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THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESS FREEDOM AND CORRUPTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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"Yes, to dance beneath the diamond sky with one hand waving free."

Mr. Tambourine Man, Bob Dylan

Until a year ago I had never thought about actually graduating in Political Science. This thesis however shows that I changed my mind somewhere along the way. I am happy that I did. Especially this last year was extremely satisfying. Therefore I would like to thank everyone that taught me.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The ongoing financial crisis in Europe has caused many sleepless nights among the heads of government. While they are imposing unpopular (financial) measures on their citizens in order to maintain the economical stability, corruption is fuelling this crisis (Transparency International, 2012). That corruption is not only causing problems in the "far-away" non-democracies but also rants in the "nearby" European democracies, shows that attempts to destroy corruption have not always been effective, not even in well established democracies. Despite the general idea that more democracy, openness and transparency would lead to lower levels of corruption, the crisis shows that corruption is still causing harm in these relatively democratic, open and transparent societies. In order to free all societies from the consequences of corruption, more research is necessary on the mechanisms that cause corruption and specific effects of these processes on corruption.

In this thesis the focus is on the relation between press freedom and corruption. Because of the hidden nature of corruption, free and independent media are believed to be important in the battle against corruption by uncovering corruption. So far, one body of the literature focuses on why the media is capable of fighting corruption, whereas the other body is busy demonstrating why the found negative association between press freedom and corruption is overstated or caused by other factors than the media. In this thesis I steer a middle course: I do acknowledge the corruption curbing capabilities of the press, although I argue that this relationship is more complex than it appears to be at first sight. As is demonstrated in chapter 3, the marginal effects of the press differ across the levels of corruption in democracies; news media are more effectively curbing corruption as the corruption level of the country is lower. Thus, it is the context in which the media operate that the effectiveness of the media can be on corruption, not the mere existence of free media itself.

This begs the question what exactly makes that the effectiveness of free press to curb corruption is stronger as the corruption in a country is lower. I aim to answer this question in this thesis by reflecting a cross-national comparative study I have conducted. In order to be able to present the analysis it needs to be established what corruption actually encompasses and why it is such a problem. It is also necessary to illustrate the current knowledge about the negative relationship between the press and corruption in order to understand how this thesis contributes to this field of research. Therefore this thesis is continued with an extensive review of the literature (chapter 2). As already mentioned, I acknowledge the negative relationship between free press and corruption, but I consider this relationship to be complex. This is shown in chapter 3. The analysis itself is build around a theoretical framework that explains the factors that are influencing the capabilities of media to curb corruption. This model is discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides for the empirical illustration that this model indeed explains the differences in the marginal effects of the press on corruption between different countries. In the final chapter of this thesis the findings are discussed as well as the implications of these findings on the existing literature.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to analyze the relation between press freedom and corruption, it is necessary to work with a clear, unambiguous and measurable definition of corruption that holds for every country. This is important, because any research effort that involves corruption is heavily influenced by how it is defined (Kurer, 2005: 2002). Firstly, because the definition for corruption determines what exactly is tried to capture when measuring corruption. Secondly, any definition of corruption specifies what is understood with corruption and, as a consequence, which strategies are qualified to curb corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009: 750). Therefore, in the first section of this chapter I discuss which different strategies there are to define corruption and what implications these different strategies have on comparable research on corruption. This section concludes with the argumentation for using Transparency International's definition for corruption in this thesis. This is followed by a section that shows that corruption is a problem for political and economical reasons and that research to corruption is therefore justified and even necessary in order to be able to actively fight corruption.

After corruption is defined, I turn the focus to the relationship between freedom of news media and corruption—the subject of the empirical analysis in this thesis. In that section it is illustrated, using the current literature, that the corruption curbing effects of the press are most significant when the press freedom is high. The alleged mechanisms are discussed, just as the critiques on the empirical evidence of this relationship. The chapter is concluded with a review of that body of the literature that is less convinced about the causality of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. I conclude with this, because although I adhere to the position that the free media are indeed an effective weapon in the fight against corruption, I also acknowledge that the relationship should not be overstated.

Corruption

Defining Corruption

Most of the definitions of corruption that are used by various scholars originate from Nye's (1967) definition. He defines corruption as:

> "[B]ehaviour which deviates from normal duties of public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of rewards to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)" (Nye, 1967: 966).

This definition and, therefore, most follow-up definitions rest upon three important requirements: firstly, the emphasis on the public role an official fulfils when he conducts his abusive behaviour; secondly, the requirement of personal gain; and thirdly, officials' behaviour can only be corrupt when the behaviour "deviates from normal duties". In order to demonstrate the difficulties for comparable research one runs into when an attempt of defining corruption is made, I discuss the implications of the three requirements separately.

The first requirement—behaviour has to be expressed in the public role of the official—is little debated in the literature. Obviously, an official can also conduct questionable behaviour in his private life, such as beating his wife or stealing from a shop, but this is not corruption. This requirement also separates corruption from other but related kinds of misbehaviour that are conducted by private organisations, such as business corruption and fraud, (Gardiner, 2002: 28). The second requirement already leads to more debate, because it is unclear how far the requirement for private-regarding gain reaches. Clearly, if the official personally benefits from his public misbehaviour this has to be considered as private-regarding. If the misconduct leads to beneficial effects for the direct family, then most scholars also consider this as private-regarding gains. However, when misbehaviour of the official is mainly benefiting a specific constituency, political or ethnical group it is less clear whether the requirement of private-regarding gain is met. This dispute is largely related to the debate concerning the third requirement, that corruption is behaviour that deviates from “normal” responsibilities. Especially this condition contributes majorly to the variations there exist in what is considered as a corrupt act between countries. Moreover, it can be that within the same country at various points in time there are differences in what is considered to be a normal duty for an official. And to make it even more complex, even within one society there can be strong individual differences in perception of what is considered as normal; what for some people might be normal, is perceived as abnormal and immoral behaviour by others.

It is this dispute about what has to be considered as normal behaviour that makes it hard to define corruption in such a way that a definition holds in a comparative research setting. The different strategies to determine “normal duties” underlie the categorization of the definitions for corruption. The different categories Gardiner (2002) identifies are the legal definitions, the public interest definitions and the public opinion definitions. All these types of definitions come with their own difficulties and complexities for the use in a comparative research framework.

The legal definitions use the law as main criterion and are the most tangible method to define corruption. If behaviour is prohibited by the nation’s laws and, obviously, also meets the requirement of the public role and private benefits, then this misbehaviour can be considered as corruption. However, if the behaviour is not prohibited by the law then it cannot be labelled as corruption. Scott (1972: 5) rightfully sees problems in using only legal definitions. Firstly, not everything that is legal is necessarily ethical. Thereby, countries have different laws, and consequently in different countries the same behaviour is judged differently. A comparative study to corruption would be nearly impossible when the law determines what the definition of corruption is, because there is variation in what kind of behaviour have to be considered as corruption. This makes it hard to interpret the results of such a study.

Using the public interest in order to determine whether behaviour is corrupt comes down to the following: “if an act is harmful to the public interest, it is corrupt even if it is legal; if it is beneficial to the public, it is not corrupt even if it violates the law” (Gardiner, 2002: 32). To use this strategy in a comparable framework it has to be assumed that the public interest is equal across the planet, otherwise the same difficulty arises that arise when the legal definition is applied for corruption. In addition, even if the public interest around the world would be similar, the question is how public interest can be measured and which values should be included in these measurements. Suppose that parliaments are be able to express the “general will” and therefore be able to represent the public interest, this “public interest” strategy would be equal to the legal strategies of defining normal duties. However, when it is assumed that the legislature cannot always express the public interest, then this would mean that it would be ethical to conduct illegal behaviour sometimes. This would create an internal ambiguity in such a definition for corruption; corruption is not acceptable behaviour, but at the same time it is acceptable. Thus, defining corruption purely as a result of the public interest also gives complexities.

The last strategy for determining normal public officials’ behaviour that is considered by Gardiner (2002: 32) is to use public opinion to determine the moral standards. However, also this method leads to variation between countries, because the people in different countries might have different moral standards. This makes comparisons between countries problematical. Even more challenging is that even within the same country there might also exist discrepancies about what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. Therefore using a public opinion for corruption is also not completely satisfactory in a comparable framework.

Despite the difficulties all strategies bring, it is necessary to select one definition. In this thesis the Transparency International’s definition for corruption will be used. This NGO’s mission is to stop corruption and to promote transparency around the world. The data about corruption that is used in this thesis is mainly obtained from this NGO, therefore the definition of corruption that is used in this thesis is equal to Transparency International's definition for corruption: "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2009: 14). The reason for the selection of this definition is that Transparency International was the first to provide for a yearly systematic attempt to quantify corruption around the world. Their enormous amount of data is a major source. Consequently, by using this data I am doing research to the phenomenon corruption as is defined by that NGO. However, it is not only the availability of data that underlies this selection. Because of the pioneering role of Transparency International in measuring corruption and the use of their data by various scholars, they have shaped the research field. Much of what is known about the factors involved with corruption directly or indirectly derives from Transparency International: "Without the CPI, it is doubtful whether many secondary studies which seek to identify the causes of corruption would have been undertaken, since the index offers an ideal large-n basis for analysis" (Andersson & Heywood, 2009: 57).

Nevertheless, also Transparency International's definition leaves room for variation among countries. Even more so, because Transparency International draws there information upon surveys held among country experts, journalists and mainly Western business leaders by various organisations. Thus, it is the aggregate of how all the individual respondents define corruption that actually should be the definition that is used in this thesis. This means that, although Transparency International gives guidance by promoting to use their formal definition, the measure reflects the interpretation of corruption by the respondents. It can therefore never be completely sure what the nature of the phenomenon is that is studied. Although, the definition leaves some room for interpretation and Transparency International provides data on corruption that might be slightly off from their definition for corruption, many scholars on corruption have advocated to let Transparency International's data have a role in comparative research (for example Johnston, 2000; Senior, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 2008). Therefore, I am confident enough to use their definition and their data.

Nevertheless, considering all the possible pitfalls, careful interpretation of any results is required.

The Political and Economical Consequences of Corruption

The great tenacity by those who try to fight corruption is grounded in the harmful consequences of corruption. Firstly, corruption has harmful effects on the economy and, secondly, corruption is conflicting with the basic principles of democracy. The harmful effects on the economy are well described by Mauro (1995). He shows that corruption lowers investments and are therefore weaken the economic growth[1]. These negative consequences for the economy are even more a problem for countries that need economical development. For example, the governmental actions in poor states are fundamental for their economic development. This developmental process is extremely fragile and therefore it requires "[…] single-minded hard work from all holders of public office. If the top political elite […] consumes its time and energy in trying to get rich by corrupt means, it is not likely that the developmental plans will be fulfilled" (Leys, 2002: 70). It is also imaginable that the improperly obtained wealth of the political elite is secured by putting in foreign bank accounts in stead of investing it in their countries, which will have a negative effect on the economy. Another negative effect on the economy can be that donor countries decrease their investments, because the morality of the elite is not in agreement with those of the countries. In rich countries the negative consequences on the economy caused by corruption have less impact. Nevertheless, also these countries' societies are vulnerable for the harmful effects of corruption. Although low levels corruption has less impact individually, its aggregates might have an enormous negative effect on the (economic) society.

Although for the (mainly rich) democracies, corruption may have less impact on the economy, this kind of behaviour is still harmful; especially for those who adhere to

[1] A more extensive discussion on the exact numerical effects on the economy can be found in Mauro (2002).

the normative position that democracy is desirable. “Corruption […] breaks the link between collective decision making and people’s power to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy” (Warren, 2004: 328). There are other political phenomena that exclude people from their equal share to power—indeed, a prime-minister has more power than a student—but in a true democracy those positions are not excluded for parts of the society beforehand. Therefore these phenomena are not necessarily conflicting with democratic norms.

But it is not only exclusion as a result of corruption that is a problem for a democracy. Corruption lowers the trust in political institutions and social trust too (Rothstein, 2000; Bjrønskov, 2004). If the corrupt patterns of the political elite are well-known, this is likely to rob them of their authority (Philp, 2001). The authority challenge that results from corruption is one that may occur in every state, both rich and poor, that is faced by corrupt political elites. Corrupt elites lack the authority to prevent the “common man” to do the same. Thereby, social trust is related to economic equality (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). “This implies that with a high level of social trust, the best of both worlds is possible – economic prosperity goes together with a reasonably fair distribution of resources and democracy” (Rothstein & Eek, 2009: 82). Also on the individual level social trust correlates with many aspects that are considered to be good, such as education, personal happiness, health and tolerance towards minorities (Uslaner, 2002).

Despite the acknowledgement by most scholars that corruption can cause great harm, some argue that corruption in the right context might not always be harmful and might sometimes even have beneficial consequences. Gardiner (2002: 37), for example, gives several examples of relatively harmless or alleged healthy effects of corruption: bribes can make the system work despite the inefficiencies of the legal, official system; corruption can divert the scarce resources of a country and may erode the status and influence of the authoritarian elite; and the prospect of gains from corruption might also attract officials to public offices that otherwise would have been empty or filled with less capable people, because of the low salaries. Rose-Ackerman (2002: 353-371) evaluates in more detail under what conditions corruption is harmful and when not. One of the would-be positive aspects of corruption she has analyzed is when people arrange themselves with corruption to avoid (or ease) inefficient rules. How attractive and positive the consequence of corruption might seem, investors cannot be trusted that their only aim is to avoid inefficient burdens, “they will, instead, want to reduce the impact of all state-imposed burdens, justified or not” (Rose-Ackerman, 2002: 367). It is, therefore, highly questionable whether all the alleged positive consequences of corruption, are so positive after all. Thereby, it is uncomfortable, at least, from the perspective of a *Rechtsstaat* or the rule of law, that it is a firms’ judgment whether some bribes are justified. This can do serious harm to the authority and sovereignty of the state, especially in those societies that are struggling building a viable state.

In the previous paragraphs I have tried to demonstrate that corruption can have harming consequences for both the political and economic arena of a society. Despite the great damage it can cause, however, it is still a worldwide existing problem. It is commonly believed that free and independent press play an important role in the battle against corruption. “if corruption involves harms caused by exclusion, a key means for fighting corruption will involve empowering those harmed to protect themselves by democratic means: with information, arguments, organization, and votes” (Warren, 2004: 341). Nevertheless, if free and independent media are indeed the Holy Grail, then why is corruption still so widespread? Therefore the next section is devoted to the relationship between medium freedom and corruption.

The relationship between press freedom and corruption

Hgh levels of press freedom are associated with low levels of corruption (see for example Ahrend, 2002; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Chowdhury, 2004). Ahrend (2002) shows that this association cannot be attributed to spurious variables and that the direction of this negative relationship runs from press freedom to corruption. Others (for example Freille et al, 2007) believe that this relationship “simply picks up wealth effects and the institutional environment more generally” (Freille et al, 2007: 839). In order to better understand the relationship between free press and corruption, the mechanisms are discussed that are believed to explain why the free press is capable to curb corruption. Consequently, criticisms on this relation will be discussed. This section concludes with my point of view on this debate.

Mechanisms

Reduction of corruption can be the result of two things: either the corrupt officials themselves decide not to be corrupt anymore or the public officials are captured and punished if they conduct corrupt behaviour. The media are a contributing factor to both corruption curbing explanations. That the media can contribute to the first mechanism is illustrated by Ahrend's (2002) model of the influence of the press on corruption. Similar to Treisman (2000) he argues that whether an official will behave corrupt is a rational decision based on the expected profit against the expected costs[2]. This theory sais that if the expected costs outbalance the expected benefits, then an official will not behave corrupt. The major expected cost for a public official conducting corrupt behaviour is being caught and being punished. A strengthening of the media enhances

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[2] The model Ahrend (2002: 7) provides is that public official's utility (U) is equal to the official's wage (w) plus the bribe that is expected minus the fine (F) that is expected. This is represented in the following formula:

$$U(b, h, F, w) = w + B(b, h_B)(1\text{-}PD(h_B, b, M(h_M))) – P_D(h_B, b, M(h_m))*F$$

The rent the official extracts (B) is a function of the bribe rate (b) and the official's human capital (h_B). Human capital is everything that a person has intellectually collected and gained during his professional life and what gives him the ability to perform labour and brought him to the position holds. The human capital corresponds with the value an official has to offer to the bribe payer. The probability that the corrupt official will be caught and sentenced (P_D) is depending on the rent he extracts and the functioning of the media (M). The functioning of the media is also depending on the journalist's human capital and abilities (h_m). For the situation in which the abilities of the media increase and every other variable remains the same, it can be seen from Ahrend's (2002) utility equation that it becomes less likely for an official that corruption is beneficial.
The rent an official may extracts from corrupt behaviour does not have to be financially. From the widely used definition of corruption that corruption is "the abuse of public office for personal gain" (for example Warren, 2004), it can be concluded that any personal gain from the abuse of public office has to be considered as corruptive rent. Thus, Ahrend's (2002: 6-9) model can be well-translated to any form of corruption.

the official's believe that this actually happens[3]. An increase in the functioning of the media, for example assigning more freedom to news media, results in a shift in the balance between the costs and the benefits in the direction of the costs. Consequently, enlarging the freedom of the media leads to less corruption. What, then, are the media's characteristics that make them increase the probability of detection and punishment?

The work of Brunetti and Weder (2003) gives insight in the answer to this question. They identify two types of corruption: extortive and collusive corruption. The mechanisms of the free media on these types of corruption are different. Extortive corruption is the kind of corruptive behaviour in which a public official seeks to extract rent from a private actor by only providing a certain service he is designated to provide when he gets a rent. For example, a public official only hands out a driving license after the successful examinee gives a certain amount of money, a bribe. Faced with this kind of blackmailing a private actor can decide to try to fight the corruption or to provide the rent to the public official. The private actor also makes a rational decision of which strategies leave him with more utility. In many circumstances the costs of paying the bribe outbalance the costs of fighting the corruption. The free and independent media act as additional channels of external control and are therefore reduce the costs of fighting extortive corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 2003: 1804-1805). For extortive corruption it applies that without corrupt behaviour of the public official, the utility for the private individual would have been higher.

The mechanism for collusive corruption is different. Collusive corruption is the kind of corruption from which both the public and the private party gain. For example, a certain person does not want to take driving lessons, but when he gives the public official a certain amount of money he will get the driving license without taking any

[3] The fact that the official believe that the probability of corruption increases, Is obviously a result of the fact that the probability will increases. However, whether an official behaves corrupt is decision based on the official's perception.

lessons or examination. Thus, for the private party there is no incentive to fight the corruption or make it public. Therefore, it is much more difficult to fight this kind of corruption. According to Brunetti and Weder independent journalists have “incentives to actively investigate any wrongdoing” (2003: 1805). The possibility exists, however, that the journalists can be bought and become corrupt themselves. Brunetti's and Weder's argue that this only increases the incentives for other journalists to detect these kinds of corrupt arrangements. “The more involved a corrupt arrangement the more fame an investigative journalist can earn by uncovering it“ (Brunetti & Weder, 2003: 1805). Thus, forming an effective cartel of corrupt journalists is impossible when entry to journalism open for everyone.

Another characteristic that makes the media an effective corruption curbing tool is related to political accountability. Transactions with representatives of the state, the government or other public officials, always implies some asymmetry of information between these representatives and the citizens. Because of the existence of rent corruption arises spontaneously in this context (Lederman et al., 2005: 3). Privatising these state transactions and, consequently, let the market resolves this information problem, would not be a solution to corruption, because the state intervenes precisely in those situations in which the market fails (Banerjee, 2007). Among the possibilities to enhance political accountability is to reduce the informational problem citizens they are faced with in transactional situation with representatives of the state. The media can fulfil a role in providing the information.

This mechanism is even more effective in a democracy with healthy electoral competition. (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Chowdhury, 2004). “The presence of press freedom brings public corruption cases to the voters while voters in a democracy in turn punish corrupt politicians by ousting them from public offices. Hence, elected politicians react to the voters by reducing corruption” (Chowdhury, 2004: 93-94). That this pathway actually works is shown by Peters and Welch (1980). They showed that the support declined for candidates between 1968 and 1978 for the United States Congress who were accused of corruption.

And finally, the press can change people's believe what corruption is and when it should be considered as a problem. If the citizens see corruption as a greater problem they are more likely to report such behaviour. Thereby, voters who consider corruption as a problem may be more likely to elect officials who consider corruption also as a problem, consequently throwing out the "rascals" (Gardiner, 2002: 33). "values about corruption are likely to affect how they behave themselves—whether they will offer bribes or will abide by the requirements of the law. For all of these reasons, understanding public opinion about corruption will provide a basic for effective law enforcement efforts" (Gardiner, 2002: 33). All these effects contribute to corruption curbing abilities of the news media.

Criticisms

Although few scholars disagree that high press freedom is associated with low levels of corruption, not everyone is convinced that this is the result of a causal relationship. As Graber points out rightfully: "The importance of a free press has been so axiomatic that its presumed benefits have seldom been questioned, at least not publicly" (1986: 257). In his research he found several instances of press investigation in which it was highly questionable whether the benefits did outweigh the costs of detecting public wrongdoings. He therefore concludes that the effects of the free media on corruption should not be overstated and that the effects might even increase corruption. That this can be the case sometimes is illustrated in the work of Vaidya (2005) and Čábelková and Hanousek (2004). Vaidya demonstrates using a rational choice model that the media might release false campaigns and accusations against the authorities driven by sales numbers' and public attention's considerations. Thereby, he argues that the media might be corrupted themselves and might therefore decide not to publish about corruption.

Vaidya (2005) mentions a scenario in which the news that is brought by the media does not result in less corruption, because the information in the news is incorrect. Čábelková and Hanousek (2004) describe a situation in which there is nothing wrong with the message, but in which the effects of the message do not lead to the desired effect. They argue that in societies in which the perception of corruption is high—and this is fed by media reports about corruption—that the public can have the feeling that they have to bribe too in order to get what they want. "Believing that everybody takes bribes, officials lose the fear of being punished for receiving them. If everyone believes everyone else is corrupt, corruption becomes a pillar of the culture in which bureaucrats go about their business" (Čábelková and Hanousek, 2004: 383)[4].

Another point for criticism is the alleged spuriousness of the relationship of the free media and corruption. It can be that this relationship "simply picks up wealth effects and the institutional environment more generally" (Freille et al., 2007 839). For example, rich countries can afford a free press or education. Moreover, the detection of corruption is likely to be related to the quality of the legal system (for example Andvig & Moene, 1990), salaries paid to public official (Andvig & Moene, 1990: 66), electoral competition (Persson et al., 2003) and other factors related to the level of development.

Naturally, the level of corruption in a country is affected by other factors than just the media. However, given the evidence I acknowledge that the free media can play an important role in diminishing corruption. But at the same time I support Vaidya (2005) in his critique that the effects of the press should be not overstated. As is shown in the following chapter (chapter 3) there are complexities in the relationship between the free press and corruption. In that chapter provides for the evidence that the marginal effects of the media on corruption differ across the levels of corruption; the corruption curbing abilities of the media are stronger as the corruption is lower.

[4] Čábelková and Hanousek (2004) have empirically shown that this argument holds in Ukraine. In this thesis only democracies are taken into account. Ukraine is not a democracy and therefore this effect does not necessarily have to hold for democracies too. However, the theoretically argument is elegant enough to take it into consideration in this thesis.

CHAPTER 3: THE PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION

In the literature review I demonstrates that the freedom of the press is associated with the levels of corruption. I also consider this association to be a causal relationship, although I support Vaidya (2005) in his statement that the positive effects should not be overstated. I found that the relationship between media freedom and corruption is a complex one: the relation between the press freedom and corruption is weaker for highly corrupt countries than for mildly corrupt countries. This chapter will provide for the empirical evidence of this finding.

In order to do so, firstly the case selection is discussed. Thereafter the independent variable—press freedom—and the dependent variable—corruption—are operationalised and the reliability and validity of the different data sources are discussed. Then the results of the analyses are presented. This analysis results in a puzzle and a question which are discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Variables and Data

The freedom of the press is considered to be the independent variable in the analysis. This degree of press freedom in a country is expressed in a score on the Free Press Index provided by Reporters Without Borders. This is a France-based non-governmental organisation which promotes press freedom and freedom of information around the world. Every year they present a Press Freedom Index. In order to compile an index, Reporters prepared a questionnaire that asses the degree of press freedom in a country. These questions are about violations directly affecting journalists (such threats, murders, imprisonments) and the news media (such as censorship). The questionnaire also took into consideration the level of self-censorship, financial pressure, independence of the media *et cetera*. The survey was held among many journalists and journalist organisations around the world. The index therefore not only is a reflection of the freedom felt by domestic journalists, but also by foreign the foreign press. The data that is used in the analysis here is from the year 2010. For this particular year the index runs from 0 (highest press freedom) to 105 (the score of the worst scoring country on the list).

To test the robustness of the analysis also data from Freedom House' Freedom of the Press 2010 has served as representation of the independent variable. Freedom House is a non-governmental organisation which supports democratic change and monitors freedom. They too compile a press freedom index based on a survey assessment about three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment and the economic environment. This index runs from 0 (maximum press freedom) to 100 (minimum press freedom). The main difference between this index and Reporters Without Border's index is that the survey Freedom House held to compile the index is also answered by other people than journalist of journalist organisation, such as country experts, consultants, international travellers and human right organisations.

Both indices share several deficiencies. For example, the press freedom is determined based on the perception of the press freedom by individuals. The amount of precise questions limits the possibility of misconceptualisation of press freedom by the different respondents. However, the respondents might experience the degree of press freedom in the various aspects differently. Thereby, both indices falsely imply accuracy, especially because score are showed in decimals. Nevertheless, there are no real alternatives to these indices[5] and despite the imperfections, the indices provide for a failry good impression on the degree of press freedom in the different countries. For the analysis it does not matter for example whether Finland (0 on the Reporters Without Borders index) experience more press freedom than Austria (0.50 on the same index); what matters is that they are both countries with a very high degree of press freedom.

[5] There are many other press freedom indices, but they are both not so widely used in the literature or do not taking into account all democracies. For example, the IREX' Media Sustainability Index does not include most European Union countries and other Western democracies.

The dependent variable in this analysis is corruption. This is represented by the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2010 (from now on CPI). This index is a compound index using data from different other institutions[6]. The index ranges from 0 (extremely corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) in a 100 steps. There are also some drawbacks to the use of this index. Partially, these are similar to the imperfections of the free press index. For example, the perceptions of corruption can be different due to the different definitions of corruption the different data sources apply if they measure corruption. Therefore the index might not exactly measure what Transparency International self defines to be corruption[7]. For example, it is likely that the index focus too much on business transactions, because the composite CPI does mainly drawn upon surveys held among business leaders and country experts. It can happen that no respondents are drawn from the country that is in question (Andersson & Heywood, 2009). Also similar to the press freedom index is that the CPI falsely implies accuracy. This is in particular a problem because the index is presented in the form of league table, giving the countries in addition to a CPI score also a ranking. This may have as consequence that a small improvement in the CPI score can result in a large improvement on the ranking. Nevertheless, whether a country scores 2.4 or 2.8 does not make that much of a difference, both scores show that that particular country is very corrupt.

Notwithstanding the imperfections of the CPI, given the hidden nature of corruption it is hard to find other ways of measuring corruption other than using perceptions. Thereby it is widely used for academic purposes and therefore critically reviewed by many political scientists (for example Chowdhury, 2004). The index might not be perfectly accurate, but it gives at least an indication of the degree of corruption.

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[6] These data sources vary from year to year. For the 2010 index the following institutions provided for the data: Asian Development Bank; African Development Bank; Bertelsmann Foundation; World Bank; Economist Intelligent Unit; Freedom House; Global Insight; IMD International, Switzerland, World Competitiveness Center; Political & Economic Risk Consultancy.

[7] Transparency International (2009, 14) defines corruption as: "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain".

Case Selection

As is discussed in the literature review (chapter 2), one of the mechanisms why the free press is capable of curbing corruption is because it gives the people information, so that they can vote wisely at the next elections. Thereby, the levels of corruption are affected by the degree of political and electoral competition. In order to control for the fact that press in democracies can be more influential than in another regime environment, even if the functioning of the press is qualitative equal, and in order to control for the degree of political and electoral competition, only liberal democracies are taken into account for an analysis. In principle, every country that is considered to be a democracy is taken into account. Only the availability of data provided by Reporters Without Border, Freedom House of Transparency International further limits the case selection.

Whether a country can be considered as a democracy is a consequence of their Freedom House 2010 scores on the political rights index and the civil liberties index. This is in line with the analysis to democratic transitions and consolidations by Stepan and Linz (1996: 445). They use a score of 2 or lower on the political rights index and scores of 3 or lower on the civil liberal index as threshold to consider a country to be a democracy. In order to prevent that electoral and political competition still influence the analysis, because of the variance in scores on the indices, I use a stricter threshold; a score of 2 or lower for both indices results in a case selection. These countries and their scores are displayed in Appendix 4.

Analysis

Now the independent and dependent variables are conceptualised and operationalised, the focus can be turned to the actual analysis. The aim here is not the show whether there is a relationship between press freedom and corruption, but to show that there are complexities in this relation. As is discussed in the literature review (chapter 2), the relationship and the direction of the relationship are already established by Ahrend (2002), Brunetti & Weder (2003) and Chowdhury (2004). Therefore it can be assumed here that press freedom is the independent variable and corruption the dependent. In order to show the complexities three ordinary least square analyses are executed. The democracies are divided in a mildly-corrupt category (50% highest CPI scores) and a highly-corrupt category (50% lowest CPI scores), because the point that I want to illustrate is that for the negative relationship between press freedom and corruption is stronger as the countries are less corrupt. I do not want to specify the strength of this relation and explanation power of the free press in values, I just want to show that there is a difference in the relation between the countries that associated with their degree of corruption. The median is therefore a good cut-off point, because it divides the cases into two equal groups. This makes it possible to use simple statistical methods—OLS regression analyses between only an independent and dependent variable—to show the complexity. The results of the various OLS regression analyses are displayed in table 1.

For all analyses the press freedom index has been considered as the sole predictor for the level of corruption. The rows 1 to 3 show the results using data from Reporters Without Borders as independent variable. The first OLS regression analysis included all democracies that made the case selection (ALL DEMOCRACIES RWB). The other two analyses only included the 50 percent most corrupt countries (LOW CPI RWB) or the 50 percent least corrupt countries (HIGH CPI RWB) according to CPI. In order to check whether the results are robust, the analysis is also conducted using the press freedom index by Freedom House (row 4 to 6). Also for this data three different OLS analysis have been executed, including every democracy (ALL DEMOCRACIES FH), only the corrupt countries (LOW CPI FH) or the least corrupt countries (HIGH CPI FH).

Table 1: results of various regression analyses considering press freedom to be the predictor for corruption.

		B	Std. error	p	R^2_{adj}
1	ALL DEMOCRACIES RWB	-0.196	0.024	0.000	0.538
2	LOW CPI RWB	-0.070	0.019	0.001	0.328
3	HIGH CPI RWB	-0.150	0.023	0.000	0.616
4	ALL DEMOCARIES FH	-0.175	0.017	0.000	0.627
5	LOW CPI FH	-0.058	0.016	0.001	0.293
6	HIGH CPI FH	-0.137	0.028	0.000	0.439

The results for the OLS regression analyses of which the results are shown in row

1 to 3 are from the same indices and, consequently, the analyses were established on the same scales (Reporters Without Borders press freedom index and CPI). This makes it possible to compare the unstandarized regression coefficients. The regression analysis including all democracies (row 1 ALL DEMOCRACIES RWB) is to show the basis relation for which complexities are determined. If all democracies are taken into account than the negative relation between press freedom and corruption is the strongest (B =- .196). However, the predicting power of press freedom for the degree of corruption is largest when the only the highest 50% on the CPI index (least corrupt countries) are taken into account (R^2_{adj} = 0.616). This is higher than when all countries are taken into account (R^2_{adj} = 0.538) or higher than if only the 50% most corrupt countries were included in the analysis (R^2_{adj} = 0.328). Also from the results it becomes clear that the negative relationship between press freedom and corruption is stronger in least corrupt countries (B = -0.150) than in the highly corrupt countries (B = -0.070). The regression analyses using the data about press freedom from Freedom House (row 4 to 6) are showing similar patterns: in corrupt countries the negative relationship between press freedom and corruption is stronger than in mildly-corrupt countries. Thereby in mildly-corrupt countries press freedom is a better predictor for corruption than in highly-corrupt countries.

Findings and Research Question

The results presented in this chapter confirm the association between press freedom and corruption in democracies. Considering the literature (in particular Ahrend 2002; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; and Chowdhury, 2004) I have assumed that this relation is based on causality and that the negative relation runs from press freedom to corruption. This assumption makes it possible to carry out OLS regression analyses. The results show that the negative relationship between press freedom and corruption is stronger for the 50% least corrupt democracies than for the 50% most corrupt countries. Moreover, the free press is also a better predictor for corruption in the least corrupt countries than for corruption in the 50% most corrupt countries.

The median of the democracies ranked by their CPI score is used as cut-off point to divide the sample of democracies into a mildly- and a highly-corrupt group. This is rather an arbitrary cut-off point. The aim is however not to specify the strength and the predictability of the relationship exactly, but to show that there are differences. Dividing the sample into two groups has been proven to be helpful in showing this difference. As a result, it has been made plausible that marginal effects of media differ across levels of corruption in democracies; the ability of the news media to reduce corruption is greater as the level of corruption is lower.

In this chapter the complexity in the relationship between press freedom and corruption is demonstrated. This is already a contribution to the current knowledge about corruption. This complexity means that simply enlarging the press freedom would not automatically leads to a dramatic reduction of corruption. This knowledge is even more of interest, because in especially those countries in which it is more important to fight corruption—the countries that are face by a lot of corruption—the media does not seem to be effective. In order to understand how these countries still can be helped by the media, it needs to be established why the media is not as effective in curbing corruption in corrupt countries as in less corrupt countries. To answer this question a theory is developed and presented in the next chapter (chapter 4).

CHAPTER 4: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

In the previous chapter the empirical data confirmed that there is a negative relationship between press freedom and corruption, but that the marginal effects differ across the levels of corruption. Higher levels of corruption are associated with a weaker and less predictable relationship between the variables. The complexity in this relation can only be explained partially by other factors such as the functioning of the judicial system and wealth levels. In this chapter I will argue that this complexity is a result of a factor that is related to the press itself. I will lay out an argumentation that explains that the press is less effective in changing peoples' attitudes in highly corrupt countries than in mildly-corrupt countries. Firstly, it is explained why attitude change is important in order to curb corruption. Secondly, Zaller's (1992) model for attitude change is explained and it is argued how this model can be applied to the puzzle of this thesis. The chapter is concluded with a hypothesis that results from the discussed theoretical model.

Changing Attitudes to Fight Corruption

As is discussed in the literature review (chapter 2), corruption reduces when either the public official decides not to be corrupt anymore, or when public officials that are corrupt, are punished or ousted from their public office. Different pathways are discussed that may illustrate the mechanisms behind one of these corruption curbing factors. All these mechanisms have in common that the role of the media in the fight against corruption, can be explained by the media's capabilities of changing the attitude of the people that are involved with corruption. Firstly, increasing the functioning of the press increases the official's perception of the expected costs of being corrupt, because information brought by the media about corruption increases the official's probability of being caught and punished. As a result of the increased expected costs is that the balance now leans more towards the expected costs side and consequently it can now be that being corrupt is not a valuable strategy anymore. Secondly, information about corruption brought by the press reduces the information a-symmetry between the public officials and the citizens. The public can use this information to oust corrupt public officials from office or elect those politicians that actively fight corruption among the non-elected public officials. It is this change in voting that leads to less corruption.

The free press only is an effective instrument for the fight against corruption when news brought by them results in a change of people's behaviour or thinking about corruption; or in other words, because of its capability to change people's attitudes, the free press is able to fight corruption. The empirical evidence that underlies the puzzle of this thesis (chapter 3) shows that the relationship between press freedom and corruption is weaker in corrupt countries. In the previous paragraphs of this chapter I have reasoned that the attitude changing capabilities of the media are the reason that the press is effective in curbing corruption. This suggests that the press is less effectively changing people's attitudes in corrupter countries. What, then, makes the media in corrupt countries less effective in changing attitudes?

Attitude Change by the Media

In order to answer the question posed in the last paragraph it needs to be explained how the process of attitude change works. This first requires explaining what an attitude is. Attitudes are the evaluations and associated beliefs and behaviours towards some object (McGuire et al., 1985). These attitudes are receptive for change when the context changes or a person receives new information about the object on which it can base his evaluations. The process of persuasion, or attitude change, by receiving information or messages can be separated in series of discrete steps with their own mediators (Hovland, 1963; Zaller, 1996: 21).

The first step of this chain reaction is the *exposure* to persuasive messages. Second is the step of *reception* of the message; this is the mere fact that people are actually "taking in" the message to which they are exposed. The final step in the persuasion chain reaction is the *acceptance* of the message; the fact that persons change their evaluations towards the object because of the newly received information. Thus, if the news media in corrupt are less effective in curbing corruption than their colleagues in mildly-corrupt countries the problem probably can be found in a factor that is diminishing the effectiveness of one or more of the steps in the persuasion chain reaction.

Zaller (1992; 1996) argues that knowledge about exposure to media cannot lead to any predictions about the likeliness of attitude change by a citizen. Although it is relatively straightforward to measure exposure—someone has been exposed or not—it does not say anything about the actual intake of information. The mere fact that people have a physical proximity to a persuasive message does not say anything about the attention they pay to it. "Even when someone is watching, television viewing is often a secondary activity-second to an astonishing variety of other activities, such as eating, conversation, dancing, sorting wash, playing Monopoly, scolding children, and reading, to mention only some of the mentionable ones" (O'Sears & Kosterman, 1994: 258)[8]. This argument also holds for listening to the radio. Reading the newspaper and being on the internet somewhat escapes this argument. However, even for these forms of media the exposure cannot predict the probability of attitude change.

Although a message cannot lead to attitude change without the individual being exposed to it, it is the actual intake of a message that is a better predictor for the probability of attitude change. Whether reception of the message has taken place is, however, much more difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, because it is one of the steps in the chain of persuasion, it is important to understand reception before attitude change can be explained. To use an analogy, if a researcher wants to know whether a

[8] Although this quote might be a bit jolly and I do not understand why he mentions Monopoly (the most boring game there exists, I just do not believe anyone ever plays it), the point should be well received. A lot of the time media use is a secondary activity. But even when this "secondary" exposure is not considered as exposure, it is likely that people do receive some of the information brought be the media. Therefore using exposure would lead to serious measurement problems.

certain drug has an effect on a particular disease it is not enough to know whether the patient took the drug from the drug store, but the researcher has to know whether the patient actually took the drug (Zaller, 1996: 22). If the researcher finds that the patient took the drug, he can also safely assume that drug was taken from the drugstore. This also holds for the persuasive message; it is not said that when a person is exposed to persuasive information he actually takes in the information, but if there has been reception the researcher can assume that the person has been exposed to the message.

Both the exposure to and the reception of political information is related to the attention people pay to those kinds of messages. People who pay most attention to these messages are those people that know a lot about public affairs and are, therefore, able to recognise political information. At the other end of the attention spectrum are those who do not know a lot about public affairs. (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 219) It is a combination of disinterest, but also no ability to understand political messages, that leads to low intake of political information. Most citizens fall in between both extremes. It is this combination of attention to news about public affairs and the ability to retain a message about public affairs that determines the, what Zaller (1992) calls, "political awareness". "Political awareness denotes intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or no engagement at all" (Zaller, 1992: 21). Zaller (1992; 1996) shows that political awareness is the key factor in whether press messages are able to effectively change an individual's attitude or not.

The probability of a long-term attitude change is the result of the combination of probability of reception of the message after exposure and the probability of acceptance upon reception. For both the probability of acceptance and the probability of acceptance upon reception the individual's political awareness is the most important determinant. If an individual's political awareness is low, the probability of reception of the persuasive information is also low. Indeed, if the individual does not have the "language" or cognitive ability to understand the information, it is most likely that this person does not take in the information, although he is exposed to it. However, if such an individual does take in the message, it is likely to have an effect on the attitude of that person. The person does not have much knowledge yet about that particular topic covered by the message. Thus every bit of persuasive information can be that piece of information that tips the balance of knowledge towards the different attitude.

At the other extreme—when the individual's political awareness is high—the logic works in the opposite direction. This individual does have the "language" and attention for this new information and will likely take in the information. Thus, if a citizen is politically aware then the probability of reception of the message is high. However, because that person already has a lot of previous knowledge about that particular topic, new information is not very likely going to tip the balance toward a different attitude. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between political knowledge and stability of attitudes (Delli Carpini, 1996: 232-234; Clawson & Oxley, 2008) Therefore it is not probable low that a message that attacks a person's attitude will lead to attitude change. The probability that an individual experiences attitude change is therefore not monotonic, but highest with the middle levels of political awareness. This is because the probability of change is the result of a multiplication of the reception rate and the acceptance rate. This is supported by a model created by Zaller (1992: 123). In table 1 this is shown by showing hypothetical data. The model Zaller proposes is for attitude change after a message that is intended to persuade the receiver.

Table 2: Attitude change in response to a hypothetical message (from Zaller, 1992: 123).

	Level of awareness		
	Low	Middle	High
Prob(Reception)	0.10	0.50	0.90
Prob(Accept│Reception)	0.90	0.50	0.10
Change (Reception X Acceptance)	0.09	0.25	0.09

In order to explain the different effects the press have on corruption between the countries, it is necessary to translate this individual model to the macro-level. It would, however, be incorrect to simply take the average awareness of all people in one country and then argue that media in countries with an average of medium awareness are the most effective in fighting corruption. For this reason that the relation between the political awareness and the probability of attitude change is nonmonotonic and non-linear: it are the people that are in the middle level group of political awareness that have the highest probability to change their attitudes after receiving messages, whereas the political unaware and the political highly aware are the people that are least likely to change their attitudes after receiving new information.

Thus, this means that the country average cannot be taken as an independent variable. Consider the following example: assume a situation in which the country's political awareness average is 0.5 on a scale from 0 to 1. The boundary situations from which this average can be obtained are that either half of the population is maximum political aware (1 on a 0 to 1 scale) and the other half minimum political aware (0 on the 0 to 1 scale), or that the entire population is exactly middle political aware (0.5 on the 0 to 1 scale). How the people are distributed among this scale has great implications for the size of the group that experiences attitude change after receiving persuasive information. When everyone is on the edges of the political awareness spectrum—either being a 0 or a 1 on the 0 to 1 scale—the total amount of people that will change their attitudes after receiving new information will be lower than when everyone is exactly at the middle of this spectrum. Thus, in a situation in which the middle political awareness is the most effective political awareness for attitude change, then it is the proportion of the group of the medium awareness that will be able to predict the amount of people that will change their attitudes in a country.

Hypothesis

Concluding, the two main arguments of this theory chapter are: firstly, the press needs to change the attitude of people toward corruption in order to be an effective tool in the fight against corruption; and secondly, it has been argued, using an extension on Zaller's model for attitude change, that in societies with larger proportions of middle political awareness people the media is more effective in changing the attitudes of the people than in countries with smaller proportions of medium people. This thesis is build around the observation that in corrupt countries the press is less effective in curbing corruption (see chapter 3). This observation combined with these two arguments lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: The proportion of people that are middle political aware negatively correlates with the level of corruption.

Chapter 5: Political Awareness and Corruption

In the previous chapter I have hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of the people that have middle political awareness in a country and corruption. This chapter is devoted to the give to empirical evidence to confirm this expectation. In order to do so, firstly different measure for political awareness will be discussed. At the end of that section the choice for the measure for political awareness is explained. Thereafter the variables are presented and the data sources from which the data is extracted. In the analysis section the actual analysis is presented as well as the results. The chapter is concluded with discussion on the findings.

Measuring Political Awareness

In the quest for a measure for political awareness one needs to be aware of the multidimensionality it encompasses. As is discussed in the theory chapter (chapter 4), political awareness is the combination of the attention people pay the certain news messages and the ability to understand these messages. Without attention and ability to understand messages brought by the press it is impossible that this information can contribute to the receiver's knowledge and, consequently, this information cannot lead to attitude change. In the literature several suggestions are found as measures for political awareness. A justified measure for political awareness for this thesis should both be precise and it should hold in the comparative framework. Therefore a discussion about the different alleged measures is included in this work.

Traditionally, education levels in combination with self-reported media were used as main indicators for political awareness (Price & Zaller, 1993: 138). The argument for using education as indicator is that better educated people tend to learn faster from new information than lower educated people (Tichenor et al., 1970). Thereby, higher educated people are believed to be more socialized to pay attention to political affairs

(Price & Zaller, 1993: 138). Indeed, correlations have been found between education and learning from news (Robinson & Levi, 1986). However, it has not been said that fast-learning from the media necessarily means that high-educated people pay attention to political affairs. Only after the intake of the information they are better trained to learn from it, but there is a great variance between citizens in the amount of attention they pay to public affairs, also under the high-educated people (Luskin, 1990). And, although higher educated people have a better ability to understand politics because they started with more knowledge about politics, it is the attention to news that keeps them up-to-date. The political context is changing over time, thus in order to hold the ability to understand the political news, the attention dimension of political awareness have to be fulfilled to. That therefore education levels cannot be the sole measure for political awareness is supported by empirical findings that political knowledge have not been increased over the years despite an increase in education levels (Elkin & Soltan, 1999).

This attention level might be measured by the (self-reported) media use. This is, however, also not a useful measure in the context of the research in this thesis. Firstly, because different kind of media influence individual's political awareness differently[9]. This problem might be overcome to distinguish between exposure to "high-brow" and "low-brow" media[10], as Price and Zaller (1990) argue, but even within these different categories of media the influence of particular instances of the media is different. For example, what is more contributing to political awareness, the local news or the national radio? Making distinctions between different kinds of media would result in serious measurement issues. The second reason, one that may be even more important, why the use of exposure measures is not justified is that they do not take into account

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[9] For example, Aarts and Semetko (2003) found that in the Dutch context that regularly watching the public service channels on television watching had positive effects on the political knowledge, whereas watching the commercial channels has a negative effect.

[10] Price and Zaller (1990b: 4) consider news to be low-brow if the medium from which it is brought is "locally oriented" and "although, they carry national and international news, [they] carry it in a very abbreviated form, and [they] tend to focus on crime, human interest, sports and celebrity events". High-brow media, on the other hand, are "nationally oriented" and "although, they carry crime and human interest stories, [they] focus more on national politics and international affairs".

the actual intake of the information. As is been discussed in the chapter 4, measuring the actual intake of information is important in order to be able to make statements about attitude change. Despite the fact that exposure to information is necessary for the actual intake, and therefore is probably correlating, exposure measures do not catch the actual intake.

The best measure is to test the political knowledge (Zaller, 1992: 335; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993: 1180). In a latter work Zaller (1996) even treats the terms “political awareness” and “political knowledge” as being the same. The advantage of this measure is that it also captures political learning that already has occurred over time, or, in the words of Zaller (1992: 335): “political ideas that the individual has encountered, understood, and stored in his head”. Therefore, testing political knowledge automatically accounts for the persons ability to learn about political affairs from the mass media and the use of the media to gain the knowledge. Price and Zaller’s (1993) analysis confirms that the likelihood to learn from political knowledge can be best predicted by the person’s pre-existing knowledge. Therefore, political knowledge will serve as the representation of political awareness in this thesis.

Variables and Data

In the previous section is argued that political knowledge is a precise measure for political awareness, but the second demand for a justified measure is that it also holds in a cross-national comparative setting. This is easier said than done, because of the difficulties that arise when people from different countries are asked the same question. For example, a Dutchman is expected to be able to name his own prime-minister easier than to name the Spanish prime-minister. For Spaniards the opposite argumentation holds. Difficulties might arise however, when similar institutions have a different role in society. For instance, the president of France is much more involved in daily politics than the German president. Therefore it can be expected, considering the average political knowledge is equal in both countries, that more French are able to name their president correctly. This makes asking country specific questions but about similar institutions not automatically useful in a comparative setting. Therefore, measuring political knowledge has to be done with great prudence if used in a comparative setting.

What are the options then? An opportunity to obtain comparable data about political knowledge are surveys around European Elections. The EES 2009—a survey held among voters of the, at that time, 27 European Union countries—includes 4 questions about the institutional functioning of European politics and 3 about national political actors with a different degree of difficulty. According to Fraile (2010: 9-10), this survey provides a unique opportunity to use these results in a comparative research framework, because 4 of the 7 questions asked in this survey are equal in all countries. A drawback of using this method is that the questions are mainly about politics at a supranational level. The question is whether this construct can actually be used as representation for the political awareness to their domestic public affaires. The measure would be mirroring this when the saliency of European politics is equal among the different European countries. However, this is not in reality (see for instance Schuck et al, 2011; and De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). This method more or less measures the political awareness for European matters, whereas I am looking for a way to measure political awareness for domestic affaires, because corruption is mainly a domestic issue. Most likely European political awareness and domestic awareness strongly correlates. Intuitively it makes sense to believe that there would not be many people that know everything about European politics and nothing about their domestic politics[11]. Still, using only this measure to draw strong conclusions would be incorrect.

An alternative might be found in the data from the CSES modules. This database includes results of surveys that are held around national elections in many countries around the world. These surveys also include political knowledge questions. The

[11] Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996: 157) found that people who know a lot about a certain aspect of domestic politics are also likely to know a lot about other aspects. Although this still not empirically prove that people who do know a lot about European politics do know a lot about domestic politics too or the other way around. Nevertheless, it strengthen the idea to political knowledge reflects a comprehensive set of knowledge and not just the aggregate of the political knowledge of different topics.

questions that are asked are country specific and are therefore not adequate to show exact difference of average political knowledge between countries. Despite their argument against the use to show differences in political awareness between countries, Grönlund and Milner (2006) show that the CSES modules can be used in comparative research. In there study they look at which factors contribute to individual political knowledge. This is a different use than the cross-national approach that I use. However, I am not looking for a measure to compare the exact average political awareness of a country, but I am looking for a way to test whether to size of the group of middle political aware individuals is related to corruption levels. Comparing countries is just done as means to an end. Therefore, as long as the set of questions in every country has somewhat similar difficulty, it should be able to make a comparison between the levels of corruption in a country and the size of the medium group.

Thus, for the analysis between political awareness and corruption data from the EES 2009 and CSES Module 3 serve as independent variable. The dependent variable—corruption—is drawn from Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2010 (CPI). A extensive discussion on the validity and reliability of this index can be found in chapter 3.

Analysis

In order to analyse the relationship between the proportion of the people that is middle political aware and corruption, the political knowledge questions in the EES 2009 and the CSES Module 3 serve as representation of the political awareness. In the EES 2009 four question included in the EES 2009 were about the European Union institutions. Another three country specific questions were included too, but—although the questions were claimed to be standardized—in order to avoid problems that are involved with comparing the results between countries, only the questions about the EU are used in the analysis. The CSES Module 3 includes the results for 3 country specific questions. The cut-off points for the low, middle and high political aware scoring groups are determined by the quartiles of the scale of how many correct answers the respondents were able to give. These cut-offs are constructed in such a way that if political awareness would be distributed equally among the society that half of the population would fall in between the two cut-off points.

For the CSES Module 3 these cut-off points do not cause any troubles, because this data set included only 3 questions. People were able to answer 0, 1, 2 or 3 questions correctly (results available in appendix 6), therefore, people who were able to answer no question correctly were placed in the low political aware group; answering 1 or 2 questions correctly places that person in the middle political aware category; and answering all questions correctly leads to a high political aware label. The same quartiles are used to determine the cut-off points for the data of the EES 2009. However, because the people had to respond to 4 questions, the scale of correct answers counts 5 possibilities. In order to prevent a skewed scale, I decide that answering zero questions correctly leads to a low political aware label. At the other end of the spectrum are the people who answered every question correctly; they are considered to be high political aware. The others, those who answered 1 to 3 questions correctly are considered to be middle political aware.

Simple bivariate correlation techniques are used to establish the relationship between the proportion of people that are middle political aware and CPI. Using the EES 2009 dataset the empirical result show a positive correlation ($r_s[27] = .534$, $p = .004$). Since the CPI is coded from 0 (maximum corruption) to 10 (no corruption), this result means that large proportions of people that are middle political aware are associated with low levels of corruption. To test these results for robustness, the same analysis have been executed, but then using the data from CSES Module 3 as representation for the political knowledge. Simple bivariate correlation techniques are used to show a relation as well, although less significant ($r_s[19] = .432$, $p = .065$)[12].

[12] Simple bivariate correlation techniques analyzing all countries that are in the dataset did not show a significant relationship ($r_s = .179$, $p = .438$). Especially Sweden and Norway did not seem to fit the expectations. However, a look at greater detail at the dataset and the results of the survey led me to believe that the data for these countries are not reliable as a consequence of too difficult political …

Findings

The results in this chapter confirm the hypothesis that there is a correlation between the proportion of people in a country that is middle political aware and corruption. In order to show this correlation two datasets have provided for the data to calculate for the proportion of people that are middle political aware. The EES 2009 only includes questions about the European Union. The advantage of asking the same questions in every country is that the results can be easily compared. On the contrary, the disadvantage is that the difference between countries that are revealed are not necessarily a result of the difference in political awareness. It might be that the measured differences are a result of a difference in saliency of the European Union in. This might bias the results. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) do show that there are differences in the level of saliency in Europe. However, they showed that these differences could be explained by the attention for a major European event was concerning some of the countries at that particular. The EES 2009, however, includes results from a survey that is held around the European election, a major European event concerning all the countries. Because this event concerns every country to a particular extent, I believe that the saliency is somewhat equalized. Nevertheless, the difference in saliency might lead to mistakes when the results are interpreted.

Therefore, also another source is consulted in order to determine the political awareness. The advantage of the CSES Module 3 is that this survey includes country specific questions that are believed to have equal difficulty level. Because it is assumed that the degree of difficulty is the same, the results are comparable. It remains, however, unclear how it can be tested whether the questions really have the same difficulty across the countries. In appendix 7 I have argued that there are, indeed, differences in the degree of difficulty of the questions. Although the difficulty of the

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knowledge questions. A complete argumentation for this is included in appendix 7: Imperfections CSES Module 3.

questions are important for the classifying people to their levels of political awareness, I am mainly interested in the proportion of group of the people that are middle political aware. This means that as long as the degree of difficulty of questions are at least somewhat similar it is good enough to extract the proportion of this middle group.

Despite the difficulties there are in measuring political awareness in a comparative setting, I consider the findings in this chapter as valid because of the reasons I have mentioned above. Even more so, because the results of both analyses, using different sources with their own advantages and disadvantages, point out in the same direction.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In this thesis is confirmed that there is a significant relation between press freedom and corruption in democracies. However, I gave the evidence that this relation is complex. In order to demonstrate these complexities, I have classified the democracies into a highly corrupt category—the lowest 50% scoring democracies on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2010—and into a mildly-corrupt category—the highest 50% on that index. In chapter 3 is shown that the relationship between the press freedom and corruption for the highly corrupt countries is weaker than for the mildly corrupt countries. Thereby, for the highly corrupt countries the press freedom is a worse predictor for corruption than for the mildly-corrupt countries. These results imply that the marginal effects of the press vary across the levels of corruption in democracy; the press has a stronger corruption curbing effect as the level of corruption is lower. These new findings on the relationship between press freedom and the levels of corruption have provided for the puzzle and research question of this thesis. The question that was aimed to answer is what causes these patterns. Why is the effectiveness of free press to curb corruption stronger as the corruption in a country is lower?

In order to answer this question I have dived into the literature. The mechanisms that are attributed to news media to curb corruption (described in chapter 2) all have in common that diminish corruption after information brought by the press has resulted in a change of attitude by the receiver of this information. Zaller's (1992) model for attitude change is used to understand what kind of people are most influential by messages by the press. As is demonstrated in chapter 4, the people who are middle political aware are most susceptible for information by the media. For an entire societiy this would mean that the susceptibility is higher as the proportion of people that are middle political aware is larger. This argument in combination with the understanding that the media are effective in curbing corruption because of there capability to change attitudes and the finding that the marginal effects of the press on corruption levels differ across the levels of corruption, led to the following hypothesis: the proportion of people that are middle political aware negatively correlates with the level of corruption. In chapter 5 it is actually empirically demonstrated this hypothesis holds: the proportion of people that are middle political aware correlates with the level of corruption. This means that the effectiveness of the free press to curb corruption is stronger as the corruption is lower, because the people who are most susceptible for media influence—those that are middle political aware—negatively correlates with the level of corruption.

The findings in this thesis have implications for both academic as well as real world reasons. Both implications go hand in hand, because any knowledge about how the mechanisms on corruption work, are useful to understand how to fight corruption. This thesis provides for two new findings. Firstly, the marginal effects of the press on corruption differ across the levels of corruption; and secondly, these different patterns can be explained by the fact that there is a correlation between the proportion of the people that are middle political aware—the group that is most likely to experiences attitude change by media messages—and corruption. The first finding implies that the two opposing bodies of the literature can be brought together. Yes, enhancing the press freedom in any country will result in lower corruption, but in corrupt societies this effect in weaker.

For the fight against corruption this means that in the countries in which fighting corruption is most necessary—the corrupt countries—the media is less effective. I am not saying that freedom of media does not have any effect, but much more effort is necessary. It is simply not enough to advocate transparency and media freedom in corrupt countries. A broader, more comprehensive package of measures have to be brought at the same time to curb corruption. The problem however is that it are mainly the countries that are not facing a lot of corruption that are advocating good governance around the world. The non-corrupt countries have to understand that what works in their country is not necessarily effective in other countries.

I have demonstrated that there is a correlation between the proportion of the people that have middle political awareness and corruption and I have argued why this correlation would exist. However, it has just been the first attempt to understand the nature and causes of the complexities. Although, I am confident that my explanations and theoretical framework are valuable contributions to the current literature, I suggest for more research. Especially, because the political awareness is determined by general political knowledge. Although it is likely that political knowledge about different topics strongly correlate, I keep the possibility open that knowledge about corruption fall outside these correlations for that reason that the nature of corruption is perceived differently in every country. This would make the results less valid.

I also suggest to do more research to the comparability of political awareness and political knowledge. I understand that many scholars have been working on this topic for many years, but improvements have to be made. I can imagine that it is helpful to include more political knowledge questions in surveys. This would have been extremely helpful for this thesis, because for this thesis the distributions of political knowledge were required. Because of the low amount of political knowledge questions in each dataset, coincidence could play a too important role. It would also be helpful to establish correlations between domestic political knowledge questions and supranational political questions. If it is known how the knowledge about these different levels correlate within countries, these correlations can be used to compare the distributions between countries. Although differences between countries will come to light, standardisation becomes possible. Obviously, I do these suggestions without having paid a lot of effort trying this. I believe, however, that more on this should be possible. If one will succeed to construct these correlations, then these correlations will prove to be very fruitful for comparable research in various ways; this is not least in the interest of topic studied in this thesis.

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Appendix 1: Reporters Without Borders 2010

country	Press freedom score
Australia	5.38
Austria	0.50
Belgium	4.00
Benin	19.00
Brazil	16.60
Bulgaria	19.00
Canada	7.00
Cape Verde	8.00
Chile	10.50
Costa Rica	8.08
Croatia	17.50
Cyprus	13.40
Czech Republic	7.50
Denmark	2.50
Dominican Republic	26.13
Estonia	2.00
Finland	0.00
France	13.38
Germany	4.25
Ghana	8.00
Greece	19.00
Hungary	7.50
Iceland	0.00
Ireland	2.00
Israel	23.25
Italy	15.00
Japan	2.50
Latvia	8.50

country	Press freedom score
Lithuania	2.50
Luxembourg	4.00
Malta	4.00
Mauritius	18.00
Mongolia	19.42
Namibia	7.00
Netherlands	0.00
New Zealand	1.50
Norway	0.00
Panama	21.83
Poland	8.88
Portugal	12.36
Romania	16.00
Samoa	33.00
Serbia	23.00
Slovakia	11.50
Slovenia	13.44
South Africa	12.00
South Korea	13.33
Spain	12.25
Sweden	0.00
Switzerland	0.00
Taiwan	14.50
Trinidad and Tobago	8.50
United Kingdom	6.00
United States	6.75
Uruguay	11.75

APPENDIX 2: FREEDOM HOUSE PRESS FREEDOM

country	Press freedom score
Argentina	49
Australia	22
Austria	21
Barbados	19
Belgium	12
Benin	33
Brazil	43
Bulgaria	34
Canada	19
Cape Verde	28
Chile	30
Costa Rica	19
Croatia	40
Cyprus	22
Czech Republic	18
Denmark	11
Dominica	23
Dominican Republic	39
Estonia	17
Finland	10
France	23
Germany	17
Ghana	26
Greece	29
Hungary	23
Iceland	10
Ireland	15
Israel	29
Italy	33
Japan	21
Kiribati	27
Latvia	26

country	Press freedom score
Lithuania	21
Luxembourg	12
Malta	22
Mauritius	27
Mongolia	39
Namibia	34
Netherlands	14
New Zealand	14
Norway	10
Panama	44
Poland	24
Portugal	16
Romania	43
Samoa	29
Sao Tome and Principe	28
Serbia	35
Slovakia	23
Slovenia	25
South Africa	32
South Korea	30
Spain	24
Sweden	10
Switzerland	13
Taiwan	24
Trinidad and Tobago	23
United Kingdom	19
United States	18
Uruguay	25
Vanuatu	23

APPENDIX 3: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL'S CPI 2010

country	CPI score
Argentina	2.90
Australia	8.70
Austria	7.90
Belgium	7.10
Benin	2.80
Brazil	3.70
Bulgaria	3.60
Canada	8.90
Cape Verde	5.10
Chile	7.20
Costa Rica	5.30
Croatia	4.10
Cyprus	6.30
Czech Republic	4.60
Denmark	9.30
Dominican Republic	3.00
Estonia	6.50
Finland	9.20
France	6.80
Germany	7.90
Ghana	4.10
Greece	3.50

country	CPI score
Hungary	4.70
Iceland	8.50
Ireland	8.00
Israel	6.10
Italy	3.90
Japan	7.80
Latvia	4.30
Lithuania	5.00
Luxembourg	8.50
Malta	5.60
Mauritius	5.40
Mongolia	2.70
Namibia	4.40
Netherlands	8.80
New Zealand	9.30
Norway	8.60
Panama	3.60
Poland	5.30
Portugal	6.00
Romania	3.70
Samoa	4.10
Serbia	3.50
Slovakia	4.30

country	CPI score
Slovenia	6.40
South Africa	4.50
South Korea	5.40
Spain	6.10
Sweden	9.20
Switzerland	8.70

country	CPI score
Taiwan	5.80
Trinidad and Tobago	3.60
United Kingdom	7.60
United States	7.10
Uruguay	6.90

APPENDIX 4: FREEDOM HOUSE DEMOCRACY

Country	PR	CL
Andorra	1	1
Australia	1	1
Austria	1	1
Bahamas	1	1
Barbados	1	1
Belgium	1	1
Canada	1	1
Cape Verde	1	1
Chile	1	1
Costa Rica	1	1
Cyprus	1	1
Czech Republic	1	1
Denmark*	1	1
Dominica*	1	1
Estonia*	1	1
Finland*	1	1
France*	1	1
Germany*	1	1
Hungary*	1	1
Iceland*	1	1
Ireland*	1	1
Kiribati*	1	1
Liechtenstein*	1	1
Lithuania*	1	1

Country	PR	CL
Luxembourg*	1	1
Malta*	1	1
Marshall Islands*	1	1
Micronesia*	1	1
Nauru*	1	1
Netherlands*	1	1
New Zealand*	1	1
Norway*	1	1
Palau*	1	1
Poland*	1	1
Portugal*	1	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis*	1	1
Saint Lucia*	1	1
San Marino*	1	1
Slovakia*	1	1
Slovenia*	1	1
Spain*	1	1
Sweden*	1	1
Switzerland*	1	1
Tuvalu*	1	1
United Kingdom*	1	1
United States*	1	1
Uruguay*	1	1
Belize*	1	2

Country	PR	CL
Croatia*	1	2
Ghana*	1	2
Greece*	1	2
Grenada*	1	2
Israel*	1	2
Italy*	1	2
Japan*	1	2
Latvia*	2	1
Mauritius*	1	2
Monaco*	2	1
Panama*	1	2
Saint Vincent and Grenadines*	2	1
South Korea*	1	2
Taiwan*	1	2
Argentina*	2	2
Benin*	2	2
Brazil*	2	2
Bulgaria*	2	2
Dominican Republic*	2	2
Mongolia*	2	2
Namibia*	2	2
Romania*	2	2
Samoa*	2	2
Sao Tome and Principe*	2	2
Serbia*	2	2
South Africa*	2	2
Suriname*	2	2

Country	PR	CL
Trinidad and Tobago*	2	2
Vanuatu*	2	2
Antigua and Barbuda*	3	2
Botswana*	3	2
El Salvador*	2	3
Guyana*	2	3
India*	2	3
Indonesia*	2	3
Jamaica*	2	3
Mali*	2	3
Mexico*	2	3
Montenegro*	3	2
Peru*	2	3
Ukraine*	3	2
Albania*	3	3
Bolivia*	3	3
Ecuador*	3	3
Lesotho*	3	3
Macedonia*	3	3
Paraguay*	3	3
Senegal*	3	3
Seychelles*	3	3
Sierra Leone*	3	3
Turkey*	3	3
Bangladesh*	3	4
Bosnia-Herzegovina*	4	3
Colombia*	3	4

Country	PR	CL
Comoros*	3	4
East Timor*	3	4
Liberia*	3	4
Malawi*	3	4
Maldives*	3	4
Moldova*	3	4
Mozambique	4	3
Papua New Guinea*	4	3
Philippines	4	3
Solomon Islands	4	3
Tanzania	4	3
Zambia*	3	4
Burkina Faso	5	3
Georgia	4	4
Guatemala*	4	4
Guinea-Bissau*	4	4
Honduras	4	4
Kenya	4	4
Kuwait	4	4
Lebanon	5	3
Malaysia	4	4
Nepal	4	4
Nicaragua*	4	4
Sri Lanka*	4	4
Tonga	5	3
Bhutan	4	5
Burundi*	4	5
Haiti*	4	5

Country	PR	CL
Kosovo	5	4
Morocco	5	4
Niger	5	4
Nigeria	5	4
Pakistan	4	5
Singapore	5	4
Thailand	5	4
Togo	5	4
Uganda	5	4
Venezuela	5	4
Armenia	6	4
Central African Republic	5	5
Djibouti	5	5
Ethiopia	5	5
Fiji	6	4
Madagascar	6	4
The Gambia	5	5
Algeria	6	5
Angola	6	5
Azerbaijan	6	5
Bahrain	6	5
Brunei	6	5
Cambodia	6	5
Congo (Brazzaville)	6	5
Cote d’Ivoire	6	5
Egypt	6	5
Gabon	6	5
Iraq	5	6

Country	PR	CL
Jordan	6	5
Kazakhstan	6	5
Kyrgyzstan	6	5
Mauritania	6	5
Oman	6	5
Qatar	6	5
Russia	6	5
Rwanda	6	5
Tajikistan	6	5
United Arab Emirates	6	5
Yemen	6	5
Afghanistan	6	6
Cameroon	6	6
Congo (Kinshasa)	6	6
Iran	6	6
Swaziland	7	5
Tunisia	7	5
Vietnam	7	5

Country	PR	CL
Zimbabwe	6	6
Belarus	7	6
Chad	7	6
China	7	6
Cuba	7	6
Guinea	7	6
Laos	7	6
Saudi Arabia	7	6
Syria	7	6
Burma	7	7
Equatorial Guinea	7	7
Eritrea	7	7
Libya	7	7
North Korea	7	7
Somalia	7	7
Sudan	7	7
Turkmenistan	7	7
Uzbekistan	7	7

APPENDIX 5: POLITICAL AWARENESS EES 2009

country		Correct answers out of 4					Total
		0	1	2	3	4	
Austria	Count	108	491	365	28	8	1000
	% within country	10,8%	49,1%	36,5%	2,8%	,8%	100,0%
Belgium	Count	212	383	265	111	31	1002
	% within country	21,2%	38,2%	26,4%	11,1%	3,1%	100,0%
Bulgaria	Count	319	402	192	68	19	1000
	% within country	31,9%	40,2%	19,2%	6,8%	1,9%	100,0%
Cyprus	Count	128	392	311	123	46	1000
	% within country	12,8%	39,2%	31,1%	12,3%	4,6%	100,0%
Czech Republic	Count	145	429	288	112	46	1020
	% within country	14,2%	42,1%	28,2%	11,0%	4,5%	100,0%
Denmark	Count	172	428	336	55	9	1000
	% within country	17,2%	42,8%	33,6%	5,5%	,9%	100,0%
Estonia	Count	290	389	225	82	21	1007
	% within country	28,8%	38,6%	22,3%	8,1%	2,1%	100,0%
Finland	Count	185	431	308	59	17	1000
	% within country	18,5%	43,1%	30,8%	5,9%	1,7%	100,0%
France	Count	126	499	297	69	9	1000
	% within country	12,6%	49,9%	29,7%	6,9%	,9%	100,0%
Germany	Count	175	479	289	49	12	1004
	% within country	17,4%	47,7%	28,8%	4,9%	1,2%	100,0%
Greece	Count	104	370	350	130	46	1000
	% within country	10,4%	37,0%	35,0%	13,0%	4,6%	100,0%
Hungary	Count	248	411	255	65	26	1005
	% within country	24,7%	40,9%	25,4%	6,5%	2,6%	100,0%
Ireland	Count	91	366	386	127	31	1001
	% within country	9,1%	36,6%	38,6%	12,7%	3,1%	100,0%
Italy	Count	323	349	241	70	17	1000
	% within country	32,3%	34,9%	24,1%	7,0%	1,7%	100,0%
Latvia	Count	273	383	229	84	32	1001
	% within country	27,3%	38,3%	22,9%	8,4%	3,2%	100,0%

Lithuania	Count	293	348	245	79	35	1000
	% within country	29,3%	34,8%	24,5%	7,9%	3,5%	100,0%
Luxembourg	Count	137	533	278	44	9	1001
	% within country	13,7%	53,2%	27,8%	4,4%	,9%	100,0%
Malta	Count	351	410	183	39	17	1000
	% within country	35,1%	41,0%	18,3%	3,9%	1,7%	100,0%
The Netherlands	Count	214	476	255	51	9	1005
	% within country	21,3%	47,4%	25,4%	5,1%	,9%	100,0%
Poland	Count	211	372	283	91	45	1002
	% within country	21,1%	37,1%	28,2%	9,1%	4,5%	100,0%
Portugal	Count	326	470	152	46	6	1000
	% within country	32,6%	47,0%	15,2%	4,6%	,6%	100,0%
Romania	Count	423	295	187	71	27	1003
	% within country	42,2%	29,4%	18,6%	7,1%	2,7%	100,0%
Slovakia	Count	133	340	347	134	62	1016
	% within country	13,1%	33,5%	34,2%	13,2%	6,1%	100,0%
Slovenia	Count	65	509	340	69	17	1000
	% within country	6,5%	50,9%	34,0%	6,9%	1,7%	100,0%
Spain	Count	167	354	341	120	18	1000
	% within country	16,7%	35,4%	34,1%	12,0%	1,8%	100,0%
Sweden	Count	132	439	355	73	3	1002
	% within country	13,2%	43,8%	35,4%	7,3%	,3%	100,0%
United Kingdom	Count	227	367	300	90	16	1000
	% within country	22,7%	36,7%	30,0%	9,0%	1,6%	100,0%
Total	Count	5578	11115	7603	2139	634	27069
	% within Country	20,6%	41,1%	28,1%	7,9%	2,3%	100,0%

APPENDIX 6: POLITICAL AWARENESS CSES MODULE 3

country		Correct answers out of 3				Total
		0	1	2	3	
Australia	Count	248	536	834	254	1872
	% within country	13,2%	28,6%	44,6%	13,6%	100,0%
Austria	Count	165	247	405	348	1165
	% within country	14,2%	21,2%	34,8%	29,9%	100,0%
Brazil	Count	71	308	408	213	1000
	% within country	7,1%	30,8%	40,8%	21,3%	100,0%
Czech Republic	Count	452	888	1059	765	3164
	% within country	14,3%	28,1%	33,5%	24,2%	100,0%
Switzerland	Count	278	541	696	487	2002
	% within country	13,9%	27,0%	34,8%	24,3%	100,0%
Deutschland	Count	409	487	844	355	2095
	% within country	19,5%	23,2%	40,3%	16,9%	100,0%
Finland	Count	36	243	568	436	1283
	% within country	2,8%	18,9%	44,3%	34,0%	100,0%
France	Count	85	492	791	632	2000
	% within country	4,3%	24,6%	39,6%	31,6%	100,0%
Croatia	Count	118	320	287	279	1004
	% within country	11,8%	31,9%	28,6%	27,8%	100,0%
Ireland	Count	282	435	551	167	1435
	% within country	19,7%	30,3%	38,4%	11,6%	100,0%
Iceland	Count	215	213	651	306	1385
	% within country	15,5%	15,4%	47,0%	22,1%	100,0%
Israel	Count	174	307	459	260	1200
	% within country	14,5%	25,6%	38,3%	21,7%	100,0%
Japan	Count	415	559	323	76	1373
	% within country	30,2%	40,7%	23,5%	5,5%	100,0%
Korea (South)	Count	38	85	374	503	1000
	% within country	3,8%	8,5%	37,4%	50,3%	100,0%
The Netherlands	Count	376	645	911	427	2359
	% within country	15,9%	27,3%	38,6%	18,1%	100,0%

Norway	Count	960	574	299	179	2012
	% within country	47,7%	28,5%	14,9%	8,9%	100,0%
New Zealand	Count	167	347	465	170	1149
	% within country	14,5%	30,2%	40,5%	14,8%	100,0%
Poland	Count	163	230	586	838	1817
	% within country	9,0%	12,7%	32,3%	46,1%	100,0%
Portugal	Count	281	373	358	304	1316
	% within country	21,4%	28,3%	27,2%	23,1%	100,0%
Sweden	Count	764	364	294	125	1547
	% within country	49,4%	23,5%	19,0%	8,1%	100,0%
Taiwan	Count	451	414	589	451	1905
	% within country	23,7%	21,7%	30,9%	23,7%	100,0%
Total	Count	7975	10051	13484	8588	40098
	% within country	19,9%	25,1%	33,6%	21,4%	100,0%

APPENDIX 7: IMPERFECTIONS CSES MODULE 3

Including all countries from the CSES Module 3 into account, do not result in empirical evidence for a relationship between the proportion of people that are middle political aware and corruption ($r_s[21] = .179$, $p = .438$). A scatter plot of this relation is displayed in figure XX. It is expected that high CPI score—thus countries with low corruption—are associated with large proportions of people that are middle political aware. Especially Sweden and Norway do not fit these expectations.



Figure 1: Scatter plot of the relationship between the proportion of the people that are middle aware and corruption.

Looking at the dataset, however, leads me to believe that there are problems with these data. It seems that the political knowledge questions in these countries were more difficult than in other countries given the high percentage of people that could not answer any question correctly (Norway 47.7% and Sweden 49.4%). The questions were constructed in such a way that approximately 2/3 would be able to answer the first question correctly, 1/2 the second and only 1/3 the last question (Grönlund & Milner, 2006: 389). Theoretically it is possible to hold a survey without a single person having every question incorrect. This is when the 1/3 of people who answer the first question incorrectly are exactly that 1/3 who answer the last question correctly, no matter what they respond to the second question. If, however, being able to answer a question is transitive over the difficultness rate—that an individual cannot answer a question that is more difficult than another question he answered incorrectly—then this would result in a maximum of people that cannot answer a single question correctly. The percentage of people that cannot answer any question correctly is then equal to the people who could not give a correct answer to the easiest question. Thus, for the questions in the CSES module this would be maximally 1/3 of the respondents. This reasoning is shown schematically in figure 5.

	q1	q2	q3
a	×		✓
b	×		✓
c	✓		×
d	✓		×
e	✓		×
f	✓		×

	q1	q2	q3
a	×	×	×
b	×	×	×
c	✓	×	×
d	✓	✓	×
e	✓	✓	✓
f	✓	✓	✓

Figure 2: Figure 6: q1, q2 and q3 are questions for which the percentage that is able to answer the questions correctly is respectively 2/3, 1/2 and 1/3. The letters A through F are the respondents. A cross represents a incorrect answer and a checkmark represents a correct answer. The left figure shows that with these correctness rates it is possible that no individual answers every question incorrect. It does not even matter what the persons answer for q2. The right figure shows a situation for which the group of political unaware people—those who cannot answer any question correctly—is largest. From the figure it becomes clear that the maximum amount of people that does not answer any question correctly cannot be larger than the incorrectness rate of the easiest question. In the CSES module 3 this is suppose to be around 33.33%.

If the fact whether an individual is able to answer a question is not transitive and only related to the percentage of correctness to a question, then the percentage of people that cannot answer a single question correctly in this survey is around 11 % (=1/3*1/2*2/3). Since, being able to answer is probably not completely transitive, but also not completely random the expectation is that the percentage of political unaware people—those who are not able to answer a question correctly—is between 11.11% and 33.33%. Scores lower are not likely, but this cannot be ruled out. Meanwhile political unawareness rates higher than 33.33 are impossible if the questions have the correct difficultness. Sweden and Norway show low political awareness rates that are well above 33.33%; 49.4% and 47.7 respectively. Therefore I do not consider the data from those to countries to be reliable.

When the same analysis is executed, but without the data for Sweden and Norway the analysis shows that it is, indeed, more likely, that there is a relationship ($r_s[19]=0.432$, $p=0.065$) between the medium aware group is calculated from the CSES module and corruption as represented by a CPI value. A scatter plot of this relationship including all countries but Sweden and Norway is shown in figure 6.



Figure 3: Scatter plot of the relationship between the proportion of the people that are middle aware and corruption. Sweden and Norway were excluded from the analysis.