Forced movement of preference orders in a civil war termination process through third-party intervention.

What circumstances favour the emergence of two-party cooperation when considering the dynamics of cooperation under anarchy in an intrastate territorial conflict?

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Course: Master Thesis seminar
Date: January 12, 2017
Word count: 9826 (incl. bibliography)

Purpose of study: Show that credible commitment theory is able to ensure domestic cooperation under anarchy by forcing opposing parties out of conflict deadlock. This is done by means of macro-level analysis of forced movements of preference orders in civil war.

Summary

This thesis combines the Cooperation Under Anarchy strategy model by Kenneth Oye with the Theory of Credible Commitment by Barbara Walter to show how third party intervention can force movements of preference orders of two conflicting parties in violent domestic conflicts over territory. This is done by applying Credible Commitment Theory axiomas to a Prisoners' Dilemma game model of *Deadlock*. The new combined model is subsequently applied to the East-Timor civil war settlement by means of a case study to show how the dynamics derived from the conceptual model are adapted to a real world casus. The model shows positive applicability in explaining successful conflict settlement and is reversely also provides an explanation for civil conflict continuation.

Introduction

The continuing involvement of third-party states in a number of extremely violent civil wars has given the conflicts an increasingly globalised character. The number of intrastate conflicts, of which numerous started in the 1950's due to a high number of wars of independence and other post-colonial conflicts, rose to a peak in the 1990's (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010: 4). After this peak in the number of civil conflicts, a quick decline followed. While the definitive reasons of this decline are still debated, it did point out a number of important new trends in post-conflict resolution (Kalyvas & Ballcells 2010: 5). While a number of conflicts got terminated by decisive military victories, others such as the civil conflict in Northern Ireland and the Balkan Wars were settled by means of peaceful dispute resolution. The way in which actors decide on the final termination of civil conflicts holds interesting material for analysis. Civil wars have often been resolved due to one-sided military victories that have either led to a complete annihilation of one of the parties involved in the conflict or resulted in a peace treaty, declaration of independence or in case of a conflict over government rule, some type of consociational system of domestic cooperation. The study of the termination of civil wars has gained less attention in the academic world compared to studies about why civil wars start. Nonetheless, knowledge about the historic dynamics of civil war termination could enhance future actions with regards to on-going conflicts. The use of case studies and qualitative research methods are therefore particularly applicable to test models of conflict termination. The use of tools of rational choice is able to provide observers of civil war termination with interesting insight in the dynamics of conflict termination. The combination of these tools with the analysis of case studies has been referred to by Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast as 'analytic narrative' (Gerring 2013: 3). For this thesis I will use a model designed by Kenneth Oye called *Cooperation Under Anarchy* and combine it with Barbara Walter's *Credible Commitment Theory* to show how third-party intervention can affect preference orders in the termination of civil war. The model is applied to the conflict on the independence of East-Timor that settled in 1999 to show how the proposed dynamics are observable in a real world casus. The research shows that the threat or actual application of a third party intervention can alter the preference structures of parties involved in the conflict. This can force parties out of situations of '*Deadlock*' into mutual cooperation for peace.

Game theory in civil war settlement

As with a lot of cases of conflict or violence in the study of political science, any two opposing parties have opposing strategies and interests. The basic strategies of thought can therefore be centralized as common models in which rational actors act and are assumed to make similar choices in similar chains of events. Kilgour and Hipel state that (2010: 203): "Virtually all methods of conflict analysis are rooted in the *non-cooperative game theory* of von Neumann and Morgenstern". The methods of analysis of rational action derive their general knowledge about actor strategies of action from this game theory. The widespread use of the rational actor models for explaining collective rational behaviour as a group within a social setting in particularly includes the application of this model of thought for violent behaviour.

The methods of the study of social conflict are in general divided between two schools of thought (Vahabi 2009: 819). The Neo-Classical school centres on the conceptual models of rationality and maximization of power within a social conflict situation. Downside of these models is that it lacks the inclusion of coercive models that stress the interaction of actors with regard to external influences, as the models are limited to the application of economic behaviour instead of socio-political behaviour. The second school of conflict theory is the Public Choice School (Vahabi 2009: 820). Models derived from this school generally extend further than studies of economic conflict in their use of systemic micro-analysis, and are therefore also applied to situations of social conflict such as revolutions and ethnic conflict.

The core assumption of *Rational Actor Models* is that individuals have self-interested behaviour In practice this means that behaviour follows certain goals, such as the will to survive. Besides that comes the maximization of welfare, being either material or immaterial. The labelling of behaviour as 'rational' derives from the constant cost-/benefit analysis that individuals make. Rational behaviour is therefore thought to provide the highest possible benefit for the lowest possible cost with the goal of maximizing gains and minimizing loss. Within a strategy model of two competing parties in a civil war, anarchy is the leading concept in explaining the theoretical space in which actors are involved. This statement follows the outcome of the rational behaviour pattern in one of the most well-known game theory models: the Prisoners' Dilemma. The cross-paternal model behaviour of the individual versus the collective will always lead the individual to

Free Riding, or non-cooperation, while taking chance that the collective will provide for non-excludable goods in the form of peace. As every actor is thought to follow the same rational pattern, the collective outcome will always be non-cooperation. However, there are theories that solve non-cooperation, but they always require third parties. Olson stresses that collective action is inapplicable to large groups, again due to the *Free Rider* problem, but as conflict analysis generally only involve a small number of actors, the solving of collective action problems to create a peace settlement is applicable. The alternative that Olson provides is the availability of selective incentives to change party preferences, but this is only available when provided by an actor who has the power to coerce another actor in participation (Olson 2009: 63). Therefore this does provide opportunities of analysis for behaviour in conflict situations where coercive power was applied by external actors. Furthermore the order of action in non-cooperation games is difficult to establish, resulting in constrains to the strategic action choice of when to act, as being first mover may be both advantageous or disadvantageous to the actor involved (Kilgour and Hipel 2010: 204).

The preference of any party in a two-party armed conflict will be to pursue its own value to the maximum obtainable gain, which is a full military victory and political domination. The assumption in case of conflict is that the baseline at any point in time is the continuation of armed conflict. In the end, the interest of both parties is to end the violent stalemate in favour of its own interest. The continuation ensues a situation in which both parties have conflicting interest, and have no propensity to alter their situation towards an outcome that could favour the opposite party. Any situation where at least one of both parties prefers arming or fighting over disarming and negotiation will result in the absence of mutual gain or interest. This situation of the absence of a mutual interest is referred to by Oye as a situation of '*Deadlock*' (1986: 6). He stated that (1986: 7): "*when you observe conflict, think Deadlock, the absence of mutual interest, before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized*". When considering this, the research on underlying factors of the continuation of conflict as opposed to peace initiatives is deemed obsolete if any side lacks the interest of settlement over conflict. Defying a situation of Deadlock is virtually impossible considering the axioma of the maximisation of gains. The situation of *Deadlock* is schematically shown in figure 1. As actors are considered rational, and therefore will follow the same strategy pattern at any given time, the order of preferences is similar for both

parties at any time too.

Figure 1.

		Party Y	
Party X		**Cooperate / Disarm / Negotiate**	**Defect / Arm / Fight**
	Cooperate / Disarm / Negotiate	3,3	1,4
	Defect / Arm / Fight	4,1	2,2 *Deadlock*

For any situation of war, regardless of the conflict being at inter- or intrastate level, I have designated four potential outcomes of the violent conflict, which are placed in order of assumed preference. For a party (P) referred to as 'P$_X$', the preferred outcome is: P$_X$ Victory > Peace Negotiations > Continuation of Conflict > P$_Y$ Victory. Logically, this order of outcomes can be ordinally valued as $4 > 3 > 2 > 1$ for the respective non-numerical outcome. These four outcomes represent all the logical possible endings of any conflict. A minor alternative option would be to prefer continuation of conflict over peace negotiations, although this is very unlikely to happen. Only in a case where extreme grievances between conflicting parties exist is it likely that a party would prefer continuation of conflict over negotiations with another party. To consider possible alterations in order of preferences is obsolete considering the potential results of alteration. The reason for this is that a unilateral, uncoordinated movement of any Party 'X' towards the disarmament or disbanding of combat forces, so change of interest to $3 > 4$ and therefore a 'D' as policy (see figure 2) could lead to two potential outcomes:

1. Party 'Y' changes its interests accordingly to 3 > 4 > 2 > 1. Results in policy D – D for both parties, thereby ensuring outcome '3': Peace Negotiations.
2. Party 'Y' continues its original preference order of 4 > 3 > 2 > 1 which leads to a situation of A – D, thereby ensuring outcome '4': Party 'Y' Victory

As both parties are aware of the potential outcome of an uncoordinated movement, being that the change of interest to D > A could potentially lead to outcome 2. For the opposing party, the movement is to be considered irrational and therefore unlikely. Therefore, in the absence of mutual interest, cooperation under anarchy becomes inapplicable.

Figure 2.

Party X preference		
Party X	Party Y	Value
A	D	4 – Party 1 Victory
D	D	3 – Peace Negotiations
A	A	2 – Continuation of conflict
D	A	1 – Party 2 Victory

Party Y preference		
Party X	Party Y	Value
D	A	4 – Party 1 Victory
D	D	3 – Peace Negotiations
A	A	2 – Continuation of conflict
A	D	1 – Party 2 Victory

Party policy: A = Arm/Fight, D = Disarm/Negotiate

Despite the rather negative preface that a situation of *Deadlock*, or military stalemate, provides, it gives the observer interesting insights in the strategy of conflicting parties. Breaching a situation of stalemate is therefore considered to be a goal to see if and how we can challenge this system of reasoning. In practice, finding a way to defy military stalemates and turning the violent situation in a long lasting peace can give the observer various insights in how to resolve on going violent

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conflicts or prevent fragile forms of peace between opposing groups from escalating into violence. The challenge of how to reach a situation of domestic cooperation under anarchy therefor is of importance to gain insight in conflict dynamics. Multiple studies have tried to explain why reaching mutual cooperation in civil wars is difficult, but few have managed to discuss how the dynamics of war affect the rational of opposing parties. Especially in cases where a rebelling party pursues the gain of territorial autonomy or independence from a central state, cooperation is the only resort apart from a full military victory that is able to provide a rebel party with maximizing their gain. But unless the government party is not seeing a territorial separation as a breach of vital interest, it will resort to the use of violent force to prevent the rebel party from succeeding in its pursuit of gains.

Research Question

The research question that I will pursue to answer by the research presented in this thesis will therefore be: 'What circumstances favour the emergence of two-party cooperation when considering the dynamics of cooperation under anarchy in an intrastate territorial conflict?'. Unlike many previous works of research on the solving of domestic conflicts, this thesis will have a qualitative approach. The reason for choosing this approach over reviewing statistics of various conflicts to test hypothesis, is that I argue that the review of a small number of cases can provide better insight in the dynamics of conflict that are vital to resolving conflict situations. The following chapters will provide insight in how the use of game theory can clear up the dynamics of war, and which implications of rational thinking by conflicting parties are of importance to decide on strategies of action. The research will show both a technical section on hypothetical dynamics within a system of two conflicting parties, and an analysis of how these dynamics are in effect in real world situations of civil conflict. These real world situations will be portrayed by the use of a case study. The case study will be used to decompose the actual happenings into dynamics schemes. These schemes are then compared to the hypothetical schemes that have been derived purely from interpretation of the theoretical dynamics in game theory.

Credible Commitment Theory

Despite the assumptions derived by the dynamics of Deadlock games as presented earlier, there is a solution that does seem to be able to provide with means that make cooperation under anarchy more likely. As proposed in figure 3, there are two puzzles that needs solving before stable cooperation under anarchy becomes viable. Both the prevention of unilateral defection from harmony and the enforcement of a common move out of situation of deadlock may be able to be solved by third-party intervention. Walter constructs this hypothesis in her *theory of credible commitment* (Walter 2001: 6). In her previous work on conflict settlement, she (1997: 340) states that "*third parties [...] can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept (or at least they can ensure that groups will survive until a new government and a new national military is formed).*" This ensures that in a situation of harmony cheating is difficult and costly for both parties. If a third party intervenes in a situation of deadlock and credibly commits itself to the resolving of the conflict, non-cooperation becomes difficult and costly for the defector. This involvement of a third party coercive actor applies to the assumptions presented by Olson on the solving of collective action problems or Free Rider behaviour in conflict situations.

The article "*The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement*" by Barbara Walter sets the absolute standard for the appliance of cooperation dynamics in the process of civil war termination. Her research surrounds the basic question of why domestic enemies tend to fail in processes of civil war termination by negotiated settlement (Walter 1997: 335). The hypothesis is applied to a set of 41 cases of civil war in the 20th century, which all have shown different termination processes. The main variables she used were the presence of negotiations and the outcome of the war. The latter being either a decisive victory by one of the parties involved or a successful settlement. Walter argues that the failure of civil war settlements between two rivalling parties is a likely outcome as long as the parties are not entirely sure that the result of cooperation will be a lasting situation. Due to the fact that cooperation supposedly ensues a situation of disarmament and disengagement of military forces, the parties involved tie themselves to significant risks if the opposing party resumes its interest of defection (Walter 1997: 336). In a hypothetical situation where this would happen, a party that reduces its military strength or front line defences to submit

to a process of peaceful cooperation may find itself severely outnumbered in military sense when the opposing party suddenly resorts to surprise attacks instead of continuing cooperation in a peace settlement process. This uncertainty will be deeper elaborated on in the next section on conflict dynamics. As long as any of the parties has no full insurance that the opposing party is committing to the same situation of vulnerability as the party concerned, they will not abide to domestic commitment terms. And even in a situation where both parties are already involved in negotiations, a party has limited insurance that the opposing party will stick to the agreement once settled. As the domestic situation lacks any means of enforcement of peace agreements, uncertainty about rival intentions remains a risk factor for both parties involved (Walter 1997: 336). This situation creates a puzzle for the way we have to look at potential opportunities for the termination of wars, and prevention of escalation through moves of unilateral defection.

Two-party Conflict Dynamics

To study the hypothetical conflict situation I modelled the dynamics involved in a game that is commonly known as the 'Prisoners Dilemma'. Considering two-party games in the solving of strategies in wars, independent of the conflict being of inter- or intrastate nature, enables the observer to reason the potential movements of either of the parties in a given situation of potential conflict. Uncertainty about the rival intentions is key in the model, which presents potential strategies by means of outcome preferences. The exact extent of the model when applied to conflict will be explained later on, but the basics of the model and the implications they have for strategy options are shown in figure 3. For the consideration of strategies of parties involved in a conflict situation, common reason leads to two possible starting points from which the observer can start the analysis process of the potential movements.

Figure 3.

Party X		Party Y	
		Cooperate / Disarm / Negotiate	**Defect / Arm / Fight**
	Cooperate / Disarm / Negotiate	Harmony	Unforeseen Defeat
	Defect / Arm / Fight	Surprise Attack	Deadlock

The first possible starting point is the presence of an armed conflict in which the two parties involved have not yet seen themselves able to view cooperation as a more gainful interest over continuation of conflict. This situation of *Deadlock*, as I presented it earlier, assumedly can only result in a one-sided military victory. However, cases have been observed in which both parties were able to commit themselves to cooperation. Walter (1997: 337) found out that out of forty-one cases of civil wars occurring between 1940 and 1990, 94% of the cases saw a cease-fire agreement at some point during the conflict, but only seventeen of the cases resulted in peace negotiations. Furthermore, out of these seventeen cases, only eight cases ended in a successful peace settlement between both parties (Walter 2007: 346). A decisive military victory by one of the parties therefore is by far the most common outcome of civil wars. Defying *Deadlock* therefore is a puzzle that needs to be solved to acquire more knowledge about the resolving of on-going or future conflicts.

In case of the second possible starting point, the two parties involved have already seen a period of violent conflict, but have for a reason (the specific reason is not yet of importance) decided either to come to a stalemate and continue in a situation of either permanent or temporary ceasefire or came to a resort through a commonly accepted peace agreement. But even in situations where opponents have agreed to enter negotiations, both parties still face uncertainties in the process of cooperation (Walter 1997: 336). The parties have no credible guarantee that the opponent will commit itself to the negotiated settlement in the aftermath of the conflict. Hidden

incentives or changed values can turn the opponent party into defection. Furthermore, as it is unlikely that parties have full insight in the capacities or incentives of the opponent during the negotiations process, they may lead themselves into a deal that is inherently negative for their own future interests (Walter 2007: 336). Hypothetical examples are pledges for greater autonomy in territorial questions, in which the grant of autonomy is not clearly defined by pre-set standards. This uncertainty of cooperation creates the first puzzle in resolving conflict situations: how to prevent unilateral defection when two parties have reached mutual cooperation? This situation of '*Harmony*', as it is referred to by Oye, is only preserved when both parties are aware of "*the absence of gains from defection*" (Oye 1986: 7). Schelling (2008: 224) states that "*the worst military confrontation is one in which each side thinks it can win if it gets the jump on the other and will lose if it is slow*". When acknowledging this, defection from a point of harmony even becomes likely, as parties involved are afraid that if they are not quick enough in creating a credible condition in which cooperation can be mutually assured, they will leave themselves vulnerable to their opponent. Therefore they may resolve to surprise attacks, as parties fear a similar strategy by the opposing party that leaves them in a vulnerable position if their defensive capability is weak, which may leave them to an unforeseen defeat (Schelling 2008: 225).

The understanding of situations of Harmony and Deadlock with regards to the dynamics of two opposing parties has important consequences to the solving of conflicts. When considering ways to create peace settlements that are both advantageous to the party's interest and are also lasting in the long term, by making incentives to defect from common cooperation unlikely, there are two outcomes that need to be answered. As shown in figure 3, the first being the puzzle of how to prevent unilateral defection when parties have reached the point of harmony, the second being the puzzle of how to force a common move out of situation of deadlock towards a situation of harmony.

Walter (1997: 336) states that there are multiple alternative explanations that argue that a settlement through cooperation in civil wars is highly unlikely. Walter sums the explanations of power asymmetries, indivisible stakes, bargaining difficulties and opposing identities as factors that make a negotiated settlement difficult (Walter 1997: 336). The explanation of the asymmetries between two parties, in which case it assumed that a formal government party is

more powerful than a rebel party, is deemed unlikely as it underestimates the power of many rebel forces. A number of rebel forces have already proven to pose an overwhelming power over government parties in a number of historic cases. The government party supposedly has the ability to use means that are unavailable for the rebel opponent, thereby making armed stalemates unlikely, but external factors can severely interfere with the proposed explanations of this assumption (Walter 1997: 336). Examples are a number of cases of successful civil wars, such the communist revolution in Cuba in 1958 and the Algerian uprising in 1962. Indivisible stakes and vital domestic assets are also objectives of party preferences that are seemingly difficult to negotiate or bargain on. However, a number of post-war power sharing agreements, such as the integration of former rebel parties into formal state politics have been successful. Legalizing these parties and providing opportunities to transform to fully functional political bodies ensures that stakes vital to a party's preference become accessible as part of a democratic system. Söderberg, Kovacs and Hatz (2016: 257) have analyzed the transition of armed groups from rebel groups to formal political parties. They argue that the adaptability of rebel movements to political parties is a hard challenge in the political peace process, but that it does provide with a more stable settlement. Sindre (2016: 196) states that "*the links between internal organisational characteristics of armed groups and the post-war institutional environment are important determinants for the governance practices and adaptability to multi-party democracy by former rebel parties*". Virtually the same holds for domestic parties that have conflicting identities, such as ethnical or religious cultural divisions. Again, cases in which clashing domestic cultures have transitioned to violence have proven to be resolvable by applying consociational arrangements to the domestic political structure, as for instance shown by Arend Lijphart in his study of apartheid in South Africa (Lijphart 1985).

Credible commitment and two-party conflict dynamics

In the prospect of an unilateral defection by either one of the parties, a powerful third party can create counter measures that affect the preference order of a party. By either providing both parties with means that improve their gains from cooperation, or by threatening with the use of force to improve loss by non-cooperation, a third party mediator may take control over an unstable situation of domestic harmony (containing mutual cooperation).

Chang, Luo and Zhang discuss the relation of timing in games of strategic movement. As I briefly discussed in the section on game theory, timing and moving orders may affect strategy results and preference outcomes. Chang, Luo and Zhang suggest that the concept of timing is more important in sequential-move games, which represent action-reaction-action etcetera, than it is in simultaneous-move games such as the Prisoners' Dilemma (Chang et.al 2015: 2). While this may be true for games in an economic conflict setting which Chang, Luo and Zhang are trying to explain, in military conflict the timing issue is of much less importance.

The following section will show that a simultaneous movement is only represented in one case of potential third party intervention, which is the most simple movement a third-party can make to force conflicting parties out of deadlock.

In addition to non-movement CC $\rightarrow$ CC, there is the potential of a movement CC $\rightarrow$ DC, which represents an unilateral defection by a party. This case represents a sequential moving order C_XC_Y $\rightarrow$ D_XC_Y. When the present third party Z intervenes with force to restore CC, this results in order $C_XC_Y \rightarrow D_XC_Y \rightarrow$ Intervention $P_Z \rightarrow C_XC_Y$.

The enforcement of common move out of a situation of deadlock also seems a promising solution the end a violent stalemate. In this case, there are two potential options of movement:

1. Either the third party (Z) enforces a move of both parties towards mutual cooperation, threatening both parties with the use of force when defecting, which result in an immediate move of DD$\rightarrow$CC. A move of this type represents a simultaneous moving order, as it is made unilaterally as P_Z - (P_X + P_Y).
2. The third party P_Z takes the sides of one of the parties involved (in this example $P_{X)}$, which creates a new party structure P_{ZX}. A move of this type represents a sequential moving order, as it is made as P_{ZX} - P_Z - P_Y. In this case, the intervener can:
   a. Both improve the gains from cooperation for the party it prefers, so it prefers C >D, and force the opponent towards a situation in which it too prefers C>D. The moving order of interests therefore represents $D_XD_Y \rightarrow C_XD_Y \rightarrow$ Intervention P_Z

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$\rightarrow C_X C_Y$

    b. Support one of the parties into a military victory (DD), after which both parties may choose to move towards mutual cooperation (CC) in which the losing party has a strongly reduced say in the settlement. The moving order of interests therefore represents $D_X D_Y \rightarrow$ Intervention $P_Z \rightarrow D_{ZX} D_Y \rightarrow$ Victory $P_{ZX} \rightarrow C_X C_Y$. This situation still implies that containing harmony is needed, as a losing party may see continuation of conflict as a last resolve in the post-settlement situation.

In general, the prospect of third party intervention becomes more likely if the stakes at play in the conflict coincide with the interest of other powerful states. Morgenthau (1967: 430) states that: *"All nations will continue to be guided by their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests"*. When stakes are threatened by either the escalation of violence or the by the way the conflict advances over time, the likelihood for a third party intervention becomes higher (Change et al. 2015: 2).

Walter (1997: 340) does sum a number of vital indicators of credible commitment of the intervening party. The intervening party must have "*self-interest in upholding its promise*", which indicates that there a certain gains at stake of the intervening party. These can be both material and immaterial. An example is the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979, where a communist revolutionary movement was about to overthrow the ruling Afghan monarch. In this case, the intervening party supported the revolutionary movement to ensure the prevalence of communist ideology over an authoritarian monarchy which showed a growing preference for a capitalist system (Morgenthau 1967: 428). In the case of Vietnam, the United States were trying to prevent a communist uprising by the Vietcong from spreading further into South-Vietnam. Other examples of self-interest that Walter mentions are indicators of former colonial ties, geopolitical strategy, economic interests or alliances (Walter 1997: 340). The second indicator is the willingness to resort to the use of violent force if deemed necessary to resolve the conflict. Therefor the capabilities of the intervening party must include a sufficient military capacity to overpower an enemy force. This study of the theoretical dynamics of two conflicting parties acting in a system of anarchy has led to the following hypothesis that I will test using a case study:

Hypothesis:

> The breaching of conflict dynamics in civil war that make opposing parties prefer military stalemate over mutual cooperation is more likely if an outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement.

Case selection

The selection of cases has been made with the use of UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 2-2015 (Kreutz 2010). This dataset provides statistics about the termination of both internal and external conflicts since 1946. First, as derived from Sambanis' definition of civil war, I selected cases that had more than 1000 battle-related deaths during the entire conflict and in at least one single year of the war (Sambanis 2001: 262; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010: 417). Second, I selected Intrastate armed conflicts in which the government of a state and one or more domestic opposition group(s) are involved, as the research targets domestic territorial conflicts. Third, the conflict has to have been concluded by means of a peace treaty. Fourth, the incompatibility of the conflict has to have been over a territorial conflict. Selection criteria resulted in twelve potential cases, of which I ruled out another four for additional reasons that were not registered in the UDCP database. These cases are for instance the Georgian territory of Abkhazia, which is effectively occupied by Russian armed forces, and Mauritania due to its negligibility in the Western-Sahara conflict. The remaining cases of the selection that are the most promising for analysis are the Indonesian conflict over East-Timor in 1999, the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict over its independence from Serbia in 1995 and the Serbian conflict over the independence of Kosovo in 1999. After a basic evaluation of these three cases, I finally selected the conflict over East-Timor independence for further analysis as it is the most-likely case to fit theory. The case represent a situation in which the actors involved on both sides of the conflict are relatively clearly presentable, in this case the Indonesian military and the East-Timorese independent movement as conflicting parties with the INTERFRET force as third-party intervener. This includes their proposed preference structures and motivations for consequential action strategies. Secondly, the conflict is well documented so a wide range of sources is available to evaluate the courses of action.

Case study: East-Timor

The following analysis of the conflict over East-Timorese independence will begin with a brief history of governance over the island nation. This is important is the historical factors portray a number of interests of various states with regard to the long lasting conflict situation. After the historical analysis, the dynamics of the settlement process are presented with the application of the model introduced in this thesis.

A brief history

The history of the territory that is now known as East-Timor is predominantly shaped by its colonial rule. While the Portuguese derived its earliest trading posts on the Timor coastline around 1700, it did not fully colonialize the rough areas inland until 1912 (Kingsbury 2009: 33). The Portuguese had formally decided on the demarcation of territorial control with the Dutch colonials in West-Timor in various treaties in the 1850's. Both the Dutch and the Portuguese struggled to gain control of the inland territory, and both organized military campaigns to subdue the inland population under colonial control (Kingsbury 2009: 35). Unlike the Dutch side of the island of Timor, the Portuguese rule never developed the economic presence beyond basic trading posts. The Dutch had developed profitable coffee plantations on the Western half of Timor, but the Portuguese struggles with the inland tribal population denied them from developing meaningful profitable export goods (Kingsbury 2009: 36). This form of low intensity colonialism on the eastern part of the Timor island remained until the beginning of the 20th century.

The changing political situation in Portugal, which saw the overthrowing of the Portuguese monarchy and the installation of a fascist dictatorship, had a strong impact on the Portuguese colonies. The colonial administration was brought directly under Lisbon rule, which subsequently strengthened all ties of the colonial presence in East-Timor (Kingsbury 2009: 38). The Portuguese colonial rule continued until the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, only to be interrupted by the Second World War. The Japanese occupation devastated much of the infrastructure and acts of indiscriminate violence and force labour led to the death of about 60,000 Timorese inhabitants (Kingsbury 2009: 39). In 1949, as result the Dutch decolonization,

West Timor became part of the new Indonesian independent state. From this point onwards, the Timorese population saw an almost continuous violent repression by the Indonesian central government. After the Portuguese administration had left East-Timor in the summer of 1975, the Indonesian military started a violent campaign to integrate East-Timor in the Indonesian State (Kingsbury 2009: 49). The indigenous troops that supported the Portuguese colonial rule prior to its breakdown joint forces with the local tribal militia. This new military force, which was called 'Forcas de Defesa de Timor Leste', or Falintil, was subsequently supplied with NATO material to strengthen their position of independence, which was declared unilaterally on the 28th of November 1975 (Kingsbury 2009: 49). However, the UN refused recognition as it supported the annexation by Indonesia (McCloskey 2000: 3).

On the 7th of December 1975, the Indonesian started its military invasion to annex the Eastern part of the Timorese island. The military campaign was politically supported by both the USA and Australia (Scott 2005: 110). Days before, the East-Timorese pro-independence elite had fled the island and went into exile in Mozambique for the next 24 years (Kingsbury 2009: 50). However, the Falintil continued armed resistance until the 1990's, effectively fighting a civil war for independence. The outbreaks of violence were often actions of revenge against Indonesian aggression against the indigenous population. Towards the end of the 1990's the authority of the Indonesian ruler Suharto was dwindling, as both the economy and the states' political situation became increasingly unstable. Suharto resigned from office in the spring of 1998. He was replaced by the former minister of technology and vice president Habibie, who held a more favourable opinion towards East Timorese self-determination (Kingsbury 2009: 67). Negotiations for either increased autonomy or complete independence were started towards the end of 1998. Habibie had announced that he would support East Timorese independence if the majority of the East Timorese population would want so. However, Habibie was not supported by the Indonesian military and police in this matter. As the support for the pro-independence movement of East-Timor increased, so did the violent oppression by the pro-Indonesian security forces.

On the 6th of april 1999, militia associated with the Indonesian army attacked pro-independence activist in an event that became known as the Liquica massacre, killing up to an estimated 200rd people (Kingsbury 2009: 69). Short time after the massacre, Australia and the UN proposed the

installation of a peace keeping force, to oversee the process toward a popular vote for autonomy or independence to be held the same year. Indonesia refused this as they argued that they would be able to remain control over the unstable situation themselves. Nonetheless, on the 10th of june 1999, the UN established the UNAMET mission, charged with organizing an electoral commission to oversee the voting (Kingsbury 2009: 70). Although denied by the Indonesian officials, the Indonesian proxy militia continued it campaign of destabilisation in the weeks prior to the voting day. The militias burned down entire villages in the countryside and left nothing but red and white Indonesian flags on the remains as a sign of allegiance to the Indonesian state. The actual votes were cast on the 30th of august, and on the 4th of September, the result of the votes were announced, with 78,5% having voted in favour of East Timorese independence (Kingsbury 2009: 73).

Conflict dynamics in the conflict settlement process in East-Timor

The day of voting will be marked as the point on which I will start my analysis of the resolving of the conflict. At this point, the situation remained an actual civil conflict. The armed resistance had been particularly low after the resignation of Suharto, as the Falintil elite saw the change of presidency of the Indonesian state as an opportunity seek peaceful means. The fact that independence was supported by the new Indonesian president enforced their beliefs. Xanana Gusmao, the commander in chief of Falintil, had by means of a press release in early spring of 1999 ensured that he would order Falintil to cancel armed resistance if an UN peacekeeping force would intervene in the country (BBC 1999a). Short time after, he cancelled his statement of disarmament as no credible reaction of the international community had followed. He did however resumed his call for a UN force to provide stability to the country. On the 10th of August 1999, Gusmao ordered the pro-independence militia to resist provocations by the Indonesian military and its proxy militias in the weeks prior to the voting day (Robinson 2009: 147). This made the conflict situation at this point effectively a temporary military victory for the pro-Indonesian forces. The violent campaign of the pro-Indonesian militia made it clear that cooperation with the pro-independence movement was never going to be an option. The Indonesian government publicly denied any acts of violence by the Indonesian security forces present in East-Timor, and blamed the Falintil militia for the indiscriminate violence against the

civilian population. The order of Gusmao to resist armed provocation by the pro-Indonesian forces is a move that is open to multiple interpretations with regards the vision presented here on gains and losses of preference movements. First, by resisting to fight the Indonesian security forces, the resistance movement was showing that it preferred cooperation over further continuation of the conflict. Their gains from choosing not to fight were increased by the prospect that the international community would react against the violence used by the Indonesian security forces. The prospect of gaining international recognition of their struggle with the Indonesian forces therefore prevailed over the prospect of a military victory, as Gusmao had already presented a proposal for a mediated resolution involving all major actors involved in the conflict (Kingsbury 2009: 58). However, it can be considered a risky move as the international support was not fully ensured. A neglecting of the signs by the international community could have eventually led to a military victor by the Indonesian forces. Presumably, the resistance would have reversed its move at some point if there had not come a reaction to support the move of cooperation by the resistance forces. Nonetheless, a move that could lead to a military victory of the opposing side is, according to the traditional Prisoners' Dilemma game model, an irrational form of behaviour.

As mentioned in the introduction to Cooperation Under Anarchy, if Party 'Y' continues its original preference order of $4 > 3 > 2 > 1$ when Party 'X' would change it to $3 > 4 > 2 > 1$, this action would lead to a situation of A – D, thereby ensuring outcome '4': Party 'Y' Victory. However if one of the parties, in this case Party 'X', is convinced that their potential gains from $3 > 4$ are higher than from $4 > 3$, the movement may be considered rational after all. There are multiple factors that impact negatively on this rationality, such as the lack of full information prior to the move and the lack of credible assurance that the proposed reaction to their move will actually follow. The basic axioma of Cooperation Under Anarchy, which states that cooperation is only possible when two parties have mutual interest, still stands. The period of time after the casting of the vote for independence for East-Timor however showed that an enforcement of a change of interest is possible.

In response to the result of the vote for independence, the pro-Indonesian Halilintar militia rampaged throughout the country, killing an estimated of 1400 people (Kingsbury 2009: 73).

Furthermore, an estimated 250,000 East-Timorese fled to West-Timor or the impregnable hills of the island. The Indonesian government send in another 1800 security forces just days after the voting, with the intention to restore order after the violence following to voting result announcement (BBC 1999b). Many Indonesian forces have however been accused of supporting the pro-Indonesian militia which were responsible for the violent rampages. As a reaction to the escalation violence, the UN staff responsible for the overseeing of the electoral process was evacuated to Australia. They staff had ensured that they would remain on the island after the vote to ensure the implementation of the outcome. The new situation on the island forced them to abandon their positions in fear of being captured by the pro-Indonesian militia (White 2008, 82). Shortly after the outbreak of violence, the Falintil militia got their intended reaction by the international community. The chain of events after the vote had gained international public attention. Public protests in Australia and Portugal ordered their respective governments to develop a credible reaction to the violence by intervening with force. The USA indicated to the Australian government that it preferred a leading role of the Australian forces in the intended intervention (White 2008: 83). In advance, the USA had contacted the Indonesian government that it would suspend military ties between the two states, and force them to accept an international peace keeping force to the island state to restore order (Kingsbury 2009: 74). The Indonesian government however still refused to accept an UN peace keeping force to intervene in East-Timor. But perhaps the most important threat made to the Indonesian government was that in case it would remain its position of refusal, the World Bank would severely cut funding to the state (Clear 2008: 228). At this time, the Indonesian government was still facing an economic crisis. It had been one of the foremost reasons for former president of Indonesia Suharto to resign from office. In addition, the IMF also suspended a planned meeting in Jakarta (Kingsbury 2009: 74). In terms of the game theoretical dynamics, sanctions in economy, diplomatic and military affairs by the USA and various international institutions would severely lower the Indonesian gains from defecting a cooperation through the acceptance of intervention by a peace enforcement force. The dissertation of gains and losses of the various actors involved is showed in figure 4.

Figure 4.

	Gains/loss from Indonesia defecting	Gain/loss from Indonesia cooperating
Indonesia	-Gains: loyalty of domestic elites with economic ties in East-Timor -Gains: regional prestige as powerful actor -Loss: severe economic and diplomatic sanctions -Loss: increased threat of violent military intervention	-Gains: Continued funding by international organizations -Loss: possible domestic instability, might trigger other independence movements -Loss: economic exploitation of East-Timorese territory
East-Timor	-Loss: potential military defeat by Indonesia -Loss: reducing resources due to conflict continuation	-Gains: Independence, end of repressive governance.
Foreign actors	-Loss: potential need to spend military resources for violent conflict intervention. -Loss: potential economic negativities of sanctioning -Loss: potential loss of credibility as advocates of peace and stability -Loss: continued regional instability	-Gains: regional stability -Gains: International prestige as coercive power -Loss: commitment of resources to international peacekeeping force
International organizations	-Loss: potential domestic and regional economic instability due to sanctioning	-Gain: continuation of regional economic progress

The thread with financial sanctions did have its intended effect. It forced the Indonesian government to change its position with regards to the acceptance of a UN force to restore order. When examining figure 4, the general conclusion would be that with the knowledge about

potential outcomes of Indonesian defection, all parties involved would prefer Indonesian cooperation of defection. Indonesia accepted the international peacekeeping force barely two weeks after the voting results were announced, and on the 20th of September 1999, a Australian led multinational peace enforcement force entered East-Timor (Kingsbury 2009: 74). The taskforce was not UN led, but acted in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1264, which was adopted unanimously on the 15th of September 1999. The main initial combat-ready taskforce, called INTERFRET, consisted of troops from Australia, New-Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Within 48 hours, the combined force was able to deploy almost 3000 troops into East-Timor. They force had both naval and air combat assets at its disposal. In addition, an armoured and artillery unit was on high alert standby on Australia's northern coast ready to be deployed when the violence would intensify or the Indonesian military would revolt against the INTERFRET force. The UN mandate enabled the force to use 'all necessary means' in support of the civilian UNAMET and additional aid relieve missions (Chesterman 2007: 196). This massive deployment is an indication that the peace enforcement force was able and willing to use credible force against any violator. In accordance with the credible-commitment theory developed by Walter, the deployment of the INTERFRET force showed that third-party states were willing to guarantee the safety and security of the newly formed independent East-Timorese state. Walter (1997: 345) mentions in her coding of here hypothesis on the success of credible commitment that "*third-party security guarantees were defined as any implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries*". She does however add in additional note to this statement that a commitment of troops by means of a peace enforcement force can be considered a credible threat to the side of the opposition (Walter 1997: 345). In this case, the international coalition did not necessarily warn the present Indonesian security forces of their intention to deploy a combat force if they would not stop their support for pro-Indonesian militia.

The time between the adoption of the UNSC resolution for the deployment of a taskforce and the initial entry of peace enforcement troops was five days. The passing of the resolution can be seen as the explicit voicing of credible commitment to the East-Timorese independence movement. The little time between the voicing of commitment and the actual 'show of strength' by the INTERFRET coalition gave the Indonesian security forces and militia little time so overthink their potential options. Through the rapid deployment of the INTERFRET force, which had been

already put on standby immediately after the voting results announcement on the 4th of September, the force also managed to capture a severe number of pro-Indonesian militia on the territory of East-Timor. Eventually, only the use of limited amounts of violence was needed to force remaining pro-Indonesian militia to abandon their arms and either flee to Indonesian West-Timor or return to their native villages. After action reports state that about twenty minor skirmishes between INTERFRET troops and opposition militia have been reported during the deployment that lasted until February 2000, which resulted in one New Zealand casualty due to combat actions, and two Australian casualties due to illness or accident (Independent 2000). Bellamy and Williams (2010: 3) state that "*the Australians calculated that the physical presence of this brigade would instill a sense of security and reinforce the idea that INTERFET was a force capable of protecting people, unlike the UNAMET observation mission*". The Indonesian armed forces left East-Timor on the 29th of October 1999. The pro-Indonesian militia structures had been forcefully disbanded during the INTERFRET deployment. The deployment included a disarmament project of all militia involved, so including the pro-Independence Falintil militia. However the latter gained formal recognition as the new domestic security force in the developing state building process, and was therefore excepted from disarmament (Kingsbury 2009: 98).

The disbanding and disarmament of pro-Indonesian militia forces and the forced evasion of the Indonesian security forces is to be interpreted as a final move towards a stance of cooperation with the pro-Independence movement and the developing state bodies. As the latter had already adopted their preference of disengagement over conflict continuation, the situation has essentially reached a point of mutual cooperation. Visualized as a pattern of movement as presented in the introduction to options of movement in civil war interventions, the situation in East-Timor followed the following sequential pattern:

$D_X D_Y \rightarrow C_X D_Y \rightarrow$ Intervention $P_Z \rightarrow C_{ZX} C_Y$

The INTEFRET intervention ensured that the Party 'Y', in this case the pro-Indonesian side, changed it preference order from P_Y Victory (4) > Peace Negotiations (3) > Continuation of Conflict (2) > P_X Victory (1) to Peace Negotiations (3) > P_X Victory (4) > Continuation of

Conflict (2) > P_Y Victory (1). The sum of gain versus loss of converting to this preference order became higher through two factors. First, the economic sanctioning that was threatened by the World Bank and IMF severely increased the losses in case the party would not have realigned its preference order. Second, the prospect of military defeat against the far more powerful INTERFRET intervention force, which would not only have defeated them temporarily as militant force, but also affect their long term survival as an opposition movement. The only alternative explanation available that would possible result in a change of preference orders would be through a process of mediation. However, the likeliness of behavioural change in a mediation process is limited, as it would rely on full political commitment of both parties. Furthermore, a mediation process takes time and resources, which either one of the parties might not have been eager to commit to. Indonesia was unlikely to give up its claim on the territory of East-Timor if not to its own benefit in ways of economic policy or prestige claims (Kingsbury 2009: 70).

By choosing cooperation over defection, the pro-Indonesian movement ensured that it remained the possibility of continuing as political active movement. This situation still implies that containing harmony through mutual cooperation is needed, as a losing party may see continuation of conflict as a last resolve in the post-settlement situation. The UNTAET that oversaw the transition of civil administration and the UNMISET and UNOTIL peacekeeping missions ensured this harmony for the years following up to the INTERFRET intervention.

The intervention in the East-Timorese conflict is also in accordance with the two vital indicators of credible commitment as presented by Walter, namely self-interest and sufficient military capability. On an Australian Defence Force website dedicated to the INTERFRET mission, the government (Gov.au) states that "*It is in Australia's vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stable and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and respected role in the region. It is also in Indonesia's own interests to ensure East Timor's transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australia's efforts in building our relations with Indonesia are directed to that outcome.*" It is most logical that Australia sees the stability of states in its periphery of vital importance. The island of Timor being just about 700km away from Australia's northern shoreline gave the Australian government a credible interest in the resolving of the conflict as

security part of its geopolitical strategy. The second indicator, the sufficient military capacity to overthrow the targeted opposition force without having to engage in a long stretching conflict of atrocity was clearly met. At its peak, the INTERFRET force accounted for about 11,000 forces, half of which were of Australian nationality, the other major contributors being New-Zealand and Thailand. The force of pro-Indonesian militia was estimated to be around 12.000 members strong, but divided between more than twenty different groups of various strength. The majority of the militia were hired guns that had little intention to fight an overwhelming force, especially if the Indonesian regular armed forces would be forced to leave East-Timor, so only a limited number of hardline militia were actually threatening the INTERFRET forces (Frost and Cobb 1999). As an additional indicator that hasn't been presented by Walter I want to add host-state support as supplement to self-interest and military capability. One of the factors that lead to the successful intervention in East-Timor was the support the mission got prior to its deployment from the state's population. Xanana Gusmao, the commander in chief of Falintil and popular leader of the pro-independence movement asked for a UN approved intervention force a number of times prior to the vote for independence. This indicates that the majority of the East-Timorese population favored the deployment of foreign armed forces to the country to restore peace.

The mandate of the last peacekeeping mission UNOTIL ended in May 2005. In 2006 a mutiny within the East-Timorese government security forces led to a return of international troops to restore order. The 2006 crisis led to little casualties. As of today, Easter-Timor holds as stable democratic political situation. Despite the high poverty rates in the country, the economy is improving, with an average growth rate of 8% between 2006 and 2016 (tradingeconomics.com)

Conclusion

The settlement of the domestic conflict in East-Timor has shown that the use of credible commitment theory to the models of cooperation under anarchy is applicable. Comparable to the selective incentives that Olson has presented, credible commitment is able to construct a situation that is able to defy games of *Deadlock*. I therefore conclude that, in accordance with the hypothesis, the breaching of conflict dynamics in civil war that make opposing parties prefer military stalemate over mutual cooperation is possible if an outside power steps in to guarantee a peace agreement. Vital indicators of credible commitment that make circumstances favourable to

mutual cooperation are self-interest of the intervening party, sufficient military capability of the intervening party and host-state support from one of the two parties involved in the conflict. These indicators can reversely also explain why a number of current on-going civil wars are not yet resolved. For instance in the civil war in the Donbas region in Ukraine, the Russian state is supporting the pro-independence armed movement in eastern Ukraine, but it is not (yet) credibly committed to the solving of the conflict in favour of the rebel side. For Russia, the potential losses of intervention as a third-party are higher than it would gain from intervening in full military force. Losses would include international reprisal of the action, and potentially an armed conflict of a much bigger scale, which Russia cannot afford. For the US and NATO, the interventions as peace enforcement force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Serbia 1999 were shows of credible commitment. In which the stakes at gain, for various reasons, were higher than the potential losses.

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