

The Importance of Seeing:
Assessing the Public Perception of Petty Corruption in Mérida,
Mexico

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*“The phenomenon of corruption is as polymorphic as are the attempts to stamp it out”
(Von Alemann, 2004: 28)*

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Introduction

“The phenomenon of corruption is as polymorphic as are the attempts to stamp it out”, is a quote written by Von Alemann (2004: 28). This quote shows the problem of corruption. Corruption is a concept which has many layers and is present in every country on this planet. For many scholars, it has become a task to identify, define and combat corruption. However, even though many attempts have been made to identify and fight it, it is still a problem which maintains control in many countries and institutions. The question then follows why the identification and the extensive solutions to the problem have not yet been sufficient. One part of the responsibility lies with governments and other institutions to prevent corruption. Another part of the responsibility can be directed towards the citizens as they are the ones who encounter corruption more often. However, they do not maintain a single definition of corruption. This thesis will show that in order to combat corruption more efficiently, government, institutions and citizens need to apply the same definition and understanding of corruption. There has been extensive writing on what the government and institutions use as a definition, but limited literature has addressed the perception of citizens of the definition of corruption. In order to understand how corruption is perceived as opposed to the internationally used definition, this thesis will focus on ‘petty corruption’, the form of corruption that is most encountered by citizens and should, therefore, be best understood. Another reason to address petty corruption specifically is the lack of information. While it is the form closest to the citizens, it is also one of the least discussed subjects in the academic field of corruption.

This thesis aims to aid in the understanding and fighting of corruption. In order for corruption to be fought, a thorough understanding of the subject is necessary. While there is a significant amount of literature available on subjects such as political and institutional corruption, petty corruption remains a field relatively unexplored. Organisations such as Transparency International aim to raise awareness for and to prevent corruption. The awareness campaigns are often held within governments, but also at businesses and schools. The goal is to create awareness for everyone from high governmental official to the ‘average’ citizen. As there is a lot of information available regarding political and institutional corruption, access to said information and raising awareness to these fields becomes easier. However, citizens encounter a large variety of corruption, and this field remains relatively unexplored. In order to combat the many versions of corruption, a sufficient amount of information should be available for all the categories of corruption. Thus, the field closest to the citizens, petty corruption, should be further explored as it would increase the awareness of citizens themselves, instead of creating an understanding of corruption that can only be found at an institutional and governmental level, which many citizens are unlikely to encounter. Another issue regarding the understanding of corruption for the citizens is the use of a large variety of definitions in order to create measurability. As will be explained in the first chapter, Transparency International is one of the leading organisations in raising awareness on corruption and the definition used by this organisation is one that is reflected on by a variety of academic resources. Research into the citizens’ current perception and understanding will show gaps in where information is lacking and where more attention and awareness is needed. In order to compare the definition of petty corruption as provided by Transparency International and the perception of citizens, elements of corruption are used as they are provided by Von Alemann. Rather than defining corruption, he presents several elements which he deems essential to create a corrupt situation. These elements can be found in both the definition of Transparency International and of the perception, thus allowing a

comparison to be made. The citizens' understanding of this concept is furthermore of importance, because it shows which area needs more focus on international level in the fight against corruption, what areas need to be improved and, finally, why corruption is not rapidly decreasing. This thesis aims to increase the information where it is currently lacking, to create awareness of the importance of citizen perception and participation, and to start bridging the gap between international organisations and the citizens.

This research will mainly focus on addressing the question: “to what extent and in what aspects does the perception of petty corruption from students in Mérida, Mexico vary from the definitions as used by Transparency International and Von Alemann?”

This research has been conducted among students between the age of 18 to 30 currently living in Mérida, Yucatán in Mexico. This decision has been made for three main reasons. First of all, it is essential to have an open and trusted social context in which to address the subject of corruption. Students have a similar age to my own. This will allow for easier conversations and for a more open debate. This is important, because discussing corruption is a complicated process. Due to the fear of consequences it is unlikely that people will discuss this easily. Thus, before doing so it is essential that a level of trust between the respondents and myself has been established. An open and trusted social context is also the reason this research is done in the city Mérida. I have previously visited Mérida and then stayed with a local family. They have allowed me to do so again during the research for this thesis. This allowed me access to the local culture and a target group which would have otherwise required an extended period of time. Safety is a second reason for the choice of Mérida. Within Mexico Yucatan, and in particular Mérida, is seen as a relatively safe city with low levels of criminality and consider themselves to be one of the leading cities in the fighting of corruption, as several state institutions are located in this city and working from here. Lastly, the hypothesis is that students will show a more diverse understanding of petty corruption than the institutional definitions used and that they will portray a more tolerant discourse. This will be due to the fact that petty corruption is something that is entwined with many actions in their daily routine and might thus have resulted in a more accepted understanding as opposed to a country that is not faced with such corruption every day.

In order to conduct this research, several methods have been used. First of all, there has been extensive literary research, especially focussed on the understanding of corruption and what influence perception has had on defining it. Secondly, field research has been conducted for two months, end of November 2017 to the end of January 2018. While doing field research, I was allowed to stay with a local host family which allowed me to use participant observation as part of my research. The field research was largely done through a survey. In Merida, I created and adapted the survey to fit the local culture and to allow safety and anonymity. When the survey was finished it was first translated from Spanish to English by a third party and was finally translated back to Spanish by another person to see if the questions had the same scope and did leave minimal space for debate and interpretation (Bernard, 2002: 262-263). Once the survey was finished it was shared via Google Forms, to facilitate the spreading. After being spread through social media and text messages, a total of 71 people responded to the survey. This data was processed and analysed using the program SPSS. The last method used were interviews. I had several conversations with the local family, of which one has been recorded. Further, I conducted three interviews with local experts, working for INAIP (*Instituto Estatal de*

Transparencia, Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales) and INECCO (*Instituto Estatal para el Combate de la Corrupción*).

This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter will address the concept of corruption and will expand on the difficulties in defining it. Then, it will address corruption as discussed in Latin American literature and will eventually compare two definitions in order to provide an answer to what this thesis will use as a working definition. Once a working definition has been established, an analysis will be made into objective measuring, hard data and statistics versus subjective measuring, such as the use of perception and why the use of perception is relevant in measuring corruption. The second chapter will focus on Mexico and provide an in-depth understanding of, on the one hand, the intertwining of corruption with all levels of Mexican society, and, on the other hand, will focus on the creation of distrust between the government and its citizens. The in-depth understanding will be portrayed by an analysis of several corruption scandals, the government response and the results it has had. The final part of this chapter will address a question emerging from the previous parts: is corruption an integral part of Mexican society, a ‘culture of corruption’, or is it not? The final chapter will provide the analysis of the case study and a comparison between the two definitions from the first chapter and the results of the research. The last section of this thesis will provide a general summary and conclusion in which an answer will be provided whether there is a difference between the working definitions and the perception of the citizens. It will, finally, look at possible consequences the results might have on effectively combatting corruption and on the ongoing academic debate.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Approaches to Assessing Corruption: Objective versus Subjective Measuring

Corruption is a concept most people have heard of before. Often, there are news articles discussing corruption-scandals. But what is corruption? This chapter will address the current discussion surrounding corruption. The current available literature surrounding corruption is very extensive. Therefore, in this chapter, only the part of the academic debate necessary for this thesis will be addressed. First of all, this chapter will address the ambiguity and the difficulties of defining corruption, while simultaneously providing a working definition to form a foundation for this research. Secondly, this chapter will address the issue surrounding measuring. Corruption is a complex phenomenon which does not only have obstacles when defining it, but the process of measuring corruption is even more intricate. Finally, this chapter will look at the perception of corruption as the method for measuring corruption.

1.1 A Black Hole Called Corruption

The use of the concept of ‘corruption’ is widespread and as multi-layered as there are societies and systems (Von Alemann, 2004: 27-28). Corruption scandals are often mentioned by news and social networks, but what ‘corruption’ implies is rarely explained. A list of actions considered corrupt is extensive and can range from *mordida* (bribes) to electoral fraud to clientelism (Morris, 1999; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002). However, even corrupt actions can extend to several ends of the spectrum and merely providing a list of corrupt actions will not explain why they are considered corrupt. Yet, it is important to have a working definition of corruption, because it sets boundaries and makes corruption measurable, and able to investigate. Once an ambiguous concept becomes measurable it also becomes possible to research it and its impact.

The earliest definition of corruption was used by Machiavelli. This concept of corruption has been addressed since Aristotle and describes corruption “as a decline (Latin: *corrumpere*) of the virtues (Italian: *virtù*) of a state or a ruler” (Von Alemann, 2004: 26). This definition implies a strong historical focus and is still used. In order to increase the understanding of Machiavelli’s definition, it is important to take a closer look at the assumptions he made. The first assumption this definition makes is the idea of a ‘golden age’, a period in which it was customary to follow the norms and rules established. These virtues will eventually stop and disappear over time. Thus, corruption, in this case, is used to indicate this decline and to signal the end of a ruler or a society as existed before. However, it depends on how one perceives this. It can be seen as the end of one society or the beginning of another (Von Alemann, 2004: 27). Nonetheless, this initial definition of corruption that focusses on historical development does not necessarily focus on small acts and is seen as a sign, not as a negative concept.

The concept of corruption as currently in use is hard to define, as mentioned before, and depends on the view. Contrarily to the previous definition, corruption has become an act as opposed to a signal.

Von Alemann does provide a specific description of corruption. In his article, he identifies seven factors which are all required in order to create a corrupt situation. The first factor is the corrupter. The corrupter is someone who demands something he or she wants. This could be a large variety of things as long as it is, which is the second factor, a scarce resource. The third factor is the supplier. Depending on the definition a person uses, this could, for instance, be a public official. This person will receive, in exchange for the scarce resource a ‘concealed additional incentive’, the fourth element as mentioned by Von Alemann, on top of the regular price for the resource. The incentive often comes in the form of money but can also be given in other forms. By accepting this incentive, the supplier is violating established rules or publicly accepted norms, which is number five. The breaking of the norms and rules will negatively impact, which is factor number six, other parties involved or even the public, and finally number seven, involving secrecy, because of the effect it has on other parties and people (Von Alemann, 2004: 30). This situation is a specific description of corruption. Although it does not directly define the acts of corruption, it does describe essential components of a corrupt situation.

Another example of a working definition is provided by Lučić, Golubović and Džunić. They define corruption as follows: “[c]orruption is behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power or status” (Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, 2016: 102). The article discusses further the issues surrounding finding a working definition of corruption. They argue that the definition of corruption often stretches from ambiguous concepts such as ‘misuse of public power and moral decay’ to stricter definitions such as: “corruption as an act of bribery involving a public servant and a transfer of tangible resources” (ibid.: 101-102). These opposites show the extent of the ambiguity of corruption.

On the one hand, it can contain broad concepts, such as ‘misuse’ which do not explicitly define any boundaries and allow for several grey areas to exist, which in turn allows for extensive debate about said situations. On the other hand, more limited and often legal definitions do provide boundaries, but by doing so exclude several cases, which under other definitions might still be considered corrupt. The only thing that is shared by public opinion, according to Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, is that corruption influences society often negatively (ibid.: 102).

The discussion on corruption has not been merely an international or purely abstract discussion. It has been discussed related to specific cases, companies and areas. The discussion on defining corruption in the context shows that it is not merely a question of defining but also one of perspective. Thus, the argument on how to define corruption in Latin America is an important part to discuss. Generally, when discussing cases of corruption, writers do not clearly specify to what extent their definition goes, but instead aim to provide examples throughout the text to provide the reader with an idea. Examples of such cases can be found by Morris and Tromme & Otaola. Instead of providing a clear working definition of corruption Morris describes several situations of common forms of corruption in Mexico, such as *mordida*, which is a typical Spanish word to describe small bribes. Another example he provides is the embezzlement of money by government officials (Morris, 1999: 623). Tromme & Otaola, to provide another example, provides an understanding of their concept by addressing the history of political corruption (Tromme & Otaola, 2014: 559).

In other cases, such as Sarsfield, there is a use of a direct definition of corruption. Sarsfield does use the definition of “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain”, based on a definition created by Transparency International (TI) (Sarsfield, 2012: 216). Furthermore, he argues that there is a distinction between legal and illegal corruption. This is an interesting distinction as this suggests that not all corruption is illegal. Legal corruption is the understanding that something extra is required for the service provided by the official, without the official himself doing something outside the service he was already providing. Illegal corruption, on the other hand, is a form of corruption where the public official receives a payment for providing a service that was not his to provide (Sarsfield, 2012: 216). Another example of providing a working definition is provided by Blake and Morris (REF), which is similar to the one used by Sarsfield. It states that corruption is “the abuse of trust generally one involving public power, for private benefits, which often, but by no means always, comes in the form of money” (Blake and Morris, 2010: 2). These definitions are similar as they both argue that it involves the abuse of trust and often involves public power. The definition as used by Blake and Morris is more descriptive, whereas the definition of TI leaves more things open for interpretation. Writers often refer to a definition which was based on the definition created by Transparency International, even the current Mexican law (La Ley General del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, which will be further discussed in the next chapter) provides a similar definition of corruption with similar categories. The law states that corruption “*consiste en el abuso del poder para beneficio propio. Puede clasificarse en corrupción a gran escala, menor y política*” (translated: “consists of the abuse of power for personal Benefit. It can be classified as grand, petty and political corruption”) (Secretaría de la Función Pública). On an international level, this definition is also used. As this is a recurrent definition and one that appears to be most used it is also of importance to address the definition as provided by Transparency International. They define corruption as “the use of power granted to obtain private benefits” (Jain, Nundy & Abbasi, 2014: 1). In addition to the academic definitions of corruption organisations that also address corruption need a working definition.

TI provides one of those working definitions and, as shown above, their definition is most often used. As with many definitions that have been created, there are several issues with defining corruption in this way. An example of this would be that this definition uses broad concepts which are difficult to define (Von Alemann, 2004: 29) and as a result, this definition becomes ambiguous due to the fact that this definition can include anything. He playfully draws a parallel between finding a definition for corruption and the search for the Holy Grail. By doing so, he wants to stress the impossibility of defining corruption without excluding anything or making it too ambiguous (Von Alemann, 2004: 26).

TI also emphasises the complexity of corruption by identifying three forms of corruption: political, grand and petty corrupt. Political corruption is defined by the abuse of power to maintain power and wealth. This can be found by, for example, changing policies and manipulating institutions. Grand corruption and petty corruption are two opposites. Grand corruption is created through the action of high-level officials or government that will use their power to allow the benefit of the public good. Petty corruption is the most common form of corruption and is often found in the actions of low- and middle-level officials. It is found mainly in the health system, police forces and education systems (Transparency International, 2014). Since there has been extensively written about the grand and political corruption, this study will focus on the latter: petty corruption. Transparency International defines petty corruption as: “Everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions

with ordinary citizens who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies” (Transparency International, 2018a). Considering that Von Alemann provides the most elaborated and structured definition Figure 1 shows a comparison with his defining elements to the elements constituting the TI definition:

| Von Alemann’s elements of corruption | TI definition on Petty corruption |
|---|--|
| 1. The corrupter | “The ordinary citizen” |
| 2. The scarce resource | “entrusted power” |
| 3. The supplier | “public official” |
| 4. The concealed additional incentive | Left undefined |
| 5. Violating the established rules or publicly accepted norms | “access to basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies” |
| 6. The negative impact on society | Left undefined |
| 7. Secrecy | Left undefined |

Figure 1: The elements of corruption and the TI definition of Petty Corruption

As presented in Figure 1, the elements as presented by Von Alemann can also be found in the definition provided by TI. To start with the corrupter, often a person, but it does not have to be necessarily one person, who initiates the situation, which would, according to this definition be the ordinary citizen. The citizen is the person looking for something which is not obtainable through regular means: the scarce resource. The scarce resource, in this case, is the entrusted power of the public official during his job. Whether this resource is scarce is debatable, but in this case, is seen as something not obtainable through regular media and thus becomes scarce. The supplier is the public official in position. He or she is the only one able to provide the resource that is required by the ordinary citizen. Fourthly, the concealed additional incentive, while not specifically defined, is also perceived as an essential element to the concept of corruption. Furthermore, as the term already suggests, this incentive is already concealed and can come in different forms, shapes or sizes. Fifth, the term “abuse”, even though very broad, implies a violation of established rules and a misuse of the entrusted power. The sixth element is the negative impact. TI refers to this element by mentioning the gaining access to, what most would consider, basic goods or services in places such as health and education. Finally, secrecy, corruption often appears in secrecy to a certain degree. However, it is imaginable that petty corruption comes with a lower level of secrecy as this is an “every day” phenomenon. If it becomes a recurring issue, it becomes increasingly difficult to hide. This definition is used by Transparency and many others in the combatting of corruption.

The definition of petty corruption as provided by Transparency International is considered incomplete as it leaves three of the seven elements as undefined. These elements are considered essential to making corruption a negative offence. The first element undefined is the concealed additional incentive. As it is left open to interpretation within this definition it could either include everything or nothing at all. This could mean that either there is an incentive, such as a *mordida* or a favour, or no incentive at all. The second one left undefined is the negative impact on society. Von Alemann argues that a negative impact on society is one of the factors that make an action into a corrupt

act. However, if one accepts the broader definition of TI it would allow for the possibility that corruption may have positive effects on society. In general, the consequences of corruption are even debatable, but can have a negative impact. León et al. refer to multiple researches which have shown that corruption “increases uncertainty and risk, increases inequality, reduces production efficiency, discourages entrepreneurial activities, takes foreign direct investment away, reduces government revenues, and reduces investment in infrastructure” (León et al.: 978). Sarsfield agrees on this and says that it prevents foreign investments and can deepen poverty and inequality. Simultaneously, it can have a severe impact on national level. The presence of corruption can create distrust and as a result damage the legitimacy of governmental organisations and institutions (Sarsfield, 2012: 215). Von Alemann states that political scientists are still debating on whether corruption actually can be dangerous for the social aspects (Von Alemann, 2004: 25), while on the other hand, in the next chapter the case of corruption will be discussed which also shows sides of corruption that allow for stability (Morris, 1999). In general, and as portrayed in Figure 1, the access to basic goods and services or rather the lack thereof – and the consequential – implicit or explicit – denial of access for third parties could be seen as the negative impact. This could be the case when the access to the public goods and services is perceived as part of the established rules and publicly accepted norms. The final element is secrecy. There is no part of the TI-definition that refers to this as being an act done in secrecy. As mentioned before petty corruption is part of a daily occurrence thus secrecy can be considered difficult. The missing element of secrecy, in turn, influences whether this is also part of the publicly accepted norms.

1.2 Measuring Corruption: Objective Measuring

The following question arises: how is petty corruption investigated? Measuring corruption is a difficult task (Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, 2016: 103). Corruption is usually a crime (or considered unacceptable) and, therefore, people will not openly and voluntarily admit that they are part of corrupt practices, and the lack of knowledge prevents people from becoming aware of the fact that they could be involved in corrupt practices (Von Alemann, 2004: 31). Furthermore, people are often not aware of what they are doing or do believe that their reason for violating laws and norms is more important than the consequence it might have for others (Von Alemann, 2004: 30). The World Bank provides three different ways of measuring corruption. The first way to gather information regarding corrupt practices is to collect information from stakeholders. Secondly, the World Bank offers to monitor and control the use of funds for different financing projects and finally, they want to watch the institutional ‘characteristics’ of different countries. These characteristics show the habit of a countries economy and will ultimately show its flaws. (Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, 2016: 104). Rehman & Perry address measuring corruption within Latin America as possible in one of three ways: first, looking at measures designed by political risk consulting companies; second, addressing “perception”, and lastly, looking at the symptoms identified as signs of corruption which are identified by the government (Rehman & Perry, 2014: 176).

Another way of addressing corruption is using conversations on topics such as transparency and accountability. Because corruption is a difficult subject to openly discuss, it is possible to use related areas to discover more about corruption. Transparency and accountability are seen as measures to prevent corruption and thus, the lack of those might in turn indicate the presence of corrupt actions.

Accountability in regard to corruption is an important tool for the United Nations to use in the fight against corruption. Accountability is the idea that an organisation is responsible and must answer for its actions. Furthermore, as a part of the responsibility an organisation should be able to show which funds have gone where, to what purpose and provide proof of this (United Nations, 2010: 5). This is intrinsically linked to transparency. The concept of transparency is that an organisation, whether this is governmental or non-profit, should be able to show all their records when asked for them. This can be asked by a concerned citizen or an independent organisation (Horne, 2012).

Lučić, Golubović and Džunić argue that there are two primary sources of gathering information regarding sensitive subjects such as corruption: objective and subjective. Objective sources are sources which are not open to subjective assessments and are often based on a consistent methodology when collecting data and thus, this easily allows for comparability (Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, 2016: 104). Objective data is hard to find regarding subjects such as corruption, because objective data may corroborate illegal actions. These could be found in things such as procurement practices or budget procedures (León et al.: 978-9).

Due to the lack of objective indicators, subjective indicators are increasingly used. Subjective indicators are often based on more inconsequential factors such as perception or experience (Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, 2016: 104). On the one hand, subjective indicators are often more unreliable and are difficult to use similar methodology of every aspect (León et al.: 978). However, it does have the potential to provide a more detailed analysis of the situation. An example of this is given in the following quote provided by Von Alemann:

“A community that prosecutes and punishes cases of corruption might show statistically more of these cases than another community that passively accepts a general prevalence of corruption hardly ever prosecutes it. Therefore, any heightening of public attention to corruption and any intensification of persecution might increase the statistical number of cases, although empirically there may not be an increase in actual cases or even a decrease. (Von Alemann, 2004: 31).

This quote is essential for this thesis, because it shows the importance of focussing more on perception rather than merely on statistics. Once a country starts to prosecute cases of corruption, it might appear as if there is more corruption in said country. This is due to the fact that a corruption scandal is often extensively covered by the media. This exposes such a country to the risk of being labelled as extremely corrupt, while another country where corruption is not covered but yet more rampant might occur less corrupt. This will create different statistical levels versus what is happening. This is why a focus on perception from citizens is of importance because they do see what is not highlighted and what is focussed but in a different context.

1.3 Subjective Measuring: The Use of Perception

The most common way to measure corruption is by subjective measuring, and to be more specific by observing perception (McCann & Domínguez, 1998; Melgar, Rossi & Smith, 2010; Song

& Chang, 2012). The use of perception in studies on corruption has led to a better understanding of the phenomenon, such as that presented by von Alemann. He discusses three versions of perceived corruption initially presented by Arnold Heidenheimer: white, grey and black corruption. In an area with "white corruption" corruption is accepted, while an area with a perception of "black corruption" is perceived as intolerable and in violation of the law. Grey corruption is the intermediate area where corruption is often not tolerated but understanding of the concept is low. Therefore, people who are involved in the latter are often unaware that they are doing something unacceptable (Von Alemann, 2004: 31). Grey corruption is the most worrisome field when dealing with corruption, because many people are unaware that they are part of the academic definition of corruption.

There are multiple ways to measure perception of corruption, including surveys and interviews. A distinction can be made between expert surveys and the perception of the 'regular' citizen. A prominent example and used as a standard of corruption measurement is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), created in 1995 by Transparency International. This index gives countries a score between 0 (very corrupt) and 100 (not corrupt) depending on how citizens perceive their country and its public officials (Transparency International, 2017). There have been extensive debates on whether CPI is accurate and if the way it is measured is precise enough. One of the most used criticism directed towards the CPI is that it depends largely on "perceptions of foreign business executives and assessments from experts, perceptions that generally are based from outside the country in question" (Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2016: 216). Another criticism mentioned is that the Index mainly focusses on bribes, giving as well as taking. This is also a form of corruption and more easily observed (ibid.). However, corruption does not only equal bribes, but can include a larger field of actions as mentioned in the previous sections. Rehman & Perry also mention that the CPI needs at least three sources per country. As this is the minimal amount, countries whose corruption level is based on three sources might be less accurate than a country that is based to up to sixteen sources. More sources provide a more balanced average than three (Rehman & Perry, 2014: 178). While the CPI has been extensively criticized, it is currently the most used tool to indicate a country's perceived corruption level.

However, the collecting of data on perception of corruption on itself also provides several issues. First of all, there is the issue of misrepresentation. Respondents might be asked about forms of corruption or corrupt situations which they have never experienced personally before. Thus, lacking any understanding of said situations and providing an answer which might be a misrepresentation of the situation. A possible solution to this problem is finding respondents who have a higher risk of having encountered situations which are accessible to corruption. This might be, for example, because of the type of job that they do or a particular area they live in. Secondly, there is an issue which has been briefly touched upon in the previous sections: respondents will not easily and openly discuss their encounters with corrupt situations, because that would imply that they would be aware that they are participating in such situations. The final argument that Lučić, Golubović and Džunić make relies on the first argument, namely that the creation of a person's opinion depends on what information they have been given and how they have been raised. Thus, the perception of one person on one situation might be completely different from that of another person's solely based on their background (Lučić, Golubović and Džunić, 2016: 105).

These arguments are also discussed by Erlingsson & Kristinsson. In their article, they make a sharp distinction between the theory of '*unbiased learning*' and of '*perceptual bias*' (Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2016: 2017). The theory behind unbiased learning is that "experience is a relatively sound source of knowledge and people can, for the most part, be relied on to perceive things accurately given fairly basic conditions" (ibid.: 217). Contrarily, the perceptual bias theory is similar to the arguments made by Lučić, Golubović and Džunić. There has been research looking at the idea of perceptual bias that argues that perceptions do differ from objective indicators. Even respondents' reasoning might already approach information differently on prior encounters and personal motivation and thus be susceptible to 'attribution errors in detecting deception' (Erlingsson & Kristinsson, 2016: 218). Erlingsson & Kristinsson conclude that expert surveys are the most effective way to measure corruption and comparing across cities and countries. However, they do stress that the importance of direct encounters of corruption will give the best indications possible. This, unfortunately, is hard to achieve (218-9). Another issue with using perception as a basis for research is that in countries where the economy mostly relies on one single resource, such as oil production, there might be a feeling of ease when prices are high but might have an increase in worry and distrust once prices start to lower. Thus, also influencing the perception (Rehman & Perry, 2014: 178).

Even with the amount of critique on perception, it is still beneficial to use it as the basis of research into the extent of corruption. Not only because it is currently the most direct way to measure corruption, but also because it is part of a solution. As long as the government, for example, is perceived as corrupt and corruption is perceived to be the way to handle things, a circle will be created in which a citizen will become a participant. If corruption is perceived as normal by the citizens, they will also be tempted to use it (Sarsfield, 2012: 223). An example is the police in Latin America. "Police officers are the state made flesh" (Sarsfield, 2012: 223). This means that they are the most direct connection between citizens and their states, especially in larger countries such as Mexico. A change in this perception circle might lead to breaking through the corruption. Furthermore, a benefit of local perspective is that it might show trends in culture which might not be visible from an outside expert level as shown in a case study by Wilshusen (2008), in which he focusses on the micro-politics of the wood and timber industry in southwest Mexico.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the complexity of corruption. As portrayed in this chapter the concept of corruption can be considered similar to a black hole: it is definable, but it can cover any form or area in society. First, the aspect of defining corruption was discussed. Defining corruption can cause issues which can be equally ambiguous as it can be vague. However, in order to work with the concept of corruption and create a research surrounding a working definition is needed. This research will work with one of the multi-layered definitions provided by Transparency International. In this case, the one focussing on petty corruption, namely: "[e]veryday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies" (Transparency International, 2018a). The next challenge discussed was the measuring of corruption. There were two types of gathering information identified: objective and subjective. Since the first is extremely rare and very hard to obtain

this study will primarily use the second version and in this specific case focus on the perception of locals in Mexico.

Chapter 2: Combating Corruption in Mexico: A Façade?

As explained in the previous chapter, corruption is hard to define because it can be found in all forms and layers of society. Corruption is a popular phenomenon and all Latin American countries show alarming signs of corruption. This thesis will focus on Mexico. In popular sources, such as Freedom House, Mexico is described as a 'hollow state' with an unstable identity. In the media, corruption appears to be a concept often addressed in relation to Mexico and scores a 29/100 on the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2018b) This raises several questions: first of all, what types of corruption do occur in Mexico? And second, if corruption is as persistent in Mexico, has the government tried to diminish it? Or does the Mexican government facilitate the process of corruption? And finally, if corruption is such an important concept in the image of Mexico can we talk about a 'culture of corruption'?

Firstly, this chapter will address the evolution of corruption and petty corruption in Mexico, focussing on the 70 years governance of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and several corruption scandals which have strongly affected the concept of corruption in the public eye starting with the scandal involving former president Salinas and his brother during the 1980s. This will work as an example of a current case of petty corruption. Secondly, an oversight will be provided of the political response to corruption during this period. While, on the one hand, being involved in corruption scandals and, on the other hand, having the pressure of the international community and Mexico's citizens, the government had to implement changes to show progress in addressing this issue in Mexico. Thirdly, there is the concept of a 'culture of corruption'. Several authors have referred to this concept when talking about corruption in Mexico. We will address the question if it is justifiable to talk about a 'culture of corruption'.

2.1 The Evolution of Multi-layered Corruption in Mexico

Mexico has had three large political parties since Mexico regained its independence. Even though their names have changed over times, their governance has remained the same. The largest one, which was mentioned before and has governed Mexico for over 70 years is the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI; Institutional Revolutionary Party). The second one is the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN; National Action Party), and finally the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD; Democratic Revolution Party) (Juárez, 2015: 271-3). When researching the subject of corruption and especially the political involvement within Mexico, there is a small amount of literature available. Stephen D. Morris is one of the few authors who has written extensively on corruption in Mexico. There are several other authors, but the lack of sufficient information shows a gap in the academic literature. This is why the next section will contain a large section focussing on an article written by Morris.

Morris argues that corruption is an essential element to the functioning of the political system in Mexico (Morris, 1999: 623). He furthermore notes that the level of corruption has been equal to the political stability. This entails that there is some correlation between the amount of political corruption

and a stable government (ibid.: 626). Essential parts of ordinary life have become regulated by the implementation of bureaucratic systems. These bureaucratic systems often function without regulations or a supervising organisation. Once there is no supervising entity, it creates the opportunity for bureaucrats to increase prices or directly ask for an additional incentive secretly. The lack of supervision, as a result, not only creates an opportunity but also prevents citizens from becoming involved in corrupt situations (ibid., 626-627). A similar phenomenon occurs at a political level, where strong support is needed in order to maintain power and control. Corruption, in this case, is creating a system of rewards. As Morris explains: "Corruption itself has aided stability, on the one hand, by providing a tangible source of rewards for politicians and bureaucrats who abide by the informal rules of the game and by granting seemingly 'rigid' system a degree of individual-based flexibility in the implementation of policies that are increasingly made simply for 'public consumption'" (ibid.: 627).

On the other hand, it has become increasingly complicated to address these cases of political and grand corruption, due to secrecy which is preventing people from reporting. Even though people are willing to speak up, they are often silenced by those who are being threatened with exposure (ibid.: 627-8). Nonetheless, Morris states that during the 1990s the amount of complaints of corruption against public officials and politicians has significantly increased, despite the certain threat of being silenced (ibid: 628). He identifies four different reasons for this occurrence. First of all, he links it to the increase in the relation between corruption and the illegal drug market. Secondly, the increase in the drug market also relates to a sharp increase in organised crime. In order for criminal organisations to function, corruption is almost inevitable, and thus, this also has contributed to the increase. Thirdly, Morris also identifies an increase in business corruption between corporations and the government, with a particular focus on the privatisation of enterprises during the 1990s. Lastly, Morris mentions that corruption has spread from the bureaucratic level also to other parts of the government, such as electoral fraud (Morris, 1999, 629-630). This sudden growth in corruption, disturbing the balance present, also meant the destabilisation of the Mexican politics. The increasing presence of corruption meant a shift from a balance to an overpowering situation in which corruption became an enemy.

Morris identifies three issues in which this phenomenon had a vast effect. The first issue in the process of destabilisation was the lack of control from the PRI on its congress, and thus opening up to further scrutiny of the public and several organisations. This led to an increase in investigations into multiple corruption cases. Secondly, the lack of power of the PRI on its congress led, in turn, to an increase in institutional organisations which focussed on inspecting the government and its decisions. These turned out to be successful and thus increasing the risk of being associated with a corrupt situation. Those who were associated, began to be prosecuted for things that occurred in the past, but which were never investigated due to the balance of the government and the lack of opportunity. Finally, there are consequences for the ruling government party. After multiple consecutive terms the political party PRI arrived at a paradoxical and politically threatening situation, where it initially functioned because of the system based on corruption, but now had to create measures to dissolve this same system due to international and political pressure to diminish corruption. In order to maintain the legitimacy of a political party they were obliged to address the level of corruption, because it had become an important topic for their citizens (ibid.: 634 -637). Multiple surveys between the mid-1980s and the 1990s show that the corruption was considered a serious issue by the Mexican population. It also displays the distrust

between the citizens and their government by stating that the concept of government was strongly connected to the concept of corruption (ibid.: 625).

The PRI, itself, has often been accused of corruption and manipulating the media, which is why addressing corruption at the highest level of the state will provide a good example. One of the forms of corruption provided in the previous chapter is clientelism. In Mexico, clientelism is the most pronounced example of corruption in the government, especially under the PRI-government. Clientelism can be understood as “a pattern of social organisation in which access to social resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various kinds of support” (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 12).

An example of political clientelism can be found in the media sector, especially with radio and television. These companies are currently in the hands of private companies. However, they still provide support for the government. This can be seen in several Latin American countries, where after the introduction of neoliberalism a large variety of companies in this sector have been sold, but still show control to some extent by the government. During the 1950s the media sector in Mexico became privatised (Garza Pena & Szanto, 1996). The cooperation between state and private companies was not in all media sectors as visible as it was in others. For example, while owners of Mexican newspapers were assumed to have related to the ruling PRI, it was more evident for the television companies. Televisa, one of the larger private television companies in Mexico, was said to have more openly partnered with the ruling party (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 4-5). Another example of the strong connection between the government and the media branch is the “*Dirección General de Radio, Televisión y Cinematografía*” (translated: Office of General Radio, Television and Cinematography) (RTC). The RTC was created in 1977 as part of the Mexican Ministry of the Interior. Its main goal is to supervise the contents presented on radio, television and in theatres. It also controls the by law required broadcasting of official programs, such as La Hora Nacional (RTC). This means that even though the media may be in the hands of private-owned companies, the government is maintaining control on what is or is not allowed to be broadcasted (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 6). It is argued that one of the presidents in the PRI candidateship for presidency also used the media to manipulate the votes. During the 1988 elections, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the presidential candidate for the PRI, appeared to be losing the elections (Garcia, 1989). During his election campaign, he promised to provide more transparency (Morris, 1999: 625). After the elections, Salinas did win the elections by a small majority (Garcia, 1989). Several years after the elections and after the release of the memoirs of former president Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), who was Salinas predecessor, corruption was exposed, and it became apparent that the 1988 election was indeed fraudulently won (Thompson, 2004). After this corruption scandal surrounding the 1988 elections, the Federal Electoral Institute was created in order to guarantee fair voting and to oversee the elections committee. Nonetheless, it is argued that the committee was still under governmental influence. The members of IFE were chosen by the Chamber of Deputies, which was still part of the government (Freedom House, 2012). Hellman states that even with the creation of this committee, corruption increased by using mistakes and technicalities in order to declare elections in which the opposition had won invalid (Hellman, 1994: 126).

The electoral fraud in Mexico is an extensively covered area of corruption in the academic field, but other forms of corruption such as petty corruption have not been covered as substantially. Thus, providing examples of petty corruption in Mexico becomes difficult. Petty corruption, as previously discussed, can be found in the education, the health sector and amongst the police, but also among citizens. During an interview with one of the respondents of the survey several cases of petty corruption were described. She provided an example of petty corruption in the health system which frequently occurred, involving an *incapacitate médica* (medical disability). An *incapacidad médica* is a paper form which someone is required to get from their physician when a person is unable to work due to sickness or injury. A person has to present this form at work in order for one's sick-days to be approved. She explained that it would often happen that people would get these necessary papers, without actually being sick, in exchange for a favour or money (Anonymous 1, 2017). However, sources on this subject are not present and corrupt acts like the latter remain under the radar.

This section has provided a short oversight of the multiple layers of corruption in Mexico, while simultaneously providing an example of why corruption might aid in a stable government. Grand corruption is one of the most visible and most discussed forms of corruption in Mexico, especially focussing on electoral corruption. By using the media and the buying of votes the PRI maintained governance during a period of 70 years. When addressing corruption on a lower level, the level of sources decreases, and locals become the most reliable source.

2.2 The Political Response to Corruption

As shown in the previous section, corruption of the government can work in favour as well as against the government. On the one hand, the government has a complicated history of allegations and being involved in corrupt situations. This has resulted in distrust by the Mexican population against its government. The distrust, in turn, has led the government to pursue action in cases of corruption. The need for anti-corruption created a new platform for politicians to gain support as the citizens no longer tolerated corruption. Thus, many politicians started their anti-corruption campaigns, promising to reduce corruption, and even referring to corruption as the “cancer of Revolution” (Morris, 1999: 626). Especially, after the corruption scandal of the 1988 elections, presidents and candidates had to prove their anti-corruption stance, due to the increase of protests by citizens and organisations, local as well as international. The initial stages of Salinas presidency provided promising signs, regarding his anti-corruption campaign, when a significant amount arrests were made regarding corruption and drug trafficking offences (Garcia, 1989; Morris, 1999: 625-6). However, no other significant changes were made until his successor Ernesto Zedillo, also a PRI-member, was elected. In his *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo* (National Plan of Development) he asks for a ‘frontal attack’ against corruption (Morris, 1999: 626). His most significant reform was increasing the autonomy of the judicial system and changing the police system in order to facilitate the process of filing complaints against corrupt officials (ibid.: 626). Furthermore, Mexico became part of the international fight against corruption by signing several international anti-corruption conventions, such as the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC) and the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. These conventions made fighting corruption mandatory for the Mexican government (Nieto, 2017: 222).

Throughout his campaign, Vicente Fox, candidate of the PAN for presidency in 2000, focussed strongly on combatting the corruption which had been used by the PRI to maintain power for decades (Nieto, 2017: 222-3). He stated that he would address corruption issues in three specific areas: first of all, the institutions in Mexico. He believed that, in order to seriously address the problem of corruption, an increase was needed in the separation of the judicial, legislative and governmental areas. Secondly, he wanted to aim at accountability for crimes committed and the prosecution of people involved in corruption within any layer in order to break through the silence and circle of corruption. Thirdly, he asked for the creation of the *Comisión Nacional de Transparencia* (National Commission on Transparency) (Morris, 2001: 5-6). This led to the first defeat of the PRI in 2000 as Fox was elected the new Mexican president (Nieto, 2017: 222-3). This idea was continued after he was elected. He created the *Programa Nacional para la Transparencia* (National Program for Transparency) which would be controlled by the *Consejo Ciudadano para la Transparencia y el Combate a la Corrupción* (Citizen Committee for Transparency and the Fight against Corruption) (Morris, 2001: 7). The *Programa Nacional* was created and ultimately had a goal to prevent, control, and persecute corruption. Furthermore, its aim was to increase trust and involvement with its citizens (Morris, 2001: 20). Under his presidency (2000-2006) the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) was signed by Mexico as well. As a result of this, Mexico became bound to combat corruption even further with an obligation and pressure from the international community (Nieto, 2017: 222-3).

President Calderón, who took office in December of 2006 until the end of 2012, also tried to combat corruption. After the often-unsuccessful attempts of the previous presidents, he decided to increase the war on drugs, and also on corruption and corrupt officials within his own government. However, it is argued that due to the increase of this focus on a war on organised crime prosecution has turned out differently than planned. Rather than efficiently fighting corruption, violence increased, and it became harder to address (Freedom House, 2012; Lacey, 2008). During his six years of presidency, it is estimated that 60,000 people were killed related to the war on organized crime (Grant, 2012). However, before he left his presidency the *Ley Federal Anticorrupción en Contrataciones Públicas* (Federal Procurement Law) was accepted; this would become a foundation for the reforms of Calderón's successor (Tromme & Otaola, 2014: 562). This law aimed to establish rules, procedures and sanctions for corrupt actions by people with Mexican nationality and foreigners in Mexico, and to facilitate the prosecution process by establishing who would control and enforce this law. Another aim of this law was to create a reward system, which aimed to make it more attractive for individuals to report different cases of corruption (Showalter Robinson, 2013: 87). An example can be found in the new fines created for individuals and companies who participated in corruption. The new fines included prices from \$5,000 to \$250,000 to individuals and even higher, up to \$10 million. However, if a company reported themselves they could get a discount of up to 70% of the imposed fine (Showalter Robinson, 2013: 88). Finally, this law aimed to stimulate awareness and the creation of procedures within companies (Showalter Robinson, 2013: 89).

As soon as Enrique Peña Nieto was elected, he put forward several reforms. The first of the series was directed at the works of the *Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos* (Federal Institute for the Access to Information and Data Protection), or IFAI. Initially, the IFAI was an independent organisation which oversaw information made public by the government on different

subjects, such as salaries and contract. The aim of the reform presented by Peña Nieto was to also extend their task from just the government and its officials to include also the legislative and judiciary, and to furthermore include any organisation which received funding from the government. The second reform was aimed at the citizens and their participation. It additionally included a plan to sever the bonds between television agencies and politicians. Finally, there was the reform to create a *Comisión Nacional Anticorrupción* (National Anti-Corruption Commission). The Commission would be independent and financially autonomous and, thus, unable to be tempted by financial support and thus diminishing the possibility of being corrupted. The Commission further had to publish an annual report which would be presented to the Senate of its work analysing public spending and calling for audits from government organisations at different levels (Tromme & Otaola, 2014: 559-566). Furthermore, there was also the idea of creating a National Council for Public Ethics. This council would work together with the CNA and provide ideas or plans, through the opinion of experts, on how to improve transparency within the government and separate companies (Márquez, 2015: 97). The foundation of these changes was created in 2016 as the *Ley General del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción* (The General Law of the National Anti-corruption System). This law describes the plans for the system and the role of the government within the creation, but it also calls for the creation of a digital platform, *Plataforma Digital Nacional del Sistema Anticorrupción* (Digital Platform for the National Anti-Corruption System). Furthermore, according to the general law a Citizen Participation Committee should be created in order to increase awareness and citizen participation (OECD, 2017: 33). This committee should also provide feedback and ideas to the Co-ordination Committee and Governing Board, which consists of representatives of organisations such as the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and the Protection of Personal Data (INAI) and the *Consejo de la judicature Federal* (Federal Judicial Council) (OECD, 2017: 34). This general law is currently being developed and its plans are still being implemented.

Sufficient attempts were made by the government to fight corruption as soon as there was a demand for it. However, until recently limited research has been done on the consequences of all these implemented laws and organisations that were created during these years. What is most common on this particular topic in the academic literature is to analyse the effectiveness of these plans within the first year of implementation. Nonetheless, there is no literature on how each of these worked during a longer period of time. The only result available is that corruption is still present, and it does not appear to have been diminished by implementing these results. This lack of information suggests that these laws are merely a facade to show that the government is working on diminishing corruption, while the enforcement and implementation of these actual laws remain vague and almost not present. This also provides a more in-depth explanation for the distrust between citizens and their government. A lot appears to be happening while in reality nothing is changing. Thus, one could argue that corruption has been integrated to such an extent in the Mexican society that it is nearly impossible to change this without changing habits. Are we, then, able to talk about a ‘culture of corruption’?

2.3 The Culture of Corruption

Corruption in Mexico has intertwined with all layers of society, from governmental corruption to petty corruption. This phenomenon is encountered in a large variety of daily activities. Would it be reasonable to consider that corruption is an integral part of the culture? Can we talk about a ‘culture of corruption’?

This concept of a ‘culture of corruption’ is one that is frequently used, but rarely explained. Morris argues that there is a culture of corruption. As mentioned before, surveys showed a strong connection between the idea of corruption and the government 70% of the respondents agreed to the use of *mordidas* and bribes when dealing with bureaucratic systems during a survey in the 1980s. During a survey held in Mexico City, it was stated by the majority of the respondents that it was necessary to use bribes to solve issues (Morris, 1999: 625). He does refer to the concept ‘culture of corruption’ as a result of prolonged and severe trust issues between the citizens and their government. He uses this concept as: “a type of social or commons dilemma in which it becomes all too rational to pay little attention to the official and formal rules of conduct when dealing with the government (*obedezco pero no cumplo*)” (ibid.: 627).

The argument of whether one can talk about a ‘culture of corruption’ is not as evident as Morris argues. Gabriela Coronado poses the question whether it is a ‘culture of corruption’ or corruption of culture and argues that the situation is more complicated and depends on the view and approach one takes to this situation. She explains this by using the postcolonial approach. She states that the view depends on ideologies and political discourses, especially the differences between developed and developing countries, such as Mexico, make a severe impact on whether an act is labelled as ‘corrupt’ or ‘legitimate’ (Coronado, 2008: 2). She remarks that often situations which are currently perceived as corrupt used to be accepted by society. She underlines this by presenting an example from Lomnitz, where during the period in which Mexico was colonised, colonisers used to compensate their low income by demanding extra fees for their services (ibid.: 3). Using the concept of culture of corruption suggests that it is an essential part of the Mexican culture and that the Mexican culture is defined by this, and that it is just the way people behave (ibid.: 4). However, Coronado concludes that it is not necessarily a culture of corruption within Mexico but people trying to survive in a flawed system (ibid.: 19).

Even experts who are currently working in the area do not appear to agree on this topic. C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza, director of the INAIP (State Institute for Transparency and the Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data) did in the interview not refer to the concept as a whole. What he did refer to, on the other hand, was that in order for the government to successfully diminish corruption a change in culture and behaviour is necessary. He argues that currently it is considered normal to ask for a bribe or to simply accept corrupt situations. Before any effective attempts to diminish corruption can be made, corruption has to become no longer standard (C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza, interview, 2017). His colleague, Clarissa Torres, explained that the organisation firmly believes in creating a culture of transparency. A culture of transparency would mean that citizens would perceive it as reasonable to regularly check up on their government by using this institution where they can ask for all the information available. As a result of a culture of transparency, INAIP believes that anyone

can not only be transparent, but make others accountable as well. This would also allow them to apply for social benefits instead of being stopped by additional prices for bribes (C. Torres, interview). Another organisation, INECCO (State Institute for the Combatting of Corruption) aims for a culture of honesty and '*juego limpio*' (fair play). During an interview with the director, L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, did, however, explicitly refer to a culture of corruption because corruption has become such an integral part of everyday activities. This will be further discussed in the third chapter (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview, 2017).

The concept of a 'culture of corruption' is a concept often used by media or other sources to refer to the intertwined status of corruption in everyday society (e.g. Waite & Allen, 2003). Nonetheless, as Coronado mentions using this concept has an extensive effect on the country carrying that label. As a 'culture of corruption' suggests that the whole culture revolves around corruption. On the other hand, local experts do appear to believe that this is the case. Corruption has become intertwined with everyday situations and therefore it is possible to speak about a culture of corruption.

2.4 Conclusion

To conclude, Mexico has a long history of corruption in multiple layers, from the government to the local citizens. Political corruption has extensively been addressed in academic debates. One of the most significant examples of political corruption can be found during the reign of the PRI for over 70 consecutive years and the electoral fraud and media manipulation which was meant to maintain victory. Nonetheless, this was not the only form of corruption. Another example shows a small example of the frequent occurring petty corruption among citizens and their public officials. Since the 1980s, the government has provided many instances of laws and regulations that were aimed at attacking corruption. However, a lack of information on the results of these laws suggests that they were simply implemented to create a façade rather than effectively combating corruption. This has resulted in an increasing distrust towards the government and an increase in corruption over the years. As a result, citizens were left with distrust and different obstacles. Thus, corruption has become a part of everyday life, and the question remains whether this can be considered a part of the culture.

The next chapter will provide a more in-depth perspective on the perception of petty corruption. Even though corruption was present within the government, the government also had to act as international pressure increased. Several new laws and projects were created since the 1980s, but it appears that none of them had the desired effect. In July 2018 new presidential elections were held in Mexico. With a majority of 53,8% a new president, López Obrador, from a new party National Regeneration Movement (Morena) was elected. Obrador also made statements regarding corruption during his campaign stating, according to the BBC that "this evil is the main cause of social and economic inequality" (BBC, 2018). Obrador was also quoted saying that corruption is not a result of culture, but part of a misbehaving government (Cullinane, 2018), and he has thus promised to eliminate corruption by also addressing his political party, because "a good judge begins at home" (Wheaton, 2018; Naishadham, 2018).

Chapter 3: Assessing the Public Perception of Corruption in Relation to Academic and Institutional Definitions

In the previous chapter, the chaotic and distrustful relationship between the government and its citizens has been shown, in addition to the many layers of corruption. This chapter will examine this further and will focus on a smaller area than the entire country. This chapter will focus on the city of Mérida in Yucatán in the southeast of Mexico. Mérida is the capital city of Yucatán and with over 700.000 citizens it is the largest city in the area. Furthermore, Mérida, also called *La Ciudad Blanca* or the White City due to the clean streets and relatively low crime levels, is also mentioned as one of the leading cities in combatting corruption of the region. In the period of November 2017 till the end of January 2018, this investigation of the perception of petty corruption among adults between the ages of 18 to 30 was conducted. This chapter will look at the results found in researching the perception of corruption in a variety of ways, including a survey, interviews and participant observation.

In the first part of this chapter, the results will be analysed based on the elements to create a comparable situation of the understanding of the three different types of definitions. In the second part, the three definitions will be presented together, and a cross analysis will be made to compare the perception of petty corruption to the actual definition in order to find if the perception is similar to the working definition, and, if not, where the differences lie and what kind of consequences these might have.

3.1 Analysing the characteristics

The survey results have been analysed using the SPSS program. In this section the results will be discussed using the seven characteristics by Von Alemann. The results of the survey do not formulate a clear answer to all of these concepts, but an interpretation of the responses can be made based upon a combination of the results of the surveys, the interviews and participant observation. This is essential to provide an as clear an answer as possible in order to be able to compare this to the other definitions. However, the number of respondents remains limited; thus, the results provide a limited view into the perception of the citizens. These tentative conclusions may serve to direct further research.

During the research in Mexico I could conduct interviews with several experts on this topic. The three experts were working within two of the leading organisations founded in that region of Mexico in order to combat corruption. Interviews with C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza, director of training and educational projects of INAIP Yucatán (National Institute for Transparency, Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data) and his colleague, C. Torres addressed the current situation in Mérida, the workings of INAIP and the role of transparency and accountability in relation to corruption. C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza and señora C. Torres are both specialised in transparency and the accessibility to information in Mexico, and the interviews with them mainly focused on these topics. On the other hand, in an interview with L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, the director of INECCO (State Institute for the Combatting of Corruption), who specialises in

corruption, especially in the Yucatan area, a clearer understanding of corruption was developed and what impact it has had on the Yucatecan community. INECCO is an institute which was created as a result of the previous anti-corruption law and is focussed on the combatting of corruption by taking complaints from citizens and formulating public policies which are then proposed. These interviews were held without specifically addressing the concepts. As a result, not all of the elements could be extensively addressed.

3.1.1 *The corrupter*

The first element is the corrupter, the element that demands something. This action (i.e. the demand) logically can be seen as the initiating cause of the corrupt situation, as the term ‘corrupter’ implies. This concept appears to be straightforward, but the survey shows that this is not the case. Results of this research show a different side, namely that being the corrupter and initiating a corrupt situation is not similar to each other according to the publicly accepted norms. Whereas, being the corrupter in a situation which would provide personal benefits is a frequent occurrence, being a corrupter, even though frowned upon, is perceived to be more ‘normal’ than it would be to receive a present from colleagues for your birthday. One of the important characteristics of a corrupter, according to the respondents, would be someone with a certain amount of power. Hereby, nearly dismissing the ‘average’ citizen as such.

In the survey, there were two sets of questions addressing the corrupter versus the supplier side of the act. The first set was asked to be graded from one, *nada grave* (not severe), to ten, *muy grave*, (very severe). One of the two questions was to grade the following situation: “*Utilizar conexiones familiares para ser contratado en algún empleo de nivel profesional*” (translated: “To use family connections to be hired for a professional job”). This question addresses the corrupter side of the situation, as this asks whether a person would use family connections to find a professional job. The opposing statement on the survey shows the supplier side: “*Contratar a alguien debido a su relación personal contigo en lugar de sus habilidades y méritos*” (translated: “To hire someone based on their personal relationship with you instead of their skills and merits”). The supplier side here can be found in the fact that you are hiring the person, instead of being the person who needs to be hired. The second set of opposing questions address the frequency someone has experienced it, in order to give provide insight into its occurrence as opposed to the opinion. With this set the first question addressing the corrupter side, the question asked was “*pagado a alguien u ofrecido algo a cambio de un favor relacionado con un trabajo o tarea*” (translated: “to pay or offer something to someone in exchange for a favour related to a job or task”). On the other side, the supplier question asked how often the respondent or someone they knew had “*aceptado algo a cambio de utilizar tu puesto laboral en favor de otra persona*” (translated: “accepted something in exchange for using your job in favour of another person”). In this section an analysis will be made of the questions addressing the corrupter side. In the following section, the focus will go towards the supplier and a cross analysis of the two.

The statement of “using family connection to find a professional job” showed answers had a high variance. In this particular survey a larger group of 36,6% graded this with a severity of an eight or higher. On the other hand, a smaller group of 9,9% graded it a three or lower. This shows that the larger

group defines this act as a serious problem. Nonetheless, over half of the respondents answered this question with a grade between four and seven showing that there is a high level of uncertainty on whether this is something that is allowed and/or accepted (Appendix 2.1, table 1).

The second question addressing the corrupter side is “to pay or offer something to someone in return for a favour related to a job or task”. As opposed to the previous question, respondents were asked to estimate the number of times they or someone they know had participated in these situations. The categories provided were “*nunca*” (never), “*muy rara vez*” (rarely), “*a veces*” (at times), “*frecuentemente*” (frequently) and “*muy frecuentemente*” (very frequently). To this particular question 21,1% answered “*nunca*” (never). 78,9% answered that they knew someone or actually did this at least once (rarely to very frequently). The answers vary between the categories rarely and very frequently but suggest that it does occur. The other categories score 36,6% for rarely, 23,9% sometimes, 14,1% frequently, and 4,2% for very frequently (Appendix 2.1, table 2). Even though, the scores are lower as the frequency increases, it does show that it is something that is currently happening. The range of the answers would suggest that not everyone agrees on whether this is actually allowed or not.

In order to provide a better understanding of this element a question was added regarding presenting gifts to co-workers. Whether it was for a special occasion or not was not specifically mentioned. The context of this question would remain open for people to interpret. Thus, allowing people to present ambiguous situations and presents connecting to corruption without explicitly labelling it as such. It would be reasonable to expect that these results would at least show similar signs as the previous question or maybe even a higher trend of giving gifts to colleagues, because in this question the circumstances are not explicitly referred to. So, if someone would respond that they gave something in return for a favour, this could also be understood as a present in this question. On the contrary, when comparing these two questions it appears to be more usual to pay someone or give something in exchange for a favour, rather than giving a colleague a gift. As mentioned before, about 78,9% answered that they, or someone they know, had offered something or payed for a favour regarding work. When the respondents were asked about giving gifts, only 54,9% admitted to being aware of this happening at least once (Appendix 2.1, table 3). This shows that giving presents is not necessarily seen as a social norm. Thus, the payment of a bribe is seen as a normal occurrence (Appendix 2.1, table 2), but is not necessarily considered a present or part of the public norm (appendix 2.1, table 3).

A third question, “*recurrir a amigos, conocidos o familiares de la administración para que agilicen un trámite*” (“to turn to friends, acquaintances or relatives to expedite a process”), shows less certainty. Using family connections to make a procedure speed up is a debatable situation. While only a small percentage rates it as not bad (1-3), 43,6%, rating 4-7, are unsure about whether this is a bad situation or not. Simultaneously, over 49%, scoring 8-10, saw this as something that is not supposed to be done (Appendix 2.1, table 4). Using these results, it can be argued that nearly half of the respondents agree that this is not within publicly accepted norms. However, 43,6% is still a relatively high percentage in the uncertainty area. Thus, people can agree that this is not within accepted norms, while simultaneously, the answers portray that there are benefits possible that make people doubt.

Further, some of the questions addressed characteristics of the corrupter. The first statement says “*la verdadera corrupción es aquella en la que incurren los poderosos*” (“true corruption is that in

which the powerful incur”). This question asks about the level of power the corrupter or supplier has to have. Of the respondents 39,4 % said that they strongly disagreed, and 19,7% stated that they fully agreed (Appendix 2.1, table 5). This suggests that, even though a large percentage disagrees, there is still almost a fifth that believes this is the case. This would suggest that both parties are still perceived as in a need of a certain amount of power of their own. Another question was asked regarding the amount of power. To the statement “*a mayor poder, mayor corrupción*” (“with greater power, greater corruption”) 67,6% agreed, while only 11,3% disagreed (Appendix 2.1, table 6). The answers to this statement show that there is a strong believe that corruption is something for those with a lot of power. The final statement was “*para ser un buen corrupto hay que ser muy astuto*” (“to be a good corrupter one must be very cunning”). To this almost half of the respondents disagreed, and 28% agreed to a certain extent (Appendix 2.1, table 7). A corrupter could be anyone, whether someone is astute or not does not appear to be of importance.

These questions show that being a corrupter is frowned upon, but corruption still occurs involving the citizens and the public officials. However, the final questions on the characteristics show that it is more likely to be someone in power, rather than someone without. The survey does show that it is believed that if the amount of power increases the level of corruption also rises. Thus, a citizen with no power would be unlikely to be a corrupter, as opposed to a public official in function.

3.1.2 The supplier

The third factor is the supplier, or the one who has access to the previously mentioned scarce resource, and often also the one who is confronted with a corrupt situation by the corrupter. While Von Alemann indeed distinguishes this as a third element, it can be hardly discussed and analysed separated from both the corrupter (first factor) and the scarce resource (second factor). Therefore, in this paragraph the supplier will be addressed in relation to both of these factors. The results, namely, show that these two concepts are intertwined and cannot be seen as separate from each other. The supplier initially appears to be a relatively more innocent situation as it is not the one initiating the corruption. The respondents judge a case where they are in a powerful position severe versus being in an initiating position where the situation could personally benefit them. It is perceived that being a supplier is worse than being a corrupter.

The first situation states “*contratar a alguien debido a su relación personal contigo en lugar de sus habilidades y méritos*”. Here, the scarce resource is a job and you are the one who can provide that, thus making the person the supplier. The responses show a majority voting this an eight or higher, 70,4%. On the other side, 4,2% voted this a three or lower (Appendix 2.2, table 1). These results show that hiring someone based on their personal relationship rather than their skills is against social norms and considered improper conduct. When this was addressed through a more active role, the supplier side, in the question of “*aceptado algo a cambio de utilizar tu puesto laboral en favor de otra persona*”, the results show a similar outcome where 57,7% answered that they were never part or unaware of this happening. However, even though this is a slight majority, the previous corrupter question was answered by 70,4% disapproving of the act (Appendix 2.2, table 2). This means that a small percentage is disapproving of being a supplier, while simultaneously still finding themselves in this position.

The corrupter and supplier are labelled as different elements and are both seen as essential to create a corrupt situation. The results of this survey show a debate on whether both of them are at fault or only one placing the other into corruption. As mentioned in 3.2.1., one of the questions addressed the severity of using family connections to find a job on a professional level. The responses to this vary. The majority focus lies between a grade five to seven, with 46,6%, but not an overwhelming certainty. The opposing question asks the respondents opinion on hiring someone through personal ties. Here the majority of the responses, 70,4%, is focussed between the grade eight and ten, meaning this is considered grave. The difference between these questions is whether the respondent is in a corrupter position or a supplier. In this specific comparison, it appears that the respondents consider being a supplier worse versus being in a corrupter position. This is visible by a small difference between grading the questions between one and three. In case of the supplier three out of the 71 people graded it between one and three, as opposed to seven in the corrupter situation.

A second similar case juxtaposes the corrupter and the supplier again. On the one hand, the question was raised whether the respondent knew of a situation involving themselves, family or friends where they accepted something from a client/customer in exchange for a favour regarding their job. The other question poses a similar question but, in this case, asks whether they had offered a favour or had payed someone for a favour in relation to their job or a task. The first question was answered by the majority that they had never done so/or witnessed this. However, when asked whether they had ever payed someone, rather than accepted something, the majority admitted to having done so at least once. 13 out of the 71 respondents answered that they have done so frequently. In total, four of the respondents who answered that they had payed someone or offered someone in exchange for a favour, answered that they had never accepted anything in exchange for a favour. In the other situation 6 respondents who admitted to frequently accepting presents in exchange for a favour also stated that they had payed someone at least once. This second case also shows that there is a preference for the corrupter situation versus the supplier situation. This suggests that people, while in a position of power, do regard abusing that power as something that is not done. However, initiating this situation is less frowned upon, and more often used.

There is a difficult discussion surrounding the corrupter and the supplier. In the interview with L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, director of INECCO, it became clear that there is no certain distinction between the one or the other. Corruption is invested within most areas in society. He explained to me that even all the forms of sports that are being played are currently filled with corruption. The definition of corruption which INECCO uses is that corruption is “*toda conducta antijurídica en el ejercicio de las soluciones y atribuciones de los servidores públicos, de los que hayan fungido como tales así como de los particulares que tengan como fin obtener para sí o para otra persona, algún provecho indebido, sea este con único o de cualquier otra índole y que traiga como consecuencia la aplicación de alguna responsabilidad administrativa, política, patrimonial y/o penal*”. This definition shows an interesting focus on only the public official who is participating in the corrupt act, without the distinction of a corrupter or a supplier position. Their misconduct is seen as the crime rather than focussing on those who might tempt them. As mentioned in the previous section also some characteristics of being a corrupter or supplier were discussed, and these are presented in the interview as well. For example, as the working definition of INECCO shows the person must be one in power for it to be a punishable

offense. This is also shown by previous laws, as he explains during the interview. Under these laws it often occurred that only the public officials would be sanctioned, when in fact there would often be two participants (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview). This idea is similar to the notions of Von Alemann, where there are two people necessary to create such a situation.

During the interview L.A. Aldana Burgos stated that it is very likely that if a person would discuss corruption and the government with someone they do not know that the government will be negatively judged and thus also the public servant, as they represent the government. This portrays a similar result to the surveys. The corrupter and supplier are both perceived in the role of the public official. Thus, also according to previous laws, this is the one that should be punished, while simultaneously disregarding these two elements as possibly separate and ignoring a likely second party involved. Another subject that was discussed during the interview was the level of education. During our interview he explained that, during one of their research projects, results show that in the Yucatán area the higher the level of education the higher the tendency to corruption is. He explains this phenomenon as follows: when one is more aware of the rules and regulations it is easier to avoid them and find loopholes that are necessary to create a personal benefit (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview).

The supplier is the role where the respondents appear to agree more. Being a supplier is not perceived as part of the habits of the citizen and is not tolerated. The public officials are often perceived as the supplier as they frequently control the scarce resources. However, being the supplier is considered the position in need of punishment. Previous laws show that the corrupter is a side often ignored while the supplier has a higher risk of being prosecuted. The boundaries between these two concepts do become vague as both require a certain level of power and the perception shows that the public officials are often seen as the corrupter, as well as the supplier.

3.1.3 *The scarce resource*

The scarce resource is one of the hardest things to identify, because it can include anything based on the corrupter's need. In the previous chapter the questions addressed talked about work as a scarce resource. Another form of a scarce resource addressed in the survey is the so-called *incapacidad médica*, which has also been discussed in the second chapter. This is an important resource in the medical field. In this case respondents were asked with what frequency they had applied for one without being sick 21,1% stated that they had never done so. The rest, 78,9%, has obtained one without being sick. Here again the frequencies differ with 23,9% saying they used it sometimes and over 18,3% even admitted doing this on a frequent basis. The high percentage of 78,9% shows that this is seen as a regular occurrence (Appendix 2.3, table 1). The 21,1% who stated to have never done so or do not know of such a situation could be explained by two reasons. On the one hand, it could be the case that they did not know or have never witnessed this, which then would show that is it not necessarily part of their cultural habits. On the other hand, seeing as this is a hard subject to discuss it might be the case that this question is not answered completely truthfully out of possible fear or other circumstances. This would be the case for every frequency question asked during this survey.

The survey, furthermore, looked at a scarce resource in the educational system. The scarcity of high grades is debatable, but the assumption is that they are scarce for some. The respondents were asked how often they had done a favour for a teacher in exchange for a higher grade. This shows that 56,3%, a majority has never done so. However, the majority is not overwhelming and 43,7% admits having done so at least once. From this 47,3%, 38,1% states that it happened rarely to sometimes. With only 5,6 % stating that it happened frequently (Appendix 2.3, table 2). In the interview these responses are questioned by L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos. He states that at school forms of corruption are also very common, including the bribing of teachers. The difference between the results of the survey and this statement can be due to the difference in formulation or again the fear of answering the questions genuinely. It is also possible that the results of the research of L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos simply do not correspond to this particular group.

One of the statements asked in the survey addresses circumstances in which a lot of things become a scarce resource at once. *“La ocasión hace al ladrón”* (“The occasion makes the thief”) suggest that once anything becomes a scarce resource people will resort to any means necessary, including corruption, to get what they need. To this 53,6% disagreed, scoring 1 – 2), as opposed to only 29,6% who agreed (4-5), and 16,9% neutral. This shows that people do not believe that it depends on the resource whether someone might initiate a corrupt act or violate laws. However, the answer on this question does appear to depend on the gender responding: 74,1% of the males who responded disagreed with the statement, but the female respondents appeared to be more diverse with 40% disagreeing and 34,1% agreeing to some extent (Appendix 2.3, table 3). Seeing that this group is small, a Pearson Chi Square test has been done to prevent coincidence. The Pearson Chi Square test provided a score of 0,017. The results of this test show that this is not a mere coincidence that these results appear, and that it is very likely to get similar results when using a larger target group. Thus, these results can be considered statistically significant.

There are multiple scarce resources available that would create a certain level of petty corruption. However, it does not fully depend on the what the specific scarce resource is for people to resort to corruption. Thus, it is not perceived that one specific scarce resource leads to more corruption than another scarce resource would. The scarce resource remains undefined within the perception of citizens, because it could be anything, but the element on its own remains essential for petty corruption to exist.

3.1.4 A concealed additional incentive

To clearly find signs of a concealed incentive is complicated, as the term “concealed” already proves. Incentives come in a large variety of forms, such as money, favours, “presents” and aid to other parties. L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos mentions in his interview that it is not uncommon for public officials to use their power to obtain profitable land for themselves which would otherwise be hard to access. The incentive does not necessarily have a direct financial reason (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview). However, it appears that regardless of the incentive and whether this is present at all does not make a significant difference in whether people would participate in corrupt situations. In the previous sections several incentives have been mentioned, such as personal relations. This survey

did not directly address and ask about the different forms of incentives used. However, some of the questions can indirectly be related to his concept.

The results discussed here consist of responses with a grade between one and five, where ‘one’ is completely disagreed and ‘five’ is completely agreed. One of the statements made in the survey can be related to the additional incentive, namely “*Si ganas tú, ganamos todos*” (“If you win, we all win”). This statement does not ask for a direct incentive, but rather indirectly. “If you win, we all win”, implies an untouchable incentive which benefits both parties. To this statement 39,4% neither agreed nor disagreed, 16,9% completely disagreed and 18,3% completely agreed (Appendix 2.4, table 1). A similar question was presented: “*hay que actuar según la premisa: Ayúdame, que yo te ayudo*” (“One has to act according to the following premises: Help me, so I can help you”). The results of this are similar to the previous question. The largest part of the respondents state that they neither agree nor disagree, 23,9% completely disagrees and 14,1% totally agrees (Appendix 2.4, table 2). These results show that the incentive is indeed additional. In the cases discussed the incentive present did not necessarily influence whether someone would participate or not.

3.1.5 *Violating established rules or publicly accepted norms*

There are publicly accepted norms not only regarding misbehaviour but also for corruption. The surprising result is that the majority of the results show the same trend of condoning and disapproving of certain behaviour, although, not everyone appears to fully agree.

Violating established rules or publicly accepted norms is what makes a difference between a regular situation and a criminal one. Established rules are easier to follow as these can often be found in laws and written regulations. The publicly accepted norms can vary largely, and in order to find what is publicly accepted, the survey contained multiple questions about possibly debatable behaviours, which do not all necessarily classify as crossing the law or as corruption. These were intended to establish some preliminary boundaries on what is publicly accepted, and which are not. The questions related to behaviour unrelated to corruption show an interesting trend, where consistently the majority appears to score the more negative situations worse than those considered good. For example, two questions addressed the respondents’ opinion on relatively innocent looking situations. The first talked about giving a colleague a present for his or her birthday. The majority of the respondents graded this a three or lower (disagree) on a scale of one to ten (Appendix 2.5, table 1). The same occurred when asked what they would grade giving money to a friend to help him survive. Over 95% of the respondents graded this a three or lower (Appendix 2.5, table 2). This would imply that these acts are considered accepted within the public, especially because it involves a large majority.

When addressing the more debatable situation, a similar pattern occurs only with the grading going the other direction. To give a few examples, one of the questions addressed was to not inform personnel of a restaurant or a store, when an error has been made on your bill in one’s favour. Over 92% scores this a seven or higher (Appendix 2.5, table 3). This would, thus, mean that this is considered a grave act and also not publicly accepted. Another question addressed how people would grade stealing or taking an object from a specific place to keep it as a reminder. Here again the majority, 84,6%, graded this as

severe (Appendix 2.5, table 4). A final act, namely putting false data and/or background information on a curriculum, was also graded very severe by the majority. This shows that these acts are considered severe and are not accepted within public norms by a clear majority. These results show that there is a pattern in public accepted norms. This also shows that there is a strong agreement when actions are in violation of the law they are also against the norms. Thus, to some extent the public accepted norms do follow the established rules.

Finally, also a few questions were directly asked on corruption and whether this was considered part of the public accepted norm and what is not. One of the first situations described focusses on using coquetry or gallantry to gain a favourable result from the administration or from a company. Also, here the same trend occurs with 80,3% scoring this as very grave (Appendix 2.5, table 5). The survey also addressed the opinion of the respondents directly on corruption. All the respondents agreed that corruption is a serious problem and 97,1% feels that it is a problem that has to be dealt with immediately (Appendix 2.5, table 6&7). Thus, taking part in situations that are associated with corruption are also considered not to be part of the public norm. This is even further confirmed with the question “*si todos cometen actos de corrupción, ¿para qué te vas a hacer el mártir o el santo?*” (“if everyone is committing acts of corruption, why would you become the martyr or the saint?”). Here again, over 80% agrees with this statement (Appendix 2.5, table 8). However, when asked whether people would get into trouble when exposing corruption, the opinions are strongly divided (Appendix 2.5, table 9). This shows that even though it is not accepted by public norm, it still occurs, and people are unsure whether exposing it will bring them into trouble.

From the interview with L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, it became apparent that, while corruption as a concept was not necessarily a punishable offence on its own, there were acts of corruption that had severe consequences and penalties. Thus, none of the questions during the research has specifically targeted the part of the violation of established rules. However, the interview did raise a discussion on the publicly accepted norms. As mentioned in 3.3.1, corruption has been integrated in everything from sports to the government, from friends to strangers. He compares the current publicly accepted norms to a saying that is common in the region: “*gallina come huevo aunque le quemem el pico, lo va a seguir comiendo*”. The meaning behind this saying is that a person who has learned to do improper things will always do improper things, and he will not change or improve in any way. This saying also refers to the population in the Yucatan region. They have been raised with corruption and this is the way they do things, because of this it has not necessarily become a violation of publicly accepted norms, but rather part of the publicly accepted norms (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview).

3.1.6 Negative impact on society

A negative impact on society is one of the few elements where respondents appear to agree on the most. Even though, as mentioned in the previous chapters, there are people who do not believe that all corruption has a negative impact on society, this still needs to be addressed as it is an essential part of the perception of corruption. In 3.2.5, there are, however, questions mentioned on the seriousness of corruption and whether it needs to be diminished immediately. The results show that an overwhelming

majority believes that corruption is a serious problem and needs to be addressed immediately. This shows that the perception of corruption is present and that there is an awareness that it has consequences. These questions do not show to what extent this awareness goes and whether or not people believe this has a negative impact on society or is just a private issue. It would be interesting to conduct further research into the perception of the consequence of corruption.

3.1.7 Secrecy

Secrecy is a difficult thing to measure in another way than participant observation. During my research, I did not encounter direct forms of corruptions. It took me a while to gain the trust I needed to openly discuss corruption with the family I was staying with. When I arrived in the first week they were rather hesitant to tell me about their personal experiences with petty corruption and wanted to hear more about what I was doing and discovering rather than sharing experiences with me. In the course of the first month this changed. As soon as there was an example supposedly related to corruption within the family, I would hear the details of what would happen and the frequency of occurrence. In my case this shows that corruption is not something easily talked about and the level of secrecy was very high, at least to the outgroup. Just to be sure corruption would only be talked about within the confines of the house. As soon as I would address this outside the house the answers would become short, and I was told that we would talk about it when we got back home.

Another form of corruption was shown in the survey which was not expected. In a question of the survey was the statement that corruption scandals are uncovered to hide other problems or to divert public attention. 63,4% agreed to this statement (Appendix 2.6, table 1). Showing that there not only is a level of secrecy surrounding corruption on its own, but that it is perceived that corruption is also being used to create another level of secrecy surrounding other issues.

3.1.8 Corruption

Additional to this detailed analysis of the seven characteristics, some results address the complete perception of corruption from the survey. The overall pattern shows that the majority of incidents of behaviours considered crimes are in line with the social norms and values. This proves that all the participants share the same values in what is good and what is considered bad. Thus, there is a pattern in understanding also that certain forms of corruption are against the social values.

First of all, there were several questions regarding corruption and the perception thereof. When asked whether corruption is a serious issue 100% agreed that corruption is a serious problem (Appendix 2.5, table 6). Then it was asked whether corruption is part of the Mexican culture 24% agreed to some extent 63,4% disagreed, of which 47,9% strongly disagrees (Appendix 2.7, table 1). On the other hand, when asked whether exchanging favours is necessary to “get things done” 71,8% answered that this would occur sometimes to frequently depending on the respondent, as opposed to merely 28,2% who answered that this never was the case (Appendix 2.7, table 2). This shows a perception that it is not part of the culture while at the same time it is the most conventional way to deal with issues that might occur

on a daily basis. To the question whether corruption is “the way to get things done” there is an interesting difference between male and female. Over 72% of the females replied that it never to rarely occurs, as opposed to only 32% of the males. The responses of the males show that it is to them a more occurring phenomenon. Here again a Pearson Chi Square was done as the group of respondents is very small, and there is a significant difference between the groups in response to this question ($p < 0,010$) (Appendix 2.7, table 2.1). While this thesis will not elaborate further on the differences between gender, it would encourage the in-depth investigation thereof given these results.

During the interviews, the focus was primarily on corruption in general. One of the questions both directors were asked was what kind of corruption is most present in Mérida. The answers differ. Álvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza, director of INAIP, believed that political corruption was the most evident in the area, while, on the other hand, the director of INECCO, strongly believed that this was petty corruption. This shows that corruption is indeed a problem, but on multiple levels. Even those who have an expertise in the area do not appear to agree. The divided opinion on what is the main form also shows in what is the largest obstacle in combatting it. According to the director of INAIP, one of the main issues with combatting corruption is the use of language within the laws and public policies. He refers to this as “*un lenguaje del gobierno*”. By this, he argues that INAIP is an organisation that functions as a portal between the government and its finances and contracts and the citizens on the other hand. However, C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza mentions that the organisations task is to publish these statements, contracts etc. so citizens can look at them. The problem with this is that these contracts and statements, even though published in Spanish, contain concepts and words the ‘ordinary citizen’ might not be aware of or have ever heard of. Simultaneously, there is also a difference in the actual language. These papers are all published in Spanish, but not all locals speak Spanish. Some of them only speak Mayan or a local version of this. As a result, many of these documents need to be translated not only in the actual language, but also in word use so it becomes understandable for every citizen. This is an issue when combatting corruption, because it prevents citizens to actively use their right to transparency and access this information (C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza, interview, 2018).

This issue was also addressed in the interview with the director of INECCO. Even though he agrees, to some extent, that there is a difference in language use of language between the documents published by the government and the language used by citizens, he does not necessarily perceive it to be an issue. He states that it is necessary to have something like a governmental language. The use of governmental language means that there are concepts and abbreviations used that citizens are unfamiliar with. It is also a difficult procedure as this would mean that everything would have to be translated. He does state that in order to facilitate this process everything contains a working definition, even in laws, to make it accessible for the majority of people. Rather the largest issue is that of distrust. According to L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, the largest obstacle in combatting corruption is distrust between the citizens and the government. This has been created due to the many years of political corruption within Mexico and the endless circle of corruption, promise to fight corruption and to then indulge in corruption again, especially with the police forces. L. Aldana Burgos states that the police is the embodiment of the government for a lot of the citizens. Thus, if they see the police acting corrupt, they will automatically link this to the government (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview).

3.1.9 Solutions

In the final section of the survey participants were asked whether they believed that transparency and accountability would be sufficient to fight corruption. In particular, it was discussed whether they believed they could help increase transparency and accountability, and what needed to be added to improve these.

Whether these are sufficient to eliminate corruption is debatable, based on the responses. 39,4% agreed, saying that both of them would be sufficient. A small percentage of 2,8% thought that only transparency would be sufficient, whilst no one thought that only accountability would aid in the elimination of corruption. The majority of the respondents, 47,9%, thought that these would not be sufficient, but when asked if these would not help at all only 1,4% agreed (Appendix 2.8, table 1). This would mean that even though these two might not be sufficient, according to the respondents, they will help in the process.

The survey also asked the respondents to provide a grade between one and five on whether they think they could be part of increasing transparency and accountability, with one 'absolutely not' and five 'definitely'. A clear majority believes they could help in increasing transparency and accountability. 59,2% scored a 5, and 22,5% scored a 4. 16,9% was unsure and only 1,4% scored a two (Appendix 2.8, table 2).

The final question was focussed on which three concepts would need to be improved in order to facilitate transparency and accountability. The results were as follows:

| Ranks | Type | Percentage |
|--------------|--|-------------------|
| 1 | Educación (Education) | 22,8% |
| 2 | Participación ciudadana (Citizen Participation_) | 21,8% |
| 3 | Concientización (Awareness) | 16% |
| 4 | Ley (Law) | 13,6% |
| 5 | Disponibilidad de información (Access to Information) | 9,2% |
| 6 | Políticas Públicas (Public Policy) | 8,3% |
| 7 | Regulación (Regulation) | 5,8% |
| 8 | Discusión abierta (Open discussion) | 2,4% |
| 9 | No creo que haya que mejorar nada | 0% |
| 10 | Otro: | 0% |

Figure 2: Results surveys on areas in need of improvement

These results and the result as portrayed in figure 2 show an interesting perspective and can be interpreted in two different ways. The top three, namely education, citizen participation and awareness,

do all three require involvement of the citizens themselves. As opposed to the other results which would require governmental changes. This demand for increased participation can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, these results show that when asked for a solution, citizens want to address the solution as if they are part of the problem and are recognizing this. For example, if the education was adequate, the respondent would have known what corruption entailed and would, as a result, not have participated in corruption. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as if citizens are not part of the issue, and thus showing the distance between the problem of corruption and the citizens. As opposed to the assumption in the first interpretation the results of the survey show that the citizens do not perceive themselves as part of the issue of corruption. Thus, the demand for education would be directed towards those involved, instead of the respondents themselves. If they (the government officials) had had the right education, corruption would not occur.

Just as the respondents of the survey both of the directors were asked what their opinion is on the use of transparency and accountability to combat corruption and whether there were other solutions that should be considered when addressing this. Similar to the results of the survey shows both of them agreed that these concepts would aid in the process of combatting corruption. Nonetheless, both agreed that these concepts on their own would not be sufficient.

C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza believes that transparency and the right to access information would be sufficient to the extent that anyone can call for the information on the activities of public officials and companies. This right would then in turn cause enough incentive for someone not to participate in corrupt actions, as it would break the silence and secrecy surrounding corruption. Another area that needs to be improved is the gap between the government and the private sector. Currently, the anti-corruption and transparency systems are mainly aimed at governmental organisations and institutions. The final issue that needs to be addressed is the issue of culture. C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza states that there is a need for cultural change where it is no longer accepted for a public official to accept any corruption, whether this is out of fear or his own principles. This is also something that needs to be addressed, but together with transparency and the right to access information would be sufficient. In order for the transparency and the right to access to work and create a substantial threat there also needs to be an increase in public participation. He states that *“me parece que si los ciudadanos no participan, de nada sirve órganos garantes, ni leyes, ni sistemas de anticorrupción”* (A. de Jesús Carcaño Loeza, interview).

L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos agrees on calling upon citizen participation to aid in diminishing corruption. In a perfect situation he would suggest calling upon impartial citizens who do not have any political connections or interests, but do know the details of corruption, to break the current circle of corruption. There is, however, a problem with this ideal situation as citizens often lack sufficient information and are vastly influenced by media, politics and family. Upon the question what citizens could do at this moment to increase their participation his position is that at present the gap between citizens and government is too extensive. The way forward might be through addressing petty corruption first and starting to educate children about corruption, so they will grow up with the understanding that corruption is not a good or necessary part, while simultaneously increasing citizen participation in politics in general and allow people to be more active. With the new Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción a start is made as it demands for the creation of a committee involving citizens who are

allowed to advice on public policies, especially those addressing corruption (L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos, interview).

3.2 A Lack of Culture?

As mentioned in 3.1 the definition of Transparency International can also be divided in these seven concepts. The definition states the “everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies” (Transparency International, 2018a). The next table provides an easy perspective on the elements as they can be found in the three definitions.

| Von Alemann’s elements of corruption | TI definition on petty corruption | Citizen perception on petty corruption (as based on this study) |
|--|--|---|
| The corrupter | “The ordinary citizen” | “The public official” or anyone with power |
| The scarce resource | “entrusted power” | Anything |
| The supplier | “public official” | “The public official” |
| The concealed additional incentive | Left undefined | Anything |
| Violating the established rules or publicly accepted norms | “access to basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies” | Corruption is part of the publicly accepted norms |
| The negative impact on society | Left undefined | Petty corruption has no negative impact on society, but governmental and crime-related corruption has |
| Secrecy | Left undefined | Present to outsiders, but for locals it is a common phenomenon |

Figure 3: Comparison of Von Alemann's elements, TI definition and citizen perception

As one can see there are differences between this TI definition and the perception of the public on petty corruption. The discussion concerning the corrupter and the supplier appears to be the largest one. The surveys show that the public official is often perceived as the corrupter as well as the supplier. This is also addressed in the interviews with INECCO and INAIP. This image of the public official portraying these two roles probably originates in the fact that the previous anti-corruption laws would merely focus on the public official as being punishable rather than also addressing the citizens or others in the role of the corrupter. This also raises tension in relation to the concepts from Von Alemann. He posits the corrupter as someone initiating the process and the supplier as someone who merely has access to the scarce resource desired. The citizen perception shows that the supplier is often the one initiating the corruption. The ordinary citizen is often seen as someone without a choice but still in need of the scarce resource, thus, creating a completely new element in this corruption situation of an almost helpless pawn or even victim. This perception shows a large distance between the issue of corruption and the ordinary citizen themselves, where they do not perceive themselves to be part of the problem. There appears to be a lack of understanding to what extent this is part of their lives. This was confirmed

during my own stay in Mérida, where in the beginning no one could think of corrupt situations when asked directly, but by the end they would come to me and jokingly say “soy corrupto”. While, when looking at the survey results it shows that petty corruption for the ordinary citizen is still the way to ‘get things done’, nonetheless, the discussion does not stop here. The definition of petty corruption in TI merely focusses on the entrusted power of public officials. The citizen perception appears to be more extensive than the public official. Even though, the questions were largely focussed on the areas as addressed in the TI definition, the survey also shows that there is petty corruption outside of the public office and can also involve companies or even other citizens with a certain level of power.

Second, when addressing the element of the scarce resource the respondents as well as the definition of Transparency International perceive it as the possibility of it being anything. The scarce resource could be found in money, healthcare, education, etc. But the perception would agree with the definition that it can mainly be found in the entrusted power. It is also shown that a scarce resource is a required element, even though its definition is ambiguous, to create a corrupt situation. A scarce resource is needed for people to cross established rules in order to get it.

Third, the “concealed additional incentive” in the TI definition has been left undefined. While the survey shows that there is more often an additional incentive, which can come in any form, the interviews warns that there can also be a lack of a direct incentive. Someone could be helped due to family connections without expecting anything in return. If the concealed additional incentive does not necessarily need to be present for people to create corrupt situations, this would then make the additional incentive not an essential part of corruption. Here again creating criticism to the definition as created by Von Alemann.

Fourth, the violation of established rules or publicly accepted norms is another concept which calls for an extensive debate. The survey appears to agree, on one side, that the basic goods and services should be accessible for everyone making it an established rule and part of the publicly accepted norms. Thus, not being able to access them makes them not only a scarce resource, but also a violation of established rules. However, the results of the survey show that the “publicly accepted norm” as a concept on its own becomes ambiguous. As the results show, the publicly accepted norm not only involves access to the basic goods and services, but also provides an understanding of what is tolerated and what not. When asked directly about corruption the accepted norm shows that corruption is not tolerated. On the other hand, the results also show that corruption is the way to get to the public goods, and that petty corruption overall, even though it is understood as a negative concept, has been extensively integrated in their everyday lives. By becoming intertwined with every day activities to such an extent, petty corruption is also perceived to a certain level as part of the publicly accepted norms. This makes, in this specific case, the concept as provided by Von Alemann debatable. When something is established via rules and regulations it is easier to perceive when this is violated. While in this case the publicly accepted norms needed to be determined first, to then conclude that in some situations of petty corruption the act does not violate the publicly accepted norms.

This also influences the fourth concept of the negative impact on society, which is also left undefined by Transparency International. The perception is that it is the way to get things done, and whether it has a negative impact on society is by the respondents not perceived as such. The question

remains why Transparency International left this concept undefined. This could be because it is supposedly ‘obvious’ that it has a negative impact on society or because it does not necessarily have a negative impact on society. The first concept is not necessarily the case as the respondents do not appear to have a clear overview on the actual impacts on society of corruption.

The last one is secrecy. The perception of this part became most clear during my stay where I had to create a certain level of confidence and trust between myself and the respondents before there could be any direct discussion on this subject. Even though there is a level of secrecy present and people are scared to get into trouble when reporting cases of corruption, everyone appears to be aware of the fact that this is happening on a daily basis. Thus, the level of secrecy is present to ‘outsiders’ but locals will be able to tell you what forms are happening where and how you should act in these cases. As secrecy can to a certain level be present, the perception appears to agree that there is not necessarily a need to define this. The element is still required. There has to be a level of secrecy present. Once this is being done in the open it can no longer be perceived as a corrupt act and it would have been completely part of the publicly accepted norms.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has focussed on the results of the case study and looking to answer the question what the perception of petty corruption was within the target group. The final questions which needed to be addressed was how the definitions of Von Alemann, the definition from Transparency International and the public perception of corruption state in relation to each other. First the TI definition was divided in the elements as they were created by Von Alemann. By doing so it would make them easier comparable to the results of the perception. Three of the seven elements were left undefined, namely the additional incentive, the negative impact and the secrecy. The results of the survey also provide inconclusive answers for these three elements. Thus, to a certain extent agreeing with the undefined sections. A second similarity can be found in that the access to basic goods and services is part of the established rules and the lack thereof, thus, results in a violation. Another similarity was found in what would be defined as the scarce resource, namely the entrusted power. The perception of the citizens also adds to this that it could be anything, as they perceive petty corruption to be larger than just the public officials but could also include companies or other citizens with more power.

There is also a large difference present between the TI definition and the citizen perception, namely between the corrupter and the supplier, in particular who is responsible. Whereas, the TI definition defines the corrupter as the ordinary citizen and the supplier as the public official, the citizen perception does not appear to agree. The supplier, as perceived by the citizens, is someone in any power position. This could be a public official or an employer. However, the supplier is not only perceived as the supplier, but often also perceived as the corrupter. By doing so, the ordinary citizen is no longer seen as an essential element in this situation. This also clashes with the elements of Von Alemann, seeing the corrupter and the supplier as the same element.

Finally, there is another difference between the elements and the citizen perception, namely when focussing on the “publicly accepted norms”. The results show that corruption has become

integrated in the habits of citizens and thus, are becoming part of the publicly accepted norms. If the violation of publicly accepted norms is one of the requirements, then making it accepted would prevent it from being labelled as corruption. Thus, an understanding of the publicly accepted norms is necessary to better understand petty corruption in order for it to be diminished.

Conclusion

This thesis has several limitations: first, it is written based on a single case study with a limited group of respondents. It is too limited to draw any general conclusion since the target group is very specific, as all of the respondents are students between the age of 18 and 30 and might not be representative of the 'average citizen'. The survey was, furthermore, very local (Mérida, Mexico) and might not be representative for the large and varied country Mexico is, not to mention for Latin America. Nonetheless, the conclusions that follow in this section are a direct result from the analysis made in this study. Based on these results further research is needed into the influence of culture on corruption and the possible contribution of perception to continue diminishing corruption.

This thesis has primarily focussed on the difference between working definition of Transparency International, Von Alemann and the perception of citizens. The process of defining corruption is a complicated process and it remains complicated to find an exact, agreed upon, definition of corruption. Through the discussion of multiple definitions, two definitions were used in this thesis. The first was presented by Von Alemann and provides seven essential elements for a corrupt situation: The corrupter, the scarce resource, the supplier, a concealed additional incentive, violation of established rules or publicly accepted norms, a negative impact on society and secrecy. These elements were used to make the definition of Transparency International and the perception of citizens more comparable. The TI definition of petty corruption which was used stated that it is "[e]veryday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies" (Transparency International, 2018a). The second part of the first chapter focused on measuring corruption: objective and subjective measuring. Objective measuring relies on data and statistics that are in the case of corruption rarely present, and thus the focus lies in subjective measuring, namely the use of perception.

The perception of the government in relation to corruption can be seen as strongly influenced by an extensive history of corruption scandals and the consequent promise that the fight against corruption will become more effective. Even though, there is a long list addressing the political attempts to fight corruption, none of them appeared to have a positive effect. The lack of implementation and enforcement has created a significant level of distrust between the government and its citizens. While this occurs, corruption becomes more integrated in everyday life opening the discussion of a 'culture of corruption'.

The final chapter focussed on the analysis of the different definitions of petty corruption, namely the definitions as used by Von Alemann and Transparency International, and the perception results from the research in Mérida. On several points the perception of petty corruption is similar to the definition as used by Transparency International. However, there appears to be a crucial difference when regarding the supplier and corrupter. Where Transparency International addresses the 'ordinary citizen' as the corrupter and the 'public official' as the supplier, the 'ordinary citizen' only sees the 'public official' as the corrupter and supplier. This means that the citizen does not perceive themselves to be part of the problem and only argues that the issue is the behaviour of the public official.

Nonetheless, the results show that the citizen does participate as corrupter in corrupt actions. This shows that there is a gap between the used definition and the perception of citizens who encounter this.

This gap increases when looking at the consequences this perception has for the elements of Von Alemann. By seeing the corrupter and supplier as the same person, these two concepts appear to merge as one, rather than being seen as two. The ordinary citizen then is no longer part of the elements essential to corruption. This distance is again stressed when the respondents are asked about solutions. Here the majority of respondents asks for an increase in citizen participation and education. These results are focussed on including the participation of the citizen in finding the solution. There are two possible reasons. First, citizens perceive themselves as part of the problem and wanting to help change it, or, second citizens see themselves as part of the solution, but not as part of the problem. Another important result can be found when comparing the elements to the perception of corruption. One of the elements of Von Alemann is 'violating established rules or publicly accepted norms'. There is no discussion on the violation of established rules. However, differences do occur on publicly accepted norms. The survey results show that it is against publicly accepted norms to participate in corruption. It, simultaneously, shows that, on the one hand, corruption is necessary to achieve most goals, and, on the other hand, demonstrates that as soon as a corrupt situation becomes reasonable there is acceptance. Even though, corruption is not directly accepted, it is condoned. Thus, progressively petty corruption has become publicly accepted as it is necessary. The definition of Von Alemann on corruption stresses the importance of the violation of established rules or publicly accepted norms. Following this definition petty corruption is no longer a form of corruption as it is still within the publicly accepted norms and does not violate these norms.

This concludes that the working definition of Transparency International and Von Alemann have become too general and neglect the cultural influences that are affecting corruption and the citizens. As Von Alemann stated: "the phenomenon of corruption is as polymorphic as are the attempts to stamp it out" (2004: 28), and as corruption is a worldwide phenomenon the definition has become so abstract that it can fit any misconduct occurring in any country. On the one hand, by doing so, corruption has become measurable and comparable for the academic field. This has allowed for research which has resulted in increasing awareness and a large quantity of information. These theoretical definitions remain essential towards research on corruption. On the other hand, it has completely neglected cultural influences. Thus, such academic approaches are not attacking corruption as an issue in its entirety, but merely as a legal, abstract issue. In order to address the phenomenon of corruption, the influences of culture and perception have to be added to the theoretical definition. This could be achieved through a survey similar to the one used in this research project. This survey will add a local understanding to the original definition. By combining these two, a person will have a thorough understanding of the area of inefficiency in combatting corruption and is able to address this problem. Examples where culture is not taken into consideration can be found in different approaches to combatting corruption through the use of public policy which are currently in place in Mexico. When corruption is something that happens due to conscious misbehaviour it is more efficient to criminalize it, because the person or group of people are aware that what they are doing is wrong and breaking the law, and as a result their behaviour is punishable. However, when it is intertwined with daily routines, to such an extent that corruption has become part of a culture, simply criminalizing this will no longer be sufficient, because people do not perceive their 'misconduct' as wrong. Here, a change in culture is needed. The most efficient way to

change a culture is to adapt the education and make anti-corruption campaigns part of lower education in order to increase awareness. Once people are aware that their behaviour is 'wrong', criminalizing it will become more efficient. This would explain why criminalizing corruption has not been as effective. In order to increase the efficiency of the fight against corruption a better understanding of corruption is necessary and in order to accomplish this, the perception of corruption is necessary.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Survey on Transparency and Accountability 2018

Encuesta sobre la Transparencia y Rendición de Cuentas 2018

Estimado participante,

Esta encuesta es un elemento de una investigación realizada por Tirza Tenkink como parte de la Maestría en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la universidad de Leiden, los Países Bajos. La información recuperada durante esta encuesta se usará como parte de la investigación cuantitativa y se tratará de forma anónima y cuidadosa. Se utiliza para crear una mejor comprensión de la percepción de conceptos tales como transparencia y rendición de cuentas entre los personas de 18 - 30 años en Mérida, Yucatán, México.

La encuesta tomará alrededor de 10-20 minutos.

¡Gracias por participar!

1. Edad:años

2. Sexo:

Hombre

Mujer

3. ¿En qué parte de Mérida vives?

Norte

Sur

Oriente

Poniente

Centro

4. ¿Cómo se llama la colonia o fraccionamiento donde vives?

.....
.

5. ¿Con quién vives en tu hogar?

Vivo solo (pase a la pregunta 6)

Vivo con amigos (pase a la pregunta 6)

Vivo con mi familia

6. ¿Con cuántas personas vives y cómo se relacionan contigo? (Completa un número después de cada categoría)

| Miembros de familia | Cantidad |
|---------------------|----------|
| • Abuela: | • |
| • Abuelo: | • |
| • Madre: | • |
| • Padre: | • |
| • Hermano(s): | • |
| • Hermana(s): | • |
| • Tío(s): | • |
| • Tía(s): | • |
| • Sobrino(s): | • |
| • Sobrina(s): | • |
| • Hijo(s): | • |
| • Hija(s): | • |
| • Otros: | • |

7. ¿A qué te dedicas?

.....

8. Si estudias, ¿A qué universidad asistes?

.....

9. Rama de conocimiento de los estudios que estás cursando actualmente. Marca tu respuesta con una "X"

- Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas
- Humanidades
- Ciencias Exactas
- Ciencias de la Salud

10. ¿En tu escuela o trabajo te han proporcionado información respecto a lo que es la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas? Marca tu respuesta con una "X"

- Sí, de ambos
- Sí, pero solo sobre transparencia
- Sí, pero solo sobre rendición de cuentas
- No, de ninguno de estos

11. ¿A través de qué medio te han proporcionado dicha información? (Marca tu respuesta con una "X". Más de una respuesta es posible)

- Seminarios
- Carpetas
- Folletos
- Clases
- Cursos
- Reuniones
- Sitio web
- Libros
- Otro:

Según tu opinión, ¿cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones describirían de mejor manera la transparencia, la corrupción y la rendición de cuentas? Marca tu respuesta con una “X”

12. Transparencia es:

A. “Que toda la información generada, obtenida, adquirida, transformada o en posesión de los sujetos es pública, accesible a cualquier persona”

B. “Saber cuánto, cómo y en qué se gastará el dinero público”

C. “El intercambio honesto de información”

A

B

C

No lo sé

13. La corrupción (es):

A. “el abuso de un fideicomiso que generalmente involucra a un poder público, para beneficios privados, que a menudo, aunque no necesariamente siempre, viene en forma de dinero”

B. “consiste en el abuso del poder para beneficio propio. Puede clasificarse en corrupción a gran escala, menor y política, según la cantidad de fondos perdidos y el sector en el que se produzca.”

C. “lavado de dinero, venta de empresas y mercancías a sobreprecios o comprar terrenos y activos del gobierno por debajo de su costo y chantajes de clausura o multas excesivas”

A

B

C

No lo sé

14. La rendición de cuenta es:

A) “la obligación de una organización y sus funcionarios de ser responsables con la entrega de resultados específicos que se han determinado mediante una asignación de responsabilidades clara y transparente, sujeto a la disponibilidad de recursos y las limitaciones impuestas por factores externos”

B) “la capacidad de asegurar que los funcionarios en el gobierno sean responsables de sus acciones”

C) “honestidad”

A

B

C

No lo sé

Desde el punto de vista de la corrupción, valora la gravedad de la siguientes acciones según tu propia opinión, colocando una X en la casilla de la escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 equivale a “nada grave” y 10 a “muy grave”

- 22. Hurtar o sustraer de algún lugar algún objeto para tenerlo como recuerdo

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------|
| 1 Nada grave | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 Muy grave |
| | | | | | | | | | |

- 23. En una tienda o supermercado, llevarse sin pagar algún producto pequeño y de bajo precio

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------|
| 1 Nada grave | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 Muy grave |
| | | | | | | | | | |

- 24. Al postular a un estudio o empleo, poner datos o antecedentes positivos en el currículum, aunque sean falsos

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------|
| 1 Nada grave | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 Muy grave |
| | | | | | | | | | |

- 25. Usar la coquetería o la galantería para obtener un resultado favorable de la administración o de una empresa o comercio

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------|
| 1 Nada grave | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 Muy grave |
| | | | | | | | | | |

La siguiente sección presenta algunas expresiones relacionadas con la corrupción y la transparencia, que debes calificar en una escala de 1 a 5, siendo 1 "completamente en desacuerdo" y 5, "totalmente de acuerdo".

- 26. "Hay que actuar según la premisa: Ayúdame, que yo te ayudo"

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 27. "La corrupción es un problema serio"

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 28. "La corrupción es un problema que debe abordarse de inmediato"

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 29. “Si ganas tú, ganamos todos”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 30. “Más vale malo conocido que bueno por conocer”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 31. “La ocasión hace al ladrón”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 32. “La corrupción es parte de la cultura del mexicano”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 33. “La verdadera corrupción es aquella en la que incurren los poderosos”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 34. “Si el pobre incurre en corrupción, es por necesidad”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 35. “No pidas que te den, pide que te pongan donde puedas agarrar”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 36. “Si todos cometen actos de corrupción, ¿para qué te vas a hacer el mártir o el santo?”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 37. “Para ser un buen corrupto hay que ser muy astuto”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 38. “Los hombres son más corruptos que las mujeres”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 39. “Los escándalos de corrupción se destapan para ocultar otros problemas o para desviar la atención del público”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 40. “A mayor poder, mayor corrupción”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

- 41. “Denunciar la corrupción es meterse en problemas”

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| 1 (completamente en desacuerdo) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (totalmente de acuerdo) |
| | | | | |

Indica con qué frecuencia alguien conocido o de tu entorno ha incurrido en las siguientes conductas:

- 42. ¿Solicitado una “incapacidad medica” de su doctor sin sentirte enfermo?
 - () Nunca
 - () Muy rara vez
 - () A veces
 - () Frecuentemente
 - () Muy frecuentemente
- 43. ¿Ofrecido un regalo a un empleado mientras está en funciones?
 - () Nunca
 - () Muy rara vez
 - () A veces
 - () Frecuentemente
 - () Muy frecuentemente

- 44. ¿Aceptado algo a cambio de utilizar tu puesto laboral en favor de otra persona?
 Nunca
 Muy rara vez
 A veces
 Frecuentemente
 Muy frecuentemente

- 45. ¿Pagado a alguien u ofrecido algo a cambio de un favor relacionado con un trabajo o tarea?
 Nunca
 Muy rara vez
 A veces
 Frecuentemente
 Muy frecuentemente

- 46. ¿Hecho un favor a un maestro o profesor a cambio de una calificación más alta?
 Nunca
 Muy rara vez
 A veces
 Frecuentemente
 Muy frecuentemente

- 47. ¿Pedido a alguien que proporcione documentos oficiales nuevos o modificados (cédula profesional, licencia de conducir, documentos de identidad) a cambio de dinero, favor o un regalo?
 Nunca
 Muy rara vez
 A veces
 Frecuentemente
 Muy frecuentemente

- 48. ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas?
 Nunca
 Muy rara vez
 A veces
 Frecuentemente
 Muy frecuentemente

- 49. ¿Piensas que transparencia y rendición de cuentas sean suficientes para eliminar la corrupción?
 - Sí, de ambos son suficientes
 - Sí, solo la transparencia es suficiente
 - Sí, solo la rendición de cuentas es suficiente
 - No, los dos no son suficientes
 - Ninguno de eso puede ayudar
 - No lo sé

- 50. En una escala de 1-5, crees que puedes ser parte en mejorar la transparencia y rendición de cuentas?

| | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|---|------------------|
| 1 (Claro que NO) | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 (Claro que SÍ) |
| | | | | |

- 51. ¿Qué TRES de los siguientes deberían mejorar para aumentar la transparencia y rendición de cuentas?
 - Concientización
 - Regulación
 - Ley
 - Discusión abierta
 - Educación
 - Disponibilidad de información
 - Participación ciudadana
 - Políticas públicas
 - No creo que haya que mejorar nada
 - Otro:

Appendix 2: Frequency Tables per Chapter

Appendix 2.1: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.1

Table 1. Survey Results (2018): “Utilizar conexiones familiares para ser contratado en algún empleo de nivel profesional”, 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Utilizar conexiones familiares para ser contratado en algún empleo de nivel profesional

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| | 2 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 5.6 |
| | 3 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 9.9 |
| | 4 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 16.9 |
| | 5 | 14 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 36.6 |
| | 6 | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 45.1 |
| | 7 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 63.4 |
| | 8 | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 77.5 |
| | 9 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 81.7 |
| | 10 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 2. Survey Results (2018): “Pagado a alguien u ofrecido algo a cambio de n favor relacionado con un trabajo o tarea”

¿Pagado a alguien u ofrecido algo a cambio de un favor relacionado con un trabajo o tarea?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Nunca | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 21.1 |
| | Muy rara vez | 26 | 36.6 | 36.6 | 57.7 |
| | A veces | 17 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 81.7 |
| | Frecuentemente | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 95.8 |
| | Muy frecuentemente | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 3. Survey Results (2018): “Ofrecido un regalo a un empleado mientras está en funciones”

¿Ofrecido un regalo a un empleado mientras está en funciones?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Nunca | 32 | 45.1 | 45.1 | 45.1 |
| | Muy rara vez | 18 | 25.4 | 25.4 | 70.4 |
| | A veces | 16 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 93.0 |
| | Frecuentemente | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 97.2 |
| | Muy frecuentemente | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4. Survey Results (2018): "Recurrir a amigos, conocidos o familiares de la administración para que agilicen un trámite", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Recurrir a amigos, conocidos o familiares de la administración para que agilicen un trámite

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| | 2 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 5.6 |
| | 3 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 7.0 |
| | 4 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 9.9 |
| | 5 | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 31.0 |
| | 6 | 9 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 43.7 |
| | 7 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 50.7 |
| | 8 | 16 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 73.2 |
| | 9 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 84.5 |
| | 10 | 11 | 15.5 | 15.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 5. Survey Results (2018): "La verdadera corrupción es aquella en la que incurren los poderosos", 1 (completely disagree) – 5 (completely agree)

La verdadera corrupción es aquella en la que incurren los poderosos

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 28 | 39.4 | 39.4 | 39.4 |
| | 2 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 50.7 |
| | 3 | 17 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 74.6 |
| | 4 | 4 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 80.3 |
| | 5 | 14 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 6. Survey Results (2018): "A mayor poder, mayor corrupción", 1 (not severe) – 5 (very severe)

A mayor poder, mayor corrupción

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 |
| | 2 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 11.3 |
| | 3 | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 32.4 |
| | 4 | 14 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 52.1 |
| | 5 | 34 | 47.9 | 47.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 7. Survey Results (2018): "Para ser un buen corrupto hay que ser muy astuto", 1 (completely disagree) – 5 (completely agree)

Para ser un buen corrupto hay que ser muy astuto

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 27 | 38.0 | 38.0 | 38.0 |
| | 2 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 49.3 |
| | 3 | 16 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 71.8 |
| | 4 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 78.9 |
| | 5 | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 2.2: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.2

Table 1. Survey Results (2018): "Contratar a alguien debido a su relación personal contigo en lugar de sus habilidades y méritos", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Contratar a alguien debido a su relación personal contigo en lugar de sus habilidades y méritos

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| | 2 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.8 |
| | 3 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 4.2 |
| | 5 | 7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 14.1 |
| | 6 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 21.1 |
| | 7 | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 29.6 |
| | 8 | 12 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 46.5 |
| | 9 | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 60.6 |
| | 10 | 28 | 39.4 | 39.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 2. Survey Results (2018): "Aceptado algo a cambio de utilizar tu puesto laboral en favor de otra persona"

¿Aceptado algo a cambio de utilizar tu puesto laboral en favor de otra persona?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Nunca | 41 | 57.7 | 57.7 | 57.7 |
| | Muy rara vez | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 78.9 |
| | A veces | 9 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 91.5 |
| | Frecuentemente | 4 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 97.2 |
| | Muy frecuentemente | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 2.3: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.3

Table 2. Survey Results (2018): "Solicitado una "incapacidad medica" de su doctor sin sentirte enfermo"

¿Solicitado una "incapacidad medica" de su doctor sin sentirte enfermo?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Nunca | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 21.1 |
| | Muy rara vez | 26 | 36.6 | 36.6 | 57.7 |
| | A veces | 17 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 81.7 |
| | Frecuentemente | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 95.8 |
| | Muy frecuentemente | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 2. Survey Results (2018): "Hecho un favor a un maestro o profesor a cambio de una calificación más alta"

¿Hecho un favor a un maestro o profesor a cambio de una calificación más alta?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Nunca | 40 | 56.3 | 56.3 | 56.3 |
| | Muy rara vez | 18 | 25.4 | 25.4 | 81.7 |
| | A veces | 9 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 94.4 |
| | Frecuentemente | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 98.6 |
| | Muy frecuentemente | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 3. Survey Results (2018): "La ocasión hace al ladrón", 1 (completely disagree) – 5 (completely agree)

La ocasión hace al ladrón"

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 30 | 42.3 | 42.3 | 42.3 |
| | 2 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 53.5 |
| | 3 | 12 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 70.4 |
| | 4 | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 78.9 |
| | 5 | 15 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 2.4: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.4

Table 3. Survey Results (2018): "Si ganas tú, ganamos todos", 1 (completely disagree) – 5 (completely agree)

| | | Si ganas tú, ganamos todos | | | |
|-------|-------|-----------------------------------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid | 1 | 12 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 16.9 |
| | 2 | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 25.4 |
| | 3 | 28 | 39.4 | 39.4 | 64.8 |
| | 4 | 12 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 81.7 |
| | 5 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 4. Survey Results (2018): "Hay que actuar según la premisa: Ayúdame, que yo te ayudo", 1 (completely disagree) – 5 (completely agree)

Hay que actuar según la premisa: Ayúdame, que yo te ayudo

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 17 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 23.9 |
| | 2 | 7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 33.8 |
| | 3 | 29 | 40.8 | 40.8 | 74.6 |
| | 4 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 85.9 |
| | 5 | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 2.5: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.5

Table 5. Survey Results (2018): "Recibir un empleado o funcionario un regalo de sus subalternos o del público por su cumpleaños", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Recibir un empleado o funcionario un regalo de sus subalternos o del público por su cumpleaños

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 46 | 64.8 | 64.8 | 64.8 |
| | 2 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 76.1 |
| | 3 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 80.3 |
| | 4 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 87.3 |
| | 5 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 94.4 |
| | 6 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 98.6 |
| | 10 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 6. Survey Results (2018): "Prestar dinero a un amigo, porque este no tiene dinero para sobrevivir", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Prestar dinero a un amigo, porque este no tiene dinero para sobrevivir

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 45 | 63.4 | 63.4 | 63.4 |
| | 2 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 81.7 |
| | 3 | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 95.8 |
| | 5 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 97.2 |
| | 6 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 98.6 |
| | 8 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 7. Survey Results (2018): "En una tienda o restaurante, no informar que se han equivocado en la cuenta, cuando el error te beneficia", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

En una tienda o restaurante, no informar que se han equivocado en la cuenta, cuando el error te beneficia

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| | 4 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.8 |
| | 5 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 4.2 |
| | 6 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 7.0 |
| | 7 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 18.3 |
| | 8 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 25.4 |
| | 9 | 16 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 47.9 |
| | 10 | 37 | 52.1 | 52.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 8. Survey Results (2018): "Hurtar o sustraer de algún lugar algún objeto para tenerlo como recuerdo", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Hurtar o sustraer de algún lugar algún objeto para tenerlo como recuerdo

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 3 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| | 4 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 4.2 |
| | 5 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 8.5 |
| | 6 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 9.9 |
| | 7 | 4 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 15.5 |
| | 8 | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 23.9 |
| | 9 | 12 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 40.8 |
| | 10 | 42 | 59.2 | 59.2 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 9. Survey Results (2018): "Usar la coquetería o la galantería para obtener un resultado favorable de la administración o de una empresa o comercio", 1 (not severe) – 10 (very severe)

Usar la coquetería o la galantería para obtener un resultado favorable de la administración o de una empresa o comercio

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| | 2 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.8 |
| | 3 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 4.2 |
| | 5 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 7.0 |
| | 6 | 5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 14.1 |
| | 7 | 4 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 19.7 |
| | 8 | 9 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 32.4 |
| | 9 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 50.7 |
| | 10 | 35 | 49.3 | 49.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 10. Survey Results (2018): "La corrupción es un problema serio", 1 (completely disagree) - 5 (completely agree)

La corrupción es un problema serio

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 4 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| | 5 | 69 | 97.2 | 97.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 11. Survey Results (2018): "La corrupción es un problema que debe abordarse de inmediato", 1 (completely disagree) - 5 (completely agree)

La corrupción es un problema que debe abordarse de inmediato

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 3 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| | 4 | 4 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 8.5 |
| | 5 | 65 | 91.5 | 91.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 12. Survey Results (2018): "Si todos cometen actos de corrupción, para qué te vas a hacer el mártir o el santo", 1 (completely disagree) - 5 (completely agree)

Si todos cometen actos de corrupción, ¿para qué te vas a hacer el mártir o el santo?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 47 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 66.2 |
| | 2 | 11 | 15.5 | 15.5 | 81.7 |
| | 3 | 7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 91.5 |
| | 4 | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 94.4 |
| | 5 | 4 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 13. Survey Results (2018): "Denunciar la corrupción es meterse en problemas", 1 (completely disagree) - 5 (completely agree)

Denunciar la corrupción es meterse en problemas

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 23 | 32.4 | 32.4 | 32.4 |
| | 2 | 7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 42.3 |
| | 3 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 60.6 |
| | 4 | 8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 71.8 |
| | 5 | 20 | 28.2 | 28.2 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 2.6: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.7

Table 14. Survey Results (2018): "Los escándalos de corrupción se destapan para ocultar otros problemas o para desviar la atención del público", 1 (completely disagree) - 5 (completely agree)

Los escándalos de corrupción se destapan para ocultar otros problemas o para desviar la atención del público

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| | 2 | 3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 8.5 |
| | 3 | 20 | 28.2 | 28.2 | 36.6 |
| | 4 | 13 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 54.9 |
| | 5 | 32 | 45.1 | 45.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 2.7: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.8

Table 15. Survey Results (2018): "La corrupción es parte de la cultura del mexicano", 1 (completely disagree) – 5 (completely agree)

La corrupción es parte de la cultura del mexicano

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 1 | 34 | 47.9 | 47.9 | 47.9 |
| | 2 | 11 | 15.5 | 15.5 | 63.4 |
| | 3 | 9 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 76.1 |
| | 4 | 7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 85.9 |
| | 5 | 10 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 16. Survey Results (2018): "Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas"

¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Nunca | 20 | 28.2 | 28.2 | 28.2 |
| | Muy rara vez | 22 | 31.0 | 31.0 | 59.2 |
| | A veces | 16 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 81.7 |
| | Frecuentemente | 7 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 91.5 |
| | Muy frecuentemente | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 2.1. Survey Results (2018): Crosstabulation: "Sexo" & "Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas"

Sexo: * ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? Crosstabulation

| | | ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | | |
|------------|---|--|--------------|---------|
| | | Nunca | Muy rara vez | A veces |
| Sexo: Male | Count | 6 | 4 | 9 |
| | % within Sexo: | 22.2% | 14.8% | 33.3% |
| | % within ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | 30.0% | 18.2% | 56.3% |
| | % of Total | 8.5% | 5.6% | 12.7% |
| Female | Count | 14 | 18 | 7 |
| | % within Sexo: | 31.8% | 40.9% | 15.9% |
| | % within ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | 70.0% | 81.8% | 43.8% |
| | % of Total | 19.7% | 25.4% | 9.9% |
| Total | Count | 20 | 22 | 16 |
| | % within Sexo: | 28.2% | 31.0% | 22.5% |
| | % within ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | % of Total | 28.2% | 31.0% | 22.5% |

Sexo: * ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas?
Crosstabulation

| | | | ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | | |
|-------|---|---|--|--------------------|--------|
| | | | Frecuentemente | Muy frecuentemente | |
| Sexo: | Male | Count | 6 | 2 | 27 |
| | | % within Sexo: | 22.2% | 7.4% | 100.0% |
| | | % within ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | 85.7% | 33.3% | 38.0% |
| | | % of Total | 8.5% | 2.8% | 38.0% |
| | Female | Count | 1 | 4 | 44 |
| | | % within Sexo: | 2.3% | 9.1% | 100.0% |
| | | % within ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | 14.3% | 66.7% | 62.0% |
| | | % of Total | 1.4% | 5.6% | 62.0% |
| Total | Count | 7 | 6 | 71 | |
| | % within Sexo: | 9.9% | 8.5% | 100.0% | |
| | % within ¿Intercambiar favores como táctica necesaria para hacer las cosas? | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | |
| | % of Total | 9.9% | 8.5% | 100.0% | |

Chi-Square Tests

| | Value | df | Asymptotic Significance (2- sided) |
|------------------------------|---------------------|----|--|
| Pearson Chi-Square | 13.289 ^a | 4 | .010 |
| Likelihood Ratio | 13.710 | 4 | .008 |
| Linear-by-Linear Association | 4.192 | 1 | .041 |
| N of Valid Cases | 71 | | |

a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.28.

Appendix 2.8: Survey Results Chapter 3.1.9

Table 17. Survey Results (2018): "Piensas que transparencia y rendición de cuentas sean suficientes para eliminar la corrupción

¿Piensas que transparencia y rendición de cuentas sean suficientes para eliminar la corrupción?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Sí, de ambos son suficientes | 28 | 39.4 | 39.4 | 39.4 |
| | Sí, solo la transparencia es suficiente | 2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 42.3 |
| | No, los dos no son suficientes | 34 | 47.9 | 47.9 | 90.1 |
| | Ninguno de eso puede ayudar | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 91.5 |
| | No lo sé | 6 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Table 18. Survey Results (2018)"En una escala de 1-5, crees que puedes ser parte en mejorar la transparencia y rendición de cuentas", 1 (completely disagree) - 5 (completely agree)

En una escala de 1-5, crees que puedes ser parte en mejorar la transparencia y rendición de cuentas?

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | 2 | 1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| | 3 | 12 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 18.3 |
| | 4 | 16 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 40.8 |
| | 5 | 42 | 59.2 | 59.2 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 71 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Appendix 3: People interviewed

| Interviewee | Job | Subjects discussed | Place and Date | Duration |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|----------|
| Señora Clarissa Torres | Teacher at the Instituto Estatal de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales en Yucatán (INAIP) | INAIP, transparency, accountability, (Petty) corruption | INAIP: Avenida Colón No. 185 x 10 y 12 Col. García Ginerés. C.P. 97070. Mérida, Yucatán, México. 18 January 2018 | 55:29 |
| C.P. Alvaro de Jesús Carcaño Loeza | Director of training and educational projects at the Instituto Estatal de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos Personales en Yucatán (INAIP) | INAIP, transparency, accountability, (Petty) corruption, preliminary results of the survey and the Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción | INAIP: Avenida Colón No. 185 x 10 y 12 Col. García Ginerés. C.P. 97070. Mérida, Yucatán, México. 18 January 2018 | 37:55 |
| L.M. Luis Artemio Aldana Burgos | Director of the Instituto Estatal para el Combate a la Corrupción en Yucatán (INECCO) | INECCO, transparency, accountability, (Petty) corruption, governmental issues, preliminary results of the survey, suggestion to decrease corruption, the Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción | INECCO: Calle 20ª No 284B x 3C y 49-Diagonal colonia Xcumpich, Mérida, Yucatán 23 January 2018 | 2:43:00 |
| Anonymous 1 | English teach in primary school | Awareness on corruption, Transparency and accountability, local issues | 2 December 2017 | 45:00 |
| Anonymous 2 | Independent professional | Awareness on corruption, Transparency and accountability, local issues | 2 December 2017 | 30:00 |