built from the ground up from *campesino* self-defense groups before 1964, the year FARC was established (Torres Bustamante 2012b). Due to FARC's late arrival in the department, there was no established ideological identification between the citizens of Putumayo and the FARC and therefore it was, presumably, more difficult to gain civilian support in the region. However, it is important to keep in mind that FARC fighters were campesinos and presented themselves as such. A highly rural department, this appealed Putumayo citizens to the group (Ramírez de Jara 2011, 41).

In the late 1990s, paramilitary groups made a strong push into Putumayo and challenged the hegemony of the FARC in the urban centers while the guerrillas tried to protect their power in the many municipalities they conquered in the late 1990s, using the strength they had gradually been building up in the previous decade using coca tax revenues (United States Embassy 2000, 3). FARC doubled their troop numbers and began escalating the tactics they had long been using, with criminal activities such as kidnapping seeing a surge. Residents of Putumayo, at this point a "shadow zone" in which there was no rule of law, became forced to live in conflict between the armed actors. Human rights offenses came not only from FARC, but also very strongly from the paramilitary side. Putumayenses encountered daily checkpoints, detentions, surveillance, coercion and incidents of harassment, rape and torture while FARC's Southern Bloc became one of the strongest in the country and paramilitaries became increasingly abusive (Tate 2017, 170).

At the same time, Putumayo together with the other southern departments were treated by the Colombian government as a no man's land; outside the control of the state and inhabited by terrorists, drug traffickers and general lawlessness (Uribe 2017, 242). Putumayo was one of the departments that was targeted by Plan Colombia fumigation efforts and the department's citizens started lobbying, protesting and eventually went on strike. Putumayo representatives proposed to the government a plan for crop substitution as an alternative counternarcotics policy without results. FARC was involved in this process and posited the problem as a class struggle rather than purely an agricultural issue, and many accuse the group of forcing cocaleros and even non-involved individuals to continue the strikes. Eventually the cocaleros closed the roads and occupied town centers for over three months in the 1996 cocalero marches (Tate 2015, 124). The marches ended with the Orito Accords, which promised increased government services but had no new policy guidelines on the issue of coca, meaning that the crux of the problem was not solved. Specific projects were funded such as electricity in the main towns and expanded hospital services in Putumayo. However, promised roads were never built and proposed pilot projects for substitution crops were not executed (Tate 2015, 125-126).

The later presidency of Álvaro Uribe, 2002-2010, was a period of high securitization throughout the country. His Democratic Security Policy oversaw very high military spending, consolidating the state's sovereignty throughout the country and countrywide lowering of violence levels. Uribe did not support leniency for peasant farmers with small lots of coca and there was hardly any attention for social and economic programs while the counter-narcotic efforts were highly militarized, enhancing the perception of marginalization for farmers in Putumayo (Elhawary 2010, S394). It has been reported by the International Crisis Group that Uribe's policies weakened FARC by driving it to the peripheries, meaning the bulk of the conflict reportedly took place in the departments furthest from Bogotá whereas rural development policies in those same departments were absent under this president (International Crisis Group 2003, i).

The prospect of demobilization after the 2016 peace accord during the Santos administration brought hope for an end to the escalation of repression and violence from all sides (Tate 2017, 170). The large-scale fumigation as a result of Plan Colombia had destroyed many legal crops and state malfeasance accusations went without response or legal action. Alternative livelihood projects were of low quality and therefore the people of Putumayo sought to carry out the socio-economic projects presumably leading from the peace accord as a way to protect the rural population and finally implement sensible agricultural policies, rather than as their way to escape FARC (Tate 2017, 171). Ultimately, the *campesinos* of Putumayo wished to be treated by the Colombian state as legitimate citizens, an autonomous group with an important role in regional policies of the southern Amazon, and to stop living in a buffer zone ruled by guerrillas and paramilitaries (Ramírez de Jara 2018, 17).

Post-accord Putumayo has no such benefits. In the eyes of the citizens of the department, Juan Manuel Santos' administration failed at inclusion of the periphery. State failure to support peasant farmers, in agricultural policies with alternative development programs, and FARC's participation in illicit crop cultivation and strikes and demonstrations were likely the ultimate precursors for a (relative) FARC victory in the 2018 elections. This chapter will further examine the outlying factors that may have impacted electoral behavior in Putumayo, and

therefore focus on violence endured by civilians, agrarian policies by the state and the FARC, and state and FARC presence in terms of public services and local institutions.

Comparable departments

To determine what is the outlying factor that caused relative FARC success in Putumayo compared to all other departments, it is also relevant to consider the circumstances in a second department. Departments that are often named in the literature and reports as those where FARC was influential, where the state was not influential or helpful and where the illicit drug economy with support of the FARC helped marginalized peasant farmers make a living, are Putumayo, Nariño, Guaviare, Caquetá and Meta (UNODC 2002, Defensoría del Pueblo 2017, Ramirez de Jara 2013).

A comparison that stands out is that between Nariño and Putumayo. Nariño is a much smaller but more densely populated department than Putumayo, with over 1.5 million inhabitants in 2005 for Nariño and close to 300.000 in Putumayo (DANE 2005). Both Nariño and Putumayo were heavily involved in the civil war. There was a constant confrontation between the Colombian military, guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Both departments were targets of US military aid and counternarcotics efforts paid for by Plan Colombia money. In the later stages of the conflict, in the present century, FARC intensified its terrorist campaign in both departments through attacks on energy, road and oil infrastructures, often culminating in environmental disasters (Ceballos 2007, 182-183). From the five above mentioned departments, electoral results for FARC were lowest in Nariño and highest in Putumayo while both departments further voted along approximately the same lines; for traditional parties. Many variables are comparable for both departments and this chapter will consider those that will also be applied to Putumayo, coca cultivation and fumigation, state, paramilitary and guerrilla presence, violence and success of political competitors.

2.2 An analysis of the concepts

From the literature review, it became apparent that localized electoral success of a new political party usually depends upon two major themes that were a factor during the conflict, those being violence and the direction and perpetrator thereof, and organization and popular

support. The second category is open to interpretation and will here be explained along the lines of presence of the state and FARC and its issuance of public services and benefits. In the south of Colombia, public benefits and services include, also, security and economic support and development of poor peasants since those subjects are possible precursors for popular support. A third category, that of previous electoral success of political competitors as a predictor for new political parties' success, has not yet been proven and will here be tested for Putumayo and Nariño.

Organization and popular support

From the available literature on Putumayo during the civil war in Colombia, several important themes can be deduced in which FARC and the state were influential concerning possible sources of popular support. Putumayo was a department under strong control of FARC, and it is presumed, from the hypotheses, that this should be a factor in explaining their relative electoral success compared to other departments. The academic literature on electoral success for a former rebel group dictates that prolonged control over a territory and the provision of public services and benefits in that area can predict subsequent electoral success for the group in that area (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 545).

Several themes in the relationship of FARC, and the Colombian state, with Putumayo are relevant in this regard. One of the subjects that is most prevalent in the literature on these relationships are agrarian policies of the state and the FARC. The conflict sprouted from dissatisfied peasant fighting for agrarian land reform, which was also an issue in Putumayo. During the conflict, land inequalities were a factor in the establishment of the illicit drug economy, in essence an agricultural reform supported by the FARC and therefore relates to the hypothesis that FARC should do better in electoral districts where they supported the coca growing business, than in those where they did not. Agrarian support and security are a form of provision of public services and benefits. Secondly, FARC did not only support peasant farmers with the economic benefits of coca production, the group also provided some public services to the district, mainly in the form of security for coca farmers. The hypothesis states that this should also benefit the group's electoral support, relative to support for FARC in the comparable department of Nariño. A third subject is the prevalence of left-wing competitors

in the department. It is presumed that FARC should do well in areas where political and ideological competitors are historically strong.

Presence of state, paramilitaries and FARC

Agrarian policies

Historically, land distribution has been an issue in Colombia (Offstein 2003, 102-103). Putumayo was one of the early adopters of coca cultivation, with the first harvest in 1978. It increased the available land used for agriculture due to the coca leaf's properties, and, due to coca-inspired immigration, Putumayo's population grew with 145 percent between 1973 and 1985. Meanwhile, regular crops were being reduced in price due to governmental protectionist policies and the cultivation of typical Colombian crops like yuca, plantain and corn decreased (Holmes 2018, 127). The cultivation of coca left the farmers with an improved economic situation compared to when the farmers were still planting legal crops because coca has a higher yield and can be harvested multiple times per year (Torres Bustamante 2012a, 61). In the early 2000s, Putumayo farmers cultivated 40% of the coca grown nationally (Torres Bustamante 2012a, 32) (fig. 1) and fumigation efforts continued, while the government attempted to militarize the anti-narcotics efforts.



Figure 1 Coca cultivation in main coca growing departments in Colombia 1999-2017. Data from UNODC Coca Cultivation Surveys 2005, 2010, 2017.

By this time, the coca growing peasant farmers, *cocaleros*, had long wanted to start growing legal crops to evade government persecution. However, they did not receive the (financial and educational) support that was needed and promised by the government (Ramírez de Jara 2013, 10). Meanwhile, Nariño, from 2006, has been the department with the biggest plots of land dedicated to growing the coca leaf while it is a smaller department than Putumayo (fig. 1).

Through Plan Colombia financing, the government started fumigating plots of land in 1994, a method of aerial spraying with chemicals containing pesticides to destroy crops. The extensive support package to the Colombian state financed by the United States, was implemented throughout the country's southern Amazon region. Putumayo, through negotiations between municipal leaders and the Colombian government, and *cocalero* strikes in 1996, was able to postpone fumigation of the coca fields for a year and therefore most coca cultivation concentrated in this area (Ramírez de Jara 2013, 5-6). The destruction of legal crops alongside coca crops (fig. 2) has destroyed many legitimate farmers' lands, and they are still waiting for the introduction of policies that will help them cultivate different crops while remaining financially secure (Ramírez de Jara 2011, 185).



Figure 2 Coca cultivation and total land fumigation in percentages of land in Nariño and Putumayo, 2000-2017. Data from UNODC Coca Cultivation Surveys 2002, 2005, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2017.

Cocaleros in Nariño and Putumayo regarded themselves too poor and isolated from the central state to see an alternative to the cultivation of coca. Communities in the department did not qualify for any developmental assistance until all coca in that community would be eradicated, per the rules of the zero-coca policies of the state and USAID. This meant that all coca would have to be eradicated before even starting the process of adjusting to legal crops, a process which could take years. Eradication of coca, furthermore, leads to an eighty percent decrease in income for a *cocalero* farmer in his first years post-coca. Coca cultivators in Putumayo and Nariño alike were in a race against the fumigation efforts of Plan Colombia, rapidly cultivating new plots of land to ensure a form of financial stability. Simultaneously, farmers cultivating legal crops have been left without compensation for the fumigation of their lands (Felbab-Brown 2011).

Physical presence of guerrillas and paramilitaries

While the local and central state were viewed as absent or corrupt, and as agents of army and paramilitary systematic violence, FARC promoted the demands of the local people, to receive more services and infrastructure from the state. In 1985, around the arrival of FARC in the department, the quality of life in Putumayo was low (around 30 on a scale to 100, measuring many socioeconomic factors such as education and healthcare), while most people had no access to telephones and streets were unpaved. There were hardly any police stations in the municipalities of Puerto Asís, Orito and Mocoa and very few schools, leading to high numbers (around 20%) of analphabetism. FARC itself refused to deliver these public services, insisting it was the state's responsibility (Torres Bustamante 2012a, 63).

The municipal centers of Putumayo, from the 1990s onwards, were controlled by paramilitaries, whereas FARC had a strong grip on the countryside. Paramilitaries occupied the centers of Puerto Asís, Orito, Valle del Guamués and San Miguel in 2000. In the centers, the paramilitaries called upon the people one by one and those people unrelated by guerrillas could stay and others had to leave town, while FARC and paramilitaries forbade movement through the region (Ramírez de Jara 2004, 8). When the paramilitary advance into Putumayo continued, FARC responded with an armed strike forced on the *cocaleros*, demanding Plan Colombia to be cancelled and for the government to rein in their paramilitary groups. This armed strike negatively affected the civilian population and, unlike in 1996 when FARC and

the *campesinos* organized *cocalero* marches together to protest fumigation (Ramírez De Jara 2001, 166-168), the campesinos felt intimidated into picking a side. Leaders felt disappointed in the FARC's lack of support while FARC kept dismissing every proposal for collaboration between the municipality and the state while cocaleros were seeking legal alternatives to coca production.

What distinguishes Nariño from Putumayo in the department of state and non-state presence, is the fact that new armed groups, that formed after the demobilization of AUC, formed in Nariño by the name of *Bandas Criminales* or BACRIM (*Semana* 2008) (Appendix B). The presence of these new groups, *Águilas Negras*, *Los Urabeños* and *Los Rastrojos* more specifically, has been stronger in Nariño than in Putumayo. With 43% of the population affected by their presence, Nariño is one of the departments with the most people affected by BACRIM (*Indepaz* 2012, 3). Nariño had, until 2016, a high presence of both FARC and BACRIM - also sometimes called narcoparamilitaries. Putumayo had a high presence of FARC and a relatively lower influence of BACRIM. Especially the southeastern part of the department, Bajo Putumayo, is not affected while Nariño has BACRIM presence throughout the department (fig. 13 and 14).

Simultaneously, Nariño historically has had a high number of ELN guerrillas in the department, whereas ELN had no presence in Putumayo (UNODC 2005, 40) (fig. 15). Today, the municipality of Tumaco, Nariño is viewed as one of the epicenters of the violence that is ongoing in Colombia after the demobilization of FARC, which is to be blamed on the presence of these non-state groups, and especially that of BACRIM (*France 24* 2017). It appears that the possibility of cross-ocean trafficking from the municipality of Tumaco, a city on the Pacific coast and always an area with high numbers of coca cultivation, has caused this ongoing violence to persist in Nariño (United States Department of State 2007, 3). In 2009 already, Nariño was the only region in the country where all illegal groups were growing in numbers of combatants (United States Department of State 2009).

Relevantly, FARC dissidents in Nariño have been accused of committing human rights abuses against civilians in the department. It is one of five areas in the country where community activists have been targeted by kidnappings and killings in 2018, crimes of which FARC

dissidents have been accused (Human Rights Watch 2019). FARC dissidents are present mostly around Nariño and Putumayo borders. Simultaneously, Nariño had a highly diverse and concentrated presence of guerrilla groups still in 2018 in the form of not only FARC dissidents, but also other guerrillas, and dissidents from several other guerrilla groups. Contrary to reports from Nariño in the abovementioned Human Rights Watch report, the situation in Putumayo is relatively calm. FARC dissidents of Frente 48 are running the narcotrafficking business with the Mexican Sinaloa cartel but there are no reports of FARC dissident's violence in the department (Ávila 2018).

Violence by state, paramilitaries and FARC

As discussed in the literature review, violence is detrimental to any political actor (state or non-state) when it has intentional civilian deaths as a consequence. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the violence used by FARC and by the state and paramilitaries in the different departments to make a comparison between Putumayo and other departments, and therewith explain why civilians have not been disproportionately targeted by FARC violence, compared to the targeting of civilians by other actors, which could be a contributing factor to relatively high election results. The data concerning violence is further categorized in periods of time, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2010. The available data spans roughly these years. In three years in this period there was a general census held in Colombia, in 1985, 1993 and 2005. For the years 1980-1989, the general census of 1985 is used to calculate victims per capita. For 1990-1999 the 1993 census is used and for 2000-2010 the 2005 census. These census numbers are the most accurate information available to make calculations of rates of violence per Colombian department.

The categories of violence that are included in the data that is considered, are massacres, kidnappings[1], civilian deaths in military operations and terror attacks (Appendix A). Massacres are defined by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, the institution that collected the data, as "the intentional homicide of 4 or more persons, unable to defend

[1] Kidnappings are not necessarily violent; however, they were a highly prevalent coercive method used by many actors in the Colombian conflict and are therefore here considered under the same category.

themselves; it is a public display of violence and means to show the absolute power of the armed actor and the absolute impotence of the victims" (¡Basta Ya! 2012). Putumayo had a relatively high number of victims per capita in massacres after 1990, compared to Colombia. Nariño, however, was relatively spared from violence in massacres (fig. 3, 4, 5).

The second category that is considered here is the practice of kidnapping. Especially guerrillas and criminals were keen on kidnapping to use for extortion as a means of financing the revolution. Between 1970 and 2010 there are 37,285 reported cases of kidnapping throughout the country of which especially FARC (9,084 cases) and ELN (7,048) were the perpetrators. Putumayo, from 1980-2010, had a relatively high number of kidnappings per capita, in total and by FARC, compared to Colombia and to Nariño (fig. 6, 7, 8).

The third category, civilian deaths in military action, happened in either combat, hostage or bombardment situations with military targets: the victims are civilian casualties in war and were not necessarily targeted. The data that was recorded from 1990 onwards (fig. 9 and 10) shows that Putumayo, again, had relatively high numbers of victims per capita through the years. From 1990 until 1999, FARC was often the single cause of those deaths which would happen in raids and ambushes against military objectives. In later years, civilian deaths were often the result of combat between FARC and paramilitaries in Putumayo. In the later years of the conflict, Nariño had a spike in civilian deaths in military operations by FARC.

The fourth and last category of violence that is considered, is terrorism. From the literature review, it is clear that terrorism against government infrastructure can either be of help to the rebel groups, by proving that the government is unable to provide for the population, or it can damage support since the destruction of infrastructure can make life in the district complicated. Terrorist attacks are here defined by Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica as "indiscriminate attacks, carried out with explosives against civilian objects in public places with a high potential of devastation or lethality".[2] From the data it follows that citizens of Putumayo were disproportionately affected by FARC terrorism and especially in the 1990s. In Nariño, there were no terror attacks between 1990 and 2010 (fig. 11 and 12). FARC resorted increasingly to terror tactics (Mojica Noreña 2011, 298). News sites report, as late as

[2] Per the definition used for the construction of the database, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Atentados Terroristas 1980-2012, http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html [accessed 26 February 2019].

2015, that Putumayo had been victim to attacks by FARC in the latter years of the conflict, and especially the Colombian army and petroleum infrastructure were targeted in these attacks while the civilian population was often affected by secondary results of the attacks. For example, destroying bridges would demobilize parts of the population while a 2015 attack on an oil pipeline by FARC caused a disaster that had unparalleled consequences for the Colombian environment and left 150,000 residents without access to water (Brodzinsky 2015; *Semana* 2015). In Nariño, similar attacks were happening, not only by FARC but also by ELN (United States Department of State 2017).

Political competitors

Political competition on the left wing for FARC can best be measured from electoral results for other political parties on the left wing, more specifically M19 after demobilization of that former guerrilla group in 1989, and Union Patriótica, a political party affiliated to FARC, established in 1986. The 1986 presidential elections are documented for the Union Patriótica candidate per department (table 1).

Department	**Votes Jaime Pardo Leal**	**Department**	**Votes Jaime Pardo Leal**
Amazonas	-	Huila	9,7%
Antioquia	4,1%	La Guajira	1,9%
Arauca	-	Magdalena	2,5%
Atlántico	3,2%	Meta	22,5%
Bolívar	2,6%	**Nariño**	**2,6%**
Boyacá	1,9%	Norte de Santander	2,3%
Caldas	2,3%	**Putumayo**	**5,6%**
Caquetá	22,3%	Quindío	5,5%
Casanare	-	Risaralda	3,3%
Cauca	4,2%	San Andrés y P.	0,8%
Cesar	5,3%	Santander	6,4%
Chocó	4,3%	Sucre	0,9%
Córdoba	2,6%	Tolima	5,5%
Cundinamarca	4,2%	Valle del Cauca	3%
Guainía	-	Vaupés	-
Guaviare	-	Vichada	-
		Colombia	**4,6%**

Table 1 Electoral results per department for Union Patriótica candidate Jaime Pardo Leal, presidential elections Colombia 1986. Data from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Estadística, Vol II Municipal, *1987.*

With 4,6%, the candidate did relatively well for a newcomer in the Colombian political landscape. The other two main candidates for the Conservatives and the Liberals received many more votes; however, Jaime Pardo Leal left two other candidates behind him that did not receive a significant number of votes in this party system that was still mainly a two-party system. In Putumayo, Leal received 6,4% of the votes, which is 1,8% over the national average and in Nariño he obtained 2,6% of the votes which is 2% lower than the national average.

During the 1991 elections, the party was already much smaller and therefore weaker than in 1986, due to the political violence against members and supporters of UP. Between four and six thousand party members were murdered and the 1991 elections were the last the party took part in before it lost its legal status. UP received 1,6% of the votes. In Nariño, they received 1,2% of the votes and in Putumayo 1,9%. There were departments in which UP support was much stronger, for example in Arauca with 23% and Guaviare with 13%. Democratic Alliance M19 (AD-M19) did better with 9,4% of the national votes and 19% in Nariño. In Putumayo, they received 14% of the votes (Table 2).

Department	Votes AD-M19	Votes UP	Department	Votes AD-M19	Votes UP
Amazonas	8,4%	1,2%	Huila	8,6%	2%
Antioquia	4,9%	2,1%	La Guajira	17,5%	1,1%
Arauca	6,2%	22,9%	Magdalena	10,2%	1,4%
Atlántico	14%	0,8%	Meta	5,6%	3,5%
Bolívar	6,8%	0,9%	**Nariño**	**19%**	**1,2%**
Boyacá	6,3%	0,5%	N. de Santander	12,3%	2,1%
Caldas	4%	0,4%	**Putumayo**	**14%**	**1,9%**
Caquetá	13,7%	8,8%	Quindío	15,4%	1%
Casanare	7%	2,2%	Risaralda	7,6%	1,4%
Cauca	7,1%	1,5%	San Andrés y P.	8,7%	0,2%
Cesar	14%	2,1%	Santander	8,4%	1,8%
Chocó	2,3%	4,4%	Sucre	9,2%	1%
Córdoba	7%	0,4%	Tolima	7,7%	2%
Cundinamarca	9,5%	1,9%	Valle del Cauca	11,8%	0,8%
Guainía	8,2%	2,6%	Vaupés	2,7%	0,6%
Guaviare	10,4%	12,5%	Vichada	6,3%	4,6%
			Colombia	9,4%	1,6%

Table 2 Electoral results for Democratic Alliance M19 and Union Patriótica, Congress elections 1991. Data from Political Database of the Americas, Colombia: Elecciones Legislativas de 1991 (Senado), *1999.*

3. Discussion of the hypotheses and the outlying factor for electoral success in Putumayo

When the time came for the Congress and Presidential elections of 2018, the Santos government had reached very low levels of popularity. Hailed by the international community as the savior of the country and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the Peace Accord of 2016, Juan Manuel Santos held a popularity rating of only 24 per cent in August of 2017, while when he was elected in 2010, he won by a landslide (Pachon 2017). In the chapter above, it became clear that Uribe and his administration had a policy of defeating FARC with all means necessary and many Colombians praised Santos for his role in this as Defense Minister. When he became President, however, he made a move to diplomacy and a policy of peacebuilding. Many now believe that some agreements made in the Peace Accord were far too lenient for the enemy combatants, such as allowing most of them to avoid prison time (Pachon 2017). It is no surprise that, come election time, the country was divided between those appreciative of the peace efforts and others who still wanted justice in the form of punishments for the ex-guerrillas.

The 2018 *Congreso de la República* elections of March 11 preceded the Presidential elections of May 27. The Presidential elections moved to a second round between Iván Duque, hardline conservative with ties to former President Álvaro Uribe and member of *Centro Democrático* (founded 2013), and Gustavo Petro, former mayor of Bogotá, former guerrilla and founding member of the new (2011) political party *Colombia Humana*. Winner Duque is known to oppose the peace deal of 2016, campaigning against it even before the failed referendum, together with Uribe. He proposes to amend the peace deal so that FARC leaders can be sentenced to prison time, while still aiming for reintegration of regular combatants (Tomaselli 2018).

In this divided climate, FARC did not book significant electoral results in the first elections they could partake in since the 2016 peace accords. The political field in Colombia is a competitive one with 16 parties taking part in the 2018 Senate elections, the elections in which FARC received only 0,34% of votes, making it the third least successful political party in these elections (Registraduria 2018). In no department were the results significant, and the elections

can be regarded as a failure for FARC. However, zooming in on the departmental scale and making comparisons, it stands out that in the above researched department Putumayo the electoral results were - with 3,08% - 800% higher than the national average and 76% higher than the second highest (Caquetá, 1,75%) (Registraduria 2018). This difference is significant enough to raise questions about more localized, relative electoral success of a former rebel group.

There are several factors that possibly indicate electoral success for a former rebel group in the elections following the group's transformation into a political party. Based on the available literature in the field, in the literature review several hypotheses were formulated and they were tested against data and literature in the second chapter. This section will discuss the outcome of these hypotheses in connection to FARC's electoral success in the 2018 Senate elections in Colombia.

Organization and popular support

Presence of state, paramilitaries and FARC

H1 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where they provided public services.
H2 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where they were able to hold territory for a significant amount of time.

Physical presence of guerrillas and paramilitaries

FARC was established by peasant farmers that received very few public services and benefits from the Colombian government. Security, physical and economic, was marginal before the conflict started. Putumayo, a highly rural department, was, from the mid-1980s onwards, under strong control of FARC as is illustrated from, for example, several reports from organizations such as Indepaz and the US embassy (see also fig. 13). Nariño was always a disputed department, with widespread presence of FARC, ELN and paramilitaries (see fig. 13, 14, 15). When FARC took control over certain territories, the group tried to establish a rule of law in the governed areas while allowing peasant farmers to grow coca in their own fields and securitizing that process. At the same time, FARC protested the large-scale fumigations carried out in the Southern Amazon by the Colombian government with support of the US

government. The growing of coca certainly improved the living conditions of the average peasant, however, it did not help the marginal condition of the department since the possession of money and the conditions of trade, social organization and a permanent population are not sufficient to have a good infrastructure and public services if there is no state willing to deliver these services (Torres Bustamante 2012b). While FARC and the state both failed to resolve Putumayo's marginalized conditions, through extensive provision of public services, and support the department's transformation into an agricultural region with alternative crop development - which is, ultimately, what its citizens wanted -, FARC did support the region's livelihood, security and commercial development where the state did not.

Agrarian policies

Nariño and Putumayo were both highly affected by the fumigation efforts through Plan Colombia, in which not only areas cultivated with coca were affected but also many hectares of land cultivated with legal crops. Still, in both departments, coca cultivation was still rising until 2017 whereas coca cultivation in Guaviare, Meta and Caquetá slowly decreased or stayed stable (fig. 1). Coca cultivation and fumigation efforts are relevant factors for support for FARC in the departments, since FARC was one of the strongest opposing parties for US and governmental fumigation policies. The group helped securitize the cultivation process which gave financial stability to many peasant farmers that, previously, received little support by the government and were forced to work for large landowners against very low wages. Securitization of coca cultivation and support FARC continuously gave to the coca farmers as discussed in the previous chapter are a form of deliverance of public benefits.

Nariño was affected more heavily by Plan Colombia aerial fumigation than Putumayo (fig. 2). Both had significantly high numbers of the department's surface covered in coca, more than in all other departments, especially in later years. Putumayo was often named as the department that was the center of Plan Colombia plans (Acevedo 2008, 10), not in the least because the department had been producing 50% of the world's cocaine paste in the 1990s (Tate 2016), but the strength of the FARC in the department played a large part in enhancing American support of the Colombian military in Putumayo (United States Embassy 2000, 3). The areas that were targeted by fumigation in Nariño were far larger than the cultivated areas,

and this discrepancy is much larger than the discrepancy between cultivation and fumigation in Putumayo (fig. 2). This means that agricultural areas where legal crops were grown were also targeted by fumigation in both Putumayo and Nariño, and more heavily in Nariño. This does not directly explain the better electoral results for FARC in Putumayo than Nariño, since it is presumed that in areas with high FARC presence and large areas of coca cultivation, FARC support would be higher. If coca cultivation and fumigation was the sole variable for FARC electoral support in the departments, it could not explain a significantly lower outcome in Nariño.

Violence by state, paramilitaries and FARC

H3 FARC will have more electoral success in areas where violence by FARC was not, and violence by the government was disproportionately directed at the civilian population.
H4 FARC will have more electoral success in areas with high levels of violence in combination with the delivery of public services and benefits.

From the data collected in chapter 2, it became clear that Putumayo citizens, in massacres and accidental civilian deaths during military operations were disproportionately affected. The multitude of violent actors makes it a very complicated conflict to form an unambiguous conclusion about the direct cause. Civilian deaths in military action and in terrorism are not always the result of a directed attack against civilians or of a one-sided attack - often, civilians are unfortunate secondary victims in battle between multiple actors. In kidnappings and massacres, however, there were targeted victims due to the nature of the crime. However, often, civilians are assumed to be FARC or paramilitary supporters when they fall victim to especially the crime of mass murder by FARC, paramilitaries or the government. Still, the perception of the crime committed against civilians is the same for the civilian population. A civilian death resulting from a massacre, or a civilian victim of kidnapping, in the eyes of the local population will still be a civilian and therefore the perpetrator will be perceived as targeting a civilian.

In massacres between 1990 and 2010, the number of civilians murdered in massacres in Putumayo is relatively high, especially by paramilitaries. The number of kidnapping victims in the department was consistently high, and from 1990 onwards the number of

kidnapping victims per capita in Putumayo by FARC was very high compared to Nariño and Colombia. Civilian deaths in military action between 1990 and 2010 are more difficult to explain as civilian targeting but it stands out that civilian deaths in Putumayo were still relatively prevalent compared to Nariño and Colombia. However, there is no government involvement in Putumayo civilian deaths whereas in Nariño there was. There were consistently low numbers of victims of terrorism in Nariño whereas the number of victims in Putumayo was always high. Relevantly, the literature makes mention of a very high number of terror attacks by FARC during the Uribe administration. However, there was no FARC terrorism with deadly or injured victims in Putumayo or Nariño.

Considering all the above, hypothesis 3 cannot unambiguously be proven true for Putumayo. Putumayo citizens were relatively affected by paramilitary and FARC violence, but not by government violence. The question whether paramilitaries are widely seen as agents of the state remains, and if this is the case, hypothesis 3 can be argued to be true. Hypothesis 4 is to be answered combined with the previous paragraph on FARC presence. It is true that the level of violence in Putumayo was higher than the Colombian average, and the level of violence in Nariño. Simultaneously, FARC provided public services and benefits in the department of Putumayo.

Political competition

H5 FARC will have more electoral support in areas where its competitors on the political left are traditionally strong.

In the 1986 presidential elections, the support for UP candidate Jaime Pardo Leal in Nariño was, with 2,6%, 2% lower than the national average of 4,6%. In Putumayo, he received 6,4% of the votes making him more popular in that department than in Colombia on average. However, in Meta and Caquetá he received over 20% of the votes. The percentage of votes for the UP candidate in Putumayo was relatively high, but not one of the highest in the country and therefore does not directly support the above hypothesis.

In the 1991 elections, Nariño showed strong support for Democratic Alliance M19, a former guerrilla group that had successfully demobilized and transformed to a political

group. The national vote was 9% for AD-M19 and the result in Nariño is significantly higher, with 19% the highest percentage in the country. The result in Putumayo for AD-M19 was 14%, which is still significantly higher than the national average but significantly lower than the result in Nariño. The results for the damaged UP in these elections for these two departments are not significantly high, and there were much better results in, for example, Guaviare and Arauca. These elections alone do not prove that Hypothesis 5 is true.

ELN is not a competitor for electoral support since the group is not a recognized political party and is still in active conflict with the Colombian state. However, (historic) loyalty to one guerilla group may indicate the absence of loyalty to or support for a different guerrilla group. If all the factors investigated above - the prevalence of violence combined with the delivery of public services and benefits as a predictor for electoral support - are true for FARC in Putumayo, perhaps they will also be true for ELN in Nariño might that group demobilize and make the transformation into a political party.

Considering all the above, and when following the hypothesis that FARC should have more electoral support in areas where support for the left is traditionally strong, FARC support should have been stronger in Nariño than in Putumayo. This was not the case and therefore hypothesis 5 cannot be proven to be true.

Conclusion

To assess how FARC could gain localized electoral support, this thesis sought to answer the question: What factors contributed to a relatively successful 2018 Senate election result for the FARC's political party in the department of Putumayo, Colombia? The formerly proven determining factors for localized electoral success for a former rebel group are high levels of violence, notably by the government, rebel control over the area during the conflict and, subsequently, the delivery of public services by the insurgent group, and lack thereof from the government. In Putumayo, violence levels by the government were constantly low while FARC was relatively violent in the department. The articles by Allison and Ishiyama and Widmeier do not show these occurrences of relatively high levels of rebel violence combined with later electoral success, and therefore the case of Colombia differs from those in Guatemala, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Tajikistan. An explanation for this fact can be that the civil war in Colombia was far more protracted than those in the other mentioned countries, making opportunities for the delivery of public services more widespread and there is more familiarity in the departments with the FARC. In the literature, it becomes clear that FARC delivered public services in Putumayo in the form of security for coca farmers whereas there is no mention of such integration with the peasant farmers in Nariño. This could be an explanation of relative electoral success in Putumayo. It would be interesting to start an investigation into what socioeconomic groups have high numbers of voters for FARC which could prove that coca farmers showed high support for the group.

Secondly, the prevalence of political competitors has, like in Allison's and Ishiyama and Widmeier's articles, not proven to be a determining factor for FARC electoral success in Putumayo. Previous electoral support for parties like AD-M19 and Union Patriótica was much stronger in other departments, among which in Nariño. However, violent competitors' prevalence in Nariño compared to Putumayo can be an explanation of a lack of electoral support for FARC in Nariño and relative support in Putumayo. It appears that the actors influencing life post-demobilization of AUC, in the later stages of the conflict, were much more diversified in the department of Nariño. Therefore, violent conflict is still ongoing in the department alongside a lack of developmental support by the Colombian government. The

department of Putumayo is still very much behind in development and can still be regarded as a marginalized department. This department does have the benefit that violent conflict has all but ceased since the demobilization of the FARC as a result of the 2016 peace accord, while coca cultivation is still increasing in the department. Nariño is still not benefiting from the peace and FARC dissidents are being accused of committing human rights abuses in the department against community activists. This ongoing conflict, not only the violence by FARC but also by BACRIM and ELN, must have contributed to the electoral results in Nariño (a return to traditional parties and, in some cases, a turn to the left wing Green Party and a failure for FARC), while the calmer department of Putumayo has a relatively more positive relationship with the actions of the FARC in the later stages of the conflict: there are no FARC dissidents in the area while the reminders of the armed conflict in the form of BACRIM and ELN are present neither. Putumayo is left with its disappointment of policies of recent governments and voted for the traditional, old parties and had an 800% higher number of votes for FARC than the national average.

The thesis started out from the argument that an investigation into electoral success for a former rebel group is relevant because a durable democratization process internalized in the peace process is said to be a determining factor of a lasting peace. In that light, it is interesting to consider a relative lack of continuing conflict in Putumayo, while in Nariño, the conflict with narcoparamilitaries, FARC dissidents and ELN continues. De Zeeuw wrote that the viability of a new political party decides whether its transformation has failed or succeeded in the end, and it appears that FARC transformation may fail. Electoral support in the department of Putumayo was still quite low. This thesis has resolved questions on why FARC had relative success in the department and therewith considers state marginalization of and FARC support for peasant farmers in the department as determinants for electoral success. However, the peace process is still in danger and the ongoing violence could, again, spread to Putumayo and the rest of the country. In this context, it would be meaningful for the Colombian government to reconsider implementation of agricultural and socio-economic projects to hopefully combat the persisting violent circumstances of the drug trade in the Colombian south. Simultaneously, the government should build peace with ELN and effectively securitize the marginal zones in the south.

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Appendix A: Violence



Figure 3 Victims of massacres in Colombia by FARC, paramilitaries and governmental actors between 1980 and 1989. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Masacres 1980-2012.



Figure 4 Victims of massacres in Colombia by FARC, paramilitaries and governmental actors between 1990 and 1999. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Masacres 1980-2012.



Figure 5 Victims of massacres in Colombia by FARC, paramilitaries and governmental actors between 2000 and 2010. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Masacres 1980-2012.



Figure 6 Victims of kidnapping in Colombia by FARC and in total, 1980-1989. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Secuestro 1970-2010.



Figure 7 Victims of kidnapping in Colombia by FARC and in total, 1990-1999. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Secuestro 1970-2010.



Figure 8 Victims of kidnapping in Colombia by FARC and in total, 2000-2010. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Secuestro 1970-2010.



Figure 9 Civilian deaths in military action in Colombia per responsible actor, 1990-1999. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Civiles Muertos en Acciones Bélicas 1988-2012.



Figure 10 Civilian deaths in military action in Colombia per responsible actor, 2000-2010. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Civiles Muertos en Acciones Bélicas 1988-2012.



Figure 11 Victims of terrorism in Colombia per responsible actor 1990-1990. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Atentados Terroristas 1980-2012.



Figure 12 Victims of terrorism in Colombia per responsible actor 2000-2010. Data from Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de Datos ¡Basta Ya!, Atentados Terroristas 1980-2012.

Appendix B: Presence of armed groups



Figure 13 Presence of FARC in Colombia 2016. Colombia Plural. Zonas de Concentración y Territorios con Presencia de las FARC-EP, *29 September 2016.*



Figure 14 Presence of narcoparamilitaries in Colombia 2008-2016. Indepaz. XII Informe Sobre Presencia de Grupos Narcoparamilitares 2016, *2017, 4.*



Figure 15 Presence of ELN in Colombia 2018. Pares. ¿En Qué Municipios Tiene Presencia el ELN?*, 27 December 2018.*