

A Foreign Solution to Civil Conflict:
**US Intervention and the Duration of the Peruvian
and Colombian Civil War**

Master Thesis

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Abstract

Foreign intervention in civil war is generally perceived as being peace generating. While interveners may seek “stability”, the result of intervention is all too frequently prolonged violence and political chaos. While previous studies have confirmed a causal relationship between foreign intervention and the prolonged duration of civil war, they have neglected to dig into the causal mechanisms that explain *how* such intervention extends civil war. In the light of an increasing occurrence of the civil war phenomenon coupled with foreign intervention, it is essential to acquire a complete understanding of the relation between foreign intervention and civil war so that policy makers can create more effective responses and develop the right strategies. This study contributes to this by examining the role of US intervention in the Peruvian and Colombian civil conflict. A careful consideration of these two cases reveals that a foreign actors that supports a government in civil war, introduces separate interests to the conflict. Subsequently, diverging strategies undermine the government’s ability to deal with the insurgent independently. Foreign intervention may temporarily oppress an insurgent, but by addressing primarily the symptoms and not the cause of the conflict, foreign intervention leads to a prolonged civil war duration in the long-run.

Table of Content

1. Introduction	7
2. Literature Review	10
2.1 From interstate to intrastate war	
2.2 Intervention	
2.3 Intervention and civil war duration	
3. Theory and Hypotheses	16
4. Research Method	21
4.1 Concepts and measurements	
4.2 Data and case selection	
5. Background	25
5.1 Section one: Contextual problems of the Peruvian and Colombian conflict	
5.2 Section two: The Shining Path and the FARC	
5.3 Section three: US intervention	
6. Empirical Results	45
6.1 Diverging interests	
6.2 The bargaining range	
6.3 The informational approach	
6.4 The credible commitment approach	
6.5 The balance of power	
6.6 Military financial intervention	
7. Conclusion	68
7.1 The hypotheses	
7.2 Theory development	
7.3 Policy implications	
8. Bibliography	72

1. Introduction

Scholars in international relations have become increasingly conscious of the international dimension of civil war. The involvement of foreign actors in civil conflict has led to the blurring of the boundaries between intrastate and interstate wars. There are many examples both during and after the Cold War that confirm this development. For example, the US was involved in the civil war in Angola (1972-1980s), Nicaragua (1980's), Afghanistan (1979-1992), Peru (1980-2000), Congo (1996-1997) and Liberia (1999-2003) while France was involved in Algeria (1991-2002) and Rwanda (1990-1993). As a result, the literature on the internationalization of civil wars and the role of foreign intervention has grown significantly in recent years. Foreign intervention is most commonly perceived as being peace-generating (Regan, 2000; Walter, 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006). A neutral intervention helps to reduce asymmetries in a conflict and to transform and settle it equitably. Foreign actors may help the adversaries to communicate with each other and contribute to making the settlement more credible and fair. Additionally, they can monitor compliance to agreements and sanction violators (Kriesberg, 2013). However, a biased intervention in favour of one party can contribute to ending the conflict as well. Through direct or indirect financial, economic or military support, states can intervene in distant civil conflict by making one party excessively stronger and help ensure a victory (Salehyan, 2006).

If this were to be the case, then all civil wars could be solved by foreign intervention. Yet, many civil wars have lasted for a long time *despite* foreign intervention. Consider the civil war in Colombia (from 1964 onwards) and Peru (from 1980 onwards), and more recently in Afghanistan (from 2001 onwards). Despite durable

and intense US intervention, civil violence caused predominantly by insurgents continues to persist. Rather than shortening the duration of the conflict, US intervention seems to have complicated and prolonged these civil disputes.

Evidently, theory of intervention does not always comply with real world examples. This provides an opening for the exploration of the following research question: *How can foreign support to a government in civil war prolong the duration of the conflict?* This study will answer this question with regard to two in-depth case studies that consider US involvement in the Peruvian and Colombian civil war. By doing so this study makes a social and theoretical contribution in the following way.

Civil war, defined as those internal conflicts that count more than 1000 deaths per year, has become a familiar phenomenon since the start of the Cold War. Since 1960, twenty per cent of all nations have experienced at least ten years of civil war (Blatmann and Miguel, 2010: 4). Given the fact that civil wars rarely remain within the boundaries of a single state, many more nations have been directly or indirectly affected. Being *aware* that foreign intervention can extend the duration of a civil dispute, is not enough. What is necessary is a full understanding of *how* foreign intervention prolongs the duration of civil war. A more complete comprehension of the relation between foreign intervention and civil war duration will help policymakers to design more successful and more efficient responses to them and contribute to unravelling the complexities of conflict resolution.

This research makes a theoretical contribution in two ways. First of all, as opposed to previous studies I will focus explicitly on foreign support to a government in civil

war. Secondly, against most conventional studies of civil war I will apply a qualitative research method to test my hypotheses. With my choice of topic and methodology I intend to make an original contribution to the field of foreign intervention and civil war, which has become an increasingly socially and politically relevant topic in the past decades.

2. Literature Review

The increased salience of civil conflict during and after the Cold War has given rise to a large body of literature on the causes and origins of civil wars. Most of this literature explores the causes of civil conflict within the boundaries of the state and therefore limits itself to trying to explain the interaction between two parties: the government and the insurgents. Literature on civil war often focuses exclusively on domestic determinants such as political instability (Hegre et al., 2001), regime type, income (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and an abundance of natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Other scholars have focussed on the characteristics, capabilities and underlying motives of the insurgents (Salehyan, 2006). Such country-specific research however, does not match the empirical phenomenon of many contemporary civil wars. In fact, many contemporary conflicts such as the war in Afghanistan, Somalia and Colombia involve more than two actors. Many conflicts have what Cunningham calls an “international dimension”, meaning that besides a government and insurgent, an external actor is involved (Cunningham, 2006).

2.1 From interstate to intrastate war

How does an external actor get involved in a civil conflict? During civil war, the boundaries between inter-state and intra-state conflict often diffuse. Governments engaged in civil war may undertake cross-border counterinsurgency actions against rebels that have slipped across borders, a phenomenon Gleditsch (2006) calls “externalization”. Next to this, negative spill-over effects such as stray fire and mass refugee migration can induce international conflict and even military intervention. Refugee flows pose particular challenges to neighbouring states since they can be an economic burden and a cause of political instability (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006;

Gurr, 1993). However, a foreign actor becomes truly intertwined and actively involved in civil conflict through *intervention*, which is defined as a third party that brings in his own separate set of preferences into the conflict and is able to actively pursue them (Cunningham, 2006).

2.2 *Intervention*

There is general agreement among scholars that intervention is a form of conflict management and thus intends to reduce rather than exacerbate the conflict at hand. Many scholars claim that the involvement of a third party is a necessary guarantee for peace (Regan, 2000; Walter, 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006). Doyle and Sambanis and Fortna conclude that interventions are effective because peacekeepers change the economic incentives or the armed group away from warfare, monitor compliance with the peace agreement and facilitate communication on both sides (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004). However, neutral interventions rarely occur. Rather, interventions are aimed at trying to avoid or change outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of intervention. The greatest deal of literature focuses on foreign support for *rebel groups*. Extensive research has been conducted on what motivates states to support insurgencies and which types of organizations receive and accept foreign support (Salehyan, 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2010). The perceived effect on the duration of the conflict is disputed about. Gleditsch suggests that support for rebel groups increases their capabilities and tilts the balance of power in their favour, leading to a decisive victory and the end of civil war (Gleditsch, 2007). Regan (2002) however makes a contradicting point saying that rebel support increases the rebel's expectations and blurs their perceptions. They may be strong enough to fight but not strong enough to force the

government to concessions, leading to what he calls a "hurting stalemate". In this way, foreign support to rebels prolongs rather than shortens a civil war.

A substantial less amount of attention has been given to foreign support for *governments* in civil war. This is remarkable given the emerging occurrence of this phenomenon since the beginning of the Cold War. Of the 138 intrastate conflicts of the post Second World War period, 62% involved some form of military or economic intervention by a third party (Regan, 1996: 344). The literature suggests that intervening foreign actors pursue their own range of goals. Work as early as Deutsch discusses the phenomenon of "proxy wars" (Deutsch, 1964). Stavenhagen claims that regional powers may in fact have expansionist or geopolitical goals, which draw them into civil conflicts in order to consolidate their hegemony and enable them access to valued resources (Stavenhagen, 1996).

Scholars adopt different standpoints as to what are the principle reasons for supporting a government in civil war. Constructivist views like those of Gleditsch say that these motives are shaped to a large extent by a state's affinity and antipathies to other regimes (Gleditsch, 2007). In my view however, intervention is a rational decision that is the result of a cost-benefit analysis and driven by a degree of self-interest. Economic interests seem to be a key factor. International trade flourishes under conditions of political stability and the prospect of political instability can induce states to take action. According to Bonfatti (2010), a key trading partner may be interested in keeping an incumbent in power because he can be controlled more easily from the exterior than his challenger, even if this means keeping in place a non-democratic regime. Bonfatti (2010) shows how American support for autocratic

regimes like Guatemala (1954), Chile (1972) led to a long period of civil violence. He concludes that foreign investment provides a strong incentive for external states to engage in civil conflict, even if this favours a non-democratic regime.

2.3 Intervention and civil war duration

Research has shown that foreign support for a government in civil war tends to prolong rather than shorten the civil conflict. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline find empirical support for their claim that long civil wars correspond to the equitable distribution of third party interventions (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). They draw evidence from a data set of the Correlates Of War project consisting of 152 civil wars in the period 1820-1992 and show that as support for the government in civil war increases, the hazard rate decreases, corresponding to a lengthening of the duration of civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). Regan has developed a new data set including consistent indexes for intra-state conflicts and external interventions from 1944 onwards. He shows that many interventions in civil war, especially those on the side of the government, do not necessarily have the purpose of solving the conflict but only to prevent defeat by the opposition. By reviving the government's capacity to sustain the fight against the opposition foreign intervention extends the civil war (Regan, 2000). Luttwak follows up on this and states that third party interventions increase the heath of the conflict, resulting in an artificially stalemated conflict that is characterized by a higher rate of death and destruction in the long-run (Luttwak, 1999). Based on the data set of Regan (2000), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) found that out of 138 intra-state conflicts since 1944, 89 attracted external interventions by at least one external party. Crucially, the mean duration of civil wars that had ended and which had experienced foreign intervention was nine

years, while those wars that had ended but did not experience foreign intervention had a mean duration of 1.5 years (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000: 10).

There is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a causal relationship between foreign intervention and the prolonged duration of civil war. From the current literature a number of strengths and limitations can be drawn. First of all, the majority of the scholars agree that interventions are rarely motivated exclusively by efforts to end conflict and promote peace. Rather interventions are motivated by the desire to influence outcomes in the conflict country in ways favourable to the intervener (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2005). A limitation however is that most studies that examine foreign intervention tend to focus on formal military interventions while in fact states rarely go as far as committing troops for action in other states (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham, 2003: 5). Rather, I will define external intervention as the unilateral intervention by a third party government in civil war in the form of military and financial assistance in favour of the government.

Crucially, a substantial amount qualitative research has been devoted to proving a causal relationship between foreign intervention and prolonged civil war duration. However, a considerable less amount of attention is given to the underlying causal mechanisms, the processes and causal chains that lead foreign intervention to extend the duration of civil war. Hence my research question: *How can foreign support to a government in civil war prolong the duration of the conflict?* In the next I propose seven testable hypotheses that are possibly causal mechanisms that link foreign intervention with durable civil conflict. These hypotheses are based on existing research in the field of conflict studies. The causal mechanisms that these hypotheses

represent are not mutually exclusive and some of them are discussed by the same authors.

3. Theory and Hypotheses

First and foremost, it is crucial to recognize the independent nature of foreign interventions. Civil wars produce windows of opportunity for third parties that want to pursue national security interests, claim resources or accomplish geopolitical goals (Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008). Therefore, an external party introduces new interests, preferences and possibly even veto's to the conflict (Cunningham, 2006). This leads to diverging policy goals and possibly also diverging policy methods to combat the rebels. From this follows the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *The diverging interests hypothesis*

Foreign intervention introduces new interests to the conflict, leading to diverging goals. This weakens the government's capability to combat the rebels and thus prolongs the conflict.

Related to this, a government that relies on external support to combat the rebels has limited space to deal with the rebels independently. Governments in civil war that are backed by external support face a potential trade off between increasing its military strength and maintaining its autonomy (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham, 2003: 5). In negotiations among multiple parties with diverging interests, the set of agreements that all parties will accept is smaller (Cunningham, 2006). Outside parties may be less willing to lay down arms and may pressure the government they support to continue to fight. In other words, the range of bargains that all parties would accept as opposed to continuing war is reduced significantly. Civil wars are complex to settle with the direct parties involved itself: The addition of a foreign actor makes the dispute even more complex and should lead to a longer civil war. From this we logically arrive at

the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The bargaining range hypothesis

Foreign support to a government in civil war reduces the bargaining range of the government in conflict and therefore prolongs the duration of the conflict.

Informational approaches to civil war look at the process of civil war as a constant change of information allowing parties to make assessments on their probability to win. Crucially, in multiparty conflicts the information revealed by the battlefield is difficult to interpret (Cunningham, 2006). According to Cunningham (2006), foreign intervention distorts information asymmetries because it manipulates the perceived costs of war. Outside interventions affect the transmission of this information and its content. A government that finds itself supported by an external actor may overestimate its chance of winning (Regan, 2002). In that case, a government in conflict may feel that confident that it becomes unwilling to do the necessary concessions that would lead to peace. Rebels on the other hand, may interpret the intervention as a sign of weakness and gain renewed motivation to continue to fight (Cunningham, 2006). In this way, information asymmetries caused by foreign intervention lead to distorted estimations of winning on both sides. Following the informational approach we expect:

Hypothesis 3: The information asymmetry hypothesis

Foreign support for a government in civil war distorts information asymmetries and thus prolongs the conflict.

However, even with complete information, one side of the parties involved can decide to continue to fight because it cannot commit to a peace agreement. The credible commitment theory of civil war is one of the most intriguing theories of civil war and is one that is widely discussed among authors (Salehyan, 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2010; Licklider, 2010). Such circumstances occur when waging war today can prevent one's opponent from gaining military strength in the future (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:13). For example, a temporarily weak government may settle an agreement with a strong rebel group. However, when the state becomes stronger due to foreign support, it is likely that it will default on its earlier bargain again. A commitment problem arises when one party has the possibility to permanently alter the strategic balance by continuing to wage war (Powel, 2006; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Seeing that a foreign actor can be a decisive factor in altering the balance of power towards the government, foreign intervention amplifies the credible commitment problem.

On the side of the rebels, the credible commitment problem comes into place when a proposed agreement offers less than what the rebels can gain by continuing to fight. Seeing that agreement may be influenced by a foreign actor that the rebels fiercely oppose, the rebels may instead decide to continue to wage war to gain the highest possible payoff (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:13). Recognizing that behind this renewed promise lies the interest of a foreign actor, possibly one that the rebel are opposed to in the first place, it is very likely that next to amplifying the credible commitment problem on the side of the government, a foreign actor negatively contributes the credible commitment problem on the side of the rebels as well. Therefore we expect the following:

Hypothesis 4: *The credible commitment problem hypothesis*

Foreign support to a government in civil war amplifies the credible commitment problem and thus prolongs the conflict.

When analysing the causal mechanisms that link foreign intervention to civil war duration it is important also to consider the strategy of intervention. By strategy we mean the mix of military, economic, financial or political instruments, as well as the way in which they are employed, to come to a certain outcome. Military and financial intervention is the most commonly type of intervention used (Pearson, 1974). According to Regan (2002), the use of force by an intervener is a critical aspect of the strategy. However, there is a significant amount of evidence that an overreliance on military means leads to a longer and more severe conflict in the long run. Stofft and Guertner (1995) found out that post Second World War interventions established precedents that lead to more bold and destabilizing behavior by governments. Claims that the imposition of military forces “stabilizes and pacifies” a target seem exaggerated in the light of the fact that all too frequently intervention is almost immediately followed by increased government repression, and a higher rate of deadly political violence (Pearson, 1974: 280). I therefore expect that:

Hypothesis 5: *The military-financial intervention hypothesis*

Foreign military and financial support to a government in civil war breeds civil conflict in the target and thus prolongs the duration of civil war.

Having identified five possible causal mechanisms that could explain how foreign intervention prolongs the duration of civil war, I will now present an alternative

hypotheses. Like stated before, a government's decision to fight can be viewed as a cost-benefit analysis. This calculus is influenced by a government's perceived military capabilities relative to its opponent. Foreign intervention can manipulate this calculus by altering the balance of power and to an extent that the government is able to sustain the fight (Regan, 2002). This should either lead to a victory or make the opposition realize that the potential terms possible in negotiation have a higher utility than the outcome of further military contest (Regan, 2002). The alternative hypothesis is therefore:

Hypothesis 6 (alternative): *The balance of power hypothesis*

Foreign support for a government in civil war tilts the balance of power in favour of the government and should lead to a shorter civil war.

In this chapter I have given evidence for the causal relationship between foreign intervention and prolonged civil war duration. Identifying the causal mechanisms that link these two variables would make these theories more complete and persuasive. In this section I have outlined five possible causal mechanisms. Having discussed the literature concerning foreign intervention in civil war and its possible prolonging effects, I will now proceed to explaining the methodology of my research where I will explain how I intend to test these hypotheses.

4. Research Method

In this chapter I discuss the research method that I adopt to answer my research question: *How does foreign support to a government in civil war affect the duration of the conflict?* This question is built upon two assumptions. The first is that a foreign actor that intervenes in civil conflict pursues an independent agenda, represents a separate set of preferences and possesses the ability to pursue these interests. The second assumption is that while a foreign actor may intent to shorten the conflict at hand, foreign intervention in fact prolongs the duration of civil war. The research question implies a causal relationship. The literature review showed that there is proof of a causal effect between foreign intervention and the prolonged duration of civil war. However, causal insight is accomplished not only by measuring *causal effects*, but also requires the identification of *causal mechanisms* (Gerring, 2004). Assuming that foreign intervention prolongs the duration of civil war, this research looks specifically at the *causal mechanisms* that lead foreign intervention to prolong civil war. In the following paragraphs I will explain the methodology of my research, discuss the variables and analyse case selection.

4.1 Concepts and measurements

In this research, the independent variable is the foreign support for a government in civil conflict. Foreign support is defined as the financial and military support from one government given to another government. The dependent variable in this research is the duration of the civil war. This variable is defined as the time span between the start of the civil war and the signing of a formal peace agreement. The goal of this research is to uncover the causal relations between the independent and the dependent variable. The most suitable method to accomplish this goal is the case study method.

According to Gerring (2004), case studies allow one to peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and its purported effect. Ideally, they allow one to “see” X and Y interact. To make these causal links clearly visible I will use process-tracing. Process tracing refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome in question (Bennet and Checkel, 2012). I will collect data using some primary but mostly secondary sources due to the biased and propagandist nature of most original materials. Because of its evidence gathering character, process-tracing and the case study research design are commonly associated with each other. In fact, the case study method is one of the most time-honoured approaches to the study of civil conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). One of its primary virtues is the depth of analysis that it offers (Gerring, 2004: 8). Regarding this particular study, this is especially important given the invariant nature of the causal relationship that I am studying. On the other hand, the case study method falls short in representativeness, which is the extent to which causal mechanisms found within one unit can be assumed to be true for a larger set of units (Gerring, 2004). This inherent weakness of the case study method is especially problematic when dealing with a strong confirmative study, however this study is of a more exploratory character. In this particular study, which focuses on causal mechanisms rather than causal effects, propositional depth is prized over breadth and case comparability is prized over representativeness.

4.2 Data and Case Selection

I adopt a multiple-case study method consisting of two cases that are literal replications (Yin, 2013). The research question focuses on the causal mechanisms

between the independent and dependent variable and therefore requires no variation on either variable (Ross, 2004). In other words, the research design requires two cases that experienced similar forms of foreign intervention within a similar context. The two cases that I have selected for my research are 1) US intervention in the Peruvian civil conflict starting in 1980 and 2) US intervention in the Colombian civil conflict starting in 1964. In the next paragraph I will verify my choice by explaining how these two cases meet the requirements and have experienced similar forms of intervention and experienced this intervention in a similar context.

Peru and Colombia have experienced similar forms of US intervention throughout the time frame identified. Together with Bolivia, Peru and Colombia were part of the same "Andean" umbrella initiatives of the United States. Therefore, they have been dosed with similar levels of military and financial aid and have been subject to similar strategies. The motives of intervention on behalf of the United States have been largely the same for both countries during the Cold War and the decades thereafter.

Additionally, this intervention occurred within a similar context. Both the Peruvian and Colombian civil conflicts erupted in the Cold War and are similar in character. The Peruvian government faces the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a Communist guerrilla movement that seeks to replace what it sees as a "bourgeoisie democracy" with a socialist democracy. Similarly, the Colombian authorities are challenged by the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo), a guerrilla movement with similar goals. Both movements use similar guerrilla tactics and derive their income largely from drug trafficking. What is also important to mention, is that both movements developed in a similar economic and political

environment with a relatively weak government and widespread social and economic unrest. It is in this context that the Shining Path and FARC have been able to increase their support base.

According to George and Bennett, one of the most common critiques of case study methods is that they are particularly prone to "selection bias" (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). This issue however, does not concern this particular research, since cases with similar outcomes were *deliberately* chosen. George and Bennett state that deliberate selection on the independent of dependent variable is justified when serving the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest (George and Bennett, 2005: 23). And this is exactly what this study aims to do.

Qualitative case studies like this one, have successfully illustrated causal dynamics of civil conflict in the past (Collier and Sambanis, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2005; Walter and Snyder, 1999). While generalization remains a problem, case studies can illuminate causal relations, generate new hypothesis for testing and stimulate accurate or more innovative data collection. The methodology and case selection that I have explained above provide a solid base for this research. Therefore, I will now proceed to uncover the causal mechanisms that show that US intervention played a clear role in extending the duration of the Colombian and Peruvian civil conflict.

5. Background

Before analysing how US intervention has possibly prolonged the Peruvian and Colombian civil conflict, it is important to get a complete understanding of the conflicts. In the methodology chapter I verified my choice for the Colombian and Peruvian civil conflict because of its similar contexts and intervention. This background chapter aims to explore exactly those aspects and is structured as follows. In the first section, I will examine the contextual problems of Peru and Colombia that set the stage for the emergence of the Shining Path and the FARC. In the second section, I will dig into the core of the Peruvian and Colombian conflict and analyse the challenges posed by the Shining Path and the FARC. In the final section, I will examine subsequent US intervention.

5.1 Section one: The contextual problems Colombian and Peruvian conflict

One of the principle casualties of the Peruvian and Colombian conflict is historical perspective. The majority of the literature portrays the Peruvian and Colombian conflict as one between the government and the guerrillas. However, to perceive Peru and Colombia merely as a host to guerrilla activity is to completely misunderstand the conflict at hand. Unfortunately, this is precisely how they have become to be viewed in the past decades. While it is true that both conflicts principally evolve around the government and their respective guerrilla movements, it would be wrong to treat these conflicts in isolation of the context they developed in. The following section explores the tapestry of historical and contextual elements that set the stage for the emergence of Peru's Shining Path and Colombia's FARC.

5.1.1 Weak governance

The principle factor that has contributed to the emergence of the Shining Path and the FARC is weak governance. Colombia is one of the oldest Latin American democracies, but it is a very weak one. Corruption is evident throughout all layers of the political and judicial system. Colombia's pronounced political fragmentation has served as the backdrop for numerous assorted power plays (Rochlin, 2011: 716). In the absence of a centralized state the country has been struck by violence numerous times. Many communist peasants grouped together to form self-defence movements, seeing waging war as the only way to challenge the government (Leech, 2002: 14). In the 1960s, the unification of several of these peasant movements led to the formation of the FARC, which became Colombia's largest guerrilla group. Next to this, a substantial amount of private armies were created such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). According to Schulz, these paramilitary organizations started as self-defence organizations consisting of landowners, political figures and the military, to provide civilians with protection from the FARC (Schulz, 1999: 216). But as these groups expanded, they became increasingly concerned with their own agenda. Soon their goals went far beyond protecting the population from guerrilla demands, as they started to "cleanse" entire regions of possible subversives (Leech, 2002: 19).

The Peruvian conflict finds its roots in weak governance as well. Peru is a democracy too, but a relatively new one due to its turbulent political history with alternating periods of democracy and authoritarian rule. Peru's most recent democratic transition occurred in 1980 after 12 years of military rule (CRS, 2009: 1). During the first 10 years of democracy the country was struck by a deep economic crisis. The leftist

president Alan García (1985-1990) pursued an antagonistic relationship with the international financial community and excessive spending on social programs led to hyperinflation and a debt crisis (CRS, 2009: 1). The subsequent president, Alberto Fujimori took a drastic turn and implemented an aggressive economic reform program. In 1992, he initiated a "self-coup" dissolving the legislature and calling a constituent assembly to write a new constitution (CRS, 2009: 1). He became increasingly regarded as an authoritarian leader and his actions led to a serious erosion of Peru's already fragile democratic institutions. Due to revelations of high-level corruption and human rights violations, Fujimori resigned in 2000 and flew to Japan. The current President Ollanta Humala has accomplished remarkable levels of economic growth, but does face a deep social crisis caused by economic inequalities.

5.1.2 Economic problems and social unrest

Due to weak governance the Colombian and Peruvian government have failed to solve the deep-rooted social-economic problems that lie at the heart of both civil conflicts. Most problems are concentrated in the agrarian sector. Rural poverty and other chronic problems are magnified due to a vast inequality of wealth, issues of land tenure and the dubious legitimacy of electoral politics (Rochlin, 2003: 30). While the endemic violence is partially responsible for Colombia's and Peru's economic decline, it is not the principle cause (Leech, 2002: 44). Since the swift implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, both countries have struggled. While Colombia is still one of the poorest countries of Latin America, Peru has in fact experienced a remarkable growth rate in the past decade (CRS, 2009: 5). This has caused a lot of social unrest, as Peru's poor feel that the country's economic prosperity has not reached them (CRS, 2009: 5). The Peruvian government, still recovering from the

democratic erosion in the 1990s, has difficulties dealing with this social tension. In theory, political power is highly centralized in Lima, but messages emanating from the capital lack legitimacy in most regions of the country (Rochlin, 2003: 29). In Peru and Colombia, in many regions economic enterprise operates completely outside government structures (Rochlin, 2011: 719). It is in the context of these social-economic problems that an acceleration of the war economy has taken place, which is stirred principally by the coca-trade.

5.1.3 The drug industry

The narcotics industry adds to the Peruvian and Colombian conflict a complex dimension. Narcotrafficking and its related criminal activities have boomed since the cocaine revolution in the 1980s and the subsequent voracious demand for drugs in the United States and Europe. The drug industry has found room to flourish especially in the Andean countries (Peru, Bolivia and Colombia) because of extreme poverty and the lack of centralized authority (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 3). This highly profitable industry induces drug-trafficking related corruption across the entire political and judicial spectrum. But most of all it provides armed groups, including the Shining Path and the FARC, with financial and military resources. Up until today the drug cartels remain one of the most powerful and obscure agents in the Colombian and Peruvian conflict.

In this section I have identified the three major contextual problems of Colombia and Peru. In the next section I will explain how the Shining Path and the FARC have benefitted from this context and grown into yet an even bigger challenge that the Colombian and Peruvian government have to face.

5.2 Section two: The Shining Path and the FARC

It is against the backdrop of weak governance, social economic problems and the emergence of the drug industry, that the FARC and Shining Path have been able to increase their power and influence. At its peak from 1989 to 1992, Sendero was clearly the most powerful and brutal guerilla movement in Latin America (Rochlin, 2003: 1). The FARC managed to exacerbate the chaos and mayhem in Colombia to the point that it represented the America's most significant strategic crisis at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Rochlin, 2003: 2). How did what started as small belligerent movements, grow into such a significant threat?

5.2.1 Foundations and ideology

It was during the Second Conference of the Guerrilla Block of Southern Colombia in 1966 that the FARC was founded (Lee, 2012:30). The movement is a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization that derives its support principally from the countryside. The FARC says it represents rural Colombia against the economic depreciation caused by the ruling elite, the repressive violence caused by the state's military and the paramilitary armies, the exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies and the political influence vested in neo-imperialism of the United States. Its central objectives are land redistribution and a more equitable division of wealth. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the FARC steadily grew in numbers. Towards the end of the 1970s, FARC membership was up to 1.000 soldiers situated in the jungles of Guaviara, Caquetá and Putumay.

The Shining Path emerged somewhat later than the FARC (in 1980), but rapidly grew into a potent and ferocious guerrilla force. Similar to the FARC, the Shining Path is a

Communist-based guerrilla movement, but it finds its uniqueness in a highly violent and rigid neo-Maoist ideology (Rochlin, 2003: 23). The movement was created by Abimael Guzmán, who presided in a dictatorial fashion through a notorious cult of leadership (Rochlin, 2003: 23). The Shining Path's main goal was to destroy the existing Peruvian political institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime (Lucero, 2008). Guzmán afforded an important role to violence within the context of revolutionary struggle. The need to combat imperialism is another important feature of the movement's ideology. Guzman denounced the US as the main agent of imperialism in Peru (Starn, 1995: 407). While there are many similarities between the Shining Path and the FARC, the Shining Path's ideology is probably more exclusive, rigid and dogmatic. What else is unique is the way it plays into ethnic cleavages and secures firm indigenous support by resurrecting the historical greatness of the of the Inca civilization. In this line, it is no surprise that the Shining Path is often called the most complex, idiosyncratic, and destructive politico-military movement in twentieth century Latin America (Loveman, 1994: 205).

5.2.2 The Shining Path's and the FARC's rise to power

It was in 1980 when the Shining Path initiated its campaign. The movement was based in the rural areas of Ayacucho and Huanta and had approximately ten to fifteen thousand members (Lucero, 2008). The state's refusal to acknowledge the Shining Path's existence and its lack of military credibility gave the Shining Path the opportunity to deploy its forces to wage an effective guerrilla war against its enemies with near impunity (Lucero, 2008). In 1983 this policy of denial on behalf of the state changed abruptly into a disastrous deployment of state terror. The government adopted aggressive tactics in an attempt to destroy any popular sentiment held

towards the guerrillas. The Shining Path was displaced but then firmly established itself in the Upper Huallaga Valley, one of Peru's biggest coca regions. With an economy in recession, coca production boomed because it provided local farmers with a stable income and with larger profits than commercial crops. The precise relationship between the rebel movements and the drug trade remains hotly contested. Initially, the FARC and Shining Path denied their relation to the drug trade other than claiming to represent the political interests of the coca-farmers (Lee, 2012: 34). Soon though, both movements expanded their operations in the drug industry by maintaining a system of taxation on the production that took place in territories they control. Ever since, the drug-industry has become their main financial source to fund their military operations (Stokes, 2005). With help of the thriving cocaine industry, the Shining Path and the FARC experienced a major surge in power. During the 1980s they transformed from small, beleaguered guerrilla movements into major belligerent forces financed by organized crime. Nevertheless, both movements adopted unique strategies in their bid for power. The FARC for example, made a serious attempt to participate in formal politics while the Shining Path's adopted different propaganda methods to target specific groups. This will be illustrated in the next two paragraphs.

5.2.3 The FARC's short political history

It was in 1985 that the FARC officially entered politics through the formation of a political party called the Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union – UP) (Lee, 2012: 30). During its electoral debut the UP scored relatively well but tragically, the UP entrance in the political realm was followed by a major disruption of political violence. According to Mendez (1990), Rochlin (2003) and Tolle (2003), between 2000 and

4000 UP adherents were assassinated over a four-year period. In addition to this, President García launched a military attack against the FARC in 1990 without warning, killing the ideological cofounder of the FARC, Jacobo Arenas (Rochlin, 2012: 721). According to Rochlin, these devastating experiences solidified the group's argument for the necessity of armed struggle (Rochlin, 2003: 132). Seeing their distrust in the government reaffirmed, the FARC ended the UP experiment and alternatively increased its engagement in crime and up-scaled its military action. In the early 1990s the FARC had between 7.000 and 10.000 fighters spread over 70 fronts and inflicted numerous attacks on the Colombian military. Within a decade the FARC had turned into a military machine with a serious chance to topple the state.

5.2.4 The Shining Path's variety of tactics

The Shining Path did not attempt to engage in politics but made effective use of various propaganda tactics. Skilful indoctrinating methods were employed to engage those in the general population who were experiencing the greatest degrees of injustice caused by the Peruvian authorities. Despite some common themes, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly the Shining Path's tactics and ideology as it made effective use of traditional class cleavages, historical struggles and resentment against the religious and military institutions of non-Indian Peru. The Shining Path became known for sending out death threats to those they saw as agents of capitalism (Bejarano, 2013). In a few coca producing key areas, this strategy was modified. Instead of indoctrinating the coca farmers, the Shining Path specifically addressed their grievances against the government forces and drug traffickers so that the farmers began to regard the movement as an ally (Bejarano, 2013). Next to this, the Shining Path drastically downplayed its Maoist rhetoric of anti-capitalism, understanding that

support was based more on protecting and expanding coca crop profits than on the political cause of the Shining Path itself (Bejarano, 2013).

5.2.5 The guerrilla's bid for power

Around 1990 the Shining Path reached its peak with armed membership swelling to over 23.000 soldiers (Rochlin, 2003: 63). Not only had the movement consolidated power in key strategic areas of the country-side but the Shining Path was now close to conquering the urban terrain of Lima as well (Rochlin, 2003: 63). According to Rochlin, the Shining Paths's strategy at this time was extremely violent and now graduated to an extraordinary brutality that at times appeared sadistic (Rochlin, 2003: 63). Both the FARC and the Shining Path employed tactics like random car bombings, power outages, kidnappings, the destruction of infrastructure and political assassinations. The FARC tried to gain greater presence throughout urban Colombia as well. In 1996, the rebels overtook the Colombian military force on several occasions, but the greatest victory of all was the creation of the *Zona de Distensión* (demilitarized zone) (Rochlin, 2012: 722). In an attempt to solidify peace talks, President Pastrana ceded a section of the country as large as Switzerland. Predictably, the FARC used this territory for guerrilla training and narco-trafficking. But perhaps even more important, it strengthened the FARC's believe that it could force concessions from a seemingly weak government (Barón, 2001). By the late 1990s the FARC had a military support base of 17.000 troops spread over 60 fronts. When an attempt to seize Bogota failed, they intensified the rate of urban terror trying to increase their negotiating power. It was not until this point of time, when the Shining Path and the FARC had become extremely powerful and threatening, that the

Colombian and Peruvian government took far-reaching measurements to limit their influence. I will discuss their actions in the following paragraphs.

5.2.6 The decline of the Shining Path and the FARC

In Peru, it was under the Fujimori presidency that far-reaching measures were taken to eliminate the Shining Path's expanding power. His self-initiated coup in 1992 allowed him to temporarily rule by decree and legitimized the use of violence. Fujimori used intimidation to threaten local citizens and tortured and assassinated citizens for their alleged backing or sympathy for Shining Path (Bejarano, 2013). The Peruvian population suffered from wide spread human rights abuses from both the Shining Path as well as the government forces. Due to its extreme and unpredictable use of violence, the Shining Path failed to capture the hearts and minds of the people. The "people's revolution" had been transformed into a stark violent struggle where ideology was nowhere near to be found. Incredibly, the group's power base evaporated almost instantly following the capture of its charismatic and dictatorial leader in 1992 (Rochlin, 2003: 3). The group began to disintegrate and the level of violence diminished significantly.

Also the FARC started to face intensified pressure from the government, although this happened only at the turn of the millennium during the Uribe administration. With the help of the US, the government was able to launch a large counter-insurgency against the FARC. As a result, the FARC encountered some serious blows. In 2008, an attack by US-Colombian forces against a FARC base in Ecuador killed the group's second in command, Raúl Reyes and 24 others (Rochlin, 2012: 738). In the same year the group lost FARC Commander Tomas Medina (killed by US-Colombian forces near

the Venezuelan border), Iván Ríos (assassinated by his own bodyguard for a monetary reward from the government) and Comandante Karina Eldaneyis Mosquera, the FARC's most senior female leader (she surrendered). On top of that, they lost their ultimate leader, Manuel Marulanda who died from a heart attack. These losses were a serious blow to the morale of the organization, but also damaged what had been very consistent and experienced leadership for many years. In addition to this, the intensified level of terror has diminished the FARC's wider ideological appeal. Similar to the Shining Path, the FARC has lost much of its revolutionary commitment and acts more like a large criminal enterprise (Marcella and Schulz, 1999: 215). However, despite the military losses, lack of leadership and diminishing ideological commitment, the FARC and the Shining Path are no-where being completely defeated.

5.2.7 A never-ending conflict?

Up to today, the FARC and to a lesser extent the Shining Path, form a threat against the Peruvian and Colombian government. Drug trafficking continues to fuel their military capacity and financial resources. Experts say that the Shining Path has between 200 and 800 members and that the two factions in which the Shining Path split during the 1990s appear to be cooperating again (CRS, 2009). Different to the Peruvian government, who refuses to negotiate with the Shining Path, the FARC has become increasingly responsive to peace talks. Over the past years, the FARC has released most of its civilian and political hostages and in 2012 exploratory peace talks were initiated. The capacity of the FARC and Shining Path should not be underestimated though. On the contrary, the movements seem better armed than before, using rocket launchers and heavy machine guns that are possibly stolen from

the military or acquired from drug cartels (CRS, 2009). In response to renewed guerrilla activity, the Peruvian authorities have re-opened several military bases and increased police presence in some critical regions (CRS, 2009). Similarly, the Colombian government remains extremely careful, since as long as the political kidnappings, public terror and attacks of infrastructure continue to disrupt the peace process, the FARC is not finished.

In the last two sections I have examined the emergence of the Shining Path and the FARC and analysed the contextual problems that facilitated this. Having acquired a complete view of the conflicts and a full understanding of the contextual problems it is time to examine the involvement of the US.

5.3 Section three: US intervention

This section examines how US intervention took shape, which strategies were adopted and which goals were pursued. US intervention in the Peruvian and Colombian conflict is characterized by two dimensions; a counter-insurgency dimension and an anti-drug dimension. In the following paragraphs I am going to explore how these dimensions relate to each other and have evolved over the past decades. In order to fully understand the nature and the goals of US intervention in Peru and Colombia it is sometimes necessary to look at the US's approach towards Latin America as whole. It is therefore that I will start this section with a short examination of US policy towards Latin America before its intervention in the Colombian and Peruvian civil war.

5.3.1 Trade and expanding economic ties

The rapid growth of the US as a political and economic hegemony in the first half of the twentieth century had a big influence on Latin American affairs. For a great part, this was due to the fact that the US became Latin America's biggest trade partner and became Latin America's leading supplier of private capital and intergovernmental loans and aid (Bonfante, 2005: 6). When investments were under threat, the US did not hesitate to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American countries and help the political elite to crush rebellions (e.g.: Guatemala 1920, Dominican Republic 1916-1924 and Cuba 1917-1933) (Bonfante, 2005: 6). The US invoked the Roosevelt Corollary (a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823) to justify such military intervention. While the Roosevelt Corollary was meant to defend Latin American countries from European imperialist intentions, critics argue that it served as a means to obtain concessions and privileges in the interest of American corporations (Chomsky, 2004). The rise of reformist parties and the eruption of the Cold War however, led to a lot of uncertainty on behalf of the Americans.

5.3.2 The Cold War: Combatting leftist guerrilla forces

During the 1960s and 1970s the US tried to actively eliminate the spread of Soviet-backed communism by giving aid to centralist parties, covert CIA interventions in elections, supporting military coups and combatting leftist guerrilla forces. Concerned with national security and economic interest, the US followed Peru and Colombia with a suspicious eye towards the emergence of the Communist-based Shining Path and the FARC. US intervention in the Peruvian and Colombian conflict during the Cold War was highly focussed on counter-insurgency. The US encouraged Peru and Colombia to strengthen counter-insurgency programs by transferring weapons and

equipment, intelligence sharing and joint exercises. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 put most Defence Department spending on foreign military aid under supervision of the State Department. The Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military Financing program (FMF) made up the vast bulk of Washington's military transfers. Between 1980 and 1991 the MAP and FMF contributed more than \$2 billion to Latin America's security forces while IMET added another \$110 million (Isacson, 2005: 17). Next to political intervention, the US also interfered in the economic affairs of Peru and Colombia. Economic intervention was embodied by the Washington Consensus, which involved a set of economic policy prescriptions constituted by Washington-based institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Treasury Department. Such prescriptions included economic opening with regard to trade and foreign direct investment, the expansion of privatization and the retreat of the state. The Alliance for Progress was launched to familiarize the Peruvian and Colombian population with the American culture. However, these policies failed to address the deep-rooted social economic problems of Peruvian and Colombian society. It is therefore not a surprise that when the cocaine boom began in the 1980s, the lure of drug profits resulted in the massive cultivation of coca plants in the pre-dominantly guerrilla controlled regions providing those guerrilla movements with financial and military leverage (Leech, 2002:17).

5.3.3 The War on Drugs: Combatting narcotrafficking

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the US obsession with Communism, yet did not end US intervention. On the contrary, the US redirected its focus on other national interests. While financial and military assistance to Colombia and Peru had

already been profound, it was not until the 1980s that the floodgates of US money and weapons opened in the service of the "war on drugs". Since then, with only low-level coverage by the US media and almost no public debate on the matter, the US has stepped deeper and deeper into Peru's and Colombia's civil conflict (Leech, 2002: 2).

In response to the booming cocaine industry and its domestic drug problem, the US insisted on an overseas military solution focused on interdiction and eradication. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration introduced the term "narco-guerilla" as a means of demonizing the Shining Path and the FARC by linking them to international drug trafficking (Leech, 2002: 62). By doing so, the US justified the militarization of the war on drugs. In 1989 George W. Bush (Senior) launched the Andean Initiative. The centrepiece of the Andean Initiative was to empower Colombian, Peruvian and Bolivian military and police forces to carry out counter drug initiatives, and significant US training and support was provided to those forces willing to collaborate (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 3). In 1990 the funds totalled \$231.6 million of which all but \$48.6 million was spent on military and police assistance (Isacson, 2005: 3). The amount of aid increased rapidly. For example, in 1989 military and police aid for Colombia had been \$18 million while in 1990 this amount had jumped to \$93 million (Isacson, 2005: 3). Evidently, the focal point of US intervention had shifted from counter-insurgency to counter-narcotics.

5.3.4 Eradication and interdiction

At the onset of the Andean Drug War, the Shining Path and FARC had already established a powerful alliance between poverty stricken coca farmers and cocaine dealers. The growing intervention of the US added yet another dimension to the

conflict. With the aim of stifling the production of coca at its roots, the principle method adopted was manual eradication. The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) was and still is responsible for the eradication program's day to day operations in cooperation with local forces, while Southcom, the regional command, trains military units responsible for protecting and carrying out manual eradication and participates in intelligence to determine which areas to eradicate (Isacson, 2005: 33). In Peru, CORAH teams were occupied with the execution of eradication program using methods like burning, cutting and digging up the roots. However, this proved not to be a very effective method (Bejarano, 2003). Additionally, many CORAH workers suffered severe attacks from the Shining Path and local farmers. The increasing amount attacks on eradication teams displayed the ineffectiveness of the US's eradication programs and the government's incompetency against the insurgents and forced the US and Peruvian authorities to adopt a different strategy in the 1990s. A policy of interdiction was adopted, targeting cocaine laboratories, trafficker's airstrips and the drug traffickers themselves (Bejarano, 2003). An aerial interdiction program known as the Airbridge Denial Program (sometimes called the "shootdown policy") aimed to break the link between Bolivian and Peruvian coca fields and the criminal-run processing centres in Colombia. The program was suspended in 2001 after the Peruvian air-force, acting on US intelligence, accidentally shot down a passenger plane carrying a family of US missionaries (Isacson, 2005: 32). Nevertheless, the interdiction program did in fact successfully eliminate the production of coca in Peru and temporarily reduced the Shining Path's financial leverage. However, the successful elimination of coca production in Peru, shifted coca production to Colombia, which led to an intensified anti-drug program in that country.

5.3.5 Fumigation

In order to eliminate the growing coca production in Colombia, the US adopted an intense fumigation strategy. In the late 1990s the first fumigation campaign was launched whereby US supplied helicopters with US pilots sprayed vast amounts of toxics over coca producing fields (Leech, 2002: 66). Within a few months, 62.000 acres of coca had been destroyed, and the US and Colombia called the initial campaign a success. Soon it became clear though that more than just coca had been eradicated, as the deadly mist turned food crops brown and made children and animals sick. Moreover, the fumigation campaigns completely undermined the Colombian government's crop substitution program by indiscriminately destroying legal and illegal crops (Leech, 2002: 73). As part of the extremely militaristic approach in Peru and Colombia, rural poverty and the other economic causes of coca cultivation were largely ignored (Leech, 2002: 24). The growing involvement of the United States in the war against drugs provided the Shining Path and the FARC with an opportunity to produce a nationalist rhetoric which helped justify its use of violence and solidified its relationship with the farmers and the drug-traffickers (Bejarano, 2003). As the FARC and the Shining Path grew in power, the US adopted a more counter-insurgency approach again. In the next paragraphs I will explore this shift.

5.3.6 The Fujimori crackdown

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Shining Path posed a more serious threat than any other Latin American insurgency at the time (Vallas, 2003: 4). Despite resistance from the Peruvian government, so far the US had only been willing to give military aid for the purpose of eradication and interdiction. While the Peruvian government

viewed the insurgency as the first and most pressing problem, according to Washington it was the cocaine industry that destabilized the country and should be tackled at first. Seeing that previous eradication and interdiction effort failed to solve, or rather exacerbated the civil conflict, the US government finally decided to help the Peruvian state to combat the Shining Path first. During the Presidency of Fujimori, counter-insurgency strategies were intensified with great success. By 1995 the leader of the Shining Path had been captured and the movement was significantly weakened.

5.3.7 Plan Colombia

According to Rochlin, this strategic endeavour may have foreshadowed an increasing tendency by the US and Latin-American governments towards counter-insurgency based warfare, which was later used to a great degree in the case of Colombia (Rochlin, 2003: 256). US military and financial aid was temporarily reduced during the Clinton administration but was abruptly intensified as a result of the creation of a demilitarized zone in 1998. By then, the FARC possessed an estimated 17.000 troops spread over 60 fronts. Concerned with the growing strength of the FARC the US devised Plan Colombia, a \$7.5 billion Plan that would end the Colombian civil war, revive its economy and curtail cocaine production (Leech, 2002: 63). Plan Colombia was first and foremost a military aid program with more than 75 per cent of the package reserved for military and police aid (Rochlin, 2011: 726). This funded counter counterdrug battalions, helicopters, aircrafts and equipment for the Colombian police (Isacson, 2005: 46). The US contracted private corporations for the execution of many of its operations. By 2003, at least 16 US companies were present in Colombia (Rochlin, 2011: 727). Not only did this satisfy the domestic arms industry, the privatization of warfare served the purpose of attracting as little media

attention as possible (Rochlin, 2011: 727; Isacson, 2005: 44). Another important aspect of Plan Columbia was its careful consideration of intelligence and asymmetric warfare. Facing a well-funded, efficient and dispersed guerrilla group, the US government helped the Colombian military by making it quicker, equipped with better intelligence, and better capable of fighting in difficult terrain (Rochlin, 2011: 729).

5.3.8 The War on Terror: Combatting terrorism

Despite many of its shortcomings and brutalities, the overly militaristic approach of the US did in fact significantly weaken the FARC and the Shining Path. Between 1999 and 2001 the Colombian government and the FARC made several attempts to reach a peace agreement but failed because of the government's failure and refusal to dismantle the paramilitaries or the FARC's refusal to do any serious peace concessions. When the FARC and the Colombian government were close to reach a cease-fire agreement in April 2002, they hit upon another stumbling block. Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the rhetoric emanating from Washington under the presidency of George Bush shifted from emphasizing the FARC's role in the drug trade to the rebel group's place on the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations. According to Isacson, President Bush has been much less reluctant to execute counterinsurgency programs than his precedents. Since then, for many in Washington the "war on drugs" and the "war on terror" have become virtually indistinguishable.

While the military interventions in Peru and Colombia have debilitated the FARC and the Shining Path militarily, they have failed to eliminate the root causes for the existence of these leftist rebels in the first place (Rochlin, 2011: 740). In Colombia,

economic and political instability is still widely evident and the drug industry still poses a big challenge. In Peru, after a period of relative peace and stability, the insurgency seems to be on the rise again. This resurgence is widely associated with the loosening grip of Peru's government on narcotics control (Vallas, 2003: 166). Consequently, US aid towards Peru has been on the increase again. In 2009 for example US financial assistance included \$37 million for the Andean Counterdrug program (now part of the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance account), \$63 million in Development Assistance, \$750.000 for Foreign Military Financing and \$400.000 for International Military Education and Training (CRS, 2009:7). Also Colombia continues to be a large recipient of US finance.

Having acquired a full understanding of the Colombian and Peruvian contextual problems, the development of the Shining Path and the FARC and the nature of US intervention I will now proceed to unravelling the causal mechanisms to investigate how US intervention has prolonged the Peruvian and Colombian civil war.

6. Empirical Results

In the following chapter the hypotheses will be tested against the case studies of the Peruvian and Colombian civil war. This will determine what causal mechanisms lead foreign intervention to cause a longer duration of civil war.

6.1 Diverging interests

We established the independent nature of foreign actors and the fact that intervention is driven by self-interest. From this followed our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The diverging interests hypothesis

Foreign intervention introduces new interests to the conflict, leading to diverging goals. This weakens the government's capability to combat the rebels and thus prolongs the conflict.

The principle question that should be asked is, what are the true intentions of US intervention and how do they compare with the interests of the Peruvian and Colombian government? The primary interest of the Peruvian and Colombian government is to stop that factor that poses the biggest challenge to stable governance: The insurgency of the Shining Path and the FARC. A close assessment of the conflict and US intervention over the past decades reveals that for the US counter-insurgency is an important strategy not its principle goal. Most of the literature points at national security concerns as the overarching goal of US intervention. Counter-insurgency and counter-narcotic programs alternated each other to serve this purpose. This can be shown as follows.

During the Cold War, the US followed Colombia and Peru with a cautious eye to its leftist insurgencies and encouraged Colombia and Peru to adopt counterinsurgency doctrines, which emphasized irregular military and paramilitary operations alongside the general population to weaken and root out a perceived communist threat (Isacson in Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 17). According to Isacson, counterdrug-aid programs began during the 1970s but at this point of time they were dwarfed by counterinsurgency security assistance (Isacson, 2005: 19). As the Cold War was drawing to a close and Soviet influence diminished, a new mission began to reveal itself. Reviving the phrase "war on drugs", illicit drugs were presented as the new primary threat to US national security (Youngers & Roslin, 2005: 22). Eradication and interdiction efforts in Peru and an intense fumigation campaign in Colombia intensified US intervention in the Peruvian and Colombian conflict.

While increasing the anti-drug effort the US undermined the Peruvian and Colombian government's capability to deal with their goal, fighting the insurgency. This happened in the following way. First of all, US counternarcotic programs failed to address the social economic problems that surrounded the drug industry. Rather, this campaign fuelled violence and created a united front among coca farmers, guerrillas and narco-traffickers. Both the Shining Path and the FARC profited enormously from this relationship, which gave them the financial means to execute their military campaigns. Moreover, the "war on drugs" proved to be a valuable recruiting, mobilizing and propaganda tool for the guerrillas (Bejarano, 2003). By expanding their financial means, military capacity and support base the FARC and the Shining Path were able to pose a serious challenge to the Peruvian and Colombian government throughout the 1990s.

The extreme focus on drugs encouraged also other power plays. In Colombia this effect was especially devastating. By focussing explicitly on countering narcotics and without addressing the other actors involved in the conflict, US policy has weakened the state's ability to deal with the paramilitary violence (Marcella and Schulz, 1999: 213). The US' disregard of the paramilitary conflict has contributed to a militarization and disintegration of Columbia. In Peru, the counternarcotic campaign did in fact diminish the resource capacity the Shining Path but this was accomplished at the cost of immense levels of public terror (Fielding, 2012: 851). Thus, by explicitly focusing on narcotics and ignoring the other contributing actors in the Peruvian and Colombian conflict, the US undermined its own anti-drug campaign but most of all deepened and expanded the civil disputes.

As a result, the metaphorical "war on drugs" became all too real a battlefield (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 3). Viewing the Peruvian and Colombian conflict through the lens of a national security concern, the US came to adopt an increasingly militaristic strategy geared towards counter-insurgency again. In Peru, the US responded to the Peruvian government's demand to help tackle the guerillas first and this proved to be quite successful. With the help of the United States, Fujimori reversed a ten-year record of strategic failure on the part of the state by employing intelligence operations to obliterate the Shining Path. Given its pyramid structure, the Shining Path represented a perfect target for this strategy (Rochlin, 2003: 256). This strategic endeavour may have foreshadowed an intensification of counterinsurgency tactics in Colombia. Concerned with the growing strength of the FARC and related criminal activities, the US devised Plan Colombia. The US careful attention to

asymmetric warfare, intelligence and surveillance significantly weakened the FARC. At this point, the US' goals and strategies were more in line with those of the Colombian and Peruvian government and as a result, the insurgency was more effectively reduced in power and relative stability was accomplished.

According to Lindsay et. al (2008) civil wars produce windows of opportunity for third parties that want to pursue national interests. Clearly, the Peruvian and Columbian civil war created such an opportunity, allowing the US to pursue an intense counter-insurgency and counter-drug war for the purpose of national security concerns. A careful consideration of the case studies tells us however, that national security was not the only item on Washington's agenda. Many scholars assert that economic interest formed yet another important goal (Leech, 2001; Rochlin, 2010; Petras, 2001). I will shortly illustrate this. During the Cold War the National Security Doctrine was complemented by the Alliance for Progress, which familiarized the Andean countries with capitalism and American culture. According to Leech though, the Alliance for Progress merely acted as a safety valve for releasing growing social pressure while ensuring continued US hegemony in the region (Leech, 2002: 17). Colombia was also the first Latin American nation to initiate an Economic Development Plan, which held the US economy as a model (Leech, 2002: 17). At the same time, IMF and World Bank policies encouraged Peru and Colombia to open their economy and implement market-driven policies. As a result, Colombia's average tariff decreased from 44 per cent in 1989 to less than 12 per cent in 1993 and its trade surplus was abruptly turned into a trade deficit (Leech, 2002: 48).

Also post-Cold War US intervention had an economic motive. Plan Colombia has been analysed as representing the economic interest of the US government in a way

that it protects Latin America's markets and resources to the benefit of US-based corporations (Petras, 2001). According to Leech, the training and equipment of Colombian military forces not only served the purpose of eradicating coca or combat the guerrillas, but was primarily aimed at diminishing rebel attacks on US oil and mining companies situated in Colombia (Leech, 2002: 64). Finally, the discourse on terror has provided an ideological justification for the militarization of the country that benefits chiefly transnational corporations (Rochlin, 2010: 735). US intervention in the Colombian conflict protects US access to Columbia's extensive natural resources including oil, natural gas, coal, minerals and a relatively industrialized workforce (Leech, 2002: 66). A great part of the money is destined to assist military units to protect critical pieces of infrastructure and industry such as the Caño Limón pipeline in an attempt to protect the foreign investments of US corporations (Leech, 2002: 84). Just how important the role of US corporations are in Plan Colombia is shown by the fact that the MPRI, a private military corporation, was awarded \$4.3 million by the American government to provide advice as to how to structure warfare in Colombia and help to devise and formulate Plan Colombia itself. Other corporations that provided technology and advice were Lockheed Martin (radar systems), Sikorsky Aircraft and Bell Helicopter Textron (fighter helicopters) and Arinc (training, equipment and intelligence) (Rochlin, 2011: 727).

In conclusion of the analysis of the first possible causal mechanism that could explain how foreign intervention prolongs the duration of civil war the following can be said. The principle goal of the Colombian and Peruvian government was to bring a halt to the expanding power of the Shining Path and the FARC. For the US however, counter-insurgency was not a goal in itself but one of the strategies to serve national

security and economic interests. I have shown that these diverging interests undermined the Peruvian and Colombian government's ability to bring a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. We can thus conclude that US intervention, by introducing new interests, undermined the Peruvian and Colombian's strategies and thus prolonged the civil war.

6.2 The bargaining range

The Peruvian and Colombian government's strategies were undermined by yet another factor. On the one hand, US intervention significantly increased the military strength of the Peruvian and Colombian government, on the other hand a certain degree of autonomy was lost on their part, reducing their ability to deal with the insurgency independently. The militaristic nature of US intervention has led to an increasingly military response on behalf of the Peruvian and Colombian government as well. US interventionist programs like the Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia left little room for the Peruvian and Colombian government to act on their own initiative. Following our second hypothesis we expected the following:

Hypothesis 2: The bargaining range hypothesis

Foreign support to a government in civil war reduces the bargaining range of the government in conflict and thereby prolongs the duration of the conflict.

According to Cunningham, in negotiations among multiple parties with diverging interests, the set of agreements that all parties will accept is smaller (Cunningham, 2006). The interests of the US have indeed been an obstacle to accomplishing a peace agreement on some occasions. In 2001 for example, after a series of meetings

between President Pastrana and FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, both sides reached an agreement to resume peace talks with discussions focusing on a prisoner exchange and a possible ceasefire. When inviting President George W. Bush to join in the talks, the US refused to join claiming that the FARC was using its demilitarized zone to rearm and increase its drug profits (Leech, 2002:82). Somewhat later government talks with the FARC hit upon another stumbling block (Leech, 2002:82). Following the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, Washington changed its rhetoric from emphasizing the FARC's role in the drug trade to the guerrilla group's place on the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations, labelling the FARC as one of the most "dangerous international terrorist groups based on the hemisphere" and creating a \$98 million counterterrorism package (Leech, 2002:82). As a result, Colombian militaries beefed up their forces around the perimeter of the demilitarized zone, which lead the FARC to walk away from the negotiating table demanding free access to the zone and ordering all US military advisors to leave Colombia (Leech, 2002: 84). Washington responded by proposing a \$98 million counterterrorism aid package and only weeks later the demilitarized zone was retaken by the Colombian military undoing everything that had been accomplished in the preceding months (Leech, 2002: 85).

In Peru, the US did not directly pose a problem in negotiations due to the fact that the Peruvian government has always refused to conduct peace talks with the Shining Path. Indirectly thought, the US intervention did reduce the Peruvian government's bargaining leverage by damaging its image and credibility. With US training, equipment and diplomatic backing the Peruvian militaries on counterdrug missions began to mount roadblocks, execute searches and seizures, force down suspicious

aircrafts, eradicate crops and in some cases arrest and interrogate civilians (Isacson, 2005: 23). These activities were often accompanied by wide-spread human rights abuses, dead squads and massacres. US intervention played a role in the systematic erosion of the Peruvian government's democraticness and left it highly unpopular and incapable of effectively tackling the Shining Path.

The incidents mentioned above are meant to illustrate how the US action has hampered the Colombian and Peruvian government's ability to deal with the FARC and Shining Path independently and effectively. What is crucial though is to assess the bigger picture, to see how US intervention structurally reduces the likelihood of a compromise in the long run. Again, the underlying reasons are related to US national security and economic interests. As a consequence of its national security concerns, the US strongly encouraged increased military expenditure and military involvement of the Peruvian and Colombian military during the "war on drugs". While US saw drug trafficking as a national security threat, the Andean countries merely perceived it as a law enforcement problem. Not surprisingly, the Colombian and Peruvian government were reluctant to increase the military's role, especially at a time of tentative democratic reform (Isacson, 2005: 24). Nevertheless, Washington encouraged the Andean countries to militarize their counterdrug efforts by using heavy public diplomatic pressure (Isacson, 2005: 24). The demands to meet targets for the annual certification process and critical language appearing in official US reports encouraged countries to increase the military's internal role in order to be seen as cooperating with the United States (Isacson, 2005: 24).

A lot of encouragement took also form in economic incentives. Again this hints at the US's profound economic interests. The 1980s and 1990s were a period of economic transition in Peru and Colombia in which many neoliberal economic measures were swiftly implemented by economic elites (Avilés, 2008: 418). Past enthusiasm for liberal market economical strategies and IMF loans leave the current government no choice but to abide by the IMF's stringent demands or face a political and economic backlash from multinational corporations and governments of developed countries, especially the United States (Leech, 2002: 46). The swift implementation of market liberation policies led to an accumulation of a crippling external debt. According to Rochlin, the manipulation of debt has been used by the US as the ultimate political tool and has caused considerable adjustment pain Peru and Colombia, leading to exacerbated social tension and stimulating subversion (Rochlin, 2003: 15). In the case of Colombia, the imposition of economic austerity programs as part of the US economic policy do not allow the government to give realistic consideration of the sort of economic and social restructuring demanded by the FARC (Leech, 2002: 84). Since the beginning of the conflict in 1964, there have been four serious negotiation attempts between the FARC and the Colombian government. It was only this year, in 2013, that an agreement on land distribution was reached. Many other issues, like the future political integration of the FARC remain yet to be resolved however.

The same is true for Peru, although to a lesser extent. Economic relations have improved significantly since the Shining Paths relative decline in the 1990s. Strengthened US-Peruvian cooperation with the Andean Trade Preference Act (1991), the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (2002) and the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (2006) illustrate this. However, due to considerable leverage of

multinational companies and Peru's expanding economic elite, the Peruvian government structurally fails to provide an answer to protests from the indigenous population and the poor who feel that their rights are insufficiently protected. If the Peruvian government continues to put the interest of multinational corporations above these concerns, then this dissatisfaction among the poor and indigenous could provide a source of support for a possibly re-emerging Shining Path and result in a surge in power similar to its initial rise in the 1980s (which was caused by similar sources of economic and social unrest).

That US intervention, which is geared towards national security concerns and economic interest, has reduced the bargaining range of the Peruvian and Colombian government and hampered progress towards solving the conflict can be illustrated by various incidents. However, more important is to acknowledge that this has become a structural problem too. US national security concerns have forced the Peruvian and Colombian government to adopt an extremely militaristic approach to counter the Shining Path and the FARC and their drug related activities. US economic interests make it very difficult for the Peruvian and Colombian government to respond to the insurgency's demands and are a source of social and economic unrest that feed rebel support. We thus find our second hypothesis supported as well.

6.3 The informational approach

Having discussed also the second hypothesis, I will now proceed to address the third hypothesis concerning the information asymmetry approach. This hypothesis is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 3: *The information asymmetry hypothesis*

Foreign support for a government in civil war distorts information asymmetries and thus prolongs the conflict.

According to Cunningham (2006) foreign intervention distorts information asymmetries because it manipulates the perceived costs of war for both parties. I will discuss this notion with regard to the government side first and then proceed to discuss this with respect to the rebel side. On the government side, Regan claims that a government that finds itself supported by an external actor may overestimate its chance of winning (Regan, 2002). There are some signs that US support to Colombia lead to some overly optimistic thinking on behalf of the government. This has especially been the case in the years subsequent to Plan Colombia, which significantly weakened the FARC. According to Lee, the Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos called the FARC a "paper tiger" (Lee, 2011:38). Although the FARC has agreed to release hostages and shows more willingness to cooperate in peace talks, such benevolent acts should not be equated with military incapacity (Rochlin, 2012: 739). A case in point is the bombing of a video store in a crowded area in Bogotá just prior to the release of six hostages in 2009 (Rochlin, 2012: 739). Information distortions do play a role in the Colombian and Peruvian conflict but there is not sufficient evidence that these are caused specifically by the US. If anything, for both Colombia and Peru holds that US intervention has most likely improved rather than distorted information about the insurgencies' strength due to its assistance in intelligence and surveillance. By providing equipment and logistical support, the Peruvian and Colombian military have been able to effectively detect and subsequently attack guerrilla activity. In both countries US intelligence has played an essential role in capturing or killing key

figures of the FARC and the Shining Path. This strategy was especially important in capturing the Shining Paths' charismatic and dictatorial leader, Abimael Guzmán in 1992. Incredibly, the group's power base went from maximum to zero virtually overnight (Rochlin, 2003: 3). According to Rochlin, the FARC has been less vulnerable to a strategy decapitation as was effective against the Shining Path. Its leaders are well-known, yet they have not cultivated a cult of leadership and its troops remain widely dispersed across the country. This makes US facilitated intelligence an even more important strategy to rely on (Rochlin, 2003: 258). Thus, regarding the government side, US intervention has reduced rather than exacerbated information asymmetries and has not prolonged but rather contributed to shortening the civil war.

Considering information asymmetries caused by US intervention on the rebel side, we expected that intervention is interpreted as a sign of weakness and will lead to an overly optimistic calculated chance of winning and renewed motivation to continue to fight on behalf of the rebels (Cunningham, 2006). Although both the FARC and the Shining Path were heavily opposed to US support and may have interpreted this as a sign of weakness on the side of the Peruvian and Colombian government, there is no evidence that this increased their expectations of winning and lead to an increased level of force. Rather than viewing the *presence* of US intervention as a sign of weakness, in many cases rather the *absence* of US involvement was used as an opportunity to launch an attack. For example, during the Clinton administration US intervention in Peru and Colombia was relatively limited. It was during those years that the Colombian government ceded a territory as big as the size of Switzerland it in an effort to create a demilitarized zone and contribute to the peace process (Rochlin, 2010: 31). Encouraged by this victory, the FARC took a tougher stand in peace talks

until the US stepped into the conflict, derailed the peace talks and retook the zone. In Peru, there are signs that the retreat of US equipped counterinsurgency bases and patrols in the past years has led to renewed Shining Path activity. In 2008 for example, the group launched its most violent attack in a decade, killing two civilians and thirteen soldiers (CRS, 2009: 8).

We can thus conclude that the information asymmetry hypothesis finds itself not supported because there is insufficient evidence that US intervention caused information asymmetries, which distorted the actors chances' of winning in such a way that it prolonged the conflict. Rather, US intelligence and surveillance have contributed to reducing information asymmetries, which in turn enabled the Colombian and Peruvian military effectively eliminate some of the key leading figures, and detect military bases and drug sites of the FARC and the Shining Path. Doing so, US intervention has contributed to shortening, rather than extending the duration of the conflict.

6.4 The credible commitment approach

Having discussed information asymmetries we will now move on to yet another commonly discussed phenomenon in the study of civil conflict. The fourth hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 4: The credible commitment problem hypothesis

Foreign support to a government in civil war amplifies the credible commitment problem and thus prolongs the conflict.

The credible commitment problem arises when a proposed agreement offers less than what the government or rebel side can gain by continuing to fight. In that case this party will not be able to credibly commit to an agreement because it foresees a future possibility to permanently alter the strategic balance (Powel, 2006; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Based on the literature review, we know that the credible commitment problem hypothesis requires us to look at situations where 1) foreign intervention caused the state to default on an earlier promise because the balance of power had tilted in its favour, or 2) situations where rebels have defaulted because they could not commit to a promise made by a party that sees itself supported by an enemy that it deeply mistrusts.

Considering the first situation, the problem that rises it that there have been only a few situations where a promise or agreement was made between the government and the guerrillas. One possible situation is the re-occupation of the demilitarized zone by Colombian forces in the late 1990s as a result of US support. In the Colombian and Peruvian case, the second situation is considerably more interesting to study. Generally, scholars do affirm that US intervention poses a serious obstacle to solving the civil conflict of Peru and Colombia because of the rebel's deep distrust towards the US. The FARC for example, has always proclaimed that the US uses the issue of narco-trafficking as an excuse to increase its influence over Colombian internal policies and practices (Lee, 2011: 34). Also the Shining Path deeply mistrusts the US, denouncing it as the main agent of imperialism in Peru (Starn, 1995: 407). Many of the rebel's attacks have been specifically aimed at US related targets. For example, the Occidental Petroleum's Caño Limón pipeline was bombed over 1.000 times between 1990 and 2003 by the FARC. Of these attacks, 178 occurred in 2001, the

year in which US counterinsurgency was most intense (Rochlin, 2011: 737). In Peru, the Shining Path was involved in a car bomb explosion just outside the US embassy in Lima, right before a visit by US President George W. Bush in 2002. The explosion killed nine and injured thirty people.

However, both rebel groups have undergone significant changes in terms of ideology in the past decade. They have downplayed their revolutionary roots and proclamations about the imperialist intentions of the US significantly. While US influence remains an important source of resentment, it is not the focal point of the rebel's campaign. Rather than targeting the US directly, their anger is directed towards the Peruvian and Colombian government and the economic elite for their way of collaborating with the US and its associated institutions and corporations. This downplay of revolutionary rhetoric is principally caused by the fact that many of the older figures of the FARC and the Shining Path have died or have been captured. Their current recruits are relatively young and inexperienced and do not believe as strongly in the rebels' ideology as the older members did. Most join for more selfish reasons such as notoriety and personal financial gain (Lee, 2011: 39). In Peru for example, many recruits join the Shining Path not for its Maoist ideology or anti-imperialist rhetoric but because it gives them access to the highly profitable drug industry. The commitment problem caused by US intervention has played a bigger role in prolonging the conflict in the past than it does nowadays. Currently, the Peruvian and Colombian government seem to contribute especially to the credible commitment problem. We established that the credible commitment problem comes into place when a proposed agreement offers less than what the rebels can gain by continuing to fight. The institutional weakness, corruption and lack of attention to economic and social

inequalities on behalf of the Peruvian and Colombian government are important factors that induce the rebels to continue to fight rather than to lie down their arms. It is therefore that the fifth hypothesis is only partly supported because today, it is not the US, but the Peruvian and Colombian government that contribute to the credible commitment problem the most.

6.5 The balance of power

Before turning to the fifth hypothesis I will discuss the alternative hypothesis, which states:

Hypothesis 6 (alternative): *The balance of power hypothesis*

Foreign support for a government in civil war tilts the balance of power in favour of the government and should lead to a shorter civil war.

Following the balance of power hypothesis, foreign support to a government in civil war should increase the government's capabilities, increase its estimated chance of winning and tilt the balance of power in favour of the government leading to a shorter civil war. Two questions come to the surface. The first question that should be asked is: Did US intervention increase the Peruvian and Colombian government's capabilities to combat the guerillas? The subsequent question is then: Did increasing the government's capabilities translate into a shorter civil war?

The earlier interventions of the US in Peru and Colombia up until the 1990s did not sufficiently increase the Peruvian and Colombian government's capabilities to combat the rebels. During this time, the Shining Path and the FARC found room to increase

their military capacity and expand their territory. It was not until the 1990s that the US stepped up its game and US intervention became overwhelmingly geared towards combating the rebels. In Peru, this was a result of the increased cooperation between President Fujimori and the US administration on national security. In Colombia, US intervention hit a highpoint with the initiation of Plan Colombia.

Concerning the first question, at this point of time US intervention did indeed increase the Peruvian and Colombian government's capability to combat the rebels. According to Lee, the massive US military aid flowing into Columbia has dramatically increased the cost of the military struggle for the guerrillas (Lee, 2011: 30). Rochlin points out four ways in which the US has played a determinant role in weakening the FARC. First of all, by making effectively use of asymmetric combat tactics and training the Colombian army how to fight highly mobile guerrillas. Secondly, by surveillance and intelligence, which has made it easier to detect guerrilla and drug-trade activity. Thirdly, the US helped to weaken the communications system of the FARC. In Peru, it was due to the US intelligence service that the ultimate leader of the Shining Path could be captured. This leads us to our second question: Did this translate into a shorter civil war?

On the one hand it did, because US intervention helped to reduce the power of the FARC and especially the Shining Path significantly. However, this did not necessarily end of the conflict. On the contrary, while combatting the rebels a lot of collateral damage was caused forming yet another obstacle towards bring the conflict to a peaceful end. In Peru, US foreign intervention has a mixed record since the military and financial support to the Peruvian military raised the level of violence against

civilians (Fielding, 2012). Additionally, the involvement of the US-Peruvian military in human right violations and massacres fueled anti-governmental emotions (Bejarano, 2013). In Colombia, the explicit focus of US intervention on the FARC gave other actors, especially the paramilitaries, the opportunity to increase their influence. Despite the current weakness of the FARC, up until today the government does control the entire Colombian territory.

Thus, US intervention indeed increased the government's capabilities and led to a significant reduction of the influence of the guerillas. However, this was accomplished at the cost of increased civil violence and surging power of other actors in the conflict and therefore did not directly translate into a shorter duration of the conflict.

6.6 Military-financial intervention

The results relating to the alternative hypothesis laid out above, have told us that US intervention was determinant in reducing the influence of the rebels, but that this was accomplished at a high cost. This makes us question whether the military approach adopted by the US was in fact the right method of intervention. I mentioned earlier that when analysing the causal mechanisms that link foreign intervention to civil war duration it is important also to consider the strategy of intervention. Therefore, I constructed the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: The military-financial intervention hypothesis

Foreign military and financial support to a government in civil war breeds civil conflict in the target and thus prolongs the duration of civil war.

The literature review revealed that there is a significant amount of evidence that an overreliance on military means leads to a longer and more severe conflict in the long run. After careful examination of US intervention in Colombia and Peru I draw the conclusion that this is the case for the Colombian and Peruvian civil war as well. This result is based on three arguments.

First of all, the extremely militaristic approach of the US led to a militarization of the overall conflict. Weapons and other military supplies that were meant for the police and the military fell into the hands of paramilitaries, drug traffickers, coca cultivators and most importantly the FARC and the Shining Path through trafficking and corruption. In Colombia, quite some paramilitary groups and FARC sections have formally surrendered; however, it has been extremely difficult to disarm and demobilize the recruits (Lee, 2011: 34). Often these recruits experience difficulties integrating into society, which results in them creating new armed groups. The militaristic nature of the US did not only fuel the guerrillas with arms, but also with support. The military character of the eradication, interdiction and fumigation campaigns has driven many farmers and civilians into the hands of the rebels, which allowed them to establish a stable support base (Lee, 2011: 34).

Secondly, the militaristic approach of the US has led to an intensified level of violence overall. An empirical study conducted by Fielding has revealed that the militarization of Peru and the use of force by the Peruvian government encouraged the use of violence on behalf of the guerrillas, leading to a spiral of continuous violence. His study reveals that different types of aid affect the level of violence and combat

activity (Fielding, 2012: 851). The results show that military aid increases the government's combat capacity. Subsequently, the positive coefficient of the insurgent's use of violence equation, implies that the insurgent respond to this by increasing violence as well (Fielding, 2012: 860). Development aid however, has a different effect since the negative coefficient of development aid in the insurgent's use of violence equation, suggests that aid increases the opportunity cost of insurgent recruitment, which limits their ability to use violence (Fielding, 2012: 860). In other words, a greater focus on development aid makes it more difficult and more costly for guerrillas to recruit and thus limits their capacity to use violence.

Thirdly, by adopting an extreme militaristic approach the US is only treating the symptoms of the civil conflict and not the cause. According to Rochlin, an enormous strategic weakness of the US has been the lack concern regarding the forces that spawned dissent and civil warfare in the first place (Rochlin, 2003: 262). In the background section I identified weak governance, social economic unrest and drug trafficking as the most prominent problems. With regard to weak governance, the US approach has paid only little attention to strengthening the Peruvian and Colombian state institutions are contribute to making them more stable democracies. For Plan Columbia for example, more than 70 per cent of aid package was reserved for state security and counternarcotic operations while just about 8 per cent was invested into alternative development projects, 6 per cent to a human rights program, 4 per cent to the displaced, 2 per cent to judicial reform and less than 1 per cent to support the peace process (Leech, 2002: 67). Concerning Peru, the US has received a lot of criticism for neglecting to address the issue of human rights and democracy that hit a low point during Fujimori's rule. Many analysts claim that the US' decision to

disregard human rights violations and Fujimori's authoritarian rule was a calculated decision. In other words, US officials were satisfied that the Peruvian authoritarian regime responded to US concerns and chose not to express their discontent over human rights abuse. Just as authoritarian leadership was often considered necessary by the US government during the Cold War given the appeal of communism, it was now considered necessary given the appeal of the drug trade and the reversal of free market reform (Vallas, 2003: 159). Despite durable US involvement, Colombia remains a state with one of the highest rates of political killings and forced disappearances. The government structurally fails to protect its politicians and civilians from assassinations and kidnappings, leaving the political arena paralyzed and inaccessible. In light of the current progression with the peace talks, a political solution for the FARC becomes a possible reality. The UP experiment in 1985 was a disastrous first attempt. Almost twenty years have past but it remains questionable though if Colombia is ready for another trial.

Concerning social economic unrest, the US military approach undermined the problems of Colombia's and Peru's rural population. According to Schulz, US funding that is currently spent on fumigation and eradication is better spent on viable crop substitution programs combined with infrastructural development to help peasants change to the production of legal crops that is truly profit generating (Schulz, 1999: 226). Even if the government were to achieve a complete military victory over the FARC, that victory would have to be coupled with a political agreement that deals with poverty, insufficient employment and educational opportunities and economic equality. Fortunately, in the past decade the US has downscaled its military assistance in Peru and instead significantly increased funds that go to development, crop

substitution programs and judiciary reform. The current allocation of aid is a significant improvement compared to the 1980s and 1990s seeing a substantial increase in funds for alternative development programs. In 2008 for example, Peru and the US signed a \$35.6 million Millennium Challenge Threshold program to support Peru's efforts to reduce corruption in public administration, implemented by USAID (CRS, 2009: 7).

These policies have proven to be quite successful in solving the third problem, drug trafficking. In Peru, counternarcotic policies seem to have been successful in eliminating the relationship between the narcotraffickers and the guerrillas. UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) reports show that between 1992 and 2002 coca production fell by 63% (UNODC, 2003). In the past decade coca production has stabilized but slightly increased by approximately 2% annually (UNODC, 2010). In 2012 though, Peru took over Colombia as the world's largest coca producer. This is inevitably related to a rapid fall of coca production (15% between 2001 and 2009) in Colombia (UNODC, 2010). Experts warn for a "comeback" of coca production in Peru due to successful eradication efforts in Colombia and a rapid increase in demand from Europe. This increase has been characterized by re-appearances of the Shining Path. So far, the US approach has been quite successful in putting a temporary halt to coca production in the Andean. However, to avoid a re-emergence of coca production and related guerilla activity in the near future, also other strategies, including regional cooperation and a greater focus on demand restricting policies in the West, should be adopted.

Thus, financial and military support to the Peruvian and Colombian government led to

an intensification of the civil conflict because it increased the access and the use of arms by all actors involved in the conflict. By neglecting the importance of complementary development and social-economic policies US, strategy failed to tackle the structural problems that provide the base for guerrilla support and which are essential for terminating the civil conflict.

7. Conclusion

In this study we have moved beyond the assumption that civil war is a two-party process and acknowledged the need to investigate the role the role of foreign intervention, which has become a salient phenomenon in the past decades. The following question has been addressed: *How can foreign support to a government in civil war prolong the duration of the conflict?* Whereas previous studies in the scholarly field of foreign intervention and civil war have provided evidence for a causal relationship between foreign intervention and prolonged civil war duration, this study aimed to unravel the causal mechanisms that lead foreign intervention to prolong the duration of civil wars by looking at US intervention in the Colombian and Peruvian civil conflict. In this last chapter I will first review the evidence in the light of the articulated hypotheses and then discuss some of the implications in terms of theoretical development and policy formation.

The hypotheses

Acknowledging the independent nature of foreign intervention, we found support for the first hypothesis. Diverging interests and policy goals between the Andean governments and the US lead to diverging strategies. The dominance of the militaristic approach has limited the bargaining range of the Peruvian and Colombian government on various occasions and will probably continue to do so in the future. Thus, we see our second hypothesis supported as well. The third hypothesis looked for possible information asymmetries caused by intervention but was refuted because evidence showed that US intelligence and surveillance contributed to shortening rather than extending the conflict. Regarding the fourth hypothesis, which addressed the credible commitment problem, we concluded that US intervention may have

contributed to this problem in the past, but current evidence points at the Peruvian and Colombian government as the actors that pose the biggest obstacle for the Shining Path and the FARC to credibly commit to a peace agreement. The case studies provided insufficient support for the informational approach and the credible commitment theory. The fifth and sixth hypothesis addressed the strategy of US intervention. Regarding the sixth hypothesis we found that the US military-financial approach did indeed limit the power of the insurgents but that this did not directly translate into a shorter duration of the civil war overall. Next to this, by treating only the symptoms of the civil conflict, and not its cause, US intervention contributed to prolonging the duration of the conflict. This means that we can accept the fifth hypothesis and refute the sixth and alternative hypothesis.

Having analysed the hypotheses we can conclude that the following causal mechanisms contributed to US intervention prolonging the duration of the Peruvian and Colombian civil war in the following way. While the principle goal of the Peruvian and Colombian government is to fight the insurgents, for the US, counter-insurgency is not a goal in itself but merely a *strategy* to serve national security concerns and economic interests. The military-financial intervention that was adopted to serve this purpose has limited the Peruvian and Colombian government's ability to deal with the insurgents independently and effectively. Next to this, US intervention has militarized the conflict and encouraged the deployment of violence by all actors involved in the conflict. Finally, while the US may have debilitated the FARC and the Shining Path militarily, by disregarding the root causes for the existence of these rebels in the first place, it has failed to terminate the conflict as a whole.

Theory development

The implications for theory development in the field of foreign intervention and civil war are as follows. Having examined the first two hypotheses I conclude that the role of foreign intervention must be assessed relative to the motives of interveners. Also, one must consider how and in what way this intervention changes the relationship between the government and the insurgent (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2008: 5). The case-study method has proven to be a valuable method to examine these aspects and I therefore encourage to further this method in this field. Interestingly, while the informational and credible commitment approach are two of the most respectable theories in studies that have focussed on the causal effect between foreign intervention and civil war duration, in this study, which examined the causal mechanisms, we found relatively little evidence. Additionally, while previous studies focussed primarily on formal military intervention, the results of the last two hypotheses of this study insinuate that more attention should be devoted to studying a larger variety of strategies and their perceived effect on civil war duration.

Policy formation

Moving to the implications for policy formation I believe that two important lessons can be drawn. First of all, policy makers should be conscious of the risks of introducing foreign actors into a civil conflict since foreign actors are likely to have potentially separate interests to conflicts than domestic actors do, which makes it more difficult to terminate the conflict (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2008: 20). Secondly, the notion of what constitutes an effective intervention strategy is an important element in understanding how civil conflicts are managed (Regan, 2002: 72). When focusing exclusively on military and financial forms of outside

interventions, the symptoms of the conflict may be cured but not its cause. A military approach encourages governments to focus on internal enemies but distracts them from stabilizing and empowering their political and justice systems (Isacson, 2005: 52). Past interventions can be criticized due to their apparent blind spot regarding the importance of the cultivation of social consent, which in the end is the basis for political stability and durable peace (Rochlin, 2011: 740). Hopefully, current interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and Syria will take a different course but at the moment the picture seems rather bleak.

In this line, I am in favour of limiting the number of bilateral interventions and encouraging as much as possible interventions of a multilateral character. In the case of multilateral interventions, there is less chance that the interests of one intervening party comes to dominate the interests of the supported government. Next to this, multilateral interventions tend to adopt more varied strategies, that is if the true intentions of intervention are truly to solve the conflict. As the Colombian and Peruvian case have shown, if the objective of an intervention is simply crush an insurgent to serve only national security or economic concerns, then an outside military intervention is an effective strategy to do so. However, if the objective of an intervention is to truly terminate a civil conflict and establish durable peace, then a solemnly military intervention is probably one of the most devastating strategies that one can adopt.

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