Master thesis

POWER SHARING IN POST-CIVIL WAR LEBANON

AN EVALUATION

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"The people are all charming to me. They are not really Eastern, nor anything: just a poor fringe of a people between Islam and the sea, doomed to be paws in whatever politics are played here"[1]

[1] Stark, Freya. 1942. *Letters from Syria*. London: John Murray. https://archive.org/stream/lettersfromsyria008101mbp#page/n79/mode/1up (accessed 09-06-2014).

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2 INTRODUCTION

When thinking of Lebanon, one of the first things that come up is it highly diverse society. Today Lebanon harbours people from a wide range of different religious denominations – seventeen officially recognised religious sects –, predominantly Muslim and Christian (CIA 2012). This characteristic makes successful governance a true challenge. The area that later became modern Lebanon has been ruled by foreign powers since 1516, when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I conquered the land, until 22 November 1943, the day the French recognised the independence of Lebanon. The Ottomans handled the problem of the different religious denominations using the so-called *millet*-system that gave significant autonomy to the different religious sects (Traboulsi 2012: 3-4; Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010: 139-140). During the French Mandate (1920-1943), the French distributed government and administrative posts fairly over the various religious sects (Traboulsi 2012: 90).

In 1943, the leaders of the various religious sects came together and reached an unwritten agreement better known as the National Pact of 1943. The agreement provided for a power-sharing system aiming for a stable independent Lebanon (Traboulsi 2012: 107). With its difficulties, the system established in 1943 lasted for more than 30 years until 1975, when the first power sharing system of the Lebanese Republic officially ended with the start of the civil war.

In October 1989, the Lebanese Parliamentarians of the pre-civil war system came together in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, to end the civil war. The result of the negotiations was the Document of National Accord, better known as the Ta'if Accord. The document formed the basis for a revised political system based on the power-sharing system existing before the civil war (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 500-501).

Similar to the pre-civil war system, is the current post war-system based on the political power-sharing construction known as *consociationalism*, of which Arend Lijphart is the foremost proponent (Norris 2008: 24). The system that was agreed upon in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, was supposed to be an upgraded model of its

predecessor, the post-1943 model. The question however arises whether the 'upgraded' post-Ta'if system achieved its goals, where its predecessor failed. The focus in this research will be on the results of the *consociational* power sharing system. This thesis poses the following question: *To what extent is the power sharing-system in post-civil war Lebanon a success?*

Here, I will not determine 'success' in terms of whether the post-civil war system achieved the status of a 'stable democracy' as Lijphart argues (1977: 1). Instead, the focus here, in the case of a country torn apart by 15 years of internal sectarian-conflict, will be on a more pragmatic and realistic form of 'success'. The degree of 'success' in this research relates to the following two sub-questions: 1*) to what extent has the post-civil war power-sharing system had a moderating effect on political actors and the Lebanese public?* and: 2) *to what extent has the post-civil war power-sharing system achieved domestic peace*. I have chosen these sub-questions because they capture two stages of the process power-sharing model is believed to spark. The first sub-question captures the perceived direct effect of the power-sharing model, whereas the second sub-question captures the last part of the process, in which the power-sharing model is believed to lead to domestic peace and stability.

Lebanon before the civil war was one of the two only successful cases of *consociational democracy* in the Third World according to Lijphart, and a unique case in itself in the highly troublesome region that the Middle East was then and still is. The performance of the Lebanese power-sharing system, its weaknesses and its strengths can function as a learning case for other highly divided countries outside the first world, including cases in its own region. Lessons from post-civil war Lebanon can provide answers for Iraq's troubling domestic politics and might even demonstrate to be helpful in the case of a possible future post-civil war Syria (Rosiny 2013: 51-52).

This thesis proceeds according to following structure: First, I will give a brief historical background of the events that preceded the establishment of the post-civil war system. Secondly, I will go into the of theory power sharing in plural societies, how the theory was applied to the case of Lebanon, and whether it functioned accordingly over the period under consideration. Thirdly, the effects of

the power-sharing system will be examined (the two variables). Finally, I will provide a short recap of the thesis' findings and conclude with my final remarks on the 'success' of the power-sharing system in post-civil war Lebanon, which, as I will demonstrate, has shown, to a certain degree, to be successful in achieving moderation and domestic peace.

3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Ottoman rule

The history of Lebanon as a political entity dates back to its beginning as the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, after the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 1516 conquered the land that was then known as Syria. Under Ottoman rule the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was run following the *iqta'* system, which authorised tax farming for local ethnic and tribal leaders controlled by the Ottoman governor. Under the conditions that the *iqta'* holders paid a fixed amount of taxes to Istanbul, provided soldiers to the authorities when necessary, and kept order in the region under their control, the holders of the *iqta'* enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy from the central rule in Istanbul and the *Wali*, the local Ottoman governor (Traboulsi 2012: 3-5). In 1861, the Emirate of Mount Lebanon became an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire, a so-called *Mutassarrifiya* (see Appendix 1). The *Mutassarrifiya* of Mount Lebanon was characterised by a clear Christian majority over the Muslim population; Maronite Christians constituted the largest single religious denomination (Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010: 254).

During Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman system divided their subjects in groups, called *millets*, according to their religion. The *millet*-system established a two-level hierarchy between an upper community, made up of Muslims, and a lower community made up of Christians and Jews (Traboulsi 2012: 3-4; Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010: 139-140). The different religious *millets* in both Mount Lebanon and the rest of the Ottoman Empire enjoyed religious freedom and experienced considerable autonomy on matters as educational system and religious law (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 44-45).

3.2 The French Mandate

Mount Lebanon remained under Ottoman rule until the end of the First World War. Two years before the end of the war, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (also known as Greater Syria) into a French and a British zone. After the First World War and the defeat of the Ottomans, the division came into effect. Two years later, in 1920, the French General Henri Gouraud officially proclaimed the creation of the French mandate of Greater Lebanon, Lubnaan al-Kabiir, encompassing the area of modern Lebanon (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2)(Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010: 254; Hirst 2010: 7; Traboulsi 2012: 75-80). In addition to the Christian dominated Mount Lebanon, the French added several predominantly Muslim areas to the new state (see Appendix 3). The French, on the one hand wanted to provide Maronite Christians with a distinct political entity in which they were the largest religious denomination, in order to make sure the Maronites were not absorbed into a future Syrian Muslim state. On the other hand, adding predominantly Muslim areas, which reduced the Maronite population to around 30 per cent of the new state's total population, made sure the Maronites would be dependent on the French in order to retain their political dominance in the new state of Greater Lebanon (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 209-210; Hirst 2010: 9-11; Kerr 2006: 114). Furthermore, almost all of Greater Lebanon's newly added Muslim population rejected the French mandate; instead, instead they desired an independent Arab state (Hirst 2010: 11; Kerr 2006: 113-114; Traboulsi 2012: 80). The French measure ensured the existence of a highly unstable political system in which the different religious groups were competing for power. Because of the French support for the Maronites, Lebanon developed itself as Christian dominated state oriented on Europe. The Sunni Muslim population however, looked towards the wider Arab world, and demanded unity with Syria (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 209-210; Kerr 2006: 118).

In 1926, France granted the country a constitution renaming Greater Lebanon the 'Lebanese Republic'. The constitution created the office of the President and Prime Minister, and established the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament), the latter was elected on the basis of religious representation (Clevenland and Bunton 2013:

209-210; Kerr 2006: 114). Apart from this, the constitution provided for several important principles. First, Article 7[2] of the constitution officially recognises 17 religious groups, Christian, Muslim and Jewish. Furthermore, based on freedom of religious belief, the government abandoned its legislative rights and rulings on personal status as stated in article 9[3]. In article 10[4] of the constitution, the protection of private religious education was formally recognized. In a sense article 7, 9, and 10 of the Lebanese Constitution could be regarded as products of the Ottoman legacy, and the *millet*-system the Ottomans implemented in Mount Lebanon, providing similar freedoms for the various religious communities.

Article 95 officially prescribes the fair distribution of government and administrative posts among the several religious sects (Donohue 2009: 2510). The constitution however, did not define the exact formula of representation (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 210).

In the 1930s, Lebanon faced the political challenge to reconcile the Christians and Muslims, both communities having different ambitions for Lebanon. The goal was to persuade the Christian and Muslim communities to work together in order to create a Lebanese nation. According to one of the leading Maronite politicians, Bishari al-Khuri, Christian-Muslim cooperation was to be established based on their common opposition against the foreign occupying power, only by working together could they achieve an independent Lebanon. Furthermore, it was

[2] Article 7: All Lebanese shall be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction. http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf (accessed 10 April, 2014).

[3] Article 9: There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds and shall guarantees, under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It shall also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected.
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf (accessed 10 April, 2014).

[4] Article 10: Education shall be free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not affect the dignity of any of the religions or sects. There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf (accessed 10 April, 2014).

believed that an independent Lebanon could unite the various religious sects into a single nation. In 1936, the Franco-Lebanese treaty created the basis for fair representation of all religious sects. (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 210-211; Firro 2012: 246; Salibi 1965: 182). The shortly afterwards elected Maronite President Émile Eddé, picked Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab, a Sunni Muslim, as his Prime Minister. This move established the understanding that the President of Lebanon would be a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 210-211).

3.3 The National Pact and the First Lebanese Republic

The Second World War presented the opportunity for Lebanese independence from the French. In order to achieve independence from the French, President al-Khuri (Maronite) and Prime Minister al-Sulh (Sunni) worked together to overcome the problem of sectarianism and regional identity. Their agreement came to be known as the National Pact of 1943 or *al-Mithaq al-Watani* (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 213; Kerr 2006: 122-123). The agreement stated that Lebanon should be a completely independent, sovereign, and neutral country. Furthermore, it stated that Christians should not seek Western protections. The Muslims pledged in return not to pursue their desire for a larger Islamic Arabic state. Finally, the government's main goal was to overcome the sectarian divide (Hudson 1968: 44). A new system of power sharing with a government by grand coalition came into being. The grand coalition consisted of a Maronite President, a Sunni prime minister, a Shi'a Speaker in the Chamber of Deputies, and a Greek Orthodox Deputy Speaker and Deputy Prime Minister (Lijphart 1977: 148). In addition, the cabinet represented the sects in a proportional way. Furthermore, a Parliament of 55 seats, 30 for Christians and 25 for Muslims (6:5 ratio) was established, all based on the census of 1932, in which the Christians constituted a majority over the Muslim population (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 213; Kerr 2006: 132-133; Traboulsi 2012: 107). One can conclude that the National Pact was based on the assumption that "an individual's ultimate loyalty was still owed to his religious community" (Rabinovich 1977). Therefore, the National Pact agreement was more

of a pragmatic accommodation in order to cope with the sectarian issue and to rid themselves of the French, than it was a solution to the broader problem (Hudson 1968: 44).

The period following Lebanon's independence witnessed several developments within and outside its borders. Many Muslims immigrated from Syria and former Palestine during and after the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948 that resulted in a mass exodus of Palestinian Arabs. This development combined with the emigration of Christians and a high birth rate among the Muslim population, accounted for a change in Lebanon's demographic landscape in favour of the Muslim population (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 248; Dekmejian 1978: 256; Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010: 298-299; Hudson 1968: 54-61). Over the years, tensions among the different religious segments grew, as the Muslims, and especially the Shi'a community, felt underrepresented when looking at the share of the population they became to represent. Estimates show that over the period since the last census until 1973 the Shi'a population grew significantly with an estimated 9 per cent, whereas the Maronite and the Sunni population decreased with 5 and seven per cent according to estimates (Kerr 2006: 136). The Muslim population at least balanced the Christian population after the National Pact. Nonetheless, it was primarily in the interest of the Maronite Christians, but also the Sunni's, that the existing power-sharing formula was not to follow the demographic changes. The Maronite and Sunni leaders did little to change it since it ensured their supremacy. As a result, the governing coalitions grew increasingly unrepresentative of the changing demographics in the country (Kerr 2006: 136-138). The growing dissatisfaction within the Muslim population combined with growing allegations of corruption under the presidency of Camille Chamoun led to insurgencies and the conflict of 1958 (Traboulsi 2012: 133-134).

After the one-year civil war, the popular army General Fouad Chehab succeeded Camille Chamoun as President. During the years of Chehab's presidency (1958-1964) Lebanon witnessed a relatively calm period in which Chehab introduced several social reforms. Apart from this, since Lebanon's independence from the French it successfully developed during the 1950s into a thriving modern free market economy, reaching its economic peak during Chehab's time in office (Salibi

1988: 190-192). Lebanon's expansion over these years mostly benefited the urban areas with Christian majorities such as Beirut, whilst neglecting rural areas mostly inhabited by Shi'a Muslims (El-Khalil and Makdisi 2013: 9-10).

On June 5 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a series on pre-emptive strikes against Israel's neighbours. It took Israel only six days to defeat its adversaries, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The Six-Day-War and the decisive Israeli victory in it unwillingly plunged Lebanon into the Arab-Israeli conflict, causing the Lebanese system slowly to crumble (Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010: 327; Traboulsi 2012; 153). After the war an additional 100,000 Palestinians fled to neighbouring Lebanon, resulting in around 250,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon, making up 10 per cent of the total Lebanese population (Hirst 2010: 86-87). Apart from this, after the war many rebels of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) sought shelter in Lebanon from which they executed guerrilla raids across the border with Israel. Raids into Israel intensified after King Hussein of Jordan cracked down on the PLO in Jordan, the PLO subsequently moving its base to Lebanon. Israel in return executed retaliation raids into Southern Lebanon and Beirut (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 208-209). The Lebanese society divided on the matter of the Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel, and in turn Israel's retaliations. Support for the PLO came primarily from the Muslim population, of whom many supported the Palestinian cause (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 209; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 380-382). Eventually, the external involvement in the Lebanese society caused the already fragile system to collapse and fall into civil war (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 209-210; Choucair 2006: 5).

3.4 The civil war and thereafter

In August 1975, fighting between Christian and Muslim militias broke out. Shortly alliances emerged, soldiers of the Lebanese Armed Forces disintegrated into the different alliances along confessional lines. In May 1976, President Hafez al-Assad of Syria sent his army into Lebanon as a peacekeeping force mainly invited by the Christian militias but endorsed by the Arab League. In October of that year, both sides reached a cease-fire. The cease-fire authorised Syria's presence as 'Arab

Deterrent Force' (ADF) to observe the cease-fire agreement, enabling al-Assad to pursue his own agenda in Lebanon (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 381-382; Choucair 2006: 6; Cobban 1987: 144). The years following Syria's intervention saw the disintegration of the country along the confessional sectarian lines. Eventually in 1982, the war intensified after Israel launched a grand invasion into Lebanon with the goal the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 383-384).

In 1989, the parties to the conflict came together in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia to broker a deal to end the war (details of the institutional implications of the Ta'if Accord will follow in chapter 6). The Ta'if Accord eventually ended the war in October 1990. In the end, the 15-year long war resulted in over 70,000 deaths and another 97,000 persons injured. Furthermore, the 15 years of fighting caused the displacement of approximately 157,000 Muslims and 670,000 Christian. In addition, about a quarter of a million people emigrated permanently during the years of the war (Traboulsi 2012: 244-245). Apart from the demographic changes, the war caused the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon. However, the war gave rise to the establishment of the radical Shi'a militant group and later also political party, Hezbollah. The war and the subsequent Ta'if Accord ensured Syrian military presence in Lebanon, during the war as ADF and after the war to implement the Ta'if Accord. Syrian military presence in Lebanon granted the Syrian government in Damascus significant influence over Lebanese politics until 2005, when the Cedar Revolution forced the Syrian forces out of Lebanon (Hirst 2010: 307-309; Haddad 2009: 403-406). Moreover, the 15 years of internal warfare between the various sectarian-linked militias, has most likely made sectarianism in Lebanon stronger by the end of the war (Hudson 1997: 117).

Overall, the historical political background of Lebanon demonstrates the significance of the various religious sects and the effect they have had on the Lebanese society. As from the Ottoman period, foreign rulers tried to deal with the religious diversity in the country. The Ottomans introduced the *millet*-system, and the French gave the country a constitution drawing on the principles of the *millet*-system, whilst adding the fair distribution of government and administrative posts among the various religious sects. These principles also formed the basis for the

National Pact of 1943, in which the distribution of power in the different government bodies between the religious sects was officially finalised. Over the period leading the to the post-civil war system, the political system in Lebanon witnessed several aspects of power sharing and mechanisms of coping with its highly diverse character, which formed the basis for the post-civil war power-sharing system.

4 THEORY

How 'successful' is the post-Ta'if consociational system? To answer that question we first need understand what a consociational system is, and what it expects to achieve. Therefore, I will first describe the main theory of power sharing proposed by Lijphart, followed by refinements and additions of other scholars. Secondly, I will present both the positive and negative effects power-sharing institutions can have on a state and its people.

4.1 Theories of power sharing

Lijphart explains his power sharing theory as a solution for countries that are characterised by deep religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, or ethnic cleavages: hence plural societies. According to Lijphart these inescapable divisions cannot be erased, and therefore need to be accommodated. In turn, Lijphart proposes the consociational model, based on the inclusion rather than exclusion of the various sects. Exclusion in deeply divided in societies, through majority rule, will almost inevitably result in majority dictatorship (Lijphart 1977; Lijphart 2012: 32). Furthermore, Majority rule in plural societies results in the exclusion of minority groups in decision-making process. Exclusion from the decision-making process encourages excluded minority groups to turn to other mechanisms presenting their demands, such as violent protests or even mass rebellion, which may in turn severely destabilise the state (Lijphart 2012: 31-32; Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009: 334).

Lijphart's consociational democracy model can be characterised by four core elements. One of the most important elements according to Lijphart is the existence of power sharing on the executive level, through a grand coalition in which the political leaders of the significant segments are represented and govern the country (Lijphart 1977: 25). Proportionality is the second characteristic of consociational democracy. In a proportional system, all segments influence the decision-making process in a proportional way, as opposed to a majoritarian

system. Proportionality also serves as an impartial and neutral way for allocating financial resources and civil service appointments. Majority rule is dangerous in plural societies, since minorities that are consistently denied access to political power and the decision-making process may feel excluded and discriminated against by the majority in power. In turn, such circumstances can easily give rise to the outbreak of conflict in highly divided societies (Lijphart 1977: 38-39; Lijphart 2012: 31-32; Doorenspleet 2005: 365-369). The third characteristic is minority veto-power. Due to the minority status of minority groups in a grand coalition, these groups might have to compromise their vital interest. Since a defeat of vital interests – such as religious related issues – will be regarded as unacceptable, it will endanger the consociational democratic model and thus the stability. Therefore, it is necessary to grant every segment veto-power in order to protect their vital interests (Lijphart 1977: 36-37). Finally, the segmental autonomy characteristic states that every segment should have the ability to rule over such areas, which are of exclusive interest to that minority. On all national matters, which concern all the various segments, the grand coalition rules (Lijphart 1977: 41).

In later work, Lijphart offers a substantive revision of his original theory, classifying power sharing and autonomy (the grand coalition and the segmental principals) as the primary – most important – principles, whereas the proportionality and mutual veto principles have become secondary characteristics (Lijphart 2002: 39; Lijphart 2004: 97). Apart from Lijphart's own changes, power-sharing advocate Brendan O'Leary offers a refined approach to Lijphart's grand coalition characteristic, whilst restating the need of segmental autonomy and proportionality. According to Lijphart, consociation requires the inclusion of all the political leaders of all significant groups in society in the executive body of the state. However, O'Leary questions whether Lijphart's requirement of the inclusion of all representatives of all groups is realistic, and addresses this issue by offering three alternative types of *consociational democracy*: *complete*, *concurrent* and *weak* consociational executive (O'Leary 2005: 12-13; Kerr 2006: 27-28).

In a *complete* consociational executive, as Lijphart's proposes, the leaders of all the significant segments in the state are represented at the executive level, including

the different parties within each segment. Similar to the former, in a *concurrent* consociational executive each significant segment is represented. However in contrast to the former, in a *concurrent* consociational executive the executive has not representation of all parties of each significant segment, just of the parties that represent the majority in each significant segment. Finally, in a *weak* consociational executive at least one segment is represented by a party that does not enjoy absolute majority support within their segment. This can happen in cases of several relatively smaller parties within one segment of which none can count on more than 50 per cent of the votes (O'Leary 2005: 12-13). Overall, what matters most concerning the executive is that it must be a "meaningful cross-community executive power sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government with at least plurality levels of support within its segment" (O'Leary 2005: 13).

In addition to the four core characteristics of consociational democracy, Lijphart proposes several favourable factors, of which the presence or absence can either make or break a consociational democracy. Van Schendelen and Boogaards criticise these factors as being empty and inconsistent over time. These favourable factors or conditions do not tell us anything since, according to Lijphart (1977: 75), they may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary; they do not have any predicting value (van Schendelen 1985: 153, 160; Boogaards 1998). The most 'prominent' of these favourable conditions according to Michael Kerr are: segmental isolation of ethnic communities, a multiple balance of power, the presence of external threats common to all communities, overarching loyalties to the state, a tradition of elite accommodation, socioeconomic equality, a small population size in order to reduce the policy load and, a moderate multi-party system with segmental parties (Kerr 2006: 27; Lijphart 1977: 53-103; Lijphart 1985: 119-128). Furthermore, McGarry, O'Leary, and Kerr argue that these favourable conditions almost all focus on internal factors, downplaying the importance of exogenous forces. Outside forces can facilitate power sharing through mediation, or by using incentives or pressures to induce or force the different parties to reach an agreement or to abide by the already existing power-sharing rules (McGarry and O'Leary 2006: 48; Kerr 2006 28).

Addressing the problems with the favourable factors or conditions, power sharing proponents McGarry and O'Leary propose three conditions crucial to the establishment of democratic consociational government: "elites require sufficient motivation to engage in power-sharing and to take the tough decisions conducive to inter-ethnic political accommodation; elites must be free to negotiate and to lead their electorates where they might not want to go; there must be a multiple balance of power among the subcultures and those subcultures must be stable within society" (McGarry and O'Leary 1995: 338-344). In addition to the internal conditions, Kerr proposes the following external condition: "the existence of positive external regulating pressures, from state and non-state actors, which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of, and support for, consociation" (Kerr 2006: 28).

Furthermore, Lijphart's power-sharing model has been criticised for not being democratic enough since government by grand coalition, as opposed to the British majoritarian model, almost inevitably results in a relatively small and weak opposition, or the complete absence of an opposition in the legislature (Lijphart 1977: 47-48). According to Lijphart (1977: 48), a strong opposition is better suitable for a homogenous society, not for a society that faces unfavourable circumstances as deep segmental cleavages. In defence of Lijphart's power-sharing model, Andeweg (2000), using as his reference point Dahl's (1971) definition of democracy (polyarchy) as *competition* and *inclusiveness*, argues that consociationalism may outperform competitive majoritarian democracy with regards to Dahl's (1971) principle of *inclusiveness*, since Lijphart's power-sharing model's main objective is inclusion of all the significant segments of a plural society in government (Andeweg 2000: 530).

In the end, advocates claim that power-sharing institutions encourage moderate behaviour and cooperation among the various contenting segments in highly divided societies, eventually providing for a stable political democracy that reduces the chances of segmental tensions, violent uprisings and inter-group violence and conflict (Norris 2008: 210). Lijphart's model works according to a 'top-down' two-stage process. First, power-sharing institutions are believed to ease conflict between the leadership (elite) of the various sects. The power-

sharing system is designed to increase the number of stakeholders that benefit of playing according the rules of the game. The proportional electoral system facilitates the participation of big and small parties representing all the significant segments within the Parliament. Within the Parliament, party leaders have the incentive to collaborate and bargain with other parties of different sects in order to gain office in the cabinet or to pass or reject legislation (Norris 2008: 24-25).

Furthermore, power sharing in the executive based on proportionality is also likely to stimulate elite cooperation, mitigating extreme demands and intolerance towards each other. Because the leaders of all different segments are represented in the government, granting them a share of power, they are provided with a strong incentive to accept the legitimacy of the system, to moderate their demands, and to cooperate with leaders of other sects. In the second stage of the process, in order to retain their share of power as member of the governing elite, the segmental leaders are believed to endorse conciliation among their followers and to encourage the acceptance of the system. In this system, it is thought that the various segments will accept the system since they are represented in it (Norris 2008: 24-25).

On the other hand, concerning exclusion, quantitative research about majority rule in divided societies shows that: "the likelihood of armed confrontation increases as the centre of power becomes more ethnically segmented and as greater proportions of a state's population are excluded from power because of their ethnic background" (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009: 334). Thus, when large ethnic groups are excluded from state power or are underrepresented in government, they are much more likely to challenge the regime's insiders through violent means (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010: 114).

4.2 Possible negative effects of power sharing

Alternatively, several scholars have challenged the claims by Lijphart and other advocates that power-sharing regimes are the best solution for divided societies. In the following section, I will highlight the main critiques on power-sharing

institutions in plural society: what negative (side) effects might power sharing cause?

One of the main critiques on the model is that the power-sharing model assumes that ethnic, religious, or cultural divisions in society are impossible to overcome and will persist. Drawing on this fundamental critique, Donald Horowitz (1985) claims that power-sharing regimes actually make things worse. According to Horowitz, power-sharing regimes institutionalise ethnic, religious, or cultural differences, deepening the cleavages in society. Furthermore, due to the lower threshold in a system of proportional representation political parties and leaders representing a certain sub-group tend to focus only on the people within their sub-group, and fail to attract people from outside their community. In turn, this can have a negative impact on the relationships between the various groups. Horowitz argues therefore that the system of proportional representation does not provide an incentive for cross-group cooperation in plural societies. Due to the proportional representation electoral system there is no need to appeal to more segments in society, this supports more extreme segmental parties against more moderate parties (Horowitz 2008: 1216-1217). In this way, proportional representation helps institutionalise the differences in society, creating more inter-group tensions, which in turn are likely to cause political instability and conflict (Norris 2008: 27-30). An empirical example of Horowitz's critique can be found in the Dayton power-sharing arrangement introduced in former Yugoslavia, which led to fewer, not more, inter-group relations (Norris 2008: 28).

Furthermore, granting the distinct segments partial autonomy might provide the segments with additional demands for more autonomy, argues Eric Nordlinger (1972). When these demands are not met, internal conflict and secession may follow (Nordlinger 1972). Additionally, government by grand coalition and the mutual veto can make decision-making slow, and on some matters, it can make decision-making even impossible. These negative effects of the consociational system may even cause stagnation and the instability of the entire system (Horowitz 2008: 1220-1221; Lijphart 1977: 50-51).

In the case of Lebanon, if the power sharing institutions are present and function properly it is expected, as advocates claim, they will moderate the leaders and

followers of the various confessional groups, in turn easing the tensions between contenting confessional groups, averting hostilities and ethnic conflict.

In the end, power sharing might not be the ideal long-term solution to the problem. However, one should see it as way of coping with the existing difficult circumstances in highly divided societies; offering the most realistic goal instead of the most desirable goal (Lijphart 1977: 49).

5 METHODOLOGY

5.1 Method

For this study, a qualitative single-case study was conducted, in which post-civil war Lebanon is the one case. The time frame under examination will stretch from January 1992 until the end of 2011. Although the civil war, to which the Ta'if Accord has brought an end, lasted until October 1989 the first practical test of the new system was not until the first post-war Parliamentary elections of 1992. Therefore, January 1992 marks the beginning of the period researched. The end of 2011 was chosen because of the lack of data afterwards and the civil war in neighbouring Syria that from 2012 increasingly started to leave its marks on Lebanon. Furthermore, in order to control as much as possible for Syria's military presence in the country in the case of the first sub-question about domestic peace, the time period has been split in one period from January 1992 until the end of April 2005, and the other period stretching from May 2005 until the end of 2011, during former period Syrian troops were present in Lebanon, whereas during the latter period they were not.

5.2 Variables

As stated in the introduction, this thesis examines to what extent Lebanon's post-civil war political power-sharing structure was a 'success' until the end of 2011. In the context of this research I have linked 'success' to two questions concerning two dependent variables: 1) *moderation of political actors and the Lebanese public*, and 2) *domestic peace*. These variables are interrelated since the increased moderation of political actors and the Lebanese public, is expected, in turn, to reduce the likelihood of internal hostilities between the various sectarian groups, resulting in lower levels of inter-sectarian violence, providing for domestic peace (see chapter 4).

With *Moderation of political actors and the Lebanese public*, I have first looked at the moderation of religious based political actors. In this case, I have selected one of the most prominent of these actors, the Shi'a Muslim Hezbollah. Hezbollah is Lebanon's only group that maintains an armed militia outside the Lebanese army, and can therefore pose a serious threat for domestic peace. This distinction, compared to other political actors, makes the moderation of Hezbollah essential and more important than that of other political actors. Furthermore, there is a fair amount of information available about Hezbollah, compared to other political actors in Lebanon, which makes Hezbollah a suitable and more reliable case to research. To see if Hezbollah has moderated over the course of the period under consideration, I have looked especially at the language used in terms of identification with Shi'a Islam, demands and attitudes towards other religious groups found in official party documents and statements made by prominent Hezbollah affiliates in public statements.

Secondly, I have looked at the public opinion of the Lebanese people over the period under consideration (1992-2011) on several questions related to matters that are indicators for the level of moderation. The following indicators test the level of moderation of the Lebanese public after the end of the civil war in terms of identification with their own religious group. Furthermore, the attitude on these matters indicate the level of tolerance towards people belonging to a different group, and the likelihood a hostile environment between different groups will emerge over time. These matters include:

- Identification with religion vs. identification with the country. In this case, identification with religion indicates the importance of religion that essentially signifies the major cleavage in the Lebanese society, whereas identification with the state indicates diminishing importance of religion and increased identification with the unifying factor in Lebanon that is the state (citizenship).
- Views on violence against perceived enemies of their religion. An individual's stance on violence against perceived enemies of their religion also indicates their level of moderation in terms of importance of religion,

the main dividing cleavage in Lebanon, and the levels of religious extremism.

- Favourability or resentment towards the other group. This indicator demonstrates the level moderation of people belonging to a religious sect, which all Lebanese citizens are, towards people of the other religious sect.

Domestic peace in context of this research and the case of Lebanon refers the absence of direct intra-state violence between different groups, most notably between sectarian groups (January 1992 - 31 December 2011). The focus here will be on violent eruptions for several days within Lebanon between different domestic groups for political reasons, causing multiple deaths and injuries. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, by defining 'success' the way that I did, I have decided to go for a more pragmatic and realistic definition of 'success' than a 'stable democracy' as Lijphart poses the goal of his power-sharing model (Lijphart 1977: 1).

The independent variable in this research is the power-sharing system (re) established after the civil war as described in the previous chapter (theory), and will be further explained in the coming chapter.

5.3 Other factors

As Horowitz (1985: 572) notes, difficulty is in determining whether 'success' can actually be attributed to the presence of the power-sharing system, instead of the presence or absence of other factors. In this sense, several other factors (independent variables) could influence the success, lack of success or even failure of the power sharing system in Lebanon. Alternative factors of influence could be related to the highly unstable region of the Middle East in which Lebanon is located. In addition, one should take into account the influence of external forces such as Syria and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Including internal forces such as Syrian military presence until the Cedar Revolution in 2005, on which I will elaborate more along the way.

5.4 Data

For the most part this research was conducted through the use existing literature from a wide range of different sources. To examine the domestic peace dependent variable I have used reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the International Center for Transnational Justice (ICTJ), independent research by several scholars before me, and publications by media outlets. The first part of the second variable, the moderation of political actors (Hezbollah), was examined by using existing research of independent scholars and research institutes. In addition, primary sources such as public statements by prominent Hezbollah affiliates and the Hezbollah manifesto were used. In order to examine the second part of the second variable, the moderation of the Lebanese public, I have made use of the polling data from international research institutions as the Pew Research Center, Gallup and local and international research institutes focussing on public opinion.

6 POWER SHARING IN POST-CIVIL WAR LEBANON

The Document of National Reconciliation signed in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia on October 22, 1989 ended fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon (Traboulsi 2012: 246). The Chamber of Deputies (officially named the Parliament of Lebanon) officially approved the Ta'if Accord – as the Document of National Reconciliation is better known – on August 21, 1990 (Norton 1991: 461). The Ta'if Accord reinstated many of the pre-civil war institutions that had governed Lebanon ever since the National Pact of 1943. Lebanon remained a Parliamentary democracy based on the constitution of 1926 with its modifications over the years, and largely based on the unwritten rules of the National Pact of 1943 (Kerr 2006: 167). The articles 9[5], 10[6], and 95[7] of the constitution addressing sectarianism remained largely unchanged over time.

The top offices in the country are based on a Lijphart-like power-sharing structure, in which the positions in the executive branches of government are distributed between a Maronite President and a Sunni Prime Minister. The Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, the top-legislative office, is reserved for a Shi'a. Together

[5] See footnote 3.

[6] See footnote 4.

[7] Article 95: (As amended by the Constitutional Law of November 9, 1943 And by the constitutional law of September 21,1990) The Chamber of Deputies that is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to bring about the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee shall be formed, headed by the President of the Republic, it include, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures. The tasks of this Committee shall be to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Ministers council of ministers, and to follow up the execution of the transitional plan.
During the transitional phase:
a. The sectarian groups shall be represented in a just and equitable manner in the formation of the Cabinet.
b. The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies shall be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents shall be excepted from this rule, and the posts shall be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any setarian group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence.
Source:
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf (accessed 3 April, 2014).

these three positions form the so-called ruling *Troika*, embodying Lijphart's principle of executive power sharing, and ensuring cross-sectarian elite agreement in decisions (Traboulsi 2012: 110-111; Zahar 2005: 233-234). In the legislature (Chamber of Deputies), the distribution of seats is based on a power sharing structure representing the different sects proportionally. Likewise, in the Council of Ministers the positions are divided equally between Christians and Muslims.

The Ta'if Accord had several implications for Lebanon's political structure. The most significant changes decided upon in Ta'if affected the setup of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. The President remained a Maronite serving a six-year term, but the office of President lost in Ta'if most of its powers to the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers. The President could no longer dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, appoint or dismiss the Prime Minister, control the Lebanese Armed Forces, head the government or chair cabinet meetings (Kerr 2006: 162; Maila 1992: 27-35). Moreover, the President lost its veto and voting rights in the Council of Ministers. Before Ta'if, the President had the power to veto any legislation. The President's main role became that of a referee between the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet to oversee the application of the constitution (Kerr 2006: 162; Maila 1992: 27-35). Within the Council of Ministers, the two-thirds majority in order to pass legislation rule was introduced (Kerr 2006: 162).

The Prime Minister, traditionally a Sunni Muslim, saw its powers increase after Ta'if. The Prime Minister gained the power to form the government, a task the Prime Minister before Ta'if had to share with the more powerful President. As a result of the President's reduction of power over the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister became the new head of government and has since Ta'if been charged with forming the executive after nonbinding-consultations with the Chamber of Deputies and chairing the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister controls the Council of Minister's agenda, chairs its meetings, and signs all legislative decrees (Kerr 2006: 162-163; Maila 1992; Norton 1991: 461). Concerning the legislative, in the pre-civil war system, the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were divided among elected Christians and Muslims according to a 6:5

ratio in favour of Christians. In the post-Ta'if system, the Chamber of Deputies was expanded to 128 seats in which both Christians and Muslims would hold 50 per cent of the seats leading to the following allocation of seats:

Table 1: Sectorial seat allocation in the Lebanese Parliament after the Ta'if Accord

Religious sect	Allocated seats
Maronite	34
Greek Orthodox	14
Greek Catholic	8
Armenian Orthodox	5
Armenian Catholic	1
Protestants	1
Other Christian sects	1
Total Christian	64
Sunni	27
Shi'a	27
Alawite	2
Druze[8]	8
Total Muslims	64
Total	128

Source: (IFES 2009a)

The change in distribution was also implemented in the executive branch of government, the Council of Ministers, where the 24 (number was expanded in Doha Agreement to 30) offices where equally divided between Christians and Muslims; guidelines for the distribution of offices among the different sects within the two main religions were absent. The demographic shift in the period after the National Pact of 1943 in favour of the Muslim, and especially the Shi'a population contributed to the change in Parliamentary seats distribution. However, it is doubtful that this new distribution of seats was in fact the realistic proportional representation of the Christian and Muslim populations (Haddad 2009: 404-407; Norton 1991: 462; Traboulsi 2012: 251-251). Some believe the new distribution should have been 5:6 reflecting the perceived demographic reality favouring the Muslim population (Kerr 2006: 163).

Chiefly, when looking at estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency of the post-war demographic makeup (Figure 2 and 3), one notices that the Christians are

[8] Note that in the distribution of seats in the Parliament Druze are considered a part of Islam.

overrepresented and Muslims underrepresented when it comes to both seats in the Parliament and positions in the Council of Ministers. In fact, the supposed principle of proportional representation, as laid down in Article 95[9] of the Lebanese constitution, was not strictly met.

Figure 2: Main religious sects (in percentage of total population)[10]



Source: (CIA 2012)

Figure 3: The three distinct religions (in percentage of total population)[11] [12]



Source: (CIA 2012)

Finally, the Ta'if Accord extended the Speaker's term in office from one year to a four-year renewable term. This change, combined with the increased role of the Chamber of Deputies, significantly improved the Speaker's influence, since it could now play a considerable role in the government-formation process and in overseeing government activity without the constant political pressures and bargaining, which was a result of the initial one-year term rule (Kerr 2006: 164; Maila 1992: 18-19). The institutional changes in Lebanon's political system after Ta'if improved the balance of power between the various sects and reflected the demographic changes, favouring especially the Sunni and Shi'a sects, attributing significant more power to the Council of Ministers and the elected Chamber of Deputies, in which all the significant sects are represented proportionally (Zahar 2005: 231-232).

[9] See footnote 7
[10] Figures are based on data from 2012. Other estimates don not show substantial different figures in the years stretching the post-civil war period.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The Druze are included in the Muslim sect as was done with the distribution of seats in the Parliament.

Relating case of Lebanon to the theory, the post-civil war Lebanese political system is based on the principles of power sharing explained by Lijphart. The consociational character is reflected in the distribution of power over the top political offices (President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament), representing the three biggest sects (Maronite, Sunni and Shi'a). Furthermore, the positions in the country's top executive body, Council of Ministers, are distributed equally among Christians and Muslims and within this dichotomy proportionally over the smaller religious denominations. These institutions approach quiet well Lijphart's executive power sharing characteristic: the grand coalition, in which the different segments are proportionally represented. The same is true concerning legislature in which the various sects are represented on a proportional basis. Both proportional representation in the executive and legislative are reflecting O'Leary's foremost power-sharing condition: "meaningful cross-community executive power sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government with at least plurality levels of support within its segment" (O'Leary 2005: 13)[13].

Furthermore, in article 9[14] and 10[15] of the Lebanese constitution government abandoned its legislative rights and rulings on personal status. In article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution, the protection of private religious education was formally recognized. These principles remained unchanged after Ta'if and granted the various religious sects autonomy on matters related to their religion, qualifying as Lijphart's principle of segmental autonomy. Overall, the accord emphasised the confessional compromise and inter-communal cooperation, which are practices power-sharing institutions are believed to promote (Norton 1991: 461; Norris 2008: 24-25).

[13] Government parties are both represented in the executive (Council of Ministers) and the legislature (Lebanese Parliament).
[14] See footnote 3
[15] See footnote 4

7 THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE

In order to be able to determine whether the power sharing institutions had the desired effect on the country, it is necessary to examine how the power-sharing institutions actually functioned in practise, and whether the power-sharing institutions worked the way they were supposed to work. In this sense, can we speak of a well-functioning Parliamentary democracy based on well-functioning power sharing? In practise this means: were there elections facilitating the proportional representation of the different religious communities in a proper and fair way (proportionality characteristic)? Furthermore, did the proportional representation within the Parliament and Council of Ministers lead to effective cooperation among the community representatives within the legislature and the government (grand coalition principle)? In addition, what factors hampered or contributed to proper and fair representation, elite cooperation, and overall the functioning of the power sharing system? In order to address these questions I will give an overview of the post-civil war period that focuses on these questions.

The sole embodiment of the representation of the various sects in Lebanon is the Lebanese Parliament. Direct elections for the Chamber of Deputies are being held every four years according the constitution of 1926. Since the Electoral Law of 1992, the Lebanese electoral system consists of six administrative districts, which are subdivided in three large-size electoral districts and nine smaller multi member electoral districts. In the elections of 2000 and 2005, the number of electoral districts expanded to 14 districts. In 2008, the number of electoral districts expanded again to 26. The districts differed in size and the number of assigned seats (IFES 2009a: 1-2; Salamey and Payne 2008: 463). Within each multi member district, instead of voting for closed party lists, every elector votes for individual candidates from the various confessional groups that are assigned seats within the district; however, in most cases the individual candidates are members of a political party. Furthermore, every elector can, if desired, vote for all the available confessional seats, regardless of the voter's own confessional sect. So, for example Sunni Muslim in the district of Shouf is allowed to vote for two Sunni, two

Druze, three Maronite seats and one Greek Catholic seat within their district, eventually casting a maximum of eight votes.

The seats are allocated to the candidates that have received the most votes compared the other candidates from the same religious group. In case there is only one seat assigned for a specific sect, then a simple plurality of the votes in a specific district wins the seat assigned for that sect; in effect a *first-past-the-post* mechanism (IFES 2009a: 3-4; Salloukh 2006: 639). Since people from all the different sects are allowed to vote for the seat distribution of other sects within their district as well, candidates are encouraged to attract voters from outside their own sectarian community in order to be elected. Furthermore, this system promotes local inter-sectarian alliances, which persuade their voters to cast votes for an entire alliance list rather than voting for individual candidates (Norton 2007: 97).

7.1 Lebanese politics during Syria's presence (1992-2005)

7.1.1 The first post-war elections

Based on the earlier-presented system, Parliamentary elections took place in 1992, almost two years after the end of the civil war, these elections were the first since 1972. In the first place, Maronite leader, General Michel Aoun, among many other Maronite Christians either opposed Ta'if entirely or accepted it with great hesitation (Hudson 1997: 114). In addition, the requirement for Syria's withdrawal was shortly after the Ta'if Accord suspended by Parliament. As a result, many Lebanese, especially Christians, foresaw fixed elections and opposed the elections in August and September of 1992 (Norton 1999: 43). Apart from the Christians objecting elections due to suspicion of Syrian manipulation, practical issues such as updating the electoral rolls and the amount of displaced persons per sect after the more than 15 years of violence, further complicated hastily held elections. However, Syria refused to delay the elections despite fierce opposition from the Christian side (Hudson 1997: 114; El-Khazan 1998). In turn, most Christians decided to boycott the elections in August and September of 1992.

As a result the turnout in predominantly Christian regions as Mount Lebanon where was only 16 per cent; overall the turnout for the first post-civil war elections in 1992 elections had been around 30 per cent, the lowest since Lebanon's independence (Hudson 1999: 28-29; IDEA 2011). Furthermore, in the 1992 election a record number of candidates was elected unopposed or practically without real competition, which was especially the case with Christian candidates due to the major boycott by the majority of the Christian community (El-Khazan 1998). In addition, many of the Christian seats were allotted to districts where they constituted a minority, making Christians represent Muslim interests (Salloukh 2006: 644). Apart from this, the 1992 elections were tainted by irregularities, abuses, and manipulation by the Syrian government in favour of the pro-Syrian government in Beirut (Norton 2007: 98). The protections provided in the Ta'if Accord against such practises, including the Constitutional Council that would have been able to facilitate challenges to the elections results, were not implemented in time for the 1992 elections (IFES 2009b).

The 1992 elections eventually led to a clear victory for the pro-Syrian government. In the new Parliament new entrants filled 80 per cent of the seats. Due to large Christian boycott, many traditional Maronite political names would not return to the political stage (Hudson 1999: 29). Furthermore, the General Amnesty Law acquitted all political crimes before March 28, 1991. This amnesty law facilitated the participation of the former militia leaders in post-war Lebanese politics that would otherwise most likely be on trial for committed war crimes (Knudsen 2010: 11). One of the most important results of the 1992 elections was the entry of the Shi'a militant group Hezbollah into Lebanese politics. Hezbollah, the Party of God, won under the name Loyalty to Resistance Bloc 12 seats in the 1992 Parliamentary elections (Hudson 1997: 115; Norton 1999: 45). Before the civil war Shi'a Muslims largely felt underrepresented, the changes the Ta'if Accord brought and the subsequent elections changed that. The Shi'a parties as Hezbollah and Amal and their allies constituted the largest blocs in the Parliament after the 1992 elections (Hudson 1997: 115). The pro-Western Rafiq Hariri became Prime Minister after the 1992 elections, forming the new Council of Ministers based on the winning blocs among the various religious sects. The newly elected Hariri

provided the former warlords and militia leaders with portfolios in the Council of Ministers and other posts within the government (Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 122). This practise ensured Hariri with continued support of the various religious groups. Furthermore, by making the warlords and former militia leaders a part of the political decision-making process, incorporated in the political process, they no longer needed to resort to violence in order to affect national politics, reducing the chances of renewed violence according to power sharing proponents (Knudsen 2010: 11; Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 122; Norris 2008: 24-25).

Contrary to expectations of some Lebanese and Western officials concerning Hezbollah's participation in politics, Hezbollah's first term in the Lebanese Parliament proved to be fruitful. Like other parties and independent Members of Parliament, Hezbollah deputies showed to be just as pragmatic, brokering deals and building legislative alliances in order to promote favourable legislation. Hezbollah had become a conventional political party (Hirst 2010: 242; Norton 1999: 45). According to then President of Hezbollah's political wing, Muhammad Ra'd, the new system established in Ta'if facilitated constructive participation in Lebanese politics, something the movement previously always had objected (Norton 1999: 45).

Another significant development in Lebanese politics was the entry of Sunni self-made billionaire Rafiq Hariri. Hariri had close ties to the Saudi royal family and enjoyed a large network of powerful connections around the globe. Unlike many of his political colleagues, Hariri had no violent wartime past, and played a large role in the process leading to the Ta'if Accord (Safa 2006: 28). As Prime Minister, Hariri was dedicated to rebuild the country and restart economic growth. The first years of Hariri's presidency showed significant economic growth rate peaking at eight per cent in 1994 (Makdisi and El-Khalil 2013: 16). The Hariri government made substantial progress in establishing economic growth. Paired with economic growth, the country faced the growing problem of economic inequality. Hariri's primary focus on rebuilding Beirut's tarnished financial business district, made him neglect other problems such as the growing gap between the rich and the poor (Hudson 1997: 120). Hariri's popularity and sincere interest to rebuild and unify to country made him a source of concern in Damascus, resulting in

numerous efforts by the Hafez-al-Assad led government to trouble Hariri (Safa 2006: 28). Another reminder of Syria's dominance over Lebanese politics was the decision in 1995 to amend the constitution to extend the presidency of Elias Hwrari with an extra three-year; his friendly ties with Damascus and his presidential style suited Syrian interests (Hudson 1997: 115; Norton 1999: 46).

7.1.2 The 1996 and 2000 elections

In 1996, new Parliamentary elections were held under the same electoral law as the preceding one. Contrary to the 1992 elections, Christians did not decide to boycott the elections, resulting in an increased voter turnout of 44 per cent (IPU 1996). The elections turned out in a decisive victory for the pro-Syrian government led by Rafiq Hariri. Like the 1992 elections, were the 1996 elections tainted with irregularities according to independent monitor groups. The after the elections created government led by Hariri could count on the support from blocs of almost all religious denominations in the Lebanese Parliament (Hudson 1997: 115-116). The 1996 elections gave rise to the cooperation of different parties, movements, and blocs within inter-confessional alliances on the national and district level. In Beirut the alliance between Hariri's Future Movement (Sunni) and the Shi'a Amal movement was created and in Ba'abda-'Allay the Future Movement (Sunni), Amal (Shi'a), and Walid Jumblatt's Progessive Socialist Party (Druze) joined forces. In the North the pro-Syrian inter-confessional alliance of Sunni, Maronite and Greek Orthodox politicians won most of the seats (Salloukh 2006: 646).

When Hafez al-Assad past away in in June 2000, his 36-year old son Bashar succeeded him. With the intentions to tighten Syria's grip on Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad formed a Syrian-Lebanese security team run by Maronite President and former General Émile Lahoud, a confidant of Syria. The security team, fully supported by Assad, had a final say in all the important political and economic decisions and activity (Safa 2006: 28-29; Salloukh 2006: 646). Within the Council of Ministers Hariri and Syrian-backed Lahoud would often find themselves in a standoff against each other. Several times, Senior Syrian officials stepped in to

resolve a standoff between Hariri and Lahoud in order to steer away from government paralysis. Contrary to what was decided upon in Ta'if, the security team led by the President seemed to have the ultimate control over the Council of Ministers (Safa 2006: 29; Hirst 2010: 299).

Before the elections of August/September 2000, the electoral law reorganised several electoral districts mainly in Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the North. The reorganisation mainly benefitted pro-government and pro-Syrian candidates, whereas it contained threats from the Druze bloc, led by Jumblatt, and the anti-Syrian Christian Lebanese Forces. Besides extensive gerrymandering before the elections, were allegations of election fraud, such as the buying of votes widespread (Salloukh 2006: 646-647). Several pre-election alliances determined in many districts the outcome of the elections. For example in the South Amal (Shi'a), Hezbollah (Shi'a) and Hariri formed a cross-sectarian and cross-ideological alliance, in Ba'albak-Hermel candidates from the Phalange Party (mainly Maronites), Hezbollah (Shi'a), Amal (Shi'a), the Syrian Social National Party (secular) and the Ba'ath party (secular) joined forces in a pro-Syrian cross-sectarian alliance (Salloukh 2006: 647-649). Voter turnout in 2000 elections was 45 per cent, slightly higher than the previous elections in 1996 (IDEA 2011). The year 2000 would also mark the end of the war between Hezbollah and Israel. After being present for an 18-year long period in South Lebanon, Israel withdrew its forces to their side of the UN-drawn 'blue line'. Hezbollah's success in pushing Israel out of South Lebanon contributed to their electoral success in the 2000 elections. The Resistance and Development List of which Hezbollah was part won all the available seats in the South, and became the biggest bloc in the Lebanese Parliament (IPU 2000).

7.1.3 Rising tensions

After a two-year absence, the popular Hariri again assumed the office of Prime Minister. The confrontations between President Lahoud and Prime Minister Hariri continued after Hariri retook office. In 2004 Lahoud was supposed to leave office since his 6-year term was about to expire, a new President had to be chosen. Nevertheless, Damascus was not willing to let its ally in Beirut go. Therefore, Syria through the pro-Syrian Parliament tried to force an amendment to the constitution that would allow Lahoud to remain President for an extra three years. Hariri heavily opposed this move by Syria. The international community denounced the proposed constitutional amendment and the Syrian interference in Lebanese domestic affairs (Safa 2006: 29). As a result the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1559 calling for the immediate withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon and the disarming of all the non-state militias, the latter issue once part of the initial Ta'if Accord but was never implemented in a proper way. Despite international condemnation, the Parliament voted in favour of the amendment, extending Lahoud's Presidency. Hariri in turn resigned as Prime Minister. Along with the Druze leader Jumblatt, Syria was likely to face a strong anti-Syrian opposition that was expected to win the Parliamentary elections set for May 2005 (Choucair 2006: 6-7; Hirst 2010: 301-303; Maila 1992: 76-77; Safa 2006: 29-30).

On Valentine's Day 2005, a car bomb targeted Hariri's motorcade killing 'Mr. Lebabon' – how Hariri was known – and 21 others (Safa 2006: 30). The opposition bloc, consisting of prominent Druze, Christian, and Sunni politicians, almost immediately formed a unique cross-confessional coalition blaming Syria for the assassination (Choucair 2006: 7; Hirst 2010: 305-306). As a result, the opposition called for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces from Lebanon, the resignation of the pro-Syrian government and President Lahoud, the suspension of the leaders of the security services, to allow an UN Security Council investigation into to the assassination of Hariri, and Parliamentary elections free from outside interference (Rowayheb 2011: 419-422; Safa 2006: 30-31). The calls by the opposition resulted in mass anti-Syrian and anti-government demonstrations and rallies, bringing together protesters from all different

religious sects. In a rare display of unity people from the Socialist Party (mostly Druze), the Qornet Shahwan Gathering (Christian), the student movement of the Christian Lebanese Forces party (Christian), the Free Patriotic Movement (Christian), the Phalangist Party (Christian), Hariri's own Future Movement (mostly Sunni), and large numbers of Shi'a Muslims who belonged neither to Amal or Hezbollah came together in large anti-government and anti-Syria demonstrations on March 14; later termed the Cedar Revolution (Safa 2006: 31). On March 8, Hezbollah organised a rally in support of the pro-Syrian government, denouncing the UN Security Council Resolution; Hezbollah would later stand down. The increased international pressure combined with fierce internal pressure resulted in the complete withdrawal of the Syrian troops by late April that year, the resignation of the government, new elections to be held in June, and a UN investigation into the assassination of Hariri (Safa 2006: 33-34).

7.1.4 Analysis

Concerning the functioning of the power-sharing system, the post-civil war system provided for regular Parliamentary elections resulting in the distribution of seats among the various sects on a religious basis. However, the setup of the electoral districts after the war and the extensive gerrymandering that took place over the years especially disadvantaged the Christian population. Christians perceived the post-war system as unfair since most of the seats allotted to Christians where in districts in which they constituted a minority, therefore having to present Muslim interests, and having to rely on the Muslim-vote in order to be elected. Instead, according to the demographics, seats had to be added in the district of Beirut where Christians where underrepresented. As decided upon in Ta'if, all significant religious communities were to be proportionally represented in the Lebanese Parliament. This was however not always the case in the various districts due to the several electoral laws disadvantaging especially Christians, resulting in Christian underrepresentation in for example the electoral district of Beirut in terms of allotted electoral seats (Salamey and Payne 2008: 463-464; Salloukh 2006: 644-647).

Syria's dominance over Lebanese politics during the period under consideration resulted in extensive gerrymandering, election manipulation, and other irregularities mostly benefitting pro-Syrian parties. In addition, voter turnout was relatively low compared to the pre-war turnout of 54 per cent in 1972. Additionally, the system of proportional representation facilitated the political inclusion of the radical Shi'a party Hezbollah that still maintains its powerful militia in South Lebanon. This way Hezbollah has been given the opportunity to air its wishes and complaints via non-violent ways, and engaged Hezbollah in cooperation between other parties and blocs (Norton 1999: 45). Haddad describes Hezbollah's pragmatism as follows:

"The 128 seats in the Parliament were divided equally between Muslims and Christians, as were seats in the cabinet. Applying the Ta'if principle (…) would produce a government in which the Shi'ites would be entitled to five ministers out of the 24. Even if they were all to resign, the cabinet would still be able to meet and take decisions by a two-thirds majority vote. This reflected neither Hezbollah's demographic strength nor its big political force on the ground. Since Hezbollah decided to participate in the political system in its current form, its only possibility

of gaining the upper hand required it to participate in alliances based on negotiations, bargaining, and compromises" (Haddad 2009: 407).

Haddad's remark showed that the post-civil war power-sharing system facilitated and encouraged Hezbollah's participation in politics. In turn, power-sharing advocates believe this inclusion defuses the need to resort to alternative measures such as violence (see chapter 4 and chapter 8).

Furthermore, the post-war system facilitated, on various accounts, cooperation between different politicians of the different confessional sects. This was foremost the case in the form of electoral alliances and blocs that were formed by the political leader of the sects in order to win districts and secure a significant amount of seats in the Lebanese Parliament and eventually in the Council of Ministers.

Elite cooperation in the government institutions as the Parliament and the Council of Ministers was officially facilitated by the Ta'if Accord, which had set quotas for the number of seats allotted to the six biggest confessional sects in Parliament and an equal distribution between Christians and Muslims in the Council of Ministers. Many of the electoral alliances formed blocs in Parliament. Actual elite cooperation in both these bodies is hard to exactly track down. However, the necessity of a two-thirds majority in votes in both bodies, in order to pass legislation, makes cross-confessional cooperation practically inevitable.

Over the years after the Ta'if Accord, the pro-Syrian power-sharing body of the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament, the *Troika*, became increasingly important and influential. In effect, the *Troika* had become an executive committee, practically dominating the Council of Ministers and the Parliament concerning decision-making. In practise the elite cooperation in *Troika* between the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament decided upon all major policy issues, including the allocation of resources, in communal agreement (Haddad 2002: 213). In becoming the most important governing body – practically controlling the bodies of government in which the majority of the sects are represented – only approximately 75 per cent of the population (27 + 27 + 21) is represented in this powerful governing *Troika*. This excludes of 25 per cent of the population from representation. According to power-sharing

supporters the excluded sects can feel disenfranchised from the democratic process and might turn to non-democratic and maybe even violent ways, in order to demonstrate their grief (Lijphart 1977: 38-39; Doorenspleet 2005: 365-369). Furthermore, the influence of the non-elected security team, installed by Bashar al-Assad, was significant, making sure no legislation would be passed damaging the interests of Damascus.

In the end, Lebanese politics during Syrian presence was based on power sharing that facilitated representation and elite cooperation in the *Troika*, Council of Ministers, and the Parliament. However, Syrian control over the country tainted Lebanese politics, which usually followed Damascus' guidelines, making fair representation through elections impossible (Haddad 2009: 405). Lebanon after the civil war until the withdrawal of the Syrian troops, in 2005, was ranked in the Polity IV index with 5 on a -10 to 10 scale, labelling it as an 'open anocracy' (a classification between an autocracy and a democracy). In addition, Freedom House marked Lebanon over the same period as 'not free'. (Polity IV 2011; Freedom House 2014). These Freedom House scores reflect the lack of political rights and civil liberties during the period Syrian troops were present in Lebanon. The Polity IV scores demonstrate the absence of competitiveness, openness and level of participation in Labanon's elections, reflecting Syria's control over the political process in Lebanon until April 2005.

7.2 Lebanese politics after Syria's presence (2005- 2013)

7.2.1 The aftermath of the Hariri assassination and the 2005 elections

As mentioned in the previous sections, the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 resulted in mass demonstrations in Beirut in March of that year. On March 8th approximately half a million supporters of the incumbent pro-Syrian government took the streets near the Martyr Square in Beirut, the rally was organised by Hezbollah that had benefited from support by the Assad government in Damascus. On March 14th about more than one million protestors peacefully demonstrated in Beirut against the government and Syrian presence in the country, which came to be known as the Cedar Revolution that ousted the government and Syrian forces from Lebanon (Choucair 2006: 7; Rowayheb 2011: 418-423; Safa 2006: 33-34).

Significant about the protests following Hariri's assassination was the fact that they united large parts of the highly divided society along confessional lines. The March 14 movement included Christian, Druze, Sunni and some independent Shi'a political leaders. The Shi'a Muslims affiliated with Hezbollah and Amal, and some pro-Syrian Christian leaders mainly supported the March 8 demonstrations. Both the movement in favour of the government and Syrian presence, and the movement against that, would after the Cedar revolution and prior to the 2005 elections form two political alliances: the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance. The alliances included political parties and independent politicians from both Muslim and Christian religious denominations joining forces on the road the Parliamentary elections.

The Parliamentary elections of June 2005 were held using the electoral law of 2000 that heavily favoured pro-Syrian candidates whilst undermining Hariri and Christian candidates. Nevertheless, according the monitoring mission of the European Union the elections of June 2005 were characterized as the freest in Lebanon in over 30 years (Choucair 2006: 7; Haddad 2006: 34-35), enjoying a voter turnout of 46,5 per cent (IDEA 2011). The elections resulted in a win for the anti-Syrian and pro-Western March 14 Alliance led by Saad Hariri, the 35-year old

son of the murdered Rafiq Hariri, winning 72 of the 128 seats in Parliament (see Table 2). The March 8 Alliance won 56 of the seats (Pan 2005). The results of the elections made Saad Hariri sole leader of the Sunni sects. Hezbollah and Amal continued representing the Shi'a sect. The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt won all the Druze seats in Parliament. Most of the Christian seats were divided among three different parties. Former General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and members of the Qornet Shahwan Gathering, in which the former is part of the March 8 Alliance (however being part of the initial March 14th demonstration) and the latter two are part of the March 14 Alliance (Choucair 2006: 7).

Table 2: Summary of the 2005 election results

Alliance	Seats	Party	Religion	Seats
March 14 Alliance	72	Future Movement	Secular (but mainly Sunni Muslim)	36
		Progressive Socialist Party	Secular (but mainly Druze)	16
		Lebanese Forces	Mainly Maronite Christian	6
		Qornet Shawan Gathering	Mostly Christian	6
		- Kataeb Party	Secular (but mainly Maronite Christian)	
		- Independents		
		Tripoli Bloc	Secular	3
		Democratic Renewal	Secular	1
		Democratic Left Movement	Secular	1
		Others and independents		3
March 8 Alliance	56	Hope Movement (Amal)	Shi'a Muslim	15
		Hezbollah	Shi'a Muslim	14
		Free Patriotic Movement	Secular (but mainly Christian)	14
		Skaff Bloc	Christian	5
		Syrian Social Nationalist Party	Secular	2
		Murr Bloc	Greek Orthodox Christian	2
		Others and independents		4
Total				128

Source: (Carr 2014)

The formation of the Council of Ministers reflected the victory of the March 14 Alliance, it gained 22 out of the 30 seats. The March 8 Alliance filled the eight remaining seats. Of the eight seats for the March 8 Alliance, Hezbollah politicians filled three of them, representing Hezbollah's first-time presence in the Council of Ministers (Knio 2008: 447). The new government faced several troubling issues the members of the Council of Minister were unable to agree on, causing an inevitable institutional impasse. In order to break the impasse, the Speaker of the House, Nabih Berri, called for a 'national dialogue' forum in which all the political leaders would come together to discuss several sensitive issues. Over a four-month period (March-June 2006), the forum managed to decide on several of the

complex issues such as the status of the Palestinian refugees and economic policy. The forum however failed to reach a compromise on the disarmament of Hezbollah in South Lebanon (Knio 2008: 447-448).

7.2.2 Political deadlock and the 2009 elections

Eventually, the dispute over the acceptance of an international tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri caused government paralysis and the resignation of the six Shi'a ministers representing Hezbollah and Amal of the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance (Knio 2008: 448; Salamey 2009: 93-94). Despite the resignation of the Hezbollah and Amal representatives, the government by a two-thirds majority voted in favour of the international tribunal. The President and the Speaker of the Parliament, both in favour of the opposition, declared the government unconstitutional since the Shi'a sect was no longer represented. The March 8 Alliance retaliated in turn by organising a mass sit-in in downtown Beirut surrounding the Grand Serail, the government's headquarters, demanding the resignation of the government and the formation of a government based on national unity (Hirst 2010: 385; Knio 2008: 448; Salamey 2009: 93-94). For the first time since the end of the civil war, Lebanese politics reached a deadlock that paralysed all its major political activities. The fact that the March 14 Alliance had a simple majority in the Lebanese Parliament and a two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers, could not avert government paralysis. The power of the March 14 Alliance in Parliament and the council of ministers was balanced by the Pro-Syrian President Lahoud who refused to sign any law or decree coming from the government. In addition, the Speaker of the Parliament, the Pro-Syrian Nabih Berri refused to convene the Parliament for more than ten months (Haddad 2009: 408; Knio 2008: 449).

From June 2007 until May 2008, the topic of the debate shifted from the issue over the establishment of the international tribunal to the presidential elections that were set for late September 2007. Despite the stalemate, both parties eventually managed to agree on the independent General Michel Suleiman to fill the office of President when Lahoud's term expired. In late May of 2008 the Doha Agreement

would eventually make an end to the political impasse restarting the Lebanese Parliament and other state institutions (Haddad 2009: 408-410; Knio 2008: 449). The Doha Agreement called for the election of Michel Suleiman as President. Furthermore, the agreement instructed the formation of a government of national unity, in which the number of seats in the Council of Minister was expanded from 24 to 30. The new government was formed on 12 July 2008. In the new setup the March 18 Alliance received 16 seats, the March 8 Alliance 11 seats, and three were seats nominated by the President. This new setup gave the opposition with 11 seats (one-third plus one) in effect veto-power (Haddad 2009: 409-410; Knio 2008: 449-450).

Less than a year after the unity government was formed, new elections were scheduled. The June 2009 elections were an expected success for the March 14 Alliance led by Saad Hariri. The March 14 Alliance received 71 of the seats whilst the March 8 Alliance gained 57 seats in the Parliament (see Table 3). With 54 per cent, the voter turnout was the highest since the outbreak of the civil war (IDEA 2011; IFES 2009c). After a five-month period of intense negotiation and political stalemate, Prime Minister Saad Hariri formed a new government. Within the 30-seat Council of Ministers Hariri's March 14 Alliance took 15 seats, the March 8 opposition took 10 seats. President Suleiman, similar to the previous government formation, nominated the remaining five ministers. The new government setup, in contrast to the prior unity government, withholds the opposition's veto-power and gives the Presidential bloc (the ministers nominated by the President) the swing vote on decisions by the Council of Ministers (NOW Lebanon 209; Raad 2009).

Table 3: Summary of the 2009 election results

Alliance	Seats	Party	Religion	Seats
March 14 Alliance	71	Future Movement	Secular (but mainly Sunni Muslim)	24
		Lebanese Forces	Mainly Maronite Christian	5
		Kataeb Party	Secular (but mainly Maronite Christian)	5
		Progressive Socialist Party	Secular (but mainly Druze)	4
		Islamic Group	Sunni Muslim	1
		Armenian Democratic Liberal Party	Secular	1
		Democratic Left Movement	Secular	1
		Others and independents		30
March 8 Alliance	57	Hope Movement (Amal)	Shi'a Muslim	12
		Hezbollah	Shi'a Muslim	10
		Free Patriotic Movement	Secular (but mainly Christian)	10
		Armenian Revolutionary Federation	Secular	2
		Syrian Social Nationalist Party	Secular	2
		Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party	Secular	2
		Islamic Action Front		1
		Marada Movement	Christian (mainly Maronite)	1
		Lebanese Democratic Party		1
		Independents and others		16
Total				128

Source: (IFES 2009c)

In early 2011, Hezbollah and its political allies resigned from the Lebanese Council of Ministers, causing the collapse of the national unity government that had calmed tensions in the country. The government collapse was preceded by months of political stalemate over the UN tribunal investigation into the assassination of Hariri and the anticipated indictment of members of Hezbollah for involvement in the assassination, according to Hezbollah based on confessions of false witnesses. Hariri refused, at Hezbollah's request, to reconsider the government's position on the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Bakri 2011; BBC 2011; Rowayheb 2011: 429). Instead of resisting the government's decision violently, Hezbollah and its allies decided use peaceful measures provided to them by the Ta'if Accord that had set the necessity of a two-thirds majority in order to pass legislation in the Council of Ministers. Again after a deadlock of five months, Prime Minister Najib Mikati was able to form a new government led by the March 8 Alliance. Within the new government the March 8 Alliance took 18 of the seats. The remaining 12 seats, constituting a blocking minority, were filled by ministers close to the President, the Prime Minister and Druze-leader Jumblatt, who had broken out of the March 14 Alliance five month earlier (Salem 2011).

7.2.3 Analysis

Overall, the functioning of the power-sharing system after Syria's presence in Lebanon, like the system before Syria's ousting, provided for regular Parliamentary elections resulting in the distribution of seats among the various religious sects on a religious basis. The much-disputed electoral law that disadvantaged mainly the Christian population remained in place despite the intentions for drafting a new fairer law. However, the assassination of the popular Hariri and the subsequent demonstrations had an enormous impact on Lebanese politics. The Hariri's assassination divided the country in two opposing blocs: the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance led by Hezbollah and the anti-Syrian and pro-Western March 14 Alliance. The formation of both alliances was remarkable since both the March 8 and the March 14 Alliance were cross-confessional alliances, consisting of various Christian and Muslim denominations. The March 8 Alliance included Shi'a Muslims, some Sunni Muslims and Christians whereas the March 14 Alliance consisted of mainly Sunni Muslims, Druze and Christians. The division between the two alliances and their view on matters such as Syria and the UN special tribunal would dominate Lebanese politics after 2005. Lebanese-American professor As'ad AbuKhalil describes the significance of the new divide as follows:

> "No more is the classic Christian-Muslim divide relevant; nor the narrow Sunni-Maronite divide, which dominated the squabbles of the Lebanese political elite in pre-war Lebanon. The two new camps have crystallized along lines that are rather new to the history of the Lebanese conflict." (AbuKhalil 2008: 360).

On the one hand, the new alliances provided for elite cooperation between the various religious sects that endured over the course of the period under review in this research. However, on the other hand the March 8 and March 14 divide has in a sense created a new cleavage in the Lebanese society that would demonstrate to be of significant importance, causing on several occasions severe political deadlock. The cross-confessional alliances, on which the new division is based, according to power-sharing advocates should be able to defuse much of the sectarian tensions since they foster elite cooperation between political leaders of the various sects. However, where these new alliances are mixed in terms Muslims and Christians, almost all of the Shi'a population is represented by Amal and Hezbollah in the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, whereas the vast majority of the

Sunni population is represented by Hariri's Future Movement in the pro-Western March 14 Alliance. This additional division between (besides their initial sect) Shi'a and Sunni Muslims might reinforce the initial division based on religious sect, which helped cause the government paralysis after all Shi'a ministers left the Council of Ministers. Despite this problematic new Shi'a-Sunni division, Shi'a and Sunni Muslims were both represented in the Council of Ministers and the *Troika* offering a platform for elite cooperation between Shi'a and Sunni political leaders.

Furthermore, the successful campaign by the March 14 Alliance and the international community to force Syria out of Lebanon resulted in the freest and fairest elections in the post-civil war period. In the absence of Syrian influence in elections and society as a whole, Freedom House upgraded its status rating for Lebanon in 2006 to 'partly free' (Freedom House 2014). In the Polity IV index Lebanon's rating rose after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops, to 7 on a -10 to 10 scale, labelling it as a 'democracy' (Polity IV 2011). Despite the favourable effect Syria's withdrawal had on the levels of democracy in the country, Lebanese politics from 2005 onwards struggled with severe phases of political deadlock and government paralysis, results of power-sharing institutions critics have warned (Horowitz 2008: 1220-1221; Lijphart 1977: 50-51). On the international tribunal issue Lebanese politics faced its fiercest deadlocks that lasted from November 2006 until May 2008. Thereafter, two unity governments were formed, again after months of political stalemate. As noted in the previous section, before the 2005 withdrawal of the Syrian forces Damascus practically controlled the Lebanese political system. Despite the obvious lack of democracy, were there no severe political deadlocks or government paralyses, which characterised Lebanese politics after 2005, simply because of Syria's control over the Lebanese political system; for example on several occasions Syria had intervened in Lebanese politics in order to control the outcome of votes and averting deadlock. Lebanese decision reaffirm this finding, suggesting that although internal Lebanese decision making became more autonomous after the Syrian withdrawal, the power struggle among the *Troika* and within the Council of Ministers has in fact resulted in less decision making (Horn 2008: 56).

Overall, the period after the Syrian forces pulled out of Lebanon saw cross-religious elite cooperation especially through the creation of the two alliances (March 8 and March 14), making as it seems religion a less salient issue. However, the absence of a powerful actor that makes sure the political system, for better or for worse, keeps working, highlighted the problems of a grand coalition and proportional representation in a highly divided society.

8 MODERATION IN POST-CIVIL WAR LEBANON

Despite the fact that the power-sharing institutions in Lebanon not fully functioned as they were initially intended, has the post-civil war power-sharing system and following political inclusion of Lebanon's only remaining militia group outside the Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, helped moderate the movement? And, has the system after the civil war had a moderating effect on the Lebanese public?

8.1 The moderation of Hezbollah

Hezbollah's origins date back to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, during the civil war, in 1982. During the first years of the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah was secretly formed under the sponsorship of Iran. From the beginning Hezbollah's ideology, as formulated by its spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, called for the creation of a greater Islamic state (Hamzeh 1993: 322-323). In 1985, Hezbollah released its manifesto to the public for the first time. The manifesto officially reiterates Hezbollah's objective for the creation of an Islamic state and called on the Lebanese citizen to adopt Islamic rule and invited non-Muslims to convert to Islam (Ali 2009; Council on Foreign Relations 1988). During these years (1980s), Hezbollah led a military Jihad against all that opposed its desire of an Islamic Lebanon (Hamazeh 1993: 322-323). As a consequence, Hezbollah had spent the larger part of the 1980s waging a violent battle to bring down the government from outside the system (Azani 2011: 75). Furthermore, Hezbollah initially tried to turn the predominantly Shi'a South, into an Islamic Republic, banning the sale of alcohol, as well as parties, dancing, and music (Wheatley 2011: 113).

Despite Hezbollah's radical character, after the Ta'if Accord the Hezbollah leadership led by Hezbollah's new leader Hassan Nasrallah and its spiritual leader Sheikh Fadlallah, decided to participate in the upcoming elections, something Hezbollah had rejected outright since its inception in the 1980s. In a sense

Hezbollah accepted the new political system established after Ta'if. Muhammad Ra'd, the then President of Hezbollah's political wing, argued the new system established in Ta'if facilitated constructive participation in Lebanon's political system (Norton 1999: 45; Norton 2007: 99). The decision to enter Lebanese politics was widely supported by Lebanon's Shi'a community. Followers of Hezbollah had suffered for a long time of an entrenched sense of political disenfranchisement, the prospect of gaining political representation offered hope of growing political empowerment among Hezbollah's supporters (Norton 1999: 45; Norton 2007: 98-101). Deputy Secretary-General, Naim Qassem explained Hezbollah's decision to participate in the 1992 elections:

"Participation in parliamentary elections is an expression of sharing in an existing political structure, Parliament being one the regime's pillars. It does not, however, represent a commitment to preserving the structure as it, nor require defense of the system's deficiencies and blemishes. A position in Parliament denotes a representation of a certain group of people and allows the parliamentarian to maintain his viewpoints and defend them, enjoying a freedom of acceptance or refusal and the capability of making his position clear based on his background" (Qassem 2005 :189-190).

Qassam reiterates in this statement Hezbollah's acceptance of the post-civil war political system, despite its perceived flaws. Qassem further stresses the advantages of participation in the parliamentary process, such as the ability to advance their agenda and the opportunity to voice their agreement or disagreement with legislation proposals (Qassem 2005: 189-190; Wheatley 2011: 120). Furthermore, Sheikh Fadlallah referred to Hezbollah's changing attitude after the Ta'if as the 'Lebanonisation' of Hezbollah, which he explains in an interview in 1995:

"When I spoke of the Lebanonization of the Islamist movement in Lebanon, what I meant was that the Islamist movement should examine the prevailing circumstances in Lebanon and formulate its strategy within that framework, making allowances for Lebanon's particular circumstances, its confessional sensitivities, its perception of its environment. In other words, in spreading the faith, the Muslims in Lebanon should not follow procedures that would be inappropriate to Lebanon" (Fadlallah and Soueid 1995: 67).

The idea of 'Lebanonisation' was based on pragmatism and the willingness to work in coalition with other groups and parties. Furthermore, Fadlallah's

explanation of 'Lebanonisation' reflected again Hezbollah's acceptance of the existence of a confessionally heterogeneous Lebanon, instead of pursuing the establishment of an Islamic state (Wheatley 2011: 117). Furthermore, Hezbollah refrained from mentioning, referring to, or advocating the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon in its 1992 election program (Alagha 2006: 183). In the same interview Sheik Fadlallah emphasises the similarities between the different religious sects in Lebanon and encouraged them to open a dialogue with each other:

> "A Muslim may not malign the Torah, he may not malign Moses of Aaron, or the New Testament, or Jesus, or the Virgin Mary – all of these have sanctity for Muslims….Islam's debate with Christianity and Judaism is a debate over what it considers to be deviations from the true message of Moses and Jesus. Still, Islam calls on Jews and Christians to come together on issues of faith, worship, and obedience, and the unity of God – and the unity of mankind" (Fadlallah and Soueid 1995: 66).

Following Hezbollah's decision to participate in the electoral process, Hezbollah and its followers began to reach out to Christians in the South by providing several cross-confessional platforms to discuss socio-political issues, in order encourage Christian support for the party (Harik 2005: 73).

The following years would continue to demonstrate Hezbollah's moderation. Like the 1992 election program, none of the election programs in years that followed advocated, referred to, or mentioned the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon (Alagha 2006: 183). Furthermore, in 2009, just months after winning 10 seats in the parliamentary elections, Nasrallah, updated Hezbollah's manifesto erasing the section that calls for the creation of an Islamic state. Contrary to the 1985 manifesto, the new manifesto contained few Islamic terms and expressions, and not once indicated in the text the Shi'a identity of the party. In addition, the new manifesto draws upon the benefits of democracy, and refers to consensual democracy as a guiding principle and a proper formula for the Lebanese state (Addis and Blanchard 2011: 9; Ali 2009; Masters and Laub 2014).

8.2 Public attitudes

In 2002 and 2005 (October 15 until 21, almost six months after Syrian troops left Lebanon), Zogby International surveyed Arabs in six countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Lebanon, on their attitude towards a wide range of issues. One of the issues surveyed was self-identity. In 2002 of the surveyed Arabs in Lebanon 31 per cent said that the best way of defining themselves was by their country. On the other hand, 20 per cent thought religion best defined them. Three years later, in 2005, 71 per cent of the Lebanese respondents said their country best defined their identity, a rise of 40 per cent compared to 2002. The respondents in Lebanon that stating religion best defined their identity decreased from 20 per cent to 3 per cent in 2005 (Zogby 2005: 12). Compared to the other Arab countries surveyed, Lebanon had by far the least respondents saying religion defined their identity. On the other hand, the percentage of Lebanese respondents answering their country best defined them was much higher than that of the other, more homogeneous, Arab states in the region (CIA 2012; Zogby 2005: 12). In 2007 between May 14 and June 11, the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee (LOAC) surveyed the attitudes of Lebanese citizen towards the national identity, voting, and democratic institutions. The results again showed strong allegiance with their country above identification with other groups. Of the respondents 71 per cent claimed, they were Lebanese first and member of a religious group second (Ghattas 2013: 70). The rise of identification with Lebanon is illustrated in the following graph (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Percentage of population identifying first with religion or country



Sources: (Ghattas 2013: 70; Zogby 2005: 12).

In March 2005, the Global Attitudes Project of the Pew Research Center specifically surveyed Muslims in several Middle Eastern and North African countries on their attitude towards religion and politics. Findings showed that Lebanon's Muslims are relatively secular and pro-Christian compared to their counterparts in the rest of the Middle East and North Africa. Whilst Lebanese Muslims consider Islam an important part of their lives, it tends to plays a less prominent role. Just over half (54 per cent) of the Lebanese Muslims say religion is very important in their lives. This result makes Lebanese Muslims the least likely to say religion is very important in their life (Wike and Horowitz 2006). Moreover, Muslims in Lebanon are more likely to identify with their country. On the question: 'Do you consider yourself a national citizen first or a Muslim first' an equal amount of respondents said they identified primarily as Lebanese (30 per cent) and primarily as Muslim (30 per cent). This outcome demonstrates that Muslims in Lebanon, compared to other predominantly Muslim states, are the least likely to identify first as Muslim and the most likely see themselves as national citizen first. Furthermore, the report shows that 86 per cent of the Muslims in Lebanon have a favourable opinion of Christians, by far the highest rating of favourability towards Christians by any Muslim public. In addition, 82 per

cent of the Christian respondents have a favourable opinion towards Muslims (Wike and Horowitz 2006).

In a 2013-released report by the Pew Research Center Muslims were asked several questions concerning extremism. On the question whether suicide bombings or other forms of violence are justified in order to protect Islam from its enemies, 74 per cent of the respondents in 2002 answered it is often (48 per cent) or sometimes justified (26 per cent). In 2005 and 2011, when asked the same question, 39 per cent (2005) and 35 (2011) per cent of the Lebanese Muslims answered it is often (26 and 12 per cent) or sometimes justified (13 and 23 per cent). The findings show a significant decrease over time in the degree when suicide bombings or similar violence is justified against enemies of Islam. These findings demonstrate that many Muslims in Lebanon overtime have become more moderate, more and more resenting violence against enemies of their faith. Nonetheless, the percentage of Muslims in Lebanon that believe suicide bombings and similar acts of violence are at least sometimes justified is still high (Pew Research Center 2013). The trend of declining support for suicide bombings and similar forms of violence is illustrated in the following graph (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Percentage of the Muslim population believing suicide bombings and similar forms of violence are often or sometimes justified in order to protect Islam from its enemies



Source: (Pew Research Center 2013)

In addition, from 2009 until the end of 2011 Gallup surveyed the Lebanese population on matters as faith, jobs, and tolerance. On the question 'I would not object to a person of a different religious faith moving next door' 76 per cent of the Lebanese respondents of all religious groups answered 'strongly agree'. With 76 per cent, Lebanon scored well above the people of other countries (Belgium 65 per cent, United Kingdom 57 per cent, Germany 57 per cent, Italy 53 per cent, and Israel 23 per cent) surveyed. This result demonstrates a high degree of tolerance among the Lebanese people of all different religious faiths (Gallup 2014).

8.3 Analysis

Hezbollah's 'Lebanonisation' and the decision to join Lebanon's political process by participating in the 1992 elections, in itself could be classified as a clear signal that Hezbollah changed its radical course, was abiding by the rules of Lebanon's political game, accepting the legitimacy of the system, and thus has moderated significantly in line with what advocates of power-sharing institutions claim. After Hezbollah decided to partake in the political process, it started to reach out to non-Muslims in order to encourage their support for the party. Furthermore, from 1992 onwards, Hezbollah refrained from publically calling for the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. In addition, in 2009, Hezbollah officially removed its desire for the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon from its manifesto. This development – the moderation of (extreme) demands – is in line with what power-sharing proponents claim power-sharing institutions and inclusion in the political process promotes.

Instead of waging a military Jihad and trying to bring down the government from the outside, marked the period after Ta'if Hezbollah's non-violent participation in the Lebanese society and the political process. It is clear that Hezbollah moderated significantly after it decided to partake in the elections of 1992. Hezbollah acknowledged the benefits of participating in the political process and by doing so the need to moderate and reach out to non-Muslims in order to encourage their support for the party. By being the only party outside the Lebanese Armed Forces with an armed militia, Hezbollah posed a serious threat to the domestic peace in

Lebanon. However, as described, the post-civil war power-sharing system in Lebanon through the inclusion of the group in the political process, seemed to have been able to moderate Hezbollah significantly. The above-mentioned findings contradict Horowitz's (2008: 1216-1217) claim that the power-sharing system discourages parties to reach out to people of other religious groups, promoting extremist instead of moderated parties. Harik describes Hezbollah's radical change:

"Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim 'Party of God', has transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate, mainstream political party with a resistance wing" (Harik 1: 2005).

With regards to the moderation effect of the Lebanese public, the lack of polling data from the period just after the civil war makes the usage of the data and subsequent findings concerning the effect of the power-sharing institutions somewhat troublesome. Despite the lack of data from just after the civil war, can one assume that the civil war most likely made sectarianism in Lebanon stronger, deepening the cleavages between the different religious sects (Hudson 1997: 117). Besides, when looking at the available data from 2002, during Syria's presence and dominance over politics, identification as Lebanese was still relatively low. In addition, Lebanese Muslims believe that suicide bombings or similar violence against enemies of Islam is at least sometimes justified was very high. In contrast, the data from the period after Syria's withdrawal, when the political system started facilitate fairer representation and cross-confessional alliances, data significant better numbers on identification with Lebanon and the level of Muslims believing suicide bombings or similar violence against enemies of Islam is at least sometimes justified.

Furthermore, the other findings of Pew Research Center on importance of religion and identification among Muslims are at least highly out of the ordinary compared to other states in the Middle East and North Africa (Wike and Horowitz 2006). Also, Pew Research Center's and Gallup's findings on tolerance are remarkable not only in a country that not very long ago experienced a devastating internal conflict between different religious groups, but also compared to other countries in the region and the world (Gallup 2014; Wike and Horowitz 2006). Nevertheless, one

should also take into account other factors such as the rapid modernisation of the country or tradition of living together over several centuries could have contributed to the high levels of tolerance towards each other. However, despite the lack of opinion polls data, it is not likely that the levels of tolerance, as mentioned earlier, were very high after the civil war (Hudson 1997: 117). Overall, despite the lack of data, the findings demonstrate some trend towards moderation of the Lebanese public, and the Muslims specifically. This moderating effect coincides with the perceived moderating effect of power-sharing institutions in plural societies. Furthermore, opponents of the power-sharing model like Horowitz (1985; 2008) have claimed the model would deepen cleavages in society, however the significant increase in individual identification with country over religion, contradict these claims.

9 DOMESTIC PEACE IN POST-CIVIL WAR LEBANON

As claimed by proponents of power-sharing model, a proper functioning power-sharing system eventually promotes domestic peace between the various sects in a plural society. Despite the fact that the power-sharing institutions in Lebanon not fully functioned as they were initially intended, to what extent was the power sharing institutions able to provide for domestic peace? The decision of Hezbollah to join the political process in 1992 and its subsequent participation in the Lebanese political system demonstrated to have had a moderating effect on the party. However, did these effects, as advocates of the power-sharing model claim (see mechanism in chapter 4), eventually provided for domestic peace between the various religious groups? As the previous chapter demonstrated has Hezbollah moderated, and, despite the lack of data, has the Lebanese public demonstrated strong signs of moderation, and especially the Muslim public, over the course of the 2000s, after Syrian troops left the country and the power-sharing institutions began to provide for fairer representation.

9.1 Domestic peace during Syria's presence (1992-2005)

The first years after the civil war, saw the persecution of many Maronite Christian activists who opposed the Syrian occupation. Over the year 1992 hundreds Christians, believed to be supporters of the Maronite leader Michel Aoun, were arrested and physically tortured (ICTJ 2013: 78; Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 122). In 1993, a bomb-rigged trucked exploded in the headquarters of the Kataeb Party (Maronite Christian Party) in Beirut (ICTJ 2013: 81). From the mid 1990s, there was a rise of sectarian attacks on civilians. Feuds between several rival Islamists groups and bombings of mosques, churches and other religious sites took place over these years; the largest of these was in 1994, when a bomb exploded in a small church in the town of Jounieh near Beirut, killing ten civilians and wounding 54; a full list of bombings (excluding political assassinations) is available at the end of section 8.2 in Table 4 (ICTJ 213: 81; Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 122).

Furthermore, these years witnessed the targeted assassinations of Hezbollah Secretary-General, Syeed Abbas Musawi (helicopter attack in 1992), a Hezbollah member (car bomb in 1994) and Sunni cleric and member of a pro-Syrian Islamic oranisation, Sheikh Nizar Halabi (gunned down in 1995) (ICTJ 2013: 80; Knudsen 2010: 4). A full list of all the major political assassinations and attempts is provided at the end of section 8.2 in Table 5.

The two events that took the most Lebanese lives in the first period after the civil war were the two operations Israel organised against Hezbollah in the south of Lebanon. As a result of the 15-year long war in which Israel was one of the belligerents, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) were stationed in Israel's self-declared security-zone in Southern Lebanon (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 249). Consequently, Hezbollah and Israel found themselves in a constant standoff in Southern Lebanon. Attacks by Hezbollah on positions in Israel's security-zone in Southern Lebanon and around the Israeli-Lebanese border, and in the retaliation strikes by the IDF became fairly common during this period. Hezbollah was dedicated to getting the IDF and their ally, the mainly Christian South Lebanese Army (SLA), out of the security-zone in the south (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 249). The intensified shelling of the security-zone with the use of Katyusha rockets eventually sparked 'Operation Accountability' in late July of 1993. The operation involved the shelling of more than 30 Shi'a populated villages, which were believed to be Hezbollah strongholds. The aim of the operation was to restrain Hezbollah preventing future attacks (Bickteron and Klausner 2010: 249). Furthermore, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, explained the goal of the operation was to force large parts of the Shi'a population out of the Hezbollah dominated south, making them flee to the north, causing the government to respond and act against Hezbollah; eventually hoping both the Lebanese people and the state would turn against Hezbollah (Hirst 2010: 249-251). The Seven-Day War – how it is known in Lebanon –eventually resulted in the deaths of 140 Lebanese civilians and nine Hezbollah troops. In addition, the war caused the displacement of between 350-500 thousand Lebanese most of them moving to Beirut. In the end, Israel failed in its goals to defeat Hezbollah and to

make the Lebanese people and the state turn on Hezbollah (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 249; Hirst 2010: 250).

A few years later, in 1996, Israel and Hezbollah again faced each other, when Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath to stop the Katyusha fire on North Israel and the security-zone. This time the operation was also aimed at suspected Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut. The operation caused the death of approximately 200 civilians and led to the displacement of between 350 and 500 thousand Lebanese (Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 278-280). Both conflicts can however be seen as isolated events. No other religious affiliated parties, nor the Lebanese Armed Forces got involved, something Israel in the first place hoped (Hirst 2010: 250). Furthermore, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict was not a conflict between intra-state sectarian belligerents.

The domestic repression combined with the unfair representation, resulting from the various post-war electoral laws, gerrymandering and fraud, led in 2001 to large Christian demonstrations, including the supporters of Aoun and the Lebanese Forces Party (also a Christian party), against Syria's presence in Lebanon (ICTJ 2013: 78). The repression and unfair representation of the Christian population in Lebanon did however not lead to sectarian violence against the pro-Syrian government or sects that supported it. Mainly because the pro-Syrian government troops with help of Syria were able to crack down protests in an early stage; in 1994 public demonstrations were officially banned (ICTJ 2013: 78; Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 122).

The years that followed saw an increased crackdown on anti-Syrian opposition parties targeting especially Maronite Christians. From 2002 until 2004 the following politically aligned Christians were assassinated: former minister and Lebanese Forces commander, Elie Houbeika (car bomb), former aides to Hobeika, Jean Ghanem (car crash) and Michael Nasser (shot-close range in car), and the student leaders of the Lebanese Forces Party, Ramzi Irani and Pierre Boulos, both were abducted and killed, Irani in 2002 and Boulos in 2004 (ICTJ 2013: 80; Knudsen 2010: 4-5; Knudsen and Yassin 2012; 123). On February 14th 2005 another Syrian opponent, former Prime Minister and newly member of the anti-Syrian opposition, Rafiq Hariri, was killed in a massive car bomb.

The period before the Syrian troops pulled-out saw several events of domestic violence, mostly affecting Christian persons affiliated with anti-Syrian groups or parties. Despite, the targeted killings, attacks on religious sites and the two standoffs between the IDF and Hezbollah, the political situation in Lebanon during this period remained relatively calm. The ability to contain sectarian violence, public outbursts and above all providing for domestic peace can mostly likely be attributed to the presence of the Syrian troops in the country, and Damascus' control over the country determined in curbing political and sectarian opposition before getting out of hand (Zahar 2005: 32). Despite the presence of power-sharing institutions providing for elite cooperation in several government bodies, and the incorporation of ex-militia leaders and Hezbollah in Lebanese politics is it hard tell whether that had a genuine positive effect on the presence of domestic peace in Lebanon in the first period after the war. Politics was based on power-sharing principles, however politics during Syria's presence was also largely a charade, following suit to Damascus' instructions. It is therefore difficult to test the effect of the power-sharing institutions since Syria's presence and influence in the country in political and security sense tended to be dominant making sure nobody would jeopardize that.

9.2 Domestic Peace after Syria's withdrawal (2005-2011)

The period after the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and the subsequent Parliamentary elections, which resulted in clear victory of the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance, witnessed a period of increased violence. A string of attacks from mid-2005 onwards mainly targeted politicians and journalists critical of Syria's past influence in the country (Knudsen 2010: 5). Over this period assassinations had successfully targeted: professor, columnist and vocal critic of Syrian presence in Lebanon, Samir Kassir (car bomb), Greek Orthodox politician and outspoken critic of Syria, Georg Hawi (car bomb), and MP, journalist and also a critic of Syria's influence in Lebanon, Gebran Tueni (car bomb). In addition, assassination attempts failed to take out journalists Ali Tohme, who had written favourably about Hariri, Syria critic, May Chidiac, and former Defence Minister in the pro-

Syrian government, Elias Murr (ICTJ 2013: 81; Knudsen 2010: 5, 15). The same period also saw a rise in terrorist bomb attacks targeting civilian sites. From mid-2005 there were four bomb attacks killing one and wounding 45 civilians (ICTJ 2013: 82). In early 2006, bombs exploded on two civilian busses, killing three and wounding 20 (ICTJ 2013: 90).

In July 2006, Hezbollah's militia conducted a cross-border raid into the disputed Shebaa Farms territory killing three, wounding two, and capturing two IDF soldiers. Israel reacted by launching a large-scale land, air and sea campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon, eventually deploying more than 30,000 troops inside Lebanon. Hezbollah in turn fired thousands of Katyusha and other rockets on northern Israel. The 34-day conflict between Hezbollah and Israel resulted in the death of 1,000 Lebanese civilians and the wounding of 3,600. Additionally the conflict caused the displacement of more than 800,000 Lebanese civilians after their homes were destroyed or severely damaged (Amnesty International 2006: 1; Bickerton and Klausner 2010: 374-375; Knudsen 2010: 15). The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, like the ones in the 1990s, was not a conflict between intra-state actors nor did it spark direct sectarian conflict. Later that year in the midst of political tensions in the country over the ratification of the UN tribunal, on the 21st of November, the young Maronite leader and Minister of Industry, Pierre Gemayel Jr., was killed in a drive-by shooting in the Beirut suburb of Jdeideh (Knudsen 2010: 15).

As mentioned in chapter 5, following the resignation of all the Shi'a ministers from the Council of Ministers the opposition rendered the government 'illegitimate' since one of the major religious sects was no longer represented. However, the March 14 dominated government remained in place, sparking outrage by the Hezbollah-led March 8 Alliance demanding the resignation of the government and the formation of a government based on national unity (Hirst 2010: 385; Knio 2008: 448; Salamey 2009: 93-94). Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah ordered an indefinite sit-in in the centre of Beirut. Following Nasrallah's orders, supporters of the Hezbollah led March 8 Alliance camped out day and night around the government building in Beirut. In reaction supporters of the March 14 Alliance

organised counter-protests to force their counterparts to stop their sit-in (Hirst 2010: 385; Rowayheb 2011: 427).

Supporters of the March 8 Alliance decided to take it one step further. Protesters blocked roads, burned tires, and started to attack individuals in the streets (Rowayheb 2011: 426). This subsequently resulted in violent demonstrations, student clashes and street fights killing several young men. In clashes between Shi'a supporters of the March 8 Alliance and Sunni supporters of the pro-Western March 14 Alliance seven men were killed and 250 were injured (Hirst 2010: 385; Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 125). Due to the increased likelihood of large-scale violence, Hezbollah and its March 8 allies decided to end their protests inviting the army to intervene (Rowayheb 2011: 427). During the same period, a bus in Ain Alaq was blown up by a bomb, killing four Maronite commuters, further fuelling the tensions. The UN Security Council approval of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon on 30 May 2007 deepened the political divide and sparked additional outbreaks of violence (Knudsen 2010: 15).

In the midst of growing tensions, Palestinian terrorist organisation linked to the al Qaida, Fateh al Islam, attacked a unit of the Lebanese Army killing many of its soldiers. The Lebanese Army responded by laying siege to the Palestinian camp in the north of Lebanon where most the fighters and leadership of Fateh al Islam had fled to. Months of fighting were needed for the Lebanese Army to take over the camp. The heavy fighting between the Lebanese Army and the Fateh al Islam fighters eventually resulted in approximately 250 dead militants from Fateh al Islam, 169 dead army troops and 47 dead Palestinian refugees. The event remained isolated and was supported by most of the Lebanese factions and parties (Knudsen 2010: 16; Rowayheb 2011: 418-419).

Less than two weeks after the UN Security Council approval, supporter of the tribunal and member of the March 14 Alliance, MP Walid Eido was killed in a car bomb (ICTJ 2013: 91). Unrest continued when a roadside bomb hit an UNIFIL convoy, killing six of the UN peacekeepers. A few months later a Kataeb Party member and MP in the March 14 coalition, Antoine Ghanem was killed in a car bomb. In December General François el-Hajj was killed in a car bomb attack (ICTJ 2013: 91; Knudsen 2010: 16).

The first months of 2008 witnessed the assassination of Internal Security Forces' senior terrorism investigator, Captain Wissam Eid. During that time, Eid was part of the team investigating the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. A month later, Hezbollah's senior intelligence officer in exile, Imad Mughniyah, was killed by a car bomb in Damascus (ICTJ 2013: 91; Knudsen 2010: 17). In the beginning of May 2008, the government decided to unplug Hezbollah's independent telecommunications network and remove security officials at the airport of Beirut who were supposedly close to Hezbollah (Knio 2008: 449; Rowayheb 2011: 427). These decisions caused the institutional deadlock to escalate into the biggest clashes since the end of the civil war. Hezbollah considered the government's decision an 'act of war' and ordered its militia to take the streets where clashes with rival militias broke out (Knio 2008: 449; Knudsen 2010: 17). During the weeklong clashes 65 people were killed and more than 200 were injured (Knudsen 2010: 17). A few days after the clashes had broken out the Prince of Qatar invited the leaders of the different sides to Doha to negotiate a deal on the matters that had divided them. On the 21 May, both sides reached a deal and the Doha Agreement was signed ending the crisis (Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 126; Rowayheb 2011: 427).

Despite the Doha Agreement and the formation of the unity government, the tension remained. On August 13, a commercial bus exploded in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli. In the attack, 14 people were killed including nine Lebanese Army soldiers; around 40 people were injured in the attack. About six weeks later Tripoli was hit again, five people were killed and 35 were injured in a bomb that targeted a military bus (ICTJ 2013: 91; Knudsen and Yassin 2012: 126). Furthermore, in September, Saleh Aridi, a leading member of the pro-Syrian Lebanese Democratic Party was killed by a car bomb (ICTJ 2013: 91).

The years that followed remained relatively calm with few incidents. In late 2009, a bomb exploded in Hezbollah's headquarters in the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing two visiting Hamas members (Knudsen 2010: 18). In August 2010, members of Hezbollah clashed with members of a small Sunni faction, resulting in three deaths and some injured. However, as spokesmen of both parties later stated,

was it a personal dispute without political or sectarian motivation (Al Jazeera 2010).

Table 4: Bomb attacks (1992-2011)

Year	Event	Casualties
1993	A truck filled with explosives exploded in the headquarters of the Kataeb Party in Saifi, in Beirut	3 killed and over a 100 wounded
1994	A bomb exploded at a church in Jounieh just outside Beirut	10 killed and 54 wounded
2005	Car bomb exploded in a commercial area of Jdeideh, north of Beirut	11 wounded
2005	A bomb exploded in a shopping centre in Beirut's Ashrafieh neighbourhood	3 killed and 7 wounded
2005	A car bomb exploded in Sadd al-Boushrieh area of Beirut	6 wounded
2005	A bomb exploded in a shopping centre in Broummana (Mount Lebanon)	9 wounded
2005	A bomb exploded between the "Voice of Charity" radio station and a Church	11 wounded
2005	A bomb exploded in a Beirut nightclub	13 wounded
2005	A bomb exploded outside a shopping centre in Zalka, a northern suburb of Beirut	11 wounded
2005	A large explosion in the Geitawi neighbourhood of Ashrafieh	1 killed and 10 wounded
2007	Bombs exploded in two public buses in Bikfaya, Mount Lebanon	3 killed and 21 wounded
2007	An UNIFIL convoy traveling near Khiyam, South Lebanon, was targeted in an explosion.	6 killed
2008	A bomb exploded blew up a public bus in Tripoli	14 killed and around 40 wounded
2008	A car bomb exploded near a public bus in Tripoli	5 killed and 35 wounded

Sources: (ICTJ 2013; The Daily Star Lebanon 2012)

Table 5: Political assassinations and assassination attempts (1992-2011)

Year	Name	Position/background (denomination)	Type of attack
1992	Syeed Abbas Musawi	Hezbollah Secretary-General (Shi'a)	Helicopter attack
1994	Fuad Mughniyah	Hezbollah member (Shi'a)	Car bomb
1995	Sheikh Nizar Halabi	Leader of al-Ahbash Organisation, a Sufi religious movement (Sunni)	Gunned down
1999	Hassan Uthman Asem Bu Daber Walid Harmoush Imad Shehab	Judges in Saida Magistracy	Gunned down (in courtroom)
2002	Elie Houbeika	Former MP and minister (Maronite)	Car bomb
2002	Jean Ghanem	Former aide to Elie Houbeika (Maronite)	Car crash
2002	Michael Nasser	Former aide to Elie Houbeika (Maronite)	Shot-close range in car
2002	Ramzi Irani	Student leader of Lebanese Forces Party (Maronite)	Abducted, then killed
2002	Jihad Jibril	Leader of the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (Sunni)	Car bomb
2004	Pierre Boulos	Student leader of Lebanese Forces Party (Maronite)	Abducted, then killed
2004	Ghaleb Awali	Senior Hezbollah official (Shi'a)	Car bomb
2004	Marwan Hamade	MP and former minister (Druze)	Car bomb

	(attempt)		
2005	Rafiq Hariri	Former Prime Minister (Sunni)	Car bomb
	Basil Fuleihan	Economy Minister (Protestant), travelled with Hariri	Car bomb
2005	Samir Kassir	Journalist (Greek Orthodox)	Car bomb
2005	Georg Hawi	Former leader of the Communist Party (Greek Orthodox)	Car bomb
2005	Gebran Ghassan Tueni	Journalist and MP (Greek Orthodox)	Car bomb
2005	Ali Ramez Tohme (attempt)	Journalist (unknown)	Car bomb
2005	May Chidiac (attempt)	Journalist and news anchor (Maronite)	Car bomb
2005	Elias Murr (attempt)	Dep. Prime Minister, Defence Minister (Greek Orthodox)	Car bomb
2006	Mahmoud Majzoub	Leader of the Islamic Jihad in Lebanon (Sunni)	Car bomb
2006	Samir Shehadeh (attempt)	Police Colonel, senior investigator into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri (Sunni)	Car bomb
2006	Pierre Gemayel Jr.	Industry Minister and MP (Maronite)	Gunned down
2007	Walid Eido	MP (Sunni)	Car bomb
2007	Antoine Ghanem	MP (Maronite)	Car bomb
2007	Francois al-Hajj	Army General (Maronite)	Car bomb
2008	Wissam Eid	Captain and senior terrorism investigator (Maronite)	Car bomb
2008	Imad Mughniyah	Senior intelligence officer Hezbollah (Shi'a)	Car bomb
2008	Saleh al-Aridi	Senior party official (Druze)	Car bomb
2009	Kamal Midhat/Naji	Senior Farah official (Sunni)	Roadside bomb
2009	Hassan Saeed al-Haddad	Hamas members (Sunni)	Bomb (type unknown)

Sources: (Knudsen 2010: 4-5; ICTJ 2013)

Figure 5: Total number of attacks



Sources: (Knudsen 2010: 4-5; ICTJ 2013; The Daily Star 2012)

9.3 Analysis

Figure 5 includes the total number of targeted political assassinations and bomb attacks (from now referring this aggregate as 'attacks') over the period 1992-2011. The graph shows that the years during which Syrian troops were present in Lebanon and the Syrian government almost effectively controlled the country, the number of attacks was relatively low. On the contrary, after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri the number of attacks spiked, reflecting the high number of attacks in 2005. After this tumultuous year in which the popular Hariri was assassinated and after 30 years the Syrian troops left the country, the number of attacks dropped. The number of attacks remained relatively high, compared to the numbers during Syria's presence, during the years of political unrest and government deadlock (2007-2008) over the demands by the opposition for a unity government and the issue around the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The years after most of the political problems were resolved in Doha, witnessed a trend of low annual numbers of attacks, as was the case during Syria's presence.

Furthermore, despite the score of targeted political assassinations, terrorist attacks and the conflict with Israel has there been an absence of direct large-scale violence between the different segments in society. Only after months of political stalemate over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and demand for a unity government witnessed the country, for the first time since the end of the civil war, large-scale clashes between different groups. These clashes were however not necessarily between different religious sects, but between supporters of the pro-Western March 14 Alliance and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance. The period after the Doha Agreement again witnessed months of negotiations after the elections of 2009 and 2011 resulting in political stalemate over representation and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This time, however, the parties refrained from using direct violence against each other, sticking to peaceful negotiations.

During the period Syria was present in the country, political stalemate and demonstrations transforming into clashes would most likely be prevented by early intervention in both politics and civil society. This assumption is supported by Ghattas, who found that during the 15-year presence of the Syrian troops in

Lebanon there were 161 demonstrations and more than 130 arrests, in most cases after demonstrations against Syria presence. Contrary, the first four and a half years after Syrian troops left the country witnessed already 254 demonstrations, but no arrests were made following these demonstrations[16] (Ghattas 2013: 40-41).

[16] The author has taken the data from reports in the daily independent Lebanese newspaper An-Nahar.

10 CONCLUSION

After 15 years of internal warfare, the civil war came to an end when the leaders of the various religious groups in Ta'if agreed on a new post-civil war political system based on elements of Lijphart's power-sharing theory. These elements of grand coalition, proportionality, and segmental autonomy came to expression in Lebanon's Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the *Troika* and the constitution. Lijphart and other advocates of the power-sharing model in plural societies claim that power-sharing institutions encourage moderate behaviour and cooperation among the various contenting segments in plural societies, eventually providing for a stable political democracy that reduces the chances of segmental tensions, violent uprisings and inter-group violence and conflict.

The period from 1992 to 2005, during Syrian presence, the power-sharing elements in Lebanon's political system facilitated representation and elite cooperation. However, Syrian control over the country tainted Lebanese politics, making fair representation through elections impossible. The following period from 2005 until 2011, after the Syrian troops pulled-out, witnessed higher turnout and fairer representation. Furthermore, in this period two cross-confessional alliances (March 8 and the March 14 Alliance) were created that would dominate Lebanese politics during from then on: no longer seemed the Muslim-Christian divide relevant; the division between Sunni's (March 14) and Shi'a (March 8) however persisted. Apart from elite cooperation in the institutions based on power sharing, the executive and the legislature provided the new alliances with a new platform for inter-group elite cooperation. Where previously Syria would have stepped in, caused the new division between the March 8 and the March 14 Alliance on several occasions political deadlock and government paralysis, something opponents of power-sharing systems have warned about.

Concerning the first sub-question, despite the lack of data from period immediately after the civil war, the period after Syria had withdrawn its troops from the country and the power-sharing system started to work better, witnessed a shift in public opinion towards moderation on matters of identification and

violence. One should however keep in mind that several other factors could have attributed to these effects. Furthermore, in the period from 1992 until 2011, the radical Muslim militant group Hezbollah transformed itself to a moderated political party, dropping most of its radical Islamic rhetoric in official documents and in other public statements by prominent Hezbollah figures, and has it reached out to the non-Muslim population.

With regards to the second sub-question posed at the beginning of this thesis: *to what extent has the post-civil war power sharing system achieved domestic peace*, the period during Syria's presence, despite several events of internal violence, remained relatively calm with no major outbursts internal violence. Over the 1992-2005 period the number of attacks (see Figure 5) was very low. Despite the presence of power-sharing institutions providing for elite cooperation in several government bodies, and the incorporation of ex-militia leaders and Hezbollah in Lebanese politics is it hard tell whether that had a genuine positive effect on the presence of domestic peace in Lebanon in the first period after the war. As Zahar (2005: 32) notes, the ability to contain sectarian violence, public outbursts and above all providing for domestic peace between the various religious sects should mostly likely be attributed to the presence of the Syrian troops in the country, and Damascus' control over the country determined in curbing political and sectarian opposition before getting out of control.

The period after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops, despite the score of targeted political assassinations, terrorist attacks and the conflict with Israel witnessed no direct large-scale violent confrontations between the different segments in society. Only after months of political stalemate over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and demands for a unity government witnessed the country, for the first time since the end of the civil war, large-scale clashes between different groups. These clashes were however not necessarily between different religious sects, but between supporters of the pro-Western March 14 Alliance and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance. Nevertheless, the political stalemate and the subsequent clashes clearly demonstrated the negative side effects of the power-sharing model and the fragility of the Lebanese system. The years that followed until the end of the

analysis (2011) witnessed a trend of low annual numbers of attacks, as was the case during Syria's presence.

Overall, the post-civil war power-sharing system in Lebanon seemed to have offered a pragmatic option for a society deeply divided along confessional lines and above all tarnished by 15 years of internal conflict. The post-war power-sharing system facilitated the moderation of a previously radical Islamic group with the country's only non-state militia, calling for the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Furthermore, according to the available data the Lebanese public and especially its Muslims seemed to have moderated after Syria withdrew its troops from the country. Furthermore, besides the weeklong clashes between supporters of the March 8 Alliance (mainly Hezbollah supporters and militia men) and the March 14 Alliance, witnessed the post war-period no setback into large internal conflict between the various religious groups.

In the end, one should not judge the case of power sharing in post-civil war Lebanon at this point in time on what it ideally should look like – a full-fledged stable democracy in which all people stand united. One should look at what the system was able to achieve, coping with the existing difficult circumstances in a highly divided and war torn society. In that sense, the post-war system can be considered a 'success'

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10 June 2014

"Your Lebanon is a political knot, a national dilemma, a place of conflict and deception. My Lebanon, is a place of beauty and dreams of enchanting valleys and splendid mountains."[17]

[17] Gibran, Khalil. 1920. "You have your Lebanon and I have mine." http://www.huffingtonpost.com/magda-abufadil/you-have-your-lebanon-gib_b_800627.html (accessed 08-06-2014).

11 APPENDICES

11.1 Appendix 1: The Mutasarrifiya and Greater Lebanon

Source: (Traboulsi 2012: 43).

11.2 Appendix 2: General map of modern Lebanon

Source: (Norton 2007: 145)

11.3 Appendix 3: Confessional map of Lebanon[18]



Source: (Norton 2007: 1)

[18] Map of Lebanon's major confessional groups (sects) and the areas where they predominate.

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