From anti-imperialism to anti-Americanism in Venezuela

Analyzing the effect of 9/11 and the War on Terror on the political discourse of Hugo Chavez

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INTRODUCTION

"Personal histories, as we know, are shaped by the places and times in which they occur. In an increasingly connected and interdependent world, they are also shaped by what is going on elsewhere. And sometimes "elsewhere" can be very far away" (Naim, 2007).

Approximately 12.000 kilometers, one ocean and one continent separate Venezuela from Afghanistan and Iraq. Another 3.400 kilometers separate Caracas from New York. Yet, and despite the distances, events in these places have been closely connected to the personal history of one world leader. The tragic attacks of September 11 and the launching of the War on Terror have indeed been repeatedly associated to the former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, his sudden shift in ideology and his transition into "the most virulent anti-Americanist in the world" (Reyes, 2007).

9/11 is often considered as a turning point in history. On that morning of 2001, four commercial airlines were hijacked and redirected against American symbols of power, killing in total three thousand civilians from seventy-eight countries (Datta, 2012). The attacks shook the world and allowed Washington to immediately respond. Using its role of "defender of the world" ready to fight the "enemies of human freedom", Washington hit the heart of the Middle East, first by the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, second by the deployment of troops in Iraq in 2003 (Hodges, 2001; Reyes, 2010). Both the launching of the war and its justification divided the world between those standing by Washington's side and those who openly began to criticize America's foreign policy (Fawn, 2003; Reyes, 2010; Ryan, 2007). In fact, the implementation of new policies and disrespect for international laws ultimately paved the way for a revival of anti-Americanism amongst many world leaders.

The recently elected Hugo Chavez Frías was until then mainly known for his social and anti-imperialist program and for the success of his leftist movement across the region. Yet, a few years after 9/11, Chavez's political discourse started to evolve in the same way his reputation amongst academics, politicians and journalists did. Soon, many started to accuse him of spreading hate and consolidating a racist and dangerous ideology; according to them, Chavez had become the "most salient example of public criticism to U.S. hegemonic power" and an archetype of fascism and anti-Americanism (Fleishman, 2013; Reyes, 2010). Publicly shaming the American government for the invasion, bombing, and killing of thousands of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq at the 2006 United Nations

Assembly, there were no doubts for the international community that Chavez's anti-imperialist ideology had definitely shifted into an anti-American one following the 9/11 attacks (Marcano, 2007).

Yet, this sudden shift in Chavez's discourse raised many questions amongst scholars. Over the last decade, they thus entertained a passionate debate on the origins of his anti-Americanism, and in some cases on its own existence. Indeed, two groups of scholars emerged from this discussion, between those defending the linearity of Chavez's discourse advocating thus a constant anti-imperialism or anti-Americanism, and those analyzing a veritable shift. True believers of a transition from anti-imperialist to anti-American after the attacks, Ivan Krastev, Alan McPherson and Andrew Heywood maintain that 9/11 contributed to a radicalization of positions, ultimately leading to an increasing aggressiveness in various leaders' discourses, including Chavez's (Heywood, 2011; Krastev, 2007; McPherson, 2009). For Kirk Hawkins, 9/11 normalized the anti-American discourse until then reserved to intellectuals and radical students, and extended its reach to a larger part of the society and the government (Hawkins, 2010). While also identifying a shift, Eva Golinger however attributes this change to external factors engaged on Venezuelan soil (Golinger, 2008). On the other side, some politicians and scholars have addressed the possibility of a certain continuity in Chavez's discourse. For Javier Corrales, Luis Fleishman, Douglas Schoen and Michael Rowan, Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution had indeed always aimed at "removing the U.S. hegemony from the region" and promoting "the destruction of democracy" (Corrales, 2015; Fleishman, 2013; Shoen and Rowan, 2009). The opposite was found in Jorge Dominguez who regarded Chavez's parole as an "ever-escalating anti-imperialist discourse". Partially agreeing with him, Michael Dehram emphasizes the importance of context and background and denounces the hastiness of certain scholars to attribute an anti-American etiquette to those contesting, even a little, the United States of America (Dehram, 2010).

Yet, surprisingly, none of these scholars has attempted to analyze Hugo Chavez's political discourse as a whole, or tried to demonstrate a significant change in the long term. The simplified analysis of one or two speeches, chosen at a particular time, in a particular context, and for a particular audience hindered thus a comparative analysis, necessary to identify a shift. More, none of the studies conducted has interpreted the context or history in which the speeches were delivered. Providing a contextual and intertextual analysis, this thesis aims thus to solve this discussion, identify or not a change in Hugo Chavez's political discourse and if so, determine to what extent the events of 9/11 and the launching of the War on Terror have contributed to this shift.

To begin with, I will consider a literature investigation with the consultation of secondary sources. This research will enable me to set the base necessary to interpret Hugo Chavez's discourse, and

understand the context and theories evolving around him. Divided into two sections, that literature investigation will then be completed by a speech analysis. The first chapter will thus provide the theoretical framework in which the concepts of postcolonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism and Political Discourse will be consecutively explained, discussed and analyzed. The second chapter will further explain how Hugo Chavez came to power as part of the Latin American Left and present his academic parcours, political career, and Bolivarian Revolution. More than framing Chavez's discourse, this part will also contextualize it and introduce the triggering factor of this thesis: the reactions that have framed the attacks of 9/11 as well as the launching of the War on Terror. Lastly, the third chapter will be dedicated to the political analysis of ten speeches, ranging from 1994 when Chavez was still in the military, to 2009 after his second election. Using a wide variety of nodal points, the first section will evaluate the fluctuations in Chavez's discourse and determine when and if a change has occurred. The second and third sections will complete the analysis and determine if a correlation can be made between Chavez's increasing offensive and defensive discourses and the aftermath of 9/11.

Chapter 1

Theoretical approaches to the Latin American Left and Political Discourse Analysis

The aim of this first chapter is to discuss the fundamental concepts surrounding the analysis of Hugo Chavez's discourse, explicitly the postcolonial, anti-imperial, anti-American, and Political Discourse ones. Theoretically framing the discourse will enable to set the base for the later completion of Chavez's speeches analysis.

1.1. The Postcolonialist theory

1.1.1. From neocolonialism to postcolonialism: characteristics of a new form of domination

Postcolonialism grew under the influence of anthropologists, philosophers and historians such as Frantz Fanon, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Paul Sartre, who from the 1950s openly criticized France's colonial policies in Africa and especially in Algeria (Hiddleston, 2009). If similar thoughts were shared by Latin American, African and Eastern European scholars, it is really the publication of Edward Saïd's "Orientalism" that propelled postcolonial researches as a reliable field of study. From that moment on, numerous contributions flooded under the pen of academics and critics who, serving diverse disciplines, fed into debates surrounding the field (Ashcroft, 1998; Bohata, 2009). For instance, the distinction between 'Post-colonial' and 'Post-colonialism' was only academically acknowledged following the 2002 Toronto Conference on Postcolonialism. As stated in its final report, the term "post-colonial" refers to the status of the former colonies. No longer under direct domination, 'post-colonial' studies focus on the post-independency situation and analyze the economic, political, social and ideological impacts of colonialism on these new states (Bohata, 2009; TMC, 2002). 'Post-colonialism' on the other hand, emerged in the aftermath of the decolonization process and

represents the denunciation by critical scholars of new forms of domination used against independent states.

'Neocolonialism' is often employed to characterize these changes of coercive strategy, the prefix 'neo' endorsing the novelty of these mechanisms. Neocolonialism differs thus from colonialism for two main reasons. First, direct control was replaced by indirect involvement. Second, historical links were gradually replaced by new structures of domination. Indeed, if invisible ties persisted between ex-colonies and their former rulers, interventions in weaker states was this time also conceivable for new powerful and independent countries such as the United States (Kardulias, 1998; Nkrumah, 1965). Left without any rival after the Second World War, the economic, financial and ideological penetration of these countries by the U.S. appeared relatively easy (Bergquist, 1996; Nkrumah, 1995; Mckelvey, 2017). As a matter of fact, ever since the "Good Neighbor Policy" initiated by President Roosevelt, Washington had attempted to develop a non-interventionist and non-military strategy aiming to control Latin America and possibly other parts of the world (Mckelvey, 2017). The end of the war and decolonization process, ultimately gave the U.S. a chance to expand its hegemonic strategy to independent states applying thus a modernized form of colonialism, that is neocolonialism (Mckelvey, 2017).

Developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, the core-periphery system illustrates perfectly that replacement of a traditional colonial structure (Wallerstein, 1979). Like neoliberalism, the relationship between the dominant 'Cores' and coerced 'Peripheries' is based on a friendly transnational exchanges and the avoidance of any direct military intervention (McKelvey, 2017).The use of 'aids' as a way to justify their multilateral involvement, constitute indeed one of the main strategies of neocolonial cores. Described as a "modern method of capital export under a more cosmetic name", aid simply refers to the economic and financial penetration of a country (Nrkumah, 1965; Rodney, 1973). This aid can be directly delivered by the core, or by financial organizations, banks, and international institutions partly subsidized by them (McKelvey, 2017; Hiddleston, 2009). The United States, for example, is known to have supported financially many of these institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, International Finance Corporation and International Development Association, lowering per se their level of objectivity (McKelvey, 2017; Nkrumah, 1965). Aid packages and missions can also be delivered by some core in order to achieve cultural and educational 'goals'. By doing so, cores seek indeed a way to promote their "superior" western values and specific knowledge (Hiddleston, 2009; Gassama, 2008). This neocolonial superiority can also be perceived in the unequal commercial exchanges set by the cores. Being forced to buy expensive manufactured goods while selling high quantity of cheap raw material, peripheries face therefore an uninterrupted rise of their debt, leaving them no other choice than pursuing these exchanges in order to survive

(Gassama, 2008; Rodney, 1973). Finally, the control of peripheries' political life by the retention of privileges from cores constitutes one of the last strategies of neocolonialism. Amongst the long list of privileges, the right to interfere with the administration, the right for foreign companies to avoid taxpaying, and the right for the military to set up bases and troops are some of the most practiced.

1.1.2. The denunciation of neocolonial strategies and the emergence of an united front

Postcolonialists have for long criticized the use of neocolonial strategies and the instability they have brought in Third World countries (Gassama, 2008). For instance, many have denounced the lack of democratic values and the alacrity for result over development as formerly pledged by the cores and the multitudes of satellite-organizations around them. After a promising time following the independency wave, impoverishment gained a majority of these new states, being once again exploited for raw material and covered in debt (Gassama, 2008; Nkrumah, 1965; Hiddleston, 2009). Unity and solidarity were then advocated by the opponents of neocolonialism. By joining forces, they believed being able to offer an effective counter-hegemony strategy that would allow all Third World countries to gain back control of their own destiny. Numerous coalitions and organizations emerged throughout the years with that objective.

Representing the second biggest grouping of countries after the United Nations, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) is usually given as a reference. Created in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, the NAM was propelled in 1961 by the Belgrade Conference (Andrinof, 1995). Serving as a support system for 'vulnerable states', the absence of geographical restrictions quickly enabled the organization to grow and expand to African, Asian and Eastern European countries (Keethaponcalan, 2016). Indeed, despite their different cultures, religions and political systems, NAM members shared many similarities. First, most were ex-colonies of Spain, Portugal, France, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. Second, these ex-dominated territories had directly been affected by colonial times, and suffered economic crises. Third, both cultural and socio-political controls were still cornered by European metropoles (Achdian, 1995). Altogether, these 'Third World' nations were facing exploitation and were ready to join forces in a fight against oppression. But more than the clear and open support for national liberation movements and anti-colonialism, the NAM ultimately defended the concept of neutralism –refusing alignment with any of the two superblocks of the Cold War– as well as non-interference (Andrinof, 1995; Gallié, 2008). Surprisingly, the end of the decolonization process did not utterly change the organization's agenda. Carried by the postcolonialist wave, the NAM immediately adjusted its program, hence condemning any "concrete act of conquest aiming to

dominate the political and economic life of a country using neocolonial mechanisms" (Hiddelston, 2009). The end of the Cold War widened a bit more the objectives of the NAM, expanding its fight to a "broader form of authority or dominance" that does not necessarily involve the direct conquest of a territory to function, nor a neocolonial structure (Hiddleston, 2009). That new anti-imperialist stand enabled self-standing nations such as Latin American ones to join the movement and expand its boundaries beyond ex-colonies. The anti-imperialist critic had finally replaced the postcolonial one, relaying neocolonialism as a simple feature of imperialism (Gouysse, 2009).

1.2. Anti-imperialism and its targeted evolution

1.2.1. Socialism and post-neoliberalism: two key concepts to comprehend anti-imperialism

The concept of imperialism –and by extension anti-imperialism, has for the past two centuries been in constant evolution, limiting sometimes its interpretation. Some observers have therefore tended to reduce imperialism to the annexation of territories or to the concept of expansion and hegemony, a complete misinterpretation of the imperial ideology in the eyes of a majority of scholars (Paterson, 1973). Indeed, hegemony refers to a notion of structure while imperialism describes a foreign policy behavior and conveys a will and intent of expansion by political, economic or cultural domination. Means of coercion are thus employed by a state to subject another state. As previously explained, this can be done through colonization or neocolonial policies, but also by use of military forces or financial and administrative agency strategies (Beyer, 2013; Koebner, 1964). By contrasts, a hegemonic state will expand its influence without the use of force as in the case of neocolonialism. More, a hegemonic state will "let subordinates believe that power rests upon the consensus of the majority", an idea absent from imperialist strategies (Gramsci, 2007). The notion of anti-imperialism represents thus the policies and actions hostile to any form of coercive dominance between a core and a periphery (Dominguez Lopez, 2017; Fuentez Ramirez, 2014). Accordingly, anti-imperialists aim to rebalance the relationship scale, and give back to peripheries –under neocolonial rule or not- the control of their political economies (Philips, 2011).

Anti-imperialism was for the first time officially acknowledged by the end of the nineteenth century, as a wave of anti-imperial sentiment hit Great Britain following Prime Minister Disraeli's expansionist policies. In fact, the Boer War of 1899-1902 constituted a turning point in the history of anti-imperialism. Protests against the South African War and British imperialist policy became recurrent

for journalists and politicians (Koebner, 1964). Amongst them, William Clarke made it to fame when during the 1899 annual session of the socialist Rainbow Circle he declared that imperialism always led "to militarism and Caesarism, to slaughtering and conquests, to centralization and officialdom, to an economic parasitism and exploitation, (and) to the separation of economic classes at home" (Matikkalan, 2011). Anti-imperialism substituted that day anti-expansionism, encompassing not only the fight against territorial domination but also against political, economic and cultural influence. Yet, anti-imperialism only became a theory at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Hilferding, Luxembourg, Bukharin, Morel and Hobson eventually theorized the threat of capital expansion. With concepts such as increase of high taxation, under-consumption, capital-accumulation or bank monopolies, each of them assumed the danger of capitalism and the necessity for alternatives (Chilcote, 2003; Conway, 1961; Katz, 2017; Koebner, 1974). A decade later Vladimir Ilyich Ulyaniv, better known as Lenin, finalized to theorize the concept with the publication in September 1917 of "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism". Profoundly influenced by Hobson, Hilfedering and Marx he ultimately connected capitalism and imperialism, urging his readers to take on the fight against such oppression (Lenin, 1917; Hosseini, 2005). The translation of these concepts in French and German during the 1920s propelled the new anti-imperial movement on the international scene (Koebner, 1964).

1.2.2. Anti-imperialism in action and the importance of socialism

Anti-imperialism influenced many different people around the world. It was first of all used by Marxist historians for the defense of the proletariat against capitalist expansion (Conway, 1961; Katz, 2017; Koebner, 1964). Anti-imperialism also served the cause of nationalist historians and indigenous national movements seeking independence in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cockroft, 2006). In fact, anti-imperialist movements took various forms in these regions throughout the years. For example, between 1950 and 1970, anti-imperialist movements in Latin America were associated with revolutionary movements and armies of national liberation but also with the student population as "universities (had) bec(o)me the political and cultural ferment of the guerillas" (Green, 2013; Petras, 2015). From 1975 until the end of the century, anti-imperialist ideas were conducted by peasants and urban workers movements against neoliberal capitalist policies and "the pillage of national resources, the increase of illicit debts and the overseas transfer of billions of dollars" (Webber, 2017). The election of Hugo Chavez Frías in 1998 on a socialist and anti-imperial program ultimately broadened the anti-imperialist movement to the political field and contributed to the phenomenal expansion of the leftist Pink Tide in Latin America. Anti-imperialism in the region was no more perceived as a marginal movement but as a possible political alternative as it created "a new

chapter in the class struggle and the anti-imperialist movement" (Fuentez Ramirez, 2014; Petras, 2015).

The fighters of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 had already attempted to use socialism as an anti-imperialist strategy. Indeed, influenced by Lenin they believed that only a socialist revolution could stop the inevitable capitalist expansion of Western imperialist countries to non-capitalist states (Fuentez Ramirez, 2014; Hosseini, 2005; Lenin, 1917). Between the 1950s and the 1970s, numerous armed movements of national liberation worldwide fought imperialism while seeking a socialist revolution. Despite ups and downs, the idea of a socialist unity remained strong throughout the twentieth century, until concretizing itself in 2007; after 8 years of presidency Hugo Chavez finally unveiled his plan for a twenty-first century socialism, the "antidote" to capitalist and neoliberal policies (Petras, 2015). The success of this revolution relied on an anti-imperial domination strategy developed by Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci, a "resistance (…) with culture, rather than physical might" could successfully put an end to any sort of domination (Gramsci, 2007). By building the social foundation of a new state and creating alternative institutions, his "war of position" would provide a strong counter-hegemony while resisting the pressures and temptations (Cox, 1983). Indeed, the strength of a country's historic bloc –the State and society together- would constitute a solid structure, "strong enough to replace the first" (Cox, 1983). In order to consolidate that foundation, unity amongst anti-imperialist nations was required and took in Latin America the form of unions, trade agreements and organizations such as CELAC or ALBA. Despite their different traditions, economies and spirituality, a strong bond could in their view overcome sovereignty and self-determination issues (Koebner, 1964; Lee, 2010).

1.2.3. Anti-Americanism: a modern expansion of anti-imperialism?

If these strategies were for long employed against Western countries' domination, the United States became more recently the principal target of anti-imperialist policies. Anti-Americanism was academically acknowledged following the 9/11 attacks, as the number of articles published and scholars dedicated to the subject grew in an exponential and unprecedented manner (O'Connor, 2007). But the anti-American phenomenon was nothing new. Indeed, the breadth of influence of the U.S. had for the past two centuries continuously increased, enabling the young nation to dominate culturally, politically and economically an important part of the world (O'Connor, 2007). One of the most antique sources of anti-Americanism was cultural criticism (O'Connor, 2007; Roger, 2002). In fact, many Europeans such as Charles Dickens, Frances Trollope or Georges-Louis Buffon had already virulently criticized the manners, culture and values of Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries (O'Connor, 2007; Roger, 2002). That trend continued to develop internationally when during the "American twentieth century", movements from all over the world began to reject the idea of a U.S. bastion of "universal value and (…) God-given duty to spread democracy" (Datta, 2014; Sing 2006). Professors O'Connor and Stephan also analyzed anti-Americanism in terms of a reaction to the gap between Washington's rhetoric and practice. By dint of their history, liberty, democracy and equality have characterized the United-States of America, a country founded in the values of the Enlightenment (Kane, 2006). United Nations' supporter and protector of human rights across the globe, the U.S was globally perceived as a reliable and trustworthy nation until the realization that the satisfaction of its own interests will always come first. In fact, for professors Kaplan, Petras and Veltmeyer, the Good Neighbor policy -used by former President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s - never completely disappeared, but was rather re-shaped in order to fit any new situation where an imperial foreign policy was needed (Veltmeyer, 2012; Kaplan, 1998). Anti-Americanism was thus understood as a reaction to the gap created between America's humanitarian discourse and the pursuit of its foreign policy in the name of democracy (O'Connor, 2007).

Yet, for political scientists Kane and Krastev, anti-Americanism had to be understood as a simple and normal reaction to America's extensive power, including therefore America's foreign policy and cultural dominance but also economic and political interventions (Krasterv, 2007; Kane, 2006). In as much as military actions highly contributed to this success, globalization equally managed to elevate the country to the rank of superpower. Capitalism, privatization, free trade and free market promoted in the twentieth century the dominance of multinational institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank over national governments. Backed and partly financed by the United States since the very beginning, these supposedly impartial organizations had always America's best interests in mind and contributed to expand its sphere of influence. When former Secretary of State Colin Powel stated in 2002 that "Globalization is the United-States", he was indeed very close to the truth (Cockroft, 2006). For many academics that constant broadening of Washington's leadership inevitably led to the separation between the concepts of anti-imperialism and anti-US globalization, or what they called anti-Americanism (Cockroft, 2006).

Anti-Americanism is thus a multifaceted concept that encompasses a multitude of sources (Datta, 2014). In fact, it usually focuses on one political, economic, religious, cultural or ethical component rather than applying them all (Sing, 2006). That great paradox is commonly highlighted by nations that strongly disapprove America's policies at a time but continue to consume its products and services (Datta, 2014; Griffiths, 2006). The necessity to differentiate the many anti-Americanisms was therefore dear to certain academics, while others believed it as being relevant only if implying a systematic opposition as "a sort of allergic reaction" to America as a whole (O'Connor, 2007; Toinet,

1990).That last element supports the theory that the concept of anti-Americanism will always be elusive. For matter of clarity and time, this thesis will approach the concept of anti-Americanism as the extension of an anti-imperialist sentiment targeting the economic, political, and military domination of the United States. Anti-Americanism will therefore be understood as an essentialist approach rather than a conjectural and momentary opposition.

1.3. The Political Discourse Analysis

1.3.1. From the study of language to the analysis of political discourses

Aiming to connect the concepts of postcolonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism to Hugo Chavez's discourse, a Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) will be used to examine the selected speeches. PDA derives from the broader field of Discourse Analysis (DA), a methodological approach investigating the role of the language beyond the sentence and the individual person (Taylor, 2013; Tannen, 2007). Sometimes incorrectly perceived as a neutral vehicle, the language is regarded by most linguists as a way to express content through connections between the saying –the information, the doing –the action, and the being- the orator (Gee, 1999; Taylor, 2013). The role of DA is thus to analyzes these connections and extract the information necessary through an analysis of the discourse's content. The origins of DA can be traced as far as two thousand years ago, and encompasses a wide variety of disciplines ranging from anthropology, sociology or linguistic, to communication studies and international relations (Dijk, 1991; Tannen, 2007; Taylor, 2013). That variety of fields engaged in DA, led to the accumulation of different techniques and strategies of analysis. For instance, while Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) usually focuses on the content, themes and issues that are delivered by the language, the more traditional Descriptive Discourse Analysis (DDA) focuses on the structure, lexicon and grammar of speeches (Gee, 1999; Taylor, 2013). That difference in methods can be explained by a difference in goals. CDA scholars are indeed interested in linking the speech to a particular context whereas DDA scholars tend to give more importance to its form.

Certain branches of DA use multiple methods to ensure the pursuit of their goals. Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) for example, manages to bridge the gap between the critical and descriptive approaches using both strategies for its own analysis. Born in late 1980s, PDA focuses indeed on the critical, contextual but also syntactical analysis of speeches delivered in a political form, in a political context or by political actors (Wilson, 2015). Due to the political accent of this paper, as well as the

importance of context and syntax evolution in Chavez's discourse, a PDA analysis will be conducted in the last chapter.

1.3.2. The diverse analytical methods of PDA

As previously mentioned, PDA uses first a contextual approach including thus a Frame and Intertextual Analysis (Ruiz, 2009). Framing a discourse enable scholars to isolate recurrent topics and understand the political goal of a discourse. In political discourse, social issues such as human rights, democracy or justice are usually incorporated to speeches as it allow the speaker to reach a larger audience and support his own political agenda (Ruiz, 2009). Indeed, Political Discourse Analysis does not only investigate the language as a mental phenomenon but rather as a social one, using linguistic as a tool kit to promote, fight and spread political ideas or stances (Chilton, 2004). The Intertextual Analysis completes the framing. Indeed, Foucault explains that rather than identifying external discourses, the intertextual method examines each speech in a comparative way (Foucault, 1973). According to him "the meaning of discourse emerges in reference to other discourses with which it engages in dialogue, be it an explicit or implicit manner" (Foucault, 1973). Contextualizing a discourse gives thus academics the opportunity to understand the main issues of a speech and highlight its evolution through the similarities and differences found in other political speeches.

Close in essence, the Structural Analysis formats the descriptive approach of PDA. Developed by Laclau and Mouffe, the structural analysis goes beyond the simple critic and contextualization of a speech, as it also focuses on identifying patterns, regularities and alteration in a corpus (Müller, 2011). The three structural characteristics that are 1) the analysis of the lexicon and the syntax, 2) the search for dichotomies, and 3) the identification of nodal points, will enable a complete analysis of Hugo Chavez's discourse.

To begin with, the analysis of the lexical style considers the use of a special vocabulary and examines the possible emphasis put on words, either positively or negatively. The syntactic approach helps to determine the structure of the sentence, show changes in word orders, but also highlight potential manipulations of language that could influence the discourse (Van Dijk, 1997). A quantitative approach is generally chosen to conduct these two analyses as it emphasizes the importance of certain words or in the contrary stresses their absence (Hawkins, 2010).

The presence of dichotomies also constitutes a very important characteristic of PDA. For instance, the use of certain pronouns can ultimately create a distinction, 'us' and 'we' often facing 'they' and 'them' (Van Dijk, 1985, 1997). The place and emphasis put on these pronouns represents indeed a common strategy to create and justify a good side - that of the speaker - and blame an evil one - that

of his opponents. The creation of separations or even boundaries between two ideological contents is therefore applied with the final objective of excluding a certain group, but also gathering people around a common rejection (Van Dijk, 1991, 1997).

The search for nodal points constitutes the last structural strategy of PDA applied in this thesis. Also introduced by the two political theorists Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points have to be understood as points of capitation. Center to the discourse, these particular signifiers give to most speeches their structure, articulating the other words and giving them a meaning (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In fact, nodal points connect concepts and ideas together and enable to perceive the bigger picture of an analysis. For instance, a speech involving the nodal point liberalism would likely employ words such as capitalism, tariff, trade, economy, exchange rates and markets. Regrouping these signs around a stronger point can therefore facilitate the work of academics and give them a clear vision of the main ideas and meaning of a discourse.

Very close in meaning, the concepts of anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism and neocolonialism have sometimes been considered interchangeable. Nonetheless, this chapter presented the singular differences distinguishing them from one another. Regarded as a simple category of imperialism, neocolonialism yet envisages extension of domination as a process excluding the use of force. Including means of coercion to their list of possibilities, imperialism and Americanism are thus closer in essence, anti-Americanism being understood in this thesis as the prolongation and targeted version of anti-imperialism. Postcolonialism and anti-Americanism differ thus mainly by the way domination is applied from a Core to a Periphery. Based on the comprehension of these theories, a Political Discourse Analysis will later provide a complete and reflective analysis of Hugo Chavez's discourse.

Chapter 2

Influence and contextualisation of Hugo Chavez's Political Discourse

Having discussed the main concepts characterizing Chavez's discourse, it is thus interesting to look at how Chavez came to power as part of the Latin American Left movement, understand his influences, path and relation to anti-imperialism. This chapter will further analyze the effects of 9/11, the launching of the War on Terror and their connection to a worldwide anti-imperialist spread and anti-American revival.

2.1. The History of the Left in Latin America (1959-2013)

2.1.1. The First Wave: The Cuban influence (late 1950s-1970s)

For the past hundred years, the Left, with all its ups and downs, has been at the center of each Latin American country's strategies and political debates (Burbach, 2014). This political trend made of parties, groups and organizations, was originally conceived on Marxist inspiration (Levitsky, 2011). Indeed, José Carlos Mariátegui –Peru-, Julio Antonio Mella –Cuba-, and Luis Emilio Recabarren –Chile- formed together the first generation of Latin-American communists. Influenced by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine advocated by the USSR leader Joseph Stalin, their ideology predominated amongst Latin Americans leftists for over thirty years (Löwy, 2007). Yet, the success of the 1959 Cuban revolution irremediably shifted the political and ideological landscape of the continent, when the triumph of the revolutionary communist Fidel Castro against the general Fulgencio Batista put an end to a seven-year long dictatorship. In fact, the radical transformation of Cuba into a socialist state as early as 1960 marked a rupture from the classic Marxist-Leninist doctrine that was until then prevailing (Dominguez Lopes, 2017). Advocating the utopia of a New Man and the rejection of an American hegemony, the alternative ideas of both Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara quickly spread over the region (Serra, 2007). From that moment onwards three waves were to divide the history of the Left in Latin America (Petras, 1999).

The first “mass social movement” wave closely followed the success of the Cuban Revolution and gave Bolivian, Venezuelan, Peruvian, Chilean and Argentinean socialist and anti-imperialist groups a certain impulse and prospect (Burbach, 2014). Structural changes were quickly brought by electoral parties, guerilla troops and mass social Latin movements who by early 1960s, propelled to power “several civilian and military left and centre-left regimes” (Petras, 1999). However, these new governments were fast overthrown by U.S.-backed elites who, without consent, replaced them by pro-American military and authoritarian-civilian regimes. Famous example of the period, the Socialist and democratically elected Chilean President Allende was forced out of power by a coup staged by both the United States and the Chilean bourgeoisie, three years only after his election in 1970. Under the new leadership of the ex-Commander-in-Chief Augusto Pinochet the country was severely repressed and thousands of activists were injured, jailed or killed. The same strategies were applied in Brazil in 1964, Bolivia in 1971, Uruguay in 1974 and Argentina in 1976. Across the region, 250.000 died as a result of American sponsored regimes (Petras, 1999).

2.1.2. The Second Wave: the Post-dictatorial period (1970s-1990s)

The second wave emerged at the end of the 1970s, first in opposition to dictatorships, and second in rejection to Washington’s promotion of a neoliberal agenda (Petras, 2009). The Sandinistas of Nicaragua, FMLN of El Salvador, Frente Grande of Argentina, and Causa R of Venezuela were some of the most prominent and virulent Left groups who began to fight US-backed authoritarian regimes (Petras, 2007). But if some managed to reverse the political control of their country and gain back their independence, most had to temper their demands and compromise with the United States in order to facilitate a transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Beaseley, 2010; Petras, 2009). The laying-down of arms enabled neoliberalism to fully penetrate the continent and promote free markets, multinational corporations and institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. In sum, it enabled the affirmation of America’s global rule (Chodor, 2015).

Neoliberalism was presented as the solution to Latin America’s problems. Instead, the policy model exacerbated poverty, misery and scarcity (Harnecker, 2007). By 1980s, economic crises, bankruptcy, instability, displacement, unemployment, inequality and recession were characteristic of the region (Beaseley, 2010; Goldfrank, 2011). In only one decade, the number of people living below the poverty line doubled, stretching from 120 million in 1980 to 240 million by 1990 (Castenada, 1994).

The growing sense of disenchantment for neoliberal politics contributed to the resurgence of left "extra-parliamentary sociopolitical movements" and led to violent protests early 1990s[1] (Burbach, 2014; Ellner, 2014; Petras, 1999). Yet, by the mid-1990s, the Latin American Left came to the realization that a new strategy was necessary to win the war. Pushing aside revolutions and violence, left parties entered a new phase by suddenly embracing reform and democracy as fundamental values and relying on elections to bring about change (Goldfrank, 2011; Petras, 1999). From that moment on, armed insurrection were relayed to the second plan, as credit and legitimization were increasingly demanded (Flores, 2012).

2.1.3. The Third Wave: The Pink Tide, (late 1990s-2010s) and the emergence of a "Bad Left"

This new stage was concretized by the election of Hugo Chavez Frías as President of Venezuela in 1998 which marked a turning point in the advent of a new Latin American Left (Baeseley, 2010; Harnecker, 2007). Indeed, if by the end of the century Chavez stood alone, his progressive ideas rapidly spread over the continent contributing to a series of electoral victories in Chile (2000), Brazil (2002) Argentina (2003), Bolivia (2005), Uruguay (2005), Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua (2006), Paraguay (2008), and El Salvador (2009) propelling the new 'Pink Tide' movement (Harnecker, 2007). This success was guided by a broadening of horizon reaching to people who were looking for alternatives. One appealing idea for left and center-oriented citizens, was for instance the idea of a "participatory and protagonistic people's democracy" over an elite-based system (Castenada, 2008; Harneker, 2007). This new trend had also for objective to promote equality, cultural change, as well as the creation of a new regional bloc. That bloc would offer an alternative to the neoliberal and hegemonic order and promote democracy, social justice and cooperation between Latin American countries without the influence of Washington (Burbach, 2014; Cox, 1983; Luna; 2010; Petras, 1999). However, all countries did not embrace a complete change of policy. That divergence in opinion, gave Washington policymakers, but also some international scholars such as Castenada, the opportunity to create a clear separation between social democrats and populists, also respectively referred to as right and wrong, democratic and undemocratic, reformist and revolutionary or "Good Left" and "Bad Left" (Castenada, 2008; Chodor, 2015). The alleged "Good Left" encompassed Brazil with Lula da Silva, Chile with Michelle Bachelet and Ricardo Lagos, and Uruguay with Tabaré Vasquez (Luna, 2010). While supporting the idea of alternatives and social changes, the Good Left had yet refused to abandon the U.S. market and liberal economy for a socialist utopia (Luna, 2010). Judged "more

[1] These movements engaged peasants, working class people, landless workers and indigenous communities.

mature", their relationship with Washington however remained "sensitive and sensible" (Chodor, 2015). The "Bad Left" included Hugo Chavez for Venezuela, Nestor Kirshner for Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa for Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (Luna, 2010). All charismatic leaders, they were accused of using popular struggle for personal gains but also to "fill in a power vacuum left by the collapse of an outgoing party system" (Beaseley, 2010). Worse in Washington eyes, all shared deep anti-imperialist convictions and had virulently denounced the neoliberal world system in the past. The "Bad Left" was therefore considered as a dangerous branch by the U.S. which, in a defensive attempt, adapted its foreign policy accordingly.

2.2. Hugo Chavez, El Chavismo, and the Bolivarian Revolution: a new socialist phase for Venezuela

2.2.1. The beginning of El Chavismo: sparking a War of Movement

Part of this 'dangerous coalition', Hugo Chavez Frías contributed thus to the revival of a united Left in Venezuela and in Latin America. Indeed, while conserving his enmity against hegemony, Chavez had understood the necessity for a change of tactic, and the importance of breaking off from violence. The philosopher Antonio Gramsci had previously developed a theory on revolutionary movements using two figures of military tactics: the war of movement -also known as war of maneuver-, and the war of position (Gramsci, 1971). The war of movement is defined as a counter hegemony strategy employing a rapid and dynamic frontal attack that is usually found in strikes, insurrections, and coups. The war of position uses a much slower approach, as it insists to fight the 'evil' from the inside rather than physically. Perceived by some as an infiltration, the position strategy solely emphasizes the importance of collectivity, democracy and reforms over minority, violence or isolated acts (Cannon, 2009).

Throughout his political career, Chavez successively applied these two theories of hegemony in order to spread his anti-imperialist and socialist project, the Bolivarian Revolution (Gnecco, 2015). In fact, he believed that his movement, nowadays referred to as Chavismo or Chavism, could constitute a bloc against those who had for too long be favored by hegemony such as the bourgeoisie, the Catholic Church, traditional parties, private medias, eminent military officers or big national and transnational businesses (Gnecco, 2015). The Bolivarian Revolution had indeed for objective to overthrow the traditional dominant bloc and give all power to those who deserved it the most: the citizens (Cannon, 2009; Gnecco, 2015).

The Chavismo movement began the day Hugo Chavez's political engagement and activism were concretized by the formation of the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario – MBR – in December 1983 at the military academy. Chavez had entered the academy as a student in 1970. His instruction in political sciences and law quickly gave him a taste for democracy while his readings of Mao and Simon Bolivar challenged his vision of human rights (Chavez, 2005). The overthrown of the Argentinean President Allende during his third year of academy, marked him greatly and increased his interest for the Left (Hawkins, 2003). In 1980, Chavez came back to the academy as an instructor and began to recruit junior officers for his movement. This process lasted three years. In 1983, the MBR 200, composed of his best junior officers and three other captains, was in full capacity and had for main objectives to fight against corruption, inequalities and the political establishment of Punto Fijo[2] (Roberts, 2012).

The Caracazo of February 1989 marked an important step in Chavez's war of movement. For days, demonstrations and popular explosions shook the streets of Caracas illustrating people's strong dissatisfaction with the government. These protestors demanded a reconsideration of the Punto Fijo and the abandon of neoliberal policies which, according to them, were responsible for the increasing poverty in the country. Indeed, in only a few years, salaries had decreased by 40% bringing to 80.4% the number of Venezuelan living in poverty (Chavez, 2005; Corrales, 2013; Gnecco, 2015). The MBR 200 encouraged these demonstrations, providing great support to the people. When on February 27, the government repression killed 5.000 demonstrators and civilians, many disillusioned officers and soldiers decided to switch side and ally with the MBR 200 movements (Cannon, 2009; Chavez, 2005; Hawkins, 2010).

Another step of Chavez's strategy surprisingly remains in his failure to take over presidential powers. New anti-neoliberalism strikes had begun on January 1992. On February 4, the MBR had led a successful coup in Maracaibo, Aragua and Valencia. Yet, Hugo Chavez only, failed to take the Miraflores Palace in Caracas and was directly arrested. The same night, and after negotiating his surrender, Chavez went live on national television and addressed his companions as well as the Venezuelan people. Declaring "tak(ing) responsibility" for his action, he asked his compatriots to lay down their arms and stop the revolution "for now", insinuating that he will continue to fight

[2] The Punto Fijo is a pact that was signed in October 1958 between the three main Venezuelan parties -the AD, COPEI and URD- after the military uprising that overthrew the dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez (Chavez, 2005). The pact aimed at maintaining democracy, make political alternations possible, and push away the Venezuelan Communist party via anti-communist policy (Cannon, 2009). Yet, despite maintaining democracy for thirty years, no real political alternations were to be seen, as the two main parties –URD had quit the coalition in 1962- had total control of the Venezuelan political and economic sectors. If the political stability was respected, the country was hit by austerity, economic crises, corruption and decline in oil revenues, their main source of income (Fleishman, 2013).

Venezuela's corrupted, immoral, unethical and neoliberal government when returning from prison. Chavez became that day a national leader close to a hero figure, and propelled his movement far beyond his predictions (Cannon, 2009; Chavez, 2005). The military man was liberated two years later under the new government of Caldera (Chavez, 2005). From then, "the process of political organization accelerated" (Hawkins, 2003).

One year after his release, Chavez asked for abstention during the 1995 regional elections. Yet, in 1997, his project of a democratic revolution seemed to motivate many military and civilians who, gathering around, pushed him to present himself for the next presidential elections (Hawkins, 2003). The creation of the Fifth Republic Movement and his presidential candidacy ended Chavez's war of movement. On December 6 1998, he was elected president of Venezuela in the first round with 56% of the votes (Chavez, 2005).

2.2.2. From a Bolivarian Revolution Project to a 21st century socialism: Hugo Chavez's War of Position

The election of Chavez and his allies constituted an historical event, as it ended a forty-year bi-party regime and instilled hope to many Venezuelans (Hawkins, 2003). The new strategy of Chavez truly began the day of his election. He knew that to accomplish his goals, a new method was necessary: a war of position. To assist him in the implementation of a Bolivarian Revolution, Chavez used two main instruments. First he focused his discourse on the role of what he called "the three rooted-tree", that is, the history of the three heroes Simon Bolivar, Simon Rodriguez and Ezequiel Zamora. Using emblematic figures of the continent as examples enabled Chavez to justify his comments and support his revolutionary ideas[3] (Cannon, 2009; Kozac, 2013). Second, Chavez implemented in December 1999 the new constitution he had promised during his campaign (Kelly and Palma, 2007). Blaming western liberal democracies for their "pattern of domination in economy, in politics, a negation of the rights of peoples to be master of their own destiny" (Fleishman, 2013), Chavez believed that a representative and participatory democracy could be the key to a social and economic equality (Hawkins, 2010; Pascal, 2015; Yepes, 2007). The new constitution focused indeed on the re-legitimization of democracy, and the promotion of Venezuelan people as sovereign of the

[3] Simon Bolivar was a figure of social justice, liberty and equality of rights. Influenced by J.J. Rousseau, the "libertador" had fought for the country's independency from big powers, and a rapprochement with other ex-colonies of Latin America. Mentor and friend of Bolivar, Simon Rodriguez was seen as the educator figure. For him, the science of reading was the science of activating and connecting ideas to other ideas and giving them life (Kozac, 2013). Ezequiel Zamora was the element of rebellion, popular protest and protagonism. His most popular slogans were "land and free men!", "popular elections!" and "horror to the oligarchy!" (Cannon, 2009). Chavez's ideology attempted to include each of these characters' force, knowledge and determination, a combination of Venezuela's best representatives.

Nation. More, that constitution also emphasized the defense of human rights, including for the first time rights for minorities and indigenous, and re-affirmed Chavez's important fight against neoliberalism and interventionism (Cannon, 2009).

Chavez Bolivarian program began with a battle against corruption and poverty, both exacerbated by the former PuntoFijiste government (Fleishman, 2013). To fight corruption, Chavez believed in the democratic implementation of popular will. According to him, democracy would help building a just society, and the implication of his people would stop corruption from happening (Fleishman, 2013). To combat poverty, Chavez prioritized the popular classes, affirming his desire to rule in the name of the poor and for the poor. In order to do so, the President immediately put social spending and inequality issues at the center of his Bolivarian Revolution (Cannon, 2009; Fleishman, 2013). As early as 2000, the President launched the Plan Bolivar, the first of a long series of social programs known under the name of Bolivarian Missions. These missions intended to reduce poverty and promote access to higher education, health and pensions through subsidies or expansion of public goods[4] (Cannon, 2009; Pascal, 2015). Together with economic redistributions of wealth to popular and middle classes, these policies guaranteed him the complete and unconditional support of the poor who, willingly, became active participants in state formation (Gnecco, 2015)

President Chavez also focused on rights and dependency with the idea of promoting a "just, equal, representative and anti-imperialist revolution" (Fleishman, 2013). For him, class and race issues had divided Venezuela since the Spanish contest. In the decolonization process and postcolonial period that followed, none of these issues had been solved as the country became more and more dependent on other powers. Dear to Chavez was therefore the protection and development of individuals, and respect for their dignity[5] (Fleishman, 2013). More, he believed that by the increase of fraternal dialogue between peoples, respect for freedom of thought, religion and self-determination will emerge (Cannon, 2009).

By 2004 Chavez's policy evolved. Indeed, the President's focus switched from pure national interest to a wider regional and international one. The creation of a regional bloc to oppose western imperialism and neoliberalism marked a first step towards his new socialist program and the promotion of a regional integration (Corrales, 2013; Fleishman, 2013). That bloc would strengthen the national sovereignty of Venezuela and allow the country to move on from a unipolar American bloc to a multipolar world (Cannon, 2009). This regional bloc materialized itself by the creation of

[4] Mission Mercal and Mission Cristo had for objective to tackle poverty, Mission Vivienda was dedicated to housing, Missions Robinson and Sucre for education and literacy, and Mission Barrio Adentro promoted health care and services (Hawkins, 2010; Pascal, 2015).

[5] This included a "greater respect for women's rights and increased role for women in decision making", as well as rights for indigenous and marginalized groups (Fleishman, 2013; Pascal, 2015).

ALBA, TCP (Commercial Treaty of the People) and PetroCaribe, each becoming symbols of a possible alternatives to the American-led FTAA. Gathering around the idea of diversified political, economic and cultural relations, the unification of Latin American countries represented in addition the realization of Simon Bolivar's dream of a Spanish America, an extended version of the former Gran Colombia (Fleishman, 2013). Chavez anti-imperialist and regionalist ideology also appeared in his involvement with the Non Aligned Movement. Already member since 1989, Chavez increased Venezuela's participation in world discussion, and used the NAM as a platform for the promotion of his socialist and anti-imperialist revolution. Chavez's concerns for peace, economic development, multilateralism, respect of international laws, recognition of sovereignty and non-interventionism were therefore coupled regionally with the creation of an historical bloc, and internationally with his active participation in the NAM.

2.3. 9/11 and the launching of the War on Terror: the birth of a new world order

2.3.1. From empathy to blame: 9/11 and the American response

Yet, Chavez's open anti-imperialist and social discourse quickly came under fire. Less than three years after his election and the implementation of his Bolivarian Revolution, a terrorist attack on the United States surprised all continents and challenged the existent world system. Being in war for over 136 years, the U.S. knew about casualties but was yet not prepared for casualties on their own soil, at their heart and without any warnings (Hodges, 2011). By mid-morning, the entire world knew about the attacks. Consternation, empathy and solidarity firstly emerged amongst the international community. Gatherings took place in many countries, a vast majority of the world population considering that, as titled by the French newspaper Le Monde, they were all American. Most world leaders also denounced the attacks, the German chancellor affirming that, more than America only, the entire civilized world had been hit. More, and despite standing on the side of Washington's traditional 'enemies', Cuban, Chinese, Iranian and Palestinian officials immediately sent their condolences and condemned the attacks (Ryan, 2007).

Nonetheless, some countries immediately rejected the responsibility on the United States. Indeed, if Mexico, Spain and Argentina condemned the terrorists, they also stressed how the assault could

have been deserved (Escalante, 2007). Baptized the "Kingdom of Comma"[6], they denounced Washington's Manichean vision of good vs. evil, explaining that if applied, the U.S. should be blamed first, 1) for their deadly operations in Latin America, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo and Palestine, and 2) for spreading poverty via neoliberalism and globalization (Escalante, 2007). Likewise, 75% of Europeans believed the U.S. had too much power and influence on globalization. Despite numerous acts of sympathy and compassion, polls showed that an average of 68% of the population considered a good thing that Americans finally felt vulnerable (Romero, 2007).

President Georges W. Bush began planning for revenge the very day of the attacks (Fawn, 2003). As early as September 12, he asserted the necessity to fight the "enemies of human freedom" not only for America, but for the entire world, launching by October 2001 Washington's first invasion in Afghanistan (Hodges, 2011; Ryan, 2007). This intervention was closely followed by the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, both undertaken without the consent of the U.N. Security Council. To justify its launching, President Bush invoked three norms: the norm of self defense, the norm of victimization, and the nom of liberation[7] (MacDonald, 2008). Yet, justice was seen very differently by the international community who highly criticized the violation of international laws. Indeed, other criteria still needed to be met to justify a war (Ryan, 2007). First, the war could not happen before any other peaceful action had been undertaken to avoid conflict. Second, a sufficient amount of time for negotiations was required to allow each party to reflect then respond. Third, no war could be launched on exterior factors such as economic search for profit. Finally, sufficient measures had to be taken to protect and avoid civilian loss. Under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council charters, the U.S. had indeed the right to claim for assistance and defense, but solely if the four precedent rules were followed to the letter (Fawn, 2003; Ryan, 2007; Wright, 2003). Yet, the war on terror was launched within three weeks, without negotiations, and was, after only two months, responsible for the death of over 1.000 civilians[8] (Ryan, 2007). By the attack of two sovereign states, the U.S. managed to break both the UN and NATO Charters, as well as seven out of ten '"basic procedural norms of global covenant" written in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (MacDonald, 2008).

[6] If Mexico, Spain and Argentina condemned the terrorists, they did not put a full stop to their saying but rather a coma, signaling their willingness to debate Washington's fate (Escalante, 2007).

[7] The norm of defense lies in the U.S. Charter. Articles 1368 and 1373 recognize the right to self-defense (Wright, 2003). The victimization norm is directly associated to it and states that a counter-attack as punishment should be expected on the author of the initial attack (Maconald, 2008). As stated by Bush, the Middle East invasion followed these two rules as they were "on timing and terms of others" (Ryan, 2007). Finally, the United States justified its actions, the same way they had done in the past: since the nineteenth century, they legitimized their interventions as the ultimate promotion of democracy and freedom and fight against 'evil' states (MacDonald, 2008; Ryan, 2007).

[8] In the first two months of war, the Project for Defense Alternatives concluded that between 1.000 and 1.300 civilians had been killed by bombardment (Ryan, 2007).

2.3.2. National and international reactions on the launching of the War on Terror

Shortly after the launching, a majority of Americans believed that their government had not taken the good decisions. Polls realized by the end of 2001 showed that 86% of American citizen thought that the world had become more dangerous for them as a result of Bush administration's policies (Ginneken, 2007). Similarly, twelve out of fifteen countries probed by the Pew Center including France, Germany and Spain, believed the world had become unstable after the launching of the war (MacDonald, 2008). In addition, polls showed that the good image America inherited in the 1990s shifted as soon as the first bombardments in Afghanistan were known (Marcelo, 2005). Indeed, many reproached Washington to go too far too quick and to only be driven by its own interests over other countries' well-being[9]. Like many, the Spanish-speaking world rejected heavily Washington's launching of the Afghan and Iraqi Wars. As a result, Washington's policy toward Latin America shifted from indifference to intimidation[10]. Indeed, when President Nestor Kirshner publicly condemned Bush foreign policy in 2003, Washington immediately cut Argentinean funding. But plunged into poverty, citizens became even more critical of America's policies and of the United States in general (Marcelo, 2005). The Argentinean case was not an isolated one as many other Latin American countries experienced the same difficulties following their rejection of the War. What finally emerged as a result of the launching of the War on Terror was the change in the global perception of the United States. The traditional picture of a benign hegemonic power, shifted thus for many into that of an arrogant and autocratic empire (Romero, 2007; Wright, 2003).

Numerous scholars associated that trend reversal to the renewal of the anti-American ideology. The realization that once again, the United States was ready to wrongly justify the conduct of a war under the principles of freedom, democracy and self-determination animated Third World leaders (Ryan, 2007). In Latin America, this new war represented the proof that nothing had changed since the two-centuries-old Monroe doctrine (Singh, 2003). More than neocolonialism, the United States was thus employing imperialist methods without any restriction, threatening the region and the world's stability. From that moment, an anti-American sentiment -usually found in the traditional Left-, gradually spread over mainstream media, magazines and dinner-conversations (Marcelo, 2005). Coupled with the public rejection of anti-imperialist politicians, this widening of the audience

[9] They believed Washington was not only focused on targeting terrorism but was instead pursuing its own imperialistic agenda in the Middle East –mostly economic with oil, and military with the search for weapons of mass destruction (Fawn, 2003; Singh, 2003).

[10] After declaring a state of national emergency, President Bush claimed on September 20 'either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists', indicating Washington's new stance on foreign politics (Ryan, 2007). With that statement, Georges W. Bush made clear that not only would he target countries harboring, helping or protecting terrorists, but also all those who will not participate in the coming war on the American side (Fawn, 2003).

ultimately contributed to the advent and consolidation of Leftist governments in the region. In Bolivia, President Evo Morales was thus partly elected as a result of Bolivians low appreciation of Washington's policy and against the U.S. ambassador's call not to support the MAS –Movement Toward Socialism- party (Marcelo, 2005). On December 2006, Chavez was similarly re-elected, three months only after his virulent attack on the American President, and his public denunciation of Washington's foreign policies.

This chapter highlighted the deep connection between the Venezuelan President and the Latin American Left. Influenced by the anti-imperialist and anti-American fights of its first two waves, Hugo Chavez successfully engaged in a battle for sovereignty, justice and peace, gathering around him numerous Latin leaders. This Pink Tide movement represented the third and final phase of the Latin American Left fight. Regarded as the direct continuation of the Monroe Doctrine, the War on Terror destabilized that united Latin American region which, struck with fear, increased its degree of animosity against the United States and developed an anti-American rhetoric.

Chapter 3

Hugo Chavez's discourse breakdown: anti-Americanism under scrutiny

With both framing and contextualizing bases set previously, this last chapter aims at analyzing Hugo Chavez's anti-American rhetoric through the examination of speeches selected before and after the 9/11 attacks. Going beyond a simple language analysis, PDA will enable me to look at the overall picture as much as focusing on details with the possibility of linking Chavez's anti-Americanism to different sources.

3.1 The analysis of the discourse

3.1.1 The selection of speeches

Hugo Chavez's rhetorical campaign began as early as 1994 and was extended until his death in March 2013. However, getting ill by 2010, the President was diagnosed with a colon cancer early 2011 and a recurrence in 2012. Due to his medical condition, Chavez's presence on the international scene became less and less frequent and the amount of speeches he delivered decreased accordingly. For that reason, the analysis will only focus on speeches conveyed between 1994 and 2009. For evident reasons of time management, -Chavez delivered one speech every two days from the moment of his election- only ten allocutions will be chosen, each responding to diverse criteria (Berjaud, 2015).

As perceived by the reading of Table 1, four characteristics have shaped the selection. First, most speeches were chosen due to their international reach, that is either abroad, either in Venezuela but addressed to an international assembly (Speech 7), or addressed to a certain country (Speech 4) [1]. Indeed, most of anti-American accusations come from abroad and after the listening of regionally or

[1] 'Speech 2' was the only one chosen that was delivered in Caracas, Venezuela, and addressed to the Venezuelan population.

internationally oriented allocutions. To understand these accusations, it is therefore necessary to access Chavez's discourse the same way these protagonists did. Second, and in order to compare them, a minimum of one speech needed to match each step of Hugo Chavez's evolving career, as well as each important event revolving around him. To combine these two features, one speech was selected when Hugo Chavez was still a revolutionary (Speech 1), one while he was a candidate (Speech 2), one when he was recently elected President and before the attacks (Speech 3), one directly in the aftermath of 9/11 (Speech 4), two after the launching of the War on Terror (Speeches 5 and 6), and finally four several years after the launching of the War (Speeches 7, 8, 9 and 10). Third, speeches were selected according to their content: the presence and recurrence of certain terms such as 'United States', 'imperialism', 'colonialism' and 'socialism' highly contributed to their selection in the final list, using them to frame the analysis as explained in chapter 1. Fourth and last, each speech had to have a special characteristic making it more valuable and interesting to study. These characteristics are found in Table 1 under the category 'reason'.

Table 1. The evolution of Hugo Chavez's discourse: selection of speeches 1994-2009

N°	DATE	PLACE	DESIGNATION	REASON
1	1994 December, 14	Havana, Cuba	Speech in La Aula Magna Universidad in La Habana	Chavez's first international allocution and first encounter with Fidel Castro. For the first time, Chavez was able to spread his revolution outside Venezuela's boundaries and address young students who he believed represented the next rebellious generation in Latin America.
2	1998 August, 18	Caracas, Venezuela	Conference of the presidential candidate Hugo Chavez	Allocution with the more references to the U.S. if compared to the rest of candidature speeches delivered that year.
3	2000 August, 1	Brasilia, Brazil	Speech from the Commandant and President of the Republic, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frías. The Democratic Revolution in Venezuela and its Integration in Latin America	One year after his election. Visit to a neighboring country to promote his ideas.
4	2001 September, 12	Caracas, Venezuela	National Channel: Wednesday 12 of September, 2001	One day after 9/11. Direct reaction to the events.
5	2001 November, 10	New York, United States	Speech before the United Nations	Two months after 9/11 and only a few days after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
6	2002 September, 13	New York, Unites States	Intervention of the Commandant and President Hugo Chavez in the 57th Assembly of the United Nations.	Intervention at the United Nations, one year and two days after the 9/11 attacks.

N°	DATE	PLACE	DESIGNATION	REASON
7	2004 March, 1	Caracas, Venezuela	Speech from the President Hugo Chavez for the opening of the twelfth G-15 Summit	Opening of the G15 summit, a coalition of countries, all members of the Non Aligned Movement. One year after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Fifteen years after the Caracazo and Venezuela's protest against the neo-liberal package of the International Monetary Fund.
8	2006 September, 20	New York, United States	Speech from the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela the General Assembly of the United Nations	Most famous speech of Hugo Chavez. Delivered at United Nations, five years after the 9/11 attacks.
9	2009 December, 14	Havana, Cuba	Intervention of the Commandant and President Hugo Chavez in the closing ceremony of the VIII Summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America	Exactly fifteen years after his first allocution in Havana; Chavez went from a military man to President. Repeated the objectives of the Bolivarian Revolution and reminded its fight against imperialism.
10	2009 December, 16	Copenhagen, Denmark	Intervention of the Commandant and President Hugo Chavez during the XV International Conference of the United Nations Organization on Climate Change.	Chavez famously declared: "if the climate were a bank, it would already have been saved". Virulent criticism of imperialism.

Source: own elaboration.

3.1.2 Towards an evolution of the discourse?

The speeches selected, the main analysis can begin. Already framed during their selection, a lexical analysis of the discourses is here required. The search for Mouffe and Laclau's nodal points can in this case help finding "signs" and identify the main themes of the discourse. Table 2 presents therefore the five nodal points with economic and military features that have emerged from Hugo Chavez's selected allocutions.

The first nodal point introduced is 'neoliberalism'. As seen in Table 2, neoliberalism has been continuously present in Hugo Chavez's discourse. In 1998, Chavez first attacked neoliberalism without linking it to any institution or power (Speech 2). Two years later, he directly denounced the IMF and WTO for exploiting people from the South via neoliberal policies (Speech 3) and continued a year later qualifying neoliberalism as a "road to hell" for "innocent victims" (Speech 4). Referring to it

under the name of “salvage neoliberalism” (Speech 4), Hugo Chavez finally connected it to the North during the G15 summit of Caracas in 2004. For the first time, he openly condemned the participation of countries and not solely institutions, connecting therefore the problem not only to the economic world system, but to a larger exploitation denounced by postcolonialists: the exploitation of the south by the north (Speech 7). This sudden accusation liberated Chavez’s parole and explained a peak in his usage of the term at that date. From that moment on, neoliberalism continued to be called out by President Chavez but was at the same time increasingly replaced by another nodal point: ‘imperialism’.

Table 2. References to American Features 1994-2009



	1994	1998	2000	12/09/ 2001	10/11/ 2001	2002	2004	2006	2009 ALBA	2009 COP15
United States	5	7	3	15	2	0	2	24	6	2
Neoliberalism-Capitalism	0	5	5	0	2	3	19	3	10	5
Imperialism	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	18	4	10
Terrorism	0	0	0	5	4	18	0	5	0	0
Militar-War	12	8	2	3	4	7	2	3	1	4

Source: own elaboration based on data from Hugo Chavez’s speeches selection (T1)

Contrarily to what one could think, and despite his anti-imperialist background, ‘imperialism’ had not always been a very important nodal point in Hugo Chavez’s discourse. Close to zero before 2004, his reference to imperialism only peaked in 2006 with 18 usages, consequently followed by a respectable 4 and 10 usages in his two 2009 speeches. Indeed, for six years the President had focused on national and regional issues over international ones and attempted to integrate himself

as much as possible into the complex world system. Defying big nations and calling them out on their unjustified interventions was therefore not part of Chavez original agenda. Yet, that pattern changed radically in 2006, when he pronounced his famous discontent discourse at the United Nation, blaming President Georges W. Bush for imposing an American "model of exploitation (…) and hegemony upon (them) under threat of war". That day, Hugo Chavez Frías became an international figure of the anti-imperialist and anti-oppression movement (Speech 8).

Before that, the President had occasionally referred to the 'United States' – third nodal point, in his speeches. As a candidate, he explained in 1998 having "no interest in damaging relations with the United States, nor with any country in the world, but rather to improve and consolidate them" (Speech 2). In 2000, he reaffirmed his friendship and fraternity to the U.S., yet recognizing not appreciating Washington's foreign and economic policies[2] (Speech 3). While in 2001 and 2002, Chavez repeated his solidarity and sadness to the American people after 9/11 (Speeches 3 and 4), he also began to make a distinction between American citizens and the American government (Speech 5). In 2004, he connected his neoliberal critic to the North, and by doing so, connected it to the U.S. (Speech 7). Yet, this tie was not mentioned until 2006, when he verbally attacked the U.S. and denounced the failure of its economic system and political actions (Speech 8). That day, United States was –in a pejorative way- the word the most pronounce by the Venezuelan President. From that moment on, Chavez constantly linked his accusation of neoliberalism, capitalism and postcolonialism to Washington, but, at the same time, always made a point in distinguishing the "brave" American people from their diabolic president and administration (Speeches 8, 9 and 10).

Finally the military nodal points 'war' and 'terrorism' have brought an interesting perspective to this analysis. Indeed, if throughout time Chavez's discourse has become more denunciative, his mention of war or military operations did not increased proportionally but rather stayed between 1 to 7 uses per speech after his first election. In 2002, months after the launching of the war in Afghanistan, the President still supported the United States blaming all responsibilities on the terrorists who had attacked New York and Washington on September 11 (Speeches 4 and 6). Nonetheless, 2006 marked once again a turn in Chavez's military perception of the United States, as he began denouncing the irresponsibility of Washington in Iraq and Afghanistan and the mass murder of thousands of civilians. In his words, the real terrorists were in fact the one who had been previously attacked and had reacted in the worst way a democratic nation could have: the United States.

[2] "North America, onwards! That is a civilization we want to keep as a brother forever, we do not have anything against the Americans. Do some economic and foreign policies chock us? This is another thing (…) as sure as the safest of the certitudes, no, we only have for that people sentiments of love, brotherhood and the hope of increasing that brotherhood" (Chávez, 2000). On translation.

According to the definition given in Chapter 1, Hugo Chavez's discourse ultimately shifted to Anti-Americanism as it directly attacked the United States' economic, political and military positions and actions. Yet, this anti-Americanism did not develop in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, as commonly thought, but rather a few years after the attacks. Used as an offensive or defensive mechanism, Chavez's anti-American ideology could have indeed been deeper-rooted, aiming at differentiating himself from Washington for his own promotion, or for his own protection.

3.2. Anti-Americanism as an offensive discourse mechanism: from the consolidation of his Bolivarian program to the denunciation of an attack on the Third World

Like Fidel Castro in the 1950s and 1960s, Hugo Chavez may have used an anti-imperialist then anti-American discourse to promote his Bolivarian program and spread his ideology. Chavez was elected in 1998 on the promise of a revolution. He believed that a complete reform of the political and economic system was necessary in order to reverse the country's misfortune and enter peacefully into a new century. Unsurprisingly, words linked to his ambitions such as 'revolution', 'project', 'democracy', 'social', 'corruption', 'poverty', but also 'Latin America', 'Bolivar' and 'unity' appeared to be employed with the most recurrence during his first years as a politician.

In 1994 already, Chavez dreamt of a century of hope and resurrection, a century based on "the Bolivarian dream, (…) and the Latin American dream" (Speech 1). Named after this first one, the "Bolivarian century" had for objective to release the country from its history of colonialism and oppression, and actively fight the new millennium's issues. As seen in Table 3, Chavez first based his discourse on national and regional concerns. Upon his election, he engaged himself into a fight against Venezuela's two main demons: 'poverty' and 'corruption' (Speeches 2, 3 and 4). Tracing their origins to the Punto Fijo period, he believed that a 'revolutionary project' based on 'democracy', 'social' measures and 'unity' could overcome these issues and give his country a fresh start. The various social projects mentioned in speeches 2 and 3 affirmed this willingness of novelty. Accompanying the discourse, the "venerable figures" of Marti, Rodriguez and especially Bolivar –with 91 references in ten speeches- helped him support his social revolution and reach a broader audience (Reyes, 2010). Binding them to the present discourse, Chavez used a combination of each character's ideology to first, justify his national revolution, and second, justify his desire to spread his Bolivarian project beyond Venezuela's frontiers. Indeed, if Chavez did not officially promote his anti-imperialist ideas until 2004, his Bolivarian project spoke for itself. Like Simon Bolivar two hundred

years before him, Chavez believed in a 'united' and independent 'Latin America' (Speech 5). For Chavez, these two characteristics were intrinsically linked. Colonialism then neocolonialism had dominated and divided his region for centuries devastating most of Latin American's economy. Divided and impoverished, Latin American countries had no other choice than relying on other powers such as the United States or the European Union, perpetuating the circle of domination. Chavez thought therefore than cooperation and collaboration between Latin American countries could efficiently block this domination and assuage his 'social' aims (Speeches 2, 3, 4 and 5). Defending assiduously the ideology of the Non Aligned Movement, the idea of a Latin American organization promoting economic, social and cultural exchanges came to Chavez as the only solution to counter the hegemon and rise in a competitive world system (Speeches 2 and 3).

Table 3. Components of Chavez's Offensive Discourse Mechanism



	Bolivar	Democracy	Revolution	L.A.	Project	Social	Corruption	Unity	Poverty	Colonialism	Exploitation	Socialism	Hegemon	Merco/ ALBA	North/ South
Before 9/11	38	31	32	30	24	22	10	7	8	1	1	0	0	2	1
2001-2004	26	19	15	6	12	4	2	8	15	0	1	0	0	0	4
After 2004	27	12	5	17	5	6	1	6	7	5	6	9	13	31	47

Source: own elaboration based on data from Hugo Chavez's speeches selection (T1)

While recording an average of 50 percent decrease in usage after the attacks, the majority of these terms remained very important to Hugo Chavez's discourse until 2004. That year, changes in Chavez's politic slowly appeared, concretizing itself by the launching of a "XXIst socialist century" in 2006. These changes were naturally reflected by a restructuration of his discourse. 'Project', 'revolution' and 'social' for example, were altogether mentioned 88 times during the '1994-2001' period, 31 times between 2001 and 2004, but only 11 times between 2004 and 2009. Indeed, the old 'revolutionary' and 'social project' evolved under the broader idea of 'socialism'. The term 'corruption' also tended to disappear following Chavez's investment in anti-corruption programs, while 'Latin America', 'Bolivar' 'unity' and 'democracy' continued to appear regularly in his discourse.

In fact, as soon as 2004, Chavez began to redirect his concerns on the regional and international scene. As presented by Table 3, his discourse shifted into the promotion of regional organizations such as 'ALBA' and 'Mercosur' and the defense of the Third World. Far from distancing himself from his Bolivarian Revolution, Chavez perceived here the occasion of expanding his movement, justify his social aims and put an end to a hegemonic system. Indeed, his discourse evolved from a shy denunciation of 'exploitation' and 'poverty' to a full attack against 'colonialism' -understood here as postcolonialism or neocolonialism-, imperialism, 'hegemony', and the 'North/South' cleavage.

Unexpectedly, finding speeches dealing with colonialism has been more difficult than envisioned. Indeed, launching a Bolivarian revolution and referring in every allocution to his main source of inspiration Simon Bolivar - anti-colonialist by excellence and father of the Gran Colombia-, one could assume 'colonialism' to be part of Chavez's discourse from the very beginning. Yet, and once again, most references were only found after 2004. Before being elected, Chavez was himself very involved in the postcolonial movement, affirming in 1994 his desire for Venezuela to stop "being a colonial economy" and a land of "raw material" exploitation for the North (Speech 1). But from 1994 to 2004, and even if taking part in the Non Aligned Movement, no word was pronounced on the subject. The issue of colonialism only started to reappear in Chavez's discourse after the 2004 G-15 Summit, which coincided with the commemoration of the Ayacucho Battle that ended the 300 year-long Spanish colonial hold on the region. From that moment on, Chavez referred to colonialism in two ways: first as an anti-colonialist when mentioning Spain, France and England; second as a postcolonialist when denouncing Washington's hegemon on his region and on the South in general.

As a matter of fact, Chavez's discourse shows a clear dichotomy between his use of 'South' that he links to the Third World, and 'North' that he systematically associates with colonialism, neoliberalism and imperialism. Mentioned only once before 9/11 and four times between 2001 and 2004, 'North' and 'South' became after that prominent in his speeches with forty-seven recurrences in only five years. Besides his denunciation of a failed and savage economic and politic system, Chavez saw there

the opportunity to use this dichotomy to bring the 'South' together, 'unite' it, and prove that if "the North exists", "the South also exists" (Speech 7).

Yet for Chavez, that same South was threatened by an open disrespect and abuse of democracy by the North. If slowly declining, Table 3 shows indeed the constant interest given by the Venezuelan President to democratic issues. In 2001, he already reflected on the importance of legitimacy and international laws (Speech 5). Without accusing anyone, he felt the obligation to remind his international audience of the fundamental role played by the United Nations in conflicting situations and the necessity for any country to get an approval from the organization before starting any military operation. As previously explained, the United States decided to overpass these rules and invaded within two years Afghanistan and Iraq, causing thousands of civilian casualties. These military abuses did not stop after the bombings of Beirut and invasions in the Middle East but continued with the threatening of Iran and Venezuela, wars in Lebanon and Palestine and preventive wars in Latin America (Speeches 6 and 8). For Chavez, the lack of sanctions given to the United States for their unethical actions paved the way for an international disobedience of international rules and the possibility for other countries to follow its footsteps. More, it granted the United States the ultimate status of world decider, allowing Washington to act whenever they wanted, wherever they wanted, and act in any way they wanted. Silent until then, Chavez ultimately erupted at the UN General Assembly of 2006 (Speech 7). Publicly vilifying Georges W. Bush for the actions of his government, he denounced the immorality of a war undertaken under false justifications with the sole aim of reassuring their hegemony and control. That "just war" or war on democracy had since 1954 already attempted to overthrow 50 governments and was not ready to stop the cadence. Like Chomsky, Chavez believed that this new Middle East threat was a new orchestrated paranoia coming from the United States to legitimize the replacement of democratically elected governments. To them, the only efficient solution to stop terrorism or any threat of terror was to stop participating in it and contributing to its expansion (Chomsky, 2003). To Chavez, the United States had once again failed to understand and apply the principle of social justice, so dear to his Bolivarian Revolution.

If shy during most of his first mandate, it is really between 2004 and 2006 that Chavez took his Bolivarian Revolution to the international stage, and began both the promotion of his socialist program and the denunciation of abuses committed by the North - and in particular by the United States - against the South. Yet, if the implementation of his "21st century socialism" corresponds to the shifting period of Chavez's discourse, the analysis of speeches also highlighted his radicalization following other external factors directly related to the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship.

3.3. Anti-Americanism as a defensive discourse mechanism: from soft prevention to direct military interventions

As previously discussed, Caracas's relationship with Washington has always been more or less challenging. Since the Cold War, Washington has feared the advance of communism, populism, socialism and even the Left in Latin America. According to them, these four were irremediably intertwined and represented a threat to the U.S. hegemony and security. Hugo Chavez's leftist then publicly socialist agenda was therefore a threat for the Bush and Obama' administrations who regarded the President's national objectives but also his new ties to Iran, Russia and China, as steps toward its alignment to an "axis of evil". As mentioned earlier, Chavez represented an important figure of the "Bad Left", and could direct his Pink Tide into a direction the U.S. would have to fight.

Chavez himself knew from the beginning that his candidacy and presidency would be challenging. In 1998, he already explained that in the North -that is, in the U.S.-, the two expressions of "virus Chavez" and "effect Chavez" were very common (Speech 2). According to him, these aimed at discrediting both his campaign and program, and link him to the many problems Venezuela was facing at the time. The anti-Chavez propaganda was later carried by the American ambassador Otto Reich, who described Chavez as solely interested in "creating problems for America", because he was "at least as dangerous as Bin Laden" and was "preparing (an) attack (…) bigger than 9/11" (Schoen, 2009).

Hugo Chavez's also faced numerous bans and boycott problems throughout his mandates. In his 1998 and 2006 speeches, he explained how difficult it was for Venezuelans to obtain a permission to visit the United-States. The candidate of 1998 could not himself travel to the U.S. and meet American politicians (Speech 2). Back then, he deplored the lack of cooperation of Washington and explained how difficult it could be to collaborate if bans such as these were constantly applied. In 2006, when invited to the United Nations, his own Venezuelan medical staff and chief of security were retained in his plane and could not access the building (Speech 8). The same year, Washington had backed a boycott of Congressional elections to impede Chavez in his re-election and delegitimize the character (Petras, 2015). Before that, the U.S. had already applied military sanctions, and persuaded Israel, Brazil, and Spain to stop providing maintenance services and technology for Chavez's aircraft and decreased their military cooperation with Venezuela. On May 15, 2006, Washington publicly announced a ban on arms sales and military equipment to Venezuela (Corrales, 2015).

Likewise, threats accompanied Chavez in his early years of presidency. Yet, these increased dramatically by 2005. As reported by the Venezuelan journalist Eva Golinger, a "new strategy (…) one

more hostile, public and aggressive (had) increased the notion of U.S. meddling in Venezuela from mere 'intervention' to 'war'" (Golinger, 2008). In October of the same year, the Institute for Strategic Studies of the U.S. Army released a Doctrine for Asymmetric War against Venezuela, while the Defense department reported the country as being a "growing threat" (Golinger, 2007). A few months later, a Latin American history teacher in Pomona College and his students were interrogated and asked about their link and appreciation of the Venezuelan government. More than attacking Chavez's administration, Washington was by 2006, ready to persecute anyone who would openly support the "terrorist threat" Hugo Chavez (Golinger, 2008).

Despite these propagandas, threats, boycotts and bans, Hugo Chavez's discourse only really evolved starting from 2006. In his U.N. allocution, the amount of times the Venezuelan President referred to the 'United States' reached a whopping twenty-four. But this time, Chavez was not supporting nor promoting the U.S. but rather attacking them on current and past issues. 'Imperialism' was also invoked many times (Speech 8). In fact, the eighteen times it was mentioned, imperialism was coupled with the North American ambition, and served to accuse Washington's military and political hypocrisy.

Hypocrisy, because of its history of implication in numerous military coups across the region. After Argentina, Chile or Nicaragua, Venezuela faced itself the consequences of promoting a different system. On April 11, 2002, and after three days of strike, the Venezuelan armed forces joined the opposition and rebelled against Chavez's government (Myers, 2006). That joint force of "corrupt labor leaders, corporate interests, media moguls, and high military command" managed to force their president out of power for more than forty-eight hours (Golinger, 2008). With the support of the Bush administration, Pedro Carmona, president of the Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, was named to succeed and reverse the "violent" and "unstable" condition of the country[3]. Only two nations, the United States and Spain, recognized the change of succession and refused to admit that a military coup had occurred (Golinger, 2008). In his 2002 speech, Chavez accused the Venezuelan elite for a "fascist coup d'état directed at a legitimate government, (…) a brief dictatorship that brought terror in the streets, in cities, in villages" (Speech 4). In 2004, while investigation were still ongoing on its origins, Chavez continued to denounce the illegitimacy of the coup, mentioning it more than ten times during his G15 Summit, but still refraining to associate it to anything other than the Venezuelan media and elite (Speech 7). Yet, information over a U.S. participation started to emerge by the end of 2004. That year, two CIA documents came to light showing that 1) Washington knew a coup was about to happen at least a week prior the attack and did nothing to prevent it nor

[3] "U.S. State Department officials in Caracas (…) met several times with Pedro Carmona and other coup leaders before, during and after the event of April 11" (Golinger, 2007).

inform the Venezuelan government[4], 2) Washington knew unarmed civilians would be sacrificed in order to accuse government supporters, 3) the U.S. military was directly involved in the preparation of the coup, and 4) millions had been spent by the U.S. government over the previous month to conduct the coup. Both news of a CIA-backed coup and a U.S. military involvement on the Colombian-Venezuelan border encouraged Chavez to change his discourse and vision of the United-States. Taking advantage of the presence of most international leaders during the 2006 U.N. Assembly, Hugo Chavez unilaterally condemned the U.S. government that had "planned, financed, and promoted a coup d'état in Venezuela and (…) continued to support coup movements in Venezuela and against Venezuela, continued to support terrorism" (Speech 8). This first official condemnation opened the debate on previous American implications regarding Venezuela's affairs. Completing his attack, Chavez accused Washington for protecting the Venezuelan terrorists responsible for the attack of the Cubana Aviacion aircraft in October 1976 (Speeches 6 and 8). Amongst them, the figure of Luis Posada Carriles became very important in Chavez's discourse (Speeches 8, 9 and 10). Indeed he represented the cynicism of the American government who, despite his impressive record welcomed the Venezuelan terrorist and gave him the status of refugee[5] (Golinger, 2008). For Chavez the United States clearly supported, promoted and protected terrorism abroad and therefore in Venezuela.

More information emerged over the years. In 2009, when mentioning a coup d'état, Chavez also referred to 1) the 2003 U.S. attempt to overthrow him by lockouts aimed to shut down Venezuela's oil industry 2) the 2004 organization of a referendum by the NED and U.S. army, and 3) the 2009 coup organized against his ally, President Zelaya of Honduras (Speech 9) (Petras, 2015).

Honduras had received aid from Washington since the mid-1980s and had been on a path of neoliberal economic reform since the 1990s. The country had for a long time been an ally of the United States up until the election of Zelaya who yet campaigned under the conservative flag (Gray, 2013). A few weeks into presidency, he denied safe haven to Luis Posada Carriles, interfering for the first time with Washington plans. In 2007, Zelaya officially undertook a rapprochement with the Latin American Left visiting Fidel Castro in Cuba and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. A few months later, Honduras joined PetroCaribe and ALBA, two organizations fighting the American hegemonic FTAA treaty (Mirza, 2010). Zelaya's move to the Left was nationally and internationally criticized and resulted on June 28, 2009, to the conduct of a military coup to reverse his government and force him into exile. In his 2009 ALBA speech, Chavez strongly condemned the attack he attributed to the CIA

[4] More information at: "CIA Documents Show Bush Knew of 2002 Coup in Venezuela" : www.democracy.org/2004/11/29/cia_documents_show_bush_knew_of

[5] Luis Posada Carriles was responsible for more than a hundred bombing attempts as well as the attack of the Cubana Aviacion aircraft (Golinger, 2008).

and the American government. According to him, the invasion of Honduras was a result a Zelaya's signing ALBA and his rapprochement to Venezuela. Once again, the American government had tried to attack the Venezuelan President, this time reaching him via the assault of a "comrade".

Chavez's discourse was therefore only outwardly impacted by the events of 9/11 and the launching of the War as no clear shift was recorded around the year 2001-2003. The gradual emphasis made by the Venezuelan President to promote a socialist program and fight injustice worldwide coincided with a change in action as well as in discourse. Yet, America's direct military interventions against his allies and himself could probably have been one of the biggest justifications for Hugo Chavez's suddenly sharp anti-American ideology. Indeed, even under the pressure of diverse threats, bans and boycotts, Chavez never replied nor blamed the United States government and army. The discovery between 2004 and 2006, of a CIA and U.S. army implication in more dramatic events ultimately shifted Hugo Chavez's vision of the United States. The complex combination of these elements may have paved the way for his famous anti-American rhetoric.

CONCLUSION

Hugo Chavez Frías' virulent discourse has until his death fed the appetite of media, politicians and academics. Mostly known for his denunciation of the Bush administration, the neoliberal system, and more generally the United States' foreign policy, many have considered his discourse anti-American rather than simply anti-imperialist. Yet, for a large majority of them, this anti-Americanism was not solely the fruit of an own radicalization, but the consequence of external factors. For years, 9/11 and the War on Terror were believed to have been the triggering elements of Chavez's shift in ideology. That popular thinking was however challenged in the last decade by academics who passionately debated on the origins of Chavez's anti-Americanism some advocating a definite shift, others defending the linearity of his discourse. This thesis aimed to solve this discussion.

The theoretical framework identified the three main concepts surrounding Chavez and was followed by an historical reflection on the relationship between neocolonialism, imperialism, and Americanism in the Latin American Left. For over 70 years, the Left had consistently rejected any imposed form of power and fought hegemonic states disregarding of their use of coercion. Postcolonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism were thus largely applied, and integrated in the leftist tradition of the Latin American region. Yet, if postcolonialism and anti-imperialism stayed constant in the movement's ideology, anti-Americanism was used sporadically, a same country being able to collaborate and cooperate financially with the United States a day, and express anti-American sentiments the following one. Both influenced and influencer of that Latin American Left, Hugo Chavez Frías carried on with this ideology.

The Political Discourse Analysis first emphasized a clear transition in Hugo Chavez's discourse supporting pro-shift theories. A variation in language was indeed recorded, yet not directly in the aftermath of September 11 as it had been reported, but rather around the years 2004-2006. In fact, if September 11 was considered a turning point in the American-Venezuelan relationship, it became clear throughout the analysis that the attack of 9/11 and the launching of the War on Terror were not responsible for a sudden shift but mostly acted as catalysts for a change of discourse. Going against his social and pacific views, the violation of UN decrees and absence of sanction from the international community definitely triggered Chavez's aggressiveness, as he could see in these new invasions the continuation of a modernized Monroe Doctrine and a rupture with his social justice ideal. The reception and response to the attacks weakened therefore the already unstable link connecting a 'socialist' and 'neoliberal' state, and set up the basis for an escalation in conflict.

However, the development of his Bolivarian Revolution and the avoidance of any direct confrontation with the United States were dearest to Chavez who, until 2006, remained mostly silent. But if keeping a cordial relationship with the U.S. was at that time wiser than challenging its hegemon and risk Venezuela's new projects, Chavez quietly resented its economic, politic and military actions. Elected for his leftist engagement, Chavez had since the beginning defended his socialist and anti-imperialist ideas nationally as well as in the region. Fearing a new wave of communism in Latin America, Washington began by the end of the century an active surveillance of Venezuela. Following 9/11 and the famous "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists", the Bush administration added Hugo Chavez -alongside Saddam Hussein, Bin Laden and Fidel Castro- to the list of 'threats to America'. The later 2002 coup d'état financed by the CIA, was perceived by Washington as the only way to stop the increasing socialist menace in the region. Yet, and following the failure of the coup, Chavez hardened his social positions. This response ultimately led Washington to intensify its intervention in the country between 2003 and 2004. Still unaware of the weight of Washington's implication in Venezuela's instability, Chavez refrained to comment but instead responded with the creation of ALBA by the end of 2004 and the launching of his 21st century socialism. The discovery of the CIA documents after 2004 crystallized these tensions and led Chavez to publicly unleash the criticisms he had for years kept silent. Attacking first the neoliberal system promoted by Washington, Chavez openly denounced by 2006 the unethical yet insatiable American appetite for domination, using the latest warfare in the Middle East as the primary example of Washington's imperialist agenda. The defenders of a shift could therefore analyze Chavez's transition to anti-Americanism as the consequence of a five year escalation tension between Venezuela and the United States around the application and rejection of socialism, but also as a direct reaction to Washington's various political and military interventions.

Nonetheless, the Political Discourse Analysis also highlighted Chavez's early devotion and values, giving pro-linear scholars a point to defend. According to them, Chavez's anti-Americanism had in reality been present since the very beginning and represented a legacy inherited from the Left. This tendency needed thus to be understood in an essentialist way rather than a conjectural one. Chavez had since his 1994 Habana speech introduced his ideology and defended the principles of sovereignty as well as economic and political dependency. Postcolonialist by essence, he was, even before his election, diametrically opposed to the expansion of U.S. neoliberalism, and virulently criticized the exploitation of the South by the North. Over the years, Chavez maintained his positions, repeatedly expressing his discontent over the global financial system. 2006 marked a variation in his discourse as the year corresponded to the concretization and implementation of his socialist revolution. As previously presented, socialism had been used in the past to counter hegemony in

Latin America. The Cuban Revolution had indeed shifted the Latin American Left's ideology from Marxism to socialism, Fidel Castro believing socialism to be the key against imperialism and a powerful weapon against America's domination. Like Castro, Chavez could have thus waited until the concretization of his socialist project to liberate his parole, and, more than defend his postcolonial opinion, unleash his anti-imperialist and anti-American convictions. Chavez had previously moved from an unstable war of movement to a safer war of position. Using the same strategy to spread his ideology, he could have therefore awaited for the creation of a support base to justify his rejection and offer a strong alternative. While still present in Chavez's discourse, anti-Americanism could have thus been minimized for a while before being publicly revealed.

Both pro-linear and pro-shift views can thus be applied to this thesis, a combination of the two seeming to be the best answer to Chavez's anti-Americanism. His discourse was indeed deeply influenced by the Latin American Left's heritage, and always contained elements leaning to a contestation of the U.S. hegemony. Furthermore, external factors directly related to Washington's actions in Venezuela or in other democratic states also influenced his discourse as well as his political actions. In the end, socialism, by its clout and usage, appears here to be the key linking Chavez's anti-Americanism to his offensive and defensive discourse. Present at every stage of this analysis and common to the linear and shift views, socialism was in fact the only definite condition for the development and application of Hugo Chavez Frías' anti-Americanism.

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ANNEX

All Hugo Chavez's speeches were retrieved from the website 'Todo Chavez en la Web', between May 2nd and May 11th, 2018, at: http://todochavez.gob.ve/.

In the thesis, they appear under the name 'Chavez' followed by the year of their delivery, or under the name 'Speech' followed by their chronological number (mentioned in Table 1).

1994, December 14. Discurso en Aula Magna Universidad de La Habana.

1998, August 18. Conferencia del candidate presidencial Hugo Chavez Frias.

2000, August 1. Conferencia del candidate presidencial Hugo Chavez Frias.

2001, September 12. Discurso del Comandente Presidente de la Republica, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias. La Revolucion Democratica en Venezuela y la Integracion Suramericana.

2001, November 10. Discurso ante las Naciones Unidas.

2002, September 13. Intervencion del Comandante Presidente Hugo Chavez en la 57° Asamblea de la ONU.

2004, March 1. Discurso del Presidente Hugo Chavez, opening of XII of G-15 Summit.

2006, September 20. Discurso del Presidente de la republica.

2009, December 14. Intervencion del Comandante Presidente Hugo Chavez en el acto de clausura de la VIII Cumbre de la Alianza Bolivarian de los Pueblos de Nuestra America.

2009, December 16. Intervencion del Comandante Presidente Hugo Chavez durante XV Conferencia Internacional de la Organización de Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climatico.