

Too much love will kill you¹

**Civil Society building by the International Community for
Democratic Consolidation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
(BiH)**

Els Heimerikx
Words: 8779
Bachelor Thesis
Professor: Dr. M.S Spirova
Version 2.1
Data: 16-06-2012

¹ (Brian May, 1992).

Too much love will kill you (Brian May, 1992).

Civil Society building by the International Community for Democratic Consolidation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)

Introduction

This Bachelor Thesis will give an overview in civil society building done by the international community in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Civil society building is done to stimulate democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is the process where norms, procedures and expectations become internalized to the extent that become so internalized that actors routinely and instinctively conform to written and unwritten rules. A democracy is consolidated when everyone thinks democracy is worth defending (Diamond 1999, ch 3). This research focuses on Croatia and BiH. Despite their comparable background, their level of democratization is different. According to Nations in Transit Croatia scores a 3.64 and BiH scores a 4.32. Nations in Transit uses a comparative and multidimensional method in the former communist states of Europe and Eurasia. It scores countries in an index from one to seven, where one stands for highest democratic progress and seven for the lowest democratic progress.² The differences between Croatia and BiH on this scale may not be that big, but their prospects for the future are completely different.

The way these differences are explained is important, because both countries have received aid and assistance from the international community. Although it still struggles with some issues, only Croatia managed to become a democratic country. Bosnia still needs the support of the international community and does not seem capable to fully consolidate. When it is clear why these states differ, the international community can be more efficient in supporting regime change towards democratic consolidation in other regions, for example Afghanistan.

Both Croatia and Bosnia had severe wars after the break-up of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). After the wars these countries were supported by the international community, which greatly influenced the structure of both countries. That is why this research will focus on the period after the Dayton Accords.

² <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit> looked up on 14 may 2012

The international community has promoted democracy, because it is believed that democracy can be a long-term protection against violence, civil war and refugee flows especially in ethnic diverse countries (Vuckovic 1999, 3). For severely divided societies with non-coercive approaches to ethnic management, there are only two options available: partition or democracy. When peaceful partition does not seem likely then the state needs democracy by default (Vuckovic 1999, 4). However, democracy can also be a trigger for further conflicts. Democracy invites groups to separate themselves and compete for resources. In Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) groups divided themselves along the ethnic lines (Gallagher 2007, 342).

Since the signing of the Dayton Accords the international community has devoted substantial resources to keep the peace and create a multi-ethnic democratic society in Bosnia. The West believes that only democratic politics and society will be able to underpin the creation of the unique multi-ethnic state. The international community has been extensively involved in the state building, especially in BiH. They have been involved in everything from writing the constitution to border demarcations and local police enforcement. It guaranteed the return of refugees, the protection of human rights and the promoting of reconciliation (McMahon 2002, 19). Still, it failed to pay enough attention to the implementation and the civilian aspects of the accord, like civil society. Civil society is considered as a precondition for the development of consolidated and democratic institutions (Chandler 1998, 78). For this reason this thesis will research the influence of the international community on civil society building.

This thesis is constructed as follows: First, the theoretical framework is built. Then, the background of both countries will be discussed. After this an overview will follow on how the international community has influenced civil society building in both countries. Building on what has been discussed in the thesis, it can be concluded that civil society building has been done more effectively by the international community in Croatia than in BiH. This different effect resulted, because the international community has made BiH aid dependent.

Theoretical framework

Civil society is a frequently used concept and many authors have written on this subject, therefore there are various definitions. Civil society was first used to designate the sphere of autonomy from the state. It has been used to indicate the degree of unrestrained activism of groups and associations of all sorts, free from intervention from the state (Letki, 2009, 159). Because the state can not intervene in these groups, the condition of a self-limiting state, civil society is linked to democracy. After 1970 and 1980 the concept changed, it was now also used for protest activities and social movements in authoritarian regimes. Civil society refers therefore to the sphere of free unrestricted social activism (Letki, 2009, 159). Civil society is a set of organizations that operate between the state, the family and economic production (Chandler 1998, 78).

A term often used combined with civil society is social capital. This term is used to describe the links and connections between people that result in the creation of norms of cooperation and trust. An indicator for social capital is the membership in voluntary associations; this indicator is also used to measure civil society (Letki 2009, 160). Both social capital and civil society are used to describe the level of social activism; however, social capital is more difficult to measure than civil society is. The term civil society describes the activism in voluntary organizations or social movements. Social capital refers to the product of this activism, like norms and networks (Letki 2009, 160).

Civil society and social capital refer to turning every day contacts and interactions into political relevant and important resources. High levels of social capital and a lively civil society have been considered prerequisites of democratic and economic consolidation. Societies with low levels of civil society are unlikely to initiate a democratic transformation or consolidate a new democratic system (Letki 2009, 161). Civil society is listed as one of five keys factors in democratic consolidation. The other factors are political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic society. These factors are necessary for the modern democratic system to emerge and for it to function properly (Letki 2009, 161).

Active participation of the electorate is crucial to achieve accountability, legitimacy and competence in public life (Chandler 1998, 80). An informed and active civil society can influence the political process, keep the politicians accountable for their actions and create conditions for a lasting peace (Chandler 1998, 80). Participation in NGOs that are part of civil society is a source of information for the government and the

people. People can participate, discuss, exchange opinions and mobilize each other to influence the government. The information from these NGOs give people powerful resources that can be used to aid preference formation, to do research in political activities and learn about opportunities for cooperation related to political manners. That is why formal and informal interactions are linked to an increase institutional responsiveness, more frequent political participation and higher mobilization capacity (Leki 2009, 161). For this reason civil society is a necessary condition for democracy. Without the participation of citizens, a society can have a formal democracy, but it will not last. Political participation of citizens in a society, forms the basis of a well functioning democracy.

A democracy drives on volunteers that inform citizens, campaign and discuss issues. Civil society is necessary for a democracy to consolidate; a focus on the institutional framework is not enough. If only a constitutional form of democracy is promoted, pressure for democratization will cease when the structural form is put in place, and assistance may go mainly to strengthening formal institutions and assisting economic reform and development, which is not sufficient. It needs to be strengthened outside the formal system in a civil society (Vuckovic 1999, 4).

Building a civil society in a country that has no history of a civil society is difficult. However, the international community has tried to implement a civil society through NGOs and associations. Associations are seen as 'schools of democracy', where taking part in activities socializes citizens into other forms of participation, such as voting and campaigning. Organizations teach citizens the civic virtues of trust, moderation, compromise, reciprocity and skill of democratic discussion and organization (Leki 2009, 162).

Countries with no recent history of unrestrained civic activism will have problems in forming an active civil society. Citizens are not trained in democracy skills, like cooperative behaviour, formal and informal networks and skills necessary for local and national politics. Therefore their chances for a consolidated democracy are lower (Leki 2009, 162). The effectiveness of NGOs remain difficult to measure, but it seems crucial that there is an already available civil society for effective assistance (Dimitrova 2004, 108).

Not all forms of networks are equally effective in promoting democracy. There are bridging and bonding networks, where bridging networks connect people with

different backgrounds and bonding networks form an intra-group structure. Ethnic and religious loyalties represent bonding networks, they often promote patronage and corruption, they weaken pluralism and equality. Therefore they are less effective in democratic promotion. Before transition they may reach high levels of civic mobilization, but after transition they are more likely to become an undermining force (Leki 2009, 165).

The international community has actively tried to build a civil society in Croatia and BiH. Therefore this thesis will focus on civil society building done by the international community. The international community will be defined as cooperation between the NATO, the EU, the OSCE (Organization Security Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe. The actors agreed that the ultimate aim was a consolidated democracy in the region and they agreed on what instruments and means should be used (Smith 2001, 32).

The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) came into being in 1949. It has its origins in the Cold War in Europe. NATO is a political and military alliance, with the mission of peace and security. It promotes democracy and encourages consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and in the long run prevent conflict. NATO wants peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, when diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity for crisis management operations.³ NATO also takes an active role in crisis management. It coordinates humanitarian assistance for disaster-stricken areas. It is based on an alliance of states and has the principle of collective defense, where an attack on one member, will be treated as an attack on all members of the NATO. NATO currently has 28 member states, with the latest ones –Albania and Croatia- joining in 2009. NATO is the transatlantic link between the US and Europe.⁴

The EU is an economic and political partnership between 27 countries. It was created after the Second World War and since then it has developed in many areas. The EU is also involved in peace keeping missions, this is done under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Just like the NATO, the EU has no standing army. Instead it relies on contribution of its members. The EU conducts joint disarmament operations,

³ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-36F4E6FA-304EAA0E/natolive/what_is_nato.htm looked up 5th of June 2012

⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-36F4E6FA-304EAA0E/natolive/what_is_nato.htm looked up 5th of June 2012

humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, and crisis management.⁵

The OSCE came into being in the early 1970s. It was first called the CSCE, but this changed after the end of the Cold War. The OSCE was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West Europe. It is the world's largest regional security organization. It has 56 member states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE wants to create security through politico-military, economic and environmental and human aspects. It addresses a wide range of subjects, including security-building measures, human rights, national minorities and democratization.⁶

The Council of Europe has 47 member countries and covers a large part of the European continent. It was founded in 1949 and has as goals developing democratic and common principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other texts on the protection of individuals.⁷ It was set up to promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe.⁸ The Council has no military aspects but tries to achieve its goals through negotiations.

The aim of all these actors is peace and democracy, they try to promote it first by negotiations. However, in time of crisis some of these actors can develop military capacity. Although the aim and goal of the actors in the international community might be the same, the effectiveness in democracy promotion is different. An effective way of democracy promotion is the prospect of joining the institution, which means full membership (Dimitrova 2004, 92). The Council of Europe offers full membership. However, the Council was initially seen as a waiting room for acceptance to the EU and was not that appealing by itself. The Council uses soft conditionality with post-accession monitoring. On the other hand the EU uses hard conditionality (*acquis communautaire*⁹) and the promise of membership to motivate compliance. The Council's influence is weaker, but it creates more potential for a variety of societal actors. It uses a more

⁵ http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm looked up 5th of June 2012

⁶ <http://www.osce.org/who> looked up 5th of June 2012

⁷ <http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en> looked up 5th of June 2012

⁸ <http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=nepasconfondre&l=en> looked up 5th of June 2012

⁹ the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European Union, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm, looked up 5th of June 2012

bottom-up approach, while the EU's hard conditionality and top-down approach can cause future problems for new member states (Dimitrova 2004, 99).

NATO initially focused on security. Democracy requirements have played a secondary role. However, this has increased after the Cold War. Political conditions set by the NATO are about civilian control over armed forces, a constitutional state, market economy and the resolution of outstanding ethnic disputes. The NATO seeks political stability in the framework of regional security (Dimitrova 2004 100). NATO also offers membership to potential candidates, but focuses less on democratization as the EU does.

Compared to the Council of Europe or the NATO, the EU is a system of governance that covers an increasingly large number of policy areas and affects nearly all aspects of the governance of the member states. In contrast to the NATO, the EU offers not only a form of security, but especially economic as well as political benefits for the states that join. For the EU membership is a final goal, this in contrast with the Council of Europe (Dimitrova 2004, 94-95).

This thesis will focus on civil society building done by the EU in Croatia and the influence of the OSCE and the Office of High Representative (OHR) in BiH because these actors were most influential in the area. The OHR is an *ad hoc* international institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords, which ended the war in BiH.¹⁰ The differences between Croatia and BiH are substantial. Croatia is on its way to become a member of the European Union, while in BiH the OHR still plays a large role in implementing the civilian aspects of democracy. This thesis will argue that too much input will make a state dependent of aid and does not develop the bridging civil society. In this way the difference and effectiveness in civil society building will be clarified.

¹⁰ http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519 looked up 14th of June 2012

Background of Yugoslavia, after the First World War until separation

Pre-conditions can suppress or stimulate the development of a state; thus giving it either a head start or a disadvantage. For this reason this section will give some background information about the formation of the countries and the Dayton Accords.

With the collapse of rival powers after the First World War, Serbia took neighbouring republics under its wing. It established the Kingdom of Serbia 1918 through a union of the South Slav lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. It united Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia (Haere 2010, 112). Although the countries are linguistically similar, they are religiously very diverse (Ost 2009, 407). The Serbs had a dominant role in the republic, but this changed in 1943 when it became a member of the federation of Yugoslavia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was established by the Anti-fascist Council for the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (Haere 2010, 113). SFRY was ethnically very diverse and although it was recognized as a sovereign state by the international community, the internal sovereignty was more than doubtful. Large parts of the population did not accept the state and its government as an ultimate authority (Agh 1999, 264).

In 1945 SFRY became a communist state, Josip Broz Tito became the communist leader. Although communist it had a different system from the Soviet system. For example, SFRY was not a member of the Warsaw pact (Simon 2008, 150). Still, in social, economic and institutional set-up SFRY was decisively shaped by the communist regime. The communist legacy gave the states that arose out of SFRY an extra difficulty in becoming democratic, because they had to change on a political, economic and social level (Haerpfer 2009, 310).

The communist aspect is another possible influence in civil society building in Croatia and BiH. The communist aspect puts a burden on the citizens' capacity for collective action (Krastev 2002, 48). They had no history of a democratic culture and therefore had fewer chances to develop democratic skills. As a result membership of political parties in the countries from SFRY has been low. Low socio-economic development in the region means less social stratification and fewer interest groups which affect development. Many citizens have been too absorbed with the battle of material existence to be able to become part of a civil society (Gallagher 2007, 352).

Despite the communist aspect, SFRY has a short history of civil society. It started in the mid 1980s until the late 1980s. It involved publicly confronting previously

suppressed conflicts and official excesses (Baskin 2008, 287). However, the new democratic politics were not inclusive and did not strive to integrate all citizens and groups. The nested political communities were mono-ethnic and began locally, but grew outwards to the federation. It resulted in inflammatory programs, for example the Serbian Academy of Science (1986), which combined economic critics with a nationalist program. Still, at the same time there was also an increasing openness. For example, former officials and political prisoners held meetings in search for a common ground. People that worked abroad returned to SFRY and became political active (Baskin 2008, 287).

Civil society has contributed to the downfall of communism and played a role in the various transition scenarios that unfolded throughout the region at the end of 1989 (Kopecky 2003, 1). The strength of the civil society grew even further with the economic crisis, and the death of Tito in 1980. Yugoslavia was in economic crisis since 1982. The labour productivity first fell and then stagnated. Furthermore, inflation reached over a 100 per cent in 1987, 157 per cent in 1988 and almost 300 per cent in 1989. Less developed republics like BiH and Macedonia lagged behind Croatia and Slovenia. An economic gap that is still present today.

In 2012 Croatia has a GNI per capita of \$13.890, while BiH has a GNI per capita of \$4.770.¹¹ Furthermore, both countries have a large population living below the national poverty line. In Croatia 11 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and in BiH 14 percent of the population lives below this threshold. Economic development can give a country a head start in democratic consolidation. According to the theory of Lipset. Economic development influences democracy: when a society develops economically, their citizens will no longer tolerate a repressive political regime; therefore rise in GDP triggers a transition towards democracy (Epstein 2006, 552).

Background of Croatia

The collapse of SFRY during the last party congress in 1990 gave room for elections in the republics, Croatia held its first multiparty elections in 1990 (Bieber 2010, 312). The elections were won by the Croatian Democratic Union, which was led by Tudjman and many other former communists. The party had a strong nationalistic programme. This provoked panic among the Croatian Serbs (Krajina Serbs), armed

¹¹ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries> looked up 14 may 2012

clashes between Croat authorities and the self-declared Krajina Republic of Serbia took place (Swain 2003, 259). By 1991 the fighting reached a state of intensity and peacekeeping troops had to be deployed to keep the armies apart. Croatia was in war over its territory from 1991 until 1995. The EU agreed with the independency of the Yugoslavian state, but drew up clear conditions relating to the treatment of national minorities that would have been met before independence would be granted (Swain 2003, 260).

In 1992 Croatia was recognized as an independent state, although there was no progress made in the treatment of Krajina Serbs. Tudjman boycotted meetings of the collective state presidency and broke off all relations with Serbia. Repeated attempts from the European community to negotiate ceasefire failed, and as the fighting continued a third of Croatian territory which was mostly inhabited by Serbs was lost to Serbia (Swain 2003, 227). Eventually, to solve the war the international community became a mediator between the Croats and the Serbs. Harsh sanctions were posed on Croatia, it was not admitted in the PHARE program and when it was finally admitted to the Council of Europe the International Community continued to put pressure on the country (Vukadinovic 1999, 440). It had to strengthen its democratic foundations of society and enshrine respect for human and minority rights. In 1998 it almost got international sanctions because of the delay in implementing the return of Serb refugees (Vukadinovic 1999, 440). Tudjman stayed in charge until his death in 1999.

After the death of Tudjman in 1999 the government successfully reformed the institutional framework, it reorganized repressive services and improvement on the judiciary (Zakošek 2008, 606). In 2000 Croatia adopted a new constitution that further consolidates its model of becoming a modern European nation-state (Massari 2005, 264). Croatia has an institutionally stable semi-presidential regime, which can rely on a safe parliamentary majority and displays some delegate features that weakens the horizontal responsibility of the executive power. In Croatia there is no visible left populism and the extreme right potential is confined to minor parties who are EU-sceptic and extra-parliamentary groups (Zakošek 2008, 606).¹²

In 2009 Croatia joined NATO. It would have joined the EU too, but this was stalled because of insufficient cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), slow internal reform (corruption, rule of law) and a territorial

¹² <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/croatia> looked up 14 June 2012

dispute with Slovenia. From 2010 onwards an effort to stop corruption was started by Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor and in November 2010 the negotiations reopened and 29 of the 33 chapters for Croatia accession were closed. However, Croatia still had to improve on corruption, minority rights, return of refugees and provide conditions for an independent media. Furthermore, Amnesty International criticised Croatia in 2010 because only 18 war crime trials per year were concluded, with 700 more to go. In January 2012 Slovenia and Croatia solved their border dispute, easing the way for membership to the EU in 2013.¹³ The country has internal stability and economic growth, both of which strengthen the democratic framework¹⁴. However, because of the reliance on the EU for import and export Croatia's economy is affected by the economic crisis, limiting its growth.

Croatia is now scheduled to become a member of the European Union in the second half of 2013, though it has to improve in independent media, the fight of corruption and the prosecution of war criminals. Many institutions now have laws in line with EU criteria, but it remains to be seen if and how they work in practice.¹⁵

Background of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Republic Bosnia-Herzegovina was and still is a very diverse state, there are Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs (Orthodox Christian) and Croats (Roman Catholic). BiH held its first multiparty election in November 1990. Three nationalist parties won an overwhelming victory, gaining control of all republican institutions and winning the elections in most municipalities. The war began in 1992 as BiH declared its independence. The independence was against the will of the Serb community. The Serbs in Bosnia began an massive campaign of ethnic cleansing and territorial conquest. The Muslim-Croat coalition fell apart in 1993, which led to a three-way war (Bieber 2010, 315). During the summer of 1995 the parties were forced to negotiate through a NATO bombardment. This resulted in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP). The signing brought a fragile peace.

The Dayton Accords are based on the GFAP and is based on the principle of interethnic accommodation and compromise between wartime parties, rather than

¹³ <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/slovenia-croatia-agree-arbiters-border-dispute-news-510223> European Commission, Brussel 24 april 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/acceding-country/croatia/key-documents/index_en.htm

¹⁴ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit> looked up on 14 may 2012

¹⁵ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/croatia> looked up 7th of June 2012

democracy. The Dayton Accords divided the country in two parts: the Republic Sprska, where primarily Serbs live and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Accords set up new constitutional structures and political institutions. The Accords gave room for extensive involvement of the international community (Vukadinovic 2001, 443). The first elections took place nine months after the end of the war, and organized by the OSCE which was charged with this task and with democratization in general (Bieber 2010, 315). The elections were intended to give the power back from the international community towards domestic authorities. However, after the elections the nationalist parties ushered them into an extended presence (Bieber 2010, 315).

A central role fell to the Office of High Representatives, an ad hoc body formed to oversee the civilian aspects of implementation of the GFAP. Originally it did little more than monitoring the lack of implementation by the political elite. This changed in 1997, when the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) gave the OHR additional powers to intensify the process of nation-state building. These 'Bonn powers' included the authority to impose legislation and dismiss public officials from office who are found obstructing the implementation of Dayton or for their wartime involvement. Since then the High Representatives has dismissed more than 100 officials from public office, and imposed hundreds of laws and amendments (Bieber 2010, 315) Therefore, democratic consolidation has become increasingly depending on the international community (Cox 2001, 10).

The OHR has to impose its rule in order to strengthen the Bosnian state, but the more it uses its powers, the more it reinforces passivity and irresponsibility on the part of political elites (Massari 2010, 262). Parties are reluctant to take unpopular measures because they know that the HR will step in when they fail to reach an agreement. This creates dependency trap. The elites use the external pressure as a way to not take responsibility for the welfare of ordinary citizens. And the international community delegitimizes Balkan democracy by punishing elites who break promises to the IMF (Krastev 2002, 51).

Because GFAP was written to end the violence and keep the peace, it suffers from contradictions and ambiguity. Because of the international community failed to provide a good constitutional design, the state created in the accords has been extremely weak. The state is granted authority only for external affairs and a limited number of inter-entity matters. The state is unable to build a significant executive capacity (Cox 2001, 6).

Power sharing arrangements requires the participation of Bosniaks, Croat and Serbs, thus coalition is not based on similar policies but on ethnicity (Bieber 2010, 316). After the elections of 2010 it took the parties fourteen months to form a parliament.¹⁶ The divisions between the two republics became bigger and in 2011 the nationalist rhetoric was on the rise.

BiH also has economic difficulties, it struggled to dissolve communist structures and with the creation of a market economy (McMahon, 2002 18). In 2001, the official unemployment figures were above 40 per cent. Although, on the moment that one would take the grey labour into account the unemployment drops to 25 per cent (Cox 2006, 9). In 2012 this has not changed yet, the official unemployment figure still is on 40 per cent.¹⁷ 63 per cent of the country's import comes from the EU, and 73 per cent of the export goes to the EU; this shows a high reliance the country's trade-relation with the EU. ¹⁸ Therefore, BiH is touched by the economic crisis. BiH became a potential member state in 2010, but still remains dependent of aid. And progress that could have been made in 2011 towards EU membership has been stalled due to the lack of forming a parliament

Despite this economic dependence on the EU, the EU integration is low on the list of priorities from Bosnians. Although the EU has taken over many international missions, like the peacekeeping mission of the NATO in 2004. At the same time the HR is also used as an EU's special representative (EUSR) in 2002 (Bieber 2010, 318). In 2006 the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was not signed due to lack of reform. The SAA is part of the road map to membership prepared for each of the applicant state in the western Balkans. (Barnes 2010, 425). EU membership has no priority among the three ethnic communities in BiH. The political elite can not engender sufficient awareness and consensus about the direction the country should take. There is consensus that accession to the EU is vital to national interest, but it does not seem possible for the elite to work together effectively (Massari 2010, 265).

After the non-acceptation of the SAA in BiH in 2006 the HR sought to increase the focus on local ownership, but he did not succeed. The international community wanted to close the Office of the High Representative, but this could not happen after the

¹⁶ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/bosnia-and-herzegovina>

¹⁷ <http://nieuwsuur.nl/video/382195-eu-oplossing-voor-verdeeld-bosnie.html> looked up 15 June 2012

¹⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/relation/index_en.htm looked up 16 may 2012

independence of Kosovo. This independence gave new instability in the regions Rspka, who question the influence of the OHR and the European Union. Reform process in BiH has stalled and nationalist rhetoric continued to rise in 2010 calling for a peaceful dissolution. This nationalist rhetoric's has made it difficult to form a parliament in 2011 and has stalled the progress towards EU membership. Policymaking in 2010 was characterized by unwillingness to compromise and ineffective decision making at every level.¹⁹ The year 2011 can be identified by the destructive and divisive political dynamic that paralyzed state-level governance. Leaders did not agree to form a government until the end of 2011, and Bosnians EU reform agenda was stalled. The RS challenged the legitimacy of state institutions and the international presence in BiH and wanted to hold a referendum to challenge the international supervision of the peace process and legitimacy of the state institutions on RS soil. The EU intervened and no referendum took place, but it shows the instability of the country.²⁰

Critics of the international mission argue that progress made in BiH is temporary and superficial. The peace is temporarily because only the presence of the peacekeeping troops prevent an outbreak of violence. Furthermore, the international involvement has not helped economic recovery, the only engine of growth has been international assistance (McMahon 2005, 572). So, transformation is superficial, because the consolidated democracy envisioned by the international community failed to emerge (McMahon 2005, 569-570). The country remains under the international supervision of the OHR, the highest authority responsible for the civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords, and is still under threat of dissolution²¹.

Civil Society Croatia

The European Union is one of the actors who actively tried to build a civil society. This was partly done by how the institutional framework of the European Union works. To become a member of the European Union a state has to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. The criteria create stable institutions to guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights and the respect for and the protection of minorities (Baskin 2008, 535). So for Croatia to

¹⁹ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2011> looked up 16 may 2012

²⁰ ²⁰ http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/bosnia-and-herzegovina#_edn1#_edn1 looked up 11th of June 2012

²¹ http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/bosnia-and-herzegovina#_edn1#_edn1 looked up 11th of June 2012

become a member of the European Union it has to implement the democratic framework the EU prescribes and develop a civil society.

Although civil society is not codified by the treaty of Amsterdam or by a list of legal norms, it is a precondition for joining the EU (Vidacak 2003, 256). In order to stimulate this supporting programs that develop civil society are set up. An example is the PHARE program in 1989. The PHARE program did not focus solely on civil society building, but it concentrated on education of citizens, developing and funding of NGOs and sponsoring public awareness programmes, as well as giving ad hoc assistance to NGOs (McMahon 2002, 20). Foundations have been set up for the civil society, the goal was to develop NGOs capable of developing a high quality dialogue and partnership with the government administration (Vidacak 2003, 256). The program ended in 1999 and was replaced by ACCESS, SAPARP and IPSA (McMahon 2002, 20).

After the death of Tudjman in 1999, Croatia held its first successful democratic election in 2000. The democratic progress was stimulated through players of the civil society, namely independent media, NGOs and INGOs. They joined together, because they wanted free and fair elections (Doerfel 2004, 374). Despite the fact that they had to compete for scarce financial resources, they cooperated together in the election period. This cooperation reduced the atmosphere of political tensions and civil unrest in society. Unfortunately, after the election the motivation to cooperate reduced (Doerfel 2004, 374). The civil society partners returned to their immediate missions, like human rights and the environment (Doerfel 2004, 379). After the elections the inter-organizational system of NGOs, INGOs and media had evolved into a relatively unconnected, inefficient network of relations (Doerfel 2004, 388). Furthermore, there are three general threats towards civil society in Croatia; these are mistrust between the organizations, persistence of friendship networks and public disappointment with transitional governments and social institutions. This is common among many other Post-communist countries. The media is in a fragile stage of transition; the government-run media have a historic lack of credibility and objectivity (Doerfel 2008, 375).

The civil society has developed since 2000 and now is regarded as strong. Although civil society is constantly challenged by nationalist NGOs. However, the bridging NGOs, like human right NGOs gain influence. Historically most influential NGOs are bonding NGOs, such as churches and nationalist groups. These NGOs are fed by populism which contradicts the usual perception of civil society. NGOs of the Catholic

Church and war veterans are rigid nationalistic and are ethnically exclusive. They demand state independence from international mechanisms like the EU and ICTY.²²

In Croatia there is a block of socially conservative focus groups, either connected to the Catholic Church, war veterans' associations, or ethnic and cultural organizations. These groups in civil society are more prone to bonding civil society; they focus on reinforcing the ethnic lines and nationalism. They are against the membership and interference of the European Union.²³ The church retains a significant amount of influence on state policy in issues such as family planning, religious education in public schools, gay rights, and war crimes issues, and has undergone little transformation.

Despite the threat of bonding groups, the civil society transition in Croatia is considered a success story for the international community. With massive international support Croatia emerged as major components of the global civil society movement (Doerfel 2008, 375). Doerfel sees a threat for civil society in the competition for financial resources from the international donor organizations. This could reduce the cooperation and communication with other NGOs (Doerfel 2008, 376). However, this does not seem to be the case. The civil society in Croatia is getting stronger and stronger. Organizations like the non-partisan citizens' organization GONG, Transparency International, Iskorak, and Kontra remain active in promoting anticorruption, and gender-issue programs, by educating the public -especially voters- on specific issues.²⁴ Several of these organizations, such as Documenta and the Center for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights have publically supported the EC proposal for the additional monitoring of the Croatian government efforts in relation to war crimes investigations.²⁵

In general the civil society is getting stronger, and the bridging NGOs gain influence. However, despite these developments, there is still a lack of trust of the public in the public institutions. This public trust in various civil and political institutions is an indicator to measure civil society (Kopecky 2003, 1-2). In 2011, it was shown that in Croatia, less than 10 per cent of the people trusted political parties, and less than a fifth of the population put trust in government and parliament. These figures display a weak,

²² <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2010/croatia> looked up 7th of June 2012

²³ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/croatia> looked up 7th of June 2012

²⁴ ²⁴ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/croatia> looked up 7th of June 2012

²⁵ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/croatia> looked up 14th of June 2012

or low level, civil society; because, a strong civil society would lead to a higher level of trust of the people in these public institutions. On the other hand, Nations in Transit finds that civic participation has increased and that there were a number of local civic initiatives, and that a larger part of the population became active in civic organizations. This is estimated that 35.2 per cent of the Croatian citizens have been active in NGOs.²⁶ Therefore, the civil society rating improved in 2010 towards a 2.50 and remained so in 2012. It thus seems that looking at the measure of trust the people have in public institutions on the one hand, and looking at the measure showing the activity of people in NGOs on the other, can lead to very diverse conclusions. Generally speaking the civil society in Croatia is strong although it has to defend itself against the threat of nationalistic NGOs.

Civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina

There was a history of civil society in BiH before the wars broke out. BiH had a multicultural society, a good nationalities policy and progressive policies regarding women (Chandler 2008, 95). They had an extensive higher education, historical record of inter-ethnic tolerance, understanding and a relatively high level of involvement in local political and civic life (Chandler 1998, 81). After the war, BiH was left in ruins, and its civil society was destroyed. The international community first tried to rebuild the country through traditional measures with economic, military and political strategies. After this did not give the result they wanted they focused more on civil society building (Belloni 2001, 163).

In BiH civil society is considered even more important, because of the ethnic and nationalist identification in a strongly politically segmented society. To challenge this segmentation, international institutions provided financial and technical support to a large civil society sector based on NGOs (Chandler 1998, 78). Dayton further stimulates the promotion of civil society through the support for the work of Bosnian NGOs and civic groups. This is done by authorizing the OSCE to lay the foundation of a representative government in BiH. The OSCE was entrusted with coordinating international effort for civil society building (McMahon 2002, 21). The OSCE identified a problem with the elites who lack the technical and organizational abilities. In order to challenge this the OSCE developed a three fold plan. First, it targets persons or groups

²⁶ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/croatia> looked up 7 June 2012

who are open to external support; this is followed by training and educating those persons or groups in how to build a civil society agenda; the programme is concluded by mobilizing active NGOs as political voices (Chandler 1998, 82). NGOs carry information from the people towards the government and are therefore important for democratic consolidation. The OSCE focused mostly on the NGOs devoted to public interest such as human rights and environment (McMahon 2002, 21).

Dayton also creates the new institution of the Office of High Representative. It was empowered to monitor the implementation of the peace settlement. To promote compliance it was relying on the cooperation of the local parties to fulfil obligations and it reported on their progress. The HR most important function was the facilitating role it played for the local parties' to establish political and constitutional institutions and to mobilize and coordinate activities of other organization. This only monitoring role changed with the upgrade of the Bonn-powers (Caplan 2004, 54-60). The international community became increasingly frustrated with the political obstruction it encountered of the three nationalist parties, and from 1997 the international community began to arrogate new powers to the HR. These Bonn powers gave the HR the unlimited power to impose laws and dismiss public officials (Cox 2001, 11). The HR got extensively involved in all layers of politics, dismissing national and local politicians, making for example media laws to encourage a civil society. This was done without a democratic mandate of the Bosnian people (Caplan 2004, 54-60).

The HR worked together with the OSCE who funds and sets up NGOs. For the OSCE the sign of successful civil society building is when the new NGOs begin to act as political actors in their own right (Chandler 1998, 85). This does not take into consideration that there is a difference between bonding and bridging civil society and NGOs, and that therefore not all NGOs are beneficial for democratic consolidation.

The HR and international community viewed civil society building as a technical task, as a matter of allocating resources and of delivering services, but it misunderstood the struggle to overcome nationalist fragmentation (Belloni 2001, 163). There is little evidence that this civil society strategy is helping to challenge support for nationalist parties or overcome ethnic segmentation and division in BiH (Chandler 2008, 95). It seems to be on the contrary, from 2006 the nationalist fuelled NGOs rose again and tensions deepened. Despite the help of the international community many civil society organizations are mono ethnic. Examples of commonly existing organisations are

religious organizations who participate in nationalist appeals. And there are groups who are inwards looking and willing to use violence to realize their exclusivist goals. These NGOs are challenging the goal of a civil society, because they fuel the conflict instead of finding a common ground. Nonetheless, there are also multiethnic organizations that grew out of the war and produces social capital that bridges ethnic divisions, like Medica Zenica (McMahon 2002, 22).

Despite the lack of evidence of effectiveness in bridging the ethnic differences and consolidating democracy, civil society has become an integral component of international intervention. Every measure is taken in building a civil society. Growing amounts of financial, human and symbolic resources were being located to civil society building programs. However, the results are disappointing (Belloni 2001, 173). The international community's idealized conception of civil society differs dramatically from the actual conditions in which Bosnian civic groups and organizations function. The civil society groups do not seem to harmonize ethnic tensions, but become mono ethnic and pursue the goals of their own minority.

Also, there seemed to be a large gap between civil society associations funded and supported by the international community and the people. The more support civil associations got, the less effective they tended to be. Civil society NGOs are reliant on external support, they never had to build their own popular support (Chandler 1998, 88).

The international community has a total lack of understanding the social and political situation. Civil society programs are often ill-equipped to comprehend the political, social and cultural contexts (Belloni 2001, 170). The NGOs do not seem capable to survive without the support of the international community. The NGOs do not pursue the goals of a minority, but pursue the goals of the West. The NGOs are dependent on the donations of the West, therefore NGOs are based on the assessments of the West and to lesser extend on the local needs (Bieber 2002, 28). NGOs have been created since 1996, but many have since collapsed, and the remaining NGOs stayed highly vulnerable to the changing whims of the international community. Local representatives were forced to think about what the international community wishes first and then what the domestic society needs. NGOs which managed to survive are forced to compete for international support, this competitiveness diminishes their

individual effectiveness and breeds resistance to cooperation among groups that have similar objectives (McMahon 2005, 582).

Despite considerable efforts the NGOs position remained weak. This was partly due to economic hardship, lack of tradition in volunteerism and the war and its effect in social structure. Another problem had risen: the international community has created dependency. The international community has hired many citizens who would otherwise become part of the civil society, especially those with higher education and language skills (Bieber 2002, 27). The higher educated, thus, did not become part of civil society independently, which therefore undermined the influence of it. This then undermines a long-term ability to develop a sustainable local economy and social structure (Belloni 2001, 165). The attempt to generate participation through a top-down process of planning and organization might, paradoxically enough, lead to the creation of obstacles to participate (Belloni 2001, 174). The civil society's contribution to peace, tolerance and the reintegration of the country has, thus, been extremely limited.

Although the results of the civil society progress might be disappointing, the international community believes that its work is done and it is time to move on to areas with more pressing needs. The departure of international donors is not wholly negative; domestic generated solutions are crucial for BiH's stability and future (McMahon 2005, 582). A handful of international donors have stayed and have put down domestic roots and are well regarded among locals. These NGOs are run and controlled by locals, but rely on money abroad (McMahon 2005, 582).

And in 2008 it got help through the SAA programme. This was set up to train people and organizations on proposal writing and reporting. With the goal that dialogue would become the norm and not the acceptance.²⁷ And in 2010 BiH became a potential member candidate, despite the fact that the two most influential political parties question the Dayton Accords and the influence of international actors. Depolarization of education and free and independent media is still not achieved. The Serbs in BiH still want to split from BiH. However, the civil society has become more energetic and

²⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/civil-society-development/conf_17_18_docs_en.htm looked up 12th of June 2012

effective in 2010. It focused on the in the pre-elections debate on socio-economic topic instead of nationalist rhetoric's.²⁸

The situation of civil society in BiH is that the regional levels of government show no responsiveness to civil society's demands, unless they are of religious origin or a type that could be manipulated for political purpose or economic gain. Furthermore, there has been no significant growth in charitable, non-profit NGOs or improvement in quality of performance. For example, in 2007, 70 per cent of the BiH population wanted to join the EU, but the NGO confronted with politicians has blocked the membership. Tensions between the three communities have not been reduced since. The international community has replaced the local public sector through aid, which hinders the development of the local labour markets.²⁹

The presence of a large number of international organizations obstructs the development of governmental responsibility in the fields of social regulation, redistribution, and provision (Belloni 2001, 165). In BiH the trust of the people in the institutions was initially very high after the signing of the Dayton Accords, but then declined sharply and stabilized at a low level in 2008. The country scored a 1.8, this means that people have little to no confidence in the institutions (Drystad 2012, 3). The Serbs community wants less international interference and become part of Serbia, this minority has the least trust in the political institutions. The Bosniaks do not want BiH to break up and have the most amount of trust in the institutions, while the Croats are somewhere in between (Drystad 2012, 7-8). Nations in Transit categorizes the civil society in 2012 in BiH as immature, although they see that civil society becomes more effective, but it remains too depended on international financing. Because of this dependency on international funding the civil society in BiH is rated a 3.50 by Nations in Transit. This means that NGOs do not play an important role in public life, their influences remains relatively weak and they are too depended on financing.

Conclusion

This thesis has tried to give an overview in civil society building done by the international community in Croatia and BiH. Despite the fact that Croatia and BiH both

²⁸ ²⁸ http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/bosnia-and-herzegovina#_edn1#_edn1 looked up 11th of June 2012

²⁹ ²⁹ http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/bosnia-and-herzegovina#_edn1#_edn1 looked up 12th of June 2012

have been part of SFRY, they have developed completely different. Croatia has a defined territory, has only a Serb minority and a developed economy. However, they have tried to marginalize the Serb community and as a result were criticized by the international community. They still struggle with some communist aspects in becoming democratic, such as free and independent media. Croatia also had a war and the international community was needed to resolve it. However, after the war the international community did not need to take over day-to-day politics the way it eventually did in BiH. This could be an explaining factor in the democratic differences between BiH and Croatia. The international community posed strict requirements on them for aid and promised them membership of the European Union. The international community intervened and gave aid, but did not take away the responsibility from the elite. Croatia did not receive the amount of interference BiH has received and therefore it did not become as dependent as BiH is. Croatia has created their own civil society, this was necessary to become part of the EU, but was also part of a natural process. Conversely in BiH the civil society was implemented artificially. Also, Croatia has a much more stable economy and a general will to become part of the European Union. They have a history of civil society which is much more powerful than in BiH. This also has to do with the fact that they have far less ethnic minorities and that the civil society is divided along the ethnic lines.

In BiH the situation seems completely different, the tensions after the war do not seem to have diminished and what makes prospects for a consolidated democracy even worse is that not all groups want to be part of BiH. The international community does not seem successful in bringing the groups closer together. Building of a civil society by setting up NGOs does not seem effective. There is no evidence that tensions became less after civil society building; at best it seems to have no effect. The high influence of the HR ensures that the Bosnian elite does not take responsibility in unpopular decisions and can wait for the HR to implement this, while at the mean time continue expressing various nationalistic rhetoric. In both countries bonding civil society organisations threaten the democratic consolidation, but in BiH they seem to be more influential.

The international community needs an already existing civil society to be able to develop it even further. BiH had a history of civil society, but communism, the war and poverty in general challenged this. After the war the NGOs became mono-ethnic, this would not pose a problem on democratic consolidation if the elite was willing to work

together. However, the elite in BiH do not pursue the same goals. Therefore working together to become part of the European Union and thus becoming democratic does not seem a priority. The unwillingness of the elites to work together undermines the effectiveness. The structure of Dayton further stimulates this, the elite does not have to take responsibility and can blame the OHR for the non-efficiency bureaucracy and stalling democracy.

In BiH civil society building has not given the effect the international community had hoped for. They have tried to build NGOs, but the NGOs became dependent of the foreign financing, as they found no way to finance themselves. Furthermore, the international community has employed the people that could otherwise have built the civil society themselves, mostly them having a higher education. BiH became depended of aid and needs the OHR to make decisions.

Despite the fact that so much money has been invested in BiH, maybe the most effective solution would be splitting the country up. In that way, the remains of BiH have a fair chance of becoming democratic consolidated and would have an effective decision structure. Furthermore, this solution would ensure that there would be no (ethnic) minorities stalling democratic process. In Croatia the Serb minority is not big enough to influence policy making the way it influences this BiH. Croatia needs to give their minorities more rights and let them join in the decision making process. However, the fact that Croatia was able to define their territory in an earlier stage and that there was consensus among the majority of people together with the economic developments, gave a head start towards joining the EU and to become a consolidated democracy.

It seems that too much aid will create a dependency and takes away responsibility. The over-involvement of the international community has stopped the fighting, but has not stopped the tensions or created an consolidated democracy. The best people were in service of the international community and therefore grass-roots NGOs did not get a change to develop. The democratic consolidation was partly stopped by the aid programme of the international community, thus leading to the conclusion that too much love has killed it.

Bibliography

- Ágh, A. (1999) "Processes of democratization in the East Central European and Balkan states: sovereignty-related conflicts in the context of Europeanization" *Elsevier Science, California*
- Baskin, M. (2008) "What is to be done? Succession from the league of Communist Croatia" *Elsevier LTD, Regents of the University of California*
- Belloni, R. (2001) "Civil society and Peace building in Bosnia and Herzegovina", *The journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (March 2001), pp. 163-180*
- Bieber, F. (2002) "Aid dependency in Bosnian Politics and Civil Society: Failures and Successes of Post-war peace building in Bosnia-Herzegovina" *UDC, Belgrade*
- Caplan, R. (2004) "International authority and state-building. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina" *Global Governance 10, 53-65*
- Chandler, D. (2007) "Democratization in Bosnia: The limits of civil society building strategies" *Democratization, 5:4, 78102*
- Cox, M. (2001) "State building and Post-conflict reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia" *The rehabilitation of war-torn societies, Geneva*
- Cini M. (2010) "European Union Politics" *Oxford University Press, Oxford*
- Barns, I (2010) "Chapter 26, enlargement"(pp 419-435)
- Dover, R (2010) " Chapter 15, From CFSP to ESDP, The EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy." (pp 239-258)
- Diamond, L. 1999, "Developing democracy, toward consolidation". *The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore*
- Dimitrova, A. (2004) "International actors and democracy promotion in central and eastern Europe: the integration model and its limits" *Democratization, 11:5 91-112*
- Doerfel, M.L. and Taylor, M (2004) "Network dynamics of Inter-organizational cooperation: The Croatian Civil Society Movement" *Communication Monographs, Vol.71, No4, Dec 2004, pp. 373-394*

- Drystad (2012), "Power sharing and institutional confidence, the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina" *University of Science and technology Norwegian (preliminary draft)*
- Epstein, L.D. a.o. (2006) "Democratic Transitions" *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 50, no.3, July 2006, Pp. 551-569
- Gallager, T (1995) "Democratization in the Balkans: Challenges and prospects" *Democratization*, 2:3, 337-361
- Hague, R. a.o. (2007) "Comparative Government and Politics, an introduction" *Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire*
- Haerpfer, C.W. a.o. (2009), "Democratization". *Oxford University Press, Oxford*
- Haerpfer, C.W. (2009) "Chapter 20, Post-communist Europe and Soviet Russia" (309- 318)
- Letki, N (2009): "Chapter 11, Social capital and Civil Society" (158-169)
- Kopecky, P. and Mudde C. (2003) "Rethinking Civil Society", *democratization vol. 10. No. 3, Autumn 2003. pp. 1-14*
- Krastev, I. (2002) "The Balkans, Democracy without choices" *Journal of democracy Volume 13, number 3*
- Kesselman, M. (2009), "European Politics in Transition" *Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston New York.*
- Ost, D. "Chapter 26, The making of Modern East-Central Europe" (402-415)
- "Chapter 27, Political Economy and Development" (418-429)
- "Chapter 28, Governance and Policymaking" (432-441)
- "Chapter 29, Representation and Participation" (444-456)
- "Chapter 30, East-Central European Politics in Transition" (458-467)

- Lijphart A. 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative method', *American Political Science review*, Vol. 65, No 3 (Sept 1971), pp 682-693.
- McMahon, P. (2002) "What have we wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia" *Problems of Post-Communism January/ February 2002*
- McMahon, P. (2005) "Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulate or Avoid?" *Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 4*
- Massari, M (2010), "Do all roads lead to Brussels? Analysis of the different Trajectories of Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:2, 259-273*
- Ott, K (2003), "Croatia accession to the European Union, economic and legal challenges" *Institute of public finance, Zagreb*
- Vidacak, I. (2003) "Chapter 11, the non-governmental sector and government. A dialogue for Europe.
- Ramet P.S. (2010) "Central and Southeast European politics since 1989" *Cambridge University Press, Cambridge*
- Haore M.A. (2010) "Chapter 6, The War of Yugoslav Succession"(111-133)
- Bieber, F. (2010) "Chapter 14, Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1990"(311-325)
- Swain G. (2003) "Eastern Europe since 1945" *Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill*
- Vuckovic, G. (1999) "Promoting Peace and Democracy in the Aftermath of the Balkan Wars, comparative assessment of democratization and institution-building processes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and former Yugoslavia" *University of Southern California, vol. 162 no. 1*
- Zakošek, N. (2008) "Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia." *Democratization, 15:P3, 588-610*
- Zielonka, J. a.o. (2001) "Democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, volume 2 International and Transnational Factors" *Oxford University Press*

Vukadinovic R. (2001) "Chapter 16, Former Yugoslavia: International Efforts to Link Peace, Stability and Democracy"