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Russia and the Responsibility to Protect norm:
friend or foe?



Table of Contents

Russia and the Responsibility to Protect norm: <i>friend of foe?</i>	1
Abstract	3
CHAPTER 1 Introduction	4
1.1 Background	4
1.2 Research aim and question	6
CHAPTER 2 theoretical framework and research methodology	8
2.1 Introduction	8
2.2 Classification of norms: Wiener's theory (2017)	8
2.3 The Norm life cycle theory: Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)	10
2.4 Norm contestation	12
2.5 Norm Localizaton: Acharya (2013)	14
2.6 Case study methodology	14
2.7 Conclusion	15
CHAPTER 3 Literature Review	16
3.1 Introduction	16
3.2 Norm emergence phase	16
3.3 Norm cascade phase	20
3.4 Conclusion	26
CHAPTER 4 Russia's relationship towards the norm of R2P	27
4.1 Introduction	27
4.1 Georgia	27
4.2 Crimea	30
4.3 Libya	32
4.4 Syria	34
4.5 Results	37
CHAPTER 5 Conclusion	40
Bibliography	44

Abstract

The Responsibility to Protect principle introduced both the state's and the international community's responsibility to protect human rights. The principle is regarded as an emergent norm that is yet to be successfully diffused and classified as a global norm. This thesis assesses the principle's normative trajectory through the use of Finnemore and Sikkink's 'norm life cycle theory' (1998). This work works toward a better understanding of Russia's approach towards the emergent norm of human rights by default. By assessing Russia's approach towards intervention, this study reviews the claim that Russia seeks to undermine the norms that underpin R2P. This has been conducted via a qualitative case study that reviews the following cases: Georgia, Crimea, Libya and Syria. The findings demonstrate that although Russia is actively engaged with the principle's norm development process, it did also attempt to interpret the norm according to its own preferences. However, only once was the norm truly undermined - in the case of Crimea.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P) is a normative product that resulted of the creation of the UN charter (Kurtz and Rotmann, 2016, 3). As a result, the world witnessed a normative change in the conduct of global governance. With the introduction of the principle of R2P, the world acquired a new understanding of the importance of human rights and the responsibility of the community to protect these rights. The emerging norm of R2P also created a new understanding of the principle of sovereignty: formerly regarded as absolute since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, under R2P sovereignty has become conditional on the state's ability to protect human rights within its own borders. R2P identifies the state as the responsible actor for protecting human rights within its own borders.

R2P's development as a norm, however, has not been without challenges. These challenges had already arisen when the notion of humanitarian intervention was introduced, which can be regarded as the precedent of R2P. After the 1990s, the United States took a leading role in international affairs, being the sole superpower at the end of the Cold War. This resulted in the rise of 'liberal interventionism' under which the notion of humanitarian interventions was classified (Jamison, 2011, 365). The introduction of the notion brought about a lot of questions and dilemmas, which were not easily answered. One such issue was the conceptualization of intervention as universally unlawful due to the invasion on a state's sovereignty (Roach et al. 2014, 160). Other problems were of a moral nature, but also related to the selectivity of chosen cases in which intervention took place. Consequently, the contestation of humanitarian intervention resulted in skepticism of the possibility for the United Nations (UN) to intervene for geopolitical interests, according to the West's own political interests.

The skepticism towards humanitarian intervention continued to be of influence when R2P was introduced in 2001. R2P was met with fear of double standards, susceptibility of manipulation and Western imperialism (Mani and Weiss, 2011, 456). Nonetheless, throughout the years, the world became increasingly acquainted with R2P.

One important difference between the notion of humanitarian intervention and R2P is that R2P aims to invoke responsibility, rather than intervention (Roach and Griffiths, 2014, 309). As a result of this different approach, there has been a discursive shift in the international community. R2P is now recognized as grounded in the moral responsibility of the international community to act against human rights violations. An important year during which the existence of this worldwide moral responsibility became significant was 2005. This was when the World Summit occurred, which is an important date for R2P's normative trajectory (Bellamy, 2011, 24). However, despite the international community reaching a broad consensus on R2P in 2005, it remains unclear whether R2P can be regarded as a norm, or the extent to which it permits force (Thakur, 2016, 421; Melling, 2018).

Recently, the aftermath of the Libyan crisis in 2011, together with the UN's inability to effectively resolve the Syrian crisis, cast doubt over R2P's status as norm, as the principle acts like an international obligation while remaining unarticulated in theory (Thakur, 2016, 421). Factors that influence this perspective constitute, among others, changing power relations throughout the world.

In the last couple of years, there has been a growing strength of community amongst non-Western powers, such as Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa (BRICS). The BRICS gained increasing relevance in the conduct of global governance and are, therefore, also of increasing relevance for R2P's normative trajectory. In direct relation to R2P are Russia and China, who are both permanent members of the United Nations UNSC (UNSC). Specifically, Russia is regarded as a highly skeptical actor towards the future use of R2P (Ziegler, 2016, 347).

Russia, both a permanent UNSC member and a skeptic of R2P, is regarded as a key challenger to R2P's normative development, as Russia demonstrates its resistance towards a Western form of humanitarian intervention (Morris, 2013, 1280; Kurowska, 2014, 490). Russia is highly critical of the use of R2P under pillar III, as this touches upon the notion of sovereignty and the use of force (Ziegler, 2016, 356; Baranovsky and Mateiko, 2016, 51). Russia has expressed its concerns towards R2P and believes that the principle is used according to the preferences of the West (Rotmann et al 368). This is regarded as problematic for two reasons: (1) the remaining importance of sovereignty and; (2) the emphasis on Western norms and values, such as democracy, which are culturally specific and therefore not exportable (Ziegler, 2016, 348). As a result, it is believed that Russia does not share the same

perspective on R2P as the West, as it values its own interests more than the protection of human rights.

Academic literature on the topic refers to Russia's critical stance on R2P, which is often framed in a Western and non-Western debate. Especially after the Libyan aftermath, different opinions have been expressed on Russia's stance towards R2P. Muraviev (2018) classifies Russia as a major strategic spoiler of the US' ambitions to retain its dominant position in the global order. On the other hand, others have argued that Russia is not willing to adhere to R2P if doing so would contravene its own interests (Ignatieff, 2012; Holmes, 2015; Glanville, 2013, 339). As a result, Ignatieff (2012) argues that Russia puts its national interests above the protection of human rights. Therefore, Russia's stance towards R2P is portrayed as a direct contradiction to the fundamental ideas of the Western liberal community (Averre and Davies, 2015, 833). Consequently, Russia's approach towards R2P is typically viewed as antiwestern. Unfortunately, opposing Russia's stance to R2P to that of the West generates dividing lines in which the future of R2P as norm is rather pessimistic.

The literature also emphasizes the existence of skepticism among academics towards the rising non-Western powers, in which the international community questions the normative future of R2P. One example is the academic debate in which it is argued that the BRICS undermine the R2P principle in its development as global norm (Stuenkel, 2014; Newman, 2013; Thakur, 2016). The existing contestation is simplified and classified as the North-South debate, which distinguishes between two groups: the global North, which supports the R2P principle; and the global South, which rejects the principle (Claes, 2012, 69). In other words, the R2P rejectionists are characterized as non-Western countries, that have often experienced historical colonial rule, and who strongly defend the principle of sovereignty. On the other hand, R2P promoters are characterized as Western powers that instead strongly emphasize the need to defend human rights. Therefore, the existing literature lacks in looking further to R2P's normative future, beyond the existing differences and dividing lines between the West and the non-Western countries.

1.2 Research aim and question

This work aims to assess Russia's approach to R2P. Specifically by reviewing whether the claims that Russia deliberately undermines the norm are accurate. This thesis is divided in a total of five chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 covers both the theoretical

framework and the research method employed. The aim of this chapter is to elaborate the relevant notions of contestation, undermining and norm localization. Furthermore, Chapter two explains Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle theory, in order to gain an understanding of R2P's status as a norm. Finnemore and Sikkink's theory is applied in Chapter 3, which includes an overview of literature on R2P. The chosen literature is reviewed according to the identified stages of the norm life cycle theory. After having identified R2P's current norm stage, Chapter 4 looks specifically into Russia's relationship with R2P by looking at four case studies. The reviewed case studies are Georgia 2008, Crimea 2014, Libya 2011 and Syria 2011. The findings of the research are presented in Chapter 5, and offers concluding statements and remarks.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology

2.1 Introduction

There are different approaches that one can adopt to discuss and understand the extent to which a phenomenon can be classified as a norm. In addition, other relevant issues that arise when discussing the status of a norm are questions such as how can an emerging notion be challenged or can become further developed in its norm trajectory? The aim of this chapter is to further elaborate on these issues, while shedding light on the approach that is adopted to understand R2P's norm trajectory. Therefore, this chapter offers an explanation of the different kinds of existing norms, using Wiener's 2017 study. Afterwards, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) work is introduced, which demonstrates the stages through which an emerging norm needs to pass before its successful diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) study is of importance for this work as it provides its theoretical framework, which is used to identify R2P's norm status. Furthermore, an explanation for how an emerging norm can be challenged or, instead, be further progressed in its normative trajectory. This includes an elaboration of the concepts of norm contestation, norm undermining and norm localization.

2.2 Classification of norms: Wiener's theory (2017)

In the study of norms a range of different concepts exist that serve to clarify different aspects of the norm process. All of these different existing concepts can cause confusion and, therefore, this work aims to provide clarity on different existing norms. This clarity is provided, among others, by elaborating on Wiener's (2017) Theory of Contestation. Wiener (2017, 119) proposes three different typologies from which norms can be classified. The first typology covers fundamental norms. The second typology refers to organizing principles. The third typology refers back to standards and regulations. Fundamental norms often inhibit a high moral standard and, therefore, have acquired a universal quality. Their nature is quasi-constitutional and contestation is minimal. Examples include concepts, such as human rights and the principle of sovereignty. These norms take place at the meta level of governance. Organizing principles are regarded as policy and/or political practices and take place at the intermediary level of governance. Standards and regulations take place at the micro level of

governance.

Wiener's theory helps to understand different types of norm. In direct relation to the subject of this work, Wiener's theory is helpful in identifying the Responsibility to Protect as an organizing principle at the intermediary level of governance. R2P as a norm has not developed sufficiently to be classified as a fundamental norm, as the principle continues to be subject to contestation. Nor can R2P be classified as a standardized procedure as the norm does not take place at the micro-level of governance. Instead, R2P is classified as an organizing principle at the intermediary level of governance, as it is regarded as a political practice that is gaining increasing relevance, but continues to be contested. In addition, the principle does touch upon essential fundamental norms, such as the principle of sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention and human rights.

Type of norms	Substance	Generalisation	Specification	Contestation on ethical grounds
Fundamental norms	Sovereignty Citizenship Human rights Fundamental freedoms Democracy Rule of law Non-Intervention	More	Less	More
Organising principles	Proportionality Accountability Responsibility Transparency Flexibility Gender mainstreaming Mutual recognition International election monitoring	Medium	Medium	Medium
Standardised procedures	Qualified majority voting Unanimous decisions Proportional representation	Less	More	Less

Figure 1 Source: Wiener 2008 Chapter 3 p.66

2.3 The Norm life cycle theory: Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)

In order to understand R2P's current status as norm, this work uses the theory postulated in Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as its theoretical framework. Their study is part of one of the first works of the relatively new study of norms (Bloomfield, 2015, 314). In their work, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 889) study norms that coordinate political action, which is of direct relevance to R2P. The authors define norms as the existence of a shared expectation of appropriate behavior in a specific case. It is through the creation of norms that behavior becomes guided. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identified three stages through which a newly emerging norm passes through before its successful diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 893) refer to the three different identified levels of the agreement as the norm life cycle.

In the norm life cycle, the following three levels are identified: The first level constitutes the domestic sphere and is labelled as the norm emergence stage; the second level constitutes the international level and is labelled as the norm cascade stage; the third level also takes places on the international level, but refers back to the creating of an active constitution of the norm. This level is labelled as internalization.

The first stage of norm emergence is characterized by the promotion of the new norm by norm entrepreneurs. The aim is to have other actors embrace the norm. The successful passing of this stage requires the creation of new cognitive frames by norm entrepreneurs, which are the actors that promote newly emerging norms, and that aid other actors in understanding the relevance of the norm.

The second stage of norm cascade is the attempt by norm entrepreneurs to led other actors to follow the norm. This stage is characterized by the increasing of international legitimation of the norm. In order to acquire increasing international legitimization an organizational platform can be created (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 900). Through this organizational platform the norm is able to acquire the adherence of actors, which serves to reinforce compliance with and adherence of the norm.

The third stage of norm internalization is broad acceptance. As a result, dialogue and discussion of the norm is effaced, because of the emergence of broadly-shared expectations of appropriate behavior. In other words, this moment indicates that the norm has reached its tipping point. The moment in which there exists no more contestation indicates the creation of a new logic of appropriateness (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 903). The reaching of this

stage is characterized by the existence of international normative and legal processes that provide an understanding of how a specific norm influences behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 893). This includes the existence of a successful organizational platform through which the norm is exerted and in which other actors socialize with the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 899).

As Finnemore and Sikkink's work provides an understanding of the different stages an emerging norm passes through, their work is used to identify the stages in which the emerging norm of R2P is currently finding itself in. In norm life cycle theory, norm development is dependent on the responses of the international community. Norm development is dependent on the extent to which norm entrepreneurs are able to successfully promote norms. Only if the norm gains international appeal, can it pass to the second stage of norm cascade. In the stage of norm cascade, the survival of the norm is dependent on the extent to which the norm further acquires legitimacy and internalization. During this stage, organizational platform helps to concretized a phenomenon as a norm. In the phase of norm cascade, the survival of the norm depends on the response of the international society. Depending on the extent to which the norm is broadly accepted, actors that instead do not comply with the international norm will receive criticism from others that promote the norm instead (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 904). Also, if actors comply with an emerging international norm, they therefore demonstrate their adherence to a specific social environment.

Two limitations are observed in the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Firstly, the two authors identify the problem of measurement (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 889). Second, the study is limited as it does not discuss norm trajectory phases after internalization. This is because their work is regarded as part of the first studies on norms and their trajectory. The former dominance of the Western liberal order as a normative framework at the end of the Cold War is one explanation for this (Bloomfield, 2015, 314). Often, newly emerging norms are promoted by Western states that have adopted the role of norm entrepreneurs. As a result of the existing Western liberal dominance, it was assumed that the norms promoted by the West would become successfully diffused. In other words, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) work assumed that the established logic of appropriateness would prevail and that pre-existing norms would remain uncontested. However, nowadays, the world is witnessing an increasing importance attributed to the concept of norm contestation, particularly in the increasing contestation of the dominant Western liberal framework (Bloomfield, 2015, 313). As a result, recent developments evince the need for a better understanding of what happens if a norm

does not successfully diffuse.

2.4 Norm contestation

One possible way in which actors can respond to a norm that has not yet successfully been diffused is through norm contestation. Norm contestation is differentiated between the traditional (McKeown, 2009; Panke and Petherson, 2012; Rosert and Schirmbeck, 2007) and the more critical approaches (Krook and True, 2009; Acharya, 2004; Wiener, 2007). In the more traditional approaches, one can distinguish between the critical approach and conventional norm research (Deitelhoff and Zimmerman, 2013, 2). These approaches both emphasize the stable nature of norms. On the other hand, the more critical approaches emphasize the more dynamic nature of norms., referring to norms which can remain contested even after they emerge (Deitelhoff and Zimmerman, 2013, 3). In the case of this work, the position adopted assumes that contestation can arise even after the emergence of a norm. Norms are studied from an approach that emphasizes their dynamic nature and, thus, attention is given to the more critical approaches. This, therefore, surpasses the limitations of the life cycle theory of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) by looking into the contestation phase that emerges afterwards.

There are different understandings that can be generated from the concept of norm contestation. A general understanding of norm contestation is the social practice of objection towards norms, in which actors offer critique by either rejecting them or by refusing to implement them (Wiener, 2015, 109). Another more practical understanding of norm contestation is that of Deitelhoff and Zimmerman (2013), who slightly differ in their interpretation. In their conceptualization of norm contestation, they argue that contestation occurs because of the existence of conflicting perspectives on the interpretation and meaning of norms (Deitelhoff and Zimmerman, 2013, 3). Therefore, one probable reason for why norm contestation occurs is because norms are spread across different cultural backgrounds. Through norm contestation actors can weaken or strengthen the norm (Badescu and Weiss, 2010; Krook and True, 2012; Sandholtz and Stiles, 2009; Wiener, 2008).

Norm contestation can lead to one of three outcomes: contestation leads to the strengthening of the norm (Deitelhoff and Zimmerman, 2013); contestation leads to the weakening of the norm; or the actor damages the foundation of the norm, which is referred to as norm

undermining (Welsh, 2013; Bloomfield, 2015).

In the first outcome, the norm is strengthened through contestation. This refers back to applicatory contestation. Applicatory contestation is a concept introduced by Deitelhoff and Zimmerman (2014, 5) and refers to the different existing perspectives on the right interpretation and application of norms. Welsh (2013, 382) introduces a similar concept which is classified as ‘substantive contestation.’ This concept comprises of multiple competing perspectives as a result of a lack of precision in defining the norm. In this case, the norm can be strengthened as follows: the existence of different existing perspectives on the norm’s applicatory use provide the opportunity for discussion. Through this discussion, the norm is strengthened by the finding of a consensus among these different existing perspectives.

The second outcome is an example of how a norm can be weakened when being questioned in its validity, the reason for why it’s being upheld and the appropriateness of its meaning. This phenomenon is classified by Deitelhoff and Zimmerman (2013, 5) as ‘justificatory contestation.’ Welsh’s (2013, 367) offers a different conceptualization of this phenomena, defining it as ‘procedural contestation.’ When a norm’s validity is questioned, it is also weakened on the basis of its foundational existence. Consequently, justificatory contestation will also be classified as norm undermining.

The third outcome of norm undermining also occurs when actors become resistant to the norm to such an extent, that eventually no normative change occurs (Bloomfield, 2015, 316). In Bloomfield’s perspective (2015, 321) this extent of resistance is given by an antipreneur, which is defined as an actor that defends the existing normative status quo against challengers.

In short, norm contestation can strengthen the norm when the norm is contested in its applicatory use, as it aids in the norm’s acquisition of a status of legitimacy across different cultural societies through dialogue and discussion.¹ It provides the possibility to revitalize the norm through the shaping of a political debate in which alternative discourses are formulated that aid in the increasing of the norm’s legitimacy (Deitelhoff and Zimmerman, 2013, 5). However, contestation can also serve to weaken the norm when contested in validity and its justification. This is when it is met with non-compliance, which also indicates that the norm is being undermined. Justificatory contestation can occur when the definition of the norm is unclear. Furthermore, a norm can also become undermined if it is left to become stagnant when antipreneurs constantly reject the norm, leading to the lack of

¹ Read for more information Wiener 2008

normative change.

2.5 Norm Localization: Acharya (2013)

A norm that has not yet been successfully diffused can also be reacted to by attempting to localize the new norm. Norm localization as a concept is introduced in Acharya (2013) and is part of the theoretical framework of norm circulation. Norm circulation refers to the phases a norm goes through on its path towards becoming a new global norm. Through this process, the newly emerging norm interacts with both localized perspectives and needs with the aim of redefining the emerging norm. In Acharya's perspective (2013, 469), norm localization occurs when marginalized actors feel betrayed or abused by the norm as a result of the actions of more powerful actors. Because of this, norm localization is prone to occur when actors comply with the emerging norm while not being completely satisfied with it. Consequently, norm localization can be regarded as a form of norm contestation in which a process of socialization occurs between the newly emerging norm and actors of a different normative background.

2.6 Case study methodology

This study uses a case study analysis model to answer the proposed research question. The aim of this qualitative method is to generate an in-depth understanding of Russia's approach towards the principle of R2P. The case studies that are reviewed are Georgia, Crimea, Libya and Syria. All four case studies are relevant as they serve as prominent examples in which Russia was directly involved with R2P.

The assessment of Russia's approach towards R2P requires first an understanding of the norm status of R2P during the period in which the case took place. The status of R2P as a norm is determined through the use of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle theory (1998). An elaboration on R2P status as a norm is given in Chapter three. After having determined R2P's current norm states, Chapter four elaborates on the findings of the case studies. Each individual case consists of an explanation of the events of which they are comprised. Following, Russia's approach towards the norm is assessed by evaluating whether Russia localized, contested or undermined the norm.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the methodology, the theoretical framework and the relevant concepts that will be used in this study. The methodology section described the theoretical framework that will be applied to the case studies provided above to help understand Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle theory. This influential work in the study of norms provides an understanding of the different phases a norm passes through before its successful diffusion. A limitation of this work is, however, that it does not elaborate on what happens if a norm does not successfully diffuse. In this case, this chapter introduced the relevant concepts norm contestation, norm localization and norm undermining. These concepts have demonstrated the different ways in which actors can respond towards a norm that has not successfully been diffused.

CHAPTER 3

Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

This chapter offers insight into the contentions of the academic literature related to R2P's norm trajectory development. This chapter is structured according to Finnemore and Sikkinks' norm life cycle phase (1998) and is, therefore, divided into three parts.

The first part is dedicated to discussing literature related to R2P's norm-emerging phase. The included literature focuses on the notion of humanitarian intervention that arose during the 1990s, until the UN World Summit in 2005. The notion of humanitarian intervention and R2P are interlinked, as the humanitarian intervention can be regarded as the precedent of R2P. In their essence, both notions promote the same norm, namely the responsibility to ensure the protection of human rights. This norm became of increasing importance in the post-Cold War order during the 1990s (Newman, 2001, 104; Weiss, 2004, 135).

The second part discusses the literature that can be classified as part of R2P's norm cascade phase. As already mentioned, the norm cascade phase is characterized by the endeavor of norm entrepreneurs to make others follow the emerging norm, or to increase the norm's perceived legitimacy in the international community. During this phase, the aim is to generate compliance and adherence to the norm. In the case of R2P, the reviewed literature dates from 2005 until 2018. This chapter also aims to demonstrate that the third stage of norm internationalization has not been reached yet in R2P's norm life cycle.

3.2 Norm emergence phase

Humanitarian intervention is the precedent of R2P. In their essence, both promote the same norm: the taking upon of the responsibility to ensure the protection of human rights. This emerging norm became of increasing importance in the post-Cold War order (Newman, 2002, 104; Weiss, 2004, 135). This was when the West, especially the United States (US) took upon a leading role in the promotion of the norm of responsibility during its norm emergence phase. As a result, the United States is regarded as a promoter of the emergent norm of taking responsibility for human rights. The US first assumed this role under the notion of humanitarian intervention, and then under what is known by the Responsibility to Protect principle. Eventually, during the further development of R2P's normative trajectory, other

liberal states joined the US as norm entrepreneurs. The following part is dedicated to providing an overview on the relevant discourse which has emerged during R2P's emergence as a norm. As will be demonstrated, R2P's norm emergence was met with a broad discussion about its legality and legitimacy, starting with the notion of a humanitarian intervention (Molier, 2006, 38).

During R2P's emergence as a norm, the idea of "saving strangers" was met with skepticism. The notion of humanitarian intervention raised a lot of question marks that could not be easily answered. These include questions about its conduct, and its implications for sovereignty and international law (Newman, 2002, 103). The conduct of humanitarian intervention was regarded as problematic, as the conduct of such intervention for the protection of human rights violates the principle of state sovereignty, and thus international law (Newman, 2002, 103; Wheeler, 2002, 1). Welsh (2002, 503) identifies this as the heart of the debate. Weiss (2004, 145) contends state sovereignty is the only protection states have in the international order from other states.

Another reason for growing skepticism among the international community was the former colonial history of the Western norm promoters (Weiss, 2004, 142; Ayoob, 2001, 225). As a result, Ayoob (2001, 225) argues that humanitarian intervention is susceptible to abuse, as the international community is able to selectively pick targets. This skepticism was reinforced after the conduct of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo during the Yugoslav wars of independence. Newman (2001, 105) elaborates and argues that Kosovo was the first time when a group of states acted without explicit permission from the UNSC authority. Zacklin (2001, 937) argues that the illegitimate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led intervention was regarded with hostility and as a form of neo-interventionism. In Molier's perspective (2006, 42), the situation in Kosovo demonstrated that UNSC regardless of the UNSC's decision, states (or a regional organization such as NATO) still push ahead with intervention. Consequently, the Kosovo experience undermined the upcoming humanitarian norm of R2P.

The reviewed literature demonstrates the challenges which arose during the 1990s. Wheeler (2000, 2888) provides a good overview of these challenges: firstly, military intervention executed under the guise of human rights protections can, in fact, be used for ulterior motives; and second, R2P can be used as a tool to exploit the idea that underpins it, i.e. the protection of universal human rights. As a result, Wheeler (2000, 286) argues that, during this time, the emerging norm of R2P faced the challenge of the international community, which were not willing to accept an unjustified intervention by the UNSC. On the

other hand, Bellamy (2005, 34) argues that Kosovo demonstrated the effect of the emerging norm, as the intervention became classified as both illegitimate and legitimate. The intervention was illegitimate, according to international law, but legitimate, according to moral purposes. However, Bellamy adds that this perspective was mainly shared between the community of liberal states, which are regarded as norm promoters.

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, R2P was evoked for the first time in the International Commission in Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report in December 2001. The events of 9/11 are of relevance for R2P's norm emergence phase as it influenced the existing perspectives on R2P's future trajectory as a norm. The creation of the ICISS aided in creating a platform to debate the topic of humanitarian intervention, with the aim of reaching a political consensus on the topic of intervention (Welsh, 2002, 510). During the creation of ICISS and the introduction of R2P, R2P was not yet institutionalized as a norm. However, the creation of ICISS can be regarded as the necessary preparation of the next phase for R2P, namely norm cascade.

The reviewed literature demonstrates that the events of 9/11 influenced the existing perspectives on R2P's normative trajectory. 9/11 and the initiation of the War on Terror resulted in the conduct of an unauthorized military intervention in Iraq, in which the argument of the protection of human rights was misused (Weiss, 2014, 11). As a consequence, the future of R2P was regarded as uncertain. Molier (2006, 61) argues that one could distinguish between two perspectives: the belief that 9/11 and Iraq demonstrated that the world had reached the end of the era of humanitarian interventions; and the belief that humanitarian interventions would always be needed, especially now that war abroad could manifest at home in the form of terrorism. In Weiss's perspective (2006, 748), the conduct of an unjustified intervention in Iraq that followed after the initiation of the War on Terror demonstrates how easily the notion of R2P could be misused. A number of academics contended that "saving strangers" no longer featured on states' lists of priority (Weiss, 2004, 136; Hurrell, 2002; Molier, 2006, 45; Roth, 2005, 155). In Iraq, The United States underwent a sudden shift from humanitarian intervention towards military intervention, whose aim was not to protect human rights.

The next memorable moments for R2P's normative trajectory was the World Summit in 2005. Despite the experienced drawbacks, authors agree that the World Summit heralded the existence of a normative consensus on the importance of R2P (Arbour, 2008; Bellamy, 2006; Weiss, 2006; Stahn, 2007; Wheeler, 2008). However, the extent to which R2P enjoys

international acceptance after the World Summit can be questioned when one delves further into the literature on this topic.

The World Summit in 2005 is regarded as an event that strengthened R2P as a norm (Bannon, 2006, 1158; Bellamy, 2006, 168). However, the extent to which the World Summit actually contributed to the further development of R2P is questionable. For example, Bellamy (2006, 168) argues that the Summit did little to assuage concerns that were raised during the norm-emergence phase of R2P. Bellamy argues that disagreements continue on whether the UNSC was the only legitimate body to authorize an intervention. From the perspective of liberal states, the possibility of an unauthorized intervention could not be ruled out. On the other hand, in the perspective of the non-Western states, Western interventionism could only be constrained by the UNSC. Bannon (2006, 1165), concludes in similar way and argues that the World Summit document does not justify broad-based unilateral interventions, however, this action could still be justified in future scenarios. Furthermore, disagreement on the subject also arose concerning the establishment of criteria on how the use of force should be guided.

The existing disagreements during the World Summit 2005 demonstrate that R2P was not yet regarded as an international norm. For example, Arbour (2008, 449) expresses surprise about the lack of resistance from countries that were previously ambivalent towards the newly emerging norm. In his perspective, this can be attributed to confusion concerning what R2P exactly entails, or possible different existing interpretations of the doctrine. This perspective is further clarified by Stahn (2007, 118), who argues that R2P is a multifaceted concept with various elements, which do not enjoy the same degree of support among various states. However, in Stahn's perspective, the Summit failed to effectively clarify the concept and address the remaining ambiguities. Furthermore, according to Molier (2006, 62), the Summit did not establish formal criteria, and, therefore, R2P is not regarded as an obligation. Weiss (2006, 742) recognizes the existence of international normative consensus about the meaning of R2P, but addresses the remaining gap between theory and practice that hinders the implementation of the principle.

Literature which emerged during R2P's norm emergence phase captures the skepticism that arose in the 1990's towards humanitarian interventions, principally as a result of ethical, political and legal reasons (Newman, 2002, 103; Weiss, 2004, 145). This skepticism was reinforced as the international community was unable to answer questions that

arose of these ethical, political and legal dilemmas, while, in the meantime, intervention as a practice continued to be implemented. This skepticism proposed a challenge for R2P's normative trajectory. Furthermore, the reviewed literature shows that the Iraq intervention negatively influenced the credibility of the argument of protecting human rights. The unauthorized intervention demonstrated the inability of the UNSC to contain U.S. hegemony. As a result, this experience reconfirmed the skepticism that arose during the 1990s, namely the use of humanitarian interventions for the fulfillment of states' own interests. Moreover, Stuenkel's article (2014) on the influence of the World Summit on R2P's normative trajectory indicates that the idea behind R2P was accepted, yet the practicalities of how to implement the principle remained unclear. Because of these reasons, R2P could not yet be regarded as a fully developed international norm.

On the other hand, at this point, R2P entered the 'norm cascade' stage of its trajectory. The World Summit in 2005 helped to concretize R2P's legitimacy as a norm: through the World Summit and the ICISS report, detail and precision on what R2P actually entails became clearer and more accessible. However, the remaining ambiguities in the application of the norm hinders the international consensus on its practical implementation

3.3 Norm cascade phase

After the World Summit in 2005, R2P continues to face obstacles to being successfully accepted as an international norm. A shared expectation has been created, but its implementation remains hindered by practical issues, such as its implementation and the notion of sovereignty (Luck, 2009, Serrano, 2010).

R2P further progressed in its norm development by the introduction of the three pillar structures in 2009 (Serrano, 2010). Pillar I provides guidelines on the responsibility to prevent; Pillar II provides guidelines on the responsibility to react; and Pillar III provides guidelines on the responsibility to rebuild (Melling 2018, 8). Under Pillar I, it is established as a state's responsibility to address domestic tensions before the possibility of escalation. The aim here is to protect the state's population from human rights violations (Claes, 2012, 68). If a state fails to uphold its responsibility, Pillar II stipulates the international community's responsibility to contribute to the process of recovery, with the aim of assisting the state in crisis to exercise its responsibility (Claes, 2012, 68). If these pillars are not sufficient in

guaranteeing the state's responsibility to protect human rights within its own borders, Pillar III transfers the responsibility to respond to crisis to the international community. This includes coercive methods and therefore the possibility of a military intervention. The aim of this pillar is to incite the international community to respond quickly and decisively in situations where action is required in a timely manner (Claes, 2012, 68).

The development of the three-pillar structure in 2009 marks the next important moment in R2P's norm development trajectory. After 2010, a set of external factors entered the foray that further influenced R2P's norm development. These external factors were the changing power relations within the global world order as a result of newly emerging powers. Moreover, other important events on R2P's normative trajectory include the Libyan and Syrian crisis.

After 2005, the literature demonstrates that the norm of R2P continues to be actively interrogated. Concerns remain about R2P and its implications for the notion of sovereignty. Luck (2009, 11) argues that R2P's normative trajectory is hindered by a lack of international consensus on its implications on sovereignty. Serrano (2010, 480) identifies R2P as an inherently controversial concept due to its necessity for a trade-off between human rights and sovereign rights. Nonetheless, Serrano (2010, 432) also argues that R2P's execution and status as a norm has been strengthened since its inception, mainly through the introduction of a three-pillar structure approach. Despite its advancements, Bellamy (2010, 161) argues that R2P has a problem of indeterminacy. In Luck's perspective (2010, 363), the experienced challenges make R2P incomplete.

With the emergence of the BRICs as growing world powers after 2010, R2P's development as a globally-accepted norm has come into question from non-western-aligned states. In the relevant literature, this bipolar debate is referred to as the 'North-South' divide (Thakur, 2014; Rotmann et al. 2014; Stuenkel, 2014; Newmann, 2013). This debate is of relevance for R2P's norm development, as it exacerbates the lack of international consensus on R2P as a norm.

The global order is currently being disrupted by the emergence of prominent challenges from rapidly-developing former developing states. In Paikin's perspective (2012), this change has initiated a transition into a multipolar world order, which will bring an end to the prevailing liberal order. As a result, this development has implications for R2P's future norm development. Another academic that broadly elaborates on the changing power

dynamics and its implications for the global governance conduct is Acharya (2013)². In direct relation to R2P, Acharya (2013, 467) argues that the norm dynamics of R2P bring about sensitive divisions among Western and developing countries. This sensitivity translates into a dividing line between a Global South, which is defensive of the notion of sovereignty, and the Global North, represented by the Western liberal states.

The following perspectives on R2P can be identified that argue from a North-South debate framework. Rotman et al. (2014, 370) argues that the challenge of R2P is that it is framed in universal terms, while it is regarded by the Global South as a Western-originated concept, as it arose during the Western dominated global world order. Consequently, the Global South is believed to be skeptical of R2P, as a result of its memory of Western imperialism (Rotman et al. 2014, 365). This perspective is also identified by Mani and Weiss (2011, 456), who relate to this in terms of a fear of double standards, manipulation and Western imperialism. Furthermore, the North-South is believed to be of influence for R2P's future norm development. The reason for this is explained by Adebajo (2016, 1187), who argues that the Global South is regarded as a revisionist entity, that wishes to overthrow the unjust liberal order by revolting against R2P. According to Claes (2012, 70), the rejectionists of the global South propose a challenge to R2P, represented by actions such as blocking its implementation through the UNSC, or by arguing that the principle not only violates the UN charter, but also the national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.

The North-South debate was further reinforced by R2P's resolution 1973³ in Libya and, consequently, influenced the existing perspectives on R2P as a norm. In the first instance, the quick and swift implementation of resolution 1973 gave the sense that consensus was increasing concerning R2P as a norm. Bellamy (2011, 265) argues that Libya demonstrated the current ongoing transformation in the world, as quick decision-making demonstrated that the protection of human rights was increasingly becoming regarded as an international responsibility. Consequently, the Libyan intervention was regarded as a model intervention of R2P (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012; Evans, 2011). However, the aftermath of the Libyan intervention gave rise to an increasing skepticism among developing countries.

Different perspectives pertaining to the influence of Libya on R2P as a norm can be identified in the academic literature on the topic. The following authors adopt a perspective

² See Acharya's book *the End of the American World Order*

³ Resolution 1973 refers back to the UNSC decision making on how to respond to the crimes against human rights in Libya.

framed in the North-South debate. Morris (2013, 1266) adopts a negative perspective towards R2P's stance as a norm and argues that the Libyan experience will diminish any future implementation of a forceful humanitarian intervention. Morris (2013, 1279) attributes this to the mistrust of the BRICS towards Western-led military action. Rotmann et al. (2014, 368) adopts a similar perspective and argues that the aftermath of the Libyan intervention reinforced a long-held skepticism towards the West and the use of R2P among the BRICS. Rieff (2011) agrees with this perspective, arguing that the Libyan intervention demonstrated a possible misuse of R2P for Western interests, which are associated with imperialism and geopolitics. In short, these perspectives demonstrate less trust in R2P's ability to further develop into a norm, as a result of the skepticism of emerging global powers.

The following perspectives address R2P's norm stance without being framed in the North-South debate. Paris (2014) identifies five structural problems experienced with R2P that became especially visible after the Libyan intervention. The problems that directly affect R2P's credibility include, among others, the existence of mixed motives and the inconsistency problem (Paris, 2014, 578). In Paris' (2014) perspective, the existence of these structural problems weakens R2P's credibility, thus hindering its norm trajectory. Thakur (2013, 73) argues that the R2P consensus, that was established during the World Summit 2005, was damaged by the Libyan intervention, due to "gaps in expectations, communication, and accountability between those who mandated the operation and those who executed it". However, Thakur (2013, 62) advocates a perspective of R2P which goes beyond a North-South issue. Rather, Thakur argues (2013, 73), a need is identified to take emerging powers into account, in order to further strengthen global normative guidelines and the principle of R2P.

Another important event for R2P's normative trajectory was the Syrian crisis and the response of the international community thereafter. As the two crises occurred in succession, what has been observed in the literature is that the intervention in Libya influenced the decision-making of the international community on the Syrian crisis. The international community was, however, unable to effectively respond to the Syrian crisis (Hehir, 2014; Evans, 2014; Weiss, 2014; Glanville; 2014, Aaronson, 2014). Consequently, academic literature on the topic demonstrates different perspectives that arose that discuss the implications of Syria for R2P's normative trajectory.

When discussing the effect of the Syrian war on R2P, a critique arose on R2P being related to the inability of the international community to effectively respond to the Syrian crisis (Hehir, 2014; Evans, 2014; Weiss, 2014; Glanville, 2014). Reasons for this inability have been framed within the North-South debate (Evans, 2014, 20; Thakur, 2014). To clarify, Evans (2014, 20) argues that the inclusion of the North-South debate in the case of Syria is linked to the former Libyan intervention, in which countries of the Global South argued that the intervention overreached its mandate. As a result, there is a belief that the consensus on R2P has been damaged. In Hehir's perspective (2014,73), the inability to effectively address the Syrian crisis indicates the changing power relations in the world order. This change is characterized by a weakening West and an increasingly powerful Russia and China. Consequently, Hehir (2014, 74), argues that the future of R2P as a norm is uncertain, as a result of the ending monopoly of the West on human rights initiatives.

Other perspectives that argue outside of the North-South framework include the following. According to Carment and Laundry (2014, 52), R2P as a norm has been weakened because the Libyan intervention demonstrated that R2P is subject to political manipulation. In addition, the authors contend that the Syrian crisis demonstrated that R2P will only be implemented when the strategic benefits outweigh the costs of intervention. Aaronson (2014, 58) questions the future of R2P as a norm, arguing that the Syrian experience makes the world question whether R2P intervention is truly focused on moral grounds, or on supporting a particular political project. Cunliffe (2014, 63) relates to Aaronson's perspective, contending that the Syrian experience makes the world question whether power politics are more important than humanitarian ethics. However, he also argues that a military intervention did not occur in the Syrian crisis, because it was not an advantageous decision to do so. This correlates with R2P's outlined principles, that state that an intervention that is likely to cause more harm should be prevented. Consequently, in Cunliffe's perspective (2014) the Syrian crisis does not damage the essence of the norm.

Other perspectives that are more positive on a future outlook of R2P as a norm include Weiss (2014); Glanville (2014); Thakur (2014); Evans (2014). Glanville (2014, 46) further elaborates on Cunliffe's argument and argues that Syria does not weaken the norm, as a military intervention was not regarded as beneficial. Moreover, he argues that opposition towards the application of the norm does not weaken the effect of R2P on state behavior. Morris (2013, 1273) further explores the effect R2P has on state behavior. He concludes that R2P as a norm has not been institutionalized sufficiently, as demonstrated by the voting

behavior of states (including the BRICS) during UN resolutions. On the other hand, Stuenkel (2014, 12) responds to this and argues that the BRICS voted more in favor of R2P than they did not. Stuenkel (2014) advocates a perspective that looks further than the North-South debate. Thakur (2014, 41) identifies that Syria challenged the R2P consensus, among the emerging powers, but at the same time provided an opportunity to further strengthen the norm, through ensuring future inclusion of the emerging powers. In other words, Evans (2014, 21), Weiss (2014, 37) and Stuenkel (2014) all identify the challenge proposed by Syria and the emerging powers, but also argue that, despite the challenges, R2P has been able to create a new consciousness among the world.

The reviewed literature demonstrates that the skepticism that arose in the 1990s, is now framed as a characteristic of the Global South. This development indicates that the norm of R2P is further advancing, as the skepticism towards R2P, which was experienced as world-wide during R2P's norm emergence phase, is now associated to a minority, namely the Global South. On the other hand, the development of R2P as a norm is regarded as uncertain, as a result of the increasing prominence of the Global South and their differing perspective on R2P.

In the case of the Libya, the literature demonstrates that the intervention damaged consensus on R2P as a norm. As a result, long existing mistrust and concerns about the intentions of "humanitarian" interventions by Western countries re-arose. The literature demonstrates a change in the external context, between R2P's norm-emergence phase and norm-cascade. Namely, during R2P's norm-emergence phase the balance of power was in favor of the Western world. However, during the time of the Libyan intervention a shift occurred in the balance of power, as a result of the emerging non-Western powers, also known as the BRICS. This development reinforced R2P's perception as a norm as following; the concerns that were raised during R2P's norm emergence phase are now framed in a North-South debate. In this framing, the South is portrayed as a group that hinders R2P's further norm development, while the North is portrayed as a norm promoter.

In the case of Syria, the literature generally voices a concern that the Syrian crisis posed a challenge for R2P and the overall agreement on the norm. In addition, the damage done beforehand, as a result of the Libyan intervention, is also recognized. As a result, it is argued that R2P as a norm has been weakened. On the other hand, other perspectives regard the Syrian crisis as an exception, as a military intervention in Syria would not have been

beneficial either way. Others instead adopt a more positive perspective and argue that the opposition towards R2P, in the case of Syria, was directed on R2P's application instead of the essence of R2P as a principle.

3.4 Conclusion

To conclude, the reviewed literature has been categorized into two of the three phases of the norm life cycle theory. Namely, R2P's norm emergence phase and R2P's norm cascade phase. The literature suggests that R2P as a norm has not reached the stage of norm internationalization. However, the stages of norm emergence and norm cascade have resulted into the reaching of a consensus on what R2P as a norm means. Namely, the worldwide recognition of the existence of a worldwide consensus on the importance of the international community to take upon its responsibility to protect human rights. The reaching of this consensus was, however, not without challenges.

Challenges that occurred during the norm life cycle of R2P include remaining skepticism on the implementation of the norm, and the changing power balances in the current world order. Especially during R2P's norm cascade phase, skepticism emerged concerning the practical implementation of R2P. The World Summit in 2005 did indicate the creation of an international consensus, however, it did not resolve the ambiguity on how to practically implement R2P. This ambiguity became especially visible during the Libyan and the Syrian crisis.

Furthermore, the literature demonstrated the relevance of North-South debate. The existing skepticism is now attributed specifically to the Global South, who are characterized as pro-sovereignty defenders. As a result of this division, different perspectives on the future of R2P as a norm have emerged. In this case, the emerging powers have been regarded as an obstacle towards the forging of an international consensus on R2P as a norm. Consequently, their critical stance towards R2P has been characterized as undermining the norm.

CHAPTER 4

Russia's relationship with the norm of R2P

4.1 Introduction

The changing power relations in the world order, combined with the skepticism of the emerging powers towards the use of R2P, is regarded as challenging for the forging of an international consensus on R2P. This aids in creating a better understanding of Russia's relationship with R2P and its normative development. Russia is regarded as one of the most skeptical permanent UNSC member towards the use of R2P, and is, therefore, regarded as key challenger to the principle of R2P (Ziegler, 2016, 347; Baranovsky and Mateiko, 2016, 50).

In order to contribute to a better understanding of Russia's relationship with R2P as a norm, this chapter reviews Russia's position towards R2P in a total of four cases: Georgia, Crimea, Libya and Syria. Russia's position is assessed through the use of official documents, such as UN resolutions, official reports from the Kremlin and of the Russian foreign ministry. The aim is to assess whether Russia contests, undermines or localizes the norm of R2P, by creating an understanding of Russia's perspective towards R2P in each of the four cases. This chapter discusses the four cases individually. Each case includes an overview of the situation, followed by a discussion whether norm localization, contestation and undermining took place. Afterwards the results of the findings are discussed and summarized in table 1.

4.1 Georgia

In 2008, a crisis broke out in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, which was regarded as a threat to peace and security in the region. This event occurred on the 8th of August in 2008, when the situation in South Ossetia deteriorated as the region was attacked by Ossetian separatist militias (Allison, 2008, 1147). In response to this attack, Russian military forces were deployed on the 9th of August. Eventually, Russia's involvement developed into a full-scale occupation of Georgian territory during the 10th and 11th of August, (Repertoire of the UNSC, 2009, 131).

To acquire an objective understanding of the Georgian crisis, it is important to mention the existing differences between the Georgian and Russian explanation of what exactly happened. The countries differed on their explanation of the initiation of the crisis. According to the UN representative of Georgia, Irakli Alasania, Russia was involved in the initiation of the crisis and was responsible for the leading of illegal separatist authorities and

armed formations (UN, 2008a). According to the UN representative of Russia, Vitaly Churkin, the crisis initiated as a result of an attack by Georgian military divisions against Tskhinvali, while being led by the Georgian authorities.

In an attempt to justify its military involvement on Georgian territory, the representatives of Russia gave three reasons: first, Russia was helping to prevent a humanitarian crisis, as the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali was in violation of the UN charter of non-use of force; second, the offering of protection to Russian citizens, which are referred back to as compatriots, as the violation of human rights posed them a threat; and third, the offering of protection to Russian peacekeepers, which were being attacked by Georgian troops. However, according to the UN representative of Georgia, the action undertaken by the Georgian government was an act of self-defense, which did not include the targeting of Russian peacekeepers (UN, 2008b). Consequently, Russia's military involvement is regarded by Georgia as a violation of international law and the sovereignty of Georgia.

It is important to note that the references made by Sergey Lavrov and president Medvedev does not necessarily refer back to the principle of R2P according to the interpretation of the UN charter. Rather, the statements refer back to the Russian representatives' own interpretation of how the Responsibility to Protect should be conducted.

Norm localization

The Georgian case provides an example in which Russia attempts to localize the norm of R2P. The Russian representatives' attempt to legitimize Russia's military presence in Georgia according to their own perspectives demonstrates this localization. From this perspective, Russia's attempt to defend Russia's military involvement in Georgia has been framed according to their responsibility to protect their ethnic links, as stated in its own constitution. For example, Foreign Minister Lavrov, on the 8th of August, asserted that

"Russia would not allow the deaths of its compatriots go unpunished, and life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are, will be protect in accordance to the constitution of the Russian federation and in accordance with the laws of Russia."
(Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2008a).

This statement demonstrates that the Russian representatives feel responsible for defending Russian citizens, according to their own constitution. Another example in which we witness Russia's own interpretation of R2P is formulated by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. According to president Medvedev, Russian peacekeepers were conducting an "operation to enforce peace in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict", which is regarded as their "responsibility to protect the population" (President of Russia, 2008c).

Nonetheless, the former examples of Russia's interpretation of R2P is not aligned with the established expectations of implementing R2P. Minister Lavrov defended Russia's implementation of R2P in Georgia, by arguing that their interpretation was carried out within the boundaries of international law. Lavrov commented that

“one may not abstractly invoke ‘responsibility to protect’ and be outraged when this principle is used in practice in strict conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter and other norms of international law.” (Foreign Ministry of Russian Federation, 2008b).

These statements demonstrate that the Russian representatives justify military intervention by referring to the values of the Russian constitution, and to *“enforcing peace in accordance with the United Nations Charter”* (President of Russia, 2008a).

Despite the attempts to foster understanding and acceptance of Russia's actions in Georgia, the statements given by Russia's representatives demonstrate that their interpretation of R2P is not aligned with the official expectations of R2P established during the 2005 World Summit. Prior to the implementation of any R2P mission, consultation with the UNSC is required before a military operation can be initiated (UN, 2018). This was not the case with Russia's military involvement in Georgia. As a result, it can be argued that Russia attempted to legitimize their own understanding of R2P, an occurrence of norm localization.

Norm contestation and undermining

The Georgian case cannot be regarded as an example of norm contestation. During the Georgian case, Russia's invocation of R2P - whether to its own interpretation or not - indicates its recognition of the importance of the norm (Stuenkel, 2014, 12). As a result, it cannot be argued that Russia justifiably contests R2P, nor that it undermines the norm. Whether Russia contests R2P in an applicatory sense is arguable. Russia did not implement R2P according to established expectations, nor did it contest the already established expectations on the use of R2P. Therefore, it is questionable whether it is possible to argue if applicatory contestation of R2P really took place in the first instance.

4.2 Crimea

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea. The annexation occurred as a result of internal turmoil within Ukraine, called the Euromaidan, which occurred when president Yanukovich declined to sign the EU association agreement (Cross and Karolewski, 2016, 4). As a result of this, activists protested on Kiev's Independence Square. The small protest resulted in a larger-scale violent protest against Ukraine's pro-Russian and authoritarian regime, characterized by rallies and occupations (Zelinska, 2017). Eventually, the protesters called for the resignation of President Yanukovich, who fled the country on February 22nd 2014. In the following months, protestors established a new government on the 27th of February, with Arseniy Yatsenyuk as its president. This led to the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine and occupied the Crimean Peninsula from the end of February until the Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea on March 18th.

Following the annexation, Putin described the involvement of Russian troops and intervention of sovereign borders as a 'humanitarian mission,' with the sole purpose of defending the Ukrainian population (President of Russia, 2014a). It is important to emphasize that although Putin references humanitarian missions and protecting human rights, no direct reference is made to R2P. The lack of direct references to R2P makes it arguable whether Russia truly deployed R2P.

The Crimean annexation case provides an example of norm localization and the justificatory contestation of the R2P norm. Russia's justificatory contestation indicates that it undermined R2P in the case of Crimea. However, it should be mentioned that no direct references were made to the principle of R2P by Russian representatives, referring instead to a 'humanitarian mission.' Therefore, the Crimean case can be regarded as an example of a direct critique from the Russian representatives to the norm in which an intervention is legitimized upon humanitarian grounds, which includes the R2P norm.

Norm localization

Similar to the case of Georgia, norm localization once again has been demonstrated in Russia's intervention in Crimea. Although no direct references were made to R2P directly, the Russian representatives defended their military involvement by emphasizing their

responsibility to protect Russian citizens (UNSC, 2008, 3). The emphasis on their responsibility to protect, while not directly referring back to the principle of R2P, demonstrates an example of Russia's own interpretation of R2P, in which the Russian military intervened without prior consent from the UNSC. Nonetheless, the Russian representatives attempted several times to justify their military involvement in Crimea. This serves as an example of norm localization. However, in contrast to the Georgian case, the Crimean intervention was witness to an attempt to legitimize military involvement by referring to the permission of the legitimate president Yanukovich of Ukraine (President of Russia, 2014a).

Norm contestation and undermining

Similar to the Georgian case, no direct reference was made to the principle of R2P. As a result, it is questionable whether applicatory contestation can be said to truly apply. However, the statements made by Russian representatives do indicate a justificatory contestation of military interventions on humanitarian grounds. For example, when asked about its perceived illegitimate actions in Crimea, Putin responded:

"We are often told our actions are illegitimate, but when I ask, "Do you think everything you do is legitimate?" they say "yes". Then I have to recall the actions of the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, where they either acted without any UN sanctions or completely distorted the context of such resolutions, as was the case with Libya." (President of Russia, 2014a).

Putin's statement reflects the administration's critique of R2P and humanitarian missions as a vehicle for fulfilling political objectives.

Putin's skepticism of R2P's intentions can be classified as a justificatory contestation of the R2P doctrine, as it questions the motif humanitarian interventions are being uphold. Consequently, this skepticism can therefore apply to all historical instances of intervention under the guise of humanitarian aid. Russia's actions in Crimea can be regarded as an almost satirical critique of the intentions of actors who have previously spearheaded intervention under the guise of humanitarianism, who themselves use a veneer of responsibility and human rights to justify actions that contravene international law in pursuit of political gain. Russia's actions in Crimea undermine the principles that underpin R2P. Russia's actions in Georgia provided acted as a test-bed for both the Russian military and the Putin

administration on how to correctly implement R2P according to the shared expectations. However, despite this experience, Russia more flagrantly defied the values of R2P in the case of Crimea. As a result, Russia erodes the foundation of the norm.

4.3 Libya

In February 2011, civil war broke out in Libya. In a series of pro-democracy movements that erupted in a number of Arab countries – referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’ – popular movements decrying authoritarian regimes voiced political dissent in a series of protests in major cities in the region. While in other countries protests successfully and peacefully enacted political reform, the conflict between protesters and government security forces escalated to the point of mass violence. As a result of this violence, reports of human rights being violated in Libya have entered the public domain, inciting the UNSC to react.

On 26 February 2011, the United Nations adopted resolution 1973 which, for the first time, authorized intervention under Pillar III of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which was met with broad regional support (Hehir, 2013, 228). However, Russia abstained from voting on UN resolution 1973. From the perspective of the Russian UN representative, too many questions remained unanswered in relation to the scope and measures of the resolution to the Syrian crisis (UN, 2011a). For the Russian representatives, the former expressed concerns about the lack of clarity on the scope of the resolution were confirmed by the aftermath of the resolution, when NATO’s intervention under resolution 1973 resulted into a regime change, without consulting among the UNSC members. Therefore, indicating the existing gaps in expectations, communication and accountability on the Libyan intervention, among the UNSC members (Thakur, 2013, 72)

The aim of resolution 1973 was to protect civilians by any means necessary. The intervention led by NATO was regarded by some as a model intervention of R2P⁴. The intervention was regarded as successful, because of the UNSC quick response and its ability to protect civilians (Luck, 2011, 388). However, others heavily criticized the intervention, as the intervention resulted in the successful disposition of former Libyan dictator, president Muammar Gaddafi. Consequently, the mandate of the intervention was believed to be overextended, without the prior consultation of the UNSC (Stuenkel, 2014, 7).

⁴ See for example Daalder and Stavidris, 2012 and Evans, 2014.

The Libyan case indicates a good example of the Russian representatives contesting the applicatory use of R2P as a norm. Resolution 1973 negatively influenced Russia's consensus towards the use of Pillar III under R2P, as a result of the broad interpretation of the mandate. The Russian representatives mainly elaborated on the unjustness of how the mandate was interpreted, rather than contesting the justificatory cause of R2P. The Libyan case, however, does not indicate the occurring of norm localization.

Norm localization

The Libyan case study does not provide the indication of norm localization of R2P by Russia. Rather than witnessing an example in which R2P being interpreted according to Russia's own understanding, the implementation of R2P's military mission under resolution 1973 took place according to the guidelines of the UNSC.

Norm contestation and undermining

In the case of Libya, it can clearly be observed that Russia contested the applicatory use of the norm of R2P in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis. President Medvedev argued that the UNSC voted for a

"resolution imposing a no-fly zone, which would stop the conflict from escalating and break up the warring parties. And what have we got as a result? We have what is in fact a military operation, which is not taking place on the ground but it is happening in the air, an operation in which a number of states are taking part and which was joined by NATO as a military bloc. The resolution has no mention of this."

Another example of a statement that supports this perspective is the following:

"[The administration] strongly believe[s] that it is unacceptable to use the mandate derived from UNSC resolution 1973, the adoption of which was quite an ambiguous step, in order to achieve goals that go far beyond its provisions, which only provide for actions for the protection of civilians." (Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2011a).

These statements are examples of Russia contesting R2P applicatory use, as the given critique indicates Russia's divergent perspective on how a military mission under R2P should be conducted in the future. For example, Foreign Minister Lavrov advocates prior consultation before the use of force can be implemented, in combination with the creation of necessary

guidelines to direct the attack. As a result, these statements mainly focus on how the future use of R2P should be conducted, rather than condemning R2P's future use. As a result, it can be concluded that the Russian representatives only contest the applicatory cause of R2P, rather than the justificatory cause.

Furthermore, the Libyan intervention cannot be regarded as an example of norm undermining. Russia abstained from voting and was not further involved in the crisis until the aftermath of the Libyan intervention.

4.4 Syria

Syria started to witness of internal unrest when civil protests against the Syrian government began mid-2011. Similar to the unfolding of the Libyan crisis, the crisis in Syria was initiated as a result of the Arab Spring. In response to the increasing unrest, the Syrian government violated human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The worsening situation called for the involvement of the international community. Unfortunately, the UNSC has so far been unable to effectively find a resolution of the Syrian crisis. As a result, the UNSC has been criticized for its inability to find consensus among its members (President of Russia, 2013). The inability to effectively find consensus on a possible resolution of the Syrian crisis has been influenced by Russia's stance towards a possible resolution of the crisis.

Norm localization

The Syrian case provides an example of Russia attempting to localize R2P according to its own normative background, as can be inferred from Russia's stance towards the Syrian resolution. The Russian representatives have made clear that their attitude towards a possible resolution of the Syrian crisis is heavily influenced by the former experience of the Libyan case. The Libyan intervention led to the conclusion, among the Russian representatives, that "the UNSC resolutions in Libya as interpreted by NATO is a model for its future actions to exercise the responsibility to protect" (Foreign ministry of the Russian Federation, 2011b). Consequently, Russia's foreign minister Lavrov made clear that "Russia would do everything in her power to prevent a slide of events in Syria to the Libya scenario." (Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2011). This demonstrates Russia's attempt to exercise its power to influence the future implementation of R2P closer to its own perspective.

Norm contestation and undermining

Besides Russia's attempt to localize the norm within its own understanding, the Syrian case also provides an example of Russia contesting the R2P applicatory cause. This is witnessed in Russia's stance towards a possible resolution of the Syrian crisis. Despite the ongoing violence in the Syrian crisis, Russia did not change its thoughts and continued vetoing all possible UNSC draft resolutions (Gifkins, 2012, 384). Consequently, the vetoes by Russia were strongly condemned internationally.

In response to the international critique, Russia's UN representative Vitaly Churkin emphasized that "his country did not support the regime of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad but the draft resolution would not promote a peaceful resolution to the crisis" (UN News, 2011). Rather, the Russian representatives argued for a peaceful political resolution of the Syrian crisis, without the interference of force, regime change and choosing sides between opposition and the legitimate government (President of Russia, 2011b). The main reason for adopting this stance is explained by the following statement made by former Russian president Medvedev:

"Russia will continue to oppose any attempts to use the UNSC to legitimize all manner of unilateral sanctions aimed at bringing about regime change. The UN was not established for this purpose, and in any case, it is ultimately up to each people to decide their country's fate, whether in the Middle East, Europe, or America."
(President of Russia, 2011b)

President Medvedev's statement reflects Russia's divergent approach, which at the same time serves as a critique towards the applicatory use of R2P. Rather than intervening with military force, the Russians argue for a different approach with a different possible resolution. Foreign Minister Lavrov "stresses the need for an inclusive and Syrian-led political process and the most expeditious implementation of reforms" (Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2011c). However, Russia's approach towards the Syrian crisis can be classified as applicatory contestation of R2P, as Russia's strong dedication to ensuring a peaceful resolution was heavily influenced by the former applicatory use of R2P, which was negatively classified as unilaterally. This directly refers back to the Libyan intervention, in which the so-called overextension of the mandate happened without former consultation (Stuenkel, 2017, 14).

Therefore, one can conclude that Russia contested the applicatory use of R2P in Syria, through continuously opposing possible UNSC resolutions that might have led to the use of

force. Despite applicatory contestation, Russia does not contest the justificatory cause of R2P as, throughout the Syrian crisis, Russia recognized the possible valuable contribution of international support throughout the United Nations.

It is debatable whether the Syrian case can be regarded as an example of norm undermining. One can argue that Russia undermined the norm throughout the continuous use of their veto right, which prevents the finding of an effective resolution. However, the reviewed statements indicate that the reason for their use of veto is to ensure the prevention of a unilateral action, accompanied by the possibility of a regime change. The reason for this adopted position is defended by president Putin, who argues that

“The UNSC members, especially the permanent members, who bear the chief responsibility for the future of peace in our world, have an eminently clear duty to prevent the adoption of documents that, using simple pseudo-legal tricks, can be twisted to open the way for countries to pursue their goals through military force.”
(President of Russia, 2011b).

Consequently, we witness Russia’s attempt to take upon a responsible role to ensure the right intentions when applying R2P as norm.

The Russian representative’s explanation of their stance towards the Syrian crisis resolution clarifies their intention to prevent the undertaking of future unilateral action throughout the UNSC. Especially because of this reason, arguing whether Russia undermined R2P depends on which perspective is adopted. If one regards the Libyan intervention as a model intervention, Russia’s stance towards the Syrian resolution is regarded as undermining as it would prevent the possibility of a fast and effective goal driven resolution in which the government of Assad would be overthrown. On the other hand, if it is regarded as essential to first explore other methods that promote an internal process within the country to find a resolution to the crisis, Russia’s stance could be regarded as defensive towards the norm, rather than undermining.

The evidence presented here suggests that Russia did not undermine R2P in the case of Syria, as a military intervention in Syria would not have guaranteed political stability, as a result of its complicated circumstances (Glanville, 2013, 46). Furthermore, another reason for why Russia did not undermine R2P in the case of Syria is because of its attempt to resolve the crisis according to peaceful means, which is aligned with the three pillars of R2P.

4.5 Results

The aim of the reviewed cases was to assess Russia's approach towards R2P as a norm. The results imply that Russia's approach differs from the approach of the United States, which is regarded as the main norm promoter of R2P. This is because the findings presented above suggest that Russia differs in the perspective on how R2P should be interpreted and applied. Russia's attempt to create a different understanding of R2P refers to norm localization, while Russia's attempt to apply R2P differently refers to the applicatory contestation of R2P. However, the findings also demonstrate that although Russia's perspective differs from that of the norm entrepreneurs (principally liberal states of the West), Russia minimally undermines the norm of R2P, and does not contest its justificatory value. The results of the findings are summarized in Table 1.

Of the four cases, Georgia, Crimea and Syria serve as examples of Russia's attempt to localize the norm of R2P. In the case of Crimea and Georgia, Russia's attempt to make use of the norm of R2P can be seen, one that defies the official guidelines and expectations. It is important to mention that in both these cases, direct references to the principle R2P are either non-existent or minimal. Nonetheless, both in Georgia and Crimea, Russia's attempt to create and justify its own understanding of R2P can be observed, one that fits its own normative background. This can be regarded as Russia's endeavors to justify its military involvement by emphasizing the importance of protecting their ethnic people, according to their own constitution. In Syria, however, a different example of norm localization has been witnessed, one in which Russia seeks to influence the future implementation of R2P, by the use of its veto right. As a result, this serves as an example of Russia actively influencing the future conduct of R2P more in accordance with its standards and expectations. This is with the aim of preventing unilateral decisions in the UNSC in mind, as the United States was accused in the Libyan case by Russia (President of Russia, 2014b).

Furthermore, two of the four cases demonstrate Russia contesting R2P in an applicatory sense. This occurs both in Libya and in Syria. This form of contestation provides the possibility to further strengthen R2P as a norm, as room for discussion is created to agree on what the expectations on R2P should entail. Consequently, these cases show Russia's positive engagement with the norm of R2P by aiding in its further progression. On the other hand, Russia negatively engages with norm progression by contesting it in a justificatory

sense. This form of contestation results in the weakening of the norm rather than the strengthening of it. We observe that Russia negatively contests the norm in the case of Crimea. Russia contested the justificatory value of the norm by indirectly criticizing former humanitarian missions conducted by the United States and their intentions for political purposes by undertaking an unrightfully similar action. Nonetheless, Russia's actions in Crimea resulted in a reinforcement of skepticism towards the intentions of countries intervening under the guise of R2P. As a result, Russia's actions did not contribute to the further progression of the norm of R2P.

In Crimea, Russia undermined R2P as a norm, as it misused the value of the norm for other purposes. Russia misused the value of the norm by acting in accordance with its own interpretation of R2P, by referring to Russia's responsibility to protect ethnic Russian populations in accordance with its own laws. This action was unnecessary, as the former intervention in Georgia provided Russia with more clarification on how to use the norm in accordance to shared expectations. Therefore, it can be concluded that Russia consciously used the norm unlawfully, vying for political purpose rather than humanitarian aid and thus undermining R2P as a norm.

Russia's attempt to localize the norm according to its own understanding and its own standards in three of the four cases indicate Russia's active socialization process with the norm. Russia's applicatory contestation of R2P in 2 of the 4 cases demonstrate that Russia has attempted to strengthen the norm in its use, more than it has attempted to weaken the norm in its justificatory cause. Thus, bearing in mind that Russia only truly undermined R2P in the case of Crimea, it can be concluded that Russia's approach towards R2P is more engaging, rather than undermining.

<i>Cases</i>	<i>Norm localization</i>	<i>Norm contestation</i>		<i>Norm undermining</i>
		<i>Applicatory contestation</i>	<i>Justificatory contestation</i>	
<i>Georgia</i>	Yes	No	No	No
<i>Crimea</i>	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Libya</i>	No	Yes	No	No
<i>Syria</i>	Yes	Yes	No	No

Table 1

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

The findings of this research elaborated the current status of the Responsibility to Protect principle as a norm, and on Russia's approach towards the norm. R2P's norm status was determined through the application of Finnemore and Sikkink's theoretical framework described in Chapter Three. This Chapter also found that R2P cannot yet be regarded as a fully established norm, as it has not yet reached the third stage of norm internalization in norm life cycle theory. As a result, this means that no shared expectations have been created regarding the implementation of R2P. It should be mentioned that the creation of these shared expectations are lacking with regards to the use of force under Pillar III of R2P. As a result, R2P continues to find itself in the stage of norm cascade, which indicates that shared expectations remain open to be interpretation. Consequently, before R2P is able to develop into a global norm, it can still be weakened, strengthened and undermined in its normative trajectory. As a result, the development of the norm heavily depends on the actions of the relevant actors and the social context.

Besides the relevant liberal states of the West that have acted as norm promoters during R2P's initiation, the non-Western powers such as the BRICS are of increasing importance and, thus, play an increasing important role in R2P's normative trajectory. Especially in the last couple of years, the world is witnessing a rise of non-Western powers, resulting in non-Western powers increasing their say in the conduct of global governance, which includes the development of R2P. What is observed is that the perspectives of these non-Western powers, such as Russia, differ from the Western norms and values that have become more dominant since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, their increased say in global governance has led to the existence of more differences on matters, such as R2P. These differences, in turn, influence the social context in which R2P as a norm develops.

In these different existing perspectives, Russia is seen as a critical actor by being a strong protector of the notion of sovereignty during the implementation of R2P under Pillar III. Russia is regarded as an influential actor that has the capacity to influence R2P's normative consensus. Russia inhibits a permanent member position in the UNSC, and besides its position in the UNSC, Russia is regarded as a non-Western rising power that has increased its say in the conduct of global governance.

However, Russia's dedication to the principle of sovereignty and, therefore, different approach to R2P can be seen as undermining towards the future development of R2P. Nonetheless, R2P is to further progress in its normative trajectory, creating a better understanding of Russia's perspective of R2P is of relevance in order to overcome the existing differences on how R2P should be implemented under Pillar III. The aim of this work was to generate better understanding on Russia's stance towards the upcoming norm, and to more specifically assess whether Russia deliberately undermines R2P as norm.

This research provides interesting findings. Although critics accuse Russia of undermining R2P, the research conducted suggests that Russia is more positively engaging with the norm development of R2P than expected. An example in which Russia undermined R2P as a norm only occurred once in the case of Crimea, when Russia's actions in Crimea weakened the strength of the norm of R2P by deliberately and wrongly interpreting the norm. Before the case of Crimea, Russia's military intervention in Georgia had taken place in 2008. During this intervention, Russia acted upon its own interpretation of how its responsibility to protect should be implemented. However, Russia's interpretation was not aligned with how R2P should be conducted according to international law. Rather, Georgia is an example in which Russia attempted to localize the norm, as it acted upon its own interpretation of how their the Responsibility to Protect should be acted upon. In the case of Crimea 2014, Russia's again acted according to its own created guidelines of how the responsibility to protect *should* be implemented. This occurred despite the former clarification given in the case of Russia. Consequently, Russia's action in Crimea can be classified as undermining, as shared expectations on the rightful use of R2P were already given in Georgia. Rather than acting according to these expectations, Russia acted according to its own unjust interpretation of the responsibility to protect principle, thus, providing also an indication of Russia's attempt to localize the norm.

Russia's deliberate undermining of the norm of R2P in Crimea can be regarded as an attempt to deliver indirect critique to the former misuse by the norm promoters of the use of humanitarian grounds to justify a military mission for the fulfilment of political objectives, by conducting an illegitimate action by themselves that was in its own political interests. This mirroring of actions from the norm promoters can be regarded as a direct critique to the former misuse of humanitarian grounds to justify a military action by the United States. However, Russia's use of the norm does not mirror the essence of the R2P principle and,

therefore, it can be argued that Russia's use of R2P resulted in the weakening of R2P as a norm in its normative trajectory.

Other findings, however, indicated a more positive engagement between Russia and the development of the norm. Russia, for example, has attempted several times to implement R2P according to its own understanding, which is referred to as norm localization and can be concluded from the case of Georgia, Crimea and Syria. Russia's attempt to interpret R2P according to its own rules can be regarded by the norm promoters as hostile, as its understanding differs from the created shared expectations during the World Summit in 2005. However, as R2P currently finds itself in the stage of norm cascade, Russia's norm localization of the norm can also be regarded as an example of an active socialization process engaging with the norm. This indicates that Russia regards itself as a valuable actor that is able to actively influence the shared expectations of R2P.

Moreover, other observations of the findings indicate that Russia contested R2P in an applicatory sense in two of the four cases, namely Libya and Syria. It is important to note that the occurrence of applicatory contestation provides the opportunity for the norm to further strengthen, by adapting to the outspoken shared expectations of how the norm should be implemented. Therefore, these findings serve as another example in which Russia's engagement towards the upcoming norm is demonstrated. Russia's strong applicatory contestation of R2P demonstrates that Russia actively engages with the shaping of the shared expectations on how R2P should be implemented, while attempting to prevent the misuse of R2P through the undertaking of unilateral action by the United States. In other words, the findings indicate that throughout Russia's applicatory contestation Russia continuously attempts to influence the interpretation of the norm more according to its own expectations.

When taking into account the findings of this research in a broader sense, we can conclude that Russia's critical stance towards the use of R2P is directly related to its misuse by its former Cold War rival the United States, which seems to continue to use R2P in a unilateral sense without taking into account the emerging powers. Consequently, the findings demonstrate that Russia regards the unilateral execution of R2P by the US as outdated in the currently emerging multipolar world. In direct relation to the North-South, debate the findings indicate that there is more than meets the eye concerning the harsh dividing lines that separates the North from the South. Rather, it can be concluded that we currently find ourselves in an active socialization process in which global norms are being created through

the unification of different existing perspectives. This is also of direct relevance in an increasingly multipolar world. Consequently, this development emphasizes the increased importance of forging a consensus on which all parties agree on. To further contribute to this academic debate, it might be of interest to take a look at the other side, namely the United States and its attitude towards the implementation of R2P. In this case, the aim would be to further research to which extent the United States has demonstrated its flexibility towards the forging of a R2P consensus in a multipolar world.

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