The Double-Edged Sword of Power-Sharing: The Interactions between Consociationalism and the Politics of Identity in Burundi

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ABSTRACT

Despite its attractive attributes for settling conflict in deeply divided societies, the ability of power-sharing to catalyse the transition of post-conflict countries to a stable, peaceful democracy, has been frequently contested by the academic community. Especially in the case of identity-driven conflicts such as ethnic conflicts, the institutionalization of ethnicity in the political realm inhabits risks of further entrenchment of cleavages, instead of the much needed reconciliation between formerly conflicting parties. Since power-sharing has implicit effects on identity in these types of conflict, this research seeks to find out how the implementation of power-sharing models interact with the (de)politicisation of ethnic identity, as well as the formation and bolstering of a shared, national identity. An interpretative single-case study on the country of Burundi will be executed by method of process-tracing, in order to explore the connections and interactions between the power-sharing model with the politics of identity. This research finds that power-sharing has slightly depoliticised ethnicity, however, the power-grabbing by one political party has resulted in a persisting climate of political violence and intimidation. This development, combined with the lack of attention to transitional justice, reconciliation and truth-seeking, have not bolstered a unified sense of Burundian national identity.

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1.   Introduction

Finding a common ground to establish political stability in deeply divided countries coming out of bloody conflict, is a complex and fragile process. Especially in cases where identities along race, ethnic, religious, or other differentiating lines have been heavily politicised, it is difficult to equally accommodate the needs and desires of the very cleavages that stood head-to-head with each other in conflict. In this setting, consociationalism as coined by Lijphart (1977) has been a frequently used strategy in post-conflict reconstruction, since each group will be given a share of power and resources, which is expected to set into motion the evolution to a stable democracy and sustained peace. Although 'sharing the cake' as a way of settling dispute equally sounds plausible, the uniformity and durability of its success have been contested (Vandeginste, 2011, p. 329) In the specific case of ethnic conflict, power-sharing agreements are usually characterized by the accommodation of ethnicity in politics. Though ethnic recognition may protect the representation and inclusion of all ethnic groups, the institutionalization of ethnicity in the aftermath of its lethal politicisation, could also inhibit further accentuation of ethnic differences preventing them from truly reconciling (Aitkin, 2007). In contrast, scholars in favour of consociationalism have also argued that power-sharing is actually able to reduces ethnic tensions in the long term, and it can even foster the depoliticization of ethnicity, which in turn leaves room for unity to be formed based on a shared national identity (Simonsen, 2005, Raffoul, 2019, McGarry & O'Leary, 2009).

Is power-sharing a viable method to decrease the salience of politicised ethnic identities, and does it contribute to the cementing of a shared sense of national identity? The double-edged sword of power-sharing after ethnic conflict, that can have both negative and positive influences on the politics of identity, is the enigma that motivated this thesis. By carrying out an interpretive single case study by means of process tracing, this thesis aims to unveil the connections between institutional power-sharing after ethnic conflict, and the interaction with identity it invokes within this structure. Burundi has been chosen as a case study, as it serves a compelling case that demonstrates both the opportunities as complexities of post-ethnic conflict power-sharing. Marked by its recent history of genocide in 1993 and a brutal civil war that followed, the country has embarked on a path of consociationalism since 2000. By design of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA), the government of the country underwent a radical change from being historically characterized by Tutsi single-party rule, to a carefully composed institutional design that equally represents its 85% Hutu,

14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa populations (Vandeginste, 2014). Some scholars have carefully hinted that the successful implementation of the consociational framework has contributed to significant depoliticization of ethnic identities (Raffoul, 2019, Reyntjes, 2016). Nevertheless, after nearly two decades of institutional engineering, Burundi finds itself in a state of persisting violence and oppression. In the 15 years that former Hutu rebel group CNDD-FDD has been in power, they have undertaken several political projects to undermine the Arusha Agreement, which eventually collapsed completely when CNDD-FDD frontman president Pierre Nkurunziza sought an unconstitutional third term in 2015 (Apuuli, 2018). The ongoing political crisis that is combined with widespread human rights violations against any opposition, might jeopardize the carefully crafted ethnic power balance, leaving a lingering threat of the outbreak of mass violence (United Nations, 2018).

This research expects to build a theoretical argument that sheds light on to what extent the power-sharing agreement in post-conflict Burundi has interacted with the politics of identity. The research question will be as follows: *How has the institutional design of power-sharing in post-conflict Burundi interacted with the politics of identity, and to what extent has this contributed to the current political crisis?* By method of process-tracing, main institutional texts such the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000), the Revision of the Constitution (2018), as well as communiqués of prominent political parties will be evaluated, in order to identify the interactions between power-sharing and the politics of identity. This research will specifically look at the concepts of national identity and ethnic identity and ask whether power-sharing in Burundi has contributed to the creation of a common national identity, the further politicization of ethnic identity, or a mix of both. This research adds to a body of academia that is generally divided on the ability of power-sharing to catalyse national unity and a corresponding national identity, as well as on the ability of power-sharing to decrease the salience of ethnic identities and divisions. Moreover, whereas the politicisation of ethnic identity has been the subject of some studies on Burundi, the (re)construction of a shared national identity in Burundi under the auspices of power-sharing, has been seriously understudied. This dimension of this analysis will therefore add to the relevance of the study, as it could lead to additional interpretations of the recent events of the political crisis and unrest. In addition, the solidification of minority rights as a result of a global human-rights based approach, increasingly demands for the need for inclusion, both in the social and political domain. Therefore, studying power-sharing arrangements for divided societies that recognize these needs and rights, but at the same time address how this interacts with the politics of identity is a relevant addition to the body of literature. The generated knowledge can then also

be applied to other divided countries that implement power-sharing, and deal with issues of identity.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Power-sharing in divided societies

When internal conflicts are motivated by salient cleavages along ethnic, religious, linguistic or other lines, different democratic design choices have been proposed to manage and resolve conflict. In general, two paths can be identified when it comes to the management of diversity; integration and accommodation. 'Integrationists' aspire the establishment of a democratic electoral system that refrains from mobilization based on the identity divides, but instead praise the virtues of political parties chosen by majority or plurality support (McGarry & O'Leary, 2009). By doing so, the political salience of the identities is thought to decrease, and the violent divisions that emerged are not 'frozen' in its conflict status (Simonsen, 2005). On the other hand, 'accommodationists' prefer a system that accommodates *"dual or multiple public identities in many-roomed political mansions"* (McGarry & O'Leary, 2009, p. 16). Recognition of identities ensures rights to all groups, protects the minorities from the 'tyranny of the majority', and is expected to sustain peace (King & Samii, 2018). One of the most influential accommodationist theories is Arend Lijphart's model of a 'consociational democracy'. Lijphart (1977) describes a set of institutional elements that are thought to guarantee a democratic transition in plural societies in which political divisions are characterized by salient social differentiation, which he calls 'segmental cleavages. The main pillars of a consociational democracy are: a grand coalition, minority overrepresentation or parity, mutual veto rights, and segmented autonomy (Lijphart, 2004). Premised on elite cooperation, consociationalism is supposed to foster dedication to a collectivized idea of the state, whilst at the same time measures are built that safeguard the interests and safety of all segments into the foundation of the political system (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25).

Although Lijphart's theory has had significant impact on how conflicts worldwide are managed, some argue that it draws too much on the notion and importance of institutions, and that it is generally indifferent to the country-specific cultural and historical contexts (Schraml, 2012). Moreover, in countries that are coming out of bloody conflict, the expectancy of cooperative attitudes of the very groups that have been in conflict with each other are disputable. Indeed, Spears (2002) observed that in many post-conflict African states, violence instead crystallizes hatred between conflict groups, who seek to securitize their access to power (p. 194). Especially in weak and dysfunctional states, formal power-sharing would not be enough to overcome a political system that is mainly driven by other factors such as

neopatrimonial relations and resources (Spears, 2013). Other academics have assumed that sharing power might only succeed in conflict management and short-term peace, but does not provide grounds for sustainable peacebuilding and conflict resolution (Horowitz, 1993). Tull & Mehler (2005) take this argument one step further by claiming that power-sharing agreements serve as a 'political quick-fix and early exit' for the international community to make peace in Africa (p. 376). This in turn opens a window for rebel groups to get access to state power and resources, since the power of consociationalism lays largely in the inclusion of all major players in conflicts in the creation of a unity government (Cheeseman, 2010). In the case of Burundi this argument is especially interesting, since the current most prominent political parties used to be rebel/armed groups, and only got into politics after the peace agreement.

In relation to conflicts with an ethnic character, the initial objective of consociationalism was not to resolve or unite ethnic divisions, but rather to 'contain' them in society and to 'make plural societies more thoroughly plural' (Lijphart, 1977, p. 42). Hence, in countries that have experienced ethnic conflict, power-sharing agreements imply the recognition of ethnicity in the political realm. According to accommodationists such as Taylor (2011), recognition is not only a critical condition for democratic transition and fair representation but is essential for creating respect and upholding dignity of different group identities. In practice, this can mean that ethnic minorities are ensured fair representation through the establishment of ethnic quotas, autonomy arrangements, or specific group rights. However, critics of ethnic accommodation fear that recognition of distinctive identity-based factors might accentuate differences, as identities are 'locked down' in a momentum of heavy politicization, which can further increase their political salience (Simonsen, 2005). The potential gains that ethnic accommodation in power-sharing agreements hold, combined with the accompanied possible threats, is what De Zwart (2005) coins as the 'dilemma of recognition'. This term accurately represents the diverging interpretations in the current academic debate on the effectiveness and durability of power-sharing in the aftermath of conflict.

In this thesis, power-sharing is understood as a method of conflict resolution in divided societies, that creates a carefully drafted balance of power between cleavages that ensures equal representation and prevents domination of one over the other. Though Lijphart's theory of consociationalism will be the starting point, this thesis acknowledges its shortcomings and criticisms in the analysis. The dilemma of recognition is relevant for the case study of Burundi, since ethnicities became institutionalized right after their lethal politicization, which makes it

questionable whether this leads to sustainable reconciliation, or further division. In addition, Tull & Mehler's (2005), Spears' (2002) and Horowitz' (1993) arguments offer important insights in the case-specific context of Burundi's power-sharing agreement, because of the immense political involvement of former armed groups that has sought power in the current Burundian government, and the persistent tensions between those groups that seek to enlarge their share of the cake. Moreover, since this thesis seeks to identify interactions between power-sharing and the politics of identity, this thesis draws heavily from literature focused on the identity-dimension of power-sharing (O'Flynn & Russell, 2005, McGarry & O'Leary, 2009, Baliqi, 2018).

2.2. *The Politics of Identity*

In the modern world, people's identities have become increasingly important in invoking certain political claims. In general terms, identity can be described as an aspect of an individual's cognitive map, that refers to how they structure one's self in connection to the social world (Boix et. al. 2007). People can have multiple social identities based on gender, class, race, sexuality, nationality or any other distinguishing factor, which can be instrumentalized as a tool for framing, promoting and directing political claims, ideologies, and actions (Neofotistos, 2013). This phenomenon is frequently referred to as the 'politics of identity', which usually takes place in a larger context of inequality and injustice that catalyse the endeavour for recognition and equality (Appiah, 2006). Besides identity being a political vehicle that people can use to challenge, negotiate, or protect structures of power in a 'bottom-up' manner, collective identity can also be forged by those in power, and used to mobilize groups of people and decide on who belongs and who does not (Hill & Wilson, 2003).

National Identity

National identity is one of the identities with which people can collectively identify. National identity can be described as the sense of belonging to a certain nation, that distinguishes itself by having shared interpretations of culture, language, history and symbols (Boix et. al. 2007). Scholars are divided on the causal path that leads individuals to experiencing this feeling of belonging. Some scholars (Dobbins, 2007, Smith, 1986), emphasize 'primordial' ethno-cultural characteristics such as ancestry, race and ethnicity as defining factors for 'belonging' to a nation. This idea is challenged by constructivist scholars

that emphasize that nations and national identity are socially constructed and depend on more inclusive factors such as shared citizenship, political allegiance, and beliefs (Brubaker, 1992, Gellner, 1983). This constructivist approach identifies limitations of the primordial view, as the primordial understanding of national identity does not explain how people experience belonging to a nation in ethnically, linguistically, or religiously diverse societies (Brubaker, 1992). Therefore, in recognizing that different group identities can exist within the border of a country, national identity can be seen as an overarching principle that accommodates these group identities *"like a layer of skin that holds them together"* (Grotenhuis, 2016). Anderson (1991) provides a strong account on the constructivist interpretation of national identity, describing a nation as an 'imagined community', where people feel connected to each other and experience a common 'we-feeling', although they do not know each other individually. According to Anderson (1991), national identity and nations in general, have been created as means to political and economic ends. By constructing shared experiences, history, culture and beliefs, governments can shape national identity so it serves as a collective form of organization and identification and can have political functions such as legitimizing state authority and institutions.

In societies that are coming out of conflict, reconciliation and transitional justice are is crucial tools for restoring national identity and unity. It allows societies to move from 'negative peace' which means simple cohabitation and the absence of physical violence, to 'positive peace', meaning the prevalence of social justice and absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1969). Dedication to reconciliation has a beneficial effect on creating a sense of national cohesion and unity both between political actors as citizens, as it builds trust, transforms negative and harmful attitudes, and promotes the preoccupation of 'us and our future', instead of 'me and my future' (Villa-Vicencio, 2009, p.154). Consequently, a sense of national identity can be strengthened when people come together to deal with the legacy of injustice, as they look for a way forward together, regardless of the divisions that exist within the society. This dimension is important for the case-study of Burundi, since after the atrocities committed during the ethnic conflict, the need to heal as a unified society and come to terms with the past was high.

Ethnic Identity

In Sub-Saharan Africa, a continent characterized by a high level of ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity, constructing a national identity has proven to be a complex

undertaking. According to Salih & Markakis (1998) instead of a sense of national identity, ethnicity is the main driver to political mobilization in post-colonial Africa. Ethnic identity refers to a sense of belonging to a particular shared ancestry, cultural heritage, history, traditions, and sometimes language and religion (Verkuyten, 2005). Though ethnicity generally attests to beliefs in shared origins - a primordial conception - constructivist interpretations emphasize how ethnicity can be created, shaped, and instigated to action, and how it is subjective to change and other situational factors (Sklar, 1967). Nnoli (2007) eloquently illustrates this by stating that ethnicity *"sometimes finds expression in political domination, economic exploitation, psychological oppression and class manipulation"* (p. 75). In Africa, it is relevant that the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity are placed in the post-colonialist discourse, since colonial occupation has heavily influenced how these concepts are understood nowadays. Ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations were used by colonialists not only to shape an ideological basis to justify the colonial enterprise, but also to divide groups and alienate individuals from their original society (Nnoli, 2007). British indirect colonial rule for example, attempted to force diverse groups of people into the framework of one highly centralized state, whilst at the same time giving one group more power/access over the other (Deng, 2005). This 'centralized and decentralized despotism', as coined by Mamdani (1996), sharply defined ethnic identities and injected a hierarchy, which severely politicised ethnic identity in the colonial state.

With regards to the politics of identity, this thesis adopts a constructivist interpretation of both national and ethnic identity. National identity is conceptualized as an overarching identity that unites citizens of a country, through citizenship, shared culture, history and habits, and can be shared by people who also carry other group identities (Grotenhuis, 2016). Ethnic identity is conceptualized as a sense of belonging to a group that attests to beliefs in shared origins/ancestry, but can be instrumentalized, shaped and instigated to action (Sklar, 1967). Although in a constructivist view there is overlap in how ethnic identity and national identity are shaped, strengthened , and instrumentalized, the main difference between national identity and ethnic identity is in the understanding that national identity is connected to a certain nation with borders and can contain multiple ethnic identities, whereas ethnic identity is linked to an inherited ancestry, which can exist across borders.

2.3. Summary & Hypotheses

This chapter has shed light on the theory of power-sharing and the politics of identity, which serves as the theoretical framework for this thesis. Though Lijphart's theory of consociationalism as a method of managing diverse societies after conflict sounds valid on paper, arguments of other power-sharing scholars point out that it is rather technical and is not always sustainable in practice. Instead, as has been argued, formal power-sharing agreements may lock down the cleavages in their most politicised state. This directly links to the politics of identity, since the conceptions and power relations associated with certain conflicting identities (for example ethnic), become sealed in an official agreement. Though institutionalizing the cleavages might lead to short-term peace, it might not leave enough leeway for the salience of different identities to change naturally. Therefore, it is questionable whether institutionalizing differences of previously conflicting identities and giving them all a share of power, is a fertile ground for a shared national identity to arise. Nevertheless, as the theory on national identity in post-conflict societies has illustrated, reconciliation and transitional justice are helpful instruments to consolidate a sense of unity and national identity in this case. Concerning ethnic identity, accommodation of ethnic identities can be of significant importance to ensure group rights and protection of minorities from majority tyranny, which power-sharing encompasses. However, considering the colonial history and politicisation of ethnicity in Burundi, it is debatable if the institutionalization of ethnicity in power-sharing agreements positively contributes to undoing certain colonially constructed ethnic attributes, or if it deepens the ethnic divisions. In short, to analyse the links and interactions between power-sharing and the politics of identity in Burundi, the hypotheses beneath will be guiding lines for analysing the outcomes:

Ethnic Identity

      H1.1. Power-sharing leads to further politicization of ethnicity in Burundi;

      H.1.2. Power-sharing leads to the depoliticization of ethnicity in Burundi;

National Identity

      H2.1. Power-sharing helps in building a national identity in Burundi;

      H2.2. Power-sharing does not help in building a national identity in Burundi.

3.   Literature Review

3.1. Power-Sharing & Politics of Identity

Traditional consociationalist models are generally premised on an idea that the identities associated with the cleavages are more fixed, inflexible, resilient and hard (McGarry & O'Leary, 2009). This can be illustrated by the fact that in some ethnic power-sharing agreements like the one in Burundi, ethnicities and their corresponding share of power are formally established, for example by installing ethnic quotas, or by assigning segmental autonomy to an ethnic cleavage over a specific piece of land. Political actors in Burundi are classified by their ethnic identity, and access to political power is delegated based on ethnicity. This rigid identification leaves little room for ethnic identity to change, adapt to environmental adjustments, and it does not necessarily motivate interethnic association. Accordingly, this could suggest that identities are more rigidified in consociational models, possibly risking further entrenchment of the ethnic divisions. These further deepened cleavages have been observed in the cases of Malaysia and Iraq for example, where ethnic power-sharing has led to enforced ethnic voting behaviour, and the persistence of single-ethnic parties (Jarrett, 2016). Therefore, from a constructivist viewpoint, it can be argued that the power-sharing approach underestimates the malleability and fluidity of ethnic identities, and instead conserves the ethnic identities in an obstinate state. In addition, the institutionalization of ethnic cleavages in consociational agreements could also suppress space to develop a sense of political unity, preventing the creation of a common state identity that could unite cleavages (Jarrett, 2016).

According to Baliqi (2018), too little attention is paid to identity in power-sharing systems, whilst the creation of a multi-layered, shared civic identity is crucial for statehood, peacebuilding, and democratization in post-conflict countries. His research on power-sharing and its impact on interethnic relations in Kosovo finds that ethnic representation and participation is only practiced by political elites, and ethno-political identities have remained rigid (2018). He found that bolstering a shared national identity has been largely ignored, which discourages democratic participation on a community level, and association that transcends ethnic affiliation. Baliqi (2018) also asserts that the promotion of a shared civic identity is needed to foster state legitimacy, and that a consociational democracy has to be based primarily on political unity rather than on ethnicity, in order to incentivize this shared identity formation. Moreover, in the case of Kosovo, the lack of dedication to promoting reconciliation, transitional justice, and the establishment interethnic trust has also blocked the formation of a

shared state identity (Baliqi, 2018, p.66). Baliqi's observations about consociationalism coming short when it comes to the development of a national identity, can also be observed in the power-sharing attempt of the 1960s in Cyprus. The consociational institutional design failed to establish trust and mutual understanding between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, but instead *"injected sources of fragmentation"* (Özgur et. al., 2019, p.238). The divisions between communities enhanced misconceptions about the other, and the lack of an overarching multi-ethnic Cypriot national identity eventually led to the demise of the power-sharing agreement (Özgur et. al., 2019). This example and the example of Kosovo, suggest that power-sharing in a post-conflict situation without actively working on the creation of an overarching national identity blocks the successes that power-sharing can yield. If this is not done sufficiently, citizens still mainly identify and associate with their ethnic affiliation, which can lead to the widening of the gap between cleavages. It is important to mention here that identification along ethnic affiliation is not negative, or means that groups do not peacefully co-exist, but in a direct post-conflict context emphasizing unity and interethnic cooperation may be needed more intensively.

Nevertheless, scholars on the other side of the spectrum claim that through ethnic recognition, interethnic tensions and violence are reduced in the long-term, and could even induce the depoliticization of ethnic identities. Most notably, McGarry & O'Leary (2007, 2009) have identified a positive effect of power-sharing on the reduction of interethnic tensions and the establishment of a shared identity, by carrying out an extensive case-study on power-sharing in Northern Ireland. Their argument goes as follows: the interethnic cooperation at elite level that is required with ethnic power-sharing eventually trickles down to the larger society, stimulating widespread interethnic interaction. In turn, this creates space for socio-political identities to develop, that forge alliances that transcend ethnic lines, and at the same time foster an increased dedication to a shared state identity. However, McGarry and O'Leary (2009) make a distinction between corporate and liberal consociationalism, of which the latter is required to achieve this shared identity formation. The corporate model can be interpreted as the more traditional model in which predetermined criteria accommodate group identities, whereas liberal consociationalism is characterized by the formation of political identities as a result from democratic processes, and promotes the idea that identity is self-determined and changeable (Baliqi, 2018).

According to Raffoul (2019), in Burundi, power-sharing has encouraged the depoliticization of ethnicity, and the emergence of 'associational power-sharing'. He argues that the guaranteed ethnic representativeness in both the political and security domain,

combined with the implementation of 'alliance-shifting mechanisms', have triggered the depoliticization of ethnicity and the rearrangement of political alliances. The 'alliance-shifting mechanisms' refer to the power-sharing measures that required electoral lists to be multi-ethnic, and parties not to count more than 75% members of the same ethnicity (Raffoul, 2019). The measures depicted in Burundi's power-sharing agreement push political parties to become multi-ethnic, which according to Raffoul (2019), reduces the risk of further entrenchment of cleavages, ensures a more stable environment for post-conflict elections, and also advance better prospects for sustainable peace and reconciliation (p. 14). Nevertheless, he also notes that shifting alliances does not directly occur out of political conviction, but more so by virtue of 'imperatives of survival'. This can be demonstrated by the many Tutsis that joined Hutu-dominant CNDD-FDD after they won elections, as it would be the safest and fastest way to access power and resources (Raffoul, 2019, p.12-13).

4.   Research Design

4.1. *Case Selection*

Burundi has been selected as a case study for this thesis, because both the opportunities and complexities of post-ethnic conflict power-sharing can be observed in this country. Despite the fact that ethnic divisions were almost invisible in pre-colonial times, Burundi's recent history is marked by heavy politicisation of ethnic identity that sparked ethnic violence and even led to genocide in 1993. Though some scholars have carefully insinuated that power-sharing has facilitated the depoliticization of the ethnic factor, the current realities in the central-African country raises questions about whether these observations are not too optimistic, or premature at least. After almost two decades of the implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the leading party the CNDD-FDD has increasingly tightened their grip on political and military power. The country eventually spiralled into a political crisis when President Nkurunziza sought an unconstitutional third term in 2015. This moment severely minimized the freedom of the opposition to operate, as outbreaks of violence and intimidations against them remain uninterrupted. The contradiction of achieving a successful implementation of the power-sharing model on the one hand, but the persistence of political violence, instability, and lack of unity on the other hand, generates compelling case study to further investigate the causal mechanisms between power-sharing arrangement and the politics of identity. Additionally, the lack of academic research on the (re)construction of Burundian national identity, and the general lack of studies on Burundi in the last two decades makes that the further exploration of identity in the current power-sharing system worthwhile and could add value to the general body of work on Burundian politics.

4.2. *Method of data analysis*

This thesis will carry out an interpretive single case study on the country of Burundi. The theories that will be assessed in this thesis are the theory on power-sharing, and the theory on the politics of identity. Process tracing will be used as the method to carry out the research, which aims at uncovering causal mechanisms that connect independent and dependent variables by executing a detailed within-case empirical analysis (Vennesson, 2008). This research method was chosen because it allows for the in-depth examination of different context-specific features of the case, which makes it fitting when undertaking a single case

study, since all case-specific peculiarities can be taken into account. For Burundi, this is of crucial importance since different contextual aspects such as the colonial history, international involvement, poverty and the rebel history of current political parties all have their own effect on the outcome and success of the power-sharing agreement and identity.


Figure 1

As can be seen in Figure 1, the independent variable (input) will be the theory on power-sharing, and the dependent variables (output) whose variation is studied, will be the politics of identity. Under the umbrella of the politics of identity this thesis specifically looks at national identity and ethnic identity. Figure 2 (below) illustrates the phases and their corresponding causal mechanisms this thesis will examine. In the indicated phases the analysis will look for evidence that suggests relationships between the practice of power-sharing and identity, by looking for information that indicates links between power-sharing and the (de)politicization of ethnicity, and links/interactions between power-sharing and the encouragement or discouragement of national identity. After analysing the time-phases, the discussion will use the hypotheses as guiding lines to evaluate the output, and to assess how power-sharing has interacted with the politics of identity in Burundi.

Input	Phase 1	Phase 2	Output
Power- Sharing: Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 2000 - Burundi Constitution 2005	2000-2015 Implementation of APRA: commitment to multi-ethnic government, but leading party shows authoritarian tendencies, including desires to weaken institution, oppression and intimidation of opposition	2015-2019 Political crisis, widespread violence and oppression, revision of the Constitution that eliminates ethnic quotas	*Politics of Identity:* H1.1. H1.2. H2.1. H2.2.

Figure 2

4.3. Method of Data-Collection

This thesis will look for account evidence, which means that the content of empirical material will be critically analysed. Primary sources that will be used are the following institutional texts: the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA), and the Constitutions of 2005 and 2018. The APRA is the starting point for the analysis, since it outlines the framework for ethnic power-sharing. The 2005 Burundi Constitution will be briefly addressed as it largely overlaps with the APRA. Lastly, the 2018 revised Constitution will be evaluated since it identifies crucial aspects of institutional engineering aimed at weakening the ethnic power-sharing agreement. The first-time phase 2005-2015 as indicated in Figure 2, embodies the initial implementation period of the APRA that knew relative optimism with regards to multi-party and multi-ethnic power-sharing. Nevertheless, in this period, defects already became visible since the leading party increasingly started to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies and attempts to perish pillars of the APRA. The second-time phase 2015-2019 encompasses the turning point when President Nkurunziza opted for an unconstitutional third term in the 2015 elections, which was followed by the outbreak of a political crisis. In this period tensions have escalated to widespread violence, intimidation, and insecurity, painting an ominous picture for the upcoming 2020 elections.

Besides the institutional texts, the analysis will also draw upon secondary sources such as academic articles and books, and other relevant primary sources such as official documents from the political parties CNDD-FDD, FRODEBU, and UPRONA. Because of the lack of consistency in the availability of manifestos, this thesis will mostly use official communiqués published by the political parties that reflect their political stance on specific issues of relevance, such as the APRA implementation, and the elections of 2010, 2015, and the upcoming 2020 elections. The selection of parties is based on the parliamentary representation between 2005 and 2020, where the CNDD-FDD has been the leading party, and FRODEBU and UPRONA the main opposition parties (Burihabwa & Curtis, 2019). Moreover, these parties are specifically associated with Hutu or Tutsi ethnic affiliations, which adds value to the analysis of the role of ethnic and national identity in Burundian politics. In addition, communiqués of opposition party FNL will also be consulted, because this party gained significant political ground in the last five years.

4.4. Operationalization

To identify the practice of *power-sharing* in Burundi, this analysis will scan the APRA and the Constitutions for a design that indicate a consociationalist approach. This includes aspects like a grand coalition, minority overrepresentation, mutual veto rights, and segmented autonomy arrangements. Concerning *ethnic identity*, observable manifestations that concern the scope and intensity of ethnicity as the main factor for identification in the political realm will be looked for. These manifestations include but are not limited to: the ethnic composition of political parties, the existence of ethnicity-based organisations/parties, and ethnic-biases in the shaping of history. With respect to *national identity*, the analysis intends to identify observable manifestations that indicate a shared sense of national unity, or at least political dedication to this sentiment. One of those manifestations is the degree of civic identity promotion, which concerns that one is capable to prioritize the wellbeing of the community at large and make decisions from the perspective of the common good. This can be observed in how political parties behave and communicate, but also for example by the existence of an all-inclusive citizen forum in which every voice can be heard, and national issues are discussed (Grotenhuis, 2016). In addition, manifestations include but are not limited to: dedication to national reconciliation, truth seeking and justice for crimes and inequalities, the framing of history, shared memory and the civil war, and the practice of shared cultural/religious traditions.

5. Context of Ethnic Identity in Burundi and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

5.1. State Formation and Identity in Colonial and Post-Colonial Burundi

The country of Burundi lies in the Great-Lakes region of Central-Africa, and has a dense population consisting of three ethnic groups: Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%). Besides being largely homogeneous with regards to language, religion and culture, Hutus and Tutsis frequently intermarried and lived peacefully among each-other. Due to their similarities, the primordial origins of the ethnicities in Burundi have been highly contested, not only among Burundians themselves, but also among academics. Though there are some that claim the pre-colonial existence of the ethnic groups, for many constructivists Burundi offers the perfect example of ethnicity as a social construct, in which the differences mainly became apparent in the colonial period with the introduction of racist theories and their relation to (state) power (Daley, 2006). The administrative and social policies introduced by first the German and then the Belgian colonial administrations, imposed a new racial and ethnic hierarchy, that *"transformed the political culture and destroyed the national consensus"* (Daley, 2006, p. 665). The colonists believed that Tutsis were descendants of Ham, the son of Noah in the Bible, a hypothesis that was instrumentalized by the administration to justify their preferential treatment of Tutsis (Reyntjes, 2015). Years of discriminatory education, religious and political policies, combined with the development of political clientelism of which Hutus and Twas were fully excluded, led to intensified ethnic strife and firm Tutsi minority power when Burundi re-gained independence in 1962 (Reyntjes, 2015).

More than 30 years of exclusionary one-party rule and persisting outbreaks of violence between the ethnic groups followed in post-colonial Burundi. Finally, in 1988 Tutsi President Buyoya was the first to aspire the establishment of a non-ethnic government to make a transition to an inclusive democracy. A quota system was introduced to slowly reintegrate Hutu representation back into the political realm and was followed by the first democratic elections that led to the victory of Melchior Ndadaye, member of the moderate Hutu party FRODEBU. Ndadaye took up office in the early 90's and implemented a consociational model that included a grand coalition reflecting both Hutu and Tutsi parties. Although cooperation between Hutus and Tutsis took place among the political elite, in the lower layers of society there was *'undeniably some handing out of spoils to the winning camp'* (Reyntjes, 2000, p.10). At the

same time, there was an increasing feeling of fear among the Tutsi population that a Hutu president would eventually lead to permanent political majority of Hutu parties (Reyntjes, 2015). Despite several attempts of Ndadaye to address these concerns, tensions eventually peaked and led to the upsurge of the Tutsi dominated army, and the assassination of Ndadaye (Reyntjes, 2015). Consequently, Burundi spiralled in a brutal civil war between the Tutsi-led government/army, and Hutu rebel movements. The ethnic massacres that took place were frequently characterized as genocide; over 300.000 Burundians were killed, over 500.000 fled the country, and almost a million became internally displaced (Reyntjes, 2015).

5.2. Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

After several failed attempts to establish peace, the end of the war was finally in sight when the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) was established in 2000. Though the transition was extremely slow and fragile, the remaining Hutu rebel-movements the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL eventually laid down arms and signed ceasefire agreements in 2003 and 2006 (Vandeginste, 2017). In 2005, the institutional framework of the APRA was officially adopted by the Burundian Constitution. The APRA consists of a complex, multidimensional power-sharing arrangement, aimed at establishing a government that fairly represented all parties and segmental cleavages on a political/institutional and military level. It is multidimensional, because besides the ethnic dimension of power sharing in the political and military domain, the APRA power-sharing design also required a pact between antagonistic elites (Vandeginste, 2017). Therefore, the institutional design of power-sharing in Burundi has both an ethnic as a non-ethnic dimension, working in both the political as the military domain.

With regards to **ethnic power-sharing**, the APRA contains essential aspects of consociationalism, such as minority overrepresentation and minority veto. In practice, this was established through ethnic quotas of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi representation in the cabinet and the national assembly, of which 30 percent were to be women, and three positions were reserved for Twa representatives (APRA, PII, Art.6.6). For the senate, the ethnic composition had to consist of an equal number of Hutus and Tutsis (APRA, PII, Art.6.16). If these balances were not achieved through elections, an electoral commission would balance it out by creating additional seats for the ethnic minorities - a method called co-optation (Reyntjes, 2015, p. 38). For the cabinet, national assembly and senate, a two-third majority rule would apply, ensuring the protection of minorities (APRA, PII, Art.6.5). Moreover, if the

president was to be Hutu, she/he was required to be backed up by two vice presidents of which one had to be Tutsi, and the other a Hutu ((APRA,PII, Art.7.4). Moreover, in order to govern cooperation and fair distribution of power between major political opponents, the APRA set rules to provide basis for a transitional government with a 'grand coalition' arrangement. The coalition of Hutu-dominated parties were allocated with 50 and a maximum of 60 percent of ministerial positions, and the coalition of Tutsi-dominated parties with the remainder (APRA, PII, Art.10). In this way, no matter how poorly they would score in elections, Tutsi parties were always guaranteed to a considerable amount of ministerial positions. It is important to mention that although the APRA explicitly recognizes the ethnic groups and guarantees their representation, at the same time it also requires political parties to reflect the country's ethnic diversity; of every three candidates on the list, only two were allowed to belong to the same ethnic group, and parties characterized by ethnic or regional exclusivity are forbidden (APRA, PII, Art.14.5). Instead, political parties were required to be fully dedicated to promoting peace and national unity. Ethnic voting would be prevented by the electoral system of a blocked list proportional representation (APRA, PII, Art.20).

Military power-sharing was another crucial aspect of the APRA, since the military used to be exclusively reserved for Tutsis (Reyntjes, 2015). The APRA not only aimed to rectify this, but also to reintegrate the Hutu rebel-groups that had been at war with the Tutsi dominated army (Vandeginste, 2017). The APRA established that both the army and the national police had to meet the ethnic parity criteria, and sensitive domains such as the police and defence ministries, were carefully handled by requiring that the ministers of these departments had to be from different ethnic groups (APRA, PII, Art. 11.4d). Another requirement was that as soon as former combatants such as the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu/FNL signed the APRA, they would be incorporated in the national police and defence forces (Vandeginste, 2017). The implementation of this military transformation would be quite remarkable, considering that it was the UPRONA army that assassinated former Hutu president Ndadaye, the very event that called into life Hutu rebel-groups.

The APRA also addresses the roots of conflict, including the historical essence of ethnic conscience, inequality and intolerance as a clear result from the racialized ideologies that emerged during colonial times (APRA, PI, Art. 2). According to the APRA, colonial rule eroded certain cultural values that hitherto were seen as a factor for national unity and cohesion, and the introduction of identity cards explicitly stating ethnicity, reinforced 'ethnic awareness to the detriment of national awareness' (APRA, PI, Art. 2.3-5). Moreover, the APRA

emphasizes the homogeneity of Burundians in precolonial times, who pledged allegiance to the same monarch, conformed to the same culture and language, believed in the same god, and self-identified as Barundi (citizens of Burundi) (APRA, PI, Art.2). The emphasis of the historical causes of the conflict in the APRA indicates a strongly defined national identity until Burundi became colonized, which evoked the division between ethnicities. Another aspect in the APRA that accentuates the divisionist characterization of the colonizers and the nationally unified character of Burundi, is the specific description of the historical event of the eve of independence. It states that despite efforts of the colonizers to grasp onto their power by attempting to further divide Burundians through the 'orchestration of socio-political struggles', the 'charismatic leadership' of Prince Louis Rwagasore averted ethnic escalations and resulted in the country attaining independence 'in peace and national harmony' (APRA, PI, Art.2). Despite the historical depictions of the roots of the conflict, the signatories to the APRA recognize that the nature of the conflict was 'fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions', and originates from a struggle for power by the political class (APRA, PI Art.4).

Moreover, the objective of the transitional arrangements was focused on national reconciliation, the restoration of national unity, the education of peace, and the promotion of ethnic tolerance (APRA, PI). Therefore, the APRA recommended the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in order to seek truths, promote justice and foster reconciliation between ethnic groups about the issues that had led to violence and inequality in the past (APRA, PI, Art. 8). By unveiling the truth about the grave injustices and violence experienced by the Burundian population, the TRC would serve as a mechanism to recognize and redress the suffering of Burundians, and to achieve the essential to the goal of reconciliation and social cohesion. The clarification and rewriting of the entire history of Burundi was a crucial part of this, to make sure that all Burundians would interpret the history in the same way, regardless of ethnicity (APRA, PI, Art. 8). Furthermore, the APRA calls for other nation-building measures such as the establishment of a national observatory for the prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the construction of a remembrance monument, the implementation of an educational curriculum that advocates national peace and reconciliation, and the instalment of a national day of remembrance for victims of the mass atrocities (APRA, PI, Art.6). Reinstalling traditional cross-ethnic practices that are based on principles like respect, solidarity, responsibility, humanism, forgiveness and mutual tolerance was also advised by the APRA (APRA, PI, Art.7.26).

5.3. Discussion

The APRA provides elaborate ethnic power-sharing arrangements both within the political domain and the military domain. The guaranteed ethnic representation through ethnic quotas in the these two main domains, provide a stable starting point to transition from conflict to peace, as minorities are protected from majority tyranny, resonating with theory on power-sharing and accommodation in general. Nevertheless, the critique of power-sharing that it could further entrench cleavages is still an important consideration, because ethnicities are rigidly defined in the agreement. This could raise the question who decides when someone belongs to a certain ethnicity, and also requires someone to identify with one of the three in order to be able to partake in politics. Moreover, this uncovers a contradiction in the APRA, as it strongly emphasizes the pre-colonial values and the colonial invention of ethnicity, whilst at the same time the whole institutional design is based on the institutionalization of those constructed ethnicities. The rigid conception of ethnicity in the APRA might therefore block the organic development of ethnic identity, and requires the Burundian people to remain categorized according to ethnic identity. The 'dilemma of recognition' can be identified here, as accommodation could obstruct interethnic cooperation and parties becoming more ethnically diverse, and it allows for the continued existence of ethnic parties and ethnic voting patterns. Nevertheless, the APRA attempts to address these issues by introducing the closed voting list, and the requirements for parties to diversify their ethnic composition.

In terms of national identity, the APRA strongly emphasizes the divisionist character and 'common enemy' of the colonizers, as well as a strongly defined national identity until Burundi was colonized. The colonizers are portrayed as the ones that evoked the division between ethnicities, and historical aspects such as the description of the night of independence, are framed in a way that highlights the unified nature of Burundians. This framing of history in the APRA is relevant for the process of nation building and unifying Burundians beyond ethnicities, because it attempts to connect ethnic groups with one another to build a shared sense of national identity and a similar understanding of history. Also, the advised measures delineated in the APRA concerning national remembrance, cultural practices, and the promotion of reconciliation and transitional justice all promote collective memory of the conflict, which could contribute to the prevention of recurring violence.

6. Power-Sharing and Identity throughout 2005-2019

6.1. The implementation of the APRA and the rise of the CNDD-FDD (2005-2015)

The elaborate Peace Agreement successfully served Burundi in the transitional period leading up to the 2005 elections in which CNDD-FDD's frontman Pierre Nkurunziza was elected for presidency (Reyntjes, 2015). The major increase of political leadership of CNDD-FDD is quite remarkable, considering that the former rebel group did not participate in the peace negotiations and is not an official signatory to the APRA. Some of CNDD-FDD's core objectives are the defence of multi-party democracy, reconciliation of Burundians, and preventing discrimination and 'hegemonic tendencies' to grab power by force (CNDD-FDD Statute, 2004, Ch.II). Despite these objectives and the initial optimism regarding the safeguarding of the power-sharing agreement in the 2005 Constitution, Nkurunziza displayed a relatively intractable stance of government. In the first years in power, the CNDD-FDD occasionally resorted to violence against opposition, which withheld the party from shedding its 'military' image (Apuuli, 2018). Their unlawful use of force and intimidation was often carried out by their associated youth group the *Imbonerakure* ('those who see far'), thereby bypassing the official ethnically balanced military and police force (Apuuli, 2018). On paper however, the design of the Burundian government resonated strictly with the APRA in the first decade of implementation, as ethnic quotas were upheld, and parties became increasingly multi-ethnic (Apuuli, 2018). Though, despite the formal presence of ethnic power-sharing, the increasing informal power of the CNDD-FDD through their oppression and intimidation of the opposition still led some to perceive the government as a 'Hutu regime' (Schraml, 2010).

Initially, predominantly Tutsi party UPRONA has been the strongest in expressing their dismay of CNDD-FDD's accession to power, calling it a *"genocidal, irresponsible, incompetent, unjust, corrupt, demagogic, totalitarian, racist force"* that trivialized genocide and catastrophically managed the country after the first year of taking office (UPRONA, 2006, p.1). UPRONA generally disagreed with the majority democracy model outlined in the APRA, as they considered the 'pseudo-generosity' of 40% representation incapable of escaping the majoritarian Hutu tyranny (UPRONA, 2004). Whilst UPRONA generally emphasized the ethnic factor through their fear for Hutu tyranny, predominantly Hutu party FRODEBU similarly displayed their dissatisfaction of the CNDD-FDD. Their critique however, was focused on the unconstitutional tendencies of the CNDD-FDD, as they did not respect multi-

party requirements for the senate and national assembly as enshrined in the Constitution, but instead appropriated all the parliamentary positions to their own members (FRODEBU, 2006). They had been able to do this because the CNDD-FDD had increasingly become the most multi-ethnic Burundian party, with nearly one third of its MP's being Tutsi (Raffoul, 2018). This means they could respect the ethnic quotas as laid down in the APRA, whilst at the same time keeping most positions in the government within their own party. Leading up to the 2010 elections, traditional Hutu parties became more and more divided on issues concerning power-sharing, which led to tensions being of an intra-Hutu character rather than an interethnic one (Theron, 2011). According to FRODEBU for example, the CNDD-FDD *"forcibly imposes an anarchic and chaotic management on Burundians, doubled by incompetence and a lack of a nationalist vision"* (FRODEBU, 2008, p.1). The tensions further increased when Nkurunziza was re-elected in 2010, as the CNDD-FDD grasped onto their power more tightly by arresting opposition leaders (Reyntjes, 2015).

Besides the violence and intimidation of the opposition, the CNDD-FDD also tried to further consolidate their power institutionally by suggesting to revise the Constitution. In 2013 CNDD-FDD unilaterally designed the Revision Bill, that among other things advised to enable the president to stand for more than two terms, to decrease the two-third majority vote into a simple majority, and also to replace the two vice-presidents (belonging to different parties and ethnicities as delineated in the APRA) with one 'powerful' prime-minister belonging to the same party as the president (Apuuli, 2018). The bill was criticized as it did not consult any other political party or Burundi's civil society, and it would jeopardize the ethnic power-sharing balance. Although the Revision Bill was not passed, it showcased the intentions of the CNDD-FDD to progressively solidify an authoritarian power-grip on Burundian politics. This tendency reached its peak when Nkurunziza sought an unconstitutional third term in 2015, which shattered the principles of the APRA (Apuuli, 2018).

Additionally, a third development of relevance that illustrates the CNDD-FDD's agenda and degree of dedication to the APRA in the first decade, was the lack of impetus to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The APRA expressed strong dedication to truth seeking, reconciliation and the clarification of the causes for conflict in Burundi, in order to not only reveal the truth about committed atrocities, but also to consolidate national unity. In practice, the establishment of the TRC was postponed until 2014. The TRC was not authorized to prosecute individuals, but a Special Tribunal was needed for this part, which until today has not been realized (Apuuli, 2018). In 2007, the CNDD-FDD already expressed their dedication to the establishment of the TRC, but highly emphasizing the need

for amnesties, apologies, and forgiveness instead of prosecution (CNDD-FDD, 2007). The late realization of the TRC and the lack of criminal prosecution sparks the suspicion that the CNDD-FDD strategically waited so they could first bolster their grip on power, to ensure that their members of the former rebel-group turned political party would be left untouched. The TRC eventually was established in a climate of high political tensions and continuous human rights violations, making its successful exercise unlikely. Also, the control of the CNDD-FDD over the TRC mechanism sparked suspicion of a biased approach, and a one-sided truth telling that favoured Hutus (Apuuli, 2018). This concern was also expressed by the United Nations in 2019, that stated that the control of the government over the TRC and the frequent emphasizing of Nkurunziza to reveal the 'true' history of Burundi, *"raise concerns that the imposition of a biased official version of the country's history could sharpen the grievances of the past, with troubling consequences"* (p.14).

6.2. *The third term and consequences for identity (2015-2019)*

The controversial presidential candidacy of Nkurunziza for a third term in 2015 spiralled Burundi into a deep political crisis. The CNDD-FDD leader was re-elected in highly disputed elections from which three opposition candidates were officially banned, and were marred by widespread oppression, intimidation and violence against all critical voices (United Nations, 2018). Whilst the CNDD-FDD expressed dedication and respect for the APRA in the first years in power, during the political crisis their tone changed significantly, referring to the Arusha negotiations as a conference led by egocentric interests of people pretending to be skilled, who institutionalized the invented colonial conceptions of ethnicity, and has fooled and mislead the Burundian people (CNDD-FDD, 2016). In their 2016 communiqué they also referred frequently to Burundi's peaceful pre-colonial history, and their desire to go back to that system before the ethnicities became politicised (CNDD-FDD, 2016). Moreover, the CNDD-FDD revamped their previously rejected Revision Bill through holding a referendum to revise the Constitution in 2018, which would further break down important pillars of the APRA. The major changes included the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years, the replacement of one of the two ethnically-balanced vice-presidents with one Prime-Minister, the replacement of two-third majority to simple majority, the possibility for Nkurunziza to run for two more terms, the immediate removal of the ethnic quota for the police

and defence forces, and the general re-evaluation and possible abolishing of the ethnic quotas by 2025 (Burundi Constitution, 2018, Titre XV-XVII).

Although some expressed their concerns for the possible removal of the ethnic quota system, FNL's opposition leader Agathon Rwasa reiterated in 2018 that ethnicity is not Burundi's problem, but good governance is. (Moore, 2018). This sentiment is also reflected in the cross-ethnic coalition formation that increased since the elections of 2010. In 2014 most opposition parties signed a letter to the President calling for the guarantee of fair and transparent elections, and the immediate halt of the provision of weapons and training to the Imbonerakure militia (Memorandum addressé au Président, 2014). This letter was signed by predominantly Tutsi parties such as UPRONA, PARENA, as well as by predominantly Hutu parties such as FRODEBU, CNDD and FNL. Another letter was sent by the political parties FRODEBU, FNL and UPRONA in 2018, to warn regional and international stakeholders for the disastrous consequences the revised Constitution of 2018 could have for Burundi. It states that the revision furthers Nkurunziza's personal political agenda, and materializes an old dream of him, namely the demise of the APRA, and the abolition of constitutional mechanisms that protect political and ethnic minorities (Memorandum d'Opposition, 2018).

Though this indicates that divisions seem to occur more along associational lines instead of ethnic lines, risks for devolving into ethnic violence continue to exist (United Nations, 2018) The government has undertaken several steps in the recent years that increase the risk of escalating ethnic violence. Firstly, after UN reported instances of violence that were ethnically motivated in 2018 and 2019, the government expelled the United Nations Human Rights office from Burundi, and generally imposed major restrictions on civil society, human rights groups and media. This makes it increasingly harder to report and keep track of the violence that is taking place in the political crisis (United Nations, 2019). Secondly, Burundi withdrew from the International Criminal Court in 2017, after it commenced the investigation into alleged government sponsored crimes against humanity. Thirdly, the government has enforced measures that require (inter)national NGOS operating in the country to indicate the ethnicity of their local staff members, and attempt to become involved in the recruitment of national staff (United Nations, 2019, p.10). Fourthly, the separation of the national intelligence service from the defence forces, placing them directly under the Office of the President, means that they are no longer subject to the ethnic quotas (United Nations, 2019). Lastly, Nkurunziza recently renamed important historical landmarks, in order to get rid of names that emerge from betrayal and colonialism. However, the renaming mainly concerned the replacement of Tutsi

names into Hutu names, which according to Nkurunziza was supposed to remind Burundians of their history (Kaledzi, 2019).

6.3. Discussion

The events of recent years since the first post-conflict elections demonstrate interesting developments in the dynamics between power-sharing and identity. First of all, it has become clear that over the years, the CNDD-FDD has increasingly consolidated their power since their accession to leading party, which has undermined the beneficial working of the APRA. Their firm grip on power, and their continuous intimidation against political opponents has obstructed the implementation of good governance, the assurance of fair and transparent electoral processes, and the effectuation of transitional justice, reconciliation and truth seeking. In this situation, a climate of peace and stability is unable to prevail, as the society remains ridden by fear and lack of freedom. Considering this, the theoretical arguments put forward by Spears (2002), Tull & Mehler (2005) and Cheeseman (2010) seem to apply in the case of Burundi, as the APRA has served as an entry point for former rebel-group CNDD-FDD to become engaged in politics. The former rebel group has securitized its access to power and resources in the following years, and also strategically played into their own interests. For example, by diversifying their ethnic composition according to APRA requirements, simultaneously enabled them to keep as many of their own members in power as possible (by filling up Tutsi positions by CNDD-FDD Tutsi members). Due to these observations, it could be observed that despite the smooth functioning of the formal power-sharing arrangement, it is not a panacea. The major informal power grip that the CNDD-FDD has on society outside of formal power-sharing, has crippled the political system to truly transform, and establish sustainable peace and democratic order in Burundi.

Secondly, in contempt of the relative optimism with regards to the emergence of multi-ethnic parties and coalitions, this could be an indication to claim a depoliticizing effect of the power-sharing arrangement on ethnicity. Moreover, the cross-party coalition forming that happened after 2010, could be a sign that ethnicity is not a determining factor for organization anymore, but instead it is about either being with, or against the CNDD-FDD. An illustrating example of this, is that Tutsi-dominated parties such as UPRONA initially strongly feared a Hutu-dominating effect of the APRA, but after 2010, they formed an alliance with the two predominantly Hutu parties they used to be in direct conflict with during the war. The shifting alliances however, could also be explained by the 'imperatives of survival', as the most

straightforward way to get access to state power and resources was to join the party in power, regardless of ethnicity. This argument also extends to the voters public, since voting for the party in power could be the most effective way to ensure security, benefits and opportunities, especially in a climate of harsh socio-economic circumstances and persisting human rights abuses. Therefore, it might be too early to speak of a truly depoliticised ethnic identity, as the emergence of multi-ethnic parties and multi-ethnic institutions does not directly mean that ethnicity has lost political meaning. In addition, some developments since the outbreak of the political crisis showcase the persisting ethnic insecurity. Especially the revision of the Constitution in 2018 has increased fears for ethnic scalation, as it eroded many crucial aspects of the APRA that re-endangers minority ethnicities. The main indication for this, is the removal of the ethnic quotas in the security sector. The opposition letter confirms this fear, and reminds that the quotas were imposed to protect the minorities, and prevent threats of coups and genocides. If these bars were to be removed, *"what would prevent the CNDD-FDD from committing the irreparable?"* (Memorandum d'Opposition, 2018, p.4).

Lastly, in spite of the strong dedication to transitional justice, reconciliation and truth-seeking in the APRA, the momentum for this immediately dropped after the first elections. The delay of setting up the TRC, as well as the absence of other measures to address the injustices and grievances of the past have hindered the process of developing a shared sense of national identity as Burundians. Transitional justice and reconciliation are important for the creation of national identity, because addressing the historical imbalances is crucial to avoid selective memory, and persisting tensions and misconceptions between ethnic groups. Though the TRC was eventually erected in 2014, the fact that it remained fully controlled by the CNDD-FDD, the impartial, unbiased establishment of the truth about the grave injustices of the ethnic conflict are highly unlikely. Especially considering the informal power-grip the CNDD-FDD had on the country by that time. Inter-party dialogue (as recommended by the APRA) was also not furthered, and it could be said that it had to amount to the identification of a new 'common enemy', the CNDD-FDD, to make the political parties work together.

Conclusion

Despite the ambitious goals of power-sharing to bring about political stability and democracy, it looks like in the case of Burundi this was not enough to create a stable political order and establish sustainable peace. This thesis has demonstrated that a correct functioning of formal-power sharing and all its beneficial consequences, has simultaneously allowed CNDD-FDD, a former Hutu rebel-movement, to overpower Burundian politics. Since Nkurunziza came to power, he has slowly perished some of the core objectives of the APRA, such as inter-party cooperation, and a strong dedication to transitional justice, truth-seeking and reconciliation. Moreover, since his accession, the CNDD-FDD has plagued Burundian opposition with acts of violence and intimidation, impeding the flourishing of a healthy multi-party democracy with basic freedoms. Thus, although the APRA served as a good start to get the fighting parties to sign ceasefires and halt the violence, too little attention has been spent on creating a cohesive political and civil community.

Still, unlike in other countries such as Kosovo, Cyprus and Iraq, power-sharing in Burundi has not further entrenched the ethnic cleavage between Hutus and Tutsis. The alliance-shifting mechanisms that were put in place by the APRA have successfully led to the increased ethnic diversification of political parties, and have eliminated ethnically-exclusive parties and ethnic voting. These findings eliminate hypothesis H1.1.[1], as power-sharing has not led to further politicization of ethnicity in Burundi. Nevertheless, over time another cleavage has been entrenched, namely between the leading party and the opposition. Because of the immense power domination of the CNDD-FDD, it could also be argued that the emergence of cross-ethnic alliances have been motivated by political opportunism and imperatives of survival, rather than by political conviction. Therefore, this thesis concludes that it is too early to conclude the depoliticization of ethnicity, especially now the revision of the Constitution jeopardizes the carefully crafted ethnic power-balance, and fears for ethnic escalation remain. Because of this, hypothesis H1.2.[2] cannot fully account for the findings of this thesis.

Another main finding of this thesis is that the practice power-sharing in Burundi has not sufficiently contributed to the strengthening of national identity. This is mainly due to the severe lack of transitional justice, reconciliation and truth-seeking measures. As the theory exhibits, addressing the root causes of conflict and rectifying historical injustices is crucial in

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[1] H.1.1. Power-sharing leads to further politicization of ethnicity in Burundi;

[2] H1.2. Power-sharing leads to the depoliticization of ethnicity in Burundi;

the restoration of just relationships between people, and the consolidation of a national identity in the aftermath of conflict. Efforts to achieve this reconciliation did not take place for the victims, nor did it take place among political actors, as concrete actions remain postponed. Therefore, in the absence of good governance, inter-party cooperation, and efforts to promote transitional justice and reconciliation, a healthy ground for a strong national identity to flourish was not realized. Because of this, hypothesis H2.2.[3] accounts for the findings of this thesis. However, this conclusion is based on what has happened in practice, since on paper, the APRA strongly promotes measures that attend to transitional justice and reconciliation. Sadly, they have not been executed in a timely, correct, and transparent manner.

In conclusion, the findings of this thesis exhibit the complex double-edged sword of power-sharing in Burundi, as it had both beneficial consequences for the politics of identity, as well as challenging, unfavourable consequences. The findings demonstrate the general complexity of a one-size-fits-all consociational model, and reaffirms the importance of country-specific models that match the lived realities. The research remains limited in its scope, because of time and resource constraints. Another limitation of the study is the language barrier, since many primary sources had been written in Kirundi, a language that would require translation. Due to this language issue, as well as a general lack of data, it has been challenging to include perspectives from Burundian citizens. Having access to this data would significantly increase the accuracy of the analysis, since insights from citizens on the power-sharing agreement and the salience of ethnic and national identity would give crucial insights on how what happens in political circles, actually reflects in real-life perceptions of identity. Therefore, future research could seek to explore the perceptions of ethnic and national identity of citizens, and compare to what extent this matches with the existing literature on identity issues in Burundi that until now, mainly focused on institutional design and power politics. Moreover, the almost complete lack of data and academic sources on national identity in Burundi, also pinpoints a gap in literature that requires further academic attention.

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[3] H2.2. Power-sharing did not help in building a national identity in Burundi.

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