

The Role of the Military in Political Transitions

Egypt: a Case Study

Rozetta Meijer

This page intentionally left blank

The Role of the Military in Political Transitions

Egypt: a Case Study

Rozetta Meijer

s1270370

Master Thesis

Msc Political Science: Conflict and Cooperation

July 2014

First reader: Dr. Maria Spirova

Second reader: Dr. Rebekah Tromble

Word Count: 19.860

This page intentionally left blank

INDEX

ABSTRACT	7
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	8
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	10
2.1 Political Transitions	11
2.2 Military Involvement in Authoritarian Regimes.....	14
2.3 The Role of Political Militaries in Transitional Periods	18
2.4 Getting the Military out of Politics	21
2.5 Conclusion and Expectations	25
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY	27
3.1 Case Study: Strengths and Limitations	27
3.2 Research Methods & Key Indicators	29
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis	32
CHAPTER IV: CASE BACKGROUND	33
4.1 Historical Background of Egypt	33
4.2 Egypt's Political System.....	35
4.3 Civil-Military Relations in Egypt.....	39
4.4 Egypt's Civil and Political Society.....	43
4.5 Nature of Transition.....	45
4.6 International Actors	47
4.7 Conclusions and Empirical Expectations	47
CHAPTER V: THE MILITARY IN EGYPT'S TRANSITION	49
5.1 Introduction.....	49
5.2 Egypt's Transition	49
5.3 The Military and the Constitutions.....	53
5.4 Political Parties and Electoral Laws	57
5.5 Free and Fair Elections	59
5.6 The Parliament.....	61
5.7 The President.....	62
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION	64
REFERENCES	67

This page intentionally left blank

ABSTRACT

Militaries have played significant roles in the transition from authoritarian regimes to more democratic political systems. Most of these transitions took place during the seventies and eighties in South Europe and Latin America. They often started with cracks within the ruling party, which ultimately led to a gradual transition towards the installation of another regime and in most cases to some form of democratization. Based on those empirical examples a few key indicators predicting the behaviour of a military in transitions can be distinguished. An institutionalised military, which is not directly involved in the administration apparatus and which position has been backed by a legal framework have been found willing to shape the transition period to a more democratic system. During the transition the civilian authorities should guarantee the military certain prerogatives in order to keep it satisfied. An end of the transition period is reached when an effective and strong civilian government is installed which is able to execute civilian oversight over the military.

The recent popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East were not gradual and caused an abrupt regime change in several Arab countries. Only in Egypt the military took a leading role in the transition. This thesis shows that also in the case of Egypt the nature of the military as an institutionalized military, not directly involved in the day to day governing, made it very resistant to any form of democratization. In the three proposed constitutions it has demanded and granted itself extensive prerogatives and annulled any form of civilian oversight. This will make it very difficult for any future civilian leader to execute civilian oversight over the military.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

“A revolution that removed a regime, before the people destroyed it.

We did not protect the revolution, we made it happen”

– Egyptian Major Haytham in the documentary film ‘The Square’

“We left the square before the power was in our hands”

– Protestor at Tahrir square in the documentary film ‘The Square’

At the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011 mass demonstrations erupted throughout the Arab world. People called for freedom, social justice and human dignity and the downfall of the regime. The first country where mass demonstrations broke out was Tunisia. On January 14, 2011 President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled Tunisia for 23 years, was ousted. Inspired by the Tunisian ‘revolution’, mass popular mobilizations took place in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. Major protests broke out as well in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Sudan and minor protests in Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Western Sahara and the Palestinian Territories (Blight, Pulham & Torpe, 2012)

The mass demonstration across the Arab world late 2010 and at the beginning of 2011 caught many Middle East scholars by surprise. Scholars have been focusing on explaining the robustness of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as authoritarianism has dominated the region for over forty years (see for example Diamond, 2010; Kedourie, 1992). The toppling of the authoritarian leaders in Tunisia and Egypt took place in a respectively short period of time. Hosni Mubarak, who had been Egypt’s president for 30 years, stepped down on February 11, 2011, eighteen days after protests against his regime had started. In Tunisia, Ben Ali stepped down after one month of protests against his regime. This left the opposition with very little time to organize itself and to fill in the power vacuum (Bayat, 2013; Miller et

al., 2012). The opposition groups in Tunisia were contrary to the revolutionaries in Egypt able to organize themselves, to form a transitional government and to organize elections. In Egypt the opposition was less well organized and exhausted by the Mubarak regime. It was not able to fill in the power vacuum and instead expected the institutions of the old regime, as the military, to carry out reforms for them: to modify the constitution, hold elections, guarantee freedom of political parties and institutionalize a democratic government (Bayat, 2013).

In Egypt the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took the leading role in the transition. Egypt's military has played a significant role in Egypt's politics since 1952, when the military under the leadership of General Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power by a *coup d'état*. Under Mubarak the military was not directly involved in day-to-day politics, but played an influential role behind the scenes (Cook, 2007). The guidance of the transition by the military makes it questionable to what extent the military, as a remnant of the old regime, will be willing to give up power and will be willing to allow for democratization.

The role of militaries in transitional phases – the interval between one political regime and another – in relation to democratization is the subject of this thesis. The central research question of the thesis is to what extent and under what conditions political militaries are willing to allow for democratization during a political transition. The main argument presented is that militaries in a political transition will look out for their own institutional interests. Political militaries will be only willing to allow for democratization once they believe their institutional interests are protected. Therefore the civilian authorities should guarantee the military certain prerogatives in order to keep it satisfied. Disengagement of a political military will most likely be negotiated, incremental and pacific.

The research question will be answered theoretically by exploring theories on civil-military relations, the role of military institutions in politics and their relation with

democratization. The research question will be answered empirically by a single-case study on the role of the Egyptian military after the ousting of former president Mubarak.

Exploring the Egyptian case is as well scientifically as social relevant, as it will add new insights to the already existing literature on the role of militaries in political transitions in relation to democratization. Most of the discussed literature has been written more than twenty years ago and bases its conclusions on countries that had prior experience with democracy. Exploring the case of Egypt enables to test existing expectations on the role of the military in a transition and to add relevant and new insights to the existing literature.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two, the theoretical framework, will introduce and discuss the main theoretical concepts central in the research question. Chapter three will discuss the research design, methodology and operationalization of key indicators. Chapter four provides the context for the case study and explores the values of the independent variables. Chapter five presents the main results of the case study and chapter seven gives answer to the research question in a conclusion.

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A great deal of ink has been spent on describing the role of the military before, during, and after political transitions have taken place. Many of those descriptions are case studies describing how militaries have behaved in certain countries or certain regions. A general framework or school of thought predicting how a military would behave during a political transition or when it will return to its barracks is lacking. To a great extent this is understandable as the context of a political system and culture will for a great deal determine the political manoeuvrability of the military and its willingness to disengage from politics. Some scholars have tried to develop some classifications and have produced tentative

conclusions. In this theoretical framework the most influential works on the role of militaries during political transitions will be discussed, building on examples from primarily Latin America and Southern Europe (including Turkey).

In order to be able to answer the research question, to what extent and under what conditions a political military is willing to allow for democratization during a political transition, a few concepts need to be explained and defined at first. Those concepts are political transition and political militaries. Democratization will be defined and operationalized in the methodology section. Secondly literature on the political role of militaries will be discussed, touching upon civil-military relations theories and the different forms of militarized authoritarian regimes. Thirdly the behaviour and willingness to disengage from politics of political militaries and to allow for democratization during a political transition will be explored. Fourthly and lastly some examples from the literature on how the political role of militaries has been diminished over time and some recommendations on how civilian authorities can install civilian oversight over the military will be discussed.


2.1 Political Transitions

In four of the six Arab countries where uprisings occurred, a political transition took or is taking place, meaning: a transition from an authoritarian regime into ‘something else’. An authoritarian regime refers to the capacity of a regime to wield together relevant elites that are connected to each other through a network of trust, interests, favours and friendships and the capacity to exhaust any alternative to their regime. Cross cutting loyalties exist between high political elites and high security officers. Military and/or security institutions often act as the guardians of the authoritarian regime and form the key variable in explaining their stability (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 6-7; Cook, 2007: 2).

The transition into ‘something else’ can be the instalment of a political democracy, the restoration of a new form of authoritarian rule, ‘simply confusion’, by which is meant that successive governments fail to institutionalize political power, or widespread violence, which gives way to a revolutionary regime (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6). The transition paradigm was introduced in the eighties by O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) based on the political transitions most South European and Latin American countries were experiencing in the seventies and eighties from authoritarian rule towards a political democracy. These transitions were often characterized by remnants of the authoritarian regime which provided more rights to individuals and groups by modifying their own rules (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 65).

The transition period ends according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) when politics is back to ‘normality’, meaning that there is a clear set of rules which are obeyed about ways to access government positions and procedures on decision-making. In short, political transition refers to the interval between the dissolution of the authoritarian regime and the installation of the other regime, being it a democratic, authoritarian, revolutionary or a hybrid one (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6; Stepan & Linz, 2013).

Figure 1: Schematic view of transition period



Contrary to most political transformations in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, the political transformations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) did not start with cracks in the government and were not elite and top down driven, but were caused by popular uprisings. These uprisings were marked by the eruption of nonviolent mass protests over multiple days across multiple geographical locations and the control of protestors over public spaces, such as Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt and the Pearl Roundabout in Manama, Bahrain (Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds, 2013: 35). Furthermore most of the Arab countries do not have prior experience with democracy as most Latin American, Southern and Eastern European countries had. Mass-based political parties, labour unions and independent press are almost non-existent and moreover democracy in the MENA is often linked with colonial supremacy, rather than with self-determination (Bellin, 2004: 152; Cook, 2007: 3-7).

The political transitions towards democracy in Romania in 2005 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 show however that even without democratic experience and a strong civil society democratization is possible. As well the case of Portugal, where levels of political participation were low before the transition, proves this (Miller et al., 2012: 305). If democratization will succeed in the Arab world depends according to Fukuyama (2014) on the ability of the underlying social groups to mobilize. According to him democratization goes in three stages: (1) initial mobilization to get rid of the old regime, (2) holding free elections, and (3) being able to deliver public services and public goods. The main problem is that the first stage often succeeds, but that the second and third stage are very hard to realize because of lack of experience with the organisation of political parties. Furthermore the Middle East has long been dominated by militarized authoritarian regimes, and “political armies have been and still are one of the key variables shaping the origins and the course of democratic transitions” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 2). According to Eva Bellin (2004: 152-

153) the removal of the coercive apparatus from politics is a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy.

2.2 Military Involvement in Authoritarian Regimes

The extent to which the military is involved in governance and politics and the extent to which it holds directly power will for a great part determine the behaviour of the military when a political transition occurs. As mentioned before military institutions often act as guardians of an authoritarian regime. In such regimes, no civilian control over the military exists and the military fulfils many functions which go beyond its standard mandate of defending the country (Huntington, 1995: 10). In this section the main characteristics of the military profession, a military organisation and the different roles it can play in politics will be discussed.

2.2.1 The Military as Institution

In political democracies militaries are professionalized, political neutral and controlled by civilian authorities. Huntington (1957), still among the most cited in civil-military relations literature, makes a distinction between subjective and objective civilian control over the military. Subjective control means that the power of some civilian groups is maximized vis-a-vis the military. Objective civilian control aims to minimize the power of the military by professionalizing it and making it political neutral (Huntington, 1995: 9-10). According to Huntington (1957) military professionalism consists of: expertise, responsibility and corporatism. Expertise refers to the education and experience of military personnel. Responsibility refers to the role of the military; as defender of a state it can be essential for the existence of a state. Corporatism refers to the shared sense of unity among military personnel

(Huntington, 1957: 8-10). Finer (1962: 7) adds to this a centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, esprit de corps and self-sufficiency and Janowitz (1960: 36) a monopoly on legitimate means of violence.

The standard mandate of a military is to defend its country against external security threats. Next to defending its country, its mandate is to maintain internal security and order and to look out for its own institutional interest. These institutional interests are to maintain internal cohesion, to protect its image and national legitimacy, and to secure its economic interests. The military has both institutional as individual economic interests, think of access to first-rate military equipment and of salaries, benefits or professional promotion opportunities (Bellin, 2012: 131; Cook, 2007: 18). In militarized authoritarian regimes the mandate of the military is extended into extra-military areas, such as governing and running enterprises.

2.2.2. Political militaries

The extent to which and the way militaries are involved in authoritarian regimes differs. In general can be said that the less a political system is developed and the lower the legitimacy of civilian rule, the more likely the military will engage in politics (Finer, 1962: 164-204; Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 17). Overt military rule is however rare and short-lived. Militaries often act as a political force from behind the scenes or some form of a quasi-civilian façade (Finer, 1962: 3-4). Political militaries are characterized by the fact that they hold certain prerogatives, meaning: “the military’s acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political and civil society” (Stepan, 1988: 9). In militarized authoritarian regimes the military often

decides on legislation, the constitution and on the post of chief executive (Aguero, 1998: 385).

During the years there have been different forms of militarized authoritarian regimes. Finer (1962: 164-204; 1974: 5-27) categorises those regimes on basis of their political structures and their constitutional role. He distinguishes five political structures on the basis of the extent to which the military controls major policies and the degree of overtness. These are (1) direct open military rule, (2) direct quasi-civilianized rule, (3) indirect continuous rule, (4) indirect intermittent rule and, (5) dual rule. The military dictatorship in Argentina from 1966 to 1973 is an example of open direct military rule, while the political interventions of the Turkish military to “set things right” is an example of direct rule, followed by indirect intermittent rule (Finer, 1974: 11-13).

Secondly a distinction can be made between militaries intending to stay in power or remain in control over those in power and those intending to exert temporary control over the state to “set things right” (Finer, 1974: 6-8). The level of institutionalization of those militaries intending to stay in power into the regime has taken different forms. Institutionalization of the military into the regime involves formal rules, such as a constitution, which regulate the power structure within the regime, the assignments of government functions and the leadership succession (often critical in nondemocratic regimes). Institutionalization usually leads to a separation between the military as institution and the military as government. In Argentina, Peru and Uruguay the level of institutionalization of the military was for instance less than in Chile and Brazil (Aguero, 1998: 386-400). As will be shown in the next section this had consequences for the ability of the military to continue to have a hold on power during a political transition.

Thirdly, a distinction can be made between the levels of governance in which the military is active and parameters of governmental power. The levels of governance are (1)

control, meaning general steering, over otherwise autonomous sectors and organisations, (2) direction of those sectors and organisations, and (3) administration of government departments, business corporations and trade unions by military officers. The extent to which the military holds governmental power depends on the scope of their control, their resources base, their mean and efficacy (Finer, 1974: 11). According to Bellin (2004: 148-149) militaries will be able to hold their political role as long as they remain fiscally healthy, they successfully maintain international support networks and as long as they are not met by popular mobilizations which they cannot contain.

Next to the different forms of military rule and political engagement, a distinction can be made between institutionalized (not to be confused with the above described institutionalization of the military into an authoritarian regime) and patrimonial political militaries. An institutionalized military has a corporate identity separate from the state, while the identity of a patrimonial military is integrated with that of an authoritarian regime. Institutionalism is here defined by Max Weber's bureaucratic principles: rule governed, predictable, meritocratic, established path of career advancement and recruitment, promotion based on performance, not corrupt, has service ethic and strict merit based hierarchy (in Bellin, 2004: 145-149). Patrimonial military organisations are driven by cronyism and characterized by widespread corruption, abuse of power, patronage, demobilisation of the opposition forces and blurred lines between its public and private mission. A patrimonial military organisation will therefore be particularly resistant to democratic reform and according to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 33) armed insurrection seems to be the only way for regime change in such a case. A more institutionalized military organization will be more willing to disengage from power and to allow for political reform and there the route to democracy will be likely a pacific and negotiated one (Bellin, 2004: 145-149; O' Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 33).

2.3 The Role of Political Militaries in Transitional Periods

In political transitions, brought about by society led revolutions, history shows that militaries have played a crucial role by taking the lead in the transition period; having discretionary power over arrangements and rights (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6; Przeworski, 1986: 60-61; Stepan, 1986: 78-79; Huntington, 1991a: 36; Miller et al, 2012: 298). The speed and nature of the military withdrawal from politics is crucial for the prospects of lasting liberalization or democratization. According to Welch (1992) an abrupt retreat of the military will lead to the breakdown of an authoritarian regime, while a phased withdrawal will lead to a transformation of the political system. A quick collapse of an authoritarian regime most likely will lead to a euphoric change of government, with little staying power. That is why Alfred Stepan (1986: 75-79) argues that society led revolutions most probably lead to the instalment of a new authoritarian successor or a caretaker military junta which promises to organize elections and which are not interested in extricating themselves from power. These actors will make sure they can still perform their emergency powers.

Bellin (2004: 145-146) on the other hand argues that institutionalized military establishments have a good reason to believe that their power will not be ruined by political reform. They either opt to transfer power to civilians, as they believe this will save the institutional integrity of the military establishment, or remain in power by holding elections. Bellin (2004: 146) argues that where the military “has successfully delivered on public goals like national defence and economic development, it might be confident on its ability to ride democratic transition successfully and maintain a hold on power, this time by popular election”.

The resistance towards democracy of militaries will depend on the degree to which they are directly involved in policy-making and repression and on the degree to which they

are institutionalized into the authoritarian regime. The military in Italy, Portugal and Spain during the seventies was not directly involved in the administrative apparatus of the state and not the military, but the police, was responsible for repression. This facilitated their eventual acceptance of democratization. In Latin America and Greece there was a direct link between the military, the administrative apparatus and repression, making them less willing to allow for democratization (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 23-34; Aguero, 1998: 385-386). However, Aguero (1998: 399-400) argues that “a military will not be able to sustain its power and influence in the post-authoritarian regime if this power is not backed with formal-legal arrangements”. The more institutionalized military regimes in Chile and Brazil were able to define the transition path on their own terms, limiting the aspirations of the opposition, while the less institutionalized military regimes in Argentina, Uruguay and Peru had to reach out to the opposition in an attempt to retain part of their power (Aguero, 1998: 388-390).

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 34-35) argue that in societies where the military is professionalized, has a clear coercive supremacy within its territory and is widely involved in the regime the route to political democracy will most likely be a negotiated, pacific and incremental one. Only when the military institution realizes that in order to stay in power, meaning the power to intervene in matters of importance, it will have to remove itself from directly governing the country, the way is open for a civilian government. Such a civilian government will however most likely be faced with the continuation of military power in its government (Huntington, 1991a: 238-242; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 15; Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 29). Examples of this were visible in almost all militarized authoritarian regimes, as in Turkey, Portugal, Chile, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay, where the military continued to exert influence and power after a civilian government was elected. The military in those

countries for instance insisted on certain provisions within the constitution¹, made sure some of the actions by the military regime were irreversible², created new governmental bodies which were dominated by the military³, assigned key positions to high military officers⁴, guaranteed its autonomy by not giving the elected government any control over military personnel and finances, authorized itself to intervene in politics in case of an emergency, banned certain political parties and restricted election procedures⁵ (Huntington, 1991a: 238-242; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 15).

Adam Przeworski (1986: 60-61) therefore argues that forces in society which are trying to bring down an authoritarian regime need to 'struggle' on two fronts: the dismantling of the old regime and the realization of their interests by organizing themselves and by making sure they alter the institutional arrangement in their favour. Thus, the strengths and weaknesses of the civil society determine the extent to which the military can demand prerogatives once an authoritarian regime is extricated (Stepan, 1986: 75 – 77, Droz-Vincent, 2013: 13). The power of civil society to create and channel social pressure is therefore extremely important in bringing about democratization. The next section discusses how the political role of militaries has been diminished over time and presents some recommendations on how civilian authorities can install civilian oversight over the military.

¹ The Portuguese constitution of 1976 gave the military de jure veto-power over the National Assembly; the Chilean military installed rigid voting requirements for constitutional reforms; the Peruvian military authorized itself to intervene in cases of subversion.

² The Turkish military for instance decreed that former laws could not be changed

³ For instance the National Security Council in Turkey and in Chile

⁴ In Brazil military officers occupied cabinet positions under a civilian president. In Portugal and Turkey a military officer became president and struggled over power with the civilian prime minister. In Chile Pinochet remained the commander in chief. In Uruguay the president had to be a top military general.

⁵ The Chilean military adopted an electoral rule favouring rightist parties and diminished the power of the president over the armed forces. The Brazilian military reduced the amount of political parties to two and altered the electoral law in their favour.

2.4 Getting the Military out of Politics

Militaries have sometimes been effective stewards of democratization, but often have proved to be the last institution willing to allow for democratization (Miller et al., 2012: 308). Therefore, there seems to be a relation between the military's departure from governance and politics and the process of liberalization and democratization (Cook, 2007: 8). How can a civilian government reduce the continued military power after a political transition has taken place? The essential factor in a successful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is the establishment of democratic civil-military relations. This is a set of understandings that keeps the military safe after it has given up power and implies civilian control over the military (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 2). The most significant propositions on how to reform the civil-military relations are discussed here: professionalization of the military; protecting the interest of the military; letting democracy does it work and; install democratic civil-military relations.

2.4.1 Professionalization and Political Neutrality

Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (196) both rely on professionalizing the military as a tool for civilian governments to control the military. Huntington (1957: 84) argues that recognizing the autonomy of the military profession leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination to civilian control. Janowitz (1960) focuses more on professionalization in the occupation, by incorporating values as devotion to community and self-restraint into military education, as a way to control the military.

Finer (1962: 24-27) disagrees with Huntington; he argues that some features of professionalization actually lead to interventions in politics. Professionalism increases military capacity to act decisively and it weakens the authority of a civilian leader. The military will see itself as servant of the state rather than of a specific government. Professionalization in the Turkish military for instance led to an esprit de corps, sophisticated weaponry and fighting capabilities, but not to less political power (Kamrava, 2000: 73). Finer (1962: 25) argues that the military must believe in a basic principle: the principle of civil supremacy. In countries like Portugal, Spain, Colombia, Paraguay and South Korea militaries have permitted civilian authorities to govern.

Military disengagement is not uncommon, but military neutrality proves to be problematic in states where the military has played a political role. They have disengaged, but only as long as the civilian authorities live up to their expectations. Often this disengagement looks more like indirect intermittent rule than civilian rule. Long-term disengagement depends on the mentality of the military leaders and the nature of the society, mainly the presence of a developed political culture. In order to arrive at long term disengagement the following conditions must be met according to Finer (1974: 15-19): (1) military leaders should want their troops to quit politics, (2) civilian leaders have to be able to establish a regime which is capable of functioning without military support, (3) the civilian regime should be favourable to the armed forces and (4) the armed forces should have sufficient confidence in the new civilian leader.

2.4.2 Protecting the Interest of the Military: A Gradual Approach

Hillel Frisch (2013: 167) argues that a democratic transition is more likely to occur if the elite manages to negotiate a constitutional framework in which the interest of the military is

protected after they cease power, or if they believe that they can continue to hold power by being elected to office. Miller et al (2012) agree that giving the military a certain degree of prerogatives can be helpful. At the same time the capability of the civilian authorities should be empowered to effectively have oversight over the military.

The diminishing role of the military in Chile, Portugal and Turkey give an example of a gradualist approach, where civilian authorities were able to diminish the military's influence over time. In Chile former dictator Pinochet stayed on as commander-in-chief of the army for eight more years after the political transition had started. Special prerogatives were built into the constitution and only in 2005, twenty-five years after the transition, those prerogatives were removed from the constitution. In Portugal the military claimed certain 'reserved domains' within the constitution: domains over which the military is not accountable to the civilian authorities. These 'reserved domains' were part of the constitution for eight years after the initiation of the transition. In Turkey the military has acted as a pressure group from behind the scenes and for a long time held certain prerogatives through the National Security Council (Kamrava, 2000: 73; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 17). The role of the military in Turkish politics has steadily eroded, although slowly. These examples show that a gradual approach may delay the instalment of democracy, but that it does not necessarily prevent democratization (Miller et al, 2012: 309-312).

2.4.3 The Working of Democracy

The Latin American and South European experiences show that the working of democracy over time reduces the coup attempts by politicized militaries and reduces their power and privileges. The militaries became less interested in confronting civilians and overthrowing their regimes, as it became more concerned with protecting its institutional well-being and

privileges (Huntington, 1991a: 242-243; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 23). Those countries experienced an increased transparency in the defence area, greater supervisory over the military by its parliaments, replacement of military personnel in the defence ministry by civilian officials, a replacement of the top of the military and a more politically neutralized military (Huntington, 1995: 11). In order to establish such democratic civil-military relations a functioning civilian government is needed, which makes the prospects of returning to an authoritarian regime no longer a viable option by institutionalizing democratic control over the military and addressing shadow networks (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 18-23).

Democratic Civil-Military Relations

In order to establish democratic civil-military relations the defence sector needs to be reorganized. Huntington (1991a: 242-243; 1995: 11-13), Diamond and Plattner (1996), Pion Berlin (2009) and Droz-Vincent (2013: 18-23) mention a few measures a newly elected civilian government could take to implement this reorganization, which can be summarized in seven points. In the first place a newly elected civilian government could empower the ministry of defence by replacing the military officers by civilian officials. Secondly it could replace the top of the military by encouraging those in charge during the former regime to retire. Thirdly they could install judiciary and legislative control over the military. Fourthly they could reduce the manpower and finances of the military. The nation-building role and the economic development the military often provides for makes it however hard to cut back on their budget. Fifthly they could alter the military training and education system. Sixthly they could reorient the military on its core mission, external security, and get the military out of a wide range of activities which are not strictly related to the core business of the military. For instance by cutting back on their economic role by privatizing military enterprises. In order to keep the military satisfied they could instead invest in the modernization of their military

equipment and make sure they uphold their respect and status. Either increasing or decreasing the economic benefits of the military is an option.

Finally international pressure from the United States and the European Union can play a major role in democratizing the civil-military relations. Academics (such as Cook, 2007 and Droz-Vincent, 2013) agree that the European Union is the primary actor for driving change in the civil-military relations in Turkey. Furthermore exposure to the military education in the United States has been a factor for acceptance by military officers of liberal democratic norms of military professionalism and civilian control (Huntington, 1991a: 242-243; 1995: 11-13).

2.5 Conclusion and Expectations

History shows that in all militarized authoritarian regimes the military took a leading role in transitional periods and that the extent to which the military was able to keep its prerogatives during the transition had a great affect on the democratization process. From the literature it becomes clear that the main factor influencing the extent to which a military is willing to disengage from politics and will allow for eventual democratization, is the extent to which the military is involved in the authoritarian regime. The more a military is involved in the regime, the less it is willing to allow for political reform and democratization.

The extent to which a military is involved in a regime is determined by three factors. The first is the character of the military institution: patrimonial or institutional. Institutional militaries have an identity separate from the regime, while patrimonial militaries are identified with the regime. Patrimonial militaries are particularly resistant to democratic reform; while an institutionalized military does not necessarily has to see its power ruined by political reform. The second factor is the extent to which the military is directly involved in the administrative apparatus. The more involved, especially in repression, the less it is willing

to allow for democratization. The third factor is the extent to which the position of a military is institutionalized, referring to formal legal arrangements. Militaries which ruling is backed by a legal framework will trust that they can shape the transition and demand prerogatives. This in contrary to militaries which are not backed by a legal framework, which will more likely have to negotiate their political maneuverability with the opposition.

The other factors determining the extent to which a military will allow for democratization are the nature of a transition (abrupt or gradual), the strength of civil society and international pressure. When there is an abrupt breakdown of an authoritarian regime and a low developed political culture, the chance is high that the transition will lead to the installation of a new authoritarian regime or caretaker military junta, while a gradual change will increase the chances that the military will disengage from politics over time. Furthermore it becomes clear from the literature that the strengths and weakness of the civil and political society and the installation of an effective civilian government are extremely important for the degree to which the military will be able to continue to rule. Finally international pressure can have a positive influence on the installation of democratic civil-military relations.

Under which conditions has the military disengaged from power? From the literature becomes clear that when the military realizes that in order to stay in power, it has to remove itself from directly governing, the way is open for a civilian government. A military institution with an institutionalized character will either transfer power to civilians in order to save its institutional integrity or try to remain in power by getting elected to office. Civilian authorities will be faced with continued military power, as the military will try to circumvent civilian oversight over the military, will make sure they can still perform their emergency powers and try to shape a political environment which is favorable to them. In the past this has been done through the constitution, the creation of new governmental bodies, assigning key positions to military officers, banning political parties and restricting elections.

The cases discussed in the literature show that the role of the military will only diminish over time, and that the disengagement of the military from politics has taken place in an incremental, pacific and negotiated way. From the literature two main conclusions can be derived about the conditions under which the military will disengage. The first one being that civilian authorities should guarantee the military certain prerogatives in order to keep it satisfied. The second being that an effective and strong civilian government is needed in order to be able to execute civilian oversight over the military.

CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

This chapter firstly discusses the strengths and limitations of doing a case study. Secondly the research design and key indicators for answering the research question are defined. Finally the data collection method is explained.

3.1 Case Study: Strengths and Limitations

The research question will be empirically answered by a single-case study on the willingness of the Egyptian military to allow for democratization after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. The time frame of the case study is January 25, 2011, the start of the protests calling for the fall of the regime, up to June 30, 2013, the deposit of the first civilian elected president Mohamed Morsi by the military. The conduct of a case study, a qualitative research method, fits the research question best. A case study gives the opportunity to address the historical and sociological side of the topic as it focuses on institutions, identities of the actors and preferences. Case studies furthermore give the opportunity to test implications from theories

against empirical observations and to use those results to add new insights to the existing theory (George & Bennett, 2005: 5; Boeije, 2005: 17-27). A case study is the ultimate method for exploring complex causalities and for retaining a holistic and meaningful interpretation of real-life events (Yin, 2009: 4). Its strength is in the first place that it provides for a high level of conceptual validity, as it takes in contextual factors. Secondly, as a case study is theory-laden but not theory-determined it is possible to derive new hypotheses from the case. It can as well test deductive theories, suggest new variables that need to be incorporated and refine a theory. Thirdly a case study allows for exploring the causal mechanisms in detail (George & Bennett, 2005: 9-22, 111).

The limitation of doing a case study is the *small-n*, of which the consequence is that the research findings cannot be generalized to all cases. Especially a single case study has this limitation. Furthermore case studies can only make tentative conclusions on how much a variable affects the outcome (George & Bennett, 2005: 22-34). At the same time “case studies are stronger in identifying the scope of conditions of theories and assessing arguments about causal necessity in particular cases” (George & Bennett, 2005: 27). In this research I deliberately choose to do a single case study as the Egyptian case is as well a theoretical as a social relevant case. In Egypt the military is both highly institutionalized, as highly rooted in the regime. Based on the former you might expect that the Egyptian military will be willing to allow for democratization, while from the latter you might expect that the military officers will be highly resistant to any form of democratization. Exploring this case can add relevant insights to the existing literature on the role of militaries in transition periods.

Furthermore as a general theory on the willingness of political militaries to allow for democratization is lacking, the theoretical framework of chapter two is mainly based on empirical literature from other cases where the military has taken a leading role in the political transition. Based on these cases scholars have determined some indicators that have

an effect on the willingness of a political military to allow for democratization. Those indicators will be used in order to examine if the military in Egypt acted as can be expected based on indicators which determined the military's behaviour in other cases. This means that no formal theory testing will be done, but rather that the case of Egypt will be compared to the other cases discussed in chapter two. This narrows down the limitations of doing a single-case study.

3.2 Research Methods & Key Indicators


The method that will be used is a congruence single case study. A congruence case study assesses whether the expectations from the theory can explain or predict the outcome of a case (George & Bennett, 2005: 181). In other words:

“The investigator observes values on the independent and dependent variable within a particular case and observes the world (without doing further case studies) to ascertain values on the independent and dependent variable that are typical in most other cases. The investigator then deduces from these observations and from the test theory expected relative values for the independent and dependent variable in the study case and measures the congruence or incongruence between expectation and observation” (Van Evera, 1997: 58).

In this research the dependent variable (DV) is the *willingness* of the military to allow for democratization during a political transition. From the theoretical framework it has become clear that there are several variables which determine the extent to which a military is willing to allow for democratization. For this reason no single independent variable has been set, but several variables influencing the dependent variable are distinguished. These variables are the character of the military, the military involvement in the authoritarian regime, the character of

the society, especially the degree to which a civil and political society has been developed, the nature of the transition and the presence of international pressure. This study will test whether the Egyptian military, based on the expectations that can be derived from the literature, acts in congruence or incongruence with these expectations. The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Relationship between independent variables and dependent variable (DV)



The case study will be divided into two parts. The first part will examine the values of the independent variables. Based on these measures in relation to the theoretical framework, expectations on the willingness of the military to allow for democratization in Egypt are derived. The second part of the case study will examine the extent to which the military has

been willing to allow for democratization since the ousting of Mubarak in the beginning of 2011 until the disposition of the first elected civilian president Mohamed Morsi on June 30, 2013.

Democratization can be defined as the process of applying democratic principles and procedures to state institutions. These democratic principles and procedures include accountability of institutions, free and fair elections and a set of political and civil rights (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 8; Stepan, 1988: 6; Huntington, 1991a: 9). The extent to which the military has allowed for democratization will be measured on the basis of two indicators: representation and accountability. These indicators are as well part of the level of democracy measures employed by Freedom House and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Freedom House (2014) uses civil liberties and political rights as measures. International IDEA (Landman et al, 2008) uses a much broader range of indicators, of which the most important are incorporated in the two indicators used here. Although civil liberties are often incorporated in democracy measurements, this study limits itself to looking especially at applying representation and accountability measures to state institutions and political actors.

Accountability - Accountability refers to the implementation of procedures and rules for executive institutional accountability. This will be assessed on basis of the three written constitutions which have been adopted since 2011, the removal or reinstatement of martial law, the transfer of power to a civilian government, the transfer of key positions to civilian officials and civilian control over the military budget and personnel.

Representation – Representation refers to divide of power between civilian, judicial and

military institutions. Part of representation is the organization of free, competitive and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and all adult population is eligible to vote. This will be measured by looking at freedom of political party competition and the conduct of free and fair elections. Secondly the mandate of the different representative institutions, as the parliament and presidency will be assessed.

3.3 Data Collection and Analysis

The values of the indicators and variables in the Egyptian case will be measured by using a wide range of as well primary as secondary sources. Primary sources are the three constitutions, official statements made by the military and the laws adopted under the rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Secondary sources will primarily consist of existing literature on the role of the military in Egypt, reports of governmental and non-governmental organizations, analyses issued by think tanks and news reports on the situation in Egypt.

The structure of the analysis of the case is based on the operationalization set out in this chapter. Chapter four will analyze the values of the independent variables in the case of Egypt and on basis of this exploration expectations of the willingness of the military to allow for democratization are set. Chapter five analyses the extent to which the military has been willing to allow for democratization based on the key indicators set in the second section of this chapter.

CHAPTER IV: CASE BACKGROUND

This chapter explores the values of the independent variables introduced in the second paragraph of chapter three. In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the case, the historical background and political system of Egypt will be introduced at first. Secondly, the civil-military relations in Egypt before the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 will be explored. Thirdly the strength of the civil society, the nature of the popular uprising and pressure possibilities of international actors will be discussed. Finally, empirical expectations will be derived from the discussed subjects.

4.1 Historical Background of Egypt

The modern Egyptian state owes its genesis to the military (Kamrava, 2000: 73). On July 23, 1952 the Free Officers, midlevel Egyptian army officers, committed a coup d'état by ousting king Farouk, dissolving the parliament and outlawing political parties. The officers under the leadership of general Gamal Abdel Nasser concentrated the political power in their hands (Cook, 2007: 63-65; Karawan, 2011: 44). Nasser enjoyed great popular legitimacy in a decade where nationalism was on the rise. He embodied the Arab nationalism; known as pan-Arabism and under Nasser Egypt became one of the leading countries in the region (Woltering, 2013). In 1970 Nasser died from a heart attack and was succeeded by Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat was a senior officer of the Free Officers and served twice as vice president under Nasser. He is known for his economic liberalisation, pact with Western allies

and peace with Israel. Sadat reformed the Egyptian economy by privatizing factories, decreasing food subsidies, which led to the famous bread riots in 1977, and raising the VAT (Karawan, 2011: 44). The economic reforms resulted in more unemployment, more inequality and the rise of corruption. As a consequence Islamic organisations gained more support, because of their charity work for the poor (Woltering, 2013).

On October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated by a group of men who were linked to the Islamic Jihad (the New York Times, 2011). Hosni Mubarak, vice president under Sadat from 1975 until his death, succeeded Sadat as president. Mubarak was a career officer in the Egyptian Air Force, serving as commander from 1972 until 1975. Mubarak continued to reform the economy in line with Sadat's earlier reforms: he further privatized state assets, encouraged foreign investment, cut further on subsidies and state expenditures. The privatization of enterprises mainly ended up in the hands of crony capitalists and led to the formation of a business elite, people who were well-connected to the political regime. Especially after 2004 privatization was accelerated (Cause III; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). The majority of the Egyptian people barely profited from the economic reforms. The inequality between poor and rich increased. Data from the World Bank (2014) shows that the 16,7% of the population living at the poverty line in 2000 had increased to 25,2% in 2011.

The rise of mass media as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, Internet access and access of a larger group of youngsters to the universities led to greater societal awareness. Furthermore the fact that one fourth of Egypt's population is between 18 and 29 years old and the youth unemployment rate is 25% (age between 15 and 24) (UNDP, 2010; CIA, 2010) has led to growing youth activism since 2000 (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). The desperate socio-economic circumstances, the gap between the ruling (business) elite and the majority of the Egyptian population, corruption and the widespread brutal repression and torture by the security forces were the main reasons people took the streets on January 25, 2011, the day of

Police, and called for bread, freedom and social justice and no to corruption (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-15). This ultimately led to the ouster of Mubarak on February 10, 2011 by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

4.2 Egypt's Political System

Egypt's political system from 1952 until 2011 can be best described as hybrid/authoritarian: democratic institutions and civic organisations coexisted with repression and co-optation by the regime. Multiparty politics for example was accepted, as long as the opposition parties did not pose a serious threat to the ruling establishment. Opposition parties which were seen as serious competitors were suppressed and outlawed (Miller et al., 2012: 80-85).

4.2.1 Accountability and Representation

Political parties

After 1977 a law enabled the establishment of political parties. Until then only one party was allowed, which was renamed the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1978 (Cook, 2007: 69). Establishing a new party proved however to be difficult. Political parties were not allowed to have a religious basis, excluding the Muslim Brotherhood, or to be similar to existing parties, excluding liberal democratic parties (Miller et al, 2012: 91-92). The Committee for Affairs of Political Parties further restricted the establishment and manoeuvrability of political parties. This committee was dominated by members of the ruling NDP and had the power to decide on the applications of political parties, to shut down a party or to suspend its activities (Cook, 2007: 69-71). The political parties that *were* allowed became co-opted by the regime (Miller et al, 2012: 91-92).

Representative Institutions: the People's Assembly, Shura Council and Presidency

The Egyptian political system has three official representative institutions which are elected by secret balloting. These institutions are the People's Assembly, the Shura Council and the presidency. The People's Assembly, Egypt's lower house consisted of 518 members in 2010. Ten of the members were appointed by the president, the rest, mainly independent candidates, were elected by popular vote. The members served for a six-year term (Freedom House, 2011; Polity IV, 2010). The People's Assembly had a legislative function and was tasked with overseeing the functioning of the government, the government's budget, and had the right to question ministers and initiate discussions. They were furthermore endowed with the right to withdraw confidence in the cabinet and to nominate a president (Cook, 2007: 63-65). In practice the People's Assembly was an extension of the regime. Questioning of ministers and nominating a president have been rare. Furthermore the Assembly had no say in important policy areas, only less important areas such as agriculture, local policy, youth and the bourgeoisie (Polity IV, 2010).

The lower house has been consistently dominated by the NDP and retired military officers. The NDP was financed by the regime, had unlimited access to state media and was backed by electoral laws and fraud, severely limiting the influence of opposition parties (Cook, 2007: 70). The electoral law furthermore decreed that half of the seats in the People's Assembly should be reserved for 'farmers' and 'workers'. In reality 90 per cent of those 'farmers' and 'workers' were retired military officers and security personnel who subsequently took seat in the Defence and National Security Committee, the only committee that nominally was tasked with overseeing the military budget (Martini & Taylor, 2011).

The second 'representative' institution is the Shura Council, better known as Egypt's Upper House. The upper house has a consultative function and has 264 members of which

two third are directly elected and one third is appointed by the president (Cook, 2007: 68). The upper house is tasked with ratifying constitutional amendments and international treaties. It has consultative tasks on the subjects of drafts, bills and on all general policies. Like the People's Assembly the Shura Council has been dominated by the NDP (Freedom House, 2011).

The third officially representative institution is the presidency, which after 1967 became the most significant actor in Egypt's political system. The constitution of 1971 formally restricted the presidency to two terms of six years. Those restrictions were revoked in the amended constitution of 1980, giving the presidency an unlimited term (Cook, 2007: 72). Under pressure of the Bush administration multiparty presidential elections were for the first time organized in 2005 (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 9). Constitutional amendments made it however very difficult for other candidates than Mubarak himself, to run for presidential elections. First of all only political parties which had been established for more than five years and had obtained at least 3% of the seats in as well the People's Assembly as the Shura Council were allowed to put forward a candidate. Secondly, independent candidates needed at least 250 signatures from regime officials from different government layers in order to be able to run (Egypt's State Information Service (ESIS), 2009). The majority of government institutions were dominated by the ruling NDP party, leaving the other candidates no chance of winning (Cook, 2007: 72; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 9).

4.2.2 Law and Rights

Civil and Political Liberties

In both the constitutions of 1956 and 1971 political and civil rights were formally granted to Egypt's population. Included in the constitutions are equality for the law, the right of freedom

of opinion, expression, press, assembly and association and the right to vote (ESIS, 2009). However, since 1967 the emergency law has been almost continuously in place, stripping citizens from most of their constitutional rights (UNDP, 2005). Newspapers were subjected to censorship and even to prison terms and heavy fines for publishing misinformation, workers were forbidden to strike and political organizations were only allowed to assemble with the approval of the Ministry of Interior (Cook, 2007: 71-71; Karawan, 2011: 45). Political activists have been tried under the Emergency law and been detained without charge. Furthermore the state has repressed and detained journalists and bloggers (Freedom House, 2006; 2011).

Independency of the judiciary

The constitution formally established the independence of judiciary. During the years the judiciary has fought to remain independent, although the Ministry of Justice has controlled promotions and compensation of the judiciary, favouring judges that deliver favourable verdicts (Freedom House, 2011; Stacher, 2012). The emergency law has led to the installation of a parallel judicial system, referring civilians to the Supreme State Security Court and from 1992 to military courts. Those courts have initially been established to trial crimes related to national security, for instance terrorism. Because of the judiciary's fight to remain independent, the state started to heavily rely on its military courts. Military courts lack basic guarantees as the right to appeal (Cook, 2007: 71-71; Karawan, 2011: 45). Furthermore military judiciaries have been appointed directly by the president and verdicts have been subject to ratification by the president (Freedom House, 2011).

4.3 Civil-Military Relations in Egypt

The military has been a privileged group in Egypt since the sixties, as senior officers served in high executive functions (Frisch, 2013: 183). Furthermore the military gained a number of significant economic functions since the seventies, which made them economic actors in their own right (Kamrava, 2000: 80). Placed in Finer's (1962) typology, the Egyptian regime could be defined as quasi-civilianized direct military rule under Nasser and as indirect continuous military rule under Sadat and Mubarak. Under Nasser the military was directly involved in governing, but after the defeat of the military in the 1967 war with Israel, the military's political role was downsized (Springborg, 1987: 5; Cook, 2007: 63; Karawan, 2011: 44). The proportion of politicians with a military background decreased from 66 per cent in 1967 to 15 per cent in 1975 (Karawan, 2011: 45). Furthermore in 1980 less than five regional governors had a military background, contrary to 22 of the 26 governors in 1964. Under Nasser the military was the strongest element of the political system (Springborg, 1987: 5-6). Under Sadat and Mubarak the military did dominate the political system, but did not directly govern (Cook, 2007: 64; Karawan, 2011: 44). However, in the latest round of Mubarak's appointments of governors in 2008 20 of the 28 governors had a military or security background (Miller et al, 2012: 82; Martini & Taylor, 2011).

The military dominated political system becomes visible in four ways. In the first place all four Egypt's presidents until 2011 have been hailed from the military and were both president and Supreme Commander of the military. The presidency has been the most important institutionalization of the military in the regime. "It's the military's crucial and intimate association with the presidency that ensure the continuity of Egypt's political system (...) this mutually reinforcing relationship with the president has allowed the officers to

remove themselves from day to day governance” (Cook, 2007: 73). In the second place the military dominated system becomes visible through the multiple officers who have held high-ranking political and bureaucratic positions, as cabinet members, members of parliament or as regional governors. In the third place the ministry of defence and the Defence and National Security Committee consisted mainly of retired military and police officers. This way the military had a major influence on foreign and security policy. In the fourth place it becomes visible through the vast economic complex which the military owns (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011; Cook, 2007: 18).

Through those four structures, the Egyptian officers have been able to rule without having to govern. They served as the ultimate backbone of the regime. The democratic ‘façade’ and authoritarian institutions ensured their predominance and satisfied the military’s demands: political influence and economic privileges (Cook, 2007: 2, 8; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14, 18; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18). There has however always been a fine, but essential, line between military integrated in the political regime and military as institutional part of the state. The military as corps did not have a direct political role, only the military top held executive positions within the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 6, 18). The military as corps is highly institutionalized, professionalized and has a strong sense of corporatism (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18). Furthermore it consists of Egyptians from all layers in society, as the Egyptian military has service obligation for all Egyptian males between the age of 18 to 30 for a year and a half up to three years and a nine-year reserve obligation (CIA, 2010; Azzam, 2012: 2).

After 1967 the Egyptian presidents started to keep a close eye on the military and have only relied on a few high ranking officers in executive positions (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 7). Especially Mubarak weakened the military establishment compared to his predecessors. He invested in the security forces of the Ministry of Interior: the police and the intelligence

services (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). As the military was not directly involved in the 'dirty task' of repression and torture by the security forces, except for the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1997, it has never been target of widespread criticism. The military enjoys a certain degree of popularity among the Egyptian public as it is seen as the victorious force of the 1973 war with Israel and as the guardian of the people (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18 & 2013: 6). In order to keep the military satisfied and in its 'barracks' Mubarak invested in large military budgets, modernization programs and economic activities (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12).

Mubarak further distanced the military by not offering former high-ranking officers the position of prime minister, probably because he did not want to create a successor of himself within the military ranks (Frisch, 2013: 183). In most of the recent published academic articles on the role of the military in Egypt the succession of Mubarak by his son Gamal is mentioned as an imminent threat to the military (Cook, 2007; Barany, 2011; Albercht & Bishara, 2011; Fischer, 2013). Four months before the 25 January demonstration the New York Times published an article which stated that "the single most powerful institution" was facing its "toughest test in decades, an imminent presidential succession" (Cambanis, 2010). The military despised Gamal Mubarak, as he never served in the military, was part of the business class and in their eyes incapable of understanding and managing the country (Barany, 2011: 32).

Gamal Mubarak joined the ruling National Democratic Party in 2000 and was appointed head of policies secretariat, a board of businessman and liberal economist. With Gamal assuming power the military would see its political influence diminishing (Frisch, 2013: 187). Furthermore the economic agenda of Gamal was based on macro economic stabilization and mainly focused on benefits for the business elite. This threatened the economic interests of the military, which is committed to the economic ideas of Nasser; a

state controlled economy (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 18). According to the article in the New York Times military officers feared that Gamal would “erode the military’s institutional powers” (Cambanis, 2010).

4.3.1 The Military’s Economic Interests

Since the seventies there has been a horizontal expansion of the military into the national economy. In the eighties the budget of the military was reduced, therefore the military started to look for funding through other channels. Facilitated by the government the military assumed activities in the market place through military organizations and companies, under the supervision of the Ministry of Military Production (Barany, 2011: 32; Frish, 2013: 183-186). The military did not only assume economic activities in the field of military and security production, but as well production geared towards the civilian market. The military industrial enterprise exists of weapon production, agricultural machines, cables, medications, pumps, ovens, water management, production of electricity, land development deals, services in aviation and a share in the tourism sector (Cook, 2007: 18; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14; Frisch, 2013: 183-186). They are even involved in the production of olive oil, bottled spring water and the export of refrigerators (Cambanis, 2010). The military holds a vast economic complex from which military officers profit through relatively high salaries and other economic privileges, as free medical care, foreign travel allowances, subsidized housing and duty free imports (Kamrava, 2000: 80-81; Barany, 2011: 32).

The extent of the military’s economic empire in relation to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) remains unknown, as the military’s budget has never been subjected to state control (Cook, 2007: 18; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14; Barany, 2011: 32). The estimates differ from 20% up to 40% of Egypt’s GDP (Ashour, 2013). The extensive

economic network has turned the military into a financial and industrial force. Mehran Kamrava already in 2000 noted that: “With their political and economic interest firmly grounded into the status quo, overthrowing the seemingly civilianized military rulers becomes exceedingly difficult, while at the same time compelling those in power to fend off potential challengers with even greater zeal” (Kamrava, 2000: 81).

4.4 Egypt’s Civil and Political Society

Under Mubarak the amount of registered nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) has increased from 12.000 in 1991 to 16.800 in 2011 (Miller et al, 2012: 81). Egypt’s NGO’s have however not been effective in channelling the main interests and demands of the society. This is in the first place caused by the either religious or secular basis of the NGO’s. The former promote Islamization of society, while the latter advocates for the banning of religious expression in public life. Instead of working together, these NGO’s have excluded each other (Miller et al, 2012: 89-91). Secondly, civic organizations have been subjected to state control. In 2002 a law decreed that all NGO’s had to be apolitical, that their activities would be monitored by the Ministry of Social Affairs and that they had to report on their membership composition and sources of funding. The law restricts international funding and allows the government to dissolve a NGO at any time (Abdalla, 2008: 25-28).

The only civic and political organisation that has posed serious threats to the established regime was the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Ikhwan*. In order to reduce their organized demonstrations and strikes and to decrease the support for more extreme and militant Islamist organizations the regime decided to accommodate the brotherhood during the eighties (Cook, 2007: 76-80). The brotherhood was not formally legalized, but was allowed to preach, organize and mobilize. The unintended consequence was however that the

brotherhood gained more support and significant political power (Cook, 2007: 76-88). In 1992 the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded to form the largest opposition group of independent candidates affiliated with the Ikhwan in the lower house (Cook, 2007: 80-89). Especially the Brotherhood's success in infiltrating university boards and professional syndicates posed a threat to the regime (Campagna, 1996: 290-291). The regime ended the Muslim Brotherhood's accommodated position in 1992 and leaders and political activists of the brotherhood were referred to the Supreme State Security court and later on to military tribunals (Cook, 2007: 80-91).

Due to the brotherhood's success the regime adopted a series of laws to make it even harder for opposition groups to demand political reform. Financing from abroad became illegal, syndicates were placed under judicial supervision, the autonomy of the universities was terminated and municipal elections were terminated (Cook, 2007: 91). In 2005 the Muslim Brotherhood made a comeback by winning 87 seats in the People's Assembly. Their comeback was however short-lived. In 2006 the regime again cracked down on the brotherhood, preventing it from running for the Shura Council elections and for the municipal elections which were reinstated in 2008. Members were detained and got long-term prison sentences. In the 2010 election for the lower house, the Muslim brotherhood won no seats (Freedom House, 2011).

As has been mentioned in 4.1 recent years have seen a rising of youth activism due to an increase of Internet access and the rise of Arabic mass media. Calls for demonstrations on January 25, 2011, the first day of the Egyptian uprising, were made through Facebook groups of which the most significant were the April 6th Movement, 'We Are All Khalid Sa'id', and 'Youth for Justice and Freedom'. The Kifaya Movement, a movement that already in 2004 protested for the step-down of Mubarak (Freedom House, 2006) and several syndicates joined those groups on January 25. Clearly missing in the initial demonstrations were the opposition

parties, as for instance the Tagammu and the Muslim Brotherhood (the Muslim Brotherhood joined on January 28) (Miller et al., 2012: 92-96).

The April 6th movement and Kifaya (Enough) were the only movements which had organized civil disobedience before. On April 6th, 2008 the April 6th movement supported the textile workers strikes in the industrial town El-Mahalla El-Kubra. In 2009 it again organized strikes, but those were less successful (Miller et al, 2012: 93). The ‘We Are All Khalid Sa’id’ Facebook group was established by Wael Ghoneim, Google executive in Egypt, in response to blatantly police brutality. Police officers beat Khalid Sa’id to death, after he tried to upload pictures of police splitting a drug bust. The group attracted more than 200.000 members in the first ten days (Miller et al, 2012: 95). These online communities can be more seen as social movements, rather than organized civic organizations.

4.5 Nature of Transition

On January 25, 2011 nonviolent demonstrations erupted in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities, calling for reforms. Demonstrators came from all sectors of society, crossing ideological, socio-economic and sectarian lines. The New York Times reported on January 25, 2011 that “the protests represented the largest display of popular dissatisfaction in recent memory, perhaps since 1977” (Fahim & El-Naggar, 2011). The masses grew during the days and on January 28 the Muslim Brotherhood officially joined the demonstrations. Police forces clashed with the demonstrators, but could not contain the demonstrations any longer, as they were overran by the protestors. On January 29, 2011 Mubarak ordered a nationwide deployment of the military (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 15; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 15). The military was deployed, but on January 31, 2011 field marshal and minister of defence Husayn

Tantawi declared that the military will not use force against protestors and that the military recognizes the legitimacy of the protestor's demands (Reuters, 2011).

On February 11, 2011 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)⁶ intervened and announced that it would protect 'what the protestors have achieved' and would oversee a transition to a new constitution, free elections and an eventual end to the state of emergency (New York Times, 2011). Mubarak resigned and was replaced by field marshal Husayn Tantawi, minister of defence since 1991 and Commander of the Armed Forces.

The eruption of mass demonstrations and consequently ousting of president Mubarak was rather abrupt than gradual. The size, cross-class and nonviolent character of the demonstrations proved to be political game changers. Like in Tunisia, but unlike in Syria and Bahrain, the Egyptian military declined to use lethal force against protestors. The question if the military would shoot had the world at the edge of its seat at the beginning of 2011 (Bellin, 2011: 134). Apparently the SCAF decided that shooting at such a large group of protestors was even less in their interest than saving Mubarak. It would have undermined their institutional integrity as "Egypt's conscript army has so many ties to society at large that, even had the generals been willing to shoot demonstrators, many officers and enlisted men would probably have refused to obey such an order" (Barany, 2011: 32). Furthermore it would have undermined their prestige and national legitimacy as defender of the nation (Bellin, 2011: 132; Azzam, 2012: 3).

⁶ The SCAF consisted of nineteen military officers who had not played an active role in the making of political decisions before the uprising on January 25, 2011. The SCAF had existed before the uprising, but only met on irregular basis to discuss political issues on which it made recommendations to the president (Albrecht and Bishara, 2011).

4.6 International Actors

From the seventies on Egypt has been the United State's second main ally in the Middle East. As a consequence of signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has received 1.3 billion dollar a year in military aid and 450 million dollar in economic support funds since 1979. The 1.3 billion dollar in military aid is intended for the operation and modernization of Egypt's military and includes a reciprocal commitment from Egypt to the United States (Cook, 2007: 145; Barany, 2011: 32; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 7). Martini and Taylor (2011) have indicated that the financial aid covers 80 per cent of the military's procurement costs. Furthermore Egyptian military officers receive training in the United State's war colleges, fostering close relationships between American and Egyptian military officers (Abul-Magd, 2013).

4.7 Conclusions and Empirical Expectations

Based on the character of the military, the civil-military relations and the contextual factors in Egypt prior to the ousting of Mubarak, expectations can be derived on the willingness of the Egyptian military to allow for democratization during the political transition.

Due to as well an institutionalized as a patrimonial character of the Egyptian armed forces, it has to be seen which direction the military chooses. The patrimonial character of those linked to the regime suggests that the officers will be resistant to democratization. The officers have however not been linked by blood or ethnicity to Mubarak, so they might allow for some degree of democratization which does not threaten their interests. At the same time the Egyptian military has not been directly involved in governing and repressing the population, which makes them more willing to allow for democratization. Lastly the military

has not been backed by a legal framework, but by the emergency law. If they want to continue to play a role in politics they might seek to legitimize their political rule within a new constitution or by extending the emergency law.

The main obstacle for installing democratic civil-military relations in Egypt seems to be its weak civil and political society. Furthermore the ousting of Mubarak has been quite abrupt. Both factors increase the likelihood of the formation of a caretaker military junta or the installation of an authoritarian leader. International pressure by the United States could play a role during the transition, but is limited due the fact that America's financial aid is based on the condition that Egypt maintains its peace with Israel.

Taking both the extent to which the military is involved in the regime and the contextual factors together the most likely outcome would be that the military seeks to restore its privileged position under Mubarak. In the past the military has been comfortable with staying out of the daily governing of the country. It will probably seek to regain the construction between Mubarak and the military; a construction in which it can still rule from behind the scenes.

Another factor which could play a decisive role in the Egyptian case, but less in cases discussed in the theoretical framework, is the economic interest of the military. The military might be willing to give up some political power as long as their economical power is not impaired.

CHAPTER V: THE MILITARY IN EGYPT'S TRANSITION

“The generals who were given a free hand to steer the transition in February 2011 did so in a way that guarded their institutional interests. No one should have expected the military to give up its institutional self-interest” (Brown, 2013: 56).

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the extent to which the military has been willing to allow for democratization since it took a leading role in the transition on February 11, 2011. The chapter will be constructed along the lines of the key indicators for measuring democratization: (1) accountability (the constitutions) and (2) representation (political parties, elections, the parliament and the president). In discussing those indicators the emphasis will be on the role of the military.

5.2 Egypt's Transition

The first step the SCAF undertook after the ousting of Mubarak was suspending the 1971 constitution and dissolving the People's Assembly and Shura Council on February 13, 2011. In its statement on February 13 it stated that the SCAF had the intention to “temporarily administer the affairs of the country for a period of six months or until People's Assembly, Shura Council and Presidential elections are held” (The New York Times, 2011). The

statement concluded that in the transitional period the SCAF would issue laws and that the government of Ahmed Mohamed Shafiq would continue to work until a new government would be formed. Elections were to be held for the People's Assembly, the Shura council and the Presidency. The SCAF furthermore installed a body of legal experts to amend the articles regulating presidential elections of the 1971 constitution (Lang, 2013).

The amendments to the constitution were put to a popular vote by a referendum on March 19, 2011, and with a voter turnout of 41% the amendments were passed with 77% of the votes in favour (Ahram Online, 2011). Two weeks later the SCAF however issued its own constitutional declaration granting itself all legislative and executive powers (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 16-17). The initially planned elections for the lower and upper house within three months were held nine months later in November 2011 and January 2012. The SCAF remained the executive and legislative power for over fifteen months after the ouster of Mubarak, until the presidential elections in June 2012. The SCAF shared its legislative power with a cabinet it appointed, of which many ministers remained the same ones as under the rule of Mubarak (Miller et al, 2012: 96-99). Civilians played a limited role in directing the transition, leading to regular protests against the 'military regime' (Elshami, 2011; Sayigh, 2013). In the meantime the Brotherhood was willing to compromise and negotiate with the generals and entered a tacit deal with the SCAF. In return for ceasing its protest it gained political rights (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23; Stacher, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood has subsequently backed the SCAF by boycotting protests, calling those protests illegitimate and by organizing pro-government demonstrations (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF and police forces have brutally oppressed the anti-government demonstrations and detained many protestors without charge, leading Amnesty International (2011) to declare the human rights situation in Egypt in 2011 worse than under Mubarak.

In the months ahead of the parliamentary elections several liberal groups demanded that the constitution would be written first, as they preferred a nonpartisan constitutional college and feared that elections would lead to Islamists domination in the drafting process (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23). The SCAF was not willing to change their schedule, but interim deputy prime minister Selmy took the task upon itself of drafting a list of fundamental principles which would be guiding in the writing of the new constitution by the constitutional assembly (Sayigh, 2011). The draft version was circulated in November 2011 and granted the military a 'supra-constitutional status' (Elshami, 2011). The document and the impending parliamentary elections lead to mass protests across Cairo in November 2011. This prompted the interim civilian government of Prime Minister Esam Sharaf to resign (Elshami, 2011). The SCAF appointed Kamal al-Ganzouri, former prime minister under Mubarak, as new prime minister and promised to organize presidential elections in June 2012, instead of April 2013. It did however not reject the Selmy document officially and it has tried to retain its most important provisions (Sayigh, 2013).

The elections for the lower and upper house at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 were broadly perceived as being free and fair, despite the SCAF's manipulation and role as gatekeeper (Freedom House, 2012; Stacher, 2012; IFES, 2013). Participation was broad, there was less restraint on the registration of political parties and voter turnouts for the lower house were historically high for Egypt (65% in first round, 43% in second round, 62% in third round) (IFES, 2013; Azzam, 2012; Irshad, 2012). The Islamists parties mainly profited as they won with 75% in the lower house and with 60% in the upper house (Azzam, 2012: 4; Stacher, 2012). The electoral triumph was however short-lived. In April and June 2012 the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) declared first the upper and subsequently the lower house elections unconstitutional, leading to the dissolution of both houses (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16).

In May and June 2012 presidential elections took place, in which Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, won 51,7% of the votes in the second round (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2013). Under Morsi a new constitution was drafted and the top military generals were retired and appointed new positions within the cabinet (Freedom House, 2013). Morsi's inability to unite the different political fractions, the severe economic circumstances and his power grab, led to public unrest. Protests against his regime swelled after June 30, 2013, prompting the military to dispose Morsi on July 3, 2013 and to suspend the constitution (Freedom House, 2014).

Since the ousting of Morsi the military and judiciary have been in firm control of the country. Adli Mansour, the chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was appointed as head of the interim government. A panel of jurists was tasked with drafting the new constitution, which was adopted in January 2014. In May 2014 former minister of defence and commander of the armed forces Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was elected Egypt's new president (Freedom House, 2014).

After the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood the military initiated a harsh crackdown on the organisation and declared the organization a terrorist organization (Freedom House, 2014). According to Freedom House (2014) last year has seen extreme political repression. 1200 Muslim Brothers have been given the death penalty or life imprisonment for the killing of two policemen. According to a report of Human Rights Watch (2014) 16.000 political activists have been jailed and since the ouster of Morsi more than 900 civilians have been tried in military courts.

5.3 The Military and the Constitutions

“The military should be granted some kind of insurance under Egypt’s new constitution so that it is not under the whim of a president and the military should not be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny” – SCAF member (in Martini & Taylor, 2011)

Three and a half year after president Mubarak was ousted Egypt has had three constitutions. The first, SCAF’s Constitutional Declaration, entered into force in March 2011 and lasted until the permanent constitution at the beginning of 2012 was adopted. An Islamists dominated constitutional assembly under Morsi’s presidency drafted the second constitution. The military suspended this constitution with the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. A new constitution was drafted by a group of legal experts and has been adopted after it has been put to a popular vote in January 2014. In all three constitutions the SCAF has clearly tried to legitimize its own position in the political system, has demanded certain prerogatives and ensured its autonomy.

5.3.1 *The Constitutional Declaration*

The first interim constitution, the constitutional declaration of the SCAF, was issued after the Egyptian population had voted on amendments of the 1971 constitution two weeks earlier. Although the SCAF included most of these amendments in its own declaration, it seemed like the SCAF issued its own declaration in order to legitimize its position. The declaration for the first time provided the military with a legal basis to rule, as former constitutions have never mentioned the military as a political actor (Stacher, 2012). In fact the constitutional declaration placed the SCAF above the constitution (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16; Albrecht and Bishara, 2011: 16-17).

The declaration, consisting of 63 articles, would act as the temporary legal framework until a new constitution would be drafted (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 16-17). The amendments proposed by the legal committee to reduce the presidential term from six to four years, with a two-term limit; to ease the presidential candidate registration procedures; to obligate the installation of a vice-president; and to restore the role of the judiciary as supervisor of the electoral process were incorporated (IFES, 2011). Striking is article 56, which gave the SCAF overwhelming executive and legislative powers, even after a new parliament and council would have been elected. The SCAF authorized itself to: issue legislation; implement policy; call and adjourn the sessions of the assembly and council; promulgate laws and object them; appoint the head of the cabinet and ministers; appoint civilian and military employees (Egyptian Government Services Portal (EGSP), 2011; El-Din, 2011). It furthermore decreed that drafting a permanent constitution was the responsibility of a hundred-member constitutional assembly which would be appointed by an elected parliament (El-Din, 2011; IFES, 2013).

5.3.2 The Selmy Document

The first document which shaped the civil-military relations in the permanent constitution was issued in November 2011 by then deputy prime minister Selmy. He drafted a list of fundamental principles which would be guiding in the writing of a new constitution by the constitutional assembly (Sayigh, 2011). The list granted the SCAF as well tremendous powers in the defence area as in overseeing the drafting of the new constitution. In the defence area the list suggested that the SCAF would be the only authority responsible for matters concerning the military, including the budget and all bills related to the armed forces. It also stated that the president needed to consult the SCAF before it declared war. It furthermore proposed to revive the National Defence Council, a council which had not been in action

since Sadat's presidency (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012). In overseeing the drafting of the constitution the document stated that the SCAF would have the power to overrule any passage that "contradicts the basic tenets of the Egyptian state and society" (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2011). It furthermore gave the SCAF the right to form a new constitutional assembly if the former failed to draft a constitution within six months (International IDEA, 2011).

The Selmy document did not become binding and its provisions on the role of the SCAF in overseeing and appointing the constitutional assembly were later on annulled by president Mohamed Morsi. Its provisions on Egypt's civil-military relations became however part of both the 2012 and 2013 constitutions.

5.3.3 The 2012 Constitution

The drafting of the permanent constitution has been dominated by political struggles between the Islamists, secularist, liberalist, the SCAF and the judiciary. The constitutional assembly was appointed in March 2012 and was heavily dominated by the Islamist parties. In April an administrative court ruled the constitutional assembly unconstitutional, because fifty of its members were elected members of the lower house, which was not in line with the interim constitution (IFES, 2013: 7). This move is widely seen as an institutional competition, as the judiciary is aligned with the military and anti-Islamists (IFES, 2013: 8). In June the lower and upper house elected a new constitutional assembly. The political struggles continued, but the constitutional assembly succeeded in putting forward a draft constitution at the beginning of December (Freedom House 2013). The constitution was put to a vote through a referendum on December 15, 2012. There were allegations of fraud and vote rigging, however no official irregularities were found. The constitution was adopted on December 26, 2012 with 64% of

the votes in favour (voter turnout was 33%). The political legitimacy of the constitution was however seriously questioned (IFES, 2013: 9).

The powers the 2012 constitution granted to the military were extensive and similar to those set out in the list of fundamental principles of 2011. In the first place the constitution dictated that the minister of defence would be as well the Commander in Chief and has to be appointed from among the military officers. It is common that the Ministry of Defence is granted to the military in a transition, but not that this is stipulated in the constitution (Sayigh, 2013). Secondly, the constitution revived the National Defence Council (NDC). The NDC would consist of both civilian and military officials, but tilted the balance towards the military: eight out of the fifteen seats would be filled with military officers (Sayigh, 2013). The NDC was tasked with discussing the methods of ensuring safety and security, discussing the military budget and all draft laws related to the armed forces. The constitution furthermore dictated that the president could only declare war after consulting the NDC (Egypt Independent, 2012). Finally, the trying of civilians in military courts was not banned and remained vaguely described. “Civilians shall not stand trial except for crimes that harm the Armed Forces. The law shall define such crimes” (article 198) (Egypt Independent, 2012).

5.3.4 The 2014 Constitution

The ousting of Mubarak led to the suspension of the 2012 constitution and the drafting of a new constitution at the end of 2013 by a panel of jurists. This constitution was adopted in the beginning of January 2014, after a referendum in which 98% voted in favour (turnout was 37%). How free and fair this referendum was, is questionable (Freedom House, 2014). In the 2014 constitution the powers of the military are even more entrenched than in the previous constitution. Apart from the notion that the minister of Defence needs to be an officer, the

approval of the SCAF for his appointment is as well needed, at least for the coming two full presidential terms. Main difference with the 2012 constitution is the addition that the military budget will be incorporated as a single figure in the state budget. As a consequence the civilian officials cannot exert control on the different aspects of the military budget. At the same time the constitution stipulates that in discussions on the budget of the armed forces the head of financial affairs from the armed forces and the heads of the planning and budgeting committee and of the national security committee of the lower house need to be included (ESIS, 2014). This seems to include some weak form of civilian oversight – at least a form of civilian involvement in budgetary discussion. Concerning the military courts, the constitution has become even more vague and broad. It stipulates that: “civilians cannot stand trial before military courts except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military courts, except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military facilities, barracks or whatever falls under their authority (..) or crimes that represent a direct assault against its officers or personnel” (ESIS, 2014).

5.4 Political Parties and Electoral Laws

The most important change in the first months of SCAF’s ruling in comparison to elections under Mubarak was the strengthening of the role of the judiciary in overseeing elections and allowing for political pluralism (Martini & Taylor, 2011; Freedom House, 2012). The SCAF issued a decree in March 2011 establishing the High Judicial Committee in charge of supervising elections. Furthermore the registration of political parties became more transparent. Banned political parties were legalized and new ones were allowed to organize

themselves (Martini & Taylor, 2011)⁷. The Justice and Freedom Party (JFP), the Muslim Brotherhood's political party, was for instance formally legalized on June 6, 2011 (Irshad, 2012)⁸. The NDP, the ruling party under Mubarak, was dissolved by an administrative court in April 2011. Its affiliates were however not banned from running in elections (Freedom House, 2012).

On May 29, 2011 the SCAF circulated the election law for the lower house and allowed political groups to submit proposed amendments and met with representatives of political groups (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 21-22). As a consequence SCAF amended the electoral system to a mix of two third based on closed party list and one third based on individual candidacy with two seat constituencies. This favoured political parties over individual candidacies, something the reformist advocated for as the individual candidacy system was in the benefit of candidates close to the old regime (Democracy Reporting International (DRI), 2011; IFES, 2013; Freedom House, 2012). The candidates from single-member districts have often been 'local power brokers' who during the former regime ran independently and once elected joined the ruling NDP (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF amended the electoral system to a mix of two third based on closed party list and one third based on individual candidacy. The constitutional provision that 50 per cent of the candidates had to be 'workers and farmers' remained in place (IFES, 2013).

The same mixed electoral system was applied to the elections for the Shura Council; out of the 180 elected seats one third was elected on basis of closed party lists and one third on the basis of individual candidacy. The People's Assembly was set to consist of 508 members, of which ten would be appointed by the president. The Shura Council would consist

⁷ The new constitution adopted in January 2014 banned religious parties from running (FH, 2014).

⁸ Note: the JFP has been banned since the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization at the end of 2013.

of 270 members of which 90 members would be appointed by the president (Freedom House, 2012).

The mixed electoral system and increased transparency in the registration of political parties improved political pluralism. This however mainly benefitted existing political parties, as the timetable of the SCAF made it difficult for new political parties to organize themselves and to set up a campaign in time for the elections (Martini & Taylor, 2011; Stacher, 2012). Furthermore the political parties law dictated that new political parties needed to collect five thousand signatures instead of the initial one thousand and required the founders to publish their names in a state led newspaper, which costs are estimated to be around 150 dollar (El-Din, 2011).

5.5 Free and Fair Elections

5.5.1 Parliamentary Elections

Despite the manipulation of the SCAF on the electoral process and its gatekeeper function in allowing political parties to run in elections, the parliamentary elections have been considered to meet international standards. The elections were for a great part free, fair and enjoyed broad participation (Freedom House, 2012; Stacher, 2012; IFES, 2013). The majority of the votes went to Islamist parties; the JFP got 47% of the votes, and the Salafist Al-Nour party 25%. The remaining seats went to the liberal Wafd party (8%), the Egyptian Bloc Coalition (7%), which is an alliance of liberal, social democratic and leftist political parties, and the other smaller parties (Azzam, 2012: 4; Stacher, 2012). The elections took place in three rounds. Voter turnouts have been historically high for Egypt. In the first round the voter

turnout was 65%, in the second round 43% and in the last round 62% (IFES, 2013; Azzam, 2012; Irshad, 2012).

Following the lower house elections, the upper house elections were held in January and February 2012. Again the majority of the votes went to Islamist parties: 60% to Freedom and Justice Party, 25% to Al-Nour, 14% to Wafd and 8% to the Egyptian Bloc. Voter turnout was however very low, around the 15% (Freedom House, 2013). Apart from some irregularities and the low voter turnout, the elections have been considered free and fair (IFES, 2013).

5.5.2 Presidential elections

The first post-Mubarak presidential elections were planned in May 2012. The elections were, although not perfect, close to international standards (Freedom House, 2013). The fairness of the registration of the candidates is however contested. The Presidential Election Commission, installed by the SCAF, disqualified ten candidates, including the most popular Islamist candidates. Their decision was final and could not be appealed (Freedom House, 2013). According to Frisch (2013: 189) Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a Salafi preacher, was rejected because he was the least co-optable and Khairat al-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, was rejected because his good relations with the United States Department of State and American business leaders posed a threat to SCAF's monopoly on those relations.

In the first round of presidential elections in May the population could vote for thirteen candidates. In June Morsi and Shafiq competed against each other in the second round of presidential elections. Morsi won the elections with 51,7% of the votes. The voter turnout in the first round was 46,6% and in the second round 52% (Irshad, 2012). The SCAF would have preferred Ahmed Shafiq as president, as he has been a commander in the

Egyptian Air Force and was appointed by Mubarak as Prime Minister a few days before Mubarak's ousting (Hellyer, 2012; Egypt Independent, 2012). The SCC made Shafiq's candidacy possible by ruling out a law which was passed by the People's Assembly banning political figures from the former regime to run for office for at least ten years (Freedom House, 2013).

5.6 The Parliament

According to Frisch (2013: 189) the SCAF had a clear strategy by firstly organizing parliamentary elections and only afterwards presidential elections. This way the SCAF could already weaken and divide the ranks of parliament before a president was elected. This became clear when the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its electoral success, was unable to form a government as the SCAF refused to withdraw its support from the Ganzouri government, which it had appointed as interim government until a new president would be sworn in (Azzam, 2012: 6, Sayigh, 2011). Furthermore the parliament soon discovered it had no real power, as the SCAF had ensured in the interim constitution that the parliament could not pass legislation without the approval of the SCAF (Brown, 2013: 47). On the other hand the FJP succeeded in gaining the speaker's position and heading twelve of the nineteen lower house committees, of which as well the more important ones as foreign relations and defence and national security (Miller et al, 2012: 99).

The People's Assembly did not function for long, as in June 2012 the SCC dissolved lower house (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16). The SCC ruled that it was unconstitutional that as well party backed as independent candidates competed for individual candidate seats, while this was not possible the other way around (IFES, 2013: 7). Once Morsi was inaugurated on June

30, 2012 he recalled the resolved parliament. The SCC however suspended Morsi's decree, leaving the parliament suspended for the rest of the year (Sayigh, 2013; IFES, 2013: 7). The move by the SCC is seen as enforced by the SCAF to harm Islamists (Stacher, 2012; Azzam, 2012: 6). Shenker (2011) already before the dissolution mentioned in the Guardian that: "Although the SCAF knew that throughout the transition period it needed to partially accommodate the most important political player, the Muslim Brotherhood, it is trying to outmanoeuvre and undermine it".

5.7 The President

Two weeks before Mohamed Morsi was inaugurated as Egypt's first democratically elected president, the SCAF issued an interim constitutional decree limiting the powers of the newly elected president and expanding its own powers (Brown, 2013: 48; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16-17; Sayigh, 2013). The decree granted the SCAF power over the new constitution writing process, the right to assume the responsibilities of the parliament as long as no new parliament is elected, and "the upper hand in running the armed forces" (Egypt Independent, 2012). The president was prevented from declaring war without the SCAF's approval and "the current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of defence until a new constitution is drafted" (Ahram Online, 2012). Furthermore the SCAF appointed the SCC to have the last word on the constitution in case the SCAF and other actors would disagree on its content (Ahram Online, 2012).

Once in office, president Morsi nullified the decree of the SCAF, and issued a constitutional declaration giving him full executive and legislative powers, including the right to form a new constitutional assembly (IFES, 2013: 8). On August 12, 2012 he sacked

minister of defence and chief of the armed forces, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and deputy chief of staff Sami Anan and appointed them as presidential advisors (Sayigh, 2013; Freedom House 2013). He furthermore dismissed the commanders of the air force, air defence and navy. Morsi appointed General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as minister of defence and commander of the armed forces. Al-Sissi had been head of the military intelligence and part of the SCAF. General Mohammed el-Asser was appointed as deputy defence minister (Londono, 2012). Upon leaving office, Tantawi and Anan were honoured with accolades. Morsi appointed the navy commander as Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, the air defence commander as Chairman of the Arab Organization for Industrialization and the air force commander as Minister of Military Production; all top civilian posts (Hussein, 2012; Aboulenein, 2012).

As a reaction on the dismissal of the top generals el-Asser told Reuters: “the decision was based on consultation with the field marshal and the rest of the military council” (Blair, 2012). The deputy director of Egypt’s Organization for Human Rights commented: “What is happening now was planned once the SCAF realised they had to make a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood anyway” (Hussein, 2012). According to Droz-Vincent (2013: 12) this decision was a blow to the military in some sense, but it was mainly a way out of a ‘prisoners dilemma’, as the military had a strong desire to quite governing but did not find a ‘safe exit’. A safe exit refers to immunity from legal prosecution and independence (Azzam, 2012: 6-7).

In November 2012 Morsi caused stirring among the Egyptian public by expanding his presidential power in a ‘dramatic way’ (Brown, 2013: 49). He decreed that his decisions were above judicial review, and that the constitutional assembly and Shura council were immune for dissolution by the SCC (Freedom House, 2013). This led to massive demonstrations in Cairo. Later in December 2012 he rescinded the decree, but only after he had protected an Islamist-dominated constitution assembly from dissolution, enabling the panel to pass a controversial draft constitution (Mccrummen, 2012).

During Morsi's year in office his relationship with Egypt's population and the military soured. In the spring of 2013 activists started to campaign against his presidency, leading to mass protests on June 30, a year after his inauguration. The military detained him on July 3, 2013 and suspended the constitution. Instead of the SCAF, the SCC was now tasked with executive power (Freedom House, 2014).

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

The introduction of this thesis started with two quotes: one from an Egyptian major and one from a protester at Tahrir square. The first commented that the Egyptian revolution removed a regime, but did not destroy it. According to him the military did not protect the revolution, but rather 'made it happen'. The second commented that the protestors left the square before the power was in their hands. In analysing the Egyptian case it has become clear that both the major and protester were right. The mass demonstrations across Egypt at the beginning of 2011 toppled Mubarak, but left the 'deep state', of which the military is part, intact.

The question that stood central in this research was the extent to which and the accompanying conditions under which a political military is willing to allow for democratization during a political transition. The case of Egypt has shown to be very similar to the behaviour of political militaries in Latin America and Southern Europe during the seventies and eighties of last century. Like those militaries the Egyptian military has tried to protect its institutional interests as much as possible, by granting itself provisions within the constitution, rejecting any form of civilian oversight over the military and over its budget and reviving governmental bodies which are dominated by military officers.

Expectations derived from the theoretical framework were that the Egyptian military would either install a caretaker military junta or would seek to restore its position as under Mubarak. The first fifteen months after the ousting of Mubarak the SCAF has indeed

functioned as a caretaker military junta. In those months the Egyptian military has showed initial willingness to allow for more political rights, by allowing for multiparty elections and amending the electoral law in favour of political parties. The SCAF enabled Egypt's first free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, which led to the appointment of the first civilian president without a military background in Egypt's history.

Different than in Latin America and South Europe the SCAF has tried to regain its comfortable position to rule from behind a façade. That probably declares why the generals allowed Morsi to reshuffle the top of the military; he gave them a 'safe exit' and appointed them to top civilian positions. With Morsi ousted, the Muslim Brotherhood outlawed and former minister of defence Al-Sisi now as president everything seems to be back to the same old. However this time the SCAF is backed by a constitution granting the military officially extensive powers over the defence ministry, its budget, laws and the right to trial civilians in military courts. The role of the military has thus been strengthened by the transition.

The Egyptian case has shown that four of the six independent variables set out in the theoretical framework have explanatory value for the willingness of the Egyptian military to allow for democratization during a political transition. The character of the military, the degree to which it was involved in directly governing, the nature of the transition and the strength of the civil and political society do for a great extent determine the extent to which a military will be willing to allow for democratization. The variable on the institutionalization of the military into the legal framework of a country seemed less applicable to the Egyptian case. On the other hand it does have explanatory value for the constitutional proclamation issued by the SCAF to legitimize its role in the transition. The other less relevant variable seems to be international pressure. This variable has however not been researched extensively in this thesis and is a subject for further research.

Next to those six variables, one other variable seems to have played an important role in determining the military's willingness to allow for democratization. This variable is the economic interest of the military. Many political militaries assume economic roles, but no other military has been *directly* involved in manufacturing and providing services outside of the defence area. This probably has great implications for the willingness of the military to allow for civilian oversight and its implications need further research.

The conditions under which the Egyptian military will retreat from politics remain unclear. Military disengagements from politics are not uncommon, but political neutrality is. The extensive prerogatives the SCAF has granted itself in the constitution will make it very difficult for any future civilian leader to exercise democratic control over the military. It seems that Finer (1962) was right. The only way to reach military neutrality is when the military believes in the basic principle of civil supremacy. With Al-Sisi as president the military restored its comfortable position of ruling from behind a façade. At the same time some change might be underway as Al-Sisi is faced with a new political reality. He is no longer supported by a ruling party as Mubarak was. Furthermore the Egyptian people have found the courage to express their disaffection with the government's policy.

Looking at the civil-military relations in Turkey, international incentives might be the most effective way to alter the civil-military balance. In Turkey the EU has played a key role in providing for incentives and setting benchmarks for the implementation of more democratic civil-military relations. The United States may use this carrot and stick method for its financial aid to Egypt. President Bush for instance succeeded in pressuring Mubarak to organize multi-candidacy presidential elections. Further research is needed in order to explore this option.

REFERENCES

- Abdalla, Nadine H. (2008) Civil Society in Egypt: A Catalyst for Democratization?, *The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, 10(4), pp 25-28
- Aboulenein, Ahmed (2012) Safe exit for Tantawi and Anan, *Daily News Egypt*, 13 August 2012, retrieved from: <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/08/13/safe-exit-for-tantawi-and-anan/> (July 2014)
- Abul-Magd, Zeinab (2013) The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent History and Current Transition Status, *CMI Insight*, October 2013(2)
- Aguero, Felipe (1998) Lagacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42(2), pp. 383-404
- Ahram Online (2011) 'Egypt referendum results: 77,2 per cent say 'yes' to the amendments', Ahram Online, 20 March 2011, retrieved from: <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/8125/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-referendum-results--per-cent-say-Yes-to-the-.aspx> (May 2014)
- Ahram Online (2012) *English text of SCAF amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration*, 18 June 2012, retrieved from: <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45350/Egypt/Politics-/English-text-of-SCAF-amended-Egypt-Constitutional-.aspx> (July 2014)
- Al-Masry Al-Youm (2012) *SCAF to revive National Defence Council*, 18 June 2012, retrieved from: <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/scaf-revive-national-defense-council> (July 2014)
- Al-Sayyid, Mustapha (1993) A Civil Society in Egypt?, *Middle East Journal*, 47(2), pp 228-242

- Albrecht, Holger and Dina Bishara (2011) Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt, *Middle East Law and Governance*, 3, pp. 13-23
- Amnesty International (2011) *Broken Promises. Egypt's Military Rulers Erode Human Rights*, Amnesty International Publications
- Ashour, Omar (2013) Army can choose Turkish or Algerian path, *Brookings*, July 12, 2013
retrieved from: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/07-egypts-military-future-ashour> (June 2014).
- Azzam, Maha (2012) Egypt's Military Council and the Transition to Democracy, Middle East and North Africa Programme, *Chatham House briefing paper*, May 2012
- Barany, Zoltan (2011) Comparing the Arab Revolts. The Role of the Military, *Journal of Democracy*, 22 (4), pp. 28-39
- Bayat, Asef (2013) Revolution in Bad Times, *New Left Review*, 80, March-April 2013 pp. 47-60
- Bellin, E. (2004). The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 36(2), pp. 139-157.
- Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring. *Comparative Politics*, 44(2), pp. 127-149
- Blair, Edmund (2012) Egypt's islamists president removes top generals, *Reuters*, 12 August 2012, retrieved from: <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/12/egypt-army-mursi-tantawi-idINDEE87B06M20120812> (July 2014)
- Blight, Garry, Sheila Pulham and Paul Torpe (2012) Arab Spring: an interactive timeline of of Middle East protests, *the Guardian*, 5 January 2012
- Boeije, Hennie (2005) *Analyseren in Kwalitatief Onderzoek. Denken en Doen*, The Hague: Boom Lemma Uitgevers.
- Brown, Nathan J. (2013) Egypt's Failed Transition, *Journal of Democracy*, 24 (4), pp 45-58

Brownlee, Jason, Tarked Masoud and Andrew Reynolds (2013) Why the Modest Harvest?

Journal of Democracy, 24 (4), pp 29-44

Burk, Jason (2002) Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations, *Armed Forces &*

Society, 29 (1), pp. 7-29

Cambanis, Thanassis (2010) 'Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt', *the New York*

Times, 11 September 2010, retrieved from:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all>

Campagna, Joel (1996) From Accomodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years, *Journal of International Affairs*, 50(1)

CIA (2010) *the World Factbook: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html> (June 2014)

Cook, Steven A. (2007) *Ruling but not Governing: the Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey*, Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press

Democracy Reporting International (DRI) (2011) *Report: Comprehensive Assessment of Egypt's Electoral Framework – Part II*, 10 August, 2011, retrieved from:

http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/dri_assessment_part_ii.pdf (July 2014)

Diamond, Larry (2010) Why are there no Arab democracies? *Journal of Democracy*, 21(1), pp. 93-104

Droz-Vincent, Phillipe (2011) Authoritarianism, Revolutions, Armies and Arab Regime Transitions, *The International Spectator*, 46(2), pp 5-21

Droz-Vincent, Phillipe (2013) Democratic Control of Armed Forces? Comparative Insights and Lessons for the Arab World in Transition, *Armed Forces & Society*, March 28, 2013, pp 1-28

El-Din, Gamal Essam (2011) Egypt's Constitution a Controversial Declaration, in *Ahram*

Online, 30 March 2011, retrieved from:

<http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/8960/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt's-constitution-A-controversial-declaration.aspx> (July 2014)

Elshami, Nancy (2011) *SCAF: Above the Constitution, Below the Revolution*, *Muftah*, 26

November 2011, retrieved from: <http://muftah.org/scaf-above-the-constitution-below-the-revolution/#.U9DErYCSyDM> (July 2014)

Egypt Independent (2011) *SCAF Expands its Power with Constitutional Amendments*, 17

July 2012, retrieved from: <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/scaf-expands-its-power-constitutional-amendments> (July 2014)

Egypt Independent (2012) *Egypt's Draft Constitution Translated*, 2 December 2012,

retrieved from: <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated> (July 2014)

Egypt's State Information Service (ESIS) (2009) *Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971*, published on July 20, 2009 retrieved from:

Egypt's State Information Service (ESIS) (2014) *Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*, retrieved from: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf> (July 2014)

Egyptian Government Services Portal (EGSP) (2011) *Constitutional Declaration 2011*,

retrieved from: <http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/> (June 2014)

Evera, Stephen van (1997) *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*,

Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press

Fahim, Karim and Mona El-Naggar (2011) 'Violent Clashes Mark Protests Against

Mubarak's Rule', *the New York Times*, 25 January 2011, retrieved from:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/world/middleeast/26egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (July 2014)

Fahim, Karim (2012) In Upheaval for Egypt, Morsi Forces Out Military Chiefs, *The New*

York Times, 12 August 2012, retrieved from:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/world/middleeast/egyptian-leader-ousts-militarychiefs.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw2C%7B%22%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D&_r=0 (July 2014)

Feaver, Peter D. (1996) *The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control*, *Armed Forces & Society*, 23(2), pp 149-178

Finer, Samuel E. (1962) *The man on Horseback: the role of the Military in Politics*, London: Pall Mall Press

Finer, Samuel E. (1974) *The Man on Horseback*, *Armed Forces & Society*, 1(5), pp 5-27

Freedom House (2006) *Freedom in the World 2006: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/egypt#.U89WJI2SyDM> (July 2014)

Freedom House (2011) *Freedom in the World 2011: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/egypt#.U89eXI2SyDM> (July 2014)

Freedom House (2012) *Freedom in the World 2012: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/egypt-0#.U89W0Y2SyDM> (July 2014)

Freedom House (2013) *Freedom in the World 2013: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/egypt#.U89XAY2SyDM> (July 2014)

Freedom House (2014a) *Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology#.U8pahY2SyDN> (July 2014)

Freedom House (2014b) *Freedom in the World 2014: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/egypt-0#.U89XLo2SyDM>
(July 2014)

Freedom House (2014c) *Egypt Democracy Compass*, retrieved from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/egypt-democracy-compass#.U9FFDYCSyDM> (July 2014)

Frisch, Hillel (2013) The Egyptian Army and Egypt's 'Spring', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36 (2), pp. 180-204

Fukuyama, Francis (2014) Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm, in Diamond, Larry, Francis Fukuyama, Donald L. Horowitz and Marc F. Plattner, Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm, *Journal of Democracy*, 25(1), pp. 86-100

Gause III, Gregory (2011) Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring. The Myth of Authoritarian Stability, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2011

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Benet (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press

Hellyer, H.A. (2012) 'Egypt's Presidential Reality Show', *Foreign Policy*, 24 April 2012, retrieved from:
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/23/the_egyptian_presidential_s_how_isnt_over_yet (July 2014)

Hundley, Tom (2011) What Turkey can teach Egypt, *Foreign Policy*, December 14, 2011, retrieved from
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/14/what_turkey_can_teach_egypt
(June 2014)

Huntington, Samuel P. (1957) *The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil military relations*. Harvard University Press

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991a) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century*,

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991b) How countries democratize, *Political Science Quarterly*, 106 (4), pp.579-616

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991c) Democracy's Third Wave, *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), pp. 12-34

Hussein, Abdel-Rahman (2012) Egypt defence chief Tantawi ousted in surprise shakeup, *the Guardian*, 13 August 2012, retrieved from:

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/12/egyptian-defence-chief-ousted-shakeup> (July 2014)

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (2011) '*Elections in Egypt: Lessons from the 2011 Constitutional Referendum and the Constitutional Declaration*' 26

April 2011, retrieved from: http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2011/~/_media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/2011_egypt_briefing_paper_II.pdf (May 2014)

<http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208#.U8vokSgQqgx> (July 2014)

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (2013) 'Elections in Egypt: the Electoral Framework in Egypt's Continuing Transition: February 2011 – September 2013', *IFES Briefing Paper*, pp 1-39

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2011) *Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State Draft – A Commentary*, 23

November 2011 retrieved from: http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/2011.11_-_commentary_on_fundamental_principles_english_final.pdf (July 2014)

Irshad, Gazala (2012) Timeline: Egypt's Political Transition, *the Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, retrieved from:

<http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=225>

Janowitz, Morris (1960) *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait*, Free Press.

Kamrava, Mehran (2000) Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the

Middle East, *Political Science Quarterly*, 115 (1) pp. 67-92

Karawan, Ibrahim A. (2011) Politics and the Army in Egypt, *Survival: Global Politics and*

Strategy, 53(2), pp 43-50

Kedourie, Elie (1992) *Democracy and Arab Culture*, Washington DC: Washington Institute

for Near East Policy

Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt, eds. (2002) *Political Armies. The Military and Nation*

Building in the Age of Democracy. London/New York: Zed Books

Landman, Todd, David Beetham, Edzia Carvalho and Stuart Weir (2008) *Assessing the*

Quality of Democracy. An overview of the International IDEA Framework,

Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

Lang, A.F. Jr (2013) From Revolutions to Constitutions: The Case of Egypt, *International*

Affairs, 89(2), pp 345-363

Londono, Ernesto (2012) Egypt's Morsi replaces military chiefs in bid to consolidate power,

Washington Post, 12 August 2012, retrieved from:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-morsi-orders-retirement-of-defense-minister-chief-of-staff-names-vp/2012/08/12/a5b26402-e497-11e1-8f62-58260e3940a0_story.html

Martini, Jeffrey and Julie E. Taylor (2011) Commanding Democracy in Egypt: the Military's

Attempt to Manage the Future, *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 2011, retrieved from:

<http://www.rand.org/blog/2011/08/commanding-democracy-in-egypt-the-militarys-attempt.html> (July 2014)

Mccrumen, Stepanie (2012) Egypt's Morsi rescinds decree, *the Independent*, 9 December

2012, retrieved from: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/egypts-morsi-rescinds-decree-8397217.html> (July 2014)

Miller, L.E., Martini, J., Larrabee, F.S., Rabasa, A., Pezard, S., Taylor, J.E., Mengistu, T.

(2012) *Democratization in the Arab World. Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe*. RAND Corporation; National Defense Research Institute

New York Times, the (2011) 'Oct 6 1981: Egypt president Anwar Sadat is Killed', (6 October

2011, retrieved from: http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/oct-6-1981-egypt-president-anwar-sadat-is-killed/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (June 2014)

New York Times, the (2011) 'Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: Statements and

Key Leaders', *The New York Times*, 14 February 2011, retrieved from:

<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/10/world/middleeast/20110210-egypt-supreme-council.html> (May 2014)

O'Donnell, Guillermo and Phillippe C. Schmitter (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian*

Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. (1986)

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

Polity IV (2010) *Country Report 2010: Egypt*, retrieved from:

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Egypt2010.pdf> (July 2014)

Przeworski, Adam (1986) Some Problems in the study of the transition to democracy, in

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds.

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Part III., Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 47-63

- Reuters (2011) ‘*Egypt Army: will not use violence against citizens*’, published 31 January 2011, retrieved from: <http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFLDE70U2JC20110131> (May, 2014)
- Sayigh, Yezid (2011) The Specter of “Protected Democracy” in Egypt, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 11 December 2011, retrieved from: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/15/specter-of-protected-democracy-in-egypt/8rvr?reloadFlag=1> (July 2014)
- Sayigh, Yezid (2013) Morsi and Egypt’s Military, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 8 January 2013, retrieved from: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/08/morsi-and-egypt-s-military/f0m8> (July 2014)
- Shenker, Jack (2011) Egypt’s Military will have Final say on Country’s New Constitution, *the Guardian*, 7 December 2011, retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/07/egypt-military-final-say-constitution> (July 2014)
- Springborg, Robert (1987) The President and the Field Marshal. Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today, *Middle East Report*, July-Aug 1987, pp 5-16
- Stacher, Joshua (2012) Countries at te Crossroads: Egypt, *Freedom House*, retrieved from: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/egypt#.U89XII2SyDM> (July 2014)
- Stepan, Alfred (1986) Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical Comparative Considerations, in O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Part III., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 64-84
- Stepan, Alfred (1988) *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Stepan, Alfred and Juan J. Linz (2013) Democratization Theory and the “Arab Spring”.

Journal of Democracy, 24(2) April 2013, pp. 15-30

United Nations Development Program (2010) *Egypt Human Development Report: Youth in*

Egypt, retrieved from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2010-egypt-human-development-report-youth-egypt> (June 2014)

Welch, Claude E. Jr (1992) Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes or

Random Events, *Armed Forces & Society*, 18(3), pp. 323-342

Woltering, Robert (2013) *Power and Non-Power in the Middle East*, Lecture by Robert

Woltering at the University of Amsterdam, October 16, 2013

World Bank, the (2014) *Data: Egypt, Arab Rep.* retrieved from:

<http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic> (June 2014)

Yin, Robert K. (2009) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Applied Social Research

Methods, vol. 5), Thousands Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.

Youssef, Nariman (2012) Egypt's Draft Constitution Translated, *Egypt Independent*, 2

December 2012, retrieved from: <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated> (July 2014)

