Islamic Radicalization in Belgium and the Netherlands: A Comparison

MA Thesis International Relations

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Chapter 1:

1.1: Introduction

- **November 13th, 2015**: multiple attacks in Paris leave 130 people dead and numerous people wounded.[1]
- **March 21st, 2016**: an attack on Zaventem airport, Brussels, followed up by an attack on the metro results in 32 deaths and at least 200 wounded.[2]
- **December 19th, 2016**: a truck drives into a Christmas Market in Berlin, killing 12 people and wounding another 49.[3]
- **March 22nd, 2017**: 2 people are killed and a further 20 are wounded when a car collides with pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, London. The driver later stabbed an armed officer outside New Palace Yard.[4]
- **May 29, 2018**: An attack in Liège Belgium, takes the lives of 2 police officers and 1 civilian.[5]

These terror attacks are just a few cases in the wave of terrorism currently haunting Europe. The number of terrorism-related deaths in Europe in 2016 was the highest for the 12 preceding years, when the 2004 Madrid train bombing killed 191 people and injured approximately 1800.[6] Terrorism is by no means a recent phenomenon in Europe, and attacks have been deadlier and more devastating. During the 1970's, the number of terrorism-related deaths skyrocketed as groups pertaining to the "New Left" (such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and the Italian Red Brigades), as well as separatist movements (such as the IRA and ETA) carried out a number of terrorist attacks.[7]

[1] "Paris attacks: What happened on the night," *BBC News*, December 09, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994

[2] "Not again," *The Economist*, March 26, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21695566-after-top-fugitive-arrested-jihadists-strike-once-more-not-again.

[3] "Berlin lorry attack: What we know," *BBC News*, December 24, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38377428.

[4] Frank Kuin, "Een knal, een mes, dan schoten," *NRC*, June 1, 2018, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/03/22/een-knal-een-mes-dan-schoten-7516756-a1551498.

[5] "Man Schiet Twee Agenten En Burger Dood in Luik, Justitie Vermoedt Terreurdaad," *De Volkskrant*, May 29, 2018, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/man-schiet-twee-agenten-en-burger-dood-in-luik-justitie-vermoedt-terreurdaad~bb84dda9/.

[6] Will Chalk and Simon Maybin & Paul Brown, "Terror deaths in Western Europe at highest level since 2004 - BBC Newsbeat," *BBC News*, August 18, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/37085042/terror-deaths-in-western-europe-at-highest-level-since-2004.

[7] "Terrorist atrocities in western Europe," *The Economist*, March 23, 2017, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/terrorism-timeline.

The following graph demonstrates the existence of two different "waves" of terrorism.[8] This demarcation has been derived from Rapoport's "Four waves of modern terrorism."[9]



Rapoport's 'waves' of terrorism have been derived through an analysis of the frequency of historical terror attacks combined with an analysis of the characteristics of the attacks. It is essential to study acts of terrorism in the broader context of terrorism in order to understand what the impact of terrorism is on society, with the ultimate goal of achieving an understanding of the way factors in society subsequently impact terrorism.[10]

Rapoport labelled the wave during the second half of the 20th century as the third wave in his analysis, categorized as a movement countering western imperialism.[11] The American struggle in Vietnam against the surprisingly resilient Vietcong exposed the limit of western influence abroad,

[8] "People killed by terrorism per year in Western Europe 1970-2015." accessed June 2, 2018. http://www.datagraver.com/case/people-killed-by-terrorism-per-year-in-western-europe-1970-2015.
[9] David Rapoport, "Four waves of modern terrorism," in Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2004).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

while simultaneously creating and strengthening a feeling of disgust towards western imperialism. Both factors in turn empowered leftist and separatist movements all over the world.[12]

Europe is currently undergoing a "fourth wave" of terrorism, labelled by Rapoport as the "religious wave". Religion has always been important for terrorism, however, has proven to be more dominant in this wave than in the earlier ones. Historically, religious and ethnic identities combined have often created friction and conflict within society. The fourth wave is, however, the first wave wherein religion was not only grounds for conflict but proved to be important for the justification and organization of terrorism. Islam forms the core of this wave, as Islamic perpetrators have conducted the deadliest attacks, using religion to justify violence.[13]

[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.

1.2: Research puzzle & research question

The two major differences between the "Third Wave" and the current wave of terrorism are the targets chosen and the support enjoyed by terrorist organizations.[14] While the third wave was characterized by hostage-taking and the assassination of prominent figures, a potent aspect unique to the fourth wave is the use of suicide bombing. This method has been used extensively in Sri Lanka and in Israel, and has also been employed in a number of attacks in Europe.[15] Another difference, as described by Marc Sageman, concerns the sources of support for terrorist organization as he argued that "today, there is no longer a formal initiation into the movement, and there is no fixed number of individuals who are terrorists. Rather, there are a few full-time terrorists among a pool of people sympathetic to their ideology. The number available to carry out acts of terrorism fluctuates according to local grievances and the international situation."[16] Both Rapoport and Sageman described the characteristics of terrorism as they were present during the publication of their respective texts on the topic in 2004. Rapoport described this by labelling his last wave as "the current wave" and Sageman's timeframe is emphasized in the quote mentioned earlier (the text was published in 2004). These statements about the characteristics of terrorism can still be linked to the terrorist currently threatening Europe.

Sageman's analysis focused on the network of Al-Qaeda influencing radicalization,[17] this paper will argue that the radicalization process in the current wave has evolved compared to the earlier waves. Today, acts of terrorism – particularly in Europe - are organised in small cells, still under the auspices of religious fundamentalism, however, also coloured by the grievances of societal oppression and marginalization. It is therefore essential to understand what causes these grievances and how these grievances translate into radicalization in order to fully grasp the threat this wave poses to

[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Marc Sageman, "Killing the Hydra," *Los Angeles Times*, June 6, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/06/opinion/op-sageman6.
[17] Ibid.

European society. The importance of societal factors on the current wave of terrorism is also emphasized by terrorism expert Olivier Roy, whose argument is best summarized by Haaretz: "An estimated 60 percent of those who espouse violent jihadism in Europe are second-generation Muslims who have lost their connection with their country of origin and have failed to integrate into Western societies."[18] The last part of this quote, "… and have failed to integrate into Western societies," emphasizes the importance of understanding the impact of societal factors on the process of integration and radicalization. This quote therefore forms the basis of this study, as it assumes that radicalization and extremism is subject to societal factors rather than to external influences.

The threat posed by the radicalization of individuals is also described by the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), which regularly publishes analyses on the level of the threat of terrorism. As of 2018, the threat level is 'substantial.' Radicalized individuals in the Netherlands, returnees from Syria and Iraq and jihadists from other parts of Europe can potentially pose a threat to Dutch society.[19] This threat, as described by the NCTV[20], not only endangers the Netherlands, but multiple European countries, as proved by the various attacks that have been executed in Western Europe. Understanding and preventing radicalization should therefore be the core of any counter-terrorism program. In order to guide the analysis within this thesis, the following research question is proposed:

> *Why are individuals living in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards terrorism than others*?

It is remarkable that the Netherlands has never had to deal with a large-scale terrorist attack, comparable to attacks in France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. A recent report by Interpol states that Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom all remain high on the ISIS target

[18] Davide Lerner, "It's not Islam that drives young Europeans to jihad, France's top terrorism expert explains," *Haaretz*, June 09, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-1.791954?v=FBAED08735812BD2447429DD931B773A.
[19] "Over Het Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland," Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding En Veiligheid, November 17, 2017, https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ct/dtn/over_dtn/index.aspx.
[20] Ibid.

list[21]. The Netherlands, however, seems to be not as prone to terrorism as other Western European countries. Only one terrorist attack has been executed (on 31th of August 2018) since 2004, and the individual executing the attack was not a Dutch national,[22] which is in contrast to higher number of attacks that have been executed in, for example, Belgium[23] and France.[24] France, for example, has frequently fallen victim to terrorism. One explanation for the recurrent attacks in France is that it is the most active European country in Syria. The French foreign policy in Syria is aimed at the removal of Bashar al-Assad from power, and directly targets ISIS by launching numerous airstrikes in Syria, while neighbouring countries like Britain have focused on Iraq instead.[25] Additionally, France has drawn negative attention from religious fundamentalists for cultural reasons, being a "symbol of freedom, enlightenment, and democratic values."[26] However, reasons like these do not explain the severity of terrorism in France, as this phenomenon is mostly home-grown and not merely an attack from the outside, as mentioned earlier[27].

There is no alternative theory present that clarifies the difference in terms of terrorism between European countries. A single theory capable of explaining why certain countries are more prone to radicalism and terrorism than other countries is not present in the relevant literature. Multiple articles, however, argue that alienation from society is an important factor in the radicalization process. As already introduced in Olivier Roy's aforementioned observance, this thesis will extensively explore theories of radicalization to postulate a possible set of explanations for the

[21] "Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) Revisited," Europol, November 2016, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-islamic-state-revisite.
[22] Camil Driessen, "Waarom De Aanslag Op Amsterdam CS Tot Weinig Onrust Leidt," *NRC*, September 02, 2018, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/09/02/waarom-de-aanslag-op-amsterdam-cs-tot-weinig-onrust-leidt-a1615037.
[23] Anouk Van Kampen, "Gedode Verdachte Was Marokkaan Uit Molenbeek," *NRC*, June 21, 2017, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/06/22/gedode-verdachte-was-marokkaan-uit-molenbeek-11201562-a1563993.
[24] "Franse Terrorist Was Bekend Bij Autoriteiten," *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, March 24, 2018, https://www.rd.nl/vandaag/buitenland/franse-terrorist-was-bekend-bij-autoriteiten-1.1476276.
[25] "Why did ISIS target France?," OpenDemocracy, November 20, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/diego-muro/why-did-isis-target-france.
[26] Freddy Eytan, "Why Is France the Preferred Target for Terrorists?," Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs, July 19, 2016, http://jcpa.org/article/france-preferred-target-terrorists/.
[27] Iman Amrani, "France's terrorism is largely home grown – yet both Macron and Le Pen look away," *The Guardian*. April 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/25/france-terrorism-macron-le-pen.

recent terrorist attacks in Europe. Societal integration and/or alienation informs the hypothesis that national environment has a significant influence on the radicalization process. Understanding relevant aspects on the state-level could shed more light on national circumstances that provide a breeding ground for potential radicals. This is an essential aspect in understanding why some European Muslims turn against their homeland, and in answering how this can be prevented in the future**.** The answer to the research question will be provided by structuring this thesis around the following sub-questions:

1) What is the role of religion in terrorism/ radicalization?

2) How does the radicalization process evolve?

3) What is the impact of the national environment on the radicalization process?

1.3: Methodology

Both a literature review and a comparative case study are employed in this paper. Toshkov[28] describes two scenarios where a comparative research can be of use. The first scenario is when research starts with a theoretically motivated research question, and with the matching hypothesis. The theory and hypothesis are then tested by comparing the selected cases. In the second scenario, the researcher asks what can be learned given the available cases, and as such starts with the case rather than with the theory. This research is a combination of both scenarios. The research question asks "*why are individuals living in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards terrorism than others?".* This question is grounded in the significant differences between European countries, and as such asks the question "What can we learn from the differences between the cases?". The first part of this paper offers a conceptualization and a theoretical framework that provides the paper with a background for analysis. This is the part of the thesis where relevant literature will be used for answering the first two sub-questions, forming the literature review aspect of this thesis. The relevant literature on radicalization then directs the research towards the hypothesis that integration and alienation on the national environment impacts the radicalization process. This brings us to the last sub-question, which asks: *"What is the impact of the national environment on the radicalization process?".* This section tests the hypothesis by using various indicators from the radicalization model as described by Fathali Moghaddam. As such, this last section will sharpen the theories that are derived from the literature research conducted in the previous sections through the use of a comparative case study.

The comparative case study used for answering the last sub question will compare some aspects of the national environment of the Netherlands and Belgium that could be relevant for the radicalization process according to Moghaddam's analytical model. The Netherlands and Belgium are chosen as the cases for the research as these two cases are of best use for a most-similar cases

[28] Dimiter Toshkov, *Research Design in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

approach. The background and size of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and Belgium are appropriately comparable (7,1% in the Netherlands, 7,6% in Belgium).[29] Furthermore, the background of Muslims in Belgium and The Netherlands is similar, originally arriving as labor immigrants from Morocco and Turkey shortly after the end of the Second World War.[30] Also, dispersion across the country is comparable. The highest percentage of Muslims in these two countries can be seen in Brussels (26%), while the Muslim communities in Rotterdam (25%) and Amsterdam (24%) is almost as large[31].

On The other hand, the severity of radicalization and terrorism is significantly different in both countries. The number of foreign fighters that have joined ISIS is almost three times higher in Belgium than in the Netherlands.[32] The differences and similarities between the Netherlands and Belgium provides a comparison that provides better insights in the aspects relevant to the radicalization process. Further elaboration on the case selection will be described later in this research.

The indicators from Moghaddam's model on radicalization that are being used in the case comparison are measurable and comparable on the state-level (for example "*Educational achievements"* and "*Trust in the government")*. Information of this kind is often published by (inter)governmental institutions or academic / independent research organizations. The information derived from these sources will be the core of the comparison.

As previously mentioned, comparative case study analysis provides the opportunity to test existing hypotheses and / or sharpen theoretical ideas. A comparative case study can be used both inductively (open research aiming to achieve theoretical ideas) and deductively (testing of existing theories/ hypotheses). A comparative research is therefore a good method of executing explorative

[29] Conrad Hackett, "5 Facts about the Muslim Population in Europe," November 29, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/.
[30] Milica Petrovic, "Belgium: A Country of Permanent Immigration," Migration Policy Institute, November 15, 2012, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgium-country-permanent-immigration/.
[31] Soeren Kern, "The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013," Gatestone Institute, accessed August 31, 2018, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4129/islamization-belgium-netherlands.
[32] Louisa Loveluck, "Islamic State: Where do its fighters come from?," *The Telegraph*, June 08, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11660487/Islamic-State-one-year-on-Where-do-its-fighters-come-from.html.

research, as it broadens existing knowledge about a phenomenon while simultaneously laying out the groundwork for future generalizable research[33]. However, a comparative case study also has an important limitation. Selected cases are never identical, and it can therefore not be excluded that another variable than the ones taken into account has an effect on the differences between cases. This makes it practically impossible to reach conclusions on causal relations from case comparisons only.[34] It needs to be emphasized that the aim of this research is exploration, rather than with an eye of achieving a causal, generalizable relation between national circumstances and the radicalization process.

[33] Dimiter Toshkov, *Research Design in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
[34] Andrew Bennet, *Case Study: Methods and Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

1.5: Chapter outline

Radicalization, terrorism and other relevant concepts are often debated and used incorrectly. Clarification on these concepts is therefore an essential first step in this research. The clarification of relevant concepts is, in turn, an introduction to theories on radicalization and terrorism. This conceptualization and the literature review will then be used in answering the first two sub-questions. The first and second sub-questions are answered theoretically. The concepts and theories described in the second chapter build up towards the analysis in the fourth chapter that will provide the answer to the last sub question, the cases used in the analysis are described in the third chapter. The answers to the three sub questions will be connected in the conclusion in order to answer the overarching research question. The conclusion will additionally describe possibilities for future research based on the outcomes of this paper.

Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and theoretical framework

2.1: Conceptualization

The first part of this chapter describes the various concepts that are relevant in researching radicalization and terrorism. Clarification of the relevant concepts is an essential step in answering the research question: "*why are individuals living in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards terrorism than others*?*"*. This section will also use the relevant definitions and conceptualizations to describe the demarcation between religious and non-religious terrorism.

2.1.1. Politicization, polarization and radicalization

Nobody is a born radical, and religion alone does not explain why some people are inclined to commit religious violence. Radicalization is a process that needs to be understood and countered in order to prevent more attacks from occurring in Europe and beyond.[35] In the following section, the concept of radicalization and the relevant processes of politicization and polarization will be described. Stekelenburg and Klandermans define the concepts of politicization and polarization, before continuing their analysis to describe the concept of radicalization more specifically.[36] Both of these concepts are worth describing, as they demonstrate the processes that society as a whole is currently facing, those which are seen as the predecessors of radicalization. This is therefore an essential step in trying to understand how a specific group in society behaves (e.g. Islamic radicals or right-wing extremists). Politicization can be seen as the first step in the whole process of radicalization. This is when a group: "Intentionally engages, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly."[37] The definition sounds abstract, but

[35] J van Stekelenburg and P.G. Klandermans, "Radicalization" in *Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies. A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, ed. by Assaad Azzi, Xenia Chryssochoou, Bert Klandermans, Bernd Simon (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 181-194.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Stekelenburg, Van, J., and P.G. Klandermans. Radicalization. 2010. 1.

merely describes the process whereby a conflict starts influencing society more broadly, i.e. when a bipolar conflict forces the population as a whole to choose sides in a conflict that was initially of limited size. This process is a result of the politicization of various events, resulting in a change of the relation between a group and the rest of society. Stekelenburg and Klandermans use the example of Islamic migrants in Western Europe: before 9/11 these individuals were identified by others as Dutch Moroccans, French Algerians, German Turks, etc. However, after 9/11 all of these individuals were grouped under the same identity as 'Muslims.' [38]

Polarization is given as the next step after politicization. As different groups are formed based on political affiliation, polarization consequently exacerbates the conflict between these groups, creating a an "us" versus "them" dichotomy. This perception can induce a perspective of the outside group as a threat, ultimately reinforcing these sentiments of distrust to an extent that both parties continue to separate themselves from one another.[39]

Politicization also incites individuals into action who would otherwise have abstained from becoming involved in conflict. Polarization then causes the various groups to isolate themselves, which is an important factor in potentially driving people to commit radical political activities.[40] This particular aspect will be analysed in depth in the later sections of this thesis. Stekelenburg and Klandermans perceive radicalization as the process culminating from radical political activities, however, their analysis lacks a definition of "radical activities", a concept that requires clarification. Mark Sedgwich argues that the terms "radical", "radicalism" and "radicalization" are more complex than often perceived.[41] The relative meaning of the term "radical" is someone who is "representing or supporting an extreme section of a party", which is a synonym for an extremist and opposes moderates.[42] Standing in contrast with Stekelenburg and Klandermans, this approach defines radicalization as the process of

[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 481, doi:10.1080/09546553.2010.491009.
[42] Ibid.

moving anywhere within the whole spectrum, i.e. from being a moderate towards being a radical, and thus does not require a specific action or threshold. Stekelenburg and Klandermans' approach to radicalization is thus rather absolute, while Sedgwich describes it relatively. No academic consensus on this definition is thus present. Therefore, the definition provided by The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) will be used in this thesis, as this definition connects academic conceptualization with policy usage. The AIVD uses the following criteria as a threshold necessary to perceive a person as a radical: "The readiness, based upon ideals inspired by politics, ethnicity or religion, to develop activities which, by virtue of the ends being pursued and/or the means used, does (or may) pose a threat to national security, and in particular to the continuity of the domestic democratic legal order or the international rule of law, or could seriously hinder the functioning of either."[43] From this perspective, in order to be perceived as 'radical,' an individual needs to pose a threat either to society or to the essential institutions of society. Radicalization is the process preceding this kind of danger. The definition does not specify on the threshold necessary to be considered a radical or radicalized, but this is also subject to the radicalization model used in analysing this process. Which will be described later in this paper.

2.1.2. Religious fundamentalism, extremism, islamism & jihadism

The concepts of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are some concepts that are often used when describing Islamic radicalisation, but these terms are often used incorrectly. The root cause of the misuse of these concepts can be found in the socio-political context wherein these terms are frequently used. Misuse typically has negative implications on counter-terrorism efforts because it hinders logical analysis based on factual information. Clarification on these concepts is therefore essential for constructive research focussing on Islamic radicalization. The importance of the factual use of terms like these is emphasized by Edward Said: "fundamentalism equals Islam equals

[43] The Netherlands, General Intelligence and Security Service, The Radical Dawa in Transition: The Rise of Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands (The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2007), 59.

everything-we-must-now-fight-against."[44] This kind of oversimplification is a result of the misuse of important concepts by the media and the public, which leads to a variety of generalisations that in turn dominate any type of discussion about Islam. Emotion therefore needs to be taken out of these concepts in order to use the definitions factually and effectively in any type of analysis.[45] The following figure shows the relationship between these various concepts[46].



According to Winter and Hasan, Extremism is: "A rejection of 'balance', and an application of a single ideological perspective to all elements of an individual's life with, importantly, a fervent disdain for alternative ideological perspectives."[47] As the figure above exemplifies, this definition can thus be applied to any type of ideology. This aligns with Barry Rubin's three-part criteria in his definition of the movement towards radical (Islamic) fundamentalism:

[44] Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (London: Vintage Books, 2008), xx, xix.
[45] Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," *Philosophia* 44, no. 3 (2015): 669, doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," *Philosophia* 44, no. 3 (2015): 669, doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2.

1) Islam is the answer to the problems of their society, country and region.

2) Implementing Islam and resolving the huge problems of the peoples and states require the seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups ...

3) The only proper interpretation of Islam is the one offered by a specific political group and its leaders: "the only proper interpretation of Islam is the one offered by a specific political group and its leaders."[48]

The first criteria particularly matches with the definition of Extremism: "Islam is the answer to the problems of their society, country and region."[49] The third aspect, however, is a good example of the difference between extremism and fundamentalism. The third criteria is the essence of fundamentalism, as fundamentalism rejects any type of interpretation other than the literal Islamic texts, in which every contextual dimension of Islam is dismissed.[50] These two definitions seem to be contradictory, as Rubin's definition focusses on the interpretation by a specific group, while Winter and Hasan emphasize that fundamentalists interpret Islamic texts in the literal sense, without taking context into account. However, as Winter and Hasan contend, "religion lends itself to the progression from extremism to fundamentalism because, put simply, it is old, and this allows for anachronistic understandings of its scriptures' meanings"[51]. This leads to the fact that fundamentalists are often "among the narrowest and most ideologically guided interpreters,"[52] and creates a symbiotic relationship between Islamic extremism and fundamentalism.[53]

The next concept, Islamism, is even more contested than fundamentalism and extremism. Islamic fundamentalism is often referred to as Islamism. However, extremists and fundamentalists are

[48] Barry Rubin, "Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey & Balance Sheet," May, 1998, http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/1998/05/rubin.pdf.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," *Philosophia* 44, no. 3 (2015): 678, doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2.
[52] R. Scott Appleby and Martin E. Marty, "Fundamentalism," *Foreign Policy*, no. 128 (2002): 17, doi:10.2307/3183353.
[53] Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," *Philosophia* 44, no. 3 (2015), doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2.

apolitical, while Islamism is the over-politicization of Islamic fundamentalism. The misuse and clarification of this term is important because the perception of Islamism is often projected on Muslims, while in truth it is only a small part of the Muslim population that could be considered Islamist.

Winter and Hasan refer to over-politicization as "the expansion of the rejectionist traits and solipsistic superiority apparent in extremism and fundamentalism to the political sphere of governance[54]". This should be formulated and specified as such because a demarcation needs to be made between the politicization of Islam based on basic religious ideals and the politicization of fundamentalism based on the superiority of one specific interpretation of Islam.[55] The over-politicization of Islamic Fundamentalism is an Islamist belief that a political system based on Islam would help create a utopian Islamic state, the Islamic Caliphate, wherein Muslims will thrive again as they had done in the Islamic golden age.[56]

The second criteria of Rubin's definition - "Implementing Islam and resolving the huge problems of the peoples and states require the seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups" - aligns with the Islamist approach, as it attempts to solve societal problems by empowering 'radical' Islamic groups in the governance of the states. Islamism is thus significantly different than Islamic extremism or fundamentalism where literal interpretations of Islam are quietly and apolitically embedded in the community. Islamism, in turn, differs from Jihadism on the willingness to use violence in the pursue of this Islamic, utopian, society. Jihadism can subsequently be best summarized as "a violent expression of politics justified with a heavily manipulated and limited militant bibliography."[57]

[54] Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," *Philosophia* 44, no. 3 (2015): 678, doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] M. Zaidi, "A Taxonomy of Jihad," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 31 (2009): 30.

2.1.3. Terrorism

Before clarifying the specific characteristics of and motivations of religious terrorism and radicalization, terrorism in general needs to be defined. As there is no universal definition of terrorism, its definition is the subject of academic debate. For example, the statement that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"[58] assumes that terrorism can never be described objectively and consistently and is always subject to the perspective of the descriptor.[59]

Boaz Ganor opposes this view, and argues that it is not just possible to reach an objective, widely shared definition, but also argues that a definition of this kind is essential in the fight against terrorism[60]. Ganor postulates a definition of terrorism with this maxim in mind, defining terrorism as "the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims."[61] Ganor's definition largely overlaps with the results obtained from a study conducted by by Schmidt and Jongman. This analysis compared 109 definitions of terrorism and concluded that "*use of violence*" and "*political goals*" are the aspects most referred to in definitions. This indicates that these two aspects enjoy consensus in academia, while marginalizing other typical aspects, such as the targeting civilians. However, when all these aspects are compared with definitions being used by policy relevant institutes, none of these aspects are a requirement to label an attack as an act of terrorism, as, for example, the definition used by Europol shows: "Terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization when committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or

[58] Conor Friedersdorf, "Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?," *The Atlantic*, May 16, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/is-one-mans-terrorist-another-mans-freedom-fighter/257245/

[59] Ibid.

[60] Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism - Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?," *Police Practice an Research* 3, no. 4 (2002).

[61] Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism - Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?," *Police Practice an Research* 3, no. 4 (2002): 294.

social structures of a country or an international organization."[62] The basis of this definition is a UN agreement, sworn in on the 13th June 2002 in an attempt to combat terrorism. This Europol definition, as grounded in the UN agreement, differs from earlier stated aspects, as it focusses on the effect of the attack rather than on its means. This definition is also implemented in the national legislation of all EU Member States.[63] For example, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) uses the following definition in their National Counterterrorism Strategy: "The perpetration of ideologically inspired acts of violence against people or of acts intended to cause property damage and calculated to result in social disruption, in order to undermine and destabilize society, create a climate of fear among the general public or influence political decision-making."[64] This definition is relatively similar to the one provided by Europol, however emphasizes the need for an "*Ideologically inspired act of violence*". The definition by the NCTV thus covers the means as well as the effects of the attack, pertaining to both academically and governmentally agreed-upon definitions. Given this consensus - as well as the fact that The Netherlands is part of the analysis - makes this definition of terrorism the best match for the purposes of this paper.

[62] "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017," Europol, November 06, 2017, 52, accessed October 17, 2018, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017.
[63] Ibid.
[64] The Netherlands, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, *National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020* (The Hague: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016), 3.

2.2: Literature review

This section will describe the radicalization process theoretically and will explain why this research focusses on radicalization towards terrorism rather than on specific cases on terrorism, elaborating the model that is being used for the analysis. The concepts that are used in the analysis are important factors that can be derived from the radicalization model. Therefore, the model and the concepts will be linked in the last section of this chapter.

2.2.1 Causes, Ideologies and Action

Ideologies and Religions are not a cause of violence but are capable of mobilizing populations towards shared objectives, functioning as a justification for certain behaviours in this pursuit. Rapoport argues that "most of today's Islamic terrorists see religion as a means of achieving political, economic, social, and security objectives, rather than as an end in itself."[65] This argument is not limited to Islamic terrorism, as the characteristics of (Islamic) terrorists are not fixed, instead focused on hatred for the status quo. Rapoport emphasizes how difficult it is to distinguish religious terrorism from 'ordinary' terrorism,[66] and even argues that many Islamic fundamentalists were originally Marxists.[67] The hatred of these terrorists remains, but the way this hatred is organized varies, depending on the political events of the era. This makes religious ideologies - such as fundamentalist Islam - a vehicle for the mobilisation of hatred.

The difficulty in distinguishing religious terrorism from non-religious terrorism is confirmed by the apparent lack of consensus on the differences between them. For example, Do Ce'u Pinto argues that the distinguishing characteristic of religious violence is the individual's willingness to self-sacrifice in order to reach an objective.[68] On the other hand, Sageman focuses on the source of support for

[65] David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism a Case Study: Present," 2001, httpy/globalterrorism.com/secure/interviews/drap2.html. Wilson Center Press, 2008).
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Maria Do Ceu Pinto, "Some US Concerns regarding Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 3 (1999),doi:10.1080/09546559908427517.

terrorism, wherein religion could provide potential recruits, as described earlier.[69] Hoffman argues that it is the nature of violence that distinguishes religious terrorism from non-religious terrorism. According to Hoffman, religious terrorism causes more deaths than other forms of terrorism due to the use of indiscriminate violence.[70]

More consensus is, however, present on the role of religion in the recruitment of and radicalization towards terrorism. For example, Stewart Bell discusses the process of radicalization in his book *The Martyr's Oath: the Apprenticeship of a Home-Grown Terrorist*, describing how a young Muslim had been brainwashed into violent extremism through his connection with Islam.[71] Arie Kruglanski similarly identifies religion and nationalism as dominant motivating factors in an analysis of farewell videos and interviews with the relatives of terrorists killed in suicide bombings.[72] In *Terrorism in Perspective,* Sue Mahan and Pamela Griset discuss a variety of motivations for terrorism, citing "extreme opinions and emotions regarding a belief system as the principal motivating factor behind the current wave of terrorism."[73] Mahan and Griset's emphasis on *extreme* opinions and emotions highlights an important question: what it is that makes the Islamic religion the main motivator for contemporary terrorism? What is the cause for the diverse interpretation of the Islamic faith which for some manifests in a peaceful lifestyle, but for others incites violence?

Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, emphasizes that this is due to the lack of a central religious authority shaping Islam and guiding Muslims, like, for example, the Vatican guiding Catholic Christians. This leads to a fragmentation of ideas within Islam due to the highly interpretative nature of the teachings within Islamic texts, partially explaining how Islam can incite individuals to commit acts of violence. However, this does not explain why certain people convert to violent Islam and others do not. Oliver Roy argues that the main problem is not

[69] Marc Sageman, "Killing the Hydra," *Los Angeles Times*, June 06, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/06/opinion/op-sageman6
[70] Bruce Hoffman, "Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy," RAND Corporation, accessed August 7, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/rr-winter98-9/methods.html.
[71] Stewart Bell, *The Martyrs Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist* (Mississauga: J. Wiley & Sons, 2005).
[72] Neumann and Rogers (2009-10), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Lesson 6
73 Sue Mahan and Pamala L. Griset, *Terrorism in Perspective* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2013).

Islam, but radicalization in general. His argumentation can best be summarized by his following quote in Haaretz, shortly after the Manchester bombing on the 24th of May: "It's the Islamification of radicalism that we need to investigate, not the radicalization of Islam."[74] The underlying argument is that radicalization is not driven by Islam, but Islamic extremism just happens to be the current dominant expression of extremism. Roy compounds his postulation by arguing that, in the past, extremists would have been drawn to another form of extremism, for example, towards far-left ideologies.[75] However, this research focuses on the process of (Islamic) radicalization rather than on the Islamification of radicalism. The earlier mentioned contribution of Barry Rubin to the field has been an important factor for this decision, as Rubin provided a definition of the movement towards radical (Islamic) fundamentalism:

1) Islam is the answer to the problems of their society, country and region.
2) Implementing Islam and resolving the huge problems of the peoples and states require the seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups ...
3) The only proper interpretation of Islam is the one offered by a specific political group and its leaders.[76]

This contribution is especially interesting because "Islam" in this definition can be substituted by, for example, "communism" or "nationalism," and can as such be applied to any form of terrorism[77]. This argument is reflected in the argument of Thomas Badey: "Perceived political, economic, social, and security inequities or threats and the lack of an effective ventilation mechanism, rather than ideologies, create conditions that lead to international political violence."[78] It is therefore essential to study the root causes of (Islamic) radicalisation and to achieve insights in societal unrest, as these

[74] Davide Lerner, "It's not Islam that drives young Europeans to jihad, France's top terrorism expert explains," *Haaretz*, June 09, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-1.791954?v=FBAED08735812BD2447429DD931B773A.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Barry Rubin, "Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey & Balance Sheet," May, 1998, http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/1998/05/rubin.pdf.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Thomas J. Badey, "The Role of Religion in International Terrorism," *Sociological Focus* 35, no. 1 (2002): 85, doi:10.1080/00380237.2002.10571222.

insights could be beneficial in countering radicalization and thus terrorism, remaining useful when Islamic terrorism may no longer the dominant terrorist threat.

2.2.2. The radicalization process

There have been a variety of academic contributions which have attempted to construct a model for the process of radicalization, including some efforts trying to answer the question of how to counter this problem. An essential starting point in reviewing these contributions is the famous work by Martha Crenshaw, who postulates several theories to explain the cause of radicalization. Crenshaw argues that three different levels must be taken into account when trying to understand this phenomenon: the individual motivations of a terrorist; the strategy of the terrorist movement; and the broader societal context in which the terrorist operates.[79] The broader societal context forms the core of this research, as this is the level of research where national factors could be distinguished. Kundnani also emphasizes the necessity to shift focus to the societal context, arguing that most radicalization models have a parochial focus upon individual motives and on strategies within the terrorist organization, and as such neglect the broader societal context.[80] Kundnani argues that the current narrative focuses solely on the question why individual Muslims support extremist interpretations of Islam that leads to violence?[81] While important, as described earlier, this question only addresses part of the various causes of terrorism that are provided by Crenshaw. It is therefore necessary to shift focus from radicalization on the individual level towards a focus on the broader circumstances, the so-called "root causes in society," an important aspect of the causes of terrorism.[82] This perspective is shared by Mark Sedgwick, in his article *The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion*: "The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the ideology and the group, and significantly deemphasizes the wider circumstances – the "root causes" that it became so difficult to talk about after 9/11, and that are still often not brought into analyses. So long as the circumstances

[79] Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981), doi:10.2307/421717.
[80] Arun Kundnani, *A decade lost: rethinking radicalisation and extremism* (London: Claystone, 2015).
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.

that produce Islamist radicals' declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will often appear as a "rebel without a cause."[83] The 'root cause' of terrorism therefore can alternatively be explained not by the religious ideology of the terrorist, but by their (perceived) position within society. This negative self-perception of societal status has been described in academia as both a "perceived feeling of injustice"[84] and "relative deprivation,"[85] which incite feelings of discrimination, marginalization or injustice in the eyes of the individual. Consequently, these feelings lead to a disillusionment with society and provide a fertile breeding ground for radicalization[86].

A radicalization model that takes the social factors mentioned into account is *The Staircase to Terrorism,* as postulated by Fathali Moghaddam.[87] This model is initially derived from an individual's perceived feelings, but can also be related to the individuals' (perceived) position in society. Parts of this model will therefore be used in analyzing state-level circumstances. Moghaddam analogizes the process of radicalization evolves by using the example of a staircase. According to his levelled description of the radicalization process, any terrorist starts at ground floor, where the level of perceived injustice determines whether he or she moves further up into the staircase (continues the radicalization process), or stays at the ground floor (abstains from radicalization). Moghaddam describes 5 different floors of radicalization towards the use of terrorism, and every floor is

[83] Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 480, doi:10.1080/09546553.2010.491009.
[84] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005), doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.
[85] Caleb Odorfer, "Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States" United Nations Development Programme, July, 2015, 4. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Conflict%20Prevention/Discussion%20Paper-Root%20Causes%20of%20Radicalization.pdf
[86] Rogelio Alonso et al., "Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism," European Commission, April 25, 2006, http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf
[87] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005),doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.

characterized by a different psychological process.[88]. The following depiction will clarify this staircase metaphor[89].



This thesis contributes to existing literature as it connects the psychological processes as described by Moghaddam, to the societal context as described by Crenshaw and Kundnani. The indicators that can be derived from Moghaddams' model are based on the perceived feelings of the individual. These perceived feelings in combination with the necessary focus on social context raises the question of whether the indicators that affect the perceived feelings of the individual are applicable to the societal conditions when explaining why certain individuals in certain countries are more prone to radicalization than others. This study will expand on Moghaddams' model by connecting the position of the individual to the broader societal context wherein the individual becomes radicalized. This

[88] Ibid.
[89] Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 40, doi:10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2.

contribution is necessary as most theories and analytical models focus on the individual level, whereby the connection between the individual circumstances and social context is not elaborated upon.

Moghaddam describes the main motivator for a movement from ground floor to the first floor as one dominated by *"*perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation."[90] Frustration within society can grow when groups feel they are treated unfairly, or they are being threatened. Movement from ground floor to the first floor has increased considerably in recent decades, in part motivated by images of lavish democratic lifestyles that are being spread by mass and social media.[91] This has created higher expectations for large parts of society in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, expectations which are often not realized. Disappointment then leads to increasing frustration, leading to parts of the population subsequently taking matters into their own hands.[92] When a part of society reaches this point in the process then they have reached the first floor in the radicalization process. The part of society reaching this floor will try various options that could provide solutions for their feelings of unjust treatment. The critical factor on this floor is social mobility. The importance of this concept was already emphasized by Plato in *The Republic.* Plato warned that the collapse of society would occur if a "free circulation of individuals" was not present. This free circulation is present when talented civilians are offered the opportunity evolve their position in the social hierarchy, and correspondingly by the necessity of untalented individuals, who somehow have gained a high position in society, to lose status in the social hierarchy.[93] If people see no possibilities to improve their position in society then this makes them more likely to climb further up the staircase towards the second floor.

The second floor is subsequently characterized by more aggressive feelings of injustice, as frustration turns to anger. This state of mind facilitates the most important transformation in the radicalization process, which is a gradual movement towards the acceptance of the morality of terrorist organizations.

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[90] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 162, doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Desmond Lee, *Plato the Republic* (New York: Penguin Books, 1974).

The third floor is one stage in this gradual movement. This is when aggression turns into moral engagement as potential recruits are being committed to the morality of a terrorist organization. As Moghaddam contends, this level is where "potential terrorists find themselves engaged in the extremist morality of isolated, secretive organizations dedicated to changing the world by any means available to them."[94] From this moment the only steps left before becoming a terrorist is recruitment by an organization on the fourth floor, and the execution of an attack on the fifth floor.

This analysis will, however, only focus on the process that occurs before any (potential) radical reaches the third floor. The argument behind this focus is threefold. Firstly, executing a terrorist attack or joining a terrorist organization is not the first threshold necessary in order to be perceived as a radical. The mere perception of terrorism as a moral practice on the second floor makes individuals a potential threat for national security. This is also in line with the earlier definition of a radical, being someone opposing a moderate. Secondly, recruitment by a terrorist organization and preparing the attack are only limited barriers for being a deadly terrorist, as new kinds of terrorism can strike anywhere, anytime, and seemingly without a known origin. For example, a vehicle ramming attack, as demonstrated by the attack in Berlin on the 19th of December 2016, could be executed by any aggressor without much preparation or links to terrorist organizations.[95] Lastly, only the first two floors in the radicalization process address the root causes of terrorism. The factors that are relevant on the first two levels are part of social, comparable circumstances on the state level. The "ventilation mechanisms in society,"[96] as described earlier by Badey, are influential on the first and second floor, while the latter three floors only address individual aspects and the influence of terrorist organizations. National circumstances on these levels are less important, as at this point individuals have already distanced themselves from alternative solutions that could ease their perceived feelings of injustice.

[94] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 165, doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.
[95] Josh Halliday and Frances Perraudin, "What can be done to prevent Berlin-style attacks in modern cities?," *The Guardian*, December 20, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/20/what-can-be-done-to-prevent-berlin-style-attacks-in-modern-cities.
[96] Thomas J. Badey, "The Role of Religion in International Terrorism," *Sociological Focus* 35, no. 1 (2002): 85, doi:10.1080/00380237.2002.10571222.

Focusing on the first two floors of the radicalization process thus provides the opportunity to reach conclusions about the radicalization process that are applicable to social circumstances on the national level. Including the third, fourth and the fifth floor will only make a comparison on state level more complex as these floors focus too much on specific cases of terrorism. The factors relevant in moving up in the first two floors will thus be used as concepts in this analysis. The relation between the model and these concepts chosen will be described in the next section.

2.2.3. Indicators

As previously mentioned, "Feelings of injustice" are a critical factor in the movement from ground floor to the first floor. In his model of social inequality, Garry Runciman describes two concepts that can be distinguished regarding these feelings of injustice: *fraternal* deprivation and *egoistical* deprivation.[97] Egotistical deprivation occurs when an individual feels deprived within a group, whereas fraternal deprivation occurs when an individual, recognized externally as being part of a group, feels deprived because s/he is part of this group. The impact of fraternal deprivation on radicalization is especially high, in contrast with *egoistical* deprivation.[98] Therefore, whenever a society is politicized and polarized, the risk of the marginalized group becoming radicalized is elevated.[99] This argumentation leads to the first two concepts of analysis: *Islamophobia within society* and *Religious freedom.*

Personal mobilization is the essential factor in the second step in the radicalization process. If the individual has the ability to mobilize independently, then they are also more likely to develop terrorist independently, instead of being frustrated because they feel left behind. The perceived possibilities for mobilization are partly determined by, again, a feeling of discrimination. However, if the possibility is present to access proper education and/or subsequently access the job market on a level that matches the individual's talent, then individuals enjoy a sufficient level of social mobility. If

[97] Garry Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
[98] Ibid.
[99] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 162, doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.

this is not possible due to, for example, additional social barriers for Muslims, then this will have a negative impact on personal mobilization and could thus have a catalytic effect on the radicalization process. This bring us to the third concept of analysis: *Education & Labor*.

Another option that, when available, significantly decreases an individual's tendency to commit non-normative actions is trust in the government and the availability to participate in democracy. Tyler and Huo conceptualized this feeling of fairness as *procedural justice,* in their words, "how fair people see the decision-making process to be."[100] In an equal and just society, when an individual feels justly threated by the authorities, they would have the opportunity to influence decision making. If this is not the case, then the perception of institutional injustice will materialize, subsequently having an impact on their positive or negative participation in society.[101] The perception that individuals have of the authorities is therefore another important factor in the radicalization process. This factor provides us with the last two concepts that will be used in the analysis: *Trust in the government & Participation in decision making.*

2.2.4. Conclusion

This chapter elaborated various aspects of radicalization and terrorism that that have been the subject of recent academic debate. This led to a description of and a focus on the process of radicalization. The current literature often focuses on individual aspects, without necessarily linking these aspects to social context. This study aims to forge this link by relating this perception to the social context. The next chapters will elaborate the countries chosen for the comparison and will use the indicators derived from Moghaddam's analytical order in the case comparison.

[100] Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo, *Trust in the Law* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).
[101] Ibid.

Chapter 3: Comparison on variations within Europe

This chapter provides information on terrorist activity (the numbers of arrests, attacks, deaths & foreign fighters) in Europe. This chapter contributes to the overall analysis of this thesis, as it elaborates the differences between European countries regarding these phenomena and on (the background of) the Muslim population. The background of the Muslim population is important to consider for the case selection. This section aims to find cases that have significant differences on terrorist activity but are simultaneously comparable in other aspects. Finding cases that have a comparable Muslim population is therefore essential in constructing a case comparison analysis. This information leads to the clarification of the decision made for the cases mentioned earlier (the Netherlands and Belgium).

3.1. Terrorist offences in the EU

Terrorism offences in the European Union peaked after the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015. The number of deaths resulting from terrorism influenced by religious fundamentalism significantly increased from four deaths in 2014 to 150 deaths in 2015. The deaths caused by terrorist offences has declined since (62 deaths in 2017), however, terrorist activity has remained equal (arrests) or has increased (attacks), as the following figure illustrates.[102]

[102] "Terrorism in the EU: Terror Attacks, Deaths and Arrests ," July 25, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20180703STO07125/terrorism-in-the-eu-terror-attacks-deaths-and-arrests.



The explanation behind the paradox of the rising number of attacks despite a declining number of deaths is twofold. The attacks in 2017 were often less sophisticated compared to those in 2015 and 2016, and police and intelligence units are now better prepared than they were when terrorist offences had just seen a significant increase.[103] However, the rising number of attacks and the stable number of arrests emphasizes that the root causes of terrorism have not yet been tackled. The number of arrests and attacks per country also shows the significant variation between different countries, as the following figure shows.[104]

[103] Ibid.
[104] "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2018," Europol, September 07, 2018, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.

The figure above clearly shows that France and in the UK have experienced a higher level of terrorism-related arrests compared to arrests in the rest of the European Union. However, these numbers need to put into context before (radicalization towards) terrorism between European countries can be compared, as multiple factors affect these numbers. When an individual has reached the end of the radicalization process, they find themselves in one of three outcomes: the individual gets arrested; the individual executes an attack; or the individual leaves Europe to fight elsewhere. The differences between European countries on the last option is illustrated in the next figure.[105]

[105] Aamna Mohdin, "Foreign Fighters from Western Europe Now in Syria and Iraq," Atlas, November 16, 2015, https://www.theatlas.com/charts/Nka5HZQXg.



The different statistics show significant variations between European countries. This is, however, not enough information to draw comparisons between countries, as variations between countries are impacted by the efficiency of respective law enforcement agencies,[106] the percentage (of the total population), and the background of the Muslim population. Therefore, the profiles of western European countries with a significant number of Muslims living within their borders will be analysed in the following section.

3.2. Islam in Europe

I will describe the size and the background of the Muslim population of Western European countries that have a significant Muslim population[107]. The highest category from the following figure will form the selection for this description, in a first attempt to limit differences between countries on the Islamic population, the threshold will therefore be 6% of the total population. The background of the Muslim population of the following countries will therefore be described briefly: Sweden, UK, Netherlands,

[106] "Trends in Extremist Violence and Terrorism in Europe through End-2016," CSIS, September 26, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/trends-extremist-violence-and-terrorism-europe-through-end-2016.
[107] "Muslim Population Growth in Europe," Pew Research Center, January 10, 2018, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/.

Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France. Bulgaria is excluded from this comparison as it cannot be considered a Western European country, and has a significantly higher percentage of Muslims than other countries, which would complexify a case comparison with other countries described in this section. The figure below[108] is a measurement from 2016, taken during the refugee crisis when Western European countries witnessed an influx of Islamic immigrants and asylum seekers. The factual size of the Muslim population would therefore be bigger than the numbers presented.



Estimated size of Muslim population in 2016

REGION	25,770,000	% of population that is Muslim 4.9%
France	5,720,000	8.8
Germany	4,950,000	6.1
United Kingdom	4,130,000	6.3
Italy	2,870,000	4.8
Netherlands	1,210,000	7.1
Spain	1,180,000	2.6

Note: Europe is defined here as the 28 nations of the EU plus Norway and Switzerland. "Estimated size of Muslim population in 2016" column lists only countries with at least 1 million Muslims. Estimates do not include those asylum seekers who are not expected to gain legal status to remain in Europe, including roughly 320,000 Muslims in Germany and 140,000 Muslims in France.
Source: Pew Research Center estimates. See Methodology for details.
"Europe's Growing Muslim Population"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

[108] Ibid.

3.2.1. Sweden

In 2007, Sweden had an estimated Muslim population of 250,000 to 350,000 (respectively 1,8% to 4,4% of the total population). The research above estimates the percentage of Muslims in 2016 as 8,1% of the total population in Sweden. The Islamic population thus has sharply increased in the past decade.

The most common country of origin for Swedish Muslims is Turkey. The Turkish population constitutes 10% of the Swedish Muslim population and enjoys the most political influence in the group. The second largest group is comprised of Iranian Muslims, followed by Iraqis (mostly Kurds) and Lebanese. The remaining groups are of various origins, including Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Palestine.[109] The statistics have been derived from research conducted in 2007. Sweden has seen two big waves of migrants in the 21th century, one wave from 2004-2012 and another refugee influx that has been ongoing since 2015. Syrian and Afghan migrants made up the largest share in these influxes.[110]

3.2.2. The United Kingdom

The majority of the Islamic population in the UK are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, while other large groups are of East African origin, mostly from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Large-scale migration to the UK from these countries can be attributed to decolonization and labour shortages in the post-World War II era.[111] Multiple smaller groups of migrants arrived in the UK in the second half of the 20th century, mostly as refugees and asylum seekers.[112] The origins of the Muslim population per country is illustrated in the following figure.[113]

[109] "Islam in Sweden," Euro-Islam.info, accessed October 17, 2018, http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/sweden/.
[110] "Sweden and Migration," Sweden.se, accessed October 03, 2018, https://sweden.se/migration/#2015.
[111] Jawad Iqbal, "The Diverse Origins of Britain's Muslims," *BBC News*, January 18, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33715473
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.



3.2.3. The Netherlands and Belgium

The Netherlands and Belgium have, as mentioned, a relatively similar Muslim population. The background (labor immigrants from Morocco and Turkey, coming to both Belgium and the Netherlands shortly after the Second World War) and size (7,1% in the Netherlands, 7,6% in Belgium) of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and Belgium are also comparable.[114][115] Also, dispersion across the country is comparable. The highest percentage of Muslims in these two countries can be seen in Brussels (26%), while the Muslim communities in Rotterdam (25%) and Amsterdam (24%) are comparatively almost as large.[116]

[114] Conrad Hackett, "5 Facts about the Muslim Population in Europe," Pew Research, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/.
[115] Milica Petrovic, "Belgium: A Country of Permanent Immigration," Migration Policy Institute, November 15, 2012, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgium-country-permanent-immigration/.
[116] Soeren Kern, "The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013," Gatestone Institute, accessed August 31, 2018, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4129/islamization-belgium-netherlands.

3.2.4. Germany

Germany has the second-largest Muslim population in Western Europe behind France. Turkish guest workers arrived in the 1950's and 60's, causing a major influx of Muslims in the 20th century.[117] German Muslims are predominantly of Turkish origin, as the following figure illustrates.[118] Germany also experienced a major influx of Muslims during the refugee crisis, with large numbers of Syrian refugees enlarging the factual share of Muslims with Middle Eastern origins.[119]



3.2.5. Austria

The biggest Muslim group in Austria is of Turkish origin, followed groups of Muslim of Bosnian origins and multiple smaller groups from other Eastern European countries and Middle-Eastern countries. A

[117] "5 Things Everyone Should Know about Immigration and Islam in Germany after the Events in Cologne," Open Migration, March 06, 2016, https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-everyone-should-know-about-immigration-and-islam-in-germany-after-the-events-in-cologne/.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.

big influx of Muslims arrived as “guest workers” after 1964, while another big wave arrived in the 1990s originating from Yugoslavia.[120] The current refugee crisis has also contributed to the increasing Muslim population in Austria.[121] The Muslim population has additionally sharply risen in the last decades as a result of the willingness of Muslims to speak publicly about their religion has grown significantly, especially for Turkish Muslims.[122]

3.2.6. Switzerland

The Islamic population in Switzerland stands in contrast with the Muslim population of most other European countries. Swiss Muslims are primarily from other European countries, mostly from Eastern European countries. The biggest influx began in the 1960s and has continued up until today, attributed to the large number of politically-driven asylum seekers. The Muslim population has grown steadily and consistently since the 1960’s.[123]

3.2.7. France

A lack of consensus exists on the exact size of the Islamic population in France, but different sources confirm that France has the biggest Islamic population of all Western European countries.[124][125] The biggest influx of migrants arrived in France after WWII. The post-war European economic boom created demand for labour migrants, while this period in history coincided with the decolonization of the French colonies in Northern Africa, making Muslims with origins from Northern Africa the biggest group of French Muslims. The biggest subgroup are the Muslims from Algerian origins, followed by

[120] " Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ)," Anna Lindh Foundation, accessed on October 17, 2018, http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/members/islamic-religious-authority-austria-islamische-glaubensgemeinschaft-osterreich-iggio.
[121] Ibid
[122] "Islam in Austria," Euro-Islam.info, accessed October 17, 2018, http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/austria/.
[123] Savannah D. Dodd, "The Structure of Islam in Switzerland and the Effects of the Swiss Minaret Ban," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2015), doi:10.1080/13602004.2015.1007665.
[124] "Muslim Population Growth in Europe," Pew Research, January 10, 2018, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/.
[125] Soeren Kern, "The Islamization of France in 2016," Gatestone Institute, accessed October 9, 2018, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9791/france-islamization.

Muslims from Moroccan and Algerian origins.[126] Furthermore, the increased Muslim population in France can also be attributed to other waves of migration, to the refugee crisis and to the natural growth of the endogenous Islamic population.[127]

3.3. Conclusion

This section has shown differences in the amount of terrorist activities and on the background of the Islamic population between various European countries. Comparisons have been drawn between countries to enable further analysis on radicalization in a case comparison. The country profiles have shown significant variations between countries on the size and the background of the Muslim population. The only countries that have a comparable Islamic populations are the Netherlands and Belgium, however, these two countries vary significantly in terms of terrorist activity. The amount of foreign fighters coming to Belgium is more than triple the amount in the Netherlands. 35 arrests and 0 attacks have taken place in the Netherlands compared to 50 arrests and 2 attacks in Belgium (in 2017, with a total population of 17,1 million inhabitants in the Netherlands and 11,3 million in Belgium).[128] These differences and similarities make the Netherlands and Belgium the best fit for the case comparison in the next chapter.

[126] Jonathan Laurence, "Islam in France," Brookings, July 28, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/islam-in-france/.
[127] Burrows-Taylor, Evie. "How France's Muslim Population Will Grow in the Future." The Local France, December 1, 2017, https://www.thelocal.fr/20171201/how-frances-muslim-population-will-grow-in-the-future.
[128] "Total population of the EU member states in 2017 and 2050," Statista, accessed October 10, 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/253383/total-population-of-the-eu-member-states-by-country/.

Chapter 4: Analysis

4.2.1. Religious freedom

The right for anybody to practice their religion of choice is a fundamental right in the constitution of both the Netherlands[129] and Belgium.[130] The question is, however, how this right is actively promoted by the government. A success or failure in defending this right is essential for an individual's perceived threat to his/her identity, as this could incite feelings of inequality, which, as mentioned earlier, is an essential factor in the radicalization process. The first factor that will be used to measure the degree to which the Islamic religion is accepted and supported by these governments is the provision of funding to religious groups. When funding more easily available to, for example, Christian institutions than it is for Islamic institutions, this could easily be perceived as unjust for the Islamic population. This is therefore a good indicator for analyzing the acceptance of Islam within society. A second indicator is the restriction of the Burka or Hijab. Restrictions on religious symbols could be perceived as a limiting factor of religious freedom, which in turn can be perceived as an unjust and offensive treatment for the Islamic population.

4.2.1.1. Government Funding

The Belgian government supports religious freedom by funding religious institutions, including Mosques. Government funding for all religions supports the notion of equality in society. In order to receive funding, individual Mosques need to be recognized, which is not always the case.[131] Approximately 328 mosques exist in Belgium and only 73 receive government funding.[132] The reason

[129] "Artikel 6: Vrijheid Van Godsdienst En Levensovertuiging," De Nederlandse Grondwet, accessed October 17, 2018, https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvkl1oucfq6v2/vgrnbhimm5zv.https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvkl1oucfq6v2/vgrnbhimm5zv.

[130] Maarten Boudry, "Schaf Godsdienstvrijheid Af, Als De Vrijheid Je Lief Is," *Trouw*, February 24, 2018, https://www.trouw.nl/religie-en-filosofie/schaf-godsdienstvrijheid-af-als-de-vrijheid-je-lief-is~a67c9c74/.

[131] Jocelyne Cesari, Nadia Fadil, Farid El Asri and Sarah Bracke, *Belgium*, *the Oxford Handbook of European Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

[132] "Islam in Belgium," Euro-Islam.info, accessed October 17, 2018, http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/belgium/.

for this is two-fold: (1) receiving governmental subsidies is a long and bureaucratic process; and (2) this process is subject to strict regulations. The complexity of attracting funding for Islamic institutions is exemplified in the Belgian region of Flanders, where Protestant Christian institutions get more funding than Islamic institutions, despite there being three times more Muslims than Protestants in the region.[133] Various requirements for all mosques in Flanders exist, for example: the use of the Dutch language, the obligation to welcome both homosexuals and women and abstain from preaching extremism[134].

The Netherlands, on the other hand, has a much more simplified system for requesting government funding. Requesting funding for religious practice generally occurs without much difficulty, as long as the religion is officially recognized, which is the case for Islam.[135] No information about the exact amount of mosques receiving funding is currently available, however, only 13% of Dutch municipalities have specific rules for this type of funding.[136] One Dutch newspaper even argues that the current policy leans toward a notion of *'don't ask, don't tell,'* i.e. government organs are reluctant to investigate practices in mosques for fear of raising conflict over sensitive subjects.[137]

4.2.1.2. Restrictions on the hijab/ burka

Restrictions on using both the hijab and the burka have caused commotion both in the Netherlands and in Belgium. In 2010, Belgium was the first European country to ban the burka in public spaces in 2010.[138] The Netherlands adapted similar legislation in 2016, partly caused by the then relatively

[133] Hannes Cattebeke, "Zoveel subsidies krijgen katholieke kerk en islam in ons land," *Gazet van Antwerpen*, August 10, 2016, http://www.gva.be/cnt/dmf20160810_02419231/zoveel-subsidies-krijgen-kerk-en-islam-in-ons-land.
[134] "Islam in Belgium," Euro-Islam.info, accessed October 17, 2018, http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/belgium/.
[135] "Islam in the Netherlands," Euro-Islam.info, accessed October 17, 2018, http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/the-netherlands.
[136] Ibid.
[137] [137] Robbert Van Lanschot, "Wie durft de moskee aan te pakken?," *NRC*, August, 22, 2015, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/08/22/wie-durft-de-moskee-aan-te-pakken-1524734-a466147.
[138] Ssimons, "België eerste Europese land dat boerka verbiedt," *Het Belang van Limburg*, April 29, 2010, http://www.hbvl.be/cnt/aid924116/belgie-eerste-europese-land-dat-boerka-verbiedt.

powerful position of far-right politician Geert Wilders.[139] Wearing the hijab is not restricted by national law, but the European Court of Justice determined in 2016 that it is allowed to prohibit wearing a hijab when neutrality is necessary for someone's functioning, for example if the individual was a member of the police force.[140] It has been argued that laws prohibiting wearing a burka or hijab would undermine the fundamental right to the freedom to practice religion.[141] However, no differences on the influence of the laws exist between the Netherlands and Belgium, and therefore no differences in the impact on Muslims is derived from this restriction. This is an important notion nonetheless, as national and European legislation on the burka has generated anger within Islamic populations[142]. It is therefore important to underscore what the approach of both countries is, despite a lack of ostensible differences.

4.2.2: Islamophobia in society

When the fear or hatred of Islam is deeply rooted in society, the chances of individuals becoming radicalized increase. Feels of discrimination can polarize the in- and out-group, which in turn further alienates Muslims from society. When people of a specific religion feel deprived as a group, either because of social exclusion or by economic disadvantages, they may lean further toward radicalization.[143] In this section, the social as well as the economic position of Muslims will be compared as these two aspects are closely interconnected.[144] The European Commission regularly publishes a report about discrimination in the EU. The most recent report was published 2015, and analyzed both the experienced levels of discrimination and public opinion towards different groups.

[139] "Daar is het boerkaverbod weer," *NRC*, 26 May, 2015, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/05/26/daar-is-het-boerkaverbod-weer-1498207-a81061.
[140] "EU Workplace Headscarf Ban 'can Be Legal', Says ECJ," *BBC News*, March 14, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39264845.
[141] "Korpschef Welten: Boerkaverbod zal ik niet handhaven," Joop, January 05, 2011, https://joop.vara.nl/nieuws/korpschef-welten-boerkaverbod-zal-ik-niet-handhaven.
[142] "Boosheid Om Verbod Op Boerka's: 'Dit Is Een Aanslag Op Islamitisch Grondrecht", *AT5*, June 27, 2018, https://www.at5.nl/artikelen/183662/boosheid-om-verbod-op-boerkas-dit-is-een-aanslag-op-islamitisch-grondrecht.
[143] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 162, doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.
[144] Ibid.

The analysis on experienced levels of discriminations does, unfortunately, not specify the experiences of discrimination per group or religion, but only perceived feelings of religious or ethnic discrimination in general. In both the Netherlands and Belgium, 3% of the population feel they have been victim to discrimination on religious grounds.[145] The Netherlands scored better than Belgium in terms of discrimination based on ethnic grounds, as 2% felt discriminated on ethnic grounds in the former and 4% in the latter.[146] However, the differences become clearer when comparing personal attitudes towards specific groups. In a survey, two questions were asked regarding religious prejudice: firstly, participants were asked how comfortable they would feel if one of their children was in a loving relationship with either a Christian, Atheist, Jew, Buddhist or Muslim. While 47% of the Belgian respondents answered they would be comfortable or indifferent to their child being in a relationship with a Muslim, the average score for the other four groups was 75%. The Netherlands scored better on this question, with 57% of the respondents being comfortable with or indifferent about this situation with a Muslim. The average score on this same question regarding the other groups in the Netherlands was 83% feeling comfortable or indifferent. Comfort rates towards Muslims thus scored 28% lower in Belgium and 26% lower in the Netherlands than the average for the other groups. The gap between comfort rates regarding Muslim groups when compared with other groups is important, as it indicates general attitudes towards these groups in relation to other religions.

The second question yielded similar results. This question asked if respondents were comfortable working in a professional capacity with a Jew, Muslim, Buddhist or Christian. 69% of Belgian and 85% of Dutch respondents reported that they would be 'comfortable' or 'indifferent' working alongside a Muslim, while an average of 86.75% in Belgium and 93.5% in the Netherlands responded similarly with regard to the other groups. The difference between comfort rates in Belgium is twice as large as that of the Netherlands, standing at 17.75% and 8.5% respectively, suggesting that

[145] "Discrimination in the EU in 2015", European Commission, accessed August 31, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2077
[146] Ibid.

the attitudes towards Muslims are worse in Belgium than in the Netherlands.[147] This begs the question: can these negative attitudes towards Muslims be interpreted to demonstrate that Muslims on average are marginalized in society? To answer this, the differences between educational and economic achievements of Muslims in the Netherlands and Belgium will be discussed in the next section.

4.2.3: Labor & Education

If an individual feels discriminated in the job market, or feels limited in his or her capabilities to move up the societal hierarchy because s/he is part of a certain group, then this will most likely fuel feelings of injustice, which is an essential factor in Moghaddam's model for potential radicalization.[148] Additionally, a failure to participate in the job market or restrictions on education will affect the economic position of certain groups in society, which will also directly affect a person's social mobility. The possibilities increasing and the barriers limiting social mobility will be analysed and compared in this section. This will be done through the use of two indicators: Labor market participation and educational achievements.

4.2.3.1. Labor market participation

A comparison on levels of (un)employment comes with multiple complications, most importantly regarding the concepts used in the comparison, as government institutions almost only analyze the position of migrants, not Muslims. For example, the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) uses the term migrant in all their analyses about employment and education. They define a migrant as someone who is born abroad (first-generation migrant) or has at least one parent born abroad (second-generation migrant). A Muslim with both parents born in the Netherlands is thus not included in these statistics, and no statistics are available regarding the employment of Muslims in general. Additionally, being a migrant does not provide any information regarding the duration an individual has been living in the Netherlands, nor about his/her quality of immigration. Therefore, high unemployment among

[147] Ibid.
[148] Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005), doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161.

migrants can be caused by myriad factors, for example, not being able to speak the local language. This complicates the relationship between the (un)employment of Muslims and the presence of prejudices or discrimination against Muslims.[149]

What would be edifying in this case would be to compare statistics revealing levels of tolerance of foreigners in the Netherlands and Belgium. If the gap between migrants and non-migrants is much bigger in one of the two countries, then this could indicate that more problems exist regarding the integration process in one of these countries than the other.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regularly publishes data on unemployment rates on native- and foreign-born residents. This provides a good comparison between the Netherlands and Belgium as the same definition (persons ages 15-64, searching for a job and taking active steps to find a job) is used for both countries.[150] However, only first-generation migrants are taken into account and the unemployment rate does not distinguish between various groups of migrants, presenting a limitation which should be taken into account when formulating conclusions based on the data provided.

Netherlands scores better in this comparison as both absolute unemployment rates and on the relative position of foreigners. The Netherlands has a 4.3% and 8.9% unemployment rate respectively for natives[151] and foreigners,[152] which makes the unemployment rates among foreigners 5.8% higher. Belgium has a comparable unemployment rate for natives standing at 5.7%[153], however scores much higher on unemployment for foreigners, which stands at 13.4%.[154] This makes the gap

[149] "Begrippen," CBS, June 27, 2016, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/onze-diensten/methoden/begrippen#id=allochtoon.
[150] "Migration - Foreign-born Unemployment - OECD Data," OECD, accessed September 3, 2018, https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-unemployment.htm#indicator-chart.
151 151 "Migration - Native-born Unemployment - OECD Data," OECD, accessed September 03, 2018. https://data.oecd.org/migration/native-born-unemployment.htm#indicator-chart.
[152] "Migration - Foreign-born Unemployment - OECD Data," OECD, accessed September 3, 2018, https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-unemployment.htm#indicator-chart.
[153]153 "Migration - Native-born Unemployment - OECD Data," OECD, accessed September 03, 2018. https://data.oecd.org/migration/native-born-unemployment.htm#indicator-chart.
[154] "Migration - Foreign-born Unemployment - OECD Data," OECD, accessed September 3, 2018, https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-unemployment.htm#indicator-chart.

between natives and foreigners 7.7%, which is significantly higher than the percentual gap in the Netherlands (4.6%).

There are no detailed statistics available on unemployment, for example, statistics demonstrating why certain people fail to find a job, or on the severity of discrimination on the job market. But the statistics of unemployment among migrants does prove that discrimination happens in both countries, and also emphasizes that there are significant differences between the job market in Netherlands and in Belgium. As said, these statistics only describe the situation of foreign-born immigrants. It is therefore worth analyzing if similar differences between the Netherlands and Belgium exist regarding educational achievement, as this could influence current and future unemployment rates.

4.2.3.2. Educational achievements

The proportion of Muslims per level of education differs significantly between the Netherlands and Belgium, as shown in tables below.[155][156] When using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), , the percentage of individuals holding a certificate of higher education in the Netherlands is higher among the Muslim population (31%) than the non-Muslim population (20%).[157] A high level of education in this classification can be perceived as academic or vocational tertiary education or via the completion of an advanced research program. Medium education is equivalent to upper-secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education. Any type of education less than upper secondary education is categorized as a low educational level.[158]

In Belgium, the percentage of Muslims with higher education qualifications is almost half that of the non-Muslim population (23% non-Muslims achieving high education, compared to 12% of

[155] "Islam in the Netherlands," Euro-Islam.info, Accessed October 17, 2018. http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/the-netherlands.
[156] Sarah Teich, "Islamic Radicalization In Belgium," ICT, March 1, 2016, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1595/Islamic-Radicalization-In-Belgium#gsc.tab=.
[157] "Islam in the Netherlands," Euro-Islam.info, Accessed October 17, 2018. http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/the-netherlands.
[158] Sarah Teich, "Islamic Radicalization In Belgium," March 1, 2016, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1595/Islamic-Radicalization-In-Belgium#gsc.tab=.

Muslims).[159] The proportion of Muslims achieving only lower level education is also higher in Belgium, with 65% compared to 50% in the Netherlands. The differences between the Netherlands and Belgium are thus significant, suggesting that Belgian Muslims enjoy a higher educational position than Muslims in the Netherlands. However, it has to be noted that these statistics are derived from an analysis performed in 2005. This is important nonetheless, as the job perspective of the generation of 2005 could still be of impact to the current position of Muslims in society.

The Netherlands	High	Medium	Low
Muslim	31%	19%	50%
Non-Muslim	20%	40%	41%
Indeterminate	33%	27%	41%

Belgium	High	Medium	Low
Muslim	12%	23%	65%
Non-Muslim	23%	30%	47%
Indeterminate	43%	31%	26%

While there is a lack of contemporary research comparing these statistics, research conducted by the OECD in 2015 suggests that having a migrant background in Belgian society had a considerable impact on educational achievements. This is emphasized in *Education and Training Monitor 2017.* The country profile on Belgium, published by the European Commission, argued that the "low performance of pupils with a migrant background is a concern.[160]" This argument is derived from the PISA research analysed in 2015. This research concluded that despite the fact that the position of immigrant students in Belgium improving since 2006, it does not yet equal the OECD average.[161] The same indicator derived

[159] Ibid.
[160] "Education and Training Monitor 2017 Belgium," European Commission, September 15, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/education/sites/education/files/monitor2017-be_en.pdf.
[161] "Compare Your Country - PISA 2015 Belgium," OECD, accessed September 03, 2018. http://www.compareyourcountry.org/pisa/country/bel?lg=en.

from the same research analysed that the position of immigrant students in the Netherlands equals the OECD average, but has been stable since 2006.[162] It can therefore be concluded that Belgian migrants, and Muslims more specifically, often fail to achieve the same level of education as non-migrants/ non-Muslims. The position of Muslims as measured by this indicator is worse in Belgium than it is in the Netherlands. This could fuel feelings of injustice and could thus catalyse radicalization.

4.2.4: Procedural justice.

The last concept in this comparison is *Procedural Justice,* which describes "how fair people see the decision-making process to be."[163] If people perceive the decision making to be unfair, then could frustration and radicalization can be fueled. However, simultaneously, this same factor can also be a ventilation mechanism preventing further escalation. If people feel unfairly positioned in society, however simultaneously have trust in the government and/ or have the possibility to influence it, then this will have a positive impact, as it keeps options other than further radicalization open. This concept will thus be analyzed by the indicators 'trust in the government' and 'possibilities for participation in decision making.'

4.2.4.1: Trust in the government

The information available regarding public trust in political institutions among the Islamic population in the Netherlands and in Belgium is limited.

CBS reports that Muslims in the Netherlands have the most trust in the judges (74%) but often distrust the police (62% distrust) and the army (53% distrust). The trust in the parliament falls somewhere in between, 40% of the Dutch Muslims say to trust the Dutch parliament.[164] No statistics are available regarding the levels of trust of Muslims in Belgium have of governmental institutions. The only available source describes the trust of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians from Brussels and Antwerp

[162] "Compare Your Country - PISA 2015. Netherlands," OECD, accessed September 03, 2018, http://www.compareyourcountry.org/pisa/country/nld?lg=en.
[163] Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo, *Trust in the Law* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).
[164] Judit Arends and Hans Schmeets. "Sociaal en institutioneel vertrouwen in Nederland," CBS, January 2015, https://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/D412FF72-0AD7-40B3-AE78-

in the Government and in Parliament.[165] According to these statistics, 34% of the Turkish Belgians and 44% of the Moroccan Belgians have little or no trust in the parliament.[166] Additionally, 37% of the Turkish Belgians and 42% of the Moroccan Belgians have little or no trust the government.[167]

A relatively similar report from Netherlands explores results from a survey taken from Dutch individuals identifying as Turkish and Moroccan, asking if they agree or disagree with the statement: "I trust the Dutch political System." 40% of Turkish and 31% of Moroccans respondents disagreed.[168] Evidently, differences between the Netherlands and Belgium in this study are hard to distinguish. This is partially caused by the lack of comparable information, along with the fact that the information that has been presented not showing significant variations between the Netherlands and Belgium.

4.2.4.2: Possibilities for participation in decision-making

Both the Netherlands and Belgium are democracies, offering the possibility to join (joining the political arena) and passive (voting) influence in the political system. This has led to the presence of Muslim representatives in the governments and parliaments of both countries. The website *Democracy Barometer* provides an index of various factors relevant for the functioning of a democracy, from which each country Is given a score for the prevalence of democratic values in society. One of these factors is the aspect of equality, defined as follows: "Particularly understood as political equality - means that all citizens are treated as equals in the political process, have equal rights to influence decision-making and have equal access to political power."[169]As the following graphs demonstrate, the Netherlands and Belgium score similarly according to the index:

[165] Marc Swyngedouw et al., "Politieke Participatie van Turkse en Marokkaanse Belgen in Antwerpen en Brussel", Dienst Sociale Netwerken, accessed on 18 October, 2018. http://docplayer.nl/14547591-Politieke-participatie-van-turkse-en-marokkaanse-belgen-in-antwerpen-en-brussel.html
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] "Turken hebben minst vertrouwen in Nederlandse politiek," *Turks.nl*, March 08, 2017, https://www.turks.nl/nieuws/binnenland/turken-hebben-minst-vertrouwen-in-nederlandse-politiek.
[169] "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html.

Equality in Belgium[170]



Equality in the Netherlands[171]



When comparing country profiles based not just on the measured value of equality but on the democracy score in general, the Netherlands scores significantly higher than Belgium. This concept

[170] "Country profile: Belgium," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Belgium.html.
[171] "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html.

takes into account values of freedom, equality and opportunities for control into account, informing the following country profiles:

Quality of Democracy in Belgium[172]



Quality of Democracy in The Netherlands[173]



The democracy quality score in the Netherlands is significantly higher than that of Belgium. The differences between the Netherlands and Belgium are thus significant when the other aspects of

[172] "Country profile: Belgium," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Belgium.html.
[173] "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html.

democracy are taken into account. Taking a closer look at the various values, the Netherlands scores higher on levels of *freedom* than Belgium. *Freedom* describes the *individual liberties* ("inviolability of the private sphere[174]), the *rule of law* ("designates the independence, the primacy, and the absolute warrant of and by the law. This requires equality before the law and a good quality of the legal system2[175]) and the *public sphere* ("the right to take part with others in expressing opinions and seeking to persuade and mobilise support. This is ensured by the freedom of association and the freedom of opinion"[176]). The Netherlands scores especially high on *individual liberties* when compared to Belgium, as clarified by the graph below.

Level of Freedom in Belgium[177]



Level of Freedom in The Netherlands[178]

[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] "Country profile: Belgium," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Belgium.html
[178] "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html.



The importance of these individual liberties can easily be linked to the concept of procedural justice, as a high degree of individual liberties could limit an individual's fear for an intrusive government while simultaneously ensuring other rights that can be relevant, for example, religious freedom. The difference on this indicator is therefore worth taking into account when comparing these two countries.

4.3: Conclusion

This analysis has drawn a comparison between the Netherlands and Belgium on five different indicators: *Islamophobia within society, Religious freedom, Education & Labor, Trust in the government & Participation in decision making.* The Netherlands proved to score more inclusive, fair, or equal on all aspects where significant differences between the Netherlands and Belgium could be indicated. This is exemplified by differences in terms of Islamophobia in society (the gap in comfort rates is twice as high in Belgium as in the Netherlands) and on the educational achievements (significantly higher rates of Muslims with a high education in the Netherlands than in Belgium).

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The goal of this research was to answer the question: "*why are individuals in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards terrorism than others?"* This question is pertinent as various European countries have recently become victim to terrorism, however, the variations in terrorist activities in different countries are significant. For example, France has been a frequent victim of terrorism, while the Netherlands experienced its first terror attack (since the refugee crisis) only in 2018. Relevant literature on terrorism and radicalization suggested that a focus on radicalization rather than on the occurrence of terrorist offences would contribute toward closing the literature gap on this subject. The answer to the first sub question can be seen as the reason behind the focus on radicalization.

The first sub question regards the role of religion is in terrorism and radicalization radicalization. This role is perfectly summarized by aforementioned quote by Badey: "Perceived political, economic, social, and security inequities or threats and the lack of an effective ventilation mechanism, rather than ideologies, create conditions that lead to international political violence."[179] Ideologies, and religion subsequently play a role in (radicalization) towards terrorism, but this is not the root cause of radicalization. Rather, Islamic extremism just happens to be the current dominant expression of extremism.[180] This argument concludes that although religion affects the character of radicalization and terrorism, it is not a root cause of the phenomenon.

The second sub question refers to the evolution of the radicalization process. This refers to the actual "root cause" of terrorism, and the following steps that are taken in this process. Relevant literature on terrorism mostly focuses on activity either on the individual level or on the level of terrorist groups, lacking analysis of the societal context that has influence on the process. This research aims to narrow that gap by relating the individual motives to the societal context. Moghaddam's

[179] Thomas J. Badey, "The Role of Religion in International Terrorism," *Sociological Focus* 35, no. 1 (2002): 85, doi:10.1080/00380237.2002.10571222.
[180] Davide Lerner, "It's not Islam that drives young Europeans to jihad, France's top terrorism expert explains," *Haaretz*, June 9, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-1.791954?v=FBAED08735812BD2447429DD931B773A.

analytical model provided the staircase analogy that has been applied to a case comparison in this study. This comparison used various indicators from the staircase model in the analysis. The analysis then proved to match with the hypothesis that the national environment has a significant influence on the radicalization process, and in doing so provided the answer for the last question, asking what the impact of the national environment is on the radicalization process? The impact of the national environment appears to be significant, as we would expect to see that Belgium scores worse on the various indicators considering the fact that more terrorist activity has occurred in Belgium. This proved to be the case on almost all factors analysed. The research question can thus be answered as the analytical model appears to be applicable to societies rather than only to individuals, which allows us to conclude that an inclusive, fair and equal society will limit terrorism by addressing its root causes. However, as mentioned above, the conducted research comes with some limitations. The most important aspect is that should be read as an explorative research on the relation between multiple complex factors that influence the radicalization process. The impact of multiple social factors has been clarified, however, multiple questions on other pressing issues remain, as some factors have been left out of this analysis. This conclusion, for example, raises the question of why social environment differs between countries. How did this develop into its current form and how can we influence these circumstances in order to (further) take away the root causes for radicalization?

Another addition that could be made in order to improve the quality of this research could be a broadening of the case comparison. The choice for the two cases was a conscious decision, as the Netherlands and Belgium have a Muslim population with a comparable size and background. However, it would be beneficial to test if the current analysis would still provide comparable results in countries where Muslim populations are not comparable and significantly different instead.

However, as emphasized earlier, it is worth putting time and effort into improving the position of Muslims and in countering discrimination. Therefore, Western countries should reflect on their own society in order to understand the threat of radicalization and terrorism that they are exposed to, especially in times when populism is thriving and polarization is growing.

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