

UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN

Modernism, terrorism and resurrection

sub-state nationalism in Spain

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
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Maps



Map 1: Spain's autonomous communities



Map 2: Spain's historic nationalities



Map 3: Spain's non-Castilian languages

Map 1 shows the administrative divisions of the 1978 Spanish constitution into autonomous communities. Map 2 specifies the historical nations. Map 3 shows the present diffusion of the languages of the three historical nationalities (Conversi, 2000, XV-XIV).

1. Introduction

In 1998 Kenneth Bollen and Juan Diez Medrano asked themselves a very straightforward question. “who are the Spaniards?” They claimed that although Spain is one of the oldest countries in Europe, it is a good example of incomplete nation building. The Basques, Catalans and Galicians are common examples of sub-state nationalist movements in Spain to strengthen this claim. In their research they analyzed the sense of belonging to Spain and concluded that several regions do not feel as being a part of the nation called Spain (Bollen and Medrano, 1998, 605-608).

There are several regionalist and nationalist movements operating within the possibilities of the 1978 Spanish constitution. This constitution recognized the right in the autonomous communities of the Basque country, Galicia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and Valencia to use their own language as long as this doesn't jeopardize the use of Castilian. During the 1980's these autonomous governments used the possibilities to promote their regional languages (Bollen and Medrano, 1998, 591).

Of the regions with nationalist political parties, the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia are commonly mentioned as the three historical nationalist movements in Spain. Long before the constitution of 1978, these movements already had a nationalist character, claiming to represent a separate nation which deserved some status of autonomy or even aimed for separation. These three movements will be the cases for a comparative study in this thesis for several reasons of which the first are related to practical matters such as availability of literature. However, the puzzle of this thesis essentially also entails the reasons for this case selection. The essence of this puzzle is that although these three historic movements have a lot in common, they differ substantially on several aspects, especially to what extent they have been successful. The aim of this thesis is to set up a framework for a scholarly literature based analysis of the possible explanations for these differences. This framework is based on theories about nationalism and sub-state nationalism and tries to assess the concept of a successful nationalist movement.

The value and contribution of this thesis first lies within the detailed analysis of all three movements. Several scholars have presented arguments to explain the differences between the Basques and Catalans. These arguments were based on economic, structural, cultural and social explanations (see for example: Medrano 1994, Nili 2009, Desfor Edles 1999, Conversi 1997). This thesis also tries to fill the gap in scholarly literature by comparing all three historic nationalities. Especially concerning Galician nationalism related to the other two cases, there is substantial room for further

explorations. For the historical background of Galician nationalism in this thesis, I heavily rely on the works of Beswick (2007) and Nunez (1997). Thirdly, this thesis uses a model initially presented by Prerna Singh (2008) to establish the concept of a successful sub-state nationalist movement. This model can be used to compare several sub-state nationalist movements based on ordinal levels of success.

1.1 Puzzle & Question

The Catalans became a very successful sub-national movement for autonomy. They were the first to actually get recognition from the Spanish central government and are characterized among scholars as having a strong literary and cultural tradition. As Jordi Pujol stated: *Language and culture... are the core elements of our identity as a people* (Jordi Pujol, president of the Catalan Generalitat, 1989). Popular support has always been broad for Catalanism (Balcells 1996, Payne 1975).

Basque nationalism on the other hand, lacked broad support, literary traditions or strong cultural markers. Basque nationalism claimed to be based on the idea that the Basques are the oldest race in Europe. They therefore state: *Garean Garean Legez* (Let us be what we were). Basque nationalism eventually led to terrorism by ETA, a terrorist movement related to the Basque nationalist party, which tried to achieve independence by creating a spiral of violence.

Galician nationalism has a lot of similarities with both other regions, but nowadays cannot be characterized as strong in its regional nationalist expressions, since even during regional elections Galician nationalist parties do not dominate the state-wide parties. As Rosa Aneiros Stated, *Galician culture is always on the edge, complaining about everything, and of course it does not make any long-term plans, as it expects to die soon* (Barreto, 2011, 385).

Therefore the central puzzle of this thesis is the question why these three historic nationalist movements (which emerged under the same central government, in the same country, around the same time and with their own language and culture) have developed in three very distinct nationalist movements with different relative amounts of success? The main research question in this thesis is thus: What explains the differences in success of these three nationalist movements? While answering this empirical question, this thesis will also show how the differences in success have contributed towards the characterization of these movements in words like modernism (Catalans) terrorism (Basques) and resurrection (Galicians).

1.2. Plan of the thesis

This thesis takes a historical approach to explain how the emergence and evolution of three nationalist movements in Spain have influenced the extent to which they can be considered successful in recent decades. I will argue that Catalan nationalism has been most successful in the sense that it reflects a stronger and cohesive movement than Basque and Galician nationalism. The major reason for this success is that Catalan subnational mobilization was based on a pre-existing identity. Catalan nationalism gradually grew with a stable linguistic and cultural basis. Basque nationalism on the other hand lacked this linguistic or cultural basis and adopted race and religion as bastions of their national identity from the beginning. Catalan nationalism spread amongst the people and the region due to its inclusive character, while Basque nationalism was used for exclusionary purposes and was always focused on the conflict between Basques and Spaniards. This symbolic conflict also led to increased fragmentation within Basque political representation. The Galicians initially had a linguistic basis, but the Galician language was never allowed to become the main driving force of nationalism, while at the same time, language was the most important element of identification.

Chapter 2 will describe the main concepts used in this thesis and establish the differences between the nation, the state, nationalism and sub-state nationalism. I will also present a definition of what I consider to be a successful sub-state nationalist movement. In chapter 3 I will introduce the main theoretical arguments to explain the relative differences in success. Chapter 4 will operationalize a model to assess to what extent the three nationalist movements have been successful. Chapter 5 will present the historical background of the three cases. This historical background covers the earliest years in which the first roots of the nationalist movements emerged until the end of Franco's dictatorship (1936-1975), in which all nationalist aspirations were suppressed by the national government. Chapter 6 will establish the differences in strength and cohesiveness between the three nationalist movements. This chapter is divided between differences in strength of language and print capitalism and the extent to which the nationalist movements successfully mobilized political support after Franco's dictatorship and the transition towards Spanish democracy in 1978. In chapter 7 I will explain the relative differences in success based on the theoretical arguments from chapter 3. Chapter 8 contains the concluding remarks.

2. Concepts

2.1. Nations, nationalism and the state

The start of thesis should make a basic conceptual distinction between nation, state, nationalism and sub-state nationalism. By “state”, I take Weber's definition, referring to “*a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory*”. For the concept of the “nation” Guibernau refers to a “*human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself*” (Guibernau, 2003, 4). Thus, in his view, the “nation” includes five dimensions: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and historical. By this definition, Guibernau distinguishes the term nation from both the state and the nation-state (2003, 3-4). When a state and a nation are overlapping, we generally speak of the nation-state, but this is not always the case.

Nations without states exist, meaning that in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states, they maintain a separate sense of national identity. When nations without states develop a movement which articulates the explicit wish to rule themselves, we speak of sub-state nationalism (Guibernau, 2003, 3-4). Sub-state nationalism in turn is a concept derived from the bigger notion of nationalism.

By “nationalism” I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny (Guibernau, 2003, 5). Nationalism locates the source of identity within a people, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity. The only foundation of nationalism is thus an idea. Nationalism is a particular perspective or style of thought. At the core of nationalism lies the idea of a nation (Greenfeld, 1992, 4).

In 1983 Benedict Anderson famously proposed the following definition of the Nation: *it is an imagined community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign* (Anderson, 1992, 6). All nations are, according to Anderson, imagined communities because even in the smallest nation on earth, it is practically impossible that everybody knows each other. However, they do somehow feel connected as members of the same communion. Consequently, Gellner stated that following this definition, the concept of nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, but nationalism invents nation where they do not exist (Anderson, 1992, 6). Nations are also limited because even the largest nations in the world don't place themselves on a conterminous level with

mankind. Every nation has certain boundaries where other nations begin. The nation is a community because it is always portrait as a deep horizontal comradeship. A limited imagination for which millions of people have proven to be willing to kill or die for (Anderson, 1992, 7).

Keating states we can see nationalism as a principle of self-determination. However, the group with the right to self-determination may be defined in several ways. This group for example doesn't necessarily have to be living in one state and consequently form a nation-state. Nowadays, there are several examples of proclaimed nations, which are operating at the sub-state level. They strive for territorial reconstruction and are engaged in a process of nation-building within a state. They aim for a reconstruction of the political space both on the institutional level and in civil society. This is what Keating calls stateless nation-building (Keating, 1997, 693-694). This new form of nationalism, rooted in historic traditions and identities, has re-emerged nationalism as a vital principle of identity. Spain constitutes a very special case for the analysis of this kind of nationalism because this single country has to deal with several pro-claimed separate nations within its borders.

Guibernau (2003) stresses the specific distinction between "state nationalism" and nationalism in "nations without states". He claims this distinction is necessary to understand some of the key specific features of these different types of nationalism. These have nothing to do with a value judgment or a claim that one type of nationalism is "good" and the other is "bad". The fundamental differences between "state nationalism" and nationalism in "nations without states" are twofold. The first difference is their different access to power and resources. Nations without states do not have a government with the legitimate monopoly on the use of physical force within its territory. The second difference stresses the fact that state nationalism seeks to consolidate and strengthen the state, while sub-state nationalism or nations without states challenge the legitimacy of the state and often, but not always, seeks to construct a new state (Guibernau, 2003, 5). This thesis is concerned with the kind of nationalism of nations without states. However, theoretical arguments based on the broader concept of state nationalism can be used to explain nationalism of nations without states since sub-state nationalism is a theoretical subtype of the broader concept of state nationalism.

Singh (2008) conceptualizes the concept of sub-state nationalism by clarifying the "kind hierarchy" between the concepts of subnationalism¹, nationalism and a political community. She uses Sartori's ladder of generality and describes how we find the concept of political community, widely described as a political amalgamation characterized by a "we-feeling", on the highest rung of the ladder. Below the concept of political community lies the root concept of nationalism, which is a "we-feeling on a

¹ In this thesis, the concepts of sub-state nationalism and subnationalism are used intertwined based on the chosen words by the several scholars, but refer to the same concept.

state level. Moving down the ladder we find the concept of subnationalism, a classical sub-type of nationalism (Singh, 2008, 2). Subnationalism is theoretically identical to nationalism and can be distinguished from other classical subtypes such as supra-nationalism. The difference however, just as Guibernau (2003) argues, is in the desire for political control. In the case of nationalism this desire is focused on the political control of a territorial homeland and a desire for sovereign statehood. Subnationalism manifests itself in the aspiration for an independent homeland or the pursuit of greater autonomy within an existing political framework. Subnationalism is thus a “we-feeling” below the level of the nation-state (Singh, 2008, 3). Theoretical arguments to explain the broader concept of nationalism can thus be used to explain its subtypes such as subnationalism or supranationalism, while keeping in mind the substantial differences in the goals and aspirations of the different types and subtypes of nationalism.

2.2. Relative success

The first conceptual challenge for this thesis is to be able to claim that nationalist movements A has been or is more successful than nationalist movement B. For the comparison between the Basques, Catalans and Galicians, it isn't necessary to be able to claim that for example the Catalans have been more successful than the Basques in a numerical sense. For the comparison in this thesis, we do however want to be able to make claims on an ordinal level. We have to be able to say that the Catalans were more or less successful.

To establish a concept of success, we must ask ourselves what subnational movements are striving for and when we can consider a subnational movement to be successful. There can be substantial differences between the goals of two subnational movements. As Medrano states: "*The difference between Basque and Catalan nationalists is that the Basques want to leave Spain, and the Catalans want to run it*" (Medrano, 1995, 190). A nationalist movement can strive for autonomy or complete separation. Sub-state national minorities demand a degree of political autonomy on the basis of a claim to represent a distinct and separate demos. Lluch (2012) describes how internal variations can exist between subnational movements. These are mostly based on orientations towards secessionism or non-secessionism. He analyzes three political orientations: Independentism, autonomism or federalism. Some nationalist movements thus seek their own state, others are aiming for a special autonomous status within the constitution or their objective is to become a constituent unit within a federation. The three types of subnationalism thus agree on the idea of an existing nation, but they disagree on the amount of autonomy this nation should have (Lluch, 2012, 434-435).

Every nationalist movement first of all needs to identify its people and create enough popular support. A sub-state nationalist movement can hardly be called a successful movement when for example only 5 percent of the inhabitants of the province of Catalonia adhere to nationalist principles or identify themselves as Catalans next to, or instead of Spanish. Therefore, the most important indicator of the success of a subnational movement is the extent to which the nationalist movement represents a cohesive group with popular support for the idea of what Andersons called the 'imagined' nation. The cohesiveness of the imagined group and the amount of popular support for the representation of this group will be the main focus for the concept of relative success in this thesis. Based on a model first developed by Singh (2008), I will analyze the idea and the strength of the imagined nation, leaving out possible differences between reaching either independence, autonomy or a federal status as Lluch (2012) describes.

Singh (2008) constructs the concept of subnationalism as a three-level concept. The basic level or the background concept is subnationalism. The secondary level is constituted by a sense of belonging, the we-feeling, which is the core concept running through the ladder of political community, nationalism and subnationalism as described earlier in this thesis. According to Singh, the idea of this sense of belonging is a key concept for any social development (Singh, 2008, 3). The elements which constitute the *thick concept* of subnationalism are based on signals which can be used to identify a sense of collective identity. Such elements are a myth of common origin, a common culture, language, print capitalism and national consciousness (Singh, 2008, 4-5). In order to conduct comparative research, Singh distils what she calls a *thin concept* of subnationalism. These choices of elements for the thin concept of subnationalism are not driven by theoretical judgments but merely by practical matters such as observability and availability of data. The indicators Language, Print capitalism, and Subnational mobilization are used to establish the strength and cohesiveness of the nationalist movement, and conversely assess to what extent the nationalist movements have been successful in representing a cohesive group with popular support for what Anderson calls the imagined nation. Chapter 4 will describe how I operationalize this concept of relative success.




Figure 1: Indicators of relative success

3. Explaining sub-state nationalism: the theory

The explanation of the differences in relative success of the three nationalist movements will be based on theoretical arguments proposed by several scholars. These theoretical arguments can roughly be characterized by the following factors: The construction of national identity, nationalist discourse and symbolic frameworks. However, these three theoretical arguments are strongly connected as will be shown in the following sections. Together they provide us with a significant amount of ammunition to explain some of the differences in strength and cohesiveness of the three nationalist movements under study. The purpose of these factors is also to provide a theoretical framework in which we can find the possible explanations for the differences in success in a coordinated fashion. These three theoretical arguments can be used to explain the weakness and strength of the three indicators of success as described in the previous chapter: Language, Print capitalism and Subnational mobilization.

3.1. The construction of national identity

Every sub-state nationalist movement starts with the identification of its national identity. Greenfeld (1992) argues that nationalism is not related to membership in all human communities, but only in those communities defined as nations. National identity is different from an identity based on religion or class, nor is it the same as a linguistic or territorial identity, nor is it the same as a political identity of any kind. However, these kinds of identities can have their influence on the formation of the national identity. Unique identities can frequently be traced back centuries before the emergence of the national identity, but the presence of any kind of unique identity is no reason for anticipating the emergence of a national identity. National identity is not a generic identity, but it is specific. Generating an identity may be a psychological necessity, a natural process for human nature, but generating a national identity is not (Greenfeld, 1992, 12).

An essential characteristic of identity is that it is based on the view that the concerned actor has of him or herself. Identity therefore is a perception. If a particular identity doesn't mean anything to the population in question, this particular population doesn't have this identity. In ethnic nationalism, nationality can become the synonym of ethnicity and the national identity is often perceived as a reflection or awareness of the possession of inherited group characteristics. These components of ethnicity can be language, customs, territorial affiliations or even physical aspects. Such objective ethnicity however does not represent an identity. The national identity of the nation depends on what characteristics the people perceive to be the source of their uniqueness and distinctiveness.

Ethnicity is frequently used to constitute a national identity, but ethnicity in itself doesn't necessarily constitute nationality. Ethnic characteristics form a certain category of building stones which can be organized and rendered meaningful, becoming the elements of any number of identities (Greenfeld, 1992, 12-13).

Identity is not just a simple form of inherent self-awareness. It is a social construct and therefore subject to change. Our perception regarding who we are as individuals is first of all largely focused upon the recognition and appreciation of our origins. The idea of a myth of a common origin thus entails a perception of where we come from and what we share within a community as a whole (Beswick, 2007, 32). The notion of a common ancestral heritage might thus be one of the components of identity, but specific cultural traits, language and any form of social organization are also pertinent (Beswick, 2007, 33). A sense of solidarity between people will emerge if they share the same positive attitudes towards their particular expressions of identity and language. Especially language can present an ethnic group with a strong incentive to feel connected since it connects the present with the past through its oral tradition, literary forms, music and history. When these attitudes towards language and culture are combined with regional and social stereotypes, a strong group sense of identity can emerge (Beswick, 2007, 34).

Common elements chosen as core values can work both as mobilizing symbols and as a point of reference for a wide platform. The lack of available cultural markers like language can force a nationalist movement to look for other instruments of identity formation. In this case, the group will be forced to rely on an antagonistic identity, which is constructed essentially through the opposition of the in-groups to one or more out-groups. This antagonistic identity focuses more on the need to define one's own identity through negative comparisons to others, which results in an exclusive character (Conversi, 1997, 5).

All nationalist movements first task is to identify its people and their collective identity. To mobilize them, a sense of self-confidence has to be instilled, but for this to occur, the nation must unequivocally rid itself of all sense of inferiority. The reverse of this negative self-image often comes with a radical upgrading of all positive traits of "the would be nation". Consequently, an openly declared sense of superiority can develop against the out-groups (Conversi, 1997, 61).

3.2. Nationalist discourse

The emergence of national identity and especially its character has significant consequences for the nationalist discourse of the movement. The choice of a special symbol on nationality, such as

language or race can have direct political consequences as reflected in the movements' ideological formulations. The choice however, is dependent on pre-existing conditions. Therefore, Conversi states that historical and anthropological conditions have the power to influence the patterns of political mobilization (Conversi, 1997, 162).

Shmuel Nili (2009) for example argues that differences in national identity led to different types of nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque country. The Basque case is an example of ethnic nationalism, while the Catalan case is an example of civic nationalism. He deploys the difference made by Rogers Brubaker in his research on German and French nationalism in 1992. Brubaker states that the understanding of French nationhood has been assimilationist, while the understanding of German nationhood has been differentialist. In France, the gradual formation of a nation-state around a single political and cultural center produced the conditions for an assimilationist self-understanding. In Germany, a conglomerative pattern of state-building, uniting two confessions and even two nations (Prussia) in one state, produced conditions for a differentialist self-understanding (Brubaker, 1992, 5). Brubaker uses historical, geographic and cultural path dependency in order to explain the differences between the assimilation oriented French nationalism and the exclusionary oriented German nationalism (Nili, 2009, 247).

Civic nationalism is seen as an inclusive form of nationalism because the nation is defined by political terms rather than ethnic or biological limits. A member of a different ethnic minority, who accepts the tradition, culture and civil religion of the nation, can theoretically be considered an equal citizen. This kind of civic national identity can be acquired. In contrast to the ethnic form of nationalism, civic nationalism presents a significant possibility for assimilation. Ethnic nationalism defines the limits of a national community based on ethnic origins. Therefore, it produces a clear possibility of exclusion (Nili, 2009, 247).

Keating (1997) however emphasizes that ethnic and civic nationalism are ideal types. They do not constitute a descriptive taxonomy. Several nationalist movements actually make both types of appeal, and are based on both ethnic and civic elements. An ethnic nationalist movement for example may adopt civic elements to legitimate themselves in a society where liberal democratic values prevail. Civic nationalist movements could also use ethnically exclusive sentiments to enhance their mobilizing power. What matters is the balance between the two and which elements dominate the nationalist discourse (Keating, 1997, 691).

3.3. Symbolic frameworks

Finlayson (1998) points out that there is a danger in analyzing nationalism based on general or unitary theories such as civic or ethnic nationalism. Instead he stresses that there is always an irreducible specificity of any nationalist phenomena. Every nationalist movement always contains a very specific content, which aims to define concepts such as the culture and values of the nation. This content is of essential importance for the deployment and construction of the nationalist discourse (Finlayson, 1998, 99). When analyzing nationalism mainly based on unitary and general theories, the importance of this specific kind of content is obscured. Therefore Finlayson argues we should analyze and theorize nations and nationalism seeking not only for universal theories but try to comprehend the ways in which nationalism functions within the a broader political context.

Laura Desfor Edles (1999) tries to analyze Spanish sub-state nationalism within such a broader political context based on symbolic structures. She suggested a culturalistic approach to explain differences in Spanish sub-state nationalism. Based on its national identity and its nationalist discourse, for every nationalist movement we can identify a symbolic structure. She conceptualizes culture as a set of symbolic structures that pattern actions just as structures of a more visible kind do. Symbols can thus provide a nonmaterial structure based on which she explains why for example one particular statement appeared while the other did not. The idea of the imagined political community, as Benedict Anderson pointed out, is that it unites the living and the dead. It joins the biographies of individual persons and the nation as a whole in a common historical narrative. A cultural historical approach can thus be used to show how shared meanings within this “would be” nation develop and change over time, based on different historical circumstances and situations. These symbolic structures also shape action at any particular point in history (Edles, 1999, 311-314).

The memory of a nationalist movement for example can produce a very strong symbolic structure. Diego Muro (2009) defines the memory of a nationalist movement as a conglomerate of individual experiences that have been deliberately shaped to mark social boundaries and define a sense of belonging. The formation of a collective memory is a complex and unpredictable process in which memories are sustained by national tradition, myths and symbols which are constantly renewed by nationalist elites. New political situations and ideological settings often encourage the national elites to recall the past in order to define the nationalist political project. National memories are important because they outlive individual participants of history and influence the way new generations look at their past (Muro, 2009, 675-676).

4. Operationalization

This thesis will adopt a concept of subnationalism which was initially developed by Singh (2008). She conceptualizes the strength of sub nationalism in Indian states based on a set of indicators. These are language, print capitalism and subnational mobilization. These indicators tap into the concept which Singh calls a “we-feeling”. They determine to what extent a subnational movement is able to identify its people and the strength and popular support of the movement. This thesis will adopt Singh’s framework to establish the relative differences in success of the three movements.

Language has been central to almost every theoretical understanding and empirical assessments of nationalism. Singh operationalizes the language indicator based on internal homogeneity and external differentiation. There is scholarly consensus that a single, shared and distinctive language promotes subnationalism. Therefore Singh analyzes the language variable as an aggregate based on the questions whether the language in the movement under study is the single language, a common language and/or a distinctive language (Sing, 2008, 6-8). Based on scholarly literature I will assess to what extent Catalan, Basque and Galician languages were single, common and/or distinctive, creating the same aggregate variable as Singh uses in which presence of all three elements results in a relatively stronger language indicator than the presence of for example only one of the three elements. However, the main focus of the language indicator will be on to what extent the languages of the three movements were widely spoken, understood and written within Catalan, Basque and Galician regions. A widely spoken and written language can be seen as a strong indicator of a cohesive and strong subnational identity.

For the second indicator, print capitalism, Singh analyses the circulation of vernacular newspapers, which is viewed as the medium through which a subnational community begins to perceive itself. In a range of cases, the role of newspaper spread has been identified as a driving force towards sub nationalism. To analyze this indicator Singh looks at the per capita number of newspapers and the per capita circulation (Singh, 2008, 8-9). For this thesis I will evaluate to what extent the Basque, Catalan and Galician nationalist movements were able to set up an organization for the circulation of literature with a nationalist character. Due to the available data, I will deploy a more qualitative assessment of to what extent literature, newspapers and cultural expressions have influenced the sense of belonging to the sub nation. Furthermore, especially for the analysis of Catalan and Galician nationalism, leaving out the influence of these kinds of cultural markers would be inadequate since these elements were essential for these communities to emerge. The *Renaixença* for example (a cultural and linguistic revolution), was of essential importance for Catalan nationalism. The analysis

of the print capitalism indicator in this thesis is thus much broader and based on a more qualitative assessments, while Singh concentrates on quantitative measures. I will for example also include to what extent the movements were able to influence education policy to promote and sustain the use of regional languages. Promoting the use of for example the Catalan language meant an early standardization of its written form, which ultimately influences the possibilities for Catalan education and the use of Catalan as the official administrative language, which in turn strengthens the subnational movement.

To further establish the strength of a subnational movement, Singh analyzes the support for the idea of subnational identity. As Anderson stated, it's essential that even though the members of the community might never meet each other, they have to 'imagine' that they are part of a distinct community or a single (sub) nation. For the analysis of subnational mobilization Singh looks at three different observable manifestations: popular mobilization, support for political parties and the absence of a separatist party. Popular mobilization is a clear indicator of both a subnational consciousness and a desire for political control in the territorial homeland. Second, she looks at electoral support for subnational political parties with a subnational political ideology. When successful in the sense that this party gathers a substantial amount of support during elections, this is also a clear indicator of subnational sentiment. Subnational parties are thus both a consequence of nationalist sentiments and a consolidation and expansion of the nationalist movement (Sing, 2008, 10-11). Based on literature and election results I will deploy an analysis concentrated on the support for nationalist political parties compared to the support for state-wide parties, to investigate to what extent the three movements were able to politically mobilize their people and gain electoral support. Electoral support for nationalist parties obviously indicates a strong and cohesive subnational movement. However, all three movements have known several political parties claiming to represent the true nationalist movement. Therefore the assessment of the support for political parties would be inadequate without taking into account to what extent political representation was fragmented.

The existence of a rival subnationalism within a state likely signals a more fragmented subnational identity and solidarity. Singh therefore takes the presence of competing subnationalist identification, which can be observed through the occurrence of a movement by a section of the populace of the region or province, as indicative of a lower level of subnationalism. When a region or province is not characterized by such competing subnationalist attachments, Singh argues that the subnational identity is stronger and more cohesive (Sing, 2008, 14). The absence of a separatist party thus indicates a less fragmented subnational identity and solidarity. Within all three cases there have been several parties claiming to represent nationalist sentiments. I will therefore use the idea of separatist parties slightly differently. I will describe to what extent we can speak of fragmentation

among several parties and to what extent they were in conflict about the identity of the subnation and their goals. This allows me to assess to what extent the national identity was fragmented or cohesive, based on the amount and character of representation through several political parties.

These 3 indicators described as language, print capitalism and subnational mobilization can be seen as cues which signal the cohesion or fragmentation of subnationalism. Sing argues that language and newspaper circulation tap into the concept of one-ness and belonging. Subnational mobilization reflects the idea of a “we-feeling” which ultimately strengthens or weakens the common identity (Singh, 2008, 17). No single indicator is sufficient to establish a strong subnational movement, but when the three indicators together are strong, we can speak of a cohesive and strong nationalist movement. In terms of relative success, I therefore argue that when a subnational movement is characterized as strong in more indicators, the stronger the cohesiveness and success of the subnational movements.

5. Historical background: Catalonia, The Basque country and Galicia

5.1. Catalonia

“No one disputes the role of the Renaixença, that is, the recovery of Catalan as a literary language, in creating the atmosphere in which Catalan nationalism was to be born” (Balcells, 1996, 25).

Catalonia became the most powerful mercantile empire of the Mediterranean between the twelfth and fourteenth century. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century *los Reyes Catolicos*, Ferdinand and Isabella tried to centralize the country into a Spanish church state (Edles, 316-319, 199). By 1716 the new regime had successfully abolished the autonomous constitutional systems of not only Catalonia, but also Aragon, Valencia and the Balearics. Catalonia had been the most recalcitrant region. Its constitutional system in the late middle ages was one of the most developed in the whole of Europe. Catalan commerce, finance, shipping and manufactures were increasingly beneficial, making Catalonia the dominant military and economic power in the region (Hargreaves, 2000, 18; Payne, 1971, 15-16).

In the eighteenth century Catalonia was fully integrated within the broader Spanish affairs. The Catalans proved to be fully conscious of the advantages of the Spanish system and showed complete loyalty towards the Spanish crown (Payne, 1971, 15-16). The years 1878-88 were a period of prosperity for Catalan industry and commerce. The period is known as the era of *Febre d'or* (gold fever). The expansion of Catalan economy paralleled the rebirth of Catalan literature. This process is known as the *Renaixença* (Payne, 1971, 18). The *Renaixença* was the start of a cultural revolution which resulted in an increased salience of the national Catalan identity, based on a shared history, a shared culture, but most importantly, a national language.

At the end of 19th century, Catalan scholars began to study the socio-economic, literary and political history of Catalonia from the middle ages. The aim of their studies was the recovery of Catalonia's self-esteem as a cultural identity. This created the possibility for the Catalan mother tongue to become a modern literary language once more, although the process wasn't easy. Catalan is a difficult language, far removed from Castilian Spanish. Basic schooling also was still in Castilian and the first literary works of for example Victor Balaguer, about Catalan history were in Castilian (Balcells, 1996, 25).

Aribau's famous poem, *Oda a la patria* (Ode to the homeland), unintentionally created and formulated the central idea of Catalan nationalism: language. While for other nationalist movements

race or religion were to constitute the main sign of the collective identity, Aribau's poem identified language and the homeland. In 1843, Joaquim Rubio I Ors strengthened the recovery of Catalan literature, by proclaiming that Catalonia could still aspire to be autonomous. This would not be a form of political independence, but certainly a literary independence (Balcells, 1996, 26). In 1859, the *Jocs Florals* (historically related poetry contests) were restored in Barcelona bringing renaissance Catalan literature to a wider public. The *Jocs Florals* were aiming at re-establishing the prestige of the Catalan language (Hargreaves, 2000, 24).

Essential though, were the undertakings with lesser literary pretensions, such as books from the priest Antoni Maria Claret, a repertoire of songs collected by Anselm Clave and numerous comedies that were performed in Catalan. Serafi Soler was one of many Catalans who defended Catalan "as it was spoken today", against the artificial *Jocs Florals*. Catalan magazines became an established fact during the 1870's, inspiring a wide audience (Balcells, 1996, 26). The *Renaixença* started as an urban phenomenon, but quickly penetrated the more backward and rural hinterland. This was one of the main factors for the growing support among the rural populations for Catalanism (Hargreaves, 200, 24).

The *Renaixença* swept all sectors of society with a musical, political and especially literary wave of creativity. This cultural revival touched all fields of humanities and spread all over the Catalan speaking regions (Conversi, 1997, 15). During the 1880s the *Renaixença* reached its peak. The poetical genius Jacint Verdaguer was one of the influential artists that succeeded in bringing the literary and spoken language together. They attained a quality that even enabled them to find readers outside Catalonia. While the Catalan language was created, the Catalans realized they lacked a genuine Catalan culture. This implied they had to Catalanize education and secure an official language status (Balcells, 1996, 26).

The Catalan movement first began to take organizational form initialized by Almiral, a former federalist leader. His first Catalan congress was attended by 1500 people. Two years later he formed the *Centra Catala*, the first concrete entity to pursue the goal of Catalan autonomy. In 1886 Almiral published a collection of speeches and articles that presented a doctrine of political Catalanism. Its main focus was on the distinct regional culture and society of Catalonia. Almiral stated that its psychology and values were different from the rest of Spain. Catalonia thus required a broad political administrative autonomy. This program was neither republican nor exclusivist. He saw Catalonia as the first modern region in Spain, whose example would help the rest of the country to modernize (Payne, 1975, 66-68).

The *Renaixença* was the start of a cultural revolution which resulted in an increased salience of the national Catalan identity, based on a shared history, a shared culture, but most importantly, a national language. Since Admiral's connotations were too radical for many Catalans, a group of intellectuals broke off to form the *Lliga Catalunya* in 1887. They merged with a leading Catalan cultural group forming the *Unio Catalanista*. The notion of autonomy for Catalonia was slowly growing among the middle classes and some even went further. Round 1899, the term nationalist was first used with frequency to explain autonomous Catalan regionalism (Payne, 1975, 70-71).

In 1894, Enric Prat de la Riba, a young middle class leader, published the *Compendi Nacionalista*, the first complete ideology of Catalanism. Prat defined Spain as a political state, but Catalonia was the true fatherland, and therefore constituted a distinct and fully developed nationality. The state therefore had to be altered conform this nationality. Catalan nationalism was not separatist, but demanded a regional parliament and a fully autonomous administration. Catalanism was to become the vehicle for middle-class modernization and economic development, promoting social harmony (Payne, 1975, 71). The success of the *Renaixença* and the rich output produced by Catalan literature provided a solid political and societal base on which the nationalist movement draws its stable legitimacy upon today. Catalan nationalism relies on a pre-existing identity. This identity had already been completed by the cultural revival and preceded political nationalists (Conversi, 1997, 16).

In 1911 the idea of uniting the four Catalan provinces under one administrative umbrella began to take shape. In 1914, the *mancomunitat de Catalunya* was officially set up, and functioned as an administrative government of the four *diputaciones* of Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona. The *mancomunitat* soon became active in several fields and many institutions were created or expanded. An institute of Catalan studies was created to improve education (Hargreaves, 2000, 28) and roads and local services were improved to foster the regional culture. The actions of the *mancomunitat* soon gave Catalonia the most intense cultural life of any region in Spain. Especially the changes in education were extremely effective and innovative (Conversi, 1997, 33).

Artists and intellectuals found in the *mancomunitat* an ideal source of support. This led to the creation of the *Noucentista* movement (nine-hundred-ism, referring to the new century). More than ever, the project of cultural Catalanism was a unifying platform for a wide range of interests, such as ideology, political parties, voluntary organizations, arts and school. The heart of this project was centered around language and its orthographic unification (Conversi, 1997, 33).

However, on September the 13th 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera declared his dictatorship in Spain. At the beginning, most Catalans hoped this would bring stability. However, within a few days, a royal decree banished the Catalan flag and language and all offences against the unity of the

Spanish country were placed under jurisdiction of military courts. Catalan organizations were dissolved and meetings were prohibited. Despite the dictatorship, Catalan culture persisted in a semi-clandestine environment. Lacking public support, the dictatorship soon slowly burned itself out until it came to a sudden end in 1930 (Conversi 1997, 36-37).

In 1931, the statute of autonomy was approved and the *Generalitat* (Catalan autonomous government) was re-established and Macia elected first president. However, in 1936 the Spanish garrison in Morocco, under command of General Francisco Franco revolted against the dual traits of socialism and separatism. The civil war had begun. In 1939, after the conquest of Barcelona, the *Generalitat* was dissolved and Catalan leaders were either executed or escaped into exile. The end of the civil war in 1939 started the Francoist era (Conversi, 1997, 41-42).

Franco adopted the most radical politics of assimilation ever known against non-Castilian cultures in modern Spanish history. Catalan was banned as a spoken language in the workplace, and the Franco regime took several measures to not simply suffocate Catalan culture but tried to eradicate any sign of Catalan identity. Their results were devastating and a defeated silence fell over the entire nation (Conversi, 1997, 111-113). Any sign of opposition or independence was brutally suppressed; thousands were executed or forced into exile. Hargreaves even goes as far to state that *Catalan identity and Catalan nationalism were threatened with extinction* (Hargreaves, 2000, 28).

As soon as the repression was slightly eased after the defeat of fascism, Catalanism gave sign of renewed vitality. The strong cultural emphasis of Catalan nationalism created the conditions for a peaceful nationalist revival in which most opposition forces were accepted, independently of their ideology. This evolution was made possible by the lively pre-existing regional culture, especially in terms of language and literature (Conversi, 1997, 125). The second most important factor in stimulating the revival of Catalan nationalism were the very successful economic policies of the Franco regime in the 1950's and 60's. Both Catalonia and the Basque country were in the vanguard of Spanish economic modernizations (Hargreaves, 2000, 29).

5.2. The Basque country

“The origins of the Basques remain shrouded in mystery” (Payne, 1971, 32).

The Basque nationalist movement derives from the Non-European origins of the Basque people. They are the sole survivors of the pre-Indo-European population and their language is the sole surviving non-Indo-European language, but wasn't standardized until the 1960's. Based on their prehistoric identity the Basque people are the most ancient ethnic group in Europe, but they were never a single people (Edles, 1999, 322-327).

The three Basque Provinces, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Alava had been formally incorporated within the Spanish kingdom during the fourteenth century. Only the Basque remained its separate constitutional identity of the system of the *Fueros*. The *Fueros* refers to an ancient period of local (not national) self-rule within several communities. The Basques are the only people in Europe who did not suffer from the western feudal system (Edles, 322-323, 1999). The *Fueros* provided for separate legal and financial administration under the regional aristocracy (Payne, 1971, 32). The Basque country thus never was a full autonomous national government, while the Catalans had been the most developed constitutional political system during the late middle ages (Payne, 1971, 15-16).

Sabino de Arana y Goiri was the creator of Basque ideology and founder of the movement. Young Sabino grew up in an atmosphere of great moral seriousness, being a deeply religious man. His brother Luis convinced him of the idea that the Basques were intrinsically different from Spaniards (Kern, 1990, 34-35). The Basque country was not a part of Spain, but it was an ancient republic that had voluntarily associated itself with the Castilian crown, while retaining absolute autonomy and institutional and ethnical purity. Spain had usurped Vizcaya while attempting to corrupt its people (Payne, 1975, 65-66).

During the *Febrer d'Or*, young Sabino came to Barcelona for his studies. Only a year in Barcelona was needed to fully embrace his brother's thoughts on the Vizcayan theory. During this process, the Catalan *Renaixença* began to reach its climax. In the Barcelona of the 1880's, Arana began to conceive his own doctrine of Basque nationalism. He began to devote himself entirely to Basque studies in 1885, starting with language, because like all middle-class Vizcayan families, he only spoke Castilian. Living in Barcelona and spending his summers in Vizcaya, Arana published the first part of his *Gramatica Elemental del Euzkara Izkaino* (Payne, 1975, 68).

In 1888 he moved to Bilbao to take up the challenge of developing an ideology and a movement of Vizcayanism that would eventually become Basque Nationalism. His first major political statement was a little book called *Bizkaya por su independencia*, published in 1882. In 1893, Arana started to form a movement which would work for the independence of Vizcaya, restoring its supposed original state of liberty. In the development of this movement, Arana faced seemingly overwhelming obstacles and lacked a genuine base of support (Payne, 1975, 69-70). By contrast, during this period, the more moderate and collaborationist elements of Catalan nationalist movement began to build organizations.

Arana had to begin his movement almost single handedly. In 1883, he founded his biweekly journal called *Bizkaitarra* (The Vizcayan), and began to pronounce his doctrines and published articles on grammar, philology, Basque history, culture and local politics. In 1894, the first political incident occurred, when “the Arana brothers” burned a Spanish flag after a Basque musical concert before the symbolic foral tree of Guernica. In 1895 this group took formal shape in the organization of *Bizkai-Buru-Batzar*, which was eventually going to be called PNV, the Basque nationalist party (Payne, 1975, 71-72).

Since the Basque area had never been a single political unit, Arana had to invent one. He came up with the name Euzkadi, an enology that meant the “Basque land”. He also designed a flag: two-crossed banners on a red background with a white cross (Edles, 1999, 322-324; Payne, 1975-73-74). A central element in Arana’s ideology was his believe of Basque purity, both ethnically and culturally. As Edles states: *Arana believed that efforts needed to be made to preserve and strengthen the Basque race, and that political independence was both a right and the objective for the Basque people* (Edles, 324, 1999).

Arana completely rejected the readiness to compromise like the Catalan nationalists of his time. He made an absolute distinction of what was Basque, and what was Spanish. Basques and Spaniards where members of different races. The Basque race was pure while Spanish was not (MacClancy, 2007, 105). He condemned the Vizcayans that had married ordinary Spaniards, because they had “confounded themselves with the most vile and despicable race in Europe”. He also said the Basque didn’t have to become separatist, for the Basque Provinces had never really joined Spain. It was impossible to separate that which had never been united. The Basques only needed to reassert their fundamental independence. He strongly condemned the Catalan error which was to define the Basques and Catalans as brothers, the Basque brother being in misfortune (Payne, 1975, 75).

The Catalans where a part of Spain, whereas the Basque country had nothing to do with Spain. Catalan politics consisted of attracting to other Spaniards as well, whereas the Vizcayan program was

to reject all Spaniards as foreigners. Arana didn't want people who weren't originally Basque to learn Euskara, while this was an explicit goal of Catalan nationalism (Payne, 1975, 75). This contradicted Arana's idea of the purity of race, in which language was one of the basic elements (MacClancy, 2007, 106). Inclusion through the teachings of Catalan language thus was an important element in the Catalan attitude towards migrants, while in the Basque country, language was used for the opposite. As Nili states, It merely functioned for exclusionary purposes (Nili, 2009, 252). "*Arana's chief cultural goal was not to spread Euskara, but to prevent foreigners from knowing it*" (Nili, 2009, 253).

Arana created Basque nationalism and the concept of the Basque Nation by creating nationalist symbols (anthem and flag). Arana is seen as the undisputed founder and ideologue of the Basque nationalist movement. His goal was to preserve and strengthen the Basque race independence (Edles, 1999, 322-324). *In contrast to Catalan nationalism, which emerged in the context of a pre-existing cultural and linguistic revival, Basque nationalism emerged almost singlehandedly through the efforts of Arana, who created the very concept of the Basque nation* (Edles, 1999, 324).

A first limited success for the nationalists came in 1898 when Arana himself was elected for the provincial assembly of Vizcaya. In the 1899 municipal elections, the nationalists won five seats on the city council of Bilbao and three nearby towns. After a second imprisonment in 1902 Arana's health became precarious due to Addison's disease. He had to resign as president of the PNV and died on 25 November 1903, aged thirty-eight. He was long remembered under Basques as someone of courage and self-sacrifice. He was considered a model to his followers (Conversi, 1997, 68-69). After Arana's death, little progress was made for almost twenty years. The political elite of the region had a good relationship with the Spanish political parties and a large group of devoted Catholics supported variants of carlism and integristism while the growing proletariat was attracted to the Spanish socialist party. The Basque elite had adapted to the concentration of capital in Madrid and thought much more in terms of broader Spanish economic development. They showed a great willingness to cooperate with the Spanish elite and accepted aristocratic titles from the crown (Payne, 1971, 37-38).

The first major triumph for the nationalists came in 1917. In the province of Vizcaya they gained an absolute majority in seats in the *diputacion*. However, the post-war depression and economic crisis led to the national question being relegated to the background. The situation was reflected in an electoral decline of the nationalist party. The crisis fed internal dissent leading to a split and readjustment of the party. The re-emerging party was now called *Partido nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) and became a major force in Basque politics (Conversi, 1997, 69-70). However, Arana left a legacy of contradictions and ambivalences that showed the seeds of future nationalist fragmentation. Each of

the opposing forces within the nationalist field claimed to be the true inheritor of his ideal, whether in its moderate or radical form, anti-capitalist or industrialist focus.

Primo de Rivera's dictatorship forced the two major Parties, PNV and CNV into clandestine activity. As with most dictatorships, the stronger the repression the more nationalistic feelings were boosted. Both Catalans and Basques emerged with renewed vigor, reinforced by years of secrecy. The conditions of clandestinely emphasized the importance of culture since informal cultural and folkloric groupings were the only outlet available to express nationalistic sentiments (Conversi, 1997, 73-74). The nationalists agreed to unite their two wings (CNV and PNV) under one PNV banner. The dictatorship had thus helped to boost Basque nationalism, uniting the different souls and even mobilize wider sectors. This led to an assembly in Vergara (1930) where a new generation of political leaders emerged (Payne, 1971, 43). They were united under pure Aranist principles, only the idea of separatism was toned down. Race and religion were firmly confirmed as the bastions of Basque identity (Conversi, 1997, 73-75).

In 1933 the PNV became the largest party in the region, claiming 12 of the 24 seats in Cortes. This was the greatest electoral victory in the PNV's history (Payne, 1975, 134). In December 1935, the Basque country received a status of autonomy from the republic. This was the fourth version of the proposed status of autonomy. The first three had failed due to anti-republican opposition from Alava and Navarra. However, the autonomous government, which was installed very quickly and made the Basque country a very orderly and the least revolutionary part of Spain, lasted only nine months (Conversi, 1997, 75-76). During the civil war, the Basques had supplied the republicans with some of their most effective troops. In 1937, German planes bombed the Gonder legion and the town of Guernica on a market day slaughtering hundreds of people (Edles, 1999, 325-326). This was the first aerial bombardment of a civilian population. Autonomy only lasted 9 months and ended when Bilbao was captured by the Spanish nationalist troops in June 1937. The statute was abrogated and all political parties were suppressed (Conversi, 1997, 75-77).

From 1939 to 1945 the Basque country was subjected to a regime of state terror with no parallel in its history. Franco's troops launched a campaign of repression against any sign of Basque identity. Even innocents expressions as music and dance were subjected to suspicion (MacClancy, 2007, 16). Numerous people were imprisoned or executed under the pretext of promoting separatism (Conversi, 1997, 80-82). The political persecutions of the Basque language and culture by the Franco regime created the foundations for several unintended consequences. The memories of repression lead to a new post-war generation who was extremely radicalized in its Basque nationalist consciousness (Perez-Agote, 2006, 73).

5.3. Galicia

Galician culture is always on the edge, complaining about everything, and of course it does not make any long-term plans, as it expects to die soon (Barreto, 2011, 385).

In 14th and 15 century, Galician language had almost started to fulfill every role and aspect of a national language. Until the unification of Castile and Aragon, Galicia had enjoyed a degree of political autonomy. However, due to centralization and the socio-political situation of Spanish affairs, Galician language devaluated. By the end of the 15th century, Galicia was totally incorporated within the crown of Castile, which blocked every attempt at establishing Galician as a national language. Galician completely lost its status as the official language for public administration. The state language, Castilian became dominant (Beswick, 2007, 58-60).

The Galician nobility came to see the issue of Galician ethnicity as a negative social threat. Galician suffered from social disdain and the Castilian language became a necessity for social progress. The new ruling elite of Galicia were predominantly Castilian speaking and the Galician nobility learnt Castilian out of necessity for any kind of social progress (Keating, 2001, 226). Galician clergy, who remained to play an important role in society, were replaced by Castilian speaking priests and abbots, which resulted in the fact that the people could no longer communicate with them. The use of Castilian was thus effectively enforced upon the Galician people. However, the rural areas were still geographically and socially isolated. Galician remained the dominant language which supported the divide among elite/rural lines which in turn enforced the necessity of speaking Castilian for social progress (Beswick, 2007, 61).

In 1700, the installation of the royal house of Borbon in Spain brought important changes. The monarchy strived to create a unified and homogenous Spain. The *Ley Moyano* of 1857 forbade the use of any language other than Castilian. Within Spanish education, Castilian language became exclusive and compulsory. For the next two hundred years, the hegemony of Spanish society by the imposition of the use of Castilian was to continue virtually unabated. Galicians came to see their language as poor and lacking in prestige (Beswick, 2007, 61-61). The rest of Spain regarded Galicia as a poor and backward region and the Galician economy became extremely dependent from the central government (Keating, 2001, 226)

Despite the negative reputation of Galicia, the 18th century was characterized by a degree of economic developments and social and political upheaval. Castilian, officially seen as the dominant and only language, was used especially in the urban region, but in the countryside Galician was still

used by clergy's and landowners. In many regions around the world, language had become an important way in which communities could articulate its political aspiration. This led to a period characterized as *Galleguismo*. A small group, predominantly from the upper class of Galician urban society, attempted to demonstrate their strong ethnic ties and identification with the region, its history, culture and language. Rosalia de Castro published a book of poetry, *Os canteres de gallegos*, in 1863, which was the first modern work written entirely in Galician and marked the beginning of a literary renaissance. Just as the *Renaixença* marked the beginnings of the idea of Catalanism, the *Rexurdimento* (Resurrection) marked the beginning of Galician nationalism (Beswick, 2007, 64-65).

The *Rexurdimento* aimed at the recuperation of medieval traditions and attempted to lend credence to the use of Galician among the cultural elite. It tried to induce a sense of historical conscience and highlight the use of Galician. For the first time a collective voice appeared which was preoccupied with the establishment of a cultural and unified variety of the language (Baker, 2000, 164-165). Initially, the *Rexurdimento* was a literary and cultural movement, but subsequently, the reawakening of political consciousness and the attempt to have Galician officially recognized as a regional language led to the movements of *Galleguista* which also tried to identify the regions distinct identity. It demonstrated the idiosyncratic traits of the region setting it apart from the rest of Spain. The *Galleguista* movement was thus the predecessor of the rise of regionalism as a political doctrine (Beswick, 2007, 65).

As a regionalist movements, *Galleguismo* was to achieve total autonomy from Spain's governing bodies in Madrid. The movements organized its own political party: *Asociacion Regionalista Gallega*, based on Murguia's ideology. Galicia was to modernize socially and politically in order to retain its ethnic identity and roots to survive (Beswick, 2007, 64-65). However, the movement faced opposition from within and outside of Galicia. Some found the resurrection of Galician language dangerous because this would mean that Galicians could no longer communicate with the rest of Spain, endangering its economic development and the political unity of Spain. *Galleguismo* was primarily an urban-based movement and didn't represent the population as a whole. It did bring the debate on language to become salient, but Galician society wasn't ready to accept the consequences (Beswick, 2007, 65).

During this period, in the countryside Galician language was still dominant. However, due to poor communication, the rural communities still felt a sense of inferiority and were generally isolated from the aims and objectives of the *Galleguista* movement. This situation became even worse when due to economic crisis, the rural population left the countryside to look for employment in the cities

where the use of Castilian was still of essential importance for any social progress. Many people also migrated from Galicia to other parts of the world (Beswick, 2007, 66).

The 19th and 20th century were again characterized by centralizing and unifying policies by the Spanish central government. Although the linguistic unification of Galicia was perceived as being of vital importance for the Galician identity, many *Galleguistas* still used Castilian in daily practice which meant the movement lost credibility. The revival of Galician language was affected badly by the centralized education system. Very few people knew how to read and write Galician, particularly in the rural areas. Galician had no standardized orthography and the only written form of Galician had been the form of the elites in the cities. Due to the economic situation, Galicia started to abandon some of its tradition and started to modernize. Within a few decades, this led to a predominantly urban culture and a growing middle class (Beswick, 2007, 67).

The birth of Galician nationalism is characterized by the year in which the organization called *Irmandades de Fala* held its first assembly in Lugo. From this congress emerged the IF *Manifesto*, which adopted the term nationalist instead of regionalist, marking a distinction with the regionalist doctrine of the *Rexurdimento*. It proposed that both Galician and Castilian would be the official languages and thus resolved any contradictions between ideological discourse and linguistic practice. Their focus was the Galician language itself and to dignify the use of Galician (Beswick, 2007, 68).

A group of intellectuals, *Xeracion Nos*, identified Galician as it was spoken in the rural areas as the true authentic language. Modern Galician literature began with the *Nos* group and they advocated the establishment of a written standard (Baker, 2000, 165). In the 19th century, several efforts were made to publish Galician-Castilian dictionaries and Galician grammar books. The methods of *Xeracion Nos* and *Irmandades de Fala* differed substantially however. *Irmandades de Fala* tried to achieve nationalist aims by the recuperation of language in the Spanish system. *Xeracion Nos* wanted to undermine such a system by stimulating a sense of national consciousness in Galicia, defending its rights of the people to use Galician as a means of expressing their ethnicity (Beswick, 2007, 68).

During the second Spanish republic, the loose federalism and decentralization allowed regional nationalism to become politically organized. The IF nationalist offered a political alternative in contrast to the earlier *Galleguista* movement, in the form of the *Partido Galleguista*, which sought legal recognition of the Galician language. They also succeeded in installing a sense of national consciousness in a minority of the population. In 1936, the *Estado autonomia* was ratified, establishing a co-officiality of both Galician and Castilian (Beswick, 2007, 69). During the 1930's, the *Partido Galleguista* was about to become a mass-movement, representing nationalist feelings in Galicia. In 1936 it obtained 3 deputies for the Madrid parliament, counted more than 45000

members with an increasingly inter-class membership. The leadership as well represented a big part of the Galician intelligentsia (Núñez, 2007, 31).

However, Franco rose to power in 1936, putting an end to progress. Franco's dictatorship was nationalistic and extremely authoritarian. It was completely intolerant towards any aspiration of regional autonomy. This repression prevented any further development of the written form of Galician. Once again, both the people and the language suffered a further loss of dignity. The regime paralyzed the *Galleguista* movement by controlling all mass media and the education system. Leading academics and supporters were jailed or even executed (Beswick, 2007, 69). The social basis of Galician nationalism was expanding, but did not have enough time to become fully articulated. Galician national consciousness was not as deeply rooted as it was in Basque Country or Catalonia. Its survival under the dictatorship therefore became far more difficult (Núñez, 2007, 31).

In the Galician case, the civil war interrupted a process of social expansion of the nationalist movement, which proved to be unable to withstand the long years of dictatorship. The number of Galician nationalists remained very limited and they started to focus on cultural resistance (Núñez Seixas, 2000, 316). The Franco regime however also brought changes. General Franco, who had been born in Galicia, increased national investments in his native region and introduced better crops and better facilities for the agrarian economy of Galicia (Kern, 1990, 234). Also, the private use of the Galician language was ignored, since Franco was not as strict in trying to eradicate the Catalan and Basque language, with the Galician language in his own homeland (Beswick, 2007, 69).

During 27 years (1936-63) Galician nationalism survived as a cultural legacy shared by a minority. Since 1950 this minority concentrated on promoting the preservation of the Galician culture. The 1950's and 60's marked another turning point in the recuperation of Galician language. A small degree of permissiveness was displayed towards regional languages by the Franco regime. The publishing house *Editorial Galaxia* was founded by Ramon Pineiro and Otero Pedrayo and was devoted to publish in the Galician language (Núñez, 2007, 32). Narrative works followed such as *Merlin a familia*, and the focus of the *Galleguista* movement became both based on language and culture. In the 1960's cultural institutions were set up to serve as the focus of ideological resistance towards Franco, as were two more Galician political parties (Marxist and socialist). Civil protest poetry became prevalent by Celso Emilio Ferreiro and by the 1970's the demand for language rights had become established within cultural circles. Singers and poets proclaimed their allegiance to *La lingua maternal* (the mother tongue). A good example is the poem by Manuel Maria called *Terra Cha* (your land). Although there was a renewed interest in the language, the teachings of Galician were still forbidden (Beswick, 2007, 70-71).

6. Differences in strength and cohesiveness

The following sections describe the differences in strength and cohesiveness of the three nationalist movements. These differences can be found within the several indicators which we have operationalized as Language, Print capitalism and Subnational mobilization.

6.1. Language

Language can be a very powerful incentive for subnational communities to feel connected because it connects the present with the past through oral tradition, literature and music. We have operationalized the language indicator by evaluating whether language is single, common and or distinctive. First of all we can conclude neither of the regional languages were really single, because Castilian was spoken in all three regions next to the subnational language. All three languages can to some extent be seen as distinctive since they all had their own orthography. This weakens the differences between the three movements based on the language indicator because all three movements are strong in two of the three language indicators. There are substantial differences however in to what extent the regional languages were common and to what extent the supposed orthography was actually widely spread.

The Catalan language can be analyzed as the strongest language of the three movements. This was mainly due to the effects of the cultural and literary revolution described in earlier sections as the *Renaixença*. Catalan is a hard language, but due to many undertakings of less literary pretentions, Catalan quickly became available to a wide public. The *Renaixença* swept all sectors of society with a musical, literal wave of creativity. The language quickly spread over all Catalan regions. During the 1880's the Catalan language even reached regions outside Catalonia. The undertakings of the Mancomunitat around 1914 were also extremely effective in education, giving Catalonia the most intense cultural live in any Spanish region. For the Catalans, the recuperation of their language has always been the driving force towards nationalist feelings. After every crisis, for example the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Franco, language was the first instrument to reestablish Catalanism.

The strong sense of Catalan identity is still primarily based on the use of its language. The Catalan Generalitat reported that around the year 2000 almost 94% of the population understands Catalan and Catalan is spoken by 68%. The proficiency of Catalan language is much lower among immigrants, but the strong social incentives encourage immigrants to learn Catalan. Language therefore becomes a vehicle for assimilation and still is a symbol of higher social status. There has been a lot of regional policy from the regional government to encourage and subsidize the use of Catalan in education, art,

around media and publishing. Levels of competence have increased sharply, thus in some respects, these cultural policies have been successful (Keating, 2001, 222).

The Basque language is said to be the sole surviving non-Indo-European language. However, it wasn't standardized up until 1960. The founder of Basque nationalism, Arana, started to devote himself to the language and published his first Grammar book around 1885. Language never became one of the bastions of identity for the Basque nation. From the beginning, race and religion were firmly confirmed as the most important elements of the Basque identity. The Basques claimed that language was a part of their uniqueness, but in practice, language was a stumbling block to the nationalist movement. Save sectors among the peasantry, Castilian was the main language, and the attempted linguistic nationalization movement was received with great hostility from important elements in society (Payne, 1971, 38).

In practice, the Basque language had a very weak position both in society and at an institutional level. Partly due to the limited number of written texts, a lot of dialects have emerged. In the last decades, the academy of Basque language played a crucial role in standardizing the Basque language both in oral and written form. Nowadays, a unified Basque language is widely accepted and most books are written in *Euskara Batua* (standardized Basque language), but still only around 25% of the population in the Basque Autonomous community is bilingual (both speaking Castilian and Euskara), and only 16% is passively bilingual (Cenoz, 2005, 42-43).

During the 14th and 15th century, Galician had already started to fulfill every role and aspect of a national language. The Galician language however, was prevented from a comparable development as the Catalan language due to extreme suppression and a rural/urban divide. After the unification of Spain, during the regime of General Rivera and during the Franco Regime, Castilian was enforced upon the Galicians just as it was enforced on the Catalans and Basques. This enforcement was however more effective in Galicia due to the fact that Galician nobility saw Castilian as a necessity for social progress. The upper class in the urban areas thus embraced Castilian, while in the rural areas, Galician was still the spoken language in the strongly agrarian focused Galician society. The birth and focus of Galician nationalism had always been to dignify the use of Galician and establish co-officiality in which both Galician and Castilian would be the official languages (Beswick 2007, 60-61; Keating, 2001, 227).

Galicianism has a strong ethno-cultural base. Nowadays, the Galician distinctive language is spoken by 90% and understood by 95% of the population, and there are a lot of customs, traditions and family structures (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 65). Gallego is thus actually the only minority language in Spain, spoken by almost the entire regional population. However, this is not a sign of a healthy

language, but merely the reflection of a lack of migration. Galician is used much more in the country side than in the cities, more among the lower class than among the upper classes and more in familiar than in formal settings. Its use in written communication is still very small. Unlike Catalan, it is still associated with social disdain and those who aspire upward mobility still avoid the use of Galician and turn to Castilian. As Keating states, *unlike the Catalan language, Gallego cannot readily be used to construct an imagined community, seen as dynamic, integrated, modern and European* (Keating, 2001, 227).

Galician and Catalan are functional roman languages, easily adapted to contemporary culture and technical requirements, Euskara on the other hand is extremely hard, both to learn and in its capacity to be adapted to new requirements. Non Catalan speaking migrants frequently achieve some degree of familiarity with Catalan and tend to be culturally and psychologically Catalanized. This process was encouraged by the assimilationist attitudes of Catalan policies, whereas the Basque loyalties have always been more exclusive and particularistic. Moreover, immigrants into the Basque country come predominantly from northern Spanish regions and possessed a stronger Castilian culture. In Catalonia, the use of Catalan tended to be associated with upward mobility, and knowledge of the regional culture and language tends to increase according to income and social status. This situation is almost completely reversed in The Basque Country, where knowledge of Euskara is highest among sectors of the lower and middle classes and lowest among the wealthiest and best educated (Payne, 1975, 237-238).

The Catalans thus clearly score the strongest on the language indicator, followed by the Galicians. For the Basques, language was always one of biggest problems that the nationalist movement had to deal with. Nowadays, the bilingual educational system in the Basque country has consolidated Basque education, leading to an increasing number of students who have Basque as the language of instruction. This has had a significant impact on the number of bilingual speakers (Cenoz, 2005, 53).

6.2. Print capitalism

In a range of cases, the spread of newspapers and other forms of literature has been identified as a strong driving force towards nationalism. Again the Catalans appear to be the strongest on this indicator. The *Renaixença* produced an enormous amount of literature, ranging from subjects such as history and collected songs, or the elitist poetry contests called the *Jocs Florals*. Catalan magazines became an established fact during the 1870. The Catalans were the first to establish universally accepted standards for the Catalan language. The main objective of Catalan nationalism was initially created by a famous poem from Aribau. His poem identified the homeland and the language. Catalan nationalism started with reaching a certain amount of literary and cultural independence before the idea of political independence even took shape.

Education has always been central to Catalan nationalism. In 1898 the first Catalan school was created (*Sant Jordi*). The association for the protection of Catalan education promoted publication of books for Catalan schools, which aimed at teaching history and geography of Catalonia. In 1920 there were already 120 Catalan schools, which had an important role in the socialization of students with the values of the Catalan nation. The teachers were trained at the school of pedagogy (*Escola de mestres*). Schools became a crucial site of the creation of national identity during this period (Laia Balcells, 2013, 477).

During the second republic the Catalan schooling system was enhanced due to ideals of mass literacy and fair education. The schools were of essential importance in the peak of mass literacy. They made an important contribution to the socialization of a new generation of literate citizens with values either against the central Spanish government, or love for the Catalan nation. All this happened during the time in which the national movement was gradually growing and influenced the peak and endurance of Catalan nationalism (Laia Balcells, 2013, 478). The Catalans thus recognized the mobilizing power of education and literature, and adopted policies to strengthen this development. Nowadays, almost all elementary and most secondary and tertiary education is in Catalan. This is based on the idea that all Catalan children should be bilingual, speaking and writing both Catalan and Castilian and preferably also English (Keating, 2001, 222).

For the Basques, most literary undertaking mainly had political goals. Again, Arana was the first to actually start writing about Basque nationalism. His books almost always contained political and religious statements. In the bi-weekly journal called *Biskaiterra*, he mainly described grammar, philology, Basque history local politics and religion. The Basque literary production thus had a completely different focus than Catalan literary production (Perez-Agote, 2006, 104-105). While the

Catalans wrote poems and songs about the homeland, the language and its culture, Basque literary production where mainly a means to an end and didn't have the same mobilizing effect as Catalan literature.

Basque literature was as Stanley Payne states "a frail Growth, represented mainly by a certain amount of poetry and essays. It altogether lacked the abundance, variety and distinction of Catalan literature. The primitive vocabulary and difficult structure of the language would not have permitted more. Two leading writers of the 20th century for example, Miguel de Unamuno and Pio Baroja, were both bilingual Basques, but they chose to write in Castilian, opposing the Basque nationalist sentiment (Payne, 1971, 39).

Basque education never fully developed until the university of Bilbao was created in 1968. Before this, students only had access to a school of industrial engineering. During the Franco era, the absence of a faculty of humanities prevented the preparation of primary and secondary school teachers. Only after the death of Franco a university system was established in the Basque Country (Perez-Agote, 2006, 63). In 1979 less than 5 percent of all teachers within Basque educational system were able to teach through the use of the Basque language. Nowadays over 80% of the teachers use the Basque language. The last thirty years thus had important implications for the educational system (Gorter & Cenoz, 2011, 658).

Already in the 16th and 17th century there were private newspapers in Galician, which even continued to be used during the dark ages. Galician had been the official administrative language during the 14th and 15th century. Galician nationalism thus had a historically strong existence of literature and the use of Galician writing. Just as the *Renaixença*, the *Rexurdimento* was preoccupied with the establishment of a cultural and unified language. The use of Galician was however evaluated as a negative social threat. Also within the indicator of print capitalism, the strength of Galician literary undertakings were suppressed by the fact that Galician language was seen as poor and lacking in prestige by the urban elites who saw Castilian as a necessity for development. Also, in the agrarian regions the Galician people simply couldn't read or write, which led to a relatively small reach of Galician literature. Even nowadays, the use of Galician in all written communication is still very small and compared to the Basques and Catalans, the regional government is less active in the field of Galician education (Keating, 2001, 227).

In 1950 the printing house *Galaxia* was founded, presenting another turning point in Galicianism. *Editorial Galaxia* produced a lot of narrative works and was the start of another resurrection of Galician nationalism. However, although there was a renewed interest in the Galician language and its literary productions, schooling still wasn't organized effectively since it was forbidden. Only after

the transition towards democracy were the Galicians able to establish Galician as an official language (Beswick, 2007, 70-72).

Modern Galician literature began with the creation of the *Xeracion Nos* group. Before, Galician literature was more localist than nationalist and was more a miniscule group of poets who doubled both writers and readers (Baker, 2000, 165). Galician nationalism barely experienced the same modernizing influences that shaped Catalan nationalism. Its focus remained on *rexurdimento*, the recuperation of romantic localism with strong Celtic overtones (Baker, 2000, 164).

The Catalans also score the highest on the Print capitalism indicator, due to the enormous amount of literature produced during the *Renaixença* and the effective education policies which already started around 1900. For the Basque however, Print capitalism was one the major problems, just as language. There were only a few writers who used the Basque language and Basque education and standardization of the written language started around the 1960's with the creation of the university of Bilbao and the instruction of teachers who used the Basque language. Galician literary productions faced the problems of the divisions between the educated urban population compared to the agrarian rural population, and the social disdain associated with Galician language and writing. Even nowadays the use of written Galician is very small and schooling wasn't organized effectively until the transition towards democracy.

6.3. Subnational mobilization

The following sections describe the developments of the three nationalist movements after the transition towards democracy in 1978 and analyze to what extent the three nationalist movements have been able to mobilize political support for the nationalist parties.

6.3.1. Catalonia

After the Franco Regime Catalanism re-emerged in purely cultural manifestations and took a political form once prohibition was relaxed. Step by step, just as during the regime of Primo de Rivera, and before that, the *Renaixença*, Catalanism reflected a pattern of gradual evolution of the stateless nation building (Conversi, 1997, 140). Catalan political mobilization has always based upon the efforts of intellectuals and artists. Catalans have found their identity by habitually falling back on institutions of civil society. Catalan popular cultural manifestations such as the national dance, the *Sardana*, functioned as forms of political affirmation at times when Catalan nationalism was struggling against repression (Hargreaves, 2000, 21).

Within Catalanism, cultural nationalism provided a shared horizon for a movement which was politically fragmented. Political pluralism always persisted within the Catalan nationalist movement and even increased under the hegemony of the Lliga Catalunya. The Lliga could only exert a limited amount of influence over a number of short-lived republican parties, which finally united under Macia's populist leadership leading towards the ratification of the statute of autonomy in 1931. However, the splits were purely political. They aimed to disassociate themselves from the bourgeois character of the Lliga and approach the working class. The fragmentation was thus purely political and did not reflect opposing visions of Catalan identity. The aim was to fill up the gap between upper and lower classes and between natives and immigrants. It never reflected debates on ambiguity or confusion over Catalan identity nor did it result in tensions between radical separatists and moderate regionalists (Conversi, 1997, 43). The presence of several political parties claiming to represent the Catalan nationalist movements thus didn't endanger Catalan identity.

In November 1975, Francisco Franco died. Two days later, Juan Carlos Borbon was named king of Spain. What immediately followed was a process of democratization which is nowadays commonly characterized as the transition towards democracy. In 1978, the creation of a new Spanish constitution meant the first real possibility in decades for submerged nationalist feelings to find their voice freely (Conversi, 1997, 141-142). Catalan nationalist reasserted itself leading to the restoration

of the statute of autonomy in 1982. Since the first elections, the main nationalist parties have been in control of the Catalan government (Hargreaves, 2000, 30)

After the introduction of Spanish democracy, the nationalist message spread and became more diversified, while maintaining a broad consensus around a few central themes (Conversi, 1997, 158). Catalan politics started out as a multi-party system. The first national elections showed a huge victory for the left (table A1, appendix). The regional socialists and the communists respectively became the first and second party in the Catalan *Generalitat* (Conversi, 1997, 143). The first Catalan elections in 1980 brought about a change between the political forces in Catalonia. The *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) became the leading minority party with 27,7 percent of the votes followed by PSC-PSOE and PSUC. After the 1980 and 1982 elections, the CiU and PSC tend to be the two pre-dominant political forces in both national and Catalan elections (Balcells, 1996, 177-182).


The CiU, commanding the majority of nationalist support, does not demand complete separation from the Spanish state. The CiU adopts more moderate and pragmatic strategies to obtain maximal autonomy within the system. However, the other main nationalist force, The ERC (*Esquerra Republicana*) can be characterized as separatist, but also as non-violent. The Catalan socialist party, affiliated to the Spanish national socialist party, provides the main competition for these two nationalist parties, but due to its autonomy from the national socialist party, its general orientation is still Catalan. In comparison to the two dominant parties, the Catalan conservative *Partido Popular* (PP) and the two communist parties (IC and IU) are rather weakly represented in parliament and receive significantly less political support (Hargreaves, 2000, 33).

The structure of Catalan politics nowadays is still strongly plural. Catalans political culture and strategy of pactism enables it to respond very flexible and creatively in its relations with the national government. The availability of this wide variety of political parties and competing alternatives, combined with the tradition of pactism and explains the absence of violence in Catalan nationalism (Hargreaves, 2000, 34). Tensions between radical separatists and moderate regionalists were less than in the Basque country.

Table A1 shows the election results of Catalan elections for regional and the general parliament. Looking at these results, Perez-Nievas and Bonet found high volatility between different types of elections. Since 1980, the PSOE, a branch of the national socialist party, tends to win a majority in general national elections, while the CiU has won a majority in most regional elections. This picture is significantly different from the Basque elections, where the PNV wins almost every election, whether regional or general (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008, 64-66). This implies that Catalan voters approach every election differently based on whether they are voting for the regional or general parliament.

Graph 1 shows the same picture. Depending on the type of elections, especially between 1982 and 1995, the nationalist parties tend to receive more support at regional elections, and the state-wide parties win the general elections. The last decade however, CiU is winning more support than the PSOE also during general elections. However, graph 1 shows that the accumulation of the support for the two dominant nationalist parties (CiU and ERC), has been somewhat lower than the total support for the several state-wide parties.

Graph 1: Catalan election results, total support for nationalist and state-wide parties in percentages of the total votes during regional and general elections.



6.3.2. The Basque country

During the 1950's and the Franco Regime, the PNV which had played a major role during the republic, now seemed incapable of responding to the new challenges and became increasingly de-legitimized. This disenchantment with the PNV was an immediate cause for a breakthrough event in modern Basque History, the foundation of ETA (*Euzkadi 'ta askatasuna*, Basque land and Freedom). With the birth of ETA, the PNV ceased to be the only representative of Basque nationalism and opened up a whole new chapter of Basque history (Conversi, 1997, 108). The origins of ETA lie in a small group of nationalist students from Bilbao. These students founded a nationalist journal called *Ekin*. Originally, the journal was to some extent associated to EGI, the PNV's clandestine youth organization. The members of *Ekin* however did not share the moderate approach of the EGI organization. *Ekin* came to dominate the organization of EGI and officially reorganized EGI into ETA between 1959 and 1960 (Payne, 1975, 242).

ETA chose the path of armed struggle and wanted to reach political independence for the Basque country by creating a spiral of violence. The first acts of political violence occurred in 1961, when a few explosions shattered government buildings in different cities, but responsibility was not claimed. The spiral of violence slowly escalated with the first armed bank robberies in 1968 (Conversi, 1997, 89-98). The trigger for this cycle of armed struggle had been the violent and often indiscriminate oppression under the dictatorship (Conversi, 1997, 108).

In 1976 ex-ETA and local communists formed the electoral alliance called *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (the Basque left). When it was formed, EE adopted a Marxist and Pro-independence line, but eventually moved to an overall acceptance of the regional autonomy framework. In April 1978, *Herri Batasuna* (HB- Popular Unity) was formed. HB was a coalition which united all groups that rejected the Spanish constitution and the Basque autonomy status and declared its aspiration for independence (Conversi, 1997, 148-152). *Herri Batasuna* remained to take the extremist position in Basque politics, partly to show how the dominant nationalist forces in Basque politics adopted moderation and where prepared to compromise. *Herri Batasuna* persisted in defining the radical edges of Basque nationalism (MacClancy, 2007, 40).

In 1986 yet another party was formed. *Eusko Alkartasuna* (EA-Basque solidarity), arose as a splinter group from the PNV and during the following elections in November 86 won the same amount of seats in Basque parliament as the PNV (14 seats) (Conversi, 1997, 148-152). After democracy was installed in Spain and in the Basque country, the spread of nationalism was thus characterized by increasing fragmentation, not only among several parties, but also within (Conversi, 1997, 158).

In the Basque Country, the first general elections during the transition towards democracy saw the PNV establish itself as the main Basque Party, but it came to a close second after the Spanish socialists (PSOE) (Conversi, 1997, 143). The PNV gained and maintained a hegemonic position within the political landscape. Since the creation of Basque autonomous region in 1978, the PNV has run the government, mostly in coalition. The PSOE is a center left party widely seen as the representation of interests of non-Basques and immigrants, who's numbers were massively boosted after the great labor migrations in the 1950's and 60's. These immigrants vote either PSOE or the other national party, the Partido Popular (PP)(MacClancy, 2007, 16).


A key feature in recent Basque politics has thus been the formation of new nationalist parties challenging the PNV's supremacy. This development contributed towards the articulation of the nationalist message among different political lines and competing ideologies. ETA has always been an important reason for these challenges. Due to its popularity and symbolic value, ETA became an inescapable point of reference for several groups, interest, unions and individuals who were seeking representation in the new democratic arena (Conversi, 1997, 161).

Table A2 (Appendix) shows the elections results of Basque regional and general elections since 1977. The PNV is clearly the dominant party and has won almost every election since 1977. In Catalonia, the PSOE has always been the state-wide party who received the most support during elections. The Basque shows a different picture however, with both PSOE and PP swapping places as the biggest state-wide party (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008, 66). However, Graph 2 shows that the accumulation of support for the several nationalist parties tends to be somewhat larger than the support for the several state-wide parties, especially during the first decade of the new Spanish democracy between 1978 and 1990. In this sense, political support for Basque nationalism compared to state-wide parties is somewhat higher than support for Catalan nationalism compared to the state-wide parties in Catalan elections. Table A2 also illustrates how Basque nationalism has been characterized by higher fragmentation than Catalan nationalism due to many competing nationalist parties since the first elections in 1977.

However, during the 2009 elections, several of the smaller leftist nationalist parties were banned from competing in the Basque election because they were accused of having organizational ties with terrorist organization ETA. Thus for a few years, the state-wide parties gained more control in the Basque country (Fortes & Perez, 2013, 495-497). However, during the most recent elections in 2011 and 2012, a new separatist and nationalist party called EH-Bildu entered both Basque and the Spanish Parliament (Table A2). EH-Bildu is a coalition of the former smaller parties, including Aralar, EA, ex-members of Herri Batasuna and ex-members of ETA's political wing and can be characterized

as a pro-independence nationalist party on the left of the political specter. EH-BILDU was allowed to compete in the 2011 elections. With 24,7 % of the votes for the regional parliament in 2012 EH-Bildu has become serious competition for the PNV. But also the nationalist parties PNV and EH-Bildu now control almost 60% of the regional parliament (Fortes & Perez, 2013, 495-496). Graph 2 shows how the nationalist parties gain significantly more political support compared to the state-wide parties in the 2012 elections.

Graph 2: Basque election results, total support for nationalist and state-wide parties in percentages of the total votes during regional and general elections.



Basque nationalism thus continues to dominate the political agenda, with the PNV ideology as its disputed dominant ideology and radical nationalists still command a loyal minority. ETA also continues to lose support (MacClancy, 2007, 17). In October 2011, ETA spokespeople claimed that they had given up the armed fight. ETA declared it wanted to talk with the Spanish and French governments “with the aim of addressing the resolution of the consequences of the conflict and thus, to overcome the armed confrontation.” (The Economist, October 2011). The PNV, still the largest party in Basque politics, claimed that the nightmare was over. However, several people were still skeptical. ETA’s declaration neither meant dissolution or disarmament (Fortheringham, 2010).

6.3.3. Galicia

For a long period, the Galleguismo movement didn't represent the Galician population as a whole. It primarily was an urban based movement who couldn't integrate the rural communities within the nationalist movement. During the second republic nationalism became politically organized. In Galicia the *Partido Galleguista* was about to become a mass-movement in the 1930's, representing nationalist feelings in Galicia. In 1936 it obtained 3 deputies for the Madrid parliament, counted more than 45000 members with an increasingly inter-class membership. The leadership represented a big part of the Galician intelligentsia (Núñez, 2007, 31). Franco however, effectively made an end to this progress.

The *Partido Galleguista* was dissolved, and in the 1950s Galicianism fell under the influence of the theories held by one of its most prominent representatives, the philosopher Ramón Pineiro. He produced a doctrine which aimed at overcoming nationalism and hence the claim of self-determination. He proposed an essentialist cultural doctrine which expected the 'cultural personality' of Galicia to survive (Núñez, 2007, 32). In the 1960's, the first true nationalist parties were created: *Partido Socialista Gallego* and the *Union do Pobo Gallego*. Several social organizations and the *Union do Pobo Gallego* raised a common assembly platform founded in Northern Portugal in April 1975, the Galician National- Popular Assembly, *Asamblea Nacional-Popular Gallega* (ANPG). The assembly was initially conceived as a non-party organization. It consisted of individual activists, who claimed to accept the principles of self-determination of the Galician people, self-government (without clearly stating its extent), anti-colonialism, democracy, the existence of properly Galician parties and the defense of the interests of 'the Galician working people' (Núñez, 2007, 33).

Only after the demise of Franco, Galicia again had the opportunity to create a role for itself and its language and try to get rid of its reputation of being a backward underdeveloped region in Spain. The transition towards a Spanish parliamentary monarchy presented another process of decentralization. The 1978 Spanish constitution declared Castilian to be the official language but it also allowed co-officiality within several regions. The creation of an autonomous government in Galicia (Xunta) quickly followed and henceforth, Galician was to be the language employed in the political discourse in Galicia (Beswick, 2007, 72). The transition towards democracy within the Constitution of 1978, established Galicia along with Catalonia and the Basque Country as historic nationalities within the Spanish nation.


In 1977, the first parliamentary elections were held for the Galician Xunta. This quickly showed that the position held by left-wing Galician nationalists enjoyed little social support: the PSG and the new political organization set up by the UPG and the ANPG, the Galician National-Popular Block, *Bloque Nacional-Popular Gallego* (BNPG) – received only 4.4% of the votes. In contrast, the Galician branch of the national Spanish socialist Party, obtained three seats and support from urban voters. The rest of Galician seats in the Xunta were obtained by right-wing Spanish parties relying on a broad clientelistic network inherited from the Franco regime. From 1979 to 1989, Galician nationalists, although divided into several parties, maintained an electoral support between 12-15% (Núñez, 2007, 36). The reasons for this relative weakness during the early years after the transition to democracy lie in the extreme fragmentation and instability of the political parties. The nationalist parties saw several splits and party changes along with a radicalization of nationalist demands. The Partido Popular was able to get significant support due to this fragmentation. This changed when the BNG became the sole surviving nationalist party and developed a very moderate discourse (Aguilar, 2000, 320).

The Bloque (BNG) is a coalition of parties, including traditional Marxist and communist parties, democrats, centrists and a variety of regionalist and nationalist parties. Its political line has been rather unclear and lacked a vision of Galicia's place in Spain. However, during the last decades it has moderated its line on both socio economic position and the nationalist aspects and made huge political results (Keating, 2001, 229). In 1985, the BNG entered parliament for the first time. After 1995 the BNG became the second largest political party in Galician politics and became the only nationalist force in Galicia, concentrating on an electorate of around 24% of the votes, which had previously been scattered among several nationalist parties (Maiz, 2003, 20-21).

After the instalment of the regional Xunta, policies were implemented which reinforced and created economic centers that were previously damaged or non-existent. Regional institutions promoted Galician culture, language and educational systems. Infrastructure was created to promote the idea of Galleguismo through new public media such as Television. Galician oriented programs promoted and cultivated identity markers symbols and myths of the Galician identity through music and recovery of the national history. All these factors helped to create or reinforce a perception of belonging and a collective identity which had not previously existed. This *galleguismo* and sense of collective identity was however largely dual and overlapping. It was both Spanish and Galician. Maiz argues that due to the fact that the BNG among other parties acted within this framework, it was much easier to compete for the Galician electoral support. This is a part of the explanation for the recuperation of Galician support for nationalist movement in the late 1990's (Maiz, 2003, 22-23).

Table A3 (Appendix) shows the elections results in Galician general and regional elections. Since 1989 the BNG is the only nationalist party in Galician politics representing the nationalist movement. However, the BNG seems to gain substantially more votes during regional elections than during national elections. Just as in Catalonia, the Galician nationalist voter thus approaches elections for regional or national parliament differently. The BNG and PSOE swapped places as second and third party between 1997 and 2004 (Perez-Nieves and Bonet, 2008, 67). Next to the nationalist BNG, the state-wide parties PP and PSOE dominate the elections, just as they do in the Spanish parliament. Graph 3 shows that support for the state-wide parties in Galician elections is however always much higher than support for the nationalist parties. Therefore, Galicia scores low on the indicator of political mobilization.

Graph 3: Galician election results, total support for nationalist and state-wide parties in percentages of the total votes during regional and general elections.



The last decades have clearly showed a modernization of Galician political context. The political realm has increasingly been Galicianized. Nowadays all the political forces, even the non-Galicianist ones, assume a discourse of differentiation and use of the Galician language. Maiz and Losada state there is a common 'master frame' within contemporary Galician politics shared both by nationalists and non-nationalists of defense of the Galician culture and language (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 88).

The Catalans were most successful in mobilizing support for the nationalist movement based on a gradual process of state-less nation building. Although divided over several parties, there wasn't fragmentation in Catalan politics between nationalist and national parties, or increasing tensions between moderate nationalists and separatists. The Catalans and Basques both score high on the political support indicator. Nationalist parties play a significant role in both regional and general election as shown in tables A1 and A2. The Basques however are characterized by a history of fragmentation among parties and within. ETA is of course the clearest example of the way in which this fragmentation became very extreme. The Galicians were initially fragmented among regional and national parties, but the BNG quickly became the only nationalist party in parliament, representing about 25% of the Galician electorate. Galician nationalist parties are more successful in regional elections than in general election. However, depending on the type of elections, the Galician nationalist BNG can count on between 10 to 25 percent of the total votes, which is significantly lower than the Catalans and the Basques (Table A3).

Table 1 presents a summary of the success of the three nationalist movements within the different indicators.

<i>Table 1</i> <i>Differences in success</i>	Catalans	Basques	Galicians
Language	<p>Language is the most important bastion of Catalan identity.</p> <p>Language is widespread among the population and education is effectively organized to sustain and promote its use.</p> <p>Catalan language is associated with upward mobility.</p>	<p>Language has always been a stumbling block for Basque nationalism.</p> <p>Euskara is a hard language and wasn't standardized until 1960.</p> <p>Hostility towards Basque language from important elements in society.</p>	<p>Galician is the only minority language in Spain spoken by the entire population, but its social status remains low.</p> <p>Rural/urban divide: Galician is used more among lower classes, in the countryside and informal settings.</p>
Print capitalism	<p>The <i>Renaixença</i> produced a variety of literature which served as a driving force for nationalist sentiments.</p> <p>Education is very strong in Catalan nationalism.</p>	<p>Very few Basque writers and productions in Euskara.</p> <p>Education was organized late.</p>	<p>The use of Galician in all written communication is still very small.</p> <p>Education was organized late. Regional government still not very active to promote Galician</p>
Political support for nationalist parties	<p>High support for nationalist parties depending on type of election, but not significantly higher than support for state-wide parties.</p>	<p>High support for nationalist parties, during both regional and general elections. Swapping between higher support for state-wide parties and nationalist parties</p>	<p>Support for the nationalist party BNG is rising but remains significantly lower than support for the state-wide parties. Also dependent on type of elections</p>
Political fragmentation	<p>Two dominant parties, CiU and ERC. ERC is more separatist but also non-violent.</p>	<p>High political fragmentation, several nationalist parties competing for support.</p>	<p>Since 1985 only one nationalist party: BNG.</p> <p>State-wide PP and PSOE dominate Galician politics</p>

7. Discussion: explaining differences in strength and cohesiveness

<i>Table 2:</i> <i>Relative Success in recent decades</i>	Catalans	Basques	Galicians
Language	High	Low	Medium
Print capitalism	High	Low	Medium
Political fragmentation	medium	High	low
Support for subnational parties	High	High	low

The preceding empirical analyses has presented us with several significant differences in strength and cohesiveness of the three nationalist movements of this study. Table 2 shows the relative strengths of the three movements in the different indicators. Based on table 2 we can identify several sub-questions to explain the main differences based on the discussed theories in previous sections about the construction of national identity, nationalist discourse and symbolic frameworks:

- Why are language and print capitalism such weak forces in driving Basque nationalism?
- What explains the low support and low subnational mobilization of Galician nationalism?
- Why are Basque nationalist parties increasingly fragmented while Catalan and Galician parties are not?

7.1. National identity

Looking at the construction of national identity, the preceding case descriptions have showed how Catalan, Basque and Galician identity where based on very different elements. The historical analysis shows how Catalan nationalism was based on Language and culture, Basque nationalism was based on the notion of a distinct and separate race and Galician nationalism had a dominant linguistic basis. These common elements chosen as core values can work both as mobilizing symbols and as a point of reference for a wide platform. This was the case in Catalan Nationalism. Conversi (1997) argues that within Basque society, the lack of available cultural markers like language forced the nationalist leaders to look for other instruments of identity formation and consolidation. In this case, the group was bound to rely on an antagonistic identity. Such an identity is constructed essentially through the opposition of the in-groups to one or more out-groups. This antagonistic identity focuses more on the need to define one's own identity trough negative comparisons to others, which results in its

exclusive character (Conversi, 1997, 5). Basque nationalism lacked a clearly identified core element since an ethnic language was scarcely spoken. Catalan nationalism was greatly provided with lively rich and widespread language. This became the core element of Catalan nationalism from the very beginning, while Basque nationalism had to create a core element (Conversi, 1997, 162). Consequently, Catalan mobilization was based on a positive assertion of the group's culture. This positive assertion of the group's culture in turn was based on the idea of a separate language and culture, while Basque mobilization was based on negation and confrontation based on ethnic identity (Conversi, 1997, 262).

A Basque language did not exist, nor a widely expected cultural tradition. Arana had to design everything. His choice for race as a collective identity was necessary for the success of Basque nationalism. Because Arana almost singlehandedly enforced Basque nationalism (Edles, 1999, 322-324), he had to make a clear separation based on race to be able to identify the Basque nation. This top-down creation of Basque nationalism provided its exclusive character from the very beginning (Nili, 2009, 253). During the creation of Basque nationalism, Language has thus never been a driving force, but as Payne (1971, 38) states, "a stumbling block", which only prevented Basque nationalism from further development. Basque literature productions were also very small compared to the Catalans. Language never was, and never became one of the core elements of Basque identity, while for the Catalans and Galicians, the idea of a distinct language and culture were the basis for the very emergence of nationalism.

In the nineteenth century, a variety of cultural nationalism had emerged in Galicia, based primarily on the reality of a distinct regional language, Galician, very similar to Portuguese. Unlike Catalonia or The Basque country however, Galicia was a background agrarian region with no industry or general education or self-consciousness (Keating, 2001, 226; Beswick, 2007, 61). Galicianism therefore was a kind of vague doctrine, promoted mainly by a small middle class and elite (Payne, 1971, 42). The core element within Galician nationalism was the reality of a distinct language, but the Galician identity lacked self-consciousness. The goal of Galician nationalism has always been to dignify the use of its language (Beswick, 2007,65). The reality of a distinct language was thus the main common element of Galician identity, but the fact that the language was evaluated as a negative social threat prevented the development of a strong common element and a strong collective identity, which in turn prevented the nationalist movement from a successful development.

Language and Print capitalism are relatively stronger in Catalan and Galician nationalism, because language and culture were the core elements of their identity. This explains why language and print capitalism are such strong indicators in Catalan nationalism. They were the very basis for their

identification as a sub nation. Within Basque nationalism, Language was present, but never reached the same mobilizing effect through Print capitalism and cultural expressions because it never was an essential part of Basque identity. Religion and ethnicity were the bastions of Basque identity from the very beginning. This choice for race and religion was made by creator of Basque nationalism, Arana, but next to the idea of Race and religion, language and Print capitalism were never able to become driving forces of the Basque identity.

For Galician nationalism, language was the main part of their identification as a sub nation. We therefore would expect high scores on both language and Print capitalism. However, due to the low social status of both the language and Galicia as a region, which still plays a role in the 21st century, Galician identity never reached the levels of pride and confidence as can be found within Catalan identity. Their only element of national identity, namely language, was at the same time their biggest problem, due to its low social status. This explains the relatively lower scores in language and print capitalism.

7.2. Nationalist discourse

The Renaixença introduced nationalist feelings bottom-up. First it created support among the people and in the streets. After these feelings became salient, political organization was the logical next step. The Catalan Renaixença was not only a linguistic, but also a cultural revival which started around 1800. With Carlesse Aribau's nostalgic poem "Oda a la patria", the Renaixença restarted the Catalan literary traditions and helped to standardize the Catalan language (Edles, 1999, 317). Within the context of this cultural and linguistic revival, the nationalist movement emerged in the late 19th century. The Renaixença was a popular revolution, because it was initially started by intellectuals and artists, but gradually the Renaixença became accessible for a wider audience, creating a large popular base of support for the nationalist movement.

Its emergence based on language ensured the inclusive character because the focus on language and culture made it possible for non-original Catalans to be included. The identification of the ethnic distinctiveness of Catalan people was never necessary to make them feel connected as a group. Due to its inclusive character and focus on language and culture, civic elements are dominant within Catalan nationalist discourse.

Arana singlehandedly designed the first political program of the Basque nationalist movement, came up with the current name of the Basque country, stated the boundaries of this new country, wrote its

anthem and designed its flag (Nili, 2009, 252). Basque nationalism was thus created, introduced and guided by a single spiritual leader who determined its ideology and attitudes. In this process, the only possible collective identity Arana could find to underpin his nationalist ideology was the fact that long ago, the Basque people were a distinct race. This led to an exclusive character and the dominance of ethnic elements in Basque nationalist discourse.

A striking difference between the nationalist movements is that inclusion through the teachings of Catalan language was an important element in their attitude towards migrants, while in the Basque country, language was used for the opposite. As Nili states, language merely functioned for exclusionary purposes (Nili, 2009, 252). *“Arana’s chief cultural goal was not to spread Euskara but to prevent foreigners from knowing it”* (Nili, 2009, 253). The exclusive nature of Basque nationalism was also accompanied by a centrality of religion as another element of Arana’s ideology, compounding racial and religious “Salvation” (Nili, 2009, 253). Catalan and Galician language thus spread among the population and in case of the Catalans even among immigrants due to its inclusive character, while the Basques tried to prevent immigrants from learning their language.

These differences in inclusive and exclusive nationalist discourse explain why Catalanism gradually grew based on an expanding linguistic and cultural community and why Language and Print capitalism are much stronger in Catalan nationalism. Its dominant inclusive character provided the basis a gradual process of stateless nation-building in which language and cultural expression were the main driving forces for Catalan nationalism (Conversi, 1997, 140; Hargreaves, 2000, 21). The exclusive character of Basque nationalism explains the weakness in Language and Print capitalism. Basque teachings were used for exclusionary purposes to distinguish between in and out-groups. Language and Print capitalism were never used to unify all people in the Basque region, but to create a clear separation between Basques and non-Basques.

Galician nationalism initially knew an exclusive discourse focused on a framework of Galician nationalism against Spanish nationalism. This framework was characterized by an anti-institutional and disruptive mobilization strategy (Maiz, 2003, 21). This exclusive focus was largely tempered when Galician nationalism started to strive for both Galician and Castilian to become the official languages. However, as described in previous sections, although Galician nationalist discourse became more moderate and more inclusive, the spread of Language and Print capitalism never reached the same amount as within Catalan nationalism.

7.3. Symbolic expressions

Laura Desfor Edles focuses on the cultural developments to explain differences in both nationalist movements. She focuses on symbolic nationalist frameworks. Within the Catalan cultural and symbolic framework she finds a lot of feelings of modernism while the “*Basque nationalist symbolization was inherently volatile*” (Edles, 1999, 325).

During the process of the establishment of a new Spanish constitution in 1978, Edles finds that the two nationalist movements adopted different strategies towards the Spanish central government. The Catalan were looking for consensus and embraced the process of negotiations and the establishment of a constitution and a new central government, but the Basques didn't. Edles explains these differences based on the symbolic frameworks. For Catalan nationalism, core symbols of their nationalist discourse were democracy, Europeanization and pragmatism. Catalanism was thus very modern. It aimed for reconciliation and politics of consensus, which allowed the elites to negotiate with the central state, without the risk of losing face. The Catalan symbolic framework towards the negotiations for the new Spanish constitution didn't threaten the Catalan identity (Edles, 1999, 339).

Basque nationalist on the other hand, were working in an ambiguous nationalistic symbolic framework. Therefore compromise with centralist elites would be dangerously close to compromising Basque identity (Edles, 1999, 340). This ambiguous framework explains why the Basques have always been separated between parties who were willing to cooperate with the Spanish national government and those parties who still proclaimed that the Basques should be completely separate. This ambiguous framework can be traced back all the way to Arana, who left a legacy of contradiction after his death, creating a fruitful base for this ambiguous framework to emerge and for future Basque political fragmentation.

As Barreto states: *Galician culture is always on the edge, complaining about everything, and of course it does not make any long-term plans, as it expects to die soon* (Barreto, 2011, 385). Barreto described how Galician nationalism has become a nationally and politically ambiguous identity suspended between reality and fiction. Galician identity is characterized by the period of *Rexurdimento* (The revival). Galicia's ability to remain a vital force has relied on an ability to make seemingly dead symbolic expressions like monuments and Celtic folklore come to life once more. This practice of resurrection continued into the new millennium (Barreto, 2011, 388).

Galician nationalism however lacks a historic institutional base. While the Basques have their history of the *Fueros* and Catalans have their *Generalität*, Galicia presents a peculiar historic political-institutional deficit. The early inclusion of Galicia within the monarchy and the Spanish centralist State resulted in a lack of historical precedents in self-government. Galicians thus have no historical

memories of an ancient period of self-rule. Consequently, the Galicians have no symbolic basis for a discourse about a lost period of self-determination, on which demands for autonomy could be based (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 65). Therefore, the reality of a distinct language has always been the only common element in Galician identity. As explained in the previous sections, the spread of Galician language was however prevented by the central government and the fact that Galician became a negative social threat. Galician nationalism therefore never reached high levels of political mobilization, nor a strong Language or Print capitalism indicator.

7.3.1. After the civil war: national memories of repression

The three nationalist movements also survived the civil war and the Franco regime in very different ways. For the Basque nation, the civil war entailed a period of the destruction of Basque nationalist symbols, destruction and repression. The only memory the Basque nation has about this period is one of horrible repression. The Catalans on the other hand also suffered horribly, but after the civil war, three new sacred symbols were melded to Catalan nationalism: The notion of a modern, legitimate autonomous government (1932 Generalität), a national Hero (Macia, first president of the Generalität) and a national martyr (Luis Companys, president of the Generalität) (Edles, 1999, 326-327). As Edles states: *The cruelty of the Basque country was that it constricted even the possibility for illusion*” (Edles, 199 327). A lot of Basque national symbols were destroyed and there was nothing that the Basque people could hold on to and turn into a heroic story of a Basque national hero during the civil war.

The Galicians also faced repression, but slightly less, because Franco was not as aggressive against his homeland as against the Catalans and Basques (Beswick, 2007, 69). Galician nationalism was in the process of becoming a mass movement when Franco entered en stopped this development. The Galicians therefore experienced less destruction, because there was simply less to destroy. They focused on cultural resistance (Nunez Seixas, 2000, 316). Also, Franco implemented several economic policies to strengthen the agrarian economy of the region in which he was born (Kern, 1990, 234). The civil war and Franco’s dictatorship were also a dark page in Galician history, but it didn’t leave the same scars as in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The nationalist movements thus survived the civil war in very different ways. For The Catalans it meant another contribution of beautiful story’s about Catalan heroes to their already wealthy culture and history. For the Basques, there was nothing more than cruelty and suffering. For the Galicians, it represents a last and successful resurrection.

After the death of Arana and Franco's oppression of the Basque identity, action against the central government had taken the place of race as a core element of the Basque national movement. With every violent act of repression from Madrid, support for ETA grew. ETA established a civil religion of violence (Nili, 2009, 253). ETA's strategy was to create a spiral of mass rebellion and eventually civil war and Basque secession (Edles, 1999, 335).

Muro argues that in radical Basque nationalism, the politics of war memory are characterized by the inclusion of facts that the national political elites thought to be worth remembering in order to portray the recent past as an unambiguous story of moral success. The main purpose of the politics of war memory was to strengthen the emotional bonds of the radical community by identifying the heroes and villains of the old Basque drama. The radical Basque nationalists glorify the sacrifice of ETA militants. They see the cycle of political violence as the last stage in the long-term conflict between Basques and Spaniards. They define the hardship endured by young Basques as a form of political martyrdom in order to maintain popular support for its violent campaign and provide a powerful symbol for new militants. Due to this idea of martyrdom, the arrest or death of an ETA militant is no longer considered a defeat, but an example of symbolic power. Radical Basque nationalist used this symbol of power as a resource to generate strong emotions for what they consider as a 'good cause' and recruit new members (Muro, 2009, 675-676).

Basque nationalist thus claim that the memory of the civil war was most dramatic for the Basque nation. The war was more destructive and political reprisals were harder, both during the war and in the post-war period as well. However, Aguilar (2007) argues, that, leaving aside the bombing of Guernica and a few other disastrous episodes, the destruction in the Basque country during the civil war was less than the destruction in other areas, and survival of the nationalist movement after the war was not as difficult as for example in Galicia. The reason that the memory of the civil is so traumatic for the Basque nation is because of the nature of the struggle. The Basque and Navarrese territories were divided between those who fought for the Francoist forces being supporters of the Republic, and nationalist partisans being against the republic. This gives the conflict an even greater moral resonance, since it suggests the symbolic rupture of a natural collective identity, namely the Basque nation (Aguilar, 2007, 19-22).

After 1960 Aguilar sees a greater level of repression by the dictatorship in the Basque Country. This became especially brutal due to the emergence of ETA. From that point onwards, the Basque country was subject to many states of exception and extra countermeasures against terrorism. At the time of Franco's death, the Basque country had the largest prison population. ETA was thus allowed to perpetuate the myth that they were continuing the war that began in 1936 between Basques and

Spaniards (Aguilar, 2007, 21-22). Thus according to Aguilar, the civil war was not perceived as a war against dictator Franco, but as a struggle fought against a common foreign enemy: the Spanish state as a whole. Francisco Letamendia, a radical nationalist and member of the PNV stated: "the Civil War continues to be seen as a fight of national resistance against a foreign occupier" (Aguilar, 2007, 15-16). Altogether this led to a higher sense of suppression in the Basque Country and in turn led to a higher feeling of regional nationalism in favor of secessionism. The forces for secessionism clashed with the more moderate Nationalist forces in Basque nationalism, which increased the amount of political fragmentation.

Already in the 1950's and 60's a small degree of permissiveness was displayed towards the regional Galician language by the Franco regime. Although there was a renewed interest in the language, the teachings of Galician were still forbidden (Beswick, 2007, 70-71). Only after the demise of Franco, the Galicians had the opportunity to finally engage in the last process of resurrection and really create a role for itself. The transition towards democracy gave Galicia the chance to get rid of its reputation as an agrarian backward region, an co-officiality was established for both the Galician and the Castilian language. The creation of an autonomous government in Galicia (Xunta) quickly followed and henceforth, Galician was to be the language employed in the political discourse in Galicia (Beswick, 2007, 72). The end of the civil war and the transition of democracy for the Galician meant the last resurrection towards the first real and concrete results. While for the Basques the civil war and Franco are mostly symbols of destruction and repression, the Galician also look back at their final successful resurrection.

8. Concluding remarks: past and future

Based on a historical approach, this thesis showed how differences emerged in several indicators of relative success and how these differences influence the ways in which the three nationalist movements represent a strong and cohesive nationalist movement in recent decades.

This thesis has described how several of the major differences in success between the three historical nationalities in Spain and their nationalist movements can be explained based on theoretical arguments concerning the construction of national identity, the nationalist discourse and symbolic frameworks. However, this theoretical framework didn't include several alternative explanations for the differences in success. Globalization and the continuing integration through the European Union could have had a significant impact on the developments of the three movements for example. This thesis also didn't include explanations based on structural and economic arguments. Both Medrano (1994) and Keating (2001) implement economic arguments to explain differences between the Spanish subnational movements.

In short, Language and Print capitalism were very weak forces in Basque nationalism because language never was an essential element of Basque identity. Catalan and Galician nationalism on the other adopted language and culture as the basis of their national identity from the very beginning. Race and religion were the main driving forces for Basque nationalism. This explains why both Language and Print capitalism were always a problem for Basque nationalism.

However, Galician nationalism always knew lower support and lower subnational mobilization than the Catalans and Basques. This can be explained due to the fact that the main element of Galician nationalism, namely language, never developed in a way to become the driving force in the Galician identification. Galician nationalism lacks a historical precedent of ancient self-rule on which demands for autonomy could be based. Catalan nationalism gradually grew with a stable linguistic and cultural basis which resulted in an inclusive discourse and the gradual spread of nationalism.

The Basque nationalist parties were much more fragmented than Catalan and Galician parties. This can be explained based on the ambiguous framework and the Basque nationalist discourse. Sabino de Arana y Goiri left a legacy of contradictions within the original Basque nationalist ideology. The cruelty of the civil war provided a fruitful basis for support for secessionism and a much more aggressive nationalist movement. These forces clashed with the moderate Basque nationalists resulting in ongoing tensions between moderate and separatist forces within Basque nationalism. For

the Catalans and Galicians, the civil war and the Franco regime were not only a period of destruction, but also positive memories could be added to the Catalan cultural heritage and for the Galicians, it meant the last successful resurrection.

However, sub-state nationalism is a social construct based on imaginations of people and therefore constantly subject to change. Recent developments in all three movements show that their future and the stability of Spanish democracy is still uncertain. Catalan nationalism has recently evolved away from its historic demand for increased federalism in Spain towards a more unbalanced nationalist demand. The emergence of this unbalanced Catalan nationalism can be explained by the weakening of integrative nationalism in favor of independentism (Petithomme and Fernández, 2013, 3). The once hegemonic position of autonomist nationalism, represented by the CiU under the Jordi Pujol governments, is now greatly enfeebled. Catalan politics is becoming more characterized by greater fragmentation, the weakening of autonomist nationalism and the reinforcement of independentist feelings (Petithomme and Fernández, 2013, 17).

The Galician political scene is still full of uncertainties and open ended questions for all the political forces, especially in a national political context where the Catalan and Basque nationalist forces have demonstrated great capacity to obtain resources and areas of power from the central government . The rapid growth of the BNG (25%) as a nationalist force on the Left and its process of program moderation imply challenges in discovering the limits of these processes. The question is to what extent the BNG can react to the changing political landscape (Maiz and Losada, 2000, 88).

In the Basque country there had been up to 10 declarations of "temporary" ceasefire by ETA since 1981. The Basque interior minister claimed that the last statement in 2011 was "insufficient" (Fortheringham, 2010). Up until the completion of this thesis there haven't been any assaults by ETA and we can thus claim they uphold the ceasefire declaration. However, ETA remains to represent demands for complete Basque independence, since they stated to keep on the political struggle for "the recognition of the Basque country and the respect for the will of the people (which) should prevail over imposition." This essentially meant that ETA will try to use the little weight it still has to aim for self-determination or any variant of more autonomy. Since the Spanish constitution however does not allow this, there is still the possibility of conflict between the moderate PNV and the more radical Basque nationalists (The Economist, October 2011).

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10. Appendix

Table A1: Catalan elections results

Year	CiU	ERC	SI	Total nationalist parties	PSC-PSOE	PSUC/IC	AP/PP	UCD/CDS	PSA	C-PPC	Cup	Total state-wide parties
1977g	16.9	4.6		21.5	28.4	18.2	3.5	16.8				66.9
1979g	16.2	4.1		20.3	29.3	17.1	3.6	9.1				59.1
1980r	27.9	8.9		36.8	22.5	18.8	2.4	0.6				47
1982g	22.5	4		26.5	45.8	4.6	14.6	2	2.7			67.5
1984r	46.8	4.4		50.4	33.1	5.6	7.7	-	0.5			46.2
1986g	32	2.7		34.7	41	3.9	11.4	4.1				60.2
1988r	45.7	4.1		50.1	29.8	7.8	5.3	3.8				46.7
1989g	32.7	2.7		35.4	35.6	7.3	10.6	4.3				57.7
1992r	46.2	8		54.2	27.6	6.5	6	0.9				41
1993g	31.8	5.1		36.9	34.9	7.5	17	0.8				60.2
1995r	41	9.5		50.5	24.8	9.7	13.1	-				47.6
1996g	29.6	4.2		33.8	39.4	7.8	18	-				65.2
1999r	37.7	8.7		46.4	37.8	3.9	9.5	-				51.3
2000g	28.8	5.6		34.4	34.1	2.2	22.8					59.1
2003r	30.9	16.4		47.3	31.1	7.3	11.9					50.3
2004g	20.8	15.9		36.3	39.5	5.8	15.5					60.8
2006r	31.5	14		45.5	26.8	9.5	10.6			3.0		49.9
2008g	20.9	7.8		28.7	45.4	4.9	16.4					66.7
2010r	38.4	7	3.3	48.7	18.4	7.4	12.4			3.4		41.6
2011g	29.3	7.1		36.4	26.7	8.1	20.7					55.5
2012r	30.7	13.7		44.4	14.4	9.9	13			7.6	3.5	48.4

Table A1: Election results from general (g) and regional (r) elections in Catalonia in percentages of total votes.

Sources: own elaboration from table A.1 in Santiago Perez-Nievas and Eduard Bonet (2008) and <http://www.electionresources.org/>

Note: only parties who obtained seats in in the regional or general parliament are included in the table. Therefore the sum of nationalist and state-wide parties does not add up to 100 %, since several parties received votes, but didn't gain seats in parliament.

Table A2: Basque election results

Year	PNV	EA	EE	HB- EH- Bata suna	EH- Bildu	Total nationalist parties	UCD	PSO E-EE	AP /PP	IU	UA	Total state- wide parties
1977 g	29.4		6.1			35.5	12.8	26.6	7.1			46.5
1979 g	27.6		8	15		50.6	16.9	19.1				36
1980 r	38.1		9.8	16.5		64.4		14.2	4.8			19
1982 g	31.9		7.7	14.8		54.4		29.3	11.7			41
1984 r	42		8	14.7		64.7		23.1	9.4			32.5
1986 r	23.6	15.8	10.8	17.4		67.6		22	4.8			26.8
1986 g	27.8		9.1	17.7		54.6		26.3	10.5			36.8
1989 g	22.9	11.2	8.9	17		60		21.3	9.4	3		37.2
1990 r	28.5	11.4		18.3		66		19.9	8.2	1.4	1.4	31.9
1993 g	24.4	10		14.8		49.2		24.9	14.9	6.4		47
1994 r	29.8	10.3		16.3		56.4		17.1	14.4	9.2	2.7	43.4
1996 g	25.4	8.4		12.5		46.3		24	18.6	9.4		52
1998 r	28	8.7		17.9		54.6		17.6	20.1	5.7	1.3	44.7
2000 g	31.3	7.8				39.1		24	29.2	5.6		58.8
2001 r	42.7	-		10.1		52.8		17.9	23.1	5.6	-	46.6
2004 g	34.2	6.6				44		27.6	19.2	8.4		55.2
2005 r	38.7	-		12.5		53.5		22.7	17.4	5.4	0.4	45.9
2008 g	27.1	4.5				31.6		38.1	18.5	4.5		61.1
2009 r	38.1	3.6				41.7		30.2	13.9			44.1
2011 g	27.4				19.2	46.6		21.6	17.8	3.7		43.1
2012 r	34.2				24.7	58.9		18.9	11.6	2.7		33.2

Table A2: Election results from general (g) and regional (r) elections in The Basque country in percentages of total votes.

Sources: own elaboration from table A.2 and table A.3 in Santiago Perez-Nievas and Eduard Bonet (2008) and <http://www.electionresources.org/>

Note: only parties who obtained seats in in the regional or general parliament are included in the table. Therefore the sum of nationalist and state-wide parties does not add up to 100 %, since several parties received votes, but didn't gain seats in parliament.

In 2001 and 2005 PNV and EA formed and electoral coalition.

Batasuna was outlawed in 2002 and couldn't participate in 2004 and 2005. One week before the 2005 election, Batasuna leadership endorsed the legal candidacy of PCTV and called on its electorate to vote PCTV. This party gained 12.5 % of the votes.

In 2001, PP and UA formed an electoral coalition.

Table A3: Galician elections results

Year	BNG	Other	EU-ANOVA	Total nationalist parties	PP	PSOE	IU	Total state-wide parties
1989 r	8	7.4		15.4	44	32.7		76.7
1993 g	8	4.5		12.5	47.1	36	4.7	87.8
1993 r	18.7	2.5		21.2	52.5	23.5	3.1	79.1
1996 g	12.8	1.8		14.6	48.3	33.5	3.6	85.4
1997 r	25.5	2.7		28.2	51.5	19.4	0.9	71.8
2000 g	19.1			19.1	53.8	23.4	1.3	78.5
2001 r	22.6			22.6	51.6	21.8	-	73.4
2004 g	11.3			11.3	47.1	37.1	1.7	85.9
2005 r	18.8			18.8	45.2	33.1		78.3
2008 g	11.5			11.5	43.9	40.6	1.4	85.9
2009 r	16			16	46.7	31		77.7
2011 g	11.2			11.2	52.5	27.8		80.3
2012 r	10.1		13.9	24	45.8	20.6		66.4

Table A3: Election results from general (g) and regional (r) elections in Galicia in percentages of total votes.

Sources: own elaboration from table A.4 in Santiago Perez-Nievas and Eduard Bonet (2008) and <http://www.electionresources.org/>

Note: only parties who obtained seats in in the regional or general parliament are included in the table. Therefore the sum of nationalist and state-wide parties does not add up to 100 %, since several parties received votes, but didn't gain seats in parliament.

From 1979 to 1989, Galician nationalists, although divided into several parties, maintained an electoral support between 12-15% (Núñez, 2007, 36). Due to large fragmentation and minimal influence of these several parties, this table starts with elections results from 1989.