Political Disaffection and the Rise of Non-Institutionalized Political Participation among the Mexican Youth

The Case of the #YoSoy132 Movement

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Introduction

During the 2012 Mexican presidential campaign, the #YoSoy132 movement emerged in Mexico City out of fierce discontent with the status quo. What started as a protest to oppose the controversial candidacy of Enrique Peña Nieto, soon became a movement supported by thousands of Mexicans in the whole country. The movement began as a response by a group of students from the private Iberoamericana University. After challenging the leading candidate in the presidential campaign, Peña Nieto, they received a great deal of criticism from the media (Guillén, 2013). The close relationship between the dominant media and the Partido Revolucionario Institutional[1], or "PRI" who ruled Mexico for more than 70 years, has resulted in many frustrations for Mexicans over decades. Additionally, practices as clientelism, co-optation, and corruption became commonly known aspects of Mexico's political culture (Camp, 1980). The #YoSoy132 movement grew from opposing the attacks of the media and the PRI to an important social actor that demanded change on multiple facets of political practices in Mexico. The emergence of the movement was particularly interesting since a great amount of young people stood up and started to engage in politics, while the Mexican youth is believed to be disinterested and apathetic from politics (Sherrod *et al.,* 2010). With the extensive use of web 2.0 tools[2] the movement succeeded in reaching many youngsters in Mexico, and additionally, worldwide.

In Mexico, participating in formal politics for many people, and especially youngsters, is regarded as cooperation with institutions that are involved in practices they condemn. Therefore, non-institutionalized participation offers the possibility to engage in politics in a, for politically disaffected citizens, legitimate way. In addition, non-institutionalized political participation can be a reaction of politically disaffected people who strive for changes in political practices.[3]

This thesis will investigate if political disaffection among the Mexican youth leads to engagement in non-institutionalized political participation. The #YoSoy132 movement serves a good example of a group of young people that organized itself and became politically active in order to challenge the status quo. Since it opposed not only Peña Nieto's candidacy but also the role that clientelism played in the presidential campaign, many Mexicans who dealt with similar resentment towards the authoritarian practices of the Mexican regime sympathized with, and got inspired by, the movement.

In this thesis, I will focus on the role political disaffection played in the emergence and spread of the #YoSoy132 movement. To determine the role of political disaffection in the #YoSoy132 movement I conducted research in Mexico City from June 2017 to August 2017. During the fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured interviews with multiple #YoSoy132 members who nowadays still engage in political associations or social responsible collectives, The interviewees included but were not limited to a professor in political science who researched the #YoSoy132 movement and other Mexican youth movements extensively, and youngster who were not engaged in #YoSoy132, but in other types of political organizations.

I hypothesise that in the case of the #YoSoy132 movement, political disaffection resulted in an increasing desire among the youth to participate in politics in order to oppose the Mexican regime. Since these youngsters badly distrust political parties and institutions, they are seeking unconventional ways to engage in politics. By producing new forms of social capital, the movement was able to grow and exert influence and power on politics while staying on the side lines to not become part of the "bad" practices of the Mexican government.

To test this hypothesis, in the first chapter I will give a theoretical overview of the effects political

[1] In English Institutional Revolutionary Party. From this point on I will refer to this political party as the Partido Revolucionario Institutional or the PRI.

[2] A definition of web 2.0 tools will be provided in chapter 1.3.

[3] This hypothesis will be substantiated by work of, amongst others, Pippa Norris that will be outlined in chapter 1.

disaffection can have on society, and in particular, on the youth; followed by the distinction between institutionalized political participation and non-institutionalized political participation, where after I will focus on forms of non-institutionalized political participation among the youth; and finally, an outline on social capital in relation to political disaffection and political participation, in which I will mainly focus on contemporary theory regarding social capital in relation to the youth in the Internet era in order to get a better understanding on how the #YoSoy132 movement was able to expand in a short amount of time. In the second chapter I will provide context by describing Mexico's political culture, the 71-years of PRI rule and its effects on political participation among the Mexican society, and the rise of non-institutionalized political participation in Mexico in the past 50 years. The third chapter will consist of four sections. In the first section, I will analyse the spontaneous emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement. In the second section, I will analyse the role political disaffection played in the emergence of the movement using interviews from the movements members and a Mexican professor in political science. In the third section, interviews with members of the movement will be used again to examine the role of web 2.0 tools in the spread of the movement. In the fourth and final section, I will analyse the influence the #YoSoy132 movement had on other movements and organizations which arose out of discontent with Mexican politics using interviews with several members from movements and organizations still engaging in politics nowadays. Lastly, I will draw final conclusions and identify the role political disaffection played in the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement.

1. Political Disaffection, Political Participation and Social Capital: A Theoretical Framework

Until the late 1970s, there were only a few dozen democracies worldwide. This changed however dramatically after the Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974. The number of democracies increased significantly during the 1970s and the 1980 as numerous democratic transitions took place in Latin America, Asian countries, and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. This process is called the Third Wave of democratization (Diamond, 1997). There was a common assumption that democratization would result in a strong increase in political participation. Even though voting levels were high during the transition period of new democracies, they often declined significantly in the following elections (Huntington, 1993). Both old and new democracies had to deal with problems of, on one hand corruption, favoritism, and unequal access to political power, and on the other hand with voter apathy, cynicism, and disengagement (Diamond, 1997). These problems have resulted in a fierce decline in citizen engagement in politics. Young people in particular seem to have lost interest, trust and confidence in political institutions. This phenomenon can be defined as political disaffection. A politically disaffected society has far-reaching consequences for the way citizens engage in politics. To explain political disaffection among the youth, theory on social capital is frequently used.[4] Many scholars argue that there is a strong connection between the lack of political engagement and social capital. However, when taking into account new forms of building social capital, social capital encourages youngsters to be civic engaged in unconventional ways.

In this chapter I will take a closer look at the concepts of political disaffection, political participation and social capital among the youth. Literature on political disaffection indicates that political disaffection can either lead to apathy (Pharr & Putnam, 2000), or engagement (Norris, 2002: 2004: 2006). First, I will analyse these two possible outcomes. After, I will examine literature on political disaffection and the youth. In the second section, I will examine two different forms of political participation – institutionalized political participation and non-institutionalized political participation – to analyse the effects of political disaffection in political participation among the youth. In the last section the theory on social capital among the youth in the internet era will be analysed in order to examine how youngsters interact with one another nowadays. Both political disaffection and social capital are studied intensively by many scholars. Although this chapter will be restricted to the aspects of these concepts that are relevant for this research, key elements of the studies in the scientific field of my research topic that are fundamentally important to the study of political disaffection and social capital will be addressed.

1.1 Political disaffection: apathy versus engagement

Following Di Palma, political disaffection can be described as the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions, but without questioning of the political regime (1970: 30). In addition, other terms that are often used by scholars to describe political disaffection include distrust, political efficacy (personal feelings of political influence), detachment and alienation (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Newton, 2001; Diamond, 2001: Torcal and Montero, 2006). Cynicism towards the representative institutions, political parties and politicians make citizens distrust political institutions resulting in disinterest in politics. A lack of confidence in government, or distrust, cannot be seen just as an expression of dissatisfaction with certain

[4] In Chapter 1.3 I will describe the concept of social capital and explain why examining social capital is relevant for this research.

presidential leadership. Aside from the declining tolerance for politicians that cannot live up to their campaign promises, citizens have become more anxious of the complex institutions (Pharr and Putnam, 2000: 131). Resulting in a weakening identification and attachment to political parties (Diamond, 2001: 1). This can be related to political efficacy. According to Campbell *et al*., political efficacy can be described as the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have an impact upon the political process (Campbell *et al.,* 1954: 197). The difference between political efficacy and trust can be found in the fact that efficacy refers to a person's capacity to produce input and the response of the government to that input, while trust can be seen as the willingness and the possibility of the government to produce satisfactory output even when there is no input from citizens. Therefore, citizens can have confidence in the system in general, but at the same time distrust certain political actors or a whole administration (Westholm and Niemi, 1986: 62). Alienation, according to Citrin *et al*., refers to a relatively enduring sense of estrangement from existing political institutions, values and leaders. Politically alienated citizens feel themselves as outsiders (Citrin *et al.,* 1975: 3).[5]

Scholars on political disaffection have pointed out that an increase in political disaffection does not necessarily have to be negative for a democracy. Political disaffection can even be seen as crucial for a well-functioning democracy since a democracy is supposed to be based on institutional mechanisms that should ensure that politicians and political institutions act in a trustworthy manner to minimize the level of political disaffection. As a result of the controlling part the society has, the political institutions are more likely to behave properly (Newton, 2001: 12). Therefore, governments should strive for a low level political disaffection in order to make democracies work. In addition, many scholars argue that political disaffection results in a search for new forms, and a probable increase, in political participation. Austin and Pinkleton additionally argue that confidence in the well-being of a country, and thus a positive attitude towards the political system, contributes to a lack of political participation among its citizens, while a major crisis or an authoritarian movement can drive the apathetic voter to engage in politics (1995). Thereby, it could lead to a drive to transform the democratic system as a whole (Torcal, 2003; Di Palma 1970; Kaase and Newton 1995).

Following Pharr and Putnam (2000), political disaffection can be considered as something resulting in people's lack of engagement with the political process and a general disinterest. On the other hand, political disaffection can imply that political representatives and political institutions lack responsiveness and good representation of the population which results in a politically disaffected society. Thus, it can be said that political disaffection can either lead to an apathetic and disinterested society. Subsequently, this may lead to a decline in political participation, or to a decline in institutionalized political participation, but also to the search, as mentioned earlier, for new forms of (non-institutionalized) political participation. Looking at this perspective, political disaffection can thus be considered as a positive factor for the well-being of democracies. The challenge for political reformers, however, is to figure out how political disaffection can transform negative and pessimistic feelings to more optimistic feelings of hopefulness in order to achieve institutional change (Diamond,
2001: 9).

1.1.1 Political disaffection among the youth

The youth is often characterized by popular culture, academics and public figures as apolitical and disaffected from the formal political process and political institutions. As a consequence, young people are considered apathetic and disinterested in politics (Putnam, 1995; Farthing, 2010). Nevertheless,

[5] In chapter 1.1.2 I will further describe the term political efficacy and trust.

political disaffection can under certain circumstances convert into militancy and protest, especially among young people (Norris, 2004; Torcal, 2006). Thus, the youth may be absent in conventional politics, but not in new forms of politics. In their research on generation's political attitudes, Wilkinson and Mulgan show that there has been a shift from essentially authoritarian to a liberal culture in the past decades that can explain the absence of the youth in politics (1995:20). In comparison to the youth, adults and especially the elderly have an authoritarian world view, while young people tend to move away from the traditional institutions and political parties. Furthermore, the political orientations of the youth are often less stable than that of older people. They did not yet construct a clear ideology and vision which leaves them confused and vulnerable to negative information. People with more knowledge, a long history of participation, and more interest in politics use more resources to eventually make decisions and tend to use less negative information (Austin and Pinkleton, 1995). Young voters, on the other hand, are more influenceable by particular events and media news coverage. Lau and Erber therefore argue that young voters, are more likely to become victim to a greater sense of cynicism toward the political system than more experienced voters (as cited in Austin and Pinkleton, 1995).

As demonstrated earlier, political disaffection can lead to either an apathetic and disengaged society or a political alienated society that is not disinterested and detached from politics, but engaged in a different way. Among youngsters, there is evidence of both outcomes of political disaffection. Yet, in this research I will focus mainly on political disaffection resulting in engagement instead of apathy.

1.2 Institutionalized political participation versus non-institutionalized political participation

Barnes and Kaase state in their study about political action: "Since democracy is rule by the people, the notion of political participation is at the center of the concept of the democratic state" (1979: 28). Participating in politics is thus considered an important right for citizens in order for them to determine what is in their best interest. As mentioned earlier, citizens nowadays seem to have moved away from conventional channels of political participation and mobilization in representative governments toward forms of non-institutionalized and non-electoral political participation. Kaase calls this rise of non-institutionalized political participation "one of the most pervasive and penetrating political developments in the democracies of the West" (1999: 14). He argues that forms of unconventional political participation that were common in the actions of social movement in the 1960s in the USA and Western Europe, such as street demonstrations, sit-ins, blocking of traffic etc. were first considered as political violence and citizen disobedience by the political order. Nevertheless, this non-institutionalized political participation, including new forms, was soon explained by a new attitude of citizens towards their political role, and was not limited any longer to voting in elections and related activities (Kaase, 1999: 14-5). An important reason for this switch to new forms of political participation instead of conventional political participation is, as stated earlier, dissatisfaction with the political institutions. Political dissatisfaction is often manifested through protest behaviour rather than conventional modes of political activity (Barnes & Kaase, 1979: 410). Originally, political participation described the way citizens interact with political authorities through political institutions (Barnes & Kaase, 1979: 29). Therefore, in this research, the distinction is made between institutionalized political participation that can be described as conventional political participation, and non-institutionalized political participation that can be described as unconventional political participation, including new forms of political participation. The conventional political engagement of citizens was developed in the nineteenth century. Initially, voting in elections was considered the primary way for citizens to engage in politics. Hence,

voter turnout was almost always used to measure political participation of citizens in the United States. After the WOII, American political scientists considered political participation as a way to influence government decisions (Ekman & Amna, 2012). In line with them, Verba and his associates focus as well on conventional methods of engagement in politics when describing political participation: "by political participation, we refer to those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personal and/or the actions they take" (Verba *et al.,* 1987: 46). Among the rights citizens should have in a democratic system are, according to Verba *et al*. (1987: 48), the right to vote in meaningful elections, the right to join and form political associations, the right to sign petitions, the right of free speech, a free press, and a free assembly. For ordinary citizens, the conventional forms of political participation can thus be limited to electoral turnout and party membership. This is why this form of political participation is often referred to as institutionalized political participation. The democratic rights of citizens have far-reaching consequences for the political elites. Their power decreases when citizens' power increases. Hence, some political regimes consider specific forms of non-institutionalized political participation as illegitimate (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). Nevertheless, political participation started to be analysed by many scholars from a wider perspective including not only voter turnout, but also demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and other forms of protest behaviour (Ekman & Amna, 2012: 268). In addition, society has changed considerably during the past decades. The focus nowadays, for instance, lies more on improving democracies and increasing skills and resources of citizens to get informed. Pippa Norris therefore argues that the way people define political participation must be revised and updated to take into account these changes of civic engagement over the years. New social movements, transnational policy networks, and internet activism offer new opportunities to participate in politics (2002).[6]

1.2.1 Non-institutionalized political participation among the youth

Throughout the world, a politically active youth is considered important. A lack of intellectual interest and knowledge and a lack of participation in the political process can affect even old and strong democracies (Torcal, 2006). The electorate consists largely of young people and a well-informed electorate is considered important for the democratic process. Many scholars and media tend to focus solely on institutionalized political participation when analysing youth participation in politics. Even though the decline in institutionalized political participation is affecting all citizens, the youth is considered particularly disillusioned by the major institutions of the representative democracy (Norris, 2004: 2). This, however, does not necessarily mean that the youth is apathetic and disinterested in politics in general, as demonstrated earlier. Political efficacy and the lack of trust in politics play a significant role in the absence of the youth in the democratic process. In addition, younger and especially well-educated generations in Western countries, are increasingly dissatisfied with conventional forms of participation through traditional bureaucratic agencies (Norris, 2002). When analysing political participation among the youth, it seems that they are particularly present in unconventional, and thus, non-institutionalized forms of political participation. Looking at protest action, Norris argues that the younger generation, the higher educated, men, and the nonreligious are more active. In particular, the public sector professionals and students (2002: 200).

In this section, I will further focus on the new forms of political participation pointed out by Norris, since they are particularly important for this research: participation in new social movements, internet activism, and protest activism.

[6] In Chapter 1.2.1 I will further describe these new opportunities to participate in politics.

New social movements (NSMs) have often grown out of pre-existing organizations or interest groups. They differentiate themselves from traditional interest groups in the way they are structured, the activities of participants, and the issues the movements address (Norris, 2002: Feixa *et al*., 2009). Traditional interest groups emerged during the nineteenth- and first half of the twentieth century together with the rise of democracy in the more developed countries. Their activities were controlled, institutionalized, and structured. Additionally, the interest groups were often local and a hierarchy with full-time paid officials, formal rules and regulations, and a strong internal cohesion made it possible to participate for insiders. A good example of these interest groups are trade unions (Norris, 2002). The social base of the interest groups was often distinguished by class, nation and social condition. After WOII (1950-1970) there emerged again a large amount of NSMs in the Western world (Feixa *et al*., 2009). The social base of these movements moved away from class and focused on other identity-based issues, such as ethnicity, certain marginalized communities, gender, and generation. Hence, they operated regionally and even transnationally instead of locally. Even though not all members were youngsters, the NSMs were considered youth and gender-based movements (Feixa *et al*., 2009). Boggs for instance states that "urban social struggles, the environmental or ecology movements, women's and gay liberation, the peace movement, and cultural revolt linked primarily to student and youth activism" (1986: 39-40). They organized, amongst other things, sit-ins and demonstrations. Around the turn of the century, there was another shift in the focus and characteristics of NSMs. Their social base crosses ethnicity, gender, and generation. They carried out action by organizing marches and demonstrations as well, but the difference with the post-war social movements is that these NSMs call for action through the Internet. Issues stressed by these NSMs, such as globalization, human rights, and world trade show that there might be a surge of a global civic society (Feixa *et al*., 2009). On the other hand, Internet activism plays an important role. This brings me to the second form of non-institutionalized political participation that I will outline in the following section.

Since the emergence of the NSMs in the early 2000s, the use of the Internet has exploded. Certain events, such as the Iraq war and the growing fear of global warming, led people to take to the streets or to their computer (Earl *et al*., 2010). Information is spread quick and easily through the use of a vast mailing lists or the use of Social Media websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, that can encourage people to participate in marches or demonstrations. Moreover, virtual communities are created where like-minded people find each other and can share their ideas. Particularly global youth networks made use of these virtual communities to spread their ideas. Additionally, Feixa *et al.* argue that the Internet has created new youth cultures, as for instance cyberpunks (2009: 428). Vromen even states that “the Internet is often portrayed as a democratising force that facilitates new participatory practices. It is often assumed that young people have been the big ‘winners’, or even the leaders, in the advent of participation via the Internet” (2008: 79). Thus, different from previous social movements, young people are not in a subordinate position anymore. This is partly due to technological changes.[7]

The third form of non-institutionalized political participation I address in relation to the youth is protest activism. In their research, Barnes and Kaase measured protest activism by using six types of protest activities: signing petitions, joining a consumer boycott, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings, and blocking traffic (1979: 547). Norris argues that protest activism is a consistent dimension of political participation and that forms of political activism

[7] In Chapter 1.3 the role of the Internet in the associational life of the youth will be further analysed.

have proved to be very pervasive and became increasingly popular in the 1980s. Initially, protest activism was carried out mostly by younger generation, and in particular, students. Nowadays the social backgrounds of participants seems to be an important motive. Protest activism is on the rise as a channel of political participation (2002: 211).

1.3 Social capital among the youth in the internet era

Social capital is a concept widely studied by many scholars and has been constructed in many different ways. According to Holland *et al.*, (2007: 98) social capital can be viewed form two different perspectives: it is seen as a concept dealing with the dilemma of collective action and integration, or as a concept dealing with social injustice and inequality. In this research, I will focus solely on the first perspective of understanding social capital. One of the most important theorists on the collective action and integration factor of social capital is Robert Putnam. According to him, social capital refers to "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993: 167). Trust, cooperation, and reciprocity play herein an important role in what leads to citizen engagement in community affairs (Putnam 1993; Newton, 1999). Overall, he argues that building social capital is key to make democracy works, high levels of political participation are for instance linked to social capital (1993). Additionally, he demonstrated that social capital leads to lower crime levels in the US, better personal health, and educational attainment (1995). In addition, civic engagement could attribute to create individual rewards, such as career opportunities and expanding networks, as well as community goods, by encourage people to work together on local problems (Norris & Englehart, 2013: 2). Moreover, Coleman argues that unlike other forms of capital, social capital is reflected by the existence of close interpersonal relationships between actors and among actors (as cited in Bolino *et al*., 2002: 506). In building these interpersonal relationships between individuals, social trust and cooperation seem to play the key role (Putnam, 1993; Coleman, 1988; Newton, 1999). According to Coleman (1988: 101), a group is able to accomplish a lot more when there is a large amount of trustworthiness and trust than when there is a lack of trust. When describing the construction of social capital Putnam often refers to social-life networks such as voluntary associations, clubs, groups, and organizations. Membership in such a network brings people together and makes them cooperate which, as a consequence, leads to serving a lot of interests for the whole community (Putnam, 1993).

Nevertheless, dominant writers on social capital like Putnam and Coleman do not consider children and young people as active agents in the formation of social capital (Holland *et al*., 2007). Putnam recognizes the importance of social capital of the parents and their involvement in a child's development and educational achievement, but does not focus on the influence of the children's own networks and their ability to construct social capital themselves (Holland *et al*., 2007). He thereby stresses that there has been a large decline in social capital among the younger generation when looking at for instance the rise of television entertainment that resulted in civic disengagement and a reduction of social connectedness (Norris, 2003: 5). Coleman also did research on social capital among children and considers it important, but he focusses mainly on the relations build between children and their parents, and possibly, other family members (Marrow, 1999). Holland *et al.* argue, on the contrary, that young people are active agents in the production of social capital. They demonstrate that young people use social capital as a resource to negotiate transitions in their lives and in the construction of identity (2007: 113). When children move to secondary school for instance, they

use certain resources and networks to negotiate the move and to settle in their new environment. Furthermore, youngsters use certain resources and networks again at the transition to adulthood that will help them follow further education and employment opportunities in order to help them get out, or get in certain communities (Holland *et al*., 2007).

Newer information and communication technologies have been significantly important in producing social capital among the younger generation. The internet made it easier to create interpersonal relationships and build communities in a new way. In particular, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and web 2.0 tools have played a critical role. According to Wilson *et al.,* the web 2.0 refers to: "the second generation of the web, wherein interoperable, user-centered web applications and services promote social connectedness, media and information sharing, user-created content, and collaboration among individuals and organizations" (as cited in Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014: 368). The Internet nowadays does not solely provide information anymore, but has become a place where people can share information about themselves as well. There is an on-going debate about whether the growing use of the Internet will result in isolation, by dissolving face-to-face relationships, or contrarily whether the Internet is capable of transforming communities by creating new forms of communities online, like social networks, or additionally improve communities by creating new ways to connect with existing relationships (Norris, 2003; Hampton & Wellman, 2003). In their research, Hampton and Wellman discuss three possible outcomes of the growth of the Internet for community extensively: the weakening of community, the transformation of the community into an online "virtual community", or the enhancement of community (2003: 279).

The question whether the Internet is weakening communities or not is often discussed by many scholars. The use of the Internet is for instance likely to reduce face-to-face time, what can result in the diminishment of an individual's social capital (Ellison *et al*., 2007: 1146). Online interactions that happen at one's home could isolate people form places where people normally create their social capital, like bars, cafes, and local parks. The new information and communication technologies namely enable people to do certain activities, formerly public, privately from their homes such as work, shopping, socializing, and leisure (Hampton & Wellman, 2003: 279).

As Hampton and Wellman argue, Internet utopians have exposed community-expanding possibilities of online interactions and connections. According to them, the Internet has created an entirely new form of community known as the "virtual community" (Hampton & Wellman, 2003: 281). These virtual communities are free from constraints that often limit 'normal' communities, such as geographic distances and traditional social divisions looking at race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status (Norris, 2003; Hampton & Wellman, 2003).

According to Norris (2003: 6), certain aspects of the Internet should encourage interaction and exchange within social groups that share similar beliefs and values which would enhance the community. The possibilities are almost infinite. Thousands of networks exist that were created to bring like-minded individuals together. Also, there is a wide range of discussion groups encompassing all kinds of different matters. In addition, Hampton and Wellman argue that the Internet provides an extra opportunity to communicate. Relationships created online do not substitute existing face-to-face relationships and social networks, the Internet has added to the existing methods of communication (Hampton & Wellman, 2003: 283). Ellison *et al.* (2007: 1146) additionally argue that new forms of social capital and relationship building are likely to occur in online social network sites, since online relationships may be supported by certain technologies such as distribution lists, photo directories, and search possibilities. Summarizing this chapter, it can be said that political disaffection, political participation and social capital are

inextricably entwined. It is often assumed that a lack of social capital leads to a politically disaffected society, and a probable decline in political participation. Nonetheless, new forms of social capital and political participation also have to be taken into account when looking at the effects of political disaffection in contemporary societies. Political disaffection could namely either lead to apathy or engagement in politics. When political disaffection leads to engagement, it particularly leads to non-institutionalized political participation. Political disaffection can be considered a challenge and a motive for young people to search for other, or newer forms of (non-institutionalized) political participation. This will be further described in the following chapters where I will analyse the rise of non-institutionalized political participation in Mexico, and the role of political disaffection in the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement. Furthermore, a declining social capital leads to a less engaged society. Therefore, new forms of civic engagement and connectedness are important in producing new forms of social capital. These new forms of social capital could lead to an increase in civic engagement and are thus likely to lead to an increase in (non-institutionalized) political participation. Especially, the Internet plays an important role in the production of social capital in contemporary societies. By creating platforms and social networks where geographic distance and social divisions do not constrain people any longer, youngsters tend to interact and connect faster. This will be further substantiated in chapter 3 where I will analyse the role of these new forms of social capital in the case of the #YoSoy132 movement. In the following chapter I will investigate Mexico's political culture and the PRI hegemony in order to understand why Mexicans, and especially the youth, possibly become politically disaffected and turn against institutionalized political participation. Thereby I will analyse both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation in Mexico.

2. Political participation in Mexico: A Historical Background

In order to understand the political disaffected youth in Mexico and its strive for new forms of government, it is necessary to examine Mexico's history of political participation. Since the Revolution in 1910, the political regime of Mexico has been highly institutionalized. Although the authorities argue that the regime has been democratic in its nature, many scholars strongly contested the idea that Mexico represents a full democracy. In fact, it has been rather considered by some as a dictatorship or a combination between a democracy and a dictatorship because of the 71 years of PRI rule. Therefore, in this chapter I will first examine Mexico's political culture and how it explains the way Mexicans have engaged in politics over the years. After this, I give a historical background on the PRI dominance and how they institutionalized political participation. In the final section I will analyse the rise of non-institutionalized political participation in Mexico, and how it has influenced a possible change in Mexico's political culture.

2.1 The influence of the political culture in Mexican politics and society

The political culture of Mexico has been the subject of study by many scholars. It can be seen as an unusual political culture that is not comparable to other Latin American countries. There are a few things to keep in mind when analysing Mexico's political culture and its effects. I will outline two aspects of the political culture in this research that will help me examine the effects of political disaffection on non-institutionalized forms of political participation among the Mexican youth. The first aspect I will examine is the way Mexico's political culture is rooted in Mexican society. The second aspect will be the way Mexico's political culture is rooted in Mexican history, explained in the following section through the 71-years of PRI rule. Although, both political culture and Mexican history are closely intertwined, some historical events during the 20th century played a major role in changing the political culture in the country.

A political culture can be defined in multiple ways. In this research, I will use the definition of Craig and Cornelius:

> The political culture of a group can be understood as the set of cognitions, perceptions, evaluations, attitudes, and behavioural predispositions through which member individuals and/or subgroups order and interpret political institutions and processes, and their own relationship with such institutions and processes (1980: 340).

As already mentioned, Mexico's political culture is deeply rooted in Mexican society. In the work of Roderic Camp, this is extensively analysed. According to Camp (1980: 15), the main characteristics of the Mexican political culture are: trust, personalism, bureaucratic families, and co-optation. Trust is related to Mexican politics is two different ways: the level of confidence on the part of the citizens in political leaders, parties and institutions;[8] and the level of trust among Mexicans in general, whether they are leaders or followers. This has to do mostly with another principal characteristic of the Mexican political culture: personalism. Because of the lack of trust in Mexican culture, Mexicans find it difficult to place confidence in associates, particularly when it is about sensitive matters. Therefore, Mexicans tend to place greater reliance upon relatives, long-term friends, and *compadres*[9] for filling important positions (Camp, 1980: 16). When looking at the Mexican political system, this is even more peculiar

[8] The characteristic of trust is analysed in Chapter 1.1 on political disaffection.
[9] Officially godfathers, but the term is also used for addressing close friends.

since it is dominated by a single person, namely the President (as cited in Craig & Wayne, 1980). This can be problematic when it comes to pointing out people capable of filling all the important positions in Mexican politics. Therefore, knowing enough people to fill these positions is of vital importance in a political system where recruitment is limited. The system is thus highly dependent on personalism, familialism, and co-optation because personal loyalty, rather than political ideology. This is still the dominant feature of Mexico's political culture (Camp, 1980: 17). The strength of family ties are of major importance to the Mexican political system:

> Family ties are a passport, so to speak, allowing easy access into the highest political echelons. This access is easier to obtain because a relative has vouched politically for your loyalty through his own prior loyalties and commitments to the official system (Camp, 1980: 29).

Additionally, trust seems to play a significant role in Mexican society as well. As Fagen and Tuohy showed in their work on Mexican politics, although democracy is considered the best form of government by many Mexicans, minorities, less educated citizens and politically marginalized citizens are not considered equal in the democratic process (1972). People tend to trust people with a high income and a high education more than the low-educated and poor part of society (Coleman, 1972: 42). The other important characteristic of Mexico's political culture, political co-optation, has been an important strategy of Mexican politicians to maintain control. Co-optation can be explained as a way for politicians to win over or incorporate potential opponents. It has often been beneficiary in Mexico to be co-opted by the dominant party because of the benefits, as for instance a job offer, groups and individuals obtained in exchange for some form of concession on their part (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). Co-optation is thus used in Mexico to manipulate and reduce opposition. Sometimes the demands of interest groups are even partially met in order to get them on the Government's side (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2009). When analysing the work on Mexican political culture by Craig and Cornelius, it becomes even more obvious that Mexican political culture is deeply rooted in the Mexican society. This can be explained by the authoritarian historical experiences of the country, but also by focusing on *machismo,*[10] that explain power relations rooted in Mexican history (Craig & Cornelius, 1980). Furthermore, authoritarian features of Mexican politics have caused obstacles to achieve real democratization of the system. First, individual behaviours and attitudes play an important role in this authoritarianism, and second, authoritarian patterns of decision making and political organization are important to analyse. Authoritarian individuals are characterized by a concern with obedience or disobedience in children, admiration for persons who have power and use force, and a tendency to justify inequality by attributing merit to strength. This form of authoritarianism in Mexico is mostly observed in rural areas rather than urban areas, and among the lower class rather the high class of society (Craig & Cornelius, 1980; González Casanova, 1970). Authoritarian patterns of decision making and political organization are present in Mexican politics mainly because of the centralization of authority in Mexican politics, as earlier mentioned, in the presidency. Even though powerful interest groups can have influence, to a certain extent, on government decisions, the president himself is the key initiator and shaper of all major public policies (Craig & Cornelius, 1980: 351). To conclude, it can be said that the way Mexican citizens engage in politics is a reflection of deep-rooted values and understandings which are part of the Mexican political culture.

[10] A preoccupation with male power, expressed in displays of bravery, sexual prowess, and dominance (Craig and Cornelius, 1980: 348).

2.2 71 years of PRI rule and institutionalized political participation

> *"Mexico is the perfect dictatorship, because it is a disguised dictatorship in such a way that it does not look like a dictatorship. In fact it has, if one investigates, all of the characteristics of a dictatorship. The permanence, not of one man, but of a political party, a party that is immovable, a party that only allows space for criticism as long as it serves the party, because it wants to be considered as a democratic party, but that suppresses by all means, even the worst means" (Mario Vargas Llosa, 1990).* [11]

The Peruvian Nobel prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa once referred to the one-party system that ruled Mexico for 71 years: the Partido Revolucionario Institutional, as representing the 'perfect dictatorship'. During its rule, the party controlled Mexico's most important political offices, and, through a series of state-corporatist institutions, its leading sectoral, professional, and civic organizations. Thereby, the PRI machine could last forever by appointing a new president every six years. On the other hand, opposition parties were allowed and at the municipal level and in the lower house of the legislature, they were able to exert a certain extent of power. The success of the "political miracle of Mexico", as Lawson characterizes the regime of the PRI (2002: 12), received a great deal of attention worldwide. Authoritarian political leaders in other countries envied the success of the PRI to maintain in power for such a long period of time with popular public support. In addition, there has been admiration from outside Latin America for the political stability of the Mexican government in comparison with the rest of contemporary Latin America (Bethell, 1995: 83). The party relied on coherence and loyalty of a big group of elites who intermediated between the regime and society. Moreover, it was almost impossible to attack the presidency or other officials of his administration. This however changed significantly after 1968 (Johnson, 1978: 5).[12] The regime has been often characterized as authoritarian by many scholars because of the long period of power with often strong men that occupied the presidency (Padgett, 1957: 995). Nevertheless, others have termed the regime democratic, imperfectly democratic, or in transition toward democracy (Purcell, 1975: 29). Almond and Verby for instance describe Mexico as "a 'non-Atlantic community' democracy," a country where the democratic political system was relatively new, but in which the people's hopes and aspirations for democratization and modernization were high (Almond & Verba, 1980: 40).

In March 1929, 12 years after the new Constitution had been written, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), later renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party, was set up as the accepted agency of the Revolution (Scott, 1959: 122). Its symbolic status as the champion of the Revolution resulted in a genuine support for the party among Mexican citizens (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015: 58). The PRI is formed by a large amount of organized interest associations with their own people deeply involved. From trade unions to the congress and from foreign entrepreneurs to the military, the PRI succeeded in creating vast networks of personal loyalties through clientelist groups. The co-optation of group leaders made it difficult for interest groups to exercise power, and to pressure the executive, what reduced their autonomy and power (Craig & Cornelius, 1980). When looking at trade unions, it is very common that there are strong links between the unions and the PRI. For instance, two third of the unionized workers belong to the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), which is closely linked to the PRI and the government itself through the working-class sector of the party (Casanova,1970:14). Within the government, representatives from the PRI occupy the majority of positions within the

[11] Translated from Spanish by the author.
[12] I will further explain these changes later on in this section

Congress, federal states, and municipalities. The Mexican political scientist, Lorenzo Meyer, for instance described the Congress as " an assembly of unconditional supporters of the executive who approved almost everything the president sent it and never questioned him effectively nor called to account those responsible for political actions" (as cited in Russell, 2011: 422). The Supreme Court of Justice is endowed with power itself, nevertheless there is proof that the Court worked in favour of the President multiple times in history to make the Executive more stable (Casanova, 1970). On the other hand, party membership has not been significantly popular among Mexican citizens. However, membership of the PRI was a by-product of joining one of the various associations that united peasants, workers, bureaucrats, teachers, professional men of all categories and small landholders. The members of these party-affiliated groups automatically became party members (Padget, 1957). Furthermore, the PRI fully integrated the media into its structure of power. There has been an obvious dependent relationship between the PRI and the media. Media provided selective and favourable coverage of the PRI and in return they received generous subsidies, outright payoffs, and profitable broadcast permits (Edmonds-Poli & Shark, 2015). In a country where a great amount of people watch television regularly and where the print media industry is poorly developed, tv channels have a significant influence on society. Thereby Mexico's television industry is dominated by television network duopoly of: Televisa and TV Azteca (Park & Curran, 2000). These two networks thus have a significant influence on the public opinion and has likely contributed to the continuity of the PRI hegemony.

In this way, the PRI was able to incorporate all classes of society in the political system. As a result, citizens accepted the system as legitimate even though most people were excluded from power and there was little space for political participation outside the PRI. Nonetheless, this mass support for the PRI started to diminish after the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968, what resulted in people started to question the legitimacy of their ruling party. Changes occurred in citizens behaviour and actions. Important events that happened afterwards, and consequently ended the PRI-rule were the emergence of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), and the 2000 presidential victory of the National Action Party (PAN).

In protest against actions such as corruption of the PRI and the shortcomings of the changes promised during the Mexican revolution, students started to reunite in 1968 to oppose the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. They were able to collect a lot of support from their universities and communities by addressing corruption scandals of the PRI and the controversial investment of the preparation for the Olympics that were held in Mexico City that year. They demonstrated several times during the summer of 1968 what resulted in many confrontations between students and officials. Academic staff, and even the UNAM rector, Javier Barros Sierra joined the students in their protest. On 2 October, Federal troops were deployed to the Plaza de las Tres Culturas, Tlatelolco, Mexico City, to supervise a demonstration. It ended in bloodshed and mass arrests (Brewster, 2002: 174-75). This violent state repression called into question the legality of the Mexican state governed by the PRI (Sorensen, 2002: 298). Until 1968, Mexican presidents were more or less immune to public criticism (Stevens, 1974). The dilemma that started to face the PRI is that Mexicans have awakened to the shortcoming of the ruling party and that they are transferring their loyalty and support from the party to other groups that demand reform of the country's overall governing system (Johnson, 1971: 44).

Mexican politics is however not restricted solely to the PRI. The PAN and the PRD have been the biggest opposition parties. The PRD was established in 1989 opposing the PRI domination in Mexican politics. It has become Mexico's largest left-wing political party. Even though the party has given hope for political improvement, the party committed the same faults that the PRI made in earning citizens' trust and support; such as factionalism, personalism, and clientelism (Magaloni, 2006). This can be

explained by the Mexican political culture that is deeply rooted in Mexican society as described earlier. Despite the fact that the PRD could not meet the expectations of many citizens who hoped for a political party free of practices as corruption, clientelism and personalism, the PRD served as an interesting alternative for the conservative PAN and the authoritarian PRI (Magaloni, 2006). In addition to the emergence of the PRD, the triumph of the PAN, when Vicente Fox won the 2000 presidential and made an end to the 71-years of PRI rule, made significant changes in Mexican politics. The PAN victory demonstrated that not all institutions and political parties were incorporated by the PRI and that the Mexican democratic system functioned. It seemed that votes actually did count, and citizens could rely on fair elections, which made it look like Mexico was full of possibility and promise (Shirk, 2005). Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the PAN also became entangled in the same web of corruption, clientelism and co-optation as the PRI.

Nowadays, a lot of cynicism exists regarding the way Mexicans perceive their representatives and political institutions. Regardless of the immense pride Mexicans have for their country, they feel ashamed about many things. As Johnson puts it, Mexico can be characterized as an "esoteric democracy", a carefully preserved democratic facade (as cited in Ard, 2003: 2), that looks from the outside as a well-functioning and stable democracy, while when taking a closer look, the political system of Mexico fails to represent its citizens in numerous ways.

2.3 The rise of non-institutionalized political participation in Mexico

Since the ruling party opposition was not able to organize itself, until 2000, as a strong opponent that could overthrow the PRI "dictatorship", multiple unrecognized and illegal sources of opposition emerged. These parties, groups or movements were excluded from power and considered illegal by the PRI (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). A reason for this was to discourage party splits, since multiple PRI politicians played with the idea to start a new party. The PRI enacted a law that required parties to legally register to be able to participate in elections. To obtain such a registration, parties had to meet a number of strict requirements that made it almost impossible to establish an opposition party (Magaloni, 2006). Among the groups outlawed by the PRI was the Mexican Communist Party (PCM). Furthermore, numerous other important social movements and insurgent groups, including splinter groups from the PRI, emerged in opposition to the PRI. For instance, during the 1960s and 1970s a number of armed leftist groups emerged that, like the September 23 movement, the Revolutionary Workers' Party, the Union of the People, and the Popular Revolutionary Army. These groups expressed their discontent with the way the PRI renounced the principles of the Revolution and fought for true revolutionary change (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015: 70). In the 1980s and 1990s, there was an enormous growth of civic organizations operating in Mexico to promote democracy, clean elections, and human rights (Chand, 2001). Mexican citizens seemed more willing to participate in civic organizations. Vikram K. Chand even states that the nature of Mexican society changed. He argues that the growth in civic organizations during that time can be explained by three factors of change: the political awakening of Mexican society that started to organize itself to pursue democracy; social leaders, like experienced business men and intellectuals, emerged as institutional entrepreneurs that set up new types of NGOs; and thirdly, international actors started to provide financial and technical assistance to Mexican NGOs giving them international legitimacy (2001: 205-206). The most famous insurgent group emerged in that period, was the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de la Liberación Nacional, EZLN), often referred to as the Zapatistas.

On January 1, 1994, an armed rebellion broke out in the south-eastern state of Chiapas. In the aftermath of the cease-fire following 12 days of fighting, a new social movement emerged that

demanded the land and rights promised in the constitution of 2017, but were never realized (Gilbreth & Ontero, 2001). Their call for democratic change and rights for the indigenous people that were mostly excluded from power attracted the attention of many people worldwide. In line with Gilbreth and Ontero, it can be said that the emergence of the social movement through the EZLN, encouraged an increase in levels of political activity and has been important for Mexico's democratization process (2001: 7). In contrast to opposition parties, which have been either undermined or drawn into the political net of the PRI. The Zapatistas distinguished themselves by encouraging civil society to advocate democratization from the bottom up instead of the usual practices top-bottom strategy of the Mexican government. The Zapatista movement consisted of Mexico City intellectuals together with local indigenous men and women from Chiapas (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). The Zapatista uprising can be seen as the result of the long years of indigenous struggle and resistance in Mexico. First to Spanish colonialization and after independence, to the dominant classes that exploited the indigenous people and often stole their land. The focus of Mexican policies towards indigenous communities has been mostly assimilation, what resulted in discrimination and racism toward the indigenous population (Cleaver, 1998). The timing of the uprising was however not a coincidence. They chose the date that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect: an agreement that would let Mexico enter in the First World and bring the country great economic rewards by boosting international trade. At the same time, the agreement would result in privatization of land owned by peasants and many indigenous people would lose their land and houses. The Zapatistas and other indigenous peoples considered the agreement part of the Government's plan to dominate and marginalize the indigenous people of Mexico (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015: 178). When the Zapatistas entered San Cristóbal de las Casas on the notorious 1st of January 1994, Subcomandante Marcos, the leader of the EZLN, told reporters: "Today is the beginning of NAFTA, which is nothing more than a death sentence for the indigenous ethnicities of Mexico, which are perfectly dispensable in the modernization program of President Salinas de Gortari" (as cited in Gilbreth & Ontero, 2001: 11). The Zapatista uprising additionally set in motion a technological innovation (Gilbreth & Ontero, 2001). By using e-mail and websites, they were able to rapidly communicate their ideas with sympathizers and organizations around the world, and draw the attention of international newspapers and opinion leaders. In this way, they created new ways of protest and changed the relationship between the movement leaders and their followers (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014). Networks constructed online supporting the Zapatistas grew from providing support for traditional work of solidarity for the Zapatistas, to a much wider form of opposition networks that oppose a great variety of dominant policies. It has inspired and stimulated a wide range of grassroots political efforts in numerous countries worldwide (Cleaver, 1998). Harry Cleaver calls this the "Zapatista Effect" (1998). This was particularly important in a country like Mexico where the dominant media channels are controlled by the state. The Zapatistas succeeded in making contact with the outside world without being censored by the Mexican media (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014). In a response for their demand of reforming the Mexican political institutions, the Mexican government encouraged the Zapatistas to become a political party in order to exert real power. The Zapatistas however refused and preferred to stay autonomous (Cleaver, 1998). Even though they were not able to offer a clear political alternative, the Zapatistas succeeded in raising awareness about the condition of the human rights situation of the indigenous peoples of Mexico. As a result, every president after Ernesto Zedillo, who was elected in the same year as the Zapatista uprising, has increased public policy spending in the indigenous regions (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). In addition, the Zapatistas provided an political-engagement alternative to the PRI-machine. It can be said that they significantly

contributed to the way political participation in Mexico changed. An important factor in this was their use of technology to attract international attention and obtain a great number of supporters.

Since President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) declared the war on drugs against drug cartels, Mexico has become involved in an increasing national conflict characterized by extreme violence.[13] In 2012 the return of the PRI, like we will see in the next chapter, will not lead to a solution for both the structure of violence and the lack of the legitimacy of the political regime. The PRI has not prevented the further erosion of the political regime and legitimacy as drug traffic violence has taken control of the daily lives of Mexicans.

Even though Mexico's political culture is deeply rooted in its society, the way Mexicans look at their politicians and institutions significantly changed in the past 50 years. Mexican citizens started to question the PRI's legitimacy after many corruption scandals and electoral fraud, but most of all, after the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968. This decreased support for the PRI, resulted in the creation of movements, parties and groups that opposed the PRI. Even though the PRI was able to supress opposition for a long period of time, Mexican civil society started to change from the 1980s onwards. Civic organizations started to work from a bottom-up structure, instead of the top-down structure that is common in Mexico's political culture. In addition, people began to organize themselves to gain political power on their own terms, without being incorporated by the PRI. As shown in the previous chapter, a lack of confidence in the political institutions results in a politically disaffected society. The growing strength of opposition parties together with the emergence of civic organizations in Mexico seeking democracy however shows that distrust in Mexico's political institutions has led to an increase in non-institutionalized political participation. These parties and organizations pressured the regime to make certain changes, such as regulations that meet public demands and the incorporation of non-co-opted groups in politics, in order to survive. The emergence of civil groups opposing the regime will be further examined in the following chapter when analysing the case of the #YoSoy132 movement.

[13] I will describe the sexenio of Felipe Calderón further in chapter 3.

3. Youth's Contestation Against the Government: The Case of the #YoSoy132 Movement

The question of whether or not to participate in the political process is a dilemma for many Mexicans. Overall, conventional citizen participation in politics, like voting, is often seen as an important citizen's duty. In Mexico however, participating in the political process is considered by many equivalent to supporting the unlawful activities of the Mexican government such as corruption and non-compliance. It is often assumed that people who do participate in institutionalized politics either are part of the system, or benefit from it in one way or another. This can be explained by looking at Mexican political culture described in the previous chapter. Political disaffection is often a reason for people not to participate in (conventional) politics. Anna María Fernández Poncela,[14] professor and researcher in political science at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM), is well aware of this struggle and agreed that political disaffection plays a significant role in it. She explained to me:

> "In the case of Mexico, political disaffection makes sense. The older generation does not understand the political disaffection among the youth, but I do. It is difficult in a country like Mexico to still believe in voting and in Mexico's democracy. I always make the same joke to my students: everyone always asks if they vote, and if they say no, everyone always asks why they do not. This comes from an overall assumption that everyone, and especially students, should vote. I always ask students if they vote, and if so, why they vote."

In this chapter I will take a closer look at the effects that political disaffection has had in the past decade on the Mexican youth regarding political participation. Theory on political disaffection and political participation demonstrated in the first chapter that political disaffection can lead to an increase in citizen engagement in non-institutionalized politics, including new forms of political participation. To examine whether political disaffection in the case of Mexico indeed leads to an increase in political participation, I analysed the case of the #YoSoy132 movement. Since the movement meets the requirements to be considered a NSM, with both internet and protest activism involved, the movement is a good example of a new form of participation in Mexican politics. In the first section I will analyse the emergence of the movement. However, it is important to briefly explore the political context in which it emerged. Secondly, I will examine the role that political disaffection played in the emergence of the movement. Regarding this I hypothesized that political disaffection can lead to the creation of new forms of political participation, as discussed in chapter 1, such as a NSM like the #YoSoy132 movement. After this I will analyse the importance and role of social capital in the emergence and growth of the movement. As I demonstrated in chapter 1, among the youth, new ways to produce social capital have emerged that help youngsters to build interpersonal relations. I will examine if the production of social capital by using new information and communication technologies was of significant importance to the movement's existence and expansion. In the final section I will analyse the effects that the #YoSoy132 movement has had on contemporary non-institutionalized political participation. Although the #YoSoy132 does not seem present nowadays, I will examine if the movement's participants remain active in other movement or associations and if the movement inspired other people to organize themselves and to oppose the Mexican political regime.

[14] Interview with Anna María Fernández Poncela (25/06/2017). Translated from Spanish to English by the author. Following quotations from interviews are translated by the author as well.

3.1 The spontaneous emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement

As shown in chapter 2, Mexican politics changed significantly when the first opposition party, the PAN, defeated the PRI and came to power in 2000. Vicente Fox became the first President who peacefully received power from a political opponent in Mexico's history (Green, 2007: 210). Edmonds-Poli and Shirk (2015:5) even argue that Mexico, from that moment on, is widely viewed as a real democracy instead of a "semi-democracy" or a "perfect dictatorship". Civil society nowadays fulfils the role of watchful agents and accusations of electoral manipulation and fraud have been declining. Fox had some success during his time in office, including the passage of certain laws that promoted transparency and illegalized discrimination. Yet, Fox did not succeed in delivering on most of his campaign promises. The issue of crime and rising drug violence has been a problem in Mexico for many years, but became bigger during the Fox administration. Mexicans felt less safe at the end of his administration that at the start of it. Additionally, his administration was involved with multiple scandals that reminded Mexicans of the actions of the PRI (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). Although the Fox administration was criticized heavily after, the PAN was able to maintain control. In 2006, the presidential candidate of the PAN, Felipe Calderón won the election by a slim margin of 0.56% against the leftists PRD candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador[15] (Moreno, 2007). Moreno (2007) argues that the chance for Calderón to win the elections from a popular leftist candidate who had a lead in the polls, would have been a lot smaller if the economic growth remained slow and oil prices would not have been as high as they were. During the second half of the Fox administration the oil prices were namely unusually high and Mexico experienced strong economic growth. Shortly after his inauguration, Calderón proclaimed a war on drugs. Even though the police and military operations of his predecessor had failed in fighting the drug cartels, Calderón mobilized thousands of soldiers and federal police officers to pursue his 'kingpin strategy' of targeting cartel leaders (Morton, 2012). His war on drugs however, did not have the intended success and resulted in a surge of violence. Also, many Mexicans started to question the ability of the state to win this war, since the authorities were seemingly outmatched by the power of the organized crime (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015: 89), and its legitimacy since the state had allied itself with the Sinaloa cartel (Morton, 2012).

As a result of the frustrations of Mexicans during the Calderón administration, it did not come as a surprise that the 2012 presidential elections were won by the presidential candidate of the PRI: Enrique Peña Nieto (Edmonds-Poli & Shirks, 2015: 89). His two strongest contenders, Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN and AMLO who ran again for the PRD, could not present a challenge of significant impact. Peña Nieto benefited, amongst other things, from his popularity as a good-looking man with a soap opera star wife, and from the support of important PRI leaders and the support of the television giant Televisa (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk: 89). During his time as governor of the State of Mexico (2007-2012), local and national media supported him constantly. Large media channels, under which the earlier mentioned Televisa, additionally provided a positive image of him and gave him a lot of air time during his campaign (Gómez García & Treré, 2014). According to Gómez-García and Treré (2014), 76% of the Mexican population gets its political information via television. And since the Mexican television industry is highly dominated by a duopoly of Televisa and TV Azteca, these two networks have a strong influence in the presidential campaigns.

A month and a half prior to the 2012 presidential election, the student movement #YoSoy132 unexpectedly emerged to protest the candidacy of Peña Nieto. The movement demanded freedom of

[15] From this point on I will refer to Andrés Manuel López Obrador as AMLO.

expression and an unbiased media that would lead to a fair and open discussion and dialogue resulting in a more informed vote (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). Rodrigo[16], a participant of the #YoSoy132 movement additionally mentioned:

> "I think that the most 'casual' participants were people who had the feeling that Peña Nieto was a delusion created by Televisa. The combination Televisa-Peña Nieto was very obvious and indiscreet. The whole movement was actually channelized around this case."

On the 11th of May 2012, in the middle of the presidential campaign, Peña Nieto was invited by the private Universidad Iberoamericana (UIA) to participate in an event that would enable presidential candidates to discuss their campaign with students. The students confronted Peña Nieto with criticism of his performance as governor of the State of Mexico, which caused commotion. They confronted him for instance with questions about the repression and the massacre of peasants who protested in the town of San Salvador Atenco, commited by his government. The students supporting him were outnumbered by the students contesting him. He was eventually catcalled by the student and was forced to leave the University (Guillén, 2013). After the protest, a spokesman of the PRI stated that the students protesting were agitators, hired by Peña Nieto his rival, López Obrador. The media gave a lot of attention to the protest and claimed as well that the protesters were not real students (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). In a response, the students created a YouTube video displaying 131 students showing their student ID cards to prove that they were genuine students that acted independently, and to protest the way they were portrayed by the mainstream media. The creator of the video, Ana[17] therefore stated:

> "The video made by me and my boyfriend, the video of the 131 protesters, gave me a lot of courage that we were able to oppose the cynicism of Peña Nieto when he was presenting at my university. Also, we could oppose the claim of the PRI and the media that the protest was fake. As a communications expert, it made me furious that the media covered the event from this angle. Therefore, I decided to make this video out of pure anger and pride as someone that tells the truth."

The video went viral and soon reached many students throughout Mexico and around the world. Soon, fellow students, and also students and academics from other universities, began to show their support by saying "I am 132" on social media platforms. Since everyone was the symbolically number 132, the name of the movement became #YoSoy132 (Gómez García & Treré, 2014). The first event organized by #YoSoy132 was a march that was promoted with the hashtag #MarchaYoSoy132 on the social media platforms Twitter and Facebook.[18] Hundreds of students took part in this march to express their dissatisfaction. Remarkably, the majority of the students came from private universities and normally did not participate in similar protests (Guillén, 2013). After this, many more protests followed and the movement was able to involve a great amount of participants. Additionally, meetings and assemblies were held and the movement eventually created an interuniversity council with two representatives from each university that participated. As a consequence, the movement became more structured and attracted even more students, and also other sectors of civil societies. #YoSoy132 became a negotiator between the political institutions and the media with the aim to

[16] Interview with Rodrigo Serrano (01/08/2017).
[17] Interview with Ana Rólon (20/07/2017).
[18] I will further describe the use of social media platforms in chapter 3.3 when analysing the role of social capital in the expansion of the #YoSoy132 movement.

open up platforms for genuine discussion while operating independently, and thus, without any party affiliation. Later on, the movement started to widen its objectives by not only focussing on the media, but additionally on solving other economic, political, and social injustices (Guillén, 2013).

3.2 The role of political disaffection in the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement

As Edmonds-Poli and Shirk state: "The #YoSoy132 movements was a decentralized, democratic amalgamation of disaffected citizens seeking real change to the status quo." (2015: 175).
The movement existed out of thousands of different participants. Among them, there were students from both private and public universities and members of all different kinds of civil society groups. The one thing they had in common was their dissatisfaction towards the actions of the status quo. As shown in the previous chapter, it is not as easy in a country like Mexico for an ordinary citizen to exert power on politics as it should be in a mature democracy. The opposition parties and NGO's did not (yet) accomplish to change the Mexican political landscape and Mexican political culture to eventually achieve a real democracy and diminish political abuses of the representatives and parties. Therefore, #YoSoy132 participants chose another way to challenge the status quo. Carlos[19], a #YoSoy132 participant from the very beginning, told me about his reasons to participate:

> "The reason for me to participate in the #YoSoy132 movement was a combination of various things, but it mainly had to do with the way the previous sexenio[20] had ended. The administration of Felipe Calderón. It was a period of a lot of violence, like nowadays, but the relation between the government and the violence started to become clear. It looked like a dead end. The administration of the governor of the State of Mexico, Peña Nieto, was not able to find ways to combat the high levels of corruption, femicides, abductions, violence, inequality, and poverty. Instead, they were involved in scandals themselves and made it even worse, it was a disaster. So not only the federal government, but also the state government and actually the whole political culture of the PRI is not to be trusted."

Additionally, another member of the #YoSoy132 movement, Al-Dabi[21], stresses that after 12-years of having a President from an opposition party in power, almost nothing changed and the violence got even worse: "The PAN government actually continued with the politics of the PRI, that basically dominated the political life in Mexico for 70 years". Furthermore, the controversial candidacy of Peña Nieto seems to have resulted in the most discontent among #YoSoy132 participants. Roberto[22], a political science student at the time of the emergence with no previous experience in social movements or protests, felt like he had to participate in the movement to oppose Peña Nieto's candidacy: "This guy cannot become our president, because he is a complete disaster. He has been an incredibly lousy governor looking at, for example, the case of Atenco."

Since both the levels of participation and trust in political organizations are low among the Mexican youth, as researched by amongst others, Sherrod *et al.,* (2010) and Fernández Poncela (2009), it is often assumed that the Mexican youth is apathetic and disinterested in politics. Using the concepts political disaffection from Pharr and Putnam (2000), one could say that this can be called a disaffected society. Fernández Poncela[23] however argues that a politically disaffected youth does not mean the youth is apathetic and disinterested. According to her, this strong disengagement from

[19] Interview with Carlos Brito (27/07/2017).
[20] *Sexenio* is the term of the six-single term limit of the President in Mexico.
[21] Interview with Al-Dabi Olvera (23/06/2017).
[22] Interview with Roberto Castillo (03/08/2017).
[23] Interview with Anna María Fernández Poncela (25/06/2017).

politics comes from Mexico's history of clientelism, co-optation, and despotism. For instance, she argues that many former student leaders and movement leaders eventually became part of a leftist political party like the PRD. However, once they were involved in a political party, they seemed to have become part of the Mexican political system and forget to take into account the necessities of the society. The emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement and another movement which emerged after the disappearance of 43 students[24], gave her an optimistic feeling:

> "Finally, the people woke up. Engaging in politics does not necessarily have to mean voting or engaging in political parties. For me, the work of German sociologist Ulrich Beck makes a lot of sense. He stresses that non-political positioning is political positioning as well. So politically disaffection is just another form of giving a political opinion for youngsters. This generation is not apathetic, but political. They just do not get involved in formal politics."

Rodrigo[25] additionally argues that not engaging in institutionalized politics does not mean the youth is not political:

> "I think that the Mexican system ignores/disregards all the politics that are not part of the guardianship of the state and that in the Mexico of today, we are figuring out that it is possible to engage in politics without being on the side of the State. This form of politics serves for a lot of things and can eventually influence formal politics. I consider the politics in the indigenous communities and the politics of #YoSoy132 as politics. I therefore think there is a lot of political engagement. For me, the reason to participate was the feeling that something was wrong, not only Peña Nieto. I felt like no candidate represented me as a youngster. That is why we wanted to address the topics that do represent us."

This does not match with Pharr and Putnam's (2000) interpretation of the effect of political disaffection on society. In their view, political disaffection often leads to disengagement in politics.
On the contrary, the role of political disaffection in the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement fits the idea of Norris (2004) and Torcal (2006) that political disaffection can indeed lead to militancy and protest, especially among the youth. Earlier cases of militancy and protest as a result of discontent towards the actions of the Mexican government, were the emergence of the program 'The Other Campaign', launched by the Zapatista movement in 2006, the peasant movement (2001-2002), and the Mexican *Indignados* Movement (2011) which also had a lot of student involvement. However, the #YoSoy132 was different since it gained massive support, like Al-Dabi[26] stated: "It seemed like everybody was number 132".

3.3 The role of Social Capital in building the #YoSoy132 movement

Following Putnam's (1993) understanding of social capital, social organization, norms, and networks facilitate coordinated actions and cooperation for mutual benefit. It can thus be said that it is vital for a social movement that there is a strong social capital among its members. As demonstrated in chapter 1, social capital among the youth is often produced via new communication and information techniques. For the #YoSoy132 movement, the use of web 2.0 platforms, under which social media platforms, have had a significant importance in the spread of the movement. The organizing was done by using mobile devices and web 2.0 platforms instead of print media and conventional electronic

[24] I will describe the disappearance of the 43 students in 2014 further in chapter 3.4.
[25] Interview with Rodrigo Serrano (01/08/2017).
[26] Interview with Al-Dabi Olvera (23/06/2017).

media (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014). Via these platforms, the movement was able to reach many sympathisers in Mexico which made it one of the most powerful student movements in the country of the past decades. The movement was also able to build up international links with Mexican students living abroad and with international collectives (Gómez Garcia & Treré, 2013), following the strategy of the Zapatista movement. Both the Zapatista movement and the #YoSoy132 movement promote interaction between individuals and their actions. The difference, however, is that the Zapatista movement mainly used websites and e-mail to reach sympathizers while the #YoSoy132 movement used web 2.0 platforms that were able to generate more interaction, which consequently made it easier to produce social capital among its members. For instance, interaction was promoted in the movement's interactive website, Facebook, and in Twitter discussions using hashtags that were updated constantly (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014). In line with Pharr and Putnam (2000), Newton (2001), and Torcal & Montero (2006), social capital is important for high levels of political participation. In the case of Mexico, as shown in chapter 2, there is a high level of distrust towards everything related to institutionalized politics. Since trust plays an important role in social capital according to, amongst others, Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1988), it is likely that social capital is built outside these institutions. The #YoSoy132 movement demonstrated that in the internet era we nowadays live in, it is easy to get politically involved outside the formal institutions, as Rodrigo[27] argues:

> "Nowadays there is an open contempt and distrust towards the political parties. No one believes in them, especially not the youth. And since these parties did not offer real opportunities to participate, people turned to, amongst other things, social media and groups of Friends to engage in politics. These days it is not necessary anymore to participate in institutionalized politics, like parties and unions that are controlled by the State, to be politically engaged."

Following Norris (2002), the youth is more likely to participate in new forms of political participation instead of institutionalized forms of political participation. Social media and web 2.0 tools give people the opportunity to engage or try out these new forms of political participation in an accessible way, like Carlos[28] notes: "It is necessary that an environment is created where people can get involved in politics in the way they want to, and get involved on the topics they want to. I don't think that you should tell people to participate; you have to create an environment where people can decide whether or not, and how to participate themselves. As #YoSoy132 did with the use of social media networks". In addition, these tools provide social movements with new opportunities to reach people. For the #YoSoy132 movement the Internet was an important tool to create interaction among members and sympathizers, as Roberto[29] argues:

> "A lot of technologies are within our reach. We have the Internet and social media to organize ourselves and to have discussions. Communication goes a lot faster and there are less rules involved."

Going back to the three possible effects of the growth of the Internet for communities according to Hampton and Wellman (2003) outlined in chapter 1, the extensive use of web 2.0 platforms for interaction among #YoSoy132 participants fits their idea of the creation of a "virtual community" that

[27] Interview with Rodrigo Serrano (01/08/2017).
[28] Interview with Carlos Brito (27/07/2017).
[29] Interview with Roberto Castillo (03/08/2017).

substitutes face-to-face interaction within a community. Particularly during the spread of the movement, virtual communication played a very important role. #YoSoy132 could be considered a virtual community where social capital is produced via platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. After its expansion, face-to-face interaction stayed however an important factor in the movement, since assemblies and meetings were frequently held to discuss various important issues.

3.4 The legacy of the #YoSoy132 movement in today's non-institutionalized political participation

In less than 50 days, the #YoSoy132 movement achieved a certain amount of success. In general, the students succeeded in becoming a new actor in the political process. They put the issue of media concentration and democratization on the public agenda (Gómez & Treré, 2014: 506). Concretely, they managed to exert such an amount of pressure on the TV duopoly: Televisa and TV Azteca, that the second presidential debate was broadcasted nationwide on the main channels of both television networks. This gave many Mexican citizens the opportunity to genuinely form a political opinion. A third debate was requested as well, but the request was refused. Consequently, the movement decided to invite the four candidates and to hold a meeting outside the institutional sphere. Peña Nieto rejected the invitation however claiming the meeting was biased (Guillén, 2013). Furthermore, the movement had an impact on the campaign and election results. Peña Nieto won by a small margin while before the emergence of #YoSoy132, Peña Nieto was far ahead in the polls. Thereby, no political party was able to obtain a majority in Congress (Gómez García & Treré, 2014). Nevertheless, Edmonds-Poli and Shirk (2015: 175) point out that beyond the successes of the presidential debates and the movement's influence on the electoral results, it is difficult to point to any specific or lasting ways that the movement changed the political landscape.

Yet, during my field work, I found out that #YoSoy132 indeed became an actor in the political process. The actions of the #YoSoy132 movement correspond to the idea of Norris (2002), in which she argues that new forms of political participation like NSMs, Internet activism and protest activism play an important role in contemporary politics. Some might argue the #YoSoy132 has disappeared since the movement does not organize actions any longer on behalf of the #YoSoy132 movement. Nonetheless, #YoSoy132 as a virtual community is still very active on the Internet. For instance Twitter and Facebook groups in the name of #YoSoy132 nowadays still provide information regarding concerns about Mexico's democracy and unlawful activities of the Government, generate discussions, and call for protests.[30] In most of the demonstrations and protest marches that are held nowadays in the country's capital: Mexico City, a lot of former #YoSoy132 members or sympathizers participate or are involved in the organization.[31] A significant example is the emergence of the movement Por Ayotzinapa (For Ayotzinapa). This movement emerged after the disappearance of forty-three student-teachers, known as the *"normalistas"* from Ayotzinapa, who disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero on the 26th of September 2014. They were on their way to Mexico City where they would join the annual commemorations of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre (Wright, 2017). The students raised money for their trip in the city of Iguala, and reportedly disrupted an event hosted by the wife of Iguala's mayor, José Luis Abarca. When he learned about the students, he ordered the municipal police to arrest the students. The students were handed over to a local drug-trafficking organization to

[30] Information retrieved by the author.

[31] Interview with Anna María Fernández Poncela (25/06/2017); Al-Dabi Olvera (23/06/2017); Jimena Zavala Flores (13/07/2017); Roberto Castillo (03/08/2017); Carlos Brito (27/07/2017).

be executed. Because of the complicity of the mayor and other government officials, the slow-paced investigation, and the incapacity of Peña Nieto and his whole administration to show remorse to the public and victims, mass protest followed (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2015). Anna María Fernández Poncela[32] recalls the event and the subsequent protests:

> "After the disappearance and the assassination of the 43 *normalistas*, the Por Ayotzinapa movement emerged. Among its participants were, obviously, the parents, but also many of my students. The people who started the movement were my students and later on, professors started to participate as well. But the initiative came from the students, a lot of them participated in the #YoSoy132 movement. In addition, many organizations that were created for #YoSoy132 were used again for the Por Ayotzinapa movement."

Carlos[33] even talks about a "2012 generation", or a "#YoSoy132 generation when talking about the #YoSoy132 participants:

> "I know a lot of people working and trying to be consistent with their principals and objectives acquired by the 2012 generation of #YoSoy132. I think when you look at the protests that were organized for Ayotzinapa, you can see that a lot of the political mobilization came from the generation of #YoSoy132."

Furthermore, the "YoSoy132" generation organized many more protests and events in the past couple of years. Al-Dabi[34] stresses that #YoSoy132 nowadays is transformed in many other movements that organized many more protests, as for instance, marches that were held to call for justice after assassinations of activists. Besides social movements and protests, #YoSoy132 participants started other collectives to reach their #YoSoy132 objectives. A good example is the creation of the youth organization: "Wikipolítica" that was founded by #YoSoy132 members after Peña Nieto won the 2012 presidential elections. Roberto[35], a #YoSoy132 member and member of Wikipolítica from the very beginning, explains to me:

> "With #YoSoy132 we were not able to prevent Peña Nieto from coming to power, so we wanted to create a new form policy-making. With Wikipolítica we wanted to create a political force capable of opposing the political parties and the people that are in power. When looking at the assemblies held by #YoSoy132, we saw that there was not enough device and the movement was not structured good enough to provide real opposition. That is why we decided to create a horizontal political organization. Like in #YoSoy132, we decided to use new technologies as much as possible. We for instance moved the face-to-face assemblies to a virtual place that resulted in more efficiency."

The challenge for organizations like Wikipolítica however will be to exert real political power while staying away from the institutions and not becoming part of the dreaded Mexican political culture. When I asked Roberto[36] how they are dissociating themselves from political parties, he responded saying: "We always say that we are going to places where the political parties cannot go to, and we do things that the political parties cannot do." Whether or not they will succeed in staying

[32] Interview with Anna María Fernández Poncela (25/06/2017).
[33] Interview with Carlos Brito (27/07/2017).
[34] Interview with Al-Dabi Olvera (23/06/2017).
[35] Interview with Roberto Castillo (03/08/2017).
[36] Interview with Roberto Castillo (03/08/2017).

unattached to institutionalized politics and not getting outlawed by the Mexican government, as what happened to many other political organizations in the past[37], will remain the question.

In this chapter I have shown that political disaffection can lead to growing involvement in non-institutionalized politics among the younger generation. The unlawful activities of politicians, the war on drugs emerged under Calderón, the controversial candidacy of Peña Nieto, and the high levels of impunity resulted in a desire among the youth to oppose, and even, change Mexican politics. In the case of the #YoSoy132 movement, discontent with these practices resulted in an increase in engagement in politics among the youth. Yet, there is no proof of an increase in engagement in institutionalized politics. Actions taken by the #YoSoy132 movement were solely non-institutionalized forms of political participation, including new forms of political participation like Internet activism. It can be said, that since the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement, something has changed significantly in the Mexico's political landscape. This is visible when looking at the great number of citizens currently participating in protest marches, in discussions on web 2.0 platforms, and in social movements and collectives. The fast and effective spread of the movement would most likely not have been possible if it was not for the involvement of many web 2.0 tools. The #YoSoy132 created an easy accessible virtual space where people felt supported and motivated to engage in politics. In this way, a new form of social capital was produced that most probably explains the great number of members and sympathizers of the movement. Additionally, other movements and collectives founded by #YoSoy132 members, continued to use these tools to build their movement and reach people.

[37] More detailed explanation of organization outlawed by the Mexican government can be found in chapter 2.3.

Conclusions

The outcomes of political disaffection on society, and in particular, on the youth, in a country like Mexico where almost everyone seems to distrust the political parties and institutions have interested me for a long time. The authoritarian practices of the Mexican government are deeply rooted in Mexico's political culture as shown in chapter 2. Practices as clientelism, co-optation, and corruption seem to have become normal in Mexican politics. The PRI succeeded in incorporating all levels of society in to PRI's political machine. They institutionalized all politics which made it nearly impossible for citizens to engage in politics without somehow being part of, or cooperating with the PRI. Previous conversations about politics with many Mexicans earlier in my life gave me the impression that most Mexicans tend to either turn a blind eye to, or silently condemn the illegitimate practices of the Mexican Government. This reaction is not strange if we look at the Governments practices of outlawing and repressing all opposition that were quite common during PRI's hegemony, outlined in chapter 2. Nevertheless, as theory on political disaffection and political participation in chapter 1 has demonstrated, political disaffection or dissatisfaction can also lead to protest politics and new forms of (non-institutionalized) political participation. Especially among the youth, political disaffection regularly leads to the willingness to engage in demonstrations, online platforms, or movements to publicly condemn illegitimate political practices.

In order to identify the role political disaffection played in the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement, it has first of all been important to see if political disaffection among the Mexicans have led, as Norris argues, to protest action.

In the case of Mexico, political disaffection among the youth seems to have caused an increase in political engagement during certain events in history. The Presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, which supressed all opposition and invested a massive amount of money in the 1968 Olympics resulted in anger among many Mexicans especially among students. The Government however responded to the protests with large amounts of violence which led to the Tlatelolco massacre described in chapter 2. The Zapatista movement that emerged to oppose the rise of neoliberalism and the NAFTA that would be disadvantageous for the indigenous people of Mexico, gained a lot of support as well, as also described in chapter 2. Many more similar events, where condemnation of Government actions play the key role, took place in the past 50 years in Mexico. One of the most widely known and supported events probably was the disappearance of the 43 normalistas. This event resulted in massive protest all over the country and around the world. It therefore could be seen as a breaking point in contemporary Mexican politics. Furthermore, the spontaneous emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement was, as shown in chapter 3, a clear response of discontent to the political practices of the PRI and the biased media. It can thus be concluded that, in line with Norris (2004) and Torcal (2006), political disaffection can lead to political activism. Particularly among the Mexican youth, this seems to have been an important motive to become involved in non-institutionalized politics. In addition, during my research on the politically active youth in Mexico, it became clear that most of the youth does not want to have anything to do with formal politics. Even though participants I interviewed considered themselves very political, they do not aspire to becoming involved in a political party. On the contrary, they want to stay away from formal politics as much as possible. This corresponds to the idea of Norris (2006) that the youth is very disillusioned with the major institutions of representative democracy and is thus more likely to engage in non-institutionalized, including new forms, of political participation. Especially in the case of the #YoSoy132 movement, participating in formal politics was out of question for the youth involved. According to Norris (2006), the new forms of political participation among the youth nowadays increasingly consists of: participating in NSMs, internet activism,

and protest activism. These seem to have been popular among the #YoSoy132 generation. [38] The #YoSoy132 movement itself fits the profile of a NSM, using the internet extensively to organize and build the movement, and its involvement in various protest activities which Barnes and Kaase (1979) used to define as protest activism such as starting and signing petitions and organizing and attending demonstrations. Therefore, it could be concluded that the #YoSoy132 participants used new, non-institutionalized, forms of political participation to engage in politics. The reasoning behind their choice to participate in non-institutionalized political participation can be partly explained by political disaffection. All of the #YoSoy132 participants I interviewed claimed they distrusted, did not have confidence in, and were cynical about Mexican politicians, institutions and the political regime. This corresponds with the definition on political disaffection provided by Di Palma (1970). Moreover, #YoSoy132 participants as youngsters felt deeply unrepresented in politics which can be explained by the concept of alienation described in chapter 1. Also, the #YoSoy132 participants did not have the feeling that participating in formal politics would have a real impact upon the political process which means there is a lack of political efficacy among them, as described in chapter 1. Thus, it can be concluded that the #YoSoy132 participants indeed felt disaffected from (formal) politics.

Another reason to explain the choice to participate in these new forms of politics is the advent of the Internet and the growing possibilities it offers. Getting into contact with like-minded individuals and becoming part of a movement for instance become a lot easier using web 2.0 platforms. Especially among youngsters these platforms were used extensively to connect with others. Therefore, I analysed the importance of a strong social capital in the Internet era we nowadays live in to build a successful movement. As scholars in chapter 1 on social capital stress, social capital is considered important for high levels of political participation. Dominant writers on social capital, like Putnam and Coleman, have argued that among the youth there is nowadays a lack of social capital that can explain the low levels of (conventional) political participation among the youth. However, the work of amongst others, Norris (2003) and Hampton & Wellman (2003), have contradicted these arguments by arguing that social capital among the youth nowadays is mostly produced on web 2.0 platforms as described in chapter 1. In chapter 3, I have shown that in the case of the #YoSoy132 movement, social capital was indeed produced by using the Internet. #YoSoy132 is particularly interesting since the movement would not exist if not for the existence and wide-spread use of the Internet. Demonstrations of frustration on web 2.0 platforms, such as the Youtube-video contesting the actions of the media and the PRI and statements on Twitter and Facebook, have resulted in the emergence of the movement. Also, when looking at the events following the movement's emergence, it can be said that the use of the Internet was of essential importance for the spread of the movement as demonstrated in chapter 3.

Thus, even though political disaffection might have been one of the most important motives for the movement to emerge, the use of web 2.0 platforms has provided the medium to obtain attention and attract participants and sympathizers. Therefore, it can be concluded that a strong social capital is indeed important for high levels of political participation as Putnam argues. Yet, in the case of the #YoSoy132 movement, social capital among the youth nowadays was mostly produced online and did lead to an increase of non-institutionalized political participation.

The hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this thesis, can thus be confirmed. The movement arose by first opposing Peña Nieto's candidacy and later the PRI's and their befriended media's attempt to spread the lie that the students were not actual students but instead hired supporters of AMLO. This research however showed that political disaffection did not solely play a role in the

[38] The "#YoSoy132 generation" is a term used by the #YoSoy132 member Carlos Brito, to refer to the massive group of Mexican youngsters that started to get politically involved during the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement and continued to oppose illegitimate political practices.

emergence of the movement. Later on, the movement started to oppose the practices of co-optation and clientelism currently present in the relationship between the PRI and influential media channels. These sentiments could be described as political disaffection toward Mexico's institutions and political regime. Seeking unconventional ways of participating in politics for them was a way to attempt to influence and exert power on politics. The search for unconventional ways culminated in the creation of an NSM. Internet and protest activism were their main ways to operate. In this way, the #YoSoy132 movement tried to stay far away from the practices of the political parties and institutions which they oppose. Even though the #YoSoy132 movement seems not to be active anymore, its legacy is still very present in contemporary non-institutionalized politics, as shown in chapter 3. Five years after the emergence of #YoSoy132, many of the initial members have founded associations or movements opposing the Mexican regime, or still participate regularly in protest politics such as demonstrations. The condemnation of politicians, political parties, and political institutions were important motives for the emergence and foundation of many of these associations and movement. Therefore, it can be said, that political disaffection played an important role in the legacy of the #YoSoy132 movement as well. Creating a new form of engagement in politics distant from the institutions still seems to be an important objective for many associations and movements operating in, amongst other cities, Mexico City. The use of the Internet to show one's dissatisfaction with formal politics is still very common. Even though the Zapatista movement was one of the first movements that began using the Internet to build their movement and attract participants and sympathizers, the #YoSoy132 movement was one of the first movements using Internet activism and web 2.0 platforms as important tools to participate in non-institutionalized politics.

In conclusion, in the case of the #YoSoy132 movement political disaffection did result in an increasing urge and ultimately the political involvement of the youth to oppose the Mexican regime. Since the #YoSoy132 members badly distrusted the political institutions and political parties, they engaged in politics in unconventional ways. By starting a NSM, using protest action and Internet activism, they built a strong movement and exerted influence and power over the political institutions while remaining non-institutional and avoiding the "bad" practices of the Mexican government.

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Annex

A. List of interviewees

- **Al-Dabi Olvera, 23/06/2017. Boicot Café, Mexico City, 65 minutes:** #YoSoy132 member, activist and writer.
- **Anna María Fernández Poncela, 25/06/2017**. **Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM), Mexico City:** Professor and researcher at the UAM department of politics and culture.
- **Pablo Montes, 04/07/2017. WeWork Montes Urales, Mexico City:** Director of Operations and Debate of Diálogos and analist at Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO).
- **Jimena Zavala Flores, 13/07/2017. Café el Ocho, Mexico City:** Political science student at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México and member of Wikipolítica in Mexico City.
- **Balfer Alberto Navarette, 13/07/2017. Café B, Mexico City:** Philosophy student at the Universidad Autónoma de México and #YoSoy132 member.
- **Carlos Eduardo Molina López, 17/07/2017. Bar Baltra, Mexico City:** Vicepresident of oratory and debate at Diálogos and member of the Partido de Acción Nacional.
- **Ana Rolón, 20/07/2017. Dunkin' Donuts, Mexico City:** Activist, member and precusor of #YoSoy132, and co-founder of Fósforo.
- **Carlos Brito, 27/07/2017. Over Skype:** Activist, #YoSoy132 member and director of Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D).
- **Rodrigo Serrano, 01/08/2017. Café Té Cuento, Mexico City:** Activist, member and precusor of #YoSoy132, and co-founder of Fósforo.
- **Roberto Castillo, 03/08/2017. El Péndulo, Mexico City:** #YoSoy132 member, coordinator of Wikipolítica in Mexico City and independent cadidate of the District 26 in the State of Mexico.

B. List of events of participative observation

- **Public forum: The Governance of Security in Mexico, 19/06/2017. Hotel Crown Plaza, Mexico City:** Presentation of the Results of the First Urban Survey about Governance of the Security Sector: what the Mexicans think. The presentation was about the citizen's belief in the institutions, impunity, corruption, the human rights situation, and the role of the Armed Forces.
- **Third Conference of Wikipolítica Mexico City: Collective Creation, 13/08/2017. Santa Catarina Park, Mexico City:** Conference open to the public with various presentations like a presentation of Ruth Mendoza of the RSES CREW collective about the possibilities of creating a collective and generation social action. Furthermore, there were, amongst other things, talks with the audience.