Standing alone when it all comes down.

The relationship between personalist regimes and negative post-tenure fates explored.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to shed light on the relationship between regimes with a strong personalist dimension and a negative post-tenure fate. This was a relevant exercise, because the personalist dimension was missing in existing frameworks addressing post-tenure fates of authoritarian leaders and elites. Based on available literature, this personalist dimension was hypothesized to be a strong indicator for a negative post-tenure fate. In this thesis this hypothesis is substantiated and found to be statistically significant through merging of the *Archigos* data-set on regime leaders and Geddes' (1999) typology of authoritarian regimes. The relationship is then further explored through analysis of two similar cases, Libya and Tunisia. Based on this analysis it was possible to draw several plausible hypotheses regarding the relationship, which provide an interesting starting point for future research. All in all, it is clearly shown that the conditions that come with a strong personalist dimension can be expected to have a strong negative influence on the post-tenure fate of the regime leadership.

Keywords: personalist regimes, post-tenure fate, regime leadership

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1. Introduction

Over the last years we have been able to witness a number of long-lived dictatorships ending and making place for new regimes in a series of events commonly described as the 'Arab Spring' (Anderson, 2011). This happened in multiple ways, and it is yet unclear what kind of regimes we can expect at the end of this transitional phase. Optimists might see a start of democratization within the Arab world, whereas pessimists suggest that the old authoritarian regimes are just stepping aside for a new generation of repressive regimes. It is clear though by looking at the developments, that the former all-mighty Arab leaders experienced a different fate when their reign came to an end. Whereas Gaddafi (and Assad now) chose to defend their position to the last straw by fighting a bloody civil war, others, such as Ben Ali or Saleh, fled to foreign exile. Mubarak chose a third option by stepping down 'voluntarily' under heavy pressure of the military. It is argued that these different post-tenure fates are dependent on the previous nature of the regime (Debs, 2011; Debs & Goemans, 2010; Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2009). How a leader loses office significantly affects his subsequent fate (Debs & Goemans, 2010; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Goemans, 2008; Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009). An apparent omission in this explanatory framework is the personalist dimension present in some military regimes, which is overlooked in these explanatory models. Several authors (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Magaloni, 2008a) make a sharp distinction between military and personalist regimes, but both are scooped together in models explaining post-tenure elite fate (Debs, 2011). This is interesting, because we have every reason to assume that regime elites in personalist regimes differ from those in other authoritarian regimes (Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 51–54). Necessarily, this link between regime type and post-tenure fate is just a small aspect of the whole picture of regime change. But it is one of the most puzzling aspects and of great influence on the process of regime change, as I assume that decisions made by the regime leadership are dependent on their self perceived prospects of survival (Debs & Goemans, 2010).

The puzzle I aim to resolve concerns the fate of elites of personalist regimes after the breakdown of these regimes. Personalist regimes rely on a very narrow support base and generally alienate those

outside their ruling clique, which leaves them vulnerable after regime breakdown as those toppling their regime usually have little inclination to preserve the former leadership's rights and properties (Geddes, 1999, pp. 133–134; Goldstone, 2011; Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 55–65; Ulfelder, 2005). In this respect is it a 'double-or-nothing'-game for the regime and their support base: either they suppress the revolt and reinforce their own position or they go down with the ship. And if the regime falls apart, does this small clique of powerful people then silently fade into the night? Or is this elite actually still controlling the subsequently unfolding 'democratic' developments? These regimes are usually so ingrained in the state's structure that eradicating their existence requires rebuilding a major part of this structure and thus hampers the establishment of a new regime (Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Goldstone, 2011; Linz & Stepan, 1996). It might be beneficial for the new regime to at least work with the previous regime elite in order to make a new start more feasible. Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that it is rarely the case that this deters those that toppled the former regime from taking action against the former leadership.

An interesting opportunity to study this process arises with the recent upheavals in the Arab world, which not only grasped the attention of the world-wide media and its followers, but also surprised the community of scholars studying regime change (Plattner, 2011, p. 10). Arab authoritarian regimes used to be extraordinarily resilient to change in contrast to the earlier expectations of many, which was explained by pointing to unique circumstances specific to this region (Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Anderson, 2006; Bellin, 2004; Heydemann, 2007; Murphy, 2008). This scholarly literature now stands challenged by recent events, a challenge which can be welcomed as a strong impetus to the study of regime change. How these revolts came about and the nature of the resulting transitions is outside of the scope of this thesis though. Since most of the toppled regimes had a strong personalist dimension, this string of regime breakdowns gives the opportunity to study the post-tenure fate of the leadership of personalist regimes in roughly comparable settings.

Aiming to resolve this interesting puzzle, I zoom in on the conditions influencing the post-tenure fate of personalist regimes. The existing literature on regime transitions is abundant, which opens

up the possibility of devising a model describing presumably influential conditions, actors and processes. Examining the 'fresh' Arab cases now available enriches the current empirical knowledge and might strengthen the theoretical model used for studying regime change. This effort can be expected to lead to new hypotheses regarding the role played by elites in regimes transitions and the resulting fate of these regime elites. For reasons which will be detailed in the research design section, this effort will be made through an exploration of two comparable cases, aimed at generating hypotheses. First though, I will substantiate the relevance of examining this link by interpreting aggregate data on regime types and post-tenure fates of rulers.

The central research question of this thesis around which this exercise revolves comes down to the following: 'What characteristics of a personalist regime and the transition ending the regime make the former leadership experience a post-tenure fate worse than the former leadership of other regime types?' I do not aim to provide an overarching framework regarding post-tenure fates of former authoritarian leaders, as this would require studying a wide range of differing authoritarian regimes in-depth which is unfortunately unfeasible. Instead, I aim to shed light on the found relationship between regimes with a strong personalist dimension and a negative post-tenure fate. The cases studied, Libya and Tunisia, provide insights illuminating this relationship. I analyze these cases through a hypothesized model centered around actors (identified by strategic posture) and structural dimensions present in the regime. I base this model on existing literature on personalist regimes, and discern four groups of relevant actors and five structural dimensions. I examine the balance between these actors and their relationship to the structural dimensions present and the events transpired in the cases. Based on this, I draw several hypotheses regarding the relationship between personalist regimes and the resulting negative post-tenure fate. I argue that these hypotheses are plausible based on the literature and cases examined and hence provide us with more insight in the found relationship.

In sum, I aim to strengthen the theoretic framework on the link between regime characteristics and the post-tenure fate of the regime leadership, focusing on personalist regimes specifically. This

contributes to the study of authoritarian regimes in multiple ways. First, the recent events of the Arab Spring provide an excellent opportunity for studying the role of regime elites during regime breakdown and their fate afterwards. Most countries now undergoing change were ruled by a regime with a strong personalist, if not sultanist, dimension. These cases are part of a relatively marginal part of the field of regime change and stability which suffers from a lack of cases to be studied (Chehabi & Linz, 1998). The theoretical framework regarding this specific type of regimes is limited due to this lack of available cases[1], which makes examining what insights can be gained from 'fresh' cases beneficial. Especially because the events in the countries studied contradict the previous view on Arab authoritarian impermanence. Second, by linking the *Archigos* (Goemans et al., 2009) database on post-tenure fates of regime leaders to Geddes' (1999) typology of regime types, the relationship between regime types and post-tenure fates is explored statistically which shows that there is a clear difference between different regime types and their corresponding post-tenure fates. Third, through examination of this link in two case analyses I strengthen the causal argument that can be made with regard to this relationship. All in all, a sizeable contribution is made which might not provide definite answers with regard to the relationship identified but nonetheless further our understanding of this complex topic.

This thesis is structured in the following manner. First the key concepts relevant to the argument made are introduced. Subsequently, the research puzzle is substantiated through empirical analysis of a macro-level data set. Third, I review the available literature to identify relevant issues with regard to the causal relationship put forward in the research puzzle. Fourth, the research design describing the exploration of the research puzzle through two case-studies will be outlined. This research design includes the argumentation for the case selection and an outline of the questions guiding the case selection. Fifth, the two case-studies, Libya and Tunisia, and lastly the conclusions we can derive from this analysis and possible avenues for future research.

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1. The relative underdevelopedness of the study of personalist regimes is exemplified in Geddes article, where she only references to (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997) and (Chehabi & Linz, 1998) when talking about the personalist dimension.

2. Introducing key concepts

In order to perform a clear exploratory inductive study it is necessary to use clear concepts in a uniform manner as I rely on descriptive analysis to compare cases. The main concepts used in this thesis are commonly used throughout political science, but that does not exclude me from the need to properly identify and conceptualize these. For example, the term 'elite' is used so commonly in political science that one might take its conceptualization for granted. However, with common usage comes diverse usage. Surely, the core features of the concept 'elite' might be consistent throughout this diverse set of applications but the more nuanced conceptualizations used in specific contexts might differ quite a bit. Specifying the use of concepts, however common their use may be, is a necessity. First I will discuss the approach to regime classification taken here, then 'regime elite' and 'post-tenure fate'.

Since regime type is the independent variable in the causal link I aim to explore, it is self-explanatory that I outline my approach to classifying regimes. This is especially relevant because dozens of slightly differing approaches for doing so have been developed over the years, each with their respective merits and limitations. Ascertaining which approach to regime classification one takes should be at the core of any argument regarding the study of regimes, as the outcome of analysis might differ considerably depending on the approach used (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2009, p. 68). The basic distinction most approaches agree upon is between democratic and authoritarian regimes (Brooker, 2009, 2011; Caramani, 2011; Herb, 1999). Where one draws the line precisely between these two divisions is food for endless discussions, but the intuitive difference is clear: democracies elect their leaders through a process of free competition for a free vote[2] (Mair, 2011, p. 88) whereas authoritarian leaders come to power in different manners, depending on the type of authoritarian regime (Brooker, 2011). The line dividing these two categories is blurred from

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2. I define democracy in a procedural manner, as this is the dimension I am investigating. I here quoted a minimalist definition in the text, but the more elaborated definition by Schumpeter (cited in: Mair, 2011, p. 88) sheds more light on the procedural nature of democracy: 'the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. This procedural definition focuses on the procedure alone and disregard more normative adjectives.

both sides though. Authoritarian regimes keep up a democratic façade for legitimization and some 'new' democracies are prone to authoritarian influences. This blurring led to a rise of hybrid regime types, such as 'illiberal democracies' or 'competitive authoritarianism' (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010). Both democracies and hybrid regimes are not object of study in my argument and henceforth the increasing diversity discerned among these (semi-)democracies is not discussed here. Instead the focus lies on those regimes to which the mark of 'authoritarianism' can be wholly attributed.

Possible classifications

Inside the division of 'authoritarian' regimes, another broad set of classifications can be discerned which are concerned with more than just the authoritarian-democracy dimension (Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski, 1996; Brooker, 2011; Cheibub et al., 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Geddes, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 38–54). These different classifications of regime types result from using different approaches to differentiate between regimes, as different regime scholars base themselves on different grounds[3]. From *totalitarianism* to *caudillism*, dozens of 'regime types' within classification frameworks have been identified. Each of these generalizations has its merits and can be defended from the assumptions it is based upon and even though some of these regime categorizations overlap, the major differences present inhibit comparative usage (Geddes, 1999, p. 120; Magaloni, 2008b, p. 730). Hence it is necessary to strictly adhere to one categorization for my argument and I find Geddes' (1999) framework most convincing and suitable for the argument

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3. To name a few: Alvarez et al. (1996, pp. 14–18) uses a series of observable dichotomous[3] regime characteristics (e.g. the presence of a legislature) to sort regimes into democracies and dictatorships and subsequently into subtypes. Democracies are hence classified as either being parliamentary, presidential or mixed and dictatorships are classified as bureaucracy or autocracy. Brooker (2011) makes a division between personal rule (monarchies, personal dictators) and organizational rule (one-party, military) and Linz & Stepan (1996) make a distinction into authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and sultanist regime types. Gandhi and others (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2009, pp. 83–84; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, 2007) make a distinction based on the effective head of government, and distinguish between monarchy, military dictatorship or civilian dictatorship. This distinction is rooted in the use of institutions by dictators in order to maintain positions (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, pp. 15–17). In contrast to their role in democracies, in dictatorships these institutions exist at the mercy of the dictator who condones their existence as his personal instruments for maintaining power (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, pp. 20–22; Slater, 2003, pp. 81–82). The degree of cooperation and cooptation needed depends on the type of dictator and the availability of natural resources. (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007, p. 1283).

made here. Geddes (1999, p. 121) makes a qualitative distinction between personalist, military and single-party authoritarian regimes or amalgams of these ideal-types. Geddes (1999, p. 121):

> 'In military regimes, a group of officers decides who will rule and exercises some influence on policy. In single-party regimes, access to political office and control over policy are dominated by one party, though other parties may legally exist and compete in elections. Personalist regimes differ from both military and single-party in that access to office and the fruits of office depends much more on the discretion of an individual leader. The leader may be an officer and may have created a party to support himself, but neither the military nor the party exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the rule.'

My reasons for adhering to Geddes' typology are threefold. First, this typology focuses on the true nature of the regime rather than describing formal institutions. According to Geddes (1999, p. 123), it is based on 'control over access to power and influence rather than formal institutions'. Second, it is an intuitive, basic typology which has considerable overlap with several other prominent typologies. I.e. the single-party (or totalitarian) and military regime type can be found in most typologies and the added value of Geddes' typology lies in discerning a personalist regime type, which makes it possible to examine the personalist dimension. Third, Geddes (1999) typology illuminates the different incentives and motivations present per regime type. Choosing for Geddes' typology does not imply that replicating this research with another typology would not be possible[4], but doing so is incompatible with the arguments put forward here.

Notwithstanding the merits of Geddes' typology, the number of alternative approaches available shows that criticizing her approach or offering an alternative is not inconceivable. Hence, it is necessary to answer to these possible critiques, which can be separated in two strands: on one hand we can opt for a different qualitative distinction in ideal-types and on the other hand one can sort

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4. To test for this, I also tested the empirical argument laid out in the next section with the database used by Cheibub et al. (2009). While the data changed a bit, I still found the same relationship between military/civilian regime type and post-tenure fate. I did not include this analysis in this thesis, as this was just an explorative investigation into this other database. Fully making the same analysis for two regime typologies would be unfeasible.

regimes with regard to their position within a certain dimension. With regard to the first strand of possible critique I argue that the principles whereupon Geddes' typology rest are more in line with the qualitative difference between authoritarian regimes that lies at the core of my argument: the difference between regimes centered around one person or a small clique and regimes supported by a broader power base, be it from the military or a totalitarian party. Other typologies (Alvarez et al., 1996; Brooker, 2011; Cheibub et al., 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007) rest on other principles and differentiate between regimes on other grounds. The main advantage of Geddes's typology over these alternatives is the emphasis placed on the personalist dimension, a characteristic not central to the differentiation made in the other typologies.

Besides criticizing the typology, one can also criticize the idea behind making a qualitative distinction between ideal-types. Hadenius & Teorell (2007, pp. 143–146, 149) do so and argue that one should interpret 'personalism' as regime trait present to a certain degree in all totalitarian regimes, instead of designating 'personalism' as a regime type. Slater (2003, pp. 85–100) argues similarly and categorizes regimes on basis of their use of institutions. In his view, personalization of institutions (and thus of power) is inherently part of every authoritarian regime to a certain degree. This critique holds true to a certain extent since a personalist dimension is indeed present in every authoritarian regime. However, this does not disqualify Geddes' typology, which identifies personalist regimes as regimes where this personalist dimension is the defining feature of the regime. And even within the regimes classified as 'personalist' by Geddes, the strength of this personalist dimension might differ but that does not invalidate the argument that these regimes can be distinguished by the strength of this dimension in comparison to military or single-party regimes. Comparing regimes on the strength of their personalist dimension is desirable on an individual basis, but for making the argument on an aggregate level aggregating the regimes with a strong personalist dimension into the 'personalist' regime type makes more sense.

Central part of my argument is thus the so-called 'personalist' dimension of authoritarian regimes, whose strong presence is the defining feature for personalist regimes. To sustain my argument, it is

necessary to identify what this personalist dimension actually entails. From Geddes' definition of a personalist regime and Hadenius & Teorell's definition of the personalist dimension two defining characteristics of a personalist regime can be distilled: (1) the regime is led by an individual relying on a small clique of followers; (2) the ruler stays in position by ensuring that no other groups builds an independent power-base. By introducing these two characteristics the 'personalist dimension' of a regime takes shape. In a regime with a strong personal dimension everything is subordinate to and influenced by the ruler's wishes. The distinction between regime and state is blurred as the leadership has a tendency to bypass all features of state administration and modern bureaucracy by personal appointments. This 'personalist nature' of the regime is highly visible and plays a central role in the stability of the regime. By relying on a small clique of intimates rewarded through patronage as a narrow power base and by requiring absolute loyalty from a disjointed general population, the leader prevents any rivals to build a competitive power base (Chehabi & Linz, 1998, pp. 3–48). The denomination 'personalist' does not exclude the existence of state institutions or a military apparatus but sees the relationship to the regime leadership as more important.

This personalist regime type classification can be applied stringently or more liberal. The ideal-type 'sultanist' (Chehabi & Linz, 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 52) describes the extreme end of personalist regimes:

> 'In sultanism, the private and the public are fused, there is a strong tendency toward familial power and dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a state career and personal service to the ruler, there is a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology, economic success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler, and, most of all, the ruler acts only according to his own unchecked discretion, with no larger, impersonal goals.' Instead of ruling through ideology, impersonal law or charisma, the leadership exerts its influence through personal patronage, controlling its collaborators through a mixture of fear and rewards. (Chehabi & Linz, 1998, p. 7; Snyder, 1998, p. 53)

Sultanism presents a personalist regime type where the personalist dimension is at its strongest and the ruler does not rely on any institutional structures. When applied strictly, it only applies to few

cases such as Pahlavi's Iran, Marcos' Philippines or Batista's Cuba (Chehabi & Linz, 1998, pp. 3–48). Pessimists might wrongfully attribute these outliers grouped together in the sultanist regime type as deviants, since they are so few in number and divergent from other authoritarian regimes. However, since these sultanist regimes present a 'pure type' of personalist rule analyzing them might offer insights in the mechanisms also present to a lesser extent in personalist regimes with a less strong personalist dimension. To avoid confusion we should recognize that 'sultanism' is also applied more liberally to denote personalist regimes (Barany, 2011; Goldstone, 2011). Regardless of their application though, these definitions delineate what distinguishes the personalist dimension from single-party or military authoritarian regimes. In contrast to these ideal types, a personalist regime is characterized by the strong position of an individual leader to whose personal discretion all is subordinate. The leader and his small clique of intimates control all parts of society and state through a mixture of fear and rewards. Within this paradigm of personal rule politics prevail over government and personalities over institutions (Hague & Harrop, 2007, pp. 348–551; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). This distinction and the conditions resulting from it cause the difference in post-tenure fate.

Regime 'elite' and post-tenure fate

The regime elite in a regime with a strong personalist dimension is of a particular kind, which can have implications for the role played by the elite during regime transitions. Hence, it is necessary to define the concept regime elite. The 'elite'[5] of a 'regime'. Elite is a concept rarely explicitly defined, especially in connotation with authoritarian regimes, and is usually used together with another concept, e.g. economic elite or political elite. Stepan & Linz (1996, p. 38) define *authoritarian regimes* as 'political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones'.

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5. The Oxford English dictionary gives the following definition: 'a group of people considered to be superior in a particular society or organization.'

They define the regime leadership as 'a leader or occasionally a small group' that exercises power. Based on the earlier identified characteristics of the personalist dimension one can expect a personalist regime elite to be small, cohesive and all highly dependent on the leader for patronage. There is no economic, cultural or political elite beyond the group in favor of the regime, as the leadership does not allow any alternative congregations of influence to be built. Necessarily, the regime elite in personalist regimes is small compared to the elite in other authoritarian regimes. The leadership often comes into power leading a specific group, but in the end the social base (the elite) wherein the regime is based is restricted to family members, patronage clients and other cronies (Chehabi & Linz, 1998, p. 20). This elite is smaller but more intertwined with regime leadership than the elite in other authoritarian regimes. It is important to denote the difference between the regime leadership and the elite, since I address a wider circle of people with the latter concept. The leadership controls the regime and below the leadership there is a layer of people with a powerful position. It is dependent on the nature of the regime to what extent both groups overlap.

Authoritarian leaders leave power in different ways. Some leave power in a regular manner, by dying from natural causes or by transferring power to offspring or trustees, thereby avoiding possible reprisals from enemies made while ruling. Others are irregularly and involuntarily removed from power. This happens in a myriad of ways, ranging from popular revolution to a coup from the inside. The post-tenure fate describes the status of the former regime leadership after its tenure has ended. One could discern dozens of possible 'fates', varying from certain career developments to certain punishments. However, here I decide to follow *Archigos* categorization made in the four aggregate categories for sake of feasibility (Goemans et al., 2009, p. 273). The available data on post-tenure fate is coded in this matter so I am confined to this categorization. This is not problematic though, since these four categories adequately capture most exit options available. When the former regime elite can continue living with no overt negative consequences resulting from their tenure, this 'fate' is coded as 'OK'. This is universal practice in working democracies, but rarely the case in personalist regimes. When a leader is forced into or voluntary goes into exile to another country, this is coded as 'exile'. A more negative 'fate', ending up imprisoned at the hand of the new regime, is coded as

'imprisonment. And finally, the worst possible outcome, death, is coded as 'death', regardless of the cause of dying. Summarized, this categorization includes 'positive' post-tenure fate and three 'negative' post-tenure fates (Debs, 2011; Goemans et al., 2009).

3. Empirical puzzle

The field of regime change does not lend itself for ill-considered approaches. Instead, it is of utmost importance to be clear about the aims and methods of the approach to avoid drawing any unsubstantial conclusions. In this section I will substantiate my case for examining this research puzzle by showing the significant relationship between regime type and post-tenure on an aggregate level. I do this by integrating a data set about regime leaders, *Archigos* (Goemans et al., 2009), with Geddes' (1999) data set on regime types. Central to my argument is the assumption that the nature of the previous regime and the context wherein a regime breaks down influence the post-tenure fate of the regime elite. Underpinning this argument by establishing a statistical link between regime type and post-tenure fate would lend strong credibility to this assumption, regardless of the nature of the causal mechanism present. The direction of this link is fixed, as the question is concerned with what happen after the process. If I can establish covariance between personalist regimes and a specific outcome, this would sustain the assumption that such an influence is present. The recently developed database *Archigos* provides the opportunity to make this analysis, as it provides information on the post-tenure fates of leaders for 188 countries from 1875 to 2004 (Goemans et al., 2009, p. 270). Geddes (1999) provides a comprehensive classification of regimes along with her overview of the literature on regime change and codes regime types as military, single-party, personal or a mix of these. Both these categorizations were explained more in detail in the previous section. Besides the *Archigos* data set there is very little aggregate data on authoritarian post-tenure fates available and hence interlinking this data set with a data set of regime types provides one of the few options available for regarding large-N analysis of my research puzzle.

An elaborate description of the method used to arrive at the following conclusions can be found in Appendix A. Instead a short summary of the approach used and the main results are presented here and interpreted. I merged both data sets by using a shared variable as anchor to match cases and used a few criteria to sort out 'unsuitable'[6] cases which left me with a total 105 cases. I then created a cross tabulation of 'regime type' and 'post-tenure fate, which resulted in an interesting overview, presented in table 2. In this table, I recapitulate the findings from this analysis. Personalist regimes experience a below average amount of 'OK' post-tenure fates and an above average amount end up 'Death'. Contrastingly, both military and single-party experience an 'OK' post-tenure fate more often than average. The latter also faces imprisonment more often on an aggregate than other regime types. With regard to the post-tenure fate 'exiled', all regimes roughly score the same.

**Table 1: Indicators provided by comparing Geddes' and *Archigos***

	OK	Exile	Imprisonment	Death
Personal	-	=	=	+
Single-party	+	=	+	=
Military	+	=	=	=

Further highlighting these indicators are below graphs, which show the distribution of post-tenure fates per regime type in percentages. This is done for the three regimes put forward above and for Rtype_personal1, the dummy variable used in the analysis to denote all regimes with a strong personalist dimension[7]:

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6. I selected on the following characteristics. Cases wherein the leadership lost power in an irregular manner (this excluded democracies and regular power changes in authoritarian regimes. Only cases that lasted over one year(as I could not determine the length of the regime when shorter than one year, I chose one year as a cut-off point to determine whether regimes were 'serious' or not. Regimes lasting shorter than a year can be assumed to be very weakly consolidated) Unfortunately I also had to exclude those cases incomplete after merging the databases.
7. As detailed in Appendix A.

Graph 1: Military regimes post-tenure fate

- 33% OK
- 37% Exile
- 17% Imprisonment
- 13% Death

Legend:
- Unknown
- OK
- Exile
- Imprisonment
- Death

Graph 2: Single-party regimes post-tenure fate

- 7% Death
- 27% OK
- 33% Imprisonment
- 33% Exile

Legend:
- Unknown
- OK
- Exile
- Imprisonment
- Death

Graph 3: Personal regimes post-tenure fate

- 2% Unknown
- 6% OK
- 46% Exile
- 13% Imprisonment
- 33% Death

Legend:
- Unknown
- OK
- Exile
- Imprisonment
- Death

Graph 4: Rtype_personal2 post-tenure fate


- 2% Unknown
- 8% OK
- 45% Exile
- 11% Imprisonment
- 34% Death

Legend:
- Unknown
- OK
- Exile
- Imprisonment
- Death

These indicators support my tentative assumption that personalist regimes have a more negative perspective when their ruling spell ends. Unfortunately though, the amount of cases available to be analyzed is insufficient to establish statistical significance for above tabulation and distribution: there are simply too few cases spread out over too many categories. However, by introducing dummy variables aggregating these categories it is possible to circumvent this difficulty. I did so, and aggregated the post-tenure fate categories in the dichotomous variable 'harm', whereby 'OK' equals no harm done and the other categories imply harm done. I also extended the 'personalist' regime type to those regimes classified by Geddes as mixtures between personalist/military and personalist/single-party, thereby aggregating all regimes with a strong personalist dimension. What these dummy variables lose in descriptiveness, they gain in representativeness and so aggregate a

larger number of cases, thereby overcoming the problematic low number of cases that prevented the more detailed categorization from being statistically significant. By repeating the same cross tabulation and performing a chi-square test on this table, I found the relationship between the dummy variables to be strongly statistically significant[8]. Hence, there clearly is something interesting going with regard to post-tenure fates and regime types. My hypothesized link between a more negative post-tenure fate and a stronger personalist dimension is sustained. On top of that, the indicators provided by the distribution of post-tenure fates also provide some interesting pointers for exploring this relationship.

4. Behind the curtains of authoritarian regimes

Having now substantiated my assumed relationship between regimes with a strong personalist dimension and a relatively negative post-tenure fate, I turn to the abundant literature on authoritarian regimes to identify the relevant mechanisms at work in authoritarian regimes and the conditions that significantly characterize these regimes.

The key differences between different types of authoritarian regimes stem from how these regimes maintain their hold on power. For example, single-party regimes rely on the party apparatus of the dominant party to maintain their hold on power while military regimes exert their control through the hierarchically organized military. In some regimes, cultivation or propagation of an ideology, personal cult or religion by the regime leadership creates an intrinsically motivated support base for the regime (Brooker, 2011, pp. 105–110; Cheibub et al., 2009, pp. 84–88; Geddes, 1999). Personalist regimes on the other hand maintain their hold on power by creating a patronage network of loyalists. They do so by placing trustees in key positions while at the same disrupting any independent build-up of power, within and outside institutions. This does not imply that institutions are absent in personalist regimes, but their use and existence is at the mercy of the regime leadership. Possible opponents stay unorganized and powerless, and regime supporters

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8. Described in more detail in Appendix A.

maintain their position by virtue of their personal allegiance to the leadership. Power is concentrated into the hands of few, a clique strongly committed to the leadership (Cheibub et al., 2009, p. 84; Geddes, 1999, p. 130; Goldstone, 2011, p. 9; Svolik, 2012).

This peculiar position inhabited by the regime elite in personalist regimes has considerable implications for its functioning, especially in times of distress. The position of the regime vis-à-vis other important internal actors, society and state is determinant in deciding the outcome of conflict and the fate of the authoritarian leadership (Barany, 2011; Svolik, 2009, 2011; Way, 2011). In personalist regimes, the military is often deliberately weak in order to prevent it from being able to contest the leadership's authority. Instead, the leadership relies on paramilitary, militia-like, troops of loyalists or specific loyalist parts of the army in order to maintain power (Barany, 2011, pp. 24–28). Alternatively, the personalist leader can co-opt the military in his reign and appease those controlling the military through rewards. The same goes for civil organizations or other potentially stabilizing organizations: they are also deliberately kept weak and are often infiltrated by regime trustees. If the position of an authoritarian regime becomes undermined or threatened, it has to reassert its position either by exercising its monopoly on violence, meeting (socioeconomic, religious) demands of those protesting (Barany, 2011; Svolik, 2009, 2011). If this fails, negotiating a transition pact can prevent large-scale conflict from emerging as regimes give up their violent resistance in return for a personal good outcome (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

However, pact-making only sometimes helps to smoothen a transition. Ample discussion has been attracted by this hypothesis of pact-making (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 37–38) but these pacts have not been found to play an strong role (Geddes, 1999, p. 120), also not in sub-Saharan neo-patrimonial regimes (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994). Personalist regimes face an even more problematic position in this respect, as it is for them impossible to defer any final responsibility since all potential independent mediators are too weak. This impossibility makes a 'good' change of the regime into something new nigh impossible, as these dictators have no *alternative* (Svolik, 2009, 2011, 2012) then to rule by force. This makes it more likely that personalist regimes end in a

storm of violent conflict as personalist leaders and elites have little perspective on a positive outcome.

Contrastingly, the more positive post-tenure fate generally experienced by former military regime leaders stems from the different options these regimes have for dealing with unrest. Debs (2011) makes use of the *Archigos* data set and argues that military regime elites are inclined to turn towards democracy as this can be expected to improve their post-tenure fate. This argument is sustained by the findings of Gandhi & Przeworski (2007, p. 1289), who find that military dictatorships have a relatively high chance of being succeeded by a democratic government. Military regimes' claim to power rest in their hierarchically controlled monopoly of power. Hence, military regimes cannot commit to refrain from using violence after leaving office, as it is their primary mean of defending their position. Therefore, they can only circumvent this commitment problem by transferring to a regime where the importance of violence for selecting leaders is limited. This limits the threat for repercussions, as any democratic successor will be less likely to exercise violent repercussions against the former regime than any authoritarian successor (Debs, 2011, pp. 20–21). Personalist regimes do not have this opportunity, since they pose no threat to the new regime when brought since their patronage network is then defunct. Hence, they cannot rely on being treated fairly by the new regime.

Apart from looking at the structural context wherein regime elites function one can also look with a more voluntarist perspective to interpret that what transpires. By considering the different relevant actors to be strategic and rational[9] it is possible to devise decision-making models which can account for the behavior observed in the cases studied[10]. This is often done through the appliance of game theory (Acemoglu, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2010; Debs, 2011; Przeworski, 1992; Svolik, 2009) to frame elite behavior, setting out the options the different actors at play have and what the most likely outcome of the 'game' is *ceteris paribus*. It is difficult though to address all factors and

9. Or at least capable of rational decision-making.
10. Geddes (1999)introduced this approach first, but since then the models got ever more complicated and elaborate. See for example the model put forward by Debs (2011, pp. 31–37).

conditions of relevance in a model, since some things are beyond observation. Ideally, such a model would help interpret and explain regime behavior and help determining what variables are of crucial importance. Other interpretations of ruler, leadership or elite behavior are always reliant on personal accounts and might be subjective. However, devising or improving a game-theoretic model regarding regime transitions falls beyond the scope of this thesis.

The longevity of personalist regimes compared to military regimes is attributed to the strongly cohesive nature of the regime elite which leaves little chance for internal splits. This results in long-lived regimes, since the most authoritarian leaders are disposed by their fellow members of the regime elite. This threat is less prominent in personalist regimes, since most of the regime elite owes his influential position to the regime leadership staying in power (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007, pp. 1287–1289). Ulfelder (2005, pp. 315–316) argues that personalist regimes are not vulnerable for popular protests because no-one from within the regime has any incentive to align with these protestors. The threat must come from the outside, which is rarely the source of regime change in an aggregate sample of regime transitions (Cheibub et al., 2009, p. 84; Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2009). Only in 30 out 303 regime transitions observed by Svolik (2009, pp. 478–479) popular uprising was the cause of regime breakdown. Contrasting with Ulfelder's (2005) findings, Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) argue that personalist regime are more vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow than other regimes (Chehabi & Linz, 1998, pp. 41–42). These two insights are irreconcilable, but it is possible to conclude that if personalist regimes break down this usually happens due to mass protests, however unsuccessful this mass protest might be at most times. The events of the Arab Spring confirm this statement, since the regimes that fell were toppled by popular protests while at the same time the non-successful protests of the Arab Spring in the majority of Arab countries also confirmed the limited potential protests have against well-organized regimes.

All in all, we can conclude from the literature that personalist regimes maintain their hold on power through personalization of authority, by establishing patronage networks and preventing independent power bases from emerging. While this contributes to the longevity of these regimes, it

also has dire implications for the options the regime leadership has when it is threatened. These circumstances are most likely to result in a more negative post-tenure fate.

5. Research design

I now turn to outlining my approach to the case analysis. I will first outline my rationale for a comparative case-study approach, then underpin my case selection and lastly present my approach to the case analysis.

The case study method inhabits a most particular position within the comparative approach. At the one hand it is broadly criticized for its methodologically inadequate nature and on the other hand a major part of the body of knowledge available within political science is derived from case studies (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). Choosing a research method is always a trade-off based on the research goal (Gerring, 2007, pp. 37–38), and the case-study method is no exception in this regard. The limitations of the method regarding external validity, hypothesis testing and testing causal effects are often put forward in critiques. However, if the case selection is aptly made in concert with the research aim, a case study can be a fruitful effort which offers possibilities for uncovering causal mechanisms beyond any other method (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 17–19). This advantage outweighs the inferiority of the method in other aspects and hence a case study is a preferable option for this research, which aims at generating hypotheses (Gerring, 2004, p. 350).

Similar to the diverse array of critiques one encounters, once can also find an abundance of different conceptualizations of what the case study method actually entails. Gerring (2004, 2007) makes a distinction between cross-case and case studies, using a somewhat expanded definition of what a 'case' is. '*Case* [emphasis in original] connotes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time' (Gerring, 2007, p. 19). A case study then is 'an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units' (Gerring, 2007, p. 342). This does not imply that a case study consists of one case. On the contrary:

In order to derive causal propositions one needs to establish patterns of covariance and hence needs either within-unit or temporal variation (Gerring, 2004, p. 344). According to Gerring, case study research always focuses on multiple cases, but is defined to single unit. However, a study becomes cross-case when the focus shifts from the individual case to a sample of cases (Gerring, 2007, p. 20). George & Bennett (2004, p. 18) include the comparison of a small number of cases in their definition of a case-study though[11]. An integration of both these viewpoints is most fruitful in my opinion: combining and comparing several single-units studies to understand a larger class of similar units. I chose to examine two cases in order to generate hypotheses regarding the influence of the personalist dimensions of regimes on the post-tenure fate of the leadership of these regimes.

Case selection

Having argued my choice for a case study approach I now turn to the design of this case study and my case selection, two intertwined topics. The research design influences the case selection, but the quality of the research output depends on the case selection. Countless treatises[12] on the merits and weaknesses of the case study method have been written, each pointing at potential strengths, weakness and applications of this method. Coming from this body of literature, one can formulate an ideal comparative case study research design which is methodologically sound, feasible and applicable to the theory and situation studied. However, reality is different from theory: one always has to make concessions in order to have a workable research design. As long as one accounts for these concessions and acknowledges the limits posed by the research design this is not necessarily a problem though. I will first shortly outline the rationale behind my case selection and then I will turn to the actual case selection.

As the total amount of cases is limited and the sample taken small, my case selection has to be purposive and cannot be random (Gerring, 2007, pp. 86–88). However, selecting inherently creates

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11. I could delve extensively into the discussion of what a 'case' is or can be as this is central to the case study method. However, in light of my research design this is not explicitly necessary as long as I coherently frame what I define as a 'case' in my approach.
12. Just to name a few examples: (Caramani, 2011; Collier, 1991; George & Bennett, 2004; Gerring, 2004; Hopkin, 2010; Yin, 1989)

a bias, especially when there is a limited number of differing cases one can select from. 'Case selection is the primordial task of the case study researcher, for in choosing cases, one also sets out an agenda for studying those cases.' (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 294) My agenda is to uncover the conditions accompanying the personalist regime type which are responsible for causing a different, more negative, post-tenure fate than the leaders of other regimes types face.

The comparative method either asks for a most similar or most different systems design (Keman, 2011, pp. 57–59), which are both not readily suitable for the question at hand as there is considerable overlap in both the dependent and independent variable examined[13]. If I would keep the regime type and post-tenure fate constant while letting other conditions differ (MDSD), I would risk attaching unfounded conclusions to unrepresentative cases. Just as I would risk the same if I would keep other conditions similar and let the regime type and post-tenure fate vary (MSSD). The independent variable only explains *part* of the puzzle, which leaves every conclusion tentative when examining a limited number of cases. However, as the goal of my research is exploratory, this is not necessarily a problem but implicates that a different design might be more useful. The *diverse case* method (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 301–302) intends to make a selection which represents the full diversity of X, Y or an X/Y relationship. The categorical nature of the independent and dependent variable formulated in the research question makes this a suitable approach. As my focus lies on the apparent relationship between personalist regimes and a negative post-tenure fate I narrow this selection down to the negative post-tenure fates resulting from a personalist regime. Since I already substantiated the validity of assuming this relationship through large-N analysis, my case selection does not need to be concerned with inclusiveness or representativeness but instead highlight the nature of the relationship examined.

Together with choosing this diverse case selection it is still preferable to limit the variance in other possibly influencing variables. Unfortunately, this is only possible to a certain extent as most

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13. For example, the number of personalist regimes resulting in an 'OK' fate is equal to the number of military regime leaders ending 'Death'. However, compared to the aggregate of these regime types, these post-tenure fates are rare and not an expected outcome.

personalist regimes are so durable that a unique set of circumstances is required for their downfall. Accounting for regional circumstances, international interference or natural resources is feasible though. Personalist' regimes differ almost as much from each other as the average 'personalist' regime differs from the average 'military', which makes deriving conclusions from a single case implausible. For example, can we compare Duvalier's Haiti to Gaddafi's Libya? Or can we compare Salazar's Portugal to Assad's Syria? This is possible, but requires a careful formulation of the concept and mechanisms studied and a realistic assessment of where the possibilities for comparison lie. It is no wonder that Chehabi and Linz (1998) relied on a group of country experts to empirically support their theory-making. Each case studied caries a specific set of circumstances which explain for a large part of the variance. However, this lack of cases available and cases researched can also be regarded as a positive thing as this allows for the opportunity to make a viable contribution.

As the introduction already indicated, the events of the Arab Spring provide a unique opportunity for doing so. The context wherein regimes fell apart is similar in nature, but leaves enough variation to examine. Likewise, the former regimes and rulers lost power all share the personalist dimension but are nonetheless far from interchangeable. By focusing on these events my case selection is already delimited, as I have only a few countries to select my cases from. Geddes (1999) identifies the regimes as follows: (1) Yemen (Saleh): personalist; (2) Egypt (Mubarak): single-party/military/personalist; (3) Tunisia (Ben Ali): single-party; (4) Libya (Gaddafi): personalist. On the other hand, Goldstone (2011, p. 9) defines all of these as 'sultanist'. His assumption is called into question by Ulfelder[14], who reasons convincingly that Egypt should not be regarded as a personalist or even sultanist regime. The strong army presence in Egypt negates the personalist dimension Mubarak's authority had, which was poignantly shown as the revolution developed. And now the dust has settled the army is still in place while Mubarak is sentenced to spent the rest of his live in jail. Hence I exclude Egypt following Ulfelder's and Geddes' reasoning from my case selection.

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14. In a comment on Ulfelder's personal blog, retrieved 03-04-2012 from:
http://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2011/05/13/whats-sultanism-got-to-do-with-it-an-exchange-with-jack-goldstone-on-the-arab-revolutions/

Furthermore, Ulfelder also argues that since Geddes' seminal article Tunisia has moved towards a personalist regime (an argument also made by others (Barany, 2011; Brownlee, 2009; Fisher, 2011; Goldstone, 2011; Hochman, 2007). I find this a credible argument since Perkins' (2004) account of the history of Ben Ali's regime describes a similar process. Over the last decades the party apparatus in Tunisia eroded and Ben Ali's personal grip on the country increased. Inside this ruling clique personal enrichment thrived and outside support shrivelled in the latter days of Ben Ali's regime. I thus 'update' Geddes' classification regarding the type of the Tunisian regime in its latter days, by opting to classify it as a single-party/personalist hybrid instead of just single-party. This leaves me with three cases selected. These regimes share their personalist nature, the Arab (Spring) context and popular protest as cause for their demise. At the same time they offer ample variation for a comparative approach to be fruitful. Libya experienced a civil war with foreign intervention after an initially small-scaled and unsuccessful uprising. Qaddafi ended up being killed, and would have faced trial if not. Tunisia' Ben Ali was ousted from office in a less conflictual manner, and managed to flee from massive protests which successfully brought down his regime. I exclude Yemen from this selection for reasons of feasibility: compared to the other cases there is little information available and including three cases in the limited length of this thesis is not feasible.

Surely, this case selection is all but perfect but doing any better is difficult due to the limited availability of personalist cases. I here made the choice to keep the circumstances as similar as possible: a different strategy is possible though.

Data collection

The data collection was faced with several challenges. The recent nature of the events studied makes it difficult to find sufficient material of good scholarly quality. Secondly, Arab countries are relatively understudied by Western scholar scientists (Barany, 2011; Way, 2011). Thirdly, I am in no capability to gather empirical material myself due to geographical hurdle and language barrier. However, even in light of these difficulties it is possible to find ample documentation useful for

analyzing the process that took place in Tunisia and Libya. Some journals already devoted special issues to the events of the Arab Spring, such as the October 2011 edition of the *Journal of Democracy,* and articles discussing the Arab developments start appearing in other places too. Besides scholarly attention, the Arab Spring attracted a large deal of other attention, which can be attributed to the geopolitical significance and unprecedented nature of the events. This resulted in reports from think tanks and non-profit organisations. Considerable media attention was also given to the events, which resulted in several big media setting up useful databases. Furthermore, miscellaneous sources might provide interesting insights too. The WikiLeaks cables provide an interesting insight in the Ben Ali regime for example[15]. The sheer amount of attention given to the events of the Arab Spring overcomes the difficulties posed for the outside researcher as many others already did the groundwork necessary.

6. Measurements and guiding questions.

Detailing what research questions will guide my case exploration and analysis is important, since comparative analysis requires approaching each case in an identical manner. In an effort to take an eclectic stance in the ever-ongoing structure-agency debate I integrate both structural and voluntarist perspectives in this framework. Structure does matter, but the actions of actors within this structure cannot be disregarded as part of the puzzle. Snyder (1998, p. 51) sensibly argues that one can better identify those actors relevant in transitions and regimes according to their strategic posture operating within a structural context to avoid this potential structural determinism. I here follow his approach and will first outline my approach to identifying relevant actors. Secondly I will define the structural contexts wherein these actors function, and what possible variation is possible within these dimensions. The emphasis is obviously on the latter part, as I hypothesize in this thesis that these structural factors do play an important role in determining the post-tenure fates. However, deducing the importance of these structural factors can only be done by analyzing their

15. Shane, S. (2011). Cables From American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence on Tunisia. *New York Times.* Retrieved 02-04-2012 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/africa/16cables.html?_r=1

importance in relationship to events transpired and the interaction between actors and structures thereby.

Identifying actors by their strategic posture introduces four domestic groups relevant to the regime: regime hard-liners, regime soft-liners, the maximalist opposition and the moderate opposition (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 15–17; Snyder, 1998, pp. 51–52). The regime hard-liners belong to the group unconditionally committed to the dictatorship's rule and are usually part of the ruling clique. In times of distress, they can be expected to support the regime leadership until the very end since their own position and influence is dependent on the regime. The regime soft-liners are supportive of the regime, but see their own survival as independent of the regime leadership and might thus turn against the regime. Members of this group can usually be found in the military, administration or religious bodies. The opposition can also be divided in two groups (Snyder, 1998, p. 52): a maximalist and moderate camp. The former strives to overthrow the current regime and radically transform state and society, while the latter merely want to oust the dictator and his ruling clique. The degree to which each of these four groups is present determines the change for alliances between them, the stability of the regime, and the nature of the transition and – possibly – the post-tenure fate of the regime elite. For example, a strong presence of both regime soft-liners and opposition moderates might prevent conflict from escalating since both groups have an interest in the general well-being of the state (and themselves) instead of being bent on defending or removing the regime. If on the other hand the opposition solely consists of maximalists, such a compromise might not be possible as it is unlikely that these maximalists would accept any favours towards the former regime. For both cases the influential actors are thus placed within this framework and their actions and influence are examined.

The second part of the analysis is the structural context present in the regimes studied. I base myself on the expected relevant structural dimensions in personalist regimes. Authoritarian regimes are characterized by a specific set of relationships between the ruler, society and state and conditions. In the end this comes down to examining a paradox apparent in authoritarian regimes: ruling by force

while simultaneously having to share power in order to feasibly do so. The dictators and the ruling coalition must work together in an arena where one can only exert political influence when backed by a credible threat of violence (Svolik, 2009). I here expand on Snyder's framework (1998, p. 53), who identifies three crucial relationships relevant for mapping the structural context regime elites operate in. Firstly the ruler-state relations, the degree to which state institutions are penetrated by the dictator's patronage network. If this penetration is thorough, there is little room for regime soft-liners: almost all are then complicated in this merge of interests. If on the other hand the administration and institutions are relatively robust and capable of acting independently, regime soft-liners can organize themselves under this cover (Snyder, 1998, pp. 53–55). Generally, one would expect institutions to be relatively weak in personalist regimes, as these exist merely for their usefulness in the eyes of the leadership (Slater, 2003). The military is the second institution of relevance to the leadership's position and fate, as it presents the most viable adversary regarding the use of force. For a personalist leader it is thus necessary to ensure that the military is not capable of contesting his position. Dictators generally cope with this through one of two strategies: either they suffocate the military's capabilities and strength while sustaining a loyal paramilitary force to safeguard their monopoly on the use of force, or they infiltrate the existing structures with cronies of their own, purging those they cannot rely on (Svolik, 2009). Thirdly, the relationship between the ruler and society, the latter here understood as the total of civic associations, political organisations, trade unions and other associations outside of the state institutions. Generally, the patronage network of the ruler does not only extend itself within state institutions, but also in civil society. The degree to which an oppositional force can develop within civil society is largely dependent on the strength of the control exercised by the regime. If the better part of civil society is dominated the regime for example, oppositional forces have little room to manoeuvre or to form an independent power base. If on the other hand the regime fails to co-opt societal elites through patronage networks, both the maximalist and moderate oppositions may grow in strength which leads to an eventually untenable position for the regime (Snyder, 1998, pp. 55–58). For example, a vibrant society might offer the capabilities of mobilizing and organizing popular protests, thereby instigating a credible threat to the regime.

Besides these domestic relationships, the international context is of importance to the position the regime inhabits. Personalist dictators are often dependent on foreign patrons to sustain their patronage networks (Snyder, 1998, p. 58). Especially during the Cold War the superpowers' support was the vital lifeline that kept regimes afloat, a lifeline supplied out of self-interest and ideological motivations. The world has changed since, but still dozens authoritarian regimes stay in power partly due foreign support, be it the U.S. or one of the new actors at the world stage, such as China (Chehabi & Linz, 1998, pp. 29–33; Pastor, 1991). Opposition groups rarely manage to gather enough momentum without the influx of foreign support. These groups need resources to confront the regime and have relatively little opportunity to find these resources within the country's borders due to exclusionary nature of the regime (Anderson, 2011). Establishing the level of foreign influence and the benefactors of this influence is essential.

A fifth structural factor often mentioned with regard to authoritarian regimes is the presence or absence of natural resources (Ulfelder, 2007). Often dubbed the 'resource curse', the presence of easily extractable valuable natural resources such as oil, diamonds or gold is often linked to the survival of autocracies (Cardoso, 1979; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, p. 18; Ross, 1999, 2001; Ulfelder, 2007; Wantchekon, 2002). For example, the peculiar longevity of many Middle Eastern[16] regimes was often contributed to the abundance of oil (Ulfelder, 2007, pp. 1012–1013). This easily controllable and potentially big source of income allows regimes to behave in an exclusive manner: they are able to sustain their monopoly of violence since they do not need to rely on others to pay for their expenses. If this independent source of income is large enough, regimes can even satisfy the population and legitimize their rule by spreading this wealth through public services (free healthcare, education) or other means. Contrastingly, the accessible availability of natural resources might also fuel the opposition by presenting an independent source of income and is thus also named in relation to civil wars and conflict (Ross, 2004, p. 61). For both the incumbent regime and

16. The term Middle East is usually used for describing the countries surrounding the Arab peninsula. With regard to Libya and Tunisia it might have been better to speak of Maghreb, but since it is common throughout the literature to use the term 'Middle East' more liberally and almost synonymously with 'Arab world' I adhered to using Middle East.

oppositional forces, natural resources present an opportunity to independently build a power basis without having access popular support. Especially in personalist regimes, the presence of this opportunity is of great influence.

The focus of my analysis thus lies on the characteristics of the regime and circumstances wherein the regime fell apart. I will identify the structural contexts present in the cases examined, describe the events around the regime transition and deduce the actors' role in these processes to generate hypotheses regarding the main hypothesis put forward in the research question. While this might seem like a 'soft' approach in comparison to statistics, it might even be a more fruitful approach to discover the actual relationship between the observed variables. The goal is not to prove the existence or significance of certain factors or conditions within the here examined relationship, but to explore plausible hypotheses regarding this relationship. To a certain extent it is possible to interpret how these hypotheses relate to each other and to the indicators from the literature. Besides this analysis, the post-tenure fate of the regime leadership will also be described. I summarize the findings of both cases at the start of the 'integration'-section.

7. Case 1: Libya

When Gaddafi's exceptionally long-lived tenure came to an end in 2011, the world and the Middle East in particular lost one of its most eccentric and flamboyant dictators. Loved by few and hated by many, Gaddafi's demise was likely from the onset of the popular protests emerging during the Arab Spring but it was only due to foreign NATO intervention that he was ousted relatively quickly eventually (Brahimi, 2011, p. 606). First the rise of Gaddafi's regime, the events of the Arab Spring and his post-tenure fate will be described and then I will examine the positions of the relevant actors and the nature of the significant dimensions.

Muammar Gaddafi's rise to power

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power through a bloodless coup d'état in September 1969, whereby a group of young officers drove out the former monarchical regime (St John, 2008, pp. 91–92; Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 77–96). Gaddafi established himself from the start as the ideological head of this 'Libyan revolution' and advocated a radical reform of the country's political system through introducing the Jamahiriya: 'a country directly governed by its citizens, without the intervention of intermediaries' (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 97). Representation, capitalism and foreign influence were deemed exploitative and over the following decades Gaddafi transformed Libya into a unique state, based on his personal ideology outlined in the so-called 'Green Book', a manifesto describing Gaddafi view on the ideal Arab socialist, revolutionary, state. Advocating constant revolution, Gaddafi undertook drastic, society-upsetting, measures, sponsored state-terrorism and set aside all those opposing him (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 97–136). The enormous influx of money due to rising revenues from oil exports made unbridled spending by the regime possible and it was mostly due to this factor that Gaddafi managed to keep the majority of the populace content over the course of four decades (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 162). Supposedly functioning without 'intermediaries', Libyan society was formally ruled directly by the people but practically and informally by an extensive patronage network owing allegiance to Gaddafi (Brahimi, 2011, p. 608). And while the colonel took a more pragmatic stance over the last decade with regard to foreign policy and domestic economic issues, this was insufficient and too late to repair the discontent bred during earlier years (St John, 2008, pp. 99–104).

The events of the Arab Spring

The first protests against the Gaddafi regime erupted mid-February in the eastern coastal cities of Libya, mostly in Libya's second city, Benghazi. Thousands of people poured out onto the streets during the so-called 'Day of Rage', to which the Gaddafi regime responded with a violent crackdown.[17] From thereon, things escalated quickly and large-scale fighting between protestors and Gaddafi's loyalists and mercenaries commenced. The Libyan opposition took control of Benghazi

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17. Deadly 'day of rage' in Libya. *Al-Jazeera English*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121716917273192.html

and several other smaller cities February 20, but there their early advance quickly stalled and over the course of the next weeks Gaddafi's superior forces pushed back. Prospects looked grim for the opposition until the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973, which called for foreign intervention to protect civilians in Libya. The intervention was intended to be limited – not another Iraq – and in concert with regional powers such as the Arab League.[18] This intervention manifested itself in the enforcement of a no-fly zone and aerial bombardments of Gaddafi's military. It proved to be a turning point and made the eventual victory of the opposition forces a given[19].

However, from the onset of the uprising in Libya Gaddafi made it clear that he did not intend to stand down and instead tried to muster everything he could to repress the popular insurgency. Hence, the conflict evolved into a civil war spanning over several months as the opposition had trouble mustering sufficient forces to counter Gaddafi's dominance. The besieged city of Misrata was liberated by the rebel forces May 15 and over the course of June and July rebels made headway from the Western mountains. This led to an isolation of the still Gaddafi-controlled capital of Tripoli, which finally fell to the opposition forces in the end of August, which heralded the end of Gaddafi's regime. The remaining loyal forces were then hunted down and NTC fighters capture Sirte, the last holdout of Gaddafi, October 20 killing Gaddafi himself in the process. Mustafa Abdel Jalil, leader of the NTC, then declares Libya to be liberated.[20]

From the start of the conflict, the opposition front (and later the NATO) insisted on Gaddafi facing trial. This insistence left Gaddafi with no other credible option then continue fighting, as leaving the

18. Marcus, J. (2011). Libya UN Resolution 1973: Text analysed. *BBC News*. Retrieved 08/05/2012 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12782972
19. Vandewalle, D. (2011). How Not to Intervene in Libya. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved 13/05/2012 from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/10/how_not_to_intervene_in_libya?page=0,1
20. Overview based on several articles: Battle for Libya: Key moments. *Al-Jazeera English*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/20111024152158962327.html; Libya conflict: Q&A. *BBC News: Africa*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14612570; No way out for the colonel. *The Economist*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://ww.economist.com/node/21526358; Blight, G., Pulham, S. and Torpey, P. (2012). Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests. *The Guardian*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline; Libya — Revolution and Aftermath. *The New York Times*. Retrieved 02/06/2012 from: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html; (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 605–608; International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 1–6, International Crisis Group, 2011b, pp. 1–6).

country and facing the ICJ would have been no particularly favourable option (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. i). According to a Russian envoy, Gaddafi was willing to negotiate and relinquish his power in exchange for security guarantees. He demanded immunity from prosecution, unfreezing of part of his assets and his son Saif Al-Islam to participate in post-tenure elections.[21] These requests were obviously not met, as Gaddafi was killed and most of his family members killed or arrested[22]. Basing myself on that, I describe the regime leadership's post-tenure fate as 'death'. I do have to note that the official goal of the NTC was to capture Gaddafi and his family to let them stand trial. If that would have happened, the post-tenure fate could have changed slightly for the better. However, as Gaddafi's death was met with public approval there is little reason to assume that this alternative fate would have been positive. [23]

Actors and structural contexts defined

Opposition

No legal opposition grouping was in existence under the Gaddafi regime, and emerging (and subsequently outlawed) groups were often quickly quashed. Dissidents and opposition groups mainly existed abroad and tried to influence the regime from there. The opposition is diverse and was disunited as several marginal groups coexisted with little cooperation (Anderson, 1987, p. 65; Barger, 1999; International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 19–21; Joffé, 2011). Among them groups focusing on human rights abuses, regime opponents, former monarchists and Islamists. The Islamist current was the most organized of these, also with support of like-minded Islamist groups in other Arab countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 19–22). Besides these political groupings, there were also several ethnic minorities in Libya whose identity was not recognized by Gaddafi's regime and often subject to repression (International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 20–24). The better part of these oppositional groups were bent on ousting Gaddafi from office, even long before the events of the Arab Spring. While some

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21. Meyer, H. (2011). Qaddafi Seeks Exit Guarantees: Russian Envoy. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved 08/05/2012 from: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-05/qaddafi-seeks-security-guarantees-to-relinquish-rule-russian-envoy-says.html

22. Muammar Gaddafi killed as Sirte falls. *Al-Jazeera English*. Retrieved 30/05/2012 from: http://ww.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/20111020111520869621.html

23. Greenhill, S. (2011). Gaddafi's killers will be put on trial over mob execution, vow Libya's new rulers. *The Daily Mail*. Retrieved 30/05/2012 from: http://ww.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2054344/Gaddafi-dead-Mob-killers-trial-vow-Libyas-new-rulers.html#ixzz1c2ehSpLU

focused on raising awareness regarding the regime's wrongdoings and advocated a more moderate stance, most of these oppositional groups were of the more radical kind. Not surprisingly, seeing as they consist mainly of Libyans who fled from the Gaddafi regime .

With the events of the Arab Spring, a new oppositional force emerged grouped together in the Transitional National Council (TNC). This Council consists of technocrats, some returning from abroad, and defected regime members, mostly already reformist and critical of the regime before the revolution (Brahimi, 2011, p. 619; Tarkowski Tempelhof & Omar, 2012). From the start on, this front of Libyan opposition[24] and the NATO demanded Gaddafi's departure as a prerequisite for any political initiative[25]. Brahimi (2011, p. 610) relates this to the immense personalisation of the political system in Libya: all that was done by the regime was connected to Gaddafi personally. On top of that Gaddafi immediately took to violent repression of the protests, which only legitimized this conviction. Together with this adherence to Gaddafi needing to be ousted, the opposition quickly turned to violence in order to defend itself and expand its position *vis-à-vis* the incumbent regime.

All in all, the opposition before the events of the Arab Spring was thus divided, marginal and located abroad while the opposition from during the Arab Spring was mainly united through one ambition: bringing Gaddafi down (International Crisis Group, 2011b, pp. 1–8). Maximalists had the upper hand in both instances, as Gaddafi left no room for any moderate opposition and strengthened the maximalist argument by his iron-fist approach to the initial protests.

Regime
As I will outline later in my analysis of the ruler-state relationship, Gaddafi's regime was characterized by a regime absent of a clear hierarchical structure. Formally, Libya was ruled through

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24. Current important figures are Mustafa Abdul Jalil[24], Chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), justice member turned opposition figurehead, and Abdurrahim al-Keib, now prime minister of the interim government. (Libya profile: leaders. *BCC News*. Retrieved 08/05/2012 from:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754899; Libya's Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib in profile. *BCC News* Retrieved 08/05/2012 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15552501)
25. Bull, A. & Logan, J. (2011). Obama says Gaddafi's departure from Libya inevitable. *Reuters*. Retrieved 08/06/2012 from: www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/19/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110519

a decentralized form of direct democracy, whereby a trapped system of people's congresses transferred the people's popular will to the highest office. This system was supposed to be more fair than representative democracy, which was deemed exploitative by Gaddafi (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 103–105). Informally though, power rested with an extensive network of regime intimates who derived their position from their personal relationship or ideological connection to the regime leadership (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 606–609; International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 9–14; Moss & Pack, 2011; Pargeter, 2009, p. 1035). In this respect, this schizophrenic dichotomy realized the exact opposite of what Gaddafi's ideology intended. Instead of letting Libya be ruled by popular will, an inaccessible and small group held all important regime positions and controlled the single revenue source of importance in Libya: oil. From 1969 to 1999, no more than 112 ministers held position in the General People's Committee (i.e. equivalent to a cabinet position), a relatively small group (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 8). At the same time, Gaddafi's revolutionary agenda unsettled every part of Libyan society over the course of four decades, implicating virtually everything in its proceedings. Doing business, exerting influence or voicing one's opinion was practically impossible without collaborating in some manner with the regime.

Over the last years, a reformist departure from the early principles surfaced, personified through Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Gaddafi's eldest son from his second wife, who rose to an influential position within the regime. This reformist movement mainly advocated economic liberalisation, but also tried to move into a new direction with regard to human rights, foreign policy and the direct democracy system (Brahimi, 2011, p. 609; International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 8–15; St John, 2008, p. 104). This clashed with the conservative main body of the regime intimates, mostly there since the 1970s and bend on safeguarding their own achievements and position. Gaddafi himself took a neutral stance in this discussion, not willing to depart from the ideology outlined in his Green Book and his Jamahiriya but opening up for some reformist idea at the same time. He played both sides against each other, letting neither dominate (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 11). Notwithstanding this emerging defection from the *status quo* by a reformist movement, the whole discussion was still played out within the regime (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 175–196). And when

revolution came to the town and the whole country had to show colour, part of this reformist camp (especially the family members) closed ranks with the more conservative hard-liners, thereby discrediting the value of their previous reformist opposition (Brahimi, 2011, p. 617; International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 27).

The most visible line between regime hard-liners and soft-liners can be drawn between the revolutionary, conservative, cadre and the new reformist movement. What weakens this distinction is the realisation that all, be it soft- or hard-liners, owe their position to the regime and have every incentive to support the regime in harsh times. Before the Arab Spring, the soft-liners gained some ground on the hard-liners by making some headway with reforms but when the very position of the regime was threatened by a uncompromising opposition during the events of Arab Spring this camp of soft-liners quickly split. Some defected to the camp of the opposition, some closed ranks with their hard-line adversaries (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 610–611; International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 15–16).

Ruler-state relationship

Over his forty-two-year rule, Gaddafi shaped the Libyan political system and state to his own liking which resulted in a formal but powerless structure based on direct democracy, the so-called Jamahiriya, and an informal network of vague institutions and circles populated by Gaddafi-supporters from where actual power was exerted. The Jamahiriya was Gaddafi ideological answer to how Libya should be governed and its architecture rested on the central tenet that government was inherently wrong and should be avoided as much as possible. Instead, society should be self-reliant and directly responsible for its own actions. Representative government was deemed to be illegitimate and instead a system of direct democracy should lead to decisions. To this end, a complicated system of people's congresses was developed, and formally the top of political power rested with the GPC (general people's congress) (International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 8–9).

Vandewalle (2006, p. 150) emphasizes that while formally the political power rested with the GPC real power resided within the 'revolutionary sector' of the country: the array of informal institutions

reporting to the regime leadership and responsible for executing the revolution. Among these institutions were security organisations, but also several very influential but never constitutionally defined circles of people (Joffé, 2011). At the top of this informal network was Gaddafi's informal circle of advisors and confidants, often coined the 'Men of the Tent' (*Rijal a-Khaimah),* comprised of tribal associates, family members and loyal supporters, mostly there since revolutionary times (among them the Free Unionist Officers' Movement (*rabitat al-dubbat al-ahrar al-wahdawiyin)* and the Forum of companions of Gaddafi *(rabitat rifaq al-Qadhafi)* (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 607–609; International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 8–12; Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 150–152). Another factor of influence were the Revolutionary Committees: ideologically motivated groups of regime loyalists. These groups were responsible for muscling Gaddafi's revolutionary agenda through Libyan society, sometimes even in a physical manner by pursuing regime opponents, domestically and abroad. Within Libya itself, these informal committees directed the formal state institutions, dominated the people's congresses and had a strong foothold within the police and armed forces (Brahimi, 2011, p. 608). Over recent years these have come into discretion at account of their conservative ideas, but still functioned as an useful tool for Gaddafi to counter more reformist minded currents within the regime (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 175–196).

Gaddafi also used the tribal structure within Libya to support his regime. Gaddafi relied on two large tribes besides his own Qadadfa for support and mainly appointed representatives of the Werfella and Magarha in key positions. Furthermore, he introduced the People's Social Leadership Committees (*lijan al-qiyada al-sha'biya al-ijtima'iya)*, wherein the tribal leaders where brought together into one regime-controlled organization (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 610–614). Lastly then Gaddafi's family: he appointed his sons in key positions in the state apparatus, the military and security organisations. Among them Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi who, unlike his father, voiced more reformist ideas (International Crisis Group, 2011a, pp. 12–14; Moss & Pack, 2011). He took an active position in the regime leadership and was seen as Muammar's most likely successor. Libya presented a most extraordinary case with regard to its power architecture. The most poignant example of this was Gaddafi's own position, as he was simply called 'the Leader' without occupying

any specific position (Viorst, 1999, p. 69). However, the personalist (and even sultanist) nature of the regime clearly shines through this puzzling mess of authority. As Brahimi (2011, p. 605) puts it:

> 'Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's Libya was always supposed to be about people power. The 'state of the masses' – the Jamahiriya – was designed to be run directly by its citizens, taking charge of their political and economic destinies unimpeded by the oppressive institutions of other modern states. The theory of the Jamahiriya was, however, entirely obscured by four decades of highly personalised, repressive rule.'

Ruler-military relationship

The military was never assigned task to safeguard the regime and was instead actively depoliticized and kept weak as a coherent force (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 613–614; Vandewalle, 2006, p. 15). This prevented this military from becoming an institution capable of challenging Gaddafi's rule and incapable of maintaining order. This responsibility rested with other organisations (praetorian-guard-like according to Vandewalle (2006, p. 149)) directly at the discretion of Gaddafi (Anderson, 1987, p. 67). In the early years of the regime, Libya procured large amounts outdated weaponry from the former Soviet Union, a stream which halted with introduction of international embargos in the end of 1980s and the 1990s and the collapse of the USSR (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 148). This did not strengthen the military though, and mainly came to the benefit of the few elite loyal regiments and security organisations. The weakness of the military was exemplified in the disastrous campaign against Chad in 1986 (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 147–148). Hence, in contrast to other authoritarian regimes Libya did not have a military capable of autonomous action against the regime (Sorenson, 2007, pp. 109–112).

That parts of the military that were well-trained and armed were under command of Gaddafi loyalists and mostly aimed at domestic security (e.g. the infamous 32nd Reinforced Brigade, informally known as the 'Khamis-brigade', under command of Gaddafi's son Khamis Gaddafi)[26]. These parts of the military and those security organisations directly at the discretion of Gaddafi were

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26. Profile: Khamis Gaddafi. *BBC News*. Retrieved 12-05-2012 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14723041

responsible for guaranteeing the regime's control of Libya. Most of these organisations were also reinforced with foreign (mostly sub-Saharan African) mercenaries who had no loyalty to Libya whatsoever, only to Gaddafi's regime (Brahimi, 2011, pp. 613–614; Tarkowski Tempelhof & Omar, 2012, p. 2). However, due to this close relationship they were also entangled with all actions taken by the regime (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 5). Their fate was intertwined with the regime leadership's fate, as they were seen by the general public as part of the authoritarian control of the country (Sorenson, 2007).

Ruler-society relationship

Beyond the artificial formal structures of power and Gaddafi's informal networks, little independent organisation was allowed in Libya. The regime systematically prohibited and closed down institutions and locations where people could convene, connect, discuss and build interest groups (Anderson, 1987; Brahimi, 2011, p. 608). This followed from Gaddafi's ideologically framed vision for Libya, outlined in the Green Book, which stretches beyond the organisation of the state. One of the central tenets of this ideology is the inherent inequality of representative government: government should be an expression of the popular will according to Gaddafi and hence organized around direct democracy. This precluded the formulation of any (opposition) political parties, but also prevented the establishment of any other organisations not affiliated with the regime (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. i–ii). Especially Islamic political organisation was perceived as a threat by the regime and consequently heavily suppressed (Joffé, 1988). Independent media was abolished in 1980 and education solely state-controlled and partly devoted to mandatory study of the Green Book (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 97–135).

Sometimes civil society emerges from the economic sphere, think labour unions for example. And, economic distress or setbacks can be an important source of regime opposition, protests or even revolts. Gaddafi's revolutionary socialist economic reform of society during the 1970s and 1980s centralized the economy, outlawed the private sector ('parasites' in Gaddafi's terms) and labour organisations (Sandbakken, 2006; Vandewalle, 2006, p. 204). This halted the development of economic activities outside the petroleum sector and resulted in most Libyans living on meagre state

salaries, sponsored housing and other government handouts (Brahimi, 2011, p. 609). Living conditions high above Sub-Saharan standards and most neighbouring countries, but bleak in contrast to other oil-rich states. When the reformist movement started calling for economic liberalisation and reform in the early 2000s, the economy was in shambles. Due to long-term sanctions (applied because of Gaddafi's state-sponsoring of terrorism), foreign technology could not be imported and foreign investments were deterred. Eventually, this even threatened the sustainability of oil extraction through outdated equipment and lack of technical expertise. Since the start of large-scale oil extraction, the Gaddafi regime relied on expatriates and foreign expertise in order maintain instead of educating Libyans (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 139–205; Viorst, 1999). Due to reform efforts over the last ten years, large improvements had been made though. Nonetheless, doing business in Libya was confined to those with political connections, as regime intimates profited from being able to navigate and manipulate the intricate layers of Libyan government.[27] For example, food distribution was controlled by only four or five politically connected families.[28] Gaddafi kept a tight grip on the economy, and undertaking anything – even in the more liberal Libya of the last years – required cooperation with the regime. This did not make one a regime associate: partnering with the regime was just a necessity to do business.

All in all, the development of an independent civil society in Libya was generally suppressed. Virtually no autonomous organization was allowed, diverging opinions suppressed and the economy was dominated by the state until very recently. Instead, through extensive patronage networks the regime leadership exerted a strong control over society (International Crisis Group, 2011a, p. 14).

The presence of natural resources
Since independence, Libya had to rely on food imports to sustain its population. Agriculture is hardly possible due to the arid climate, and irrigation is only partly possible through the use of fossil water sources, a practice eventually doomed to be unsustainable (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 116).

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27. An opinion shared by the leaked WikiLeaks cables: US embassy cables: Gaddafi's modest lifestyle. *The Guardian*. Retrieved 08/05/2012 from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/63423.
28. Topol, S. A. Libyan Tycoon Husni Bey Tells All. *Business Week*. Retrieved 08/05/2012 from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/libyan-tycoon-husni-bey-tells-all-12082011.html

However, this disadvantage is countered by the large oil reserves Libya possesses. Without the exploration of the new reserves, current production rates can continue to well into the 21st century, making Libya one of the most oil-rich countries in the world.[29] On top of that, Libya's oil is mostly easily extractible (and cheap) and is highly attractive to its close proximity to European markets. Henceforth, oil has provided a steady stream of income for the regime ever since drilling began in 1955, notwithstanding the small dip taken during the low oil prices of the 1980s (Altunisik, 1996). This 'easy' flow of money prevented the build-up of any other serious economic efforts though, as this was never required: more income could easily be realised by raising oil production or prices. It may have helped Gaddafi to stay in power for such a long time as he did not need to rely on the population to sustain government spending, instead he could quell unrest through increased spending (Altunisik, 1996; Brahimi, 2011, pp. 608–609; Vandewalle, 2006, p. 166).

International relations
Gaddafi continuously showed a disregard of how the outside world, especially the West, would perceive his actions. Advocating Nasser's ideas of pan-Arabism, he strived for further Arab integration during the first decades of his rule without much success whatsoever. While initially taking a neutral stance in the Gold War, he later turned to anti-Americanism because of the USA's involvement in Palestine and other Arab causes (St John, 2008, pp. 93–95). Through state-sponsoring of terrorist groups operating against Western powers, Gaddafi further isolated the Libyan regime from the international community which even resulted in sanctions being introduced against Libya (Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 130–136). Sanctions with detrimental impact, because Libya dependent on foreign (especially American) expertise to maintain its oil production and on Western countries to buy its oil (Viorst, 1999). His enmity towards Western powers thawed a bit after his regime stopped it activist, revolutionary, agenda in the early 2000s and took a more pragmatic stance to foreign relations. This also implied a departure from his previous pan-Arabic ideals, and feeling disconnected from the broader Arab community, Gaddafi turned towards building relationships with Sub-Saharan Africa in the last years of his regime (International Crisis Group,

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29. "Oil". *BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011 (BP)*. 2011. Retrieved 12-05-2012 from:http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/ statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/oil_section_2011.pdf

2011a, p. 4; Joffé, 2005; St John, 2008, pp. 95–97; Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 181–205). All in all though, the Libyan regime was pretty much isolated. The opposition received wide-spread support from the Libyan diaspora and was later supported immensely by NATO, both through the maintenance of the no-fly zone and through other indirect military support[30].

8. Case 2: Tunisia

The Arab Spring started with the self-immolation of Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, protesting against corruption and poor living conditions[31]. As the protests grew and were eventually successful in ending the 24-year tenure of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the example provided by the Tunisians spread like fire throughout the Arab World, causing a gulf of civil disobedience previously unprecedented in most of these countries. A year has passed since and still post-revolutionary Tunisia seems to be the vanguard holding the best prospect for successful democratization. First the rise of Ben Ali's regime, the events of the Arab Spring and his post-tenure fate will be described and then I will examine the positions of the relevant actors and the nature of the significant dimensions.

Ben Ali's consolidation of power

Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali rose to the highest office in 1987, succeeding Bourguiba, the long-term president of Tunisia. Ben Ali, who was previously promoted to the office of Prime Minister by Bourguiba to deal with Islamist opposition deposed Bourguiba by having him declared medically unfit for office, a measure in accordance with the constitution (Perkins, 2004, pp. 173–175). By doing so, he gained office in a peaceful manner, supported by many (even from Bourguiba's strongest supporters). The former PSD was then renamed RCD (*Rassemblement Consitutionnel*

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30. No way out for the colonel: Thanks to the rapid advances of rebel forces, Muammar Qaddafi's capital is now a city under siege. *The Economist*. Retrieved 08/05/2012 from: http://www.economist.com/node/21526358

31. Worth, R. F. (2011). How a Single Match Can Ignite a Revolution. *The New York Times*. Retrieved 13/05/2012 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/weekinreview/23worth.html?src=twrhp; Fisher, M. (2011). In Tunisia, act of one fruit vendor unleashes wave of revolution through Arab world. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved 02/06/2012 from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html

Démocratique) and Ben Ali managed to secure full control of the party and the state. The leadership base of the party shrank and was filled with Ben Ali's loyal supporters: firm supporters of former Bourguiba found themselves marginalized. However, Ben Ali combined this with a tolerant stance to former critics, dissidents and intellectuals whom he invited back into the country. Similarly, he accepted some of the ideas proposed by the Islamist movement, believing it safer incorporated in the government and society than outside the accepted sphere. (Perkins, 2004, pp. 183–186).

Ben Ali's economic reforms of the early '90 helped the country back on track economically. These reforms, developed together with the IMF and World Bank were harsh and heavy on the population though. Nonetheless, eventually these programmes could rely on popular support as they turned Tunisia in the best performing non-oil economy of the Middle East, and helped resolve income inequality through economic progress. Tensions within society continued to rise though, which resulted in Ben Ali cracking down on the Islamist opposition in 1994. However, the violent protests of the Islamist movement and the civil war in neighbouring Algeria legitimized this excessive repression of the Islamist movement, as people were afraid of similar events happening in Tunisia. (Perkins, 2004, pp. 194–196) Small-scaled pluralism was institutionalized by offering a limited part of parliament to opposition parties and thus was the facade of democracy held up (Sadiki, 2002a). Through a successful strategy combining co-optation and repression Ben Ali further fortified his position (Alexander, 1997, pp. 35–36). By institutionalizing their symbolic influence he rendered political opposition powerless and sharp critique was met with harsh consequences. The sustained economic growth and stability provided by the Ben Ali government legitimized his regime though (Perkins, 2004, pp. 201–202). The 9/11 attacks had dire consequences for Tunisia's economy, which depended so heavily on (Western) tourism and the global economic recession of the 2000s also hit Tunisia. Over the last years, support for the regime eroded as economic stalling set in while at the same time Ben Ali tightened his grip on society and further enriched himself and his family (Murphy, 2011, pp. 299–302).

The events of the Arab Spring

As a result of Mohammed Bouazizi's act of self-immolation and subsequent dying, riots broke out in the coastal city of Sidi Bouzed. After a short week, these protests spread to neighbouring cities and grew in size, being further fuelled by a second suicide and a wide-spread shared feeling of discontent with the regime among the young protesters. The regime's response was indecisive: some of the protests were met with violence while Ben Ali promised to give in to the protestors' demands on national television. The protests then gained momentum when the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) decided to take over its leadership, thereby providing structure and sustainability. This also moved the protests beyond the socio-economic sphere as the labour unions coupled the protest's message with political critique on the regime. Through the union's network the protests quickly spread across the country, making it difficult for the security organisations to control them. Lawyers and students reinforced the ranks of the protestors[32].

In the early stages of the protests, the national branch of the UGTT tried to mediate between the regime and the protestors, but the regime's violent response forced it to take a more pronounced stance. This resulted in the UGTT clearly taking the stance of the protestors. In a televised speech on January 13, Ben Ali promised to leave his post in 2014. A concession well below the expectations of the protestors. The next day UGTT organised a nation-wide strike and protest, which led to clashes with the security forces (International Crisis Group, 2011c, pp. 1–7). As a consequence, Ben Ali sacked his entire government and proposed even earlier elections.[33] However, this was to no avail as the army finally intervened and took control. Everything came together against Ben Ali and he had no other option but to flee (International Crisis Group, 2011c, p. 12; Murphy, 2011). Which he managed to do successfully, leaving the country with part of his family on January 14 to Saudi-Arabia.[34, 35]

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32. Randeree, B. (2010). Tensions flare across Tunisia. *Al-Jazeera English*. Retrieved 12-05-2012 from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122819724363553.html
33. Emergency rule imposed in Tunisia. *Al-Jazeera English*. Retrieved 12-05-2012 from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201111410345507518.html
34. Chrisafis, A. & Black, I. (2011). Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee Tunisia as protesters claim victory. *The Guardian*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests

Subsequently, Ben Ali was tried in absentia and sentenced to long jail sentences. Other family members who got arrested were also sentenced to jail.[36] Ben Ali's post-tenure fate can hence be described as 'exile' since it is implausible that he will go back voluntarily. Alternatively, his fate could also be described as 'imprisonment' since he would have been in prison if he had not escaped. Currently, some prosecutors are even calling for the death penalty to be imposed on Ben Ali even though this is not possible within Tunisian law.[37] All in all, the regime leadership's fate is mixed but far from positive.

Actors and structural contexts defined

Opposition

Independent Tunisian political life was subdued during Ben Ali's reign, but not completely eradicated. A facade of pluralism was institutionalized by the regime and opposition parties were frequently discriminated but allowed, although their actual influence on the political process was little more than symbolic and any effective political opposition was brutally repressed (Murphy, 2011, p. 299; Sadiki, 2002a, pp. 128–132). The core 'legal' opposition parties were secular, and the Islamist movement was outlawed after Ben Ali's violently suppressed their activities in the 1990s. Besides these political parties, some volunteer and human rights organisations were tolerated and the UGTT and other trade unions were a factor of influence. Those more critical of the regime were not safe within Tunisia and thus organized opposition from abroad, among them the leaders of the Islamist movement. The judiciary system, lawyers and judges, also opposed the regime from time to time. Political parties played a limited role in the insurgency, which signals their weakness and lacking capability to coherently act as a front against Ben Ali. According to Hostrup Haughbølle & Cavatorta (2011), this was the case all throughout Ben Ali's reign and part of the reason Ben Ali

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35. This overview was also based on: Rifai, R. (2011) Timeline: Tunisia's uprising. *Al-Jazeera English*. Retrieved 12-05-2012 from:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html
36. Adetunji, J. (2011). Ben Ali sentenced to 35 years in jail. *The Guardian*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/20/ben-ali-sentenced-35-years-jail
37. Noueihed, L. (2012). Tunisian prosecutor demands death penalty for Ben Ali. *Reuters*. Retrieved 30/05/2012 from: www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/23/us-tunisia-benali-death-idUSBRE84M1G020120523

managed to rule for so long was his ability to sustain this divide among the opposition (Sadiki, 2002a, pp. 137–138).

Despite the increasing repressive regime, Tunisian opposition and society at large was mostly characterized by their inclination to work with the regime, to seek pragmatic solutions instead of actively resisting the regime (Sadiki, 2002b, pp. 60–63). This started out from genuine support for Ben Ali in the early days of his regime and was cultivated over the years by Ben Ali's willingness to parlay to a certain extent and by the economic progress made. Sadiki (2002b, p. 68) strikingly cites a Tunisian: ''in this country the "deal" is simple. We leave politics for the president, and he, in exchange, leaves us to eat. We have even a term for this: "khubzism" ... You eat and you keep quiet.' Hence, most of the (legal) political parties and trade unions were inclined to serve as mediator between the regime and the protesters at the onset of the Arab Spring protests, just as they had done several times in the past at earlier protests (International Crisis Group, 2011d, p. 4). Therefore, I identify the majority of the opposition as being moderates. Surely there were also radical opposition groups seeking to overthrow the regime and reforms, among them the Islamist movement, but these mostly lived abroad and did not play an important role in the downfall of the regime.

Regime

Ben Ali's regime was highly concentrated and most important positions were taken by members of his or his wife's family (International Crisis Group, 2011d, p. 1; Murphy, 2011, p. 300). What started out as a political system dominated by a single, hegemonic, party (the RCD), gradually corrupted into a more personalist, authoritarian, regime wherein Ben Ali and his family monopolized the use of power and the control of the country. Over the course of his rule the amount of people with power shrank while their power increased (Murphy, 1997, p. 119, 2011; Sadiki, 2002a, pp. 122–123). In that respect, the group of regime hard-liners grew to be relatively small as only Ben Ali's family and the small clique of cronies surrounding them benefited from the massive amount of wealth extorted from the country. However a large group passively acquiesced in the regime too because the benefits of his regime largely outweighed the costs. Islamism was kept at bay and Tunisia's economy fared well (International Crisis Group, 2011c, p. i–5). The tacit approval of the majority of the (middle and

upper-class) Tunisian citizens of Ben Ali's repression of the Islamist movement and of the successful economic reforms bound them to the regime and further established its position (Perkins, 2004, p. 210). However, I disagree on calling this group regime soft-liners since tacitly approving of a regime's actions is something wholly different than supporting it. But because such a big group of moderate oppositions tacitly supported Ben Ali's and failed to coherently resist his actions, Ben Ali did not need a large support base. Consequently, the regime was dominated by hard-liners and few soft-liners were actively engaged in the regime's affairs.

Ruler-state relationship

Ben Ali's authority rested with this large repressive apparatus, but at the same time he tried to keep up a facade of legitimacy, positioning himself as the legitimate successor of Bourguiba, elected through popular elections (Sadiki, 2002a). Formally a constitutional democracy, Tunisia was *de facto* a single-party state because official regulation and informal practice prevented any other party then the RCD from seriously contesting the parliamentary elections. However, as the regime leadership amassed more direct power and wealth during the decades of Ben Ali's rule, its support base within the party eroded. Membership figures stayed high, but when protests emerged during the Arab Spring the party apparatus stood by idly. Not even in Sidi Bouzid, a city where membership figures approached nearly 20% (International Crisis Group, 2011d, pp. 9–10). In that respect, the party had become a hollow shell. Not surprisingly though, as the interests of the rank and file had diverged from the party leadership due to their monopolization of wealth and power. Party-members felt dissatisfied with the regime's performance and the greediness of Ben Ali's family and cronies and hence no longer felt responsibility towards the party whatsoever. Also the senior officials within the party apparatus had been stripped of their political power in favour of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families, who extended their control over nearly everything: media, policy-making and the business community (International Crisis Group, 2011d, p. 10). Tunisia's state apparatus was well developed and functioned well – although corrupt – compared to neighbouring countries. However, it was also dominated by RCD members and trustees of the president. Doing business with the government was restricted to those who showed their allegiance to the party (Sadiki, 2002b, p. 68). Regardless of this dominance though, the state was apparatus was institutionalized

highly enough to function autonomously, even after the regime fell apart. Ben Ali controlled and used the state apparatus, but it was not dependent on his authority (Anderson, 2011, p. 3; International Crisis Group, 2011d; Murphy, 1997).

Ruler-military relationship

The Tunisian military was deliberately kept weak and underfunded by the Ben Ali regime and never played a significant political role. Soldiers were paid little, and material equipment was scarce. Instead, Ben Ali relied on other elements of the security apparatus to maintain his grip on society. He kept close ties with the police leadership and relied upon the police to maintain his grip on power. This paid off: the police stayed loyal to the last day of his reign (Pickard, 2011, p. 648). The only part of the army trusted by the regime was the so-called Presidential Guard, an elite group of 5,000 responsible for protecting the president. The privileges enjoyed by the members of this Presidential Guard and the special confidence placed by the president in this guard angered other elements of the security apparatus and significantly reduced the support of those other elements and the army for the regime. This made defection of the military more likely, a fact that proved to crucial in the final days of Ben Ali's regime (Brahimi, 2011, p. 614). In these final days, the military judged it in the benefit of Tunisia's stability to abandon Ben Ali's reign and let the insurgents take over (Murphy, 1997, pp. 301–302).

Ruler-society relationship

Compared to other authoritarian regimes, Tunisia had a relatively extensive political and social life. Independent association and other civil organisation was allowed to a certain extent, although the regime was repressive when dissent was voiced to openly (Mabrouk, 2011; Murphy, 1997, p. 120)[38]. Labour organisations, grouped together in the UGTT, were a strong autonomous force and their mediating presence strongly contributed to the stability of Ben Ali's reign. Ben Ali had no particularly strong ideological agenda and ruled from a distance from his Carthage palace. He did strongly penetrate the country's economic sphere though. Since the early 1990s, the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families used their political power and command of security organisations to gather an

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38. Byrd, D. (2011). Tunisia: Life Without Ben Ali. *VOA News*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/One-Scholars-View-of-Tunisia-Without-Ben-Ali-114499289.html

ever-growing share of Tunisian businesses and wealth. Through misuse of privatisation programmes, arranged marriages and forced cooperation the regime leadership stretched its influence in a mafia-like manner over the entire Tunisian economy[39]. As a result, civil society felt itself increasingly disconnected from the regime. Further, the socio-economic disparity resulting from this exploitative ruling expanded year after year. Grievances resulting from this equality, such as the lack of employment for college graduates and opportunities for young people in general (Perkins, 2004, p. 205), created a fertile breeding ground for unrest which had to result in protest sooner or later (Mabrouk, 2011, pp. 627–629) These grievances should have been mediated through society and regime institutions could not find an outlet and gathered until it finally came to a boiling point. This had happened before in Tunisia's history, but in contrast to those earlier instances the protests escalated to rapidly now to be handled through repressive measures or mediating efforts (Sadiki, 2000, 2002b, p. 59).

Presence of natural resources
Tunisia had and has very limited natural sources to its availability in contrast to its eastern neighbour. The amount of fossil fuels available for extraction is limited and offers little prospects for large revenues. [40] The country exports phosphate and iron ore[41], but these revenues are small in comparison to those countries seen as being afflicted by the 'resource curse' (Ross, 2001).

International Relations
Ben Ali's Tunisia was on good terms with most foreign powers, including the US and the Europea union, as it ardently supported most of their initiatives in foreign affairs. For example, Ben Ali supported Bush's War on Terror[42] and the US supported his regime in return, praising its secular character and economic progress[43]. Tunisia underwent drastic economic reforms in the 1990s at the

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39. Le clan Ben Ali, une mafia à la tête de l'Etat. *Le Monde*. Retrieved 13-05-2012 from: http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/infographie/2011/01/19/le-clan-ben-ali-une-mafia-a-la-tete-de-l-etat_1467893_1466522.html
40. "Oil". *BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011 (BP)*. 2011. Retrieved 12-05-2012 from:http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/oil_section_2011.pdf
41. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html
42. President Bush Discusses War on Terrorism with Tunisian President. Retrieved 14-05-2012 from: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040218-2.html
43. Shane, S. (2011). Cables From American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence on Tunisia. *New York Times*. Retrieved 02-04-2012 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/africa/16cables.html?_r=1

request of the IMF and joined the ENP programme of the Europea union in 2005. In return, the Europea union also provided development aid for Tunisia (Sadiki, 2000, p. 81). This made Tunisia the first Mediterranean country to enter a free-trade agreement with the EU and since then, Tunisia has established itself as an important trade partner[44]. Ben Ali's relationship with foreign powers was ambiguous: while the West criticized Ben Ali for his repressive politics and corrupt behaviour, his regime was also highly praised for its economic development, his loyal support and his defence of secularism.

9. Integration and analysis

By comparing two cases to examine the relationship between a strong personalist dimension and a unfortunate post-tenure fate I strive to broaden my scope and make my findings more sustainable. As one can discern from the case studies made above, some conditions are equal in both instances while others differ. In below two tables, the findings grouped through the perspective used are presented. Firstly the presence of the different groups of relevant actors in table 2. Regime hard-liners are always present and hence their status is included in this table. Secondly the nature of the structural dimensions examined in table 3.

Table 2: Actors			
	Strength of regime soft-liners	**Strength of moderate opposition**	**Strength of maximalist opposition**
Libya	Reformist movement gained strength in final years of the regime.	Mostly absent due to strong repression	First weak due to disunity but later stronger.
Tunisia	Present, but had little incentive to support the regime in the end	Weak due to inaction, disunity and co-optation. Later very strong though.	Mostly repressed or exiled and not strong.

Table 3: Structural factors		
	Libya	**Tunisia**
Relationship ruler – state	Characterized by statelessness and pre-eminence of informal structures over formal state institutions. Highly controlled by the regime.	Single-party state turned into a patronage-controlled autonomous state apparatus.
Relationship ruler – military	Military deliberately kept weak, regime leadership relied on elite units and security organisations run by loyalists. Military supported regime during protests.	Military deliberately kept weak, regime leadership relied on police, elite units and security organisations run by loyalists. Military defected to opposition side during protests.
Relationship regime - society	Very high penetration of society by Gaddafi's network: almost no autonomous civil society to speak of.	Due to its retracted nature of the regime did not penetrate society. Subdued social and political life tolerated.
Presence of natural resources	Immense oil reserves, oil extraction most important source of income for regime.	No significant natural resources
Foreign influence	Slowly recovered from being an international pariah due to more liberal stance. Foreign intervention.	Well-liked by foreign powers, good relationship with US and EU.

Together with these structural conditions, it is important to recall the post-tenure fate of the regime leadership in both cases. In Libya, the leader ended up 'death', part of the surrounding clique managed to go into exile and part was imprisoned. In Tunisia, the main figures of the regimes managed to go into exile and some were imprisoned.

Looking at these two cases, several hypotheses can be drawn. First, due to the prevalence of hard-liners in both cases the regime response to the protests was inadequate. Either the response was too repressive and only caused more protests (Libya) or the protests were ignored too much and continued (Tunisia). A coherent moderate force with ties to the regime might have prevented both of these reactions. However, due to the personalist nature of the regime the build of such a force was prevented. As a small group held the reins and reaped the benefits, the majority of the people could credibly claim they were no part of the regime and had no incentive in its continuation. Thus:

H₁: A strong personalist dimension prevents the build-up of a coherent force of regime soft-liners and hence decreases the chance of a negotiated outcome.

Secondly, in both cases I saw a widening gap within every aspect of society emerging over the last years. The income and influence gap between regime intimates and the population at large was widened by the regime leadership's enrichment and failure to provide an adequate outlet for discontent. This further alienated the general population from the regime leadership. In Tunisia, the absence of any incentive for the rank and file of the RCD and UGTT to follow the national cadre's commands showed the weakness incurred over years of neglect of these organisations. As Ben Ali and the small family clique surrounding him gathered more and more power during their rule, they alienated previous supporters who disconnected their fate from that of the regime leadership. Libya showed a similar picture, as Gaddafi had to rely on mercenaries and bought support to make his actions against the insurgency possible. The narrower the support base of the ruling coalition is, the easier it is for the general public to see this coalition as a target that needs to be removed. Gaddafi and Ben Ali were the personifications of their regimes and hence had to go.

H₂: If the ruling coalition is small and relies on a narrow support base over a long time, it can more easily be seen as a target and thus expect a more negative post-tenure fate.

Thirdly, mostly in Libya, dissent was repressed which left only the maximalist opposition willing to risk all in order to achieve regime change. More moderate opposition was prevented from becoming significant, especially in Libya were any non-regime sanctioned organisation of civilians was outlawed. When the protests came, the hard-liners were quickly to grab the leadership in the struggle and directly advocated drastic measures. Contrastingly, in Tunisia the regime tolerated a more active social and political life within certain boundaries. This led to the establishment of large organisations such as the UGTT who functioned as a mediator and an institution capable of tempering the more radical opponents of the regime. If a regime gives room to the establishment of a moderate opposition it can mitigate the threat posed by more radical opponents.

H₃: If the leadership represses civil society and prevents the build-up of an autonomous administration it also prevents the build-up of a moderate opposition and hence gives room to a maximalist opposition, thereby endangering the leadership's own post-tenure fate.

Fourthly, the lack of coherence amongst the opposition pre-empts the possibility of useful negotiations or a smooth transition. As the groups opposing Gaddafi differed in opinion about virtually everything but their hatred for Gaddafi, this forced their attention solely on driving Gaddafi out as this struggle legitimized their cooperation. In Tunisia on the other hand, different opposition groups acted more harmoniously and hence managed to not only oust their former leader much faster but also kept an eye to other important factors.

H₄: Lack of coherence amongst the opposition results in more negative post-tenure fate prospects for the regime leadership.

Fifthly, the presence of natural resources cannot be linked to personalist regimes and a particular post-tenure fate per se by looking at these two cases. Gaddafi's regime floated on oil revenues and Libya developed little other significant economic activities during his rule, but this does not necessarily imply that his regime would not have lasted if not for oil revenues. Tunisia is in many ways a similar country and managed to develop economically during the same period. In Libya it was the mere presence of the superfluous oil revenues that enabled the regime leadership to enrich themselves and to ignore and even sabotage economic development in other areas. In Tunisia, Ben Ali and family spread a web of control over the nation's economy and extracted their share, sufficient to maintain regime expenses and enrich themselves. The clear difference between these two sources of income is their degree of dependency: Gaddafi was in no way dependent on the general population to keep up revenues. Oil was controlled by a company controlled by loyalists and extracted mostly with the help of foreign labour and expertise. Hence, he had no qualms to engage in full-scale war (with disastrous economic effects) in order to safeguard his position. Based on these two cases, it is not possible to plausible suggest more than the following hypothesis:

H₅: The presence of natural resources controlled by the regime makes armed conflict more likely, as this independent source of income does not make it necessary to spare the national economic infrastructure.

Sixthly, one of the key features of both the Gaddafi and the Ben Ali regime was their control over the state by a personally controlled web of informal authority. Especially in Libya and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, the formal structures of power meant relatively little in daily practice and those that exerted control over the country derived their position from their personal relationship with the regime leadership. They owed their position to their loyalty towards the leaders instead of being elected or promoted on their merits. The networks these people functioned in, such as Libya's Revolutionary Committees, had little formal claim to power and were only legitimized by the leadership's approval of their actions. Hence, it is self-explanatory that those within this privileged positions had every incentive to see the leadership stay in power. This showed itself clearly in Libya, where only a few cabinet members defected and those formerly reformist were quick to realign themselves with the regime when the protests got serious. The more informal the power structure is the less room there is for compromise as regime hard-liners cannot afford having the leadership's position compromised since this threatens their own position.

H_6: *The more power structures are based on a personal relationship with the regime leadership, the lesser the chance for comprise.*

Lastly then the influence of foreign intervention on the post-tenure fate of the regime leadership. In this respect, Tunisia and Libya present two wholly different cases. Whereas Ben Ali was one of the most respected Arab regimes and generally held very good relations with (Western) foreign actors, Gaddafi's isolated Libya presented the opposite picture. Over the last decade this improved a bit, but still Gaddafi was seen as a leader which better could go then stay. The official reasons for the UN to call for intervention and for the NATO to respond were Gaddafi's massive violation of human rights, but his uncontrollable and hostile nature also made him a more suitable target then Ben Ali or now Assad. When the NATO then decided to intervene, this only worsened Gaddafi's potential outlook as the NATO had to stop his actions – and stop his rule – in order to legitimize this intervention. The room for compromise was thereby undermined, as leaving Gaddafi in place would strengthen his claim to power and discredit the NATO operation. And by facing trail, former authoritarian leaders are most likely to receive either a prison or a death sentence.

H₇: *Foreign military intervention leads to a more negative outcome, as foreign powers are not willing to accept anything less than a trial. If not, their intervention might not have been legit.*

10.   Discussion and reflection

In the previous section I drew seven plausible hypotheses regarding the relationship between personalist regimes and negative post-tenure fates. I did so based on an analysis of two cases, by using a perspective based on existing literature. These hypotheses and 'evidence' for the relationship found by merging *Archigos* and Geddes' data sets evidence that the research puzzle identified is relevant. While seemingly self-explanatory, my examination showed that the actual explanation for a more negative is quite complicated. A diverse set of conditions, differing in nature from country to country can be assumed to be of influence and multiple causal mechanisms might be at work influencing the post-tenure fate of the former regime leadership. Nonetheless, a possible explanatory framework can be imagined and researching the hypotheses put forward here would greatly add to such an explanatory framework. Through this framework, the actions of individuals can be interpreted and one can think of ways to prevent situations from escalating. However, based on this explorative study it is unfeasible to say anything decisive about the relationship examined. This leads to the conclusion that there are ample possibilities for further research.

By expanding existing data sets (such as *Archigos)* with variables relevant for identifying the hypotheses put forward here, it would be possible to actually test these hypotheses. At least some of these hypotheses, for example the relevance of regime's dependency on natural resources, could be tested in such a manner. Other, more comprehensive mechanisms identified could be explored further through small-N analysis of a representative sample of cases to test their validity. One could also go beyond personalist regimes and make a similar analysis of post-tenure fates for other authoritarian regime types. This would not only further our knowledge on the relevant conditions present in those regimes, but would also make it possible to compare post-tenure fates between regime types. Besides expanding the existing knowledge through analysis of more cases and testing

of the hypotheses, one could also integrate the indicators found here into a game theoretic model specifically aimed at personalist regimes. Doing so can provide an interesting insight and would be a valuable addition.

Reflecting on this conclusion, I think it is necessary to also denote some of the problematic issues that coming with studying this topic. First, the variety of authoritarian regimes – even within a defined category or type – hampers drawing general conclusions. No regime is the same and different factors might be of influence from case to case. Sufficing oneself with a small set of variables per case does not adequately address this complexity. Thoroughly analyzing a case requires in-depth country-specific knowledge, which makes comparative research a troublesome affair. Third, whether one escapes into exile, gets arrested and is convicted or is killed is in the end also dependent on chance. Due to a lucky streak of events, even the most personalist regime leaders can escape unharmed. On the other hand, an enlightened and moderately repressive leader open for reform can be killed as a result of a renegade action by a small group of radicals. How events unfold is influenced by pre-existing conditions and can be linked to those conditions on an aggregate level of analysis, but one can always find a case which repudiates the general conclusions. Third, it proves to be difficult to discern clearly between regime 'leadership' and 'elite', as both are subject to interpretation. While this was not problematic in this assessment, it is an issue worthy of attention. Fourth, the relationship here identified might be spurious. Even though I do not think that is likely seeing the evidence presented here, it might be the case that variance in post-tenure fates is related to something else. Further research on alternative explanations can help to minimize this possibility.

Altogether it would be wrongful to let these concerns discredit the discovered relationship and corresponding hypotheses, which in itself provides an interesting contribution to the study of authoritarian regimes. There is ample room for improvement and further research, but that was clear from the start of undertaking this research project.

11.   Appendix A: Connecting Archigos & Geddes.

In this appendix, I outline my approach to merging the *Archigos* and Geddes database. I describe my proceedings and I then present my results (beyond those already presented in the main body of the paper).

Archigos is available in two versions, one having the leader-spell as unit of observation and one having the leader-year as unity of observation. Because Geddes' data is coded in regime-years I made use of the latter for the ease of connecting both. I had to exclude the Archigos-data before 1945, as Geddes only coded regimes after 1945. Furthermore, I selected on regimes where the leader lost power through an irregular process (Archigos "EXIT >= 3") and matched both data sets on the common variable "Country_year" (combining variables 'country' and 'year', present in both data sets). I then corrected some minor discrepancies between the two data sets, mostly choosing Geddes' data as guidance (e.g. spelling of countries, regime ending years). Lastly I selected on the years regimes fell apart, which left me with a set of 105 cases. Obviously, some cases were lost through the matching exercise. However, out of the original 136 (173 including those not ended) regimes coded by Geddes this presents a fair sample. I then examined the relationship between regime type as coded by Geddes and post-tenure fate as coded by Archigos, which provided results sustaining the research question. I retained the original coding provided by Geddes and Archigos, which implies that post-tenure fate is coded as:

```
-666    >> Unknown
0       >> OK
1       >> Exile
2       >> Imprisonment
3       >> Death
```

And regime type is coded as:

```
1       >> military
2       >> military/personalist hybrid
3       >> personalist
4       >> single-party hybrids with either the military or personalist
5       >> single-party
6       >> military/personalist/single-party amalgam
```

I then added three dummy variables to emphasize the difference between personalist and non-personalist regimes and to avoid less clear results through Geddes' use of a typology including hybrids.

Rtype_personal1   >> 2 (military/personalist hybrid) + 3 (personalist)
Rtype_personal2   >> 2 (military/personalist hybrid) + 3 (personalist) + 4 (single-party hybrids with either the military or personalist)
Rtype_single   >> 4 (single-party hybrids with either the military or personalist) + 5 (single-party)

Table 4 : Comparing Regime Type and Post-tenure fate

		RType											
		1	1(%)	2	2(%)	3	3(%)	4	4(%)	5	5(%)	6	6(%)
Post tenure fate	Unknown	0	0%	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
	OK	8	33%	0	0%	3	7%	2	14%	4	27%	0	0%
	Exile	9	38%	6	86%	16	39%	6	43%	5	33%	1	25%
	Imprisonme	4	17%	0	0%	6	15%	1	7%	5	33%	2	50%
	Death	3	13%	1	14%	15	37%	5	36%	1	7%	1	25%
Total		24	24	7	7	41	41	14	14	15	15	4	4

		Rtype_extra							
		Rtype_p ersonal1	Rtype_p ersonal1 (%)	Rtype_p ersonal2	Rtype_p ersonal2 (%)	Rtype_si ngle	Rtype_si ngle (%)	Total (%)	Total
Post tenure fate	Unknown	1	2%	1	2%	0	0%	1%	1
	OK	3	6%	5	8%	6	21%	16%	17
	Exile	22	46%	28	45%	11	38%	41%	43
	Imprisonme	6	13%	7	11%	6	21%	17%	18
	Death	16	33%	21	34%	6	21%	25%	26
Total		48	48	62	62	29	29	105	105

I then cross tabbed the post-tenure fate variable with the Regime type variable and the added dummy variables and calculated the percentages of post-tenure fates corresponding with the different regime types. This resulted in the following table:

Of which I made the following graphs:

Graph 5: Overview

	Unknown	OK	Exile	Imprisonment	Death
■ Military	0%	33%	38%	17%	13%
■ Military/personal	0%	0%	86%	0%	14%
■ Personal	2%	7%	39%	15%	37%
■ Single-party hybrid	0%	14%	43%	7%	36%
■ Single-party	0%	27%	33%	33%	7%
■ Single-party/Military/Personal	0%	0%	25%	50%	25%
■ Rtype_personal1	2%	6%	46%	13%	33%
■ Rtype_personal2	2%	8%	45%	11%	34%
■ Rtype_single	0%	21%	38%	21%	21%

1 (military)

- Unknown
- OK: 33%
- Exile: 37%
- Imprisonment: 17%
- Death: 13%

2 (military/personal)

- Unknown
- OK
- Exile: 86%
- Imprisonment
- Death: 14%

3 (personal)

- Unknown: 2%
- OK: 7%
- Exile: 39%
- Imprisonment: 15%
- Death: 37%

4 (single-party hybrid)

- Unknown
- OK: 14%
- Exile: 43%
- Imprisonment: 7%
- Death: 36%

5 (single-party)

- Unknown
- OK: 27%
- Exile: 33%
- Imprisonment: 33%
- Death: 7%

Rtype_personal1

- Unknown: 2%
- OK: 6%
- Exile: 46%
- Imprisonment: 13%
- Death: 33%

Rtype_single

- Unknown
- OK: 20%
- Exile: 38%
- Imprisonment: 21%
- Death: 21%

Rtype_personal2

- Unknown: 2%
- OK: 8%
- Exile: 45%
- Imprisonment: 11%
- Death: 34%

As I could get any significant results for a correlation by cross tabbing Geddes' categories with post-tenure-fate. Hence, I created another dummy variable 'harm', thereby aggregating all post-tenure fates but 'OK' into harm = 1 and recoding 'OK' into harm = 0. I then cross tabbed this variable with the slightly expanded category of personalist regimes 'Rtype_personal1' and ran a chi-square analysis, which resulted in the following table. The results here presented in table 5 show that this relationship holds statistical significance.

Table 5

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,831[a]	1	,028		
Continuity Correction[b]	3,756	1	,053		
Likelihood Ratio	5,123	1	,024		
Fisher's Exact Test				,037	,024
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,785	1	,029		
N of Valid Cases	105				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8,23.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

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