Serving in uniform during the Spring

A case study of the role of the Egyptian military in the transition

By

Lebna de Voogd-el Mhamdi

Supervisor: dr. Daniela Stockmann

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Table of Contents

Chapter I   Introduction

The Egyptian revolution has celebrated her first anniversary in 2012. Is there a cause for celebration? The New York Times reported this April that the Egyptian Army is not only closing down civil society organizations but also successfully manipulating the drafting process of the new constitution (Dunne & Nawaz 2012). The committee that was working on a new constitution has been suspended by an Egyptian administrative court (Kirkpatrick 2012). The suspension has serious consequences because the Egyptian people will elect a president before the ratification of a new constitution. The new president will have the same powers that the former President Hosni Mubarak had during his dictatorship. The formation of a democratic government and the development of democracy will therefore face major challenges. This paper will focus on the challenges related to the role of the army in promoting or obstructing the democratization.

Diamond (2011:299) was like many scholars surprised by the development of a possible fourth wave represented by the 2011 Arab Spring. Unlike Diamond who speaks of the possibility of a fourth wave Plattner presents the Arab Spring Uprisings of 2011 as a set of revolts that provoked a fourth wave of democratization after nearly a decade of decline in democracy worldwide (2011:5). According to Plattner the revolts have contradicted the idea of Arab countries being resistant to development of democracy.

The military helped to bring down the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian army sided with the protesters. At the beginning of the so-called 'Arab Spring' the military presented itself as keeper of the revolution and promoter of the transition from authoritarian

regime to democracy. The Spring started in Tunisia and its wind blew over several Arab countries. The Arab Spring surprised many scholars. Gause III has explored the reasons why middle east experts failed to predict the Arab Spring (2011: 81). He elaborates on the assumption of the unbreakable and close relationship between the dictators and their armies. This assumption was made by most of the scholars. Egypt and Tunisia proved this assumption to be incorrect. He finds the explanation for this incorrectness in the fact that scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies lost academic interest in studying the role of the military in Arab politics. The stability of the Arab regimes since the 1950s and 1960s led him and other scholars to assume that the subject had no relevance.

Unlike the role of the Arab military in transition to democracy the role of the military in the South European and Southern American democratic transitions has been subject of serious academic study. In this paper I would like to make a contribution in reducing the "gap" in the study of the role of Arab militaries in democratic transitions through a case study of the role of the Egyptian military in the transition from authoritarianism.

The Egyptian army has two significant choices to make. It will have to choose between peaceful transition to democracy or repressive transition to military rule. Analysing the choice the army has made in the transition by examining whether the military has changed its professional and corporate identity will help make a prediction on accepting civilian control over the military power. It will predict the readiness of the Egyptian army to change and readjust in a manner that can advance democracy.

Diamond argues that the near and far future will be marked by cycles and by ups and downs in a lengthily struggle to define the future political shape of the Arab world (2011:305). Exploring the military's capacity in facing the ups and downs is important to understand the role of the military in the shaping of political landscape in the future.

This paper is an "instrumental case study". The case study of the role of the military in Arab democratic transitions will be dominated by the focus on answering the following research question: "which role did the Egyptian military, play in promoting or hindering democratization in Egypt?" Analyzing the political actions the militaries took during the uprisings and the downfall of Mubarak will allow answering the question whether the military has promoted or obstructed the democratization process after the uprisings.

The theoretical framework provided by Larry Diamond and Felipe Agüero will help in interpreting the answer to the research question. The theory of developmental democracy will be used to classify the regimes in the case study and the results of the study of Felipe Agüero on military-civilian relations will give insight in how other authoritarian regimes in Latin-America and South Europe were able to reshape the military-civilian relations to facilitate democratization. Agüero has researched the conditions under what civilian rule in a post authoritarian context can establish democracy in the face of military resistance. In his study he compares the Spanish case with cases in Southern Europe and South America.

Although conclusions from a single case are insufficient to confirm or contradict general theories. This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the effect of militaries in new to be established Arab democracies. The current Egyptian regime held competitive parliamentary elections, while power remains mainly in the hands of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. It thus falls in the category of hybrid regimes (Diamond:2002). The Supreme Council of Armed Forces is not elected. Parties are under conditions allowed to compete. Nevertheless the core political power is out of their reach. Systems as the Egyptian system that combine authoritarian and democratic elements make it difficult to determine the dynamics of the

regime. Discovering the role the military hold in the dynamic may help obtain insight into the assistance the military should provide for the democratization process.

Chapter II includes the literature review that will assist in exploring the research topic in chapter IV. The research design will be set out in chapter III. Chapter V contains the conclusion and the summary of the answers on the research questions.

Chapter II   Theoretical part

During the Egyptian revolts of 2011 the Egyptian army supported the protesters and did not side with president Hosni Mubarak. His presidency came to an end and offered an opening for a transition from the authoritarian rule to possibly a democratic rule. The aftermath of the downfall of this dictatorship raise important questions regarding the role of the Egyptian army in democratic changes. This questions will be answered in chapter IV. Why did the Egyptian army not side and defend the president? How did the military after the collapse of Mubarak use the opportunity to help build a democracy? Did the military actively intervene in the political process by creating conditions that help promote or sabotage a peaceful transition to democracy? These questions can not be answered properly without first reviewing in part I of this chapter the literature dealing with the developmental theory of democracy regarding transition of democracy and secondly in part II reviewing the literature dealing with the role of the military in transitions.

Part I   Developmental theory of Democracy

Is Egypt undergoing a transition to democracy? The case study of the role of the Egyptian military in the transition uses the definition of transition which is developed by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986a:6). This means that the transition starts by the termination of an authoritarian regime and comes to an end by the establishment of an alternative regime. Their alternative regime can be democratic or authoritarian. The transition is an interval between two regimes (1986b). Applying the definition given by O'Donnell and Schmitter Egypt finds itself in this interval and therefore in a transition. But is it a transition to

a "democratic rule"? This question will addressed in the empirical chapter and answered in the concluding chapter of this paper.

Diamond has classified non-democratic regimes and addressed the types of agenda's that must be accomplished to obtain a successful transition to democracy(1999:64-117). His concept regarding the developmental theory of democracy is used as a theoretical framework in the case study.

Diamond views democracy as a developmental phenomenon (1999:17). Viewed from a developmental perspective democracy develops in parts or in stages (Sklar:1987). He perceives continued democratic development as a challenge for all countries and all new and established democracies. The fate of democracy is thus perceived as open-ended. Moreover, democratic development may move both ways. Just as electoral democracies can become more democratic. They also can become more illiberal and less democratic. Diamond suggests that all political systems including democracies –liberal or otherwise- tend to become rigid, corrupt, and unresponsive over time in the absence of periodic reform and renewal. Democracy may even effectively disappear. This may happen through the breakdown or overthrow of formal democratic institutions and other processes of decay. This is a phenomenon Diamond calls the progressive "hollowing out" of formal democracy (1999:19).

Electoral democracies can become more democratic. However Diamond argues that many new democracies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America face serious challenges in reducing the autonomous and democratically unaccountable power of the military (1999:113). In the case of Egypt the role of the military in a transition process can be a crucial one. Part II of this

chapter will based on the work of Felipe Agüero explore the role the military can play in a transition process.

Part II   Role of the military in transitions

Agüero explores the role of the military in transition of democratization in depth in his study of Post-Franco Spain (1995). Agüero's study developed a theoretical framework answering the question how the Spanish pro-democratic movement was able to force the military to accept a democratic regime that results in dismissing Franco's political legacy.

The analysis includes both the transition and the post-transition period. This is relevant because each of these phases results according to Agüero in opportunity structures by which political actors can be influenced (Agüero:1998). Which political actor will at the end conquer? The answer to this question is dependant on how successful civilian or military rulers are in mobilizing political resources within both phases. In order to subordinate the military to civilian control Diamond points out that civilian institutional capacities to manage and oversee the subordination must be strengthened in the executive and legislative branches (1999:76).

The power of civilian leaders and the power of the military leaders is shaped by different factors. Agüero identifies the following four factors (1995:33). Whether the former regime was a civilianized one or a militarized one is one factor. Because General Franco's regime was a civilianized regime Agüero argues that the military had a subordinated role during the transition period. The second factor is the transition path. Was the path marked by a gradual liberalization or was it an abrupt breakdown of authoritarianism? The Spanish transition path was a gradual path. This path was dominated by results of negotiations between civilian and military leaders. The third factor refers to support of public for democracy. Was the public

opinion in favour of democracy or was the support of public for democracy feeble? The Spanish civilians leaders were driven by strong public support for democracy. The military was aware of this support. The strong union of key political groups is the fourth factor Agüero mentions in his study of civil-military relations. The union was in the Spanish case strong enough to challenge the army.

Did the role that the Spanish military played help make the transition to democracy successful? The success depends according to Agüero's research to the ability of being successful as civilian leaders in realizing democratic desires of the public and how the political elites interact during the transition and the post-transition period. Furthermore do the civilian leaders succeed in challenging the military and implementing civilian supremacy? Agüero defines civilian supremacy as the ability of a civilian, democratically elected government to conduct general policy without interference from the military, to formulate and conduct defence policy, and to monitor the implementation of military policy (1995: 19).

Agüero's study states that Spain succeeded in her transition to democracy. He emphasizes on who exercises control over the transition. In the case studies of Agüero proved that the success depended on whether the transition was controlled by civilians aiming to establish a new government or by military aiming to prevent further occurrence of damage? The military should be strong enough to protect its own corporate interests, but should not be strong enough to effectively oppose changes to the political system.

Chapter III   Research Design

Diamond (1999:113) argues that new democracies face a particularly difficult and dangerous challenge when they are established through a military coup. Establishing civilian supremacy is then a very complex and dangerous process. He argues that many of the factors that promote democratic consolidation skilled political leadership; unity among civilian political forces (across partisan and other divides); civilian expertise (both inside and outside government) on national security matters; and luck (in the form of divisions within the military, and the military rebellions), are required to establish civilian supremacy. The concept of civilian supremacy will be tested in the Egyptian case.

The Egyptian case lacks the factors that help establish civilian supremacy and makes it very difficult to establish civilian supremacy. The hypothesis in this research paper is that without establishing civilian supremacy the Egyptian military will not play the role of promoting democratization.

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter argue for a crucial distinction amongst regime supporters in authoritarian states between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners." The hard-liners "believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible And desirable, if not by rejecting outright all democratic forms, then by erecting some façade behind which they can maintain inviolate the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of their power." The soft-liners develop the "increasing awareness that the regime … in which they usually occupy important positions, will have to make use … of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation," and that the longer such reforms are delayed the more dangerous the situation becomes for the regime (1986b:16). A key part of the transition approach is that during the transition, and

particularly during the sensitive early stages, the "hard-liners" have the ability to use coercive force to stop the transition. If the soft-liners are not strong enough, then the transition is much more difficult, if not impossible. Thus transition to democracy requires divisions among the regime in order to succeed (1986b:23ff).

There are several indices available to measure democracy. This case study will use the Freedom House Index. Egypt has according to the freedom house report on 2012 the status not free. Details on the status can be found in the following figure. Scores in each category are from 0-7. 0 is the weakest in performance, and 7 is the strongest in performance.

EGYPT

In this paper, my research question focuses the role of the military in the democratization of Arab authoritarian regimes. The examination will be conducted through a instrumental single case study of Egypt. There are different theories which explain democratization in general and democratization in the Arab world in particular. The theory of democratization developed by Larry Diamond (1999) will be used. Data retrieved from publications and reports of NGO's,

freedom house, Amnesty International, United Nations, and Egyptian government documents and speeches as well as online and printed newspaper will help identify the actions the military has taken during the revolution and during the post-revolution period. These actions shape the role they have assumed in regard to the democratization.

In order to study the correlation between democratization and the military I first reviewed the literature regarding military civilian relations in the third waves democracies. The studies of Huntington, Plattner, Diamond and Agüero on militaries and democracy provided the basis for designing the research. The level of democratization is the dependant variable. The explanatory variables are the past military civilian relations since 1952, level of professionalism of the Armed forces and the economic power of the Armed Forces. The independent variable is the role of the military.

The object of research is very broad and worth extensive research. The decision-making process in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces related to the actions the military took during the revolution and the post revolution period is out of scope, because of the lack research data regarding this aspect. Also out of scope is the cultural and behavioural aspect of the military officials. There is no research material available of their attitudes toward democratic values. This paper will not provide an ideal in depth analysis. The objective of this thesis is to gain through a single case study more insight into the relationship between the role of the military and democratization of authoritarian Arab countries that have militaries which are deep rooted in the society and plays an important economic role in society(as shown by data retrieved from the countries studies series on Egypt in the digital library of the US Congress).

I selected the Egyptian case to study the role of the military in democratization because since the establishment the Republic of Egypt in 1952 the military always sided with the ruler in facing uprising or revolts or pursuits of opposition for democratic changes. In 2011 something in the relationship between the ruler and his military changed. The Egyptian Armed Forces is -based on the CIA factbook- the 10th largest in the world and the largest in the Africa and the Arab world. The following branches are part of the Armed Forces: Egyptian Navy, Egyptian Air Force, Egyptian Air Defense Command and the Egyptian Army. Egypt also maintains a large paramilitary forces. The Central Security Forces and the Border Guard Forces fall under the ministry of the interior and the National Guard under the control of the ministry of defence. Egyptian military being the oldest, most professional and largest Arab military is better as a research subject than other Arab militaries, because unlike other Arab militaries of the Mena countries, which dealt with the Arab spring, one can find data and information that help examine the role Arab militaries play in democratization. It will be difficult to generalize the findings of this research paper because the time that had passed since the beginning of Arab Spring is too short.

Mena Freedom house comparison 2012

■ Accountability and Public Voice ■ Civil Liberties ■ Rule of Law ■ Anticorruption and Transparency

*Scores in each category are from 0-7, 0 is the weakest performance, 7 is the strongest performance

Source: Freedomhouse 2012

The focus of the theoretical approach is democratization proces. One of the objectives is to examine how the Egyptian army case fits into the existing literature on democratization. The interactions, pacts and bargains struck by the Egyptian military and civilians are examined in chapter IV. The examination is divided in two stages: the revolution period, the post-revolution period. Reviewing the result of the interactions taken by the military, as the current ruler, and the civilians gives insight in what Grugel en Riggirozzi call the institutional rules that will define the practice of democracy in the transition (2012).

Re-examining assumptions academics made on a number of subjects, especially on the military's role in Arab politics is one of the objectives of this paper. The army has to choose between either peaceful transition, a return to repression or fragmentation. Analysing the choice the army made in the selected cases by examining whether they have changed their professional and corporate identity will help predict their readiness to accept readjustment of their institutionalization into state systems and on the manner and pace in which this is pursued by other actors.

Chapter IV   The case study of the Egyptian army

The research question regarding the role of the Egyptian Military in hindering or promoting democratization in Egypt will be answered in three parts. The first part deals with the role of the military in the revolutionary period. The second part focuses on the role of the military during the post-revolutionary period. The last part explores the role of the military and transition to "democracy". The following four sub-questions that are related to the research question and will be addressed in the different parts of this chapter: First why did the Egyptian army not side with president Mubarak and defend him? And secondly how did the military after the collapse of Mubarak use the opportunity to meet the demands of the public for democratic changes? The third sub-question deals with the military actively intervening in the political process by creating conditions that help promote or sabotage peaceful transfer of her powers. The last question addresses the relationship between the actions and democratization: Will the actions of the Supreme Council of the Army lead to democratization?

Part I The role of the military in the revolution-period

Barany has examined the role of the military (2011:26ff) in the period of the uprisings. He presents an analysis of the military's significance in political revolutions in six Arab countries. His main finding is that while military support is not the only necessary factor in a successful revolution, it is the one essential force without which a coup will not be realized (2011:24). The results of the comparative analysis Barany conducted on six Arab countries show that the role the Egyptian military played in the revolution was a decisive role in overthrowing president Mubarak. The Egyptian military sided with the protesters (Sanger:2011). The army did not open fire against the people and protesters gathering in Tahrir Square were not

stopped by the military. The military had chosen to be neutral (Emadi:2011). According to the reports of the US state department the turning point to give up on their neutral position was caused by the attacks of the supporters of Mubarak and the violence they unleashed on 2 February 2011. Mubarak tried to meet the public's demand by agreeing not to seek re-election and not put his son up for succession. His attempt to restore the peace in Egypt through these concessions and manage the riots by confronting the protesters with extreme violence was far from successful (Hauslohner:2011). The army supported the protesters, because they witnessed the lack of support among the people for Mubarak's regime and that the people did not give in to repression. The military feared that the situation would hurt its interests and will result in the loss of influence and power (Steavenson 2011:43). On 10 February 2011 the Supreme Council took the power. The Supreme Council announced on 13 February 2011 that the constitution would be suspended, both houses of parliament would be dissolved, and that the military would rule for six months until elections could be held. The prior cabinet would continue to serve as a caretaker government until a new one is formed. The siding of the army with the protesters is remarkable because up to the uprisings the military played a major role in the stability of the authoritarian regime of Mubarak (Pripstein Posusney 2004).

Before answering the first sub question related to the research question on the role of the Egyptian military in hindering or promoting democratization it is important to find out which place the military's took in the former authoritarian regime.
Because Mubarak's regime en regimes before him lacked transparency and the structures of power were surrounded by secrecy it was difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the Egyptian military. To identify the place the military's took in the former regime this research paper relies on the facts, figures and findings regarding the report on politics in Egypt that can be found in the digital countries studies of the library of the US Congress. The

report is produced by the Federal Research Division and provides customized research and analytical services on domestic and international subjects to agencies of the United States Government, the District of Colombia, and authorized Federal contractors on a cost-covery basis. The digital Countries Studies series on Egypt present a description and analysis of the historical setting and the social, economic, political, and national security systems and institutions of countries throughout the world. The following paragraph contains a brief summary of the relevant passages regarding military-civilian relations in Egypt since the revolution of 1952.

Military-civilian relations since the revolution of 1952

President Nasser's Free Officers founded republican government in 1952. This was the result of a revolution that was led by the free officers. Nasser, an ex-military became president and established presidential supremacy over the military. Kassem's study shows that President Nasser disregarded political parties and democracy because of the post-imperial experience of Egypt. As a result, revolutionary leaders were afraid of continuing the pre-revolutionary political system. President Nasser in 1957 said publicly:

> "Can I ask you a question: what is democracy? We were supposed to have a democratic system during the period 1923 to 1953. But what good was this democracy to our people? I will tell you. Landowners and Pasha... used this kind of democracy as an easy tool for the benefits of a feudal system... the peasants would cast their votes according to the instructions of their masters... I want to liberate the peasants and workers both socially and economically... I want the peasants and workers to say "yes" and "no" without any of this affecting their livelihood or their daily bread. This in my view is the basis of freedom and democracy." (Kassem: 2004)

After the death of Nasser another ex-military became president: Sadat. Demilitarization of the state and depoliticization of the officer corps were two major successes during his presidency. He was successful in changing the military from the dominant leadership group in the state into a professional force subordinate to legal authority. Deradicalization that ended the army's role as 'defender of the revolution' and as defender of the Arab nation against imperialism accompanied the changes brought by Sadat. Although this were major changes that help prevent a military rule in Egypt Sadat did not accomplish the establishment of the concept of "civilian supremacy". Larry Diamond -based on the study of Felipe Agüero regarding Civilian Supremacy in South America – points out that "civilian supremacy"

> '…gives democratically elected government unquestioned authority over all policy arenas, including defining the goals and overseeing the organization and implementation of national defense. In such a system, the military role is constrained to matters of national defense and international security, the military is removed from all responsibility for internal security, and governmental structures (such as civilian ministry of defense) exist to enable civilians to exercise effective oversight and control of the military (as well as the intelligence services)' (1999: 113)

President Sadat did not have a democratically elected government and the military was not removed from all responsibility for internal security. The report on Egypt in the library of Us Congress shows that Sadat was able to continue the tradition of presidential authority that was established during the ruling of Nasser. Moreover Sadat reinforced the legal supremacy of presidential authority over all state institutions.

The military remained a powerful corporate actor in the political system. This can be illustrated by the case of Abdul Halim Abu Ghazala who was Minister of Defence under Mubarak. The report on Egypt in the library of US Congress points out that his case

manifested both the power and limits of the military establishment. Because Mubarak was initially less careful than Sadat to rotate military chieftains and to balance them with rival officers or with strong civilian politicians. As a result, Abu Ghazala, who was profiled by the report of the countries studies of the US Congress as an ambitious politicized and conservative general, appeared according to the content of the report to establish unprecedented power and acknowledged status as the number-two man in the regime. However Minister of Defence, Abu Ghazala, did not have the authority to appoint military. Mubarak in an attempt to balance the power of Abu Ghazala positioned his own men as chief of staff and as minister of war production. Mubarak had no difficulty removing him from his post in 1989. The report states that Mubarak tried to curb military aggrandizement that diminished the civilian sector. As to why the Egyptian military did not challenge the power of Mubarak the report mentions the following reasons.

> "The professionalization of the officer corps, its tradition of respect for legal legitimacy, and the reluctance of an army lacking in national vision or ambition to assume responsibility for Egypt's problems all made it unlikely that any top general could carry the officer corps in an overt challenge to Mubarak."
> (The digital countries studies series Egypt)

The concept of Felipe Aguero's 'Civilian supremacy' was under the ruling of Sadat, Nasser not established. The lack of this supremacy continued under the ruling of Mubarak. The electoral system in Egypt under which the National Democratic Party operated did not meet the standards of electoral democracies (Kassem: 1999). The political system was designed to ensure solid majorities for the ruling National Democratic Party at all levels of government (Freedomhouse 2009). The People 's Assembly is constitutionally empowered to challenge and question presidential authority, but in reality it is confined by presidential powers beyond its control (Blaydes 2011). Article 152 of the constitution helps the president to bypass the

People's Assembly and endorse his proposals through a referendum. Kassem argues that artikel 152 makes it impossible for the Assembly to consider or reject the policy of the president (1999: 37)

Mubarak had control over the military up to the revolution of 2011 (Kamrava 2000). The first sub question of the research question which will be answered in the next paragraph should give insight into why Mubarak lost his control over the military, because obviously they did not side with the former president.

No presidential control over the military

Why did the Egyptian army not side with president Mubarak and defend him?

The position the army takes in the Egyptian economics is important and has been explored in the study of Barany (2011:26ff). The Generals were very involved in many economic domains such as agriculture, tourism and military-gear production. The National Integrity System Study on Egypt in 2009 shows the military has benefits from these revenues without state control. In the report of 2011 Egypt ranked 112 on the corruption Perceptions Index. Egypt's indices was 2.9. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries or territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries or territories included in the index.

The military directly profits from its economic involvement through high salaries plus preferential treatment in medical care, housing, and transport (Chatterjee:2011). Furthermore Reports from the US state department show that the army receives financial military aid from

the United States. To maintain the financial military aid from the United States Government the military will have to keep its role in politics limited to continue good relations with the west. When Mubarak prior to his resignation lost his support from the west the military stood to loose its financial aid and support from the United State government if it had sided with Mubarak. How important the aid is to the military is shows by the following 'Wikileak cable' of the US Ambassador to Egypt.

Cable dated:2008-03-16T16:43:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000524
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S AND NEA/FO WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP DOD FOR OSD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/28
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PTER, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MINDEF TANTAWI'S VISIT TO THE U.S. MARCH 24-28
REF: A. CAIRO 452 B. CAIRO 488 C. CAIRO 507
CAIRO 00000524 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (a)(b)&(d).
1. (S) Summary: Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi will travel to Washington, Tampa, and Chicago March 24-28. He will meet senior officials in Washington and at USCENTCOM HQ in Tampa, and view U.S. civil defense arrangements in Chicago. Mrs. Tantawi and as many as five senior generals will accompany him. Tantawi will seek assurances that the USG will not condition or reduce military assistance to Egypt in the future. He will emphasize Egypt's continuing value to the United States as an indispensable ally in the region, and he will press to return BRIGHT STAR to a full field training exercise. The eighty-year-old veteran of five wars with Israel is committed to preventing another one ever. But he is also frozen in the Camp David paradigm and uncomfortable with our shift to the post-9/11 GWOT. Recognizing that he is reluctant to change, we nonetheless should urge Minister Tantawi towards a broader and more flexible partnership based on shared strategic objectives, including border security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and civil defense. End Summary.

Source: the Guardian, 14 February 2011

There are other factors that may have played a role in the decision making of the military and are worth researching but are out of scope of this research paper. The factors have been indicated by diplomats and experts on Egypt on the matter of why Mubarak lost his power over his military. The media has speculated about the militaries discontent about Mubarak putting his son, Gamal Mubarak, up for elections and the bad relationship Gamal Mubarak had with the military elites (Thanassis 2010). .The first deals with the fact that military elites despised Gamal Mubarak. The former US Ambassador speculated about the military being dissatisfied with the dependency of the authoritarian regime on a large police and security apparatus employing 1.4 million people. The other unverified factor touches upon the structure and the population of Egyptian military. The military officers are deeply rooted into

society at large that even if the generals had been willing to open fire on the protesters, many soldiers would have refused to obey their orders.

Part II   The role of the military in the post-revolutionary period

How did the military after the collapse of Mubarak use the opportunity to help build a democracy by meeting the demands of the public?

The demands of the protesters prior to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak are summarized in the pamphlet that circulated the internet (find below).

In this paragraph each demand will be examined with the help of sources from printed, visual and internet media coverage of the revolution and post revolution in order to establish how far the Supreme Council has succeeded in meeting the demand of the protesters. The examination of the ability of the military to meet these demands can help in identifying the role the military has played in the post-revolutionary period. The following five factors will be treated in chronological order: downfall of the regime, suspension of the emergency Law, freedom, justice, transfer of power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to a democratic civilian-government and the constructive administration of all of Egypt's resources.

Downfall of the regime

The demand regarding the downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak is met partially on 11 February 2011 by the resignation of Mubarak. The president, his sons and other government officials have been put on trial. The former National Democratic Party has been dissolved. However Mubarak's regime was in place with the help of other key players within the military. Those players have not stepped down. The following 'Wikileak cable' shows that the current chairman of Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has strong ties to the old regime and has been profiled by US diplomats as being change resistant.

7. (S) Reform: In the cabinet, where he still wields significant influence, Tantawi has opposed both economic and political reforms that he perceives as eroding central government power. He is supremely concerned with national unity, and has opposed policy initiatives he views as encouraging political or religious cleavages within Egyptian society. In a speech on March 9, Tantawi said one of the military's roles is to protect constitutional legitimacy and internal stability, signaling his willingness to use the military to control the Muslim Brotherhood in the run-up to the April 9 municipal council elections. On economic reform, Tantawi believes that Egypt's economic reform plan fosters social instability by lessening GOE controls over prices and production. Tantawi rejects any conditioning on Egyptian FMF on human rights or any other grounds. Before this year he thought that FMF was inviolable and regarded ESF as a layer of protection against possible cuts to FMF. He will argue that any conditions on military assistance are counter-productive. He will also state that the military is not behind human rights problems in Egypt and that U.S. Congressional human rights conditionally is mis-targeted.

8. (S) Washington interlocutors should be prepared to meet an aged and

change-resistant Tantawi. Charming and courtly, he is, nonetheless mired in a post-Camp David military paradigm that has served his cohort's narrow interests for the last three decades. He and Mubarak are focused on regime stability and maintaining the status quo through the end of their time. They simply do not have the energy, inclination or world view to do anything differently. Nonetheless, for the benefit of Tantawi's omnipresent aides, we should focus discussions on the future and how to operate as strategic partners as we face the challenges of that future together. RICCIARDONE

Source: Guardian 14 february 2011

Based on the fact that former players in the military elite are still in office it is fair to conclude that the first demand of the people has only been met partially. The pre-revolutionary structure and mission of the military who was part of the former regime (see table 1) has not been changed. Diamond has argued that time is needed for civilian and military elites to adapt to new structures and authority and to develop confidence and trust in one another.

The emergency law has given the military and the president a very powerful base to operate and disregard human rights. Especially for military officers Diamond makes an argument that they need to be convinced that expanding civilian control will not compromise the nation's

security or the institutional prestige and integrity of the military (1999: 115). The generational change that can make old-line commanding officers, who may have been responsible for human right violations under authoritarian rule be succeeded by younger officers who are better able to adapt to a more constrained military role is according to Diamond a long-term process (1999:115).

Suspending Emergency Law

The emergency law has been forced since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, except for an 18-month break in 1980. This law entails far reaching police powers and legalizes censorship and results in suspension of constitutional rights (Samer 2004). Regarding the second demand it is fair to conclude that the demand for ending the Emergency Law is not entirely met. The Emergency Law attacks human rights (Samer 2004).

Freedom house and Amnesty International reported in 2011 that the government has the right to tap telephones, intercept mail, conduct warrantless searches, and indefinitely detain suspects without charge if they are deemed a threat to national security. The 2011 Amnesty report on Human Rights shows that the authorities continued to use state of emergency powers to attack government critics, opposition political activists and people suspected of security-related offences.

Freedom

The demand for freedom has not been met. Amnesty's report 2012 on violating of human rights and liberties leaves no doubt about the fact that this demand has not been met. Freedom of the press has according to the freedom house report on 2012 improved slightly after Mubarak's departure in early 2011, particularly through an increase in independent television stations and other media, but it continues to be restricted in law and practice (Martini &

Taylor 2011). Although the bbc media coverage and other visual media reported that the internal security agency has been dissolved and the State Security Investigation Service will be replaced with a new "National Security Force" which will be responsible for protecting the domestic front and combating terrorism, there is no evidence the Supreme Council of Armed Forces has engaged in an in-depth reform of the justice department and the ministry of internal affairs and there is no guarantee that the new "National Security Force" will not engage in the same human right violations that were conducted by the dissolved State Security Investigation Service. The Supreme Council for Armed Forces granted freedom to establish political parties. The legislation made a lot of restrictions. New parties have to have at least 5000 members from at least ten of Egypt's provinces. Parties based on religion or class can not be established.

Freedom house report on 2012 concludes that Egypt is not free. Egypt is not an electoral democracy. For most of 2011, the Supreme Council exercised executive powers, appointing a series of short-lived, interim civilian cabinets. The existing parliament was dissolved in February, and a new legislature was not scheduled to be seated until the completion of parliamentary elections in early 2012. Egypt's freedom rating is 5.5. On civil liberties Egypt scores 5. On political rights Egypt scores 6.

Diamond argues that people expect from any political system more than economic growth and security (1999: 47). People also value liberty and security. He defines liberty and security as freedom from terror and violence by both state and non-state actors (1999:47). When the military is not accountable to civilian oversight and justice a critical amount of power, according to Diamond, is out of reach of effective control of citizens and their representatives and can be turned against them at any time (1999:48).

The Egyptian case shows after testing whether the three previous demands has been met in the post-revolutionary period that the military-civilian relations can be characterized as seriously lacking civilian supremacy. By not meeting the demand of the "downfall of the regime", "suspension of emergency law", and "freedom" the civilian supremacy has not been established in the post-revolutionary period in Egypt. The findings regarding the next demand in this paragraph, "justice', is connected with the lack of freedom in Egypt.

Justice

Diamond insists that for a rule of law to be ensured elected executives, state bureaucrats, soldiers, and police cannot be held accountable without a judicial system that has the constitutional and political autonomy (1999:111). No evidence in the reports of Human rights watch or Freedomhouse or mediacoverage could be found that indicate that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has started to reform the pre-revolutionary justice system. The pre-revolutionary system is features by inequality and lack of transparency (Brown 1997) Diamond's concept of the judicial system not only constitutional and political autonomy. It also requires independent and professional judges who in turn require good pay, a secure and substantial term in office, and depolitized procedures for selection (1999:112). Egypt lacks a judicial system that meats the requirements of Diamond. He demands that judges have staffing and financial and technical resources to be effective and that they be served and petitioned by an infrastructure of institutions that compose an effective legal system: prosecutors, public defenders, police, investigators, legal aid programs, bar associations and law schools. A body of law that is clearly codified and widely accessible and democratic in spirit and citizens committed to the rule of law are necessary (1999:112).

The demand of the protestors for justice has not been met by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. The Freedom house report on 2012 is clear about the lack of justice. The report notes that under the Emergency Law "Security" cases are usually referred to executive-controlled

exceptional courts that deny defendants many constitutional protections and that the verdicts of this exceptional courts can not be appealed. Political activist are acoording to the freedom house report often tried under the Emergency Law. The judges in these courts lack according to the report of the UNHCR organization on Egypt independency. They are appointed directly by the president. Bergling, Wennerström, and Sannerholm confirm this in their study on Egyptian courts that was published in 2012.

Transfer of power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to a civilian-government

This demand has not been met yet. However on 23 January 2012 the democratically elected representatives of the Parliament got the transfer of legislative authority from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

Constructive administration of all of Egypt's resources

This demand has not been met yet. However on 23 January 2012 the democratically elected representatives of the Parliament got the transfer of legislative authority from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

Part III   The role of the military and democratization

Did the military actively intervene in the political process by creating conditions that help promote or sabotage a peaceful transition of her powers?

The military has actively sabotaged a peaceful transition of her powers. The army intervened in setting the rules for the elections of both the parliament and the next president and the draft of the new constitution (Youssef 2011). An administrative court suspended the 100-member constitutional assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution for Egypt (Kirkpatrick 2012).

Activists who seek democratic change are tried under the emergency law. The army has used violence and abused the emergency law to sabotage the revolution after the fall of Mubarak. In battle with protesters on several occasions the Army opened fire and abused human rights according to the Amnesty human right report on 2012. The Army also had effectively the final decision on who could be candidate for the presidency (Youssef 2011). The Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission disqualified ten candidates without stating the reason for rejection and the appeals of the rejected candidates were overthrown (Youssef 2011).

Do the actions of the Supreme Council of the Army lead to democratization?

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has pledged to transfer power. By looking at the scorecard –as outlined in figure 1- the military took since the downfall of Mubarak it is fair to draw the conclusion that those actions do not fit a peaceful transition to a democratic rule.

Political			
Dissolve parliament and outlaw the National Democratic Party	✓		
Suspend the constitution and prepare a new one		⚠	
Reform the electoral system	✓		
Hold free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections		⚠	
Security/Human Rights			
Arrest and try former regime officials	✓		
Lift the state of emergency		⚠	
Accountability for violence during/since revolution			❌
Reform the security forces and the military			❌
Release political prisoners and abolish military trials			❌
Other			
Reform state media			❌
Improve the country's economic position			❌

Source: aljazeera

Key officials within the military who supported the former president have not been changed. The chairman of the Supreme Council has served in the government as Minister of Defence and Military Production since 1991 and was also Deputy Prime Minister in January–February 2011. He is profiled as being not willing to implement changes. Kamrava has argued that high

ranking military officials who are change resistant are not willing to accept civilian supremacy after regime changes (2000:76).

Although the military is change resistant it has to facilitate the democratization process. The Egyptian military depends on the US aid. It receives according to the New York Times 1.3 billion dollars on an annually basis. Otherwise it could loose its credits with the US government an its financial aid (Kamrava:2000).

Without revision of the constitution prior to the presidential and parliamentary elections the soon to be elected president will find himself in the same position and have the same powers as the former president Mubarak. Study on constitutions show that it is highly risky to hold elections under the current unrevised conditions (Lomasky 2011). Free and fair elections do not coincide with dictatorship. The military itself should undergo major change. The involvement of the military in the social economic domain is huge. Enterprises and important cultural and educational institutions have in their management ex-military officials. The governors who were appointed last year are ex-generals. The military is believed to control 20%-40% of the economy ranging from pasta factories to manufacturers of weapons (Chatterjee 2011).

Huntington has argued that the maintenance of non-democratic rule depends on the coercive apparatus of the state (1991:13). Any transition to democratic rule relies on whether the military can unloose itself from politics (Huntington 2004). Reasons to do so may be that the military believe it cannot maintain non-democratic rule, the military may believe that the continuation of non democratic rule is contrary to its interests, or the military elite can come to actively favour democratization (Fukuyama 2011).

After exploring the political choices and actions the Supreme Council took during the post-revolutionary period and answering the sub questions posed in this chapter, the thesis's research question: "which role did the Egyptian military play in promoting or hindering the democratization process?" can be answered as follows. The Egyptian played a hindering role to the democratization process. The Egyptian army has based on the answers to the sub questions not yet unloosed itself from politics and by doing so helps maintaining a non-democratic rule.

Chapter V   Conclusion

Based on the findings in chapter IV the role that the military has played in democratization process after the uprising is a role that can be characterized in a general as a hindering role. The only promoting role the military assumed was at the beginning of the revolution. The military promoted the fall of Mubarak and after transfer of power there was no evidence found that the military took action to revise the pre-revolutionary developed civilian-military relations. The civilian-military relations were developed over a period of 40 years beginning with the establishment of the republic of Egypt in 1952.

The hypothesis made in this research paper is that the Egyptian Military can assume a promoting role in the democratization process if the military subjects itself to the civilian supremacy. Up until now there are no indicators that the military will establish voluntarily the civilian supremacy. The Egyptian civilians should in my opinion follow a strategy that civilians in the Spanish revolution followed. Felipe Agüero who studied the Spanish case found that the civilians were successful in establishing civilian supremacy by pursuing reforms incrementally, through bargaining, dialogue, and consensus building rather than blunt confrontation (1995).

Diamond provided a recipe for reducing the resistant of the military for changes. This recipe may be applicable in the Egyptian case. The civilians should consider awarding the military with a position of status, honour, income under the condition that the military never use the military as a power resource in political competition; and the military avoid political interference in routine promotions; and The military avoid highly conflictual trials for crimes committed under the former regime (1999:114). Diamond's solution for managing the change

resistance may be helpful in Egypt, but it has to be accompanied by what Alfred Stepan calls "democratic empowerment" (Stepan & Robertson 2004). Democratic empowerment requires civilians to develop the competence to manage and monitor military budgets, acquisitions, training, promotions and operations intelligently and responsibly. He argues that building up civilian expertise to staff the defence ministry; the foreign intelligence bureau; legislative oversight committees; the more informal inputs and scrutiny that must come from the academy; policy community; and mass media is necessary and is a long-term process. In case of "democratic empowerment" Diamond refers to Agüero stating that

> "Untimely civilian effort to initiate military reform may prove counterproductive. The need to reassure the military during the first years [following a democratic transition] may ….. demand postponement of reform measures, particularly in those areas deemed most sensitive. Civilian expertise is most effective if put into practice when at least some degree of confidence between the new authorities and the military developed."(1999:15)

In his study on democratization Diamond made a plea in transitions from authoritarian rule for slowly removing the military from the political arena, including from such non-military responsibilities as rural development, civic action, domestic intelligence, policing and participation in the cabinet(1999:114). The Egyptian Military reorientation to a more narrowly defined mission is thus necessary. However, reducing the size of the military and by doing so its capacity to seize and exercise political power -as required within the theoretical framework of Diamond (1999:114)- needs time and cooperation from the US administration. The Egyptian Army receives 1.3 billion dollars annually. Developing new missions and doctrines and changing military officer training and education will prove to be difficult, because it requires changes regarding believes and attitudes and military culture (Huntington

2006). Reorganizing force structures around weaponry better suited to performing the military's mission of defending the country's borders, such as assisting in times of national emergency or natural catastrophe, requires foreign aid and support.

The Egyptians should set out a strategy in order to reach democratization. A strategy by which military influence over non-military issues and functions is gradually reduced and civilian control is gradually established over matters of broad military and national security policy. These matters include according to Diamond strategy, force structure, deployment, expenditures, and –if armed conflict should come to pass- rule of engagement (1999:114).

Is democratization possible in Egypt? It is hard to make a prediction given the role the military has played until now. The departure of the military from politics and the economic domain is almost impossible. The army has too much at stake and has assumed the role of the preventer of disorder (Plattner 2011). The role of promoting democracy has as this research paper shows not been fulfilled by the Egyptian Military. It is also hard to predict who will assume the role of promoting democratization. Who ever takes up that role it wise to bare in mind the argument Diamond has made with regard to democracy promotion efforts. Diamond argues that democracy promotion efforts should target long-term political change and have the strategic aim to help gradually lay the foundations for market economies, constrained centres of power, rules of law, more resourceful civil societies, and the incremental development of competitive electoral processes (1999: 263).

The Indonesian may serve as a exemplary model for Egypt. Indonesia's powerful military has gradually withdrawn from politics and accepted the civilian supremacy by skilful political elites (Crouch 2010). However the Indonesian civil-military relations have not yet succeeded

in making the military withdraw from economic participation (Chandra & Kammen 2012).

Whether Indonesia's model can be useful or applicable in Egypt is worth researching in a next

paper.

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