undesirability, negation, and/or responsibility

an intersubjective approach
to constructions with μή in Ancient Greek

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Foreword

This thesis is the final piece of an almost-decennium, in which I have tried to combine and to learn more about my two favorite subjects: linguistics and the Greek language. The period started out with a Bachelor in Linguistics at Utrecht University. During this studies, I discovered that there is a whole scientific field built around the questions that I always thought I was the only one asking (and even better: there are *more* questions). But I also sensed that could not forget Greek, my favorite subject in high school with the inspiring classes by Simon Veenman. So after courses by the enthusiastic Michel Buijs, my curriculum continued with a Bachelor Greek and Latin languages and cultures at VU University. There I met Rutger Allan, who showed me what happens if one combines Greek with linguistics. I learned about more views on language than only generativism.

I subscribed for the Research Master Linguistics at Leiden University with the wish to finally combine the two subjects in one program and to learn more about different approaches to language. With courses on historical linguistics, syntax, semantics, pragmatics and construction grammar, I wrote most papers about Ancient Greek and Modern Greek (which I picked up in summer schools and one semester at the University of Crete). I followed courses at the University of Amsterdam and VU University. And I met Arie Verhagen, who showed me what happens if you take some distance from all traditional theories about parts of speech and parsing and functions— his view on constructions and cooperative communication is refreshing. I am happy that he was willing to supervise this thesis, which was written in a turbulent year.

I am grateful to my parents, who supported me in every way, and the many men and women who taught me and my stubborn character more than they and I realize. It's been nice and I look forward to the next decennium.

Dieke Janssen
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Abbreviations

1. Greek sources

Ar.   Aristophanes
Ach.   *Acharnenses*   (Acharnians)
Av.   *Aves*   (Birds)
Eq.   *Equites*   (Knights)
Nu.   *Nubes*   (Clouds)
Pax   (Peace)
Ra.   *Ranae*   (Frogs)
V.   *Vespae*   (Wasps)
Aeschin.   Aeschinus
Pl.   Plato
Cri.   *Crito*
Theaet.   *Theaetetus*
Hdt.   Herodotus' *Historiai*

2. Glosses

1/2/3	1st/2nd/3rd person	PRT	particle
ACC	accusative	PST	past
AOR	aorist	PTC	participle
DAT	dative	SBJ	subjunctive
FUT	future	SG/PL	singular/plural
GEN	genitive		
IMPER	imperative		
IMPF	imperfect		
IND	indicative		
INF	infinitive		
MH	μή		
OPT	optative		
PASS	passive		
PERF	perfect		
PRS	present		

1 | Introduction

1. Two negation particles? The problem

It is generally known that Ancient Greek has two words for negation: οὐ and μή (Kühner & Gerth 1904; Rijksbaron 2006). Their distribution is almost complementary. I give a quick sketch to illustrate the problem; the distribution is described in more detail in chapter 2. Οὐ is used in assertions with indicatives (ex. (1)) and optatives with particle ἄν, μή with imperative (2), subjunctive (3) and desiderative optative (4).

(1) οὐ γάρ με νῦν γε διαβαλεῖ Κλέων ὅτι ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν
not PRT me now PRT blame.FUT.IND Cleon that foreigners present the city
κακῶς λέγω. (Ar. Ach. 502)
badly speak.PRS.IND
'Cleon shall not be able to accuse me of speaking badly of the city in front of strangers'

(2) ὦγαθοί, τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἀκούσατ', ἀλλὰ μὴ κεκράγετε. (Ar. V. 415)
best.VOC the reality listen.IMPER but MH bawl.IMPER
'Friends, listen to the truth, and stop bawling.'

(3) μή νυν ἀνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεντείνωμεν ἀνδρικώτερον. (Ar. Pax 515)
MH now give.up.1PL.SBJ but get.stronger.1PL.AOR.SBJ manly.COMP
'Don't let us give up, let us redouble our efforts.'

(4) ἀλλ', ὦ Διόνυσ', ἀπόλοιτο καὶ μὴ 'λθοι φέρων. (Ar. Pax 267)
PRT O Dionysus die.3SG.OPT.AOR and MH come.3SG.OPT.AOR bring.PTC
'Ah! Bacchus! May he die and not return bringing [a pestle]!'

There are, however, some problems with calling μή an "adverb of negation" (Kühner & Gerth, ibid.). A well-known feature of negation is that it turns questions into rhetorical questions: the polarity is changed (Israel (2011); Bechmann (2007); Slot (1993)). Greek polar questions with οὐ have the same effect: they make a statement that something is the case, instead of asking whether something is not the case. Questions containing *why not?* are requests: they invite or urge someone to act, instead of enquiring why something is not the case. The speaker expects the addressee to affirm the statement (not negated) or act. Questions with μή work in the opposite direction. The question does not cancel the negation, but rather steers the addressee in the direction of a negative answer. Questions with μή can be interpreted as negative requests or prohibitives (ex. (5)). The state of affairs is, in the eyes of the speaker, undesirable, something he does not want to happen.

(5) ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθῇ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων (…); (Pl. Cri. 44e)
PRT PRT MH me.GEN take.care.of.2SG.SUBJ and the other friends
'You are not considering me and your other friends, are you, (…)?'

Another construction in which μή does not behave as a typical negation is in complements after verbs of fear (ex. (6)). In a complement of fear, μή does not mean 'not', but is translated with 'that'. The speaker in (6) is not afraid that the old man does *not* need beatings, but he is afraid that the old man *needs* them. If he was afraid something would *not* happen, the combination μή οὐ would have been used. The same applies to verbs of interdiction.

(6) δέδοικά σ', ὦ πρεσβῦτα, μὴ πληγῶν δέει. (Ar. Nu. 493)
fear.1SG you O old.man MH beatings need
'I fear, old man, that you will need blows.'

The combination μή οὐ is thus used in complements of fear when the subject is afraid something will not happen. The combination οὐ μή is possible as well and is used in main clauses with indicative and subjunctive (ex. (7)). The two negative words do not cancel the negative value, but rather enhance it.

(7) οὗτος μὲν οὐ μή σοι ποιήσῃ ζημίαν. (Ar. Pax 1226)
that PRT not MH you.DAT make.3SG.AOR.SBJ harm
'Oh, you will lose nothing over it.'

From the few examples above, it might appear that μή cannot be used as a negation. However, in conditional constructions μή is clearly negation (ex. (8)) and when used in an oath with indicative, μή strongly means 'not' (ex. (9)).

(8) εἰ μή μ' ἀναπείσετ', ἀποθανεῖσθε τήμερον (Ar. Eq. 68)
if MH me obey.2PL die.2PL.FUT today
'If you do not obey me, you will die today'
(9) (A: Look! Between Earth and the gods is air, right? Well, look, if we from Athens have to go, say to the Oracle at Delphi, we have to ask permission from the Boetians, to let us pass through their country. It'll be the same with you. If you've got your city up there, the gods would have to pay you for the aromas of the sacrifices the humans make, to reach them.)
B: μὴ 'γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω (Ar. Av. 195)
MH I perception clever.COMP hear.1SG.AOR.IND ever
'[I swear] I never heard of anything more cleverly conceived'

We can expand this list with different uses of μή in relative clauses (where οὐ is used in non-restricting or digressive clauses, and μή in restricting clauses). For reasons of space I have not included relative clauses in this study, so for more details I refer to Rijksbaron (2006: 87ff.).

In the previous examples, it was shown how the meaning of μή varies from a non-negative meaning in complements of fear to negation in conditionals, and from hope in questions to certainty in oaths. Is it possible to give an account for the polysemous meaning of μή? That is the main research question of this thesis.

2. Negation: objective, subjective, intersubjective

Has this question, which is about a language that was spoken over 2000 years ago, never been asked and answered before? Yes, it has. An overview of approaches is given in chapter 2. The standard description of the difference between οὐ and μή is given by Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178, § 510.1):

> § 510. Die Modaladverbien der Negation οὐ und μή
> 1. Οὐ (…) negiert objektiv, μή subjektiv, d.h. οὐ wird gebraucht, wenn etwas schlechtweg negiert, d.h. als an und für sich nicht seiend bezeichnet wird; μή hingegen, wenn etwas von dem subjektiven Standpunkte des Redenden aus negiert, d.h. als nur in dem Willen oder in der Vorstellung des Redenden nicht seiend bezeichnet wird. Durch οὐ wird das äußere, objektive Sein aufgehoben; durch μή hingegen wird ein Akt der Vorstellung oder des Willens des Redenden ausgedrückt. (Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178, § 510.1))[1]

In this grammar from over a century ago, the difference between οὐ and μή is defined by the difference between "objective" and "subjective". The main function of language was considered describing the world and this distinction played a major part: a situation is true or false, and it exists in reality or in the mind. Nearly a century later, the view on language and communication has changed, as seen in the argumentative approach (Ducrot (1996), Anscombre & Ducrot (1989)) and the intersubjective approach (Verhagen (2005)). According to these views, the primary function of language is not describing the world, but it is merely used by speakers to coordinate cognitively with their addressees in order to create a common ground (Verhagen 2005). The stance towards a situation (state of affairs, object of conceptualization) is shared, in order to lead the addressee to the right conclusions (Ducrot 1996), to behave in a certain way. The main function of communication is to influence the

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[1] Most of the citations of Kühner & Gerth come from Teil 2, Band 2 of their grammar. If a different part is cited, the source is given explicitly.

cognition and (thereby) behavior of the addressee. Utterances are never objective but always subjective, or rather intersubjective. I will give a more elaborate description of these approaches in chapter 3.

Seen from this point of view, defining the difference between words by the predicate 'objective' or 'subjective' seems insufficient. Negation is one of the phenomena in language that Verhagen (ibid.: chapter 2) has used to describe the intersubjectivity of language. The argumentative approach argues that a speaker only gives arguments in utterances, from which the addressee can draw conclusions himself. In this way, most words do not objectively describe the world, but merely the stance of a speaker, and they point towards a conclusion. Negation invalidates the conclusions that may ordinarily be drawn from a statement and orients the speaker towards other (ibid.: 42). Negation primarily has the function to help the speaker draw the right conclusions. I will come back to this view on negation in chapter 3 and 4.

3. This thesis

The aim of this thesis is to find the common characteristics in the different constructions with μή from an intersubjective point of view, which might bring us to a unifying account, allowing for the observed polysemy.

Polysemy is strongly connected to (or caused by) diachronic language development. I take the idea of Kvičala (cited in Kühner & Gerth (1904: 179)) as my starting point. He argues that "μή (…) had, when we take the oldest usages into account, not at all the meaning of negation in the beginning, but was only a rejecting, repelling particle (…)." This idea needs to be connected to the other values of μή that were shown in section 1.

This study will be a synchronic study. The different constructions are taken from comedies of Aristophanes (approx. 446–386 BCE). Details about the corpus are given in chapter 4. Because the size of an MA thesis is restricted, I will look at the following constructions with μή: complement constructions, main clauses (imperative, subjunctive, optative and indicative) with μή, main clauses (future indicative and subjunctive) with οὐ μή, and conditional clauses. Satellite clauses, relative clauses, participle clauses, and noun phrases are excluded from this study.

This study is a semasiological study. This means that I will only look at the differences and similarities between constructions with μή. Comparing the different senses with the senses of οὐ would give a very interesting onomasiological study, but I leave that for the future.

Studying language in general and classical languages in particular entails standing in a long tradition and being one of many. In chapter 2, I describe earlier accounts of μή

(and partial counterparts in other languages, such as *ne* in French) with very different approaches.

The aim of the thesis is to look at μή with an intersubjective approach. The framework in which I will work is described in chapter 3. It provides a background for the analysis presented in chapter 4. In this chapter, I describe and compare the different constructions with μή in order to find a way to bring the different uses of the word together in one account. A summary and conclusion is given in chapter 5, as well as suggestions for further research.

2 | Theoretical background: state of affairs

1. Introduction

From the perspective of a European scholar with a firm background in logics (which, in this tradition, most of us are), three things are odd about Greek negation. Firstly, Greek uses two different morphemes, οὐ and μή. Secondly, μή is used as negation in many constructions, but does not seem to negate the predicate when used in complement clauses after negative verbs and verbs of fear. And thirdly, when οὐ and μή are used together in the same clause, the clause often remains negative instead of logically becoming positive.

In this chapter, several theories and accounts are discussed that try to explain these three 'problems' above.

2. Using two different negative morphemes

A brief sketch of the distribution of οὐ and μή was given in chapter 1. A more elaborate overview of the distribution and the meaning of the construction is shown in Table 1, after Mirambel (1946). The description is based on the verbal moods, as is the custom.

Table 1. Overview of uses of οὐ and μή, divided by verbal mood (after Mirambel 1946: 58-59).

Verbal mood	οὐ	μή
Indicative	Realis mode, in a declarative proposition, expressing an expected judgment conform reality	[- Passionate oath] - Irrealis mode, in a proposition introduced with εἰ γάρ, ὡς, with past times or with ὤφελον (followed by infinitive)
Subjunctive	(not in Attic)	Mode of desire, exhortation, doubt, prohibition [Conditional clauses]
Optative	Potential mode, with ἄν, in a main clause (assertion, statement of obligation, ability)[1]	Mode of wish, without ἄν, in a main clause, generally introduced with εἰ γάρ or εἴθε
Imperative		Prohibition
Infinitive	Complement of a declarative verb (say, believe, think)	Other uses (infinitive as a subject, expressing a wish after a verb of wanting, infinitive expressing a goal or a consequence, infinitive with an article)
Participle [relative clause]	Expression of a particular circumstance, determined	Expression of a general fact, undetermined
Questions	Affirming answer expected (rhetorical question)	Negative answer expected

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[1] Addition between brackets from Willmott (2008: fig. 2).

Summarizing: οὐ is used in indicative clauses and in embedded infinitive clauses expressing an assertion or a belief, μή is used in other clauses. Their distribution seems to depend on the interaction of various syntactic, semantic and maybe pragmatic parameters.

Different scholars have tried to pin down the parameters for this distribution. One of the earliest is the Hellenistic grammarian Dionysios Thrax (ca. 170-90 BCE), in his *Art of Grammar* (Τέχνη γραμματική) (section ιθ'). He described οὐ as an adverb of ἄρνησις ἢ ἀπόφασις 'denial or negation' and μή as an adverb of ἀπαγόρευσις 'prohibition'. However, Table 1 above shows that μή is often used in sentences that are certainly not prohibitive, but e.g. a desire. Two millennia later, this division of labor has been described in different terms, but along the same lines: *objective* and *subjective*, *denying* and *repelling* (Kühner & Gerth 1904; Chatzopoulou 2012)*, assertive* and *nonassertive*, *independent* and *dependent* (Horn 1989). Horn (p. 448) calls them "indicative vs. directive (or assertive vs. prohibitive) axes".

In this section, I shortly describe three accounts that try to define the difference between οὐ and μή: by Kühner & Gerth (1904), by Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004), and by Willmott (2008).

2.1 Kühner & Gerth (1904): Objective vs. subjective

Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178)[2] say about the difference between οὐ and μή (my translation): "Οὐ (…) negates objectively, μή subjectively, i.e. οὐ is used when something roughly negates, i.e. if in and of itself not being is meant; μή on the other hand, when something from the subjective point of view of the speaker negates, i.e. if only in the will or in the idea of the speaker not-being is meant. By οὐ is the outer, objective being canceled; by μή on the other hand an act of the imagination or of the will of the speaker is expressed."[3]

In a footnote, they (p. 179) cite Kvičala (1856): "οὐ is that particle, that actually and originally encloses the notion of cancellation, negation; μή however had, when we take the oldest usages into account, not at all the meaning of negation in the

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[2] Most of the citations of Kühner & Gerth come from Teil 2, Band 2 of their grammar. If a different part is cited, the source is given explicitly.

[3] Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178): "Οὐ negiert objectiv, μή subjektiv, d. h. οὐ wird gebraucht, wenn etwas schlechtweg negiert, d. h. als an und für sich nicht seiend bezeichnet wird; μή hingegen, wenn etwas von dem subjektiven Standpunkte des Redenden aus negiert, d. h. als nur in dem Willen oder in der Vorstellung des Redenden nicht seiend bezeichnet wird. Durch οὐ wird das äußere, objektive Sein aufgehoben; durch μή hingegen wird ein Akt der Vorstellung oder des Willens des Redenden ausgedrückt."

beginning, but was only a rejecting, repelling particle: οὐ rests on the intellectual activity of denying, μή on the will-activity of repelling."[4]

Important to note here is the fact that Kühner & Gerth consider negation by οὐ equal to yes-no (polar) questions, or in their words (p. 211): "a positive expression, that by preposed οὐ (…) or by the question form is negated, (…)." That means that also Kühner & Gerth recognize that polarity can be changed by negation and equally by polar questions. Μή is not equated to questions in this way.

Negation of the infinitive

In Table 1 it is shown that both οὐ and μή are used with the infinitive. Kühner & Gerth (p. 193) explain the use of both negations with the infinitive as follows.

The infinitive "as the object of the governing verb" can have one of two meanings. When the main verb means *meinen* 'to mean, believe, think', to say, assert (and often an Accusative with Infinitive (AcI) construction is used), then the object is expressed as independent from the subject of the matrix verb, as an assertion from the writer. The infinitive is then negated with οὐ.

With main verbs of volition, possibility, ability, necessity and "in general with those, of which the object can be interpreted as imagined by the subject of the main verb", the object is expressed as dependent on the subject of the matrix verb, as an idea of the subject and negated with μή. The main verb has a 'positive' meaning, as opposed to negative verbs, e.g. *deny*. The use of μή with infinitive after negative main verbs is described in section 3.

The infinitive with an article is always negated by μή, even when it is used to describe "*wirklichen* Thatsachen", in which it is interpreted everywhere as an abstract notion (p. 197).

Negation of the participle and adjective

The difference between οὐ and μή is also visible when used with participles and adjectives (p. 198). Although these constructions are not discussed in the analysis in chapter 4, I mention them here to give the reader an idea of the difference between both negations. When the participle can be dissolved into a declarative sentence, it is negated with οὐ (cf. the infinitive). When the participle can be dissolved into a subordinate clause that would require μή, it is negated with μή. Thus οὐ πιστεύων

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[4] Kvičala (1856) in Kühner & Gerth (1904: 179): "Οὐ ist diejenige Partikel, die eigentlich und ursprünglich den Begriff des Aufhebens, Verneinens in sich schließt; μή hingegen hatte, wenn wir die ältesten Gebrauchsweisen desselben ins Auge fassen, anfangs gar nicht die Geltung einer Negation, sondern war nur eine ablehnende, abwehrende Partikel: οὐ beruht auf der Verstandesthätigkeit des Leugnens, μή auf der Willensthätigket der Abwehr."

(PTC.PRS NOM.M.SG 'believing') means 'while, because, although he does not believe', versus μή πιστεύων 'if he does not believe'.

The participle with article, e.g. οἱ βουλόμενοι (ART PTC.PRS NOM.M.PL 'the willing [people]') can be negated with both οὐ and μή (p. 201). It is a short version of the relative clause. The construction is negated with οὐ, when it is related to determined objects or real existing facts: a non-restrictive, digressive relative clause. Μή is used when it expresses a purely abstract notion, but also when it relates, very general, without consideration to particular previous cases, to a group of persons or objects. Adjectives with an article are negated and interpreted in the same way.

Concluding

We may conclude that the notions of 'objective' and 'subjective' in the definition of Kühner & Gerth comprise many different uses. 'Subjective' comprises prohibitive, 'the idea of the subject', an abstract notion, a general group of entities. 'Objective' comprises assertions of the writer, independent of the subject, and determined existing entities.

This contrast of 'objective—subjective' may describe the distinction, but it is not very specific. When is an utterance objective or subjective? Is an oath about the past ('I swear I have never') subjective? And an utterance with an epistemic stance (expressing the probability that something is the case) with an optative with ἄν objective? I think we overlook the different senses of μή when we just name it 'subjective'. Willmott (2008) (section 2.3) raises the same objections to the account of Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004).

2.2 Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004): Epistemic vs. deontic

The view of Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004), one century later, does not deviate much from Kühner & Gerth, although they use different terms. They state that the choice of negative morpheme in the main clause is not associated with the mood of the verb, because many verbal moods can occur with both negations (visible in Table 1 above). "As it is evident from the situation in embedded clauses, negation is affected by the modality of the clause. Thus, μή is the negation for deontic and οὐ for epistemic modality" (ibid.: 794). They base their conclusion on the assumption that subjunctive, optative and imperative verbs "prototypically" express deontic modalities and are prototypically negated with μή, as opposed to indicative, which is used in epistemic modalities.

In a footnote, Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (p. 811, n. 10) add that this split between modalities is also visible in conjunctions ("complementizers"). Some conjunctions, e.g. ὅτι, are incompatible with the subjunctive mood, and others, e.g. ἵνα, incompatible with the indicative. "This incompatibility may be attributed to the

modality associated with these complementizers, that is, epistemic with ὅτι vs. deontic with ἵνα."

It is not made clear in this article what is to be understood by 'deontic' modality. Many definitions are given in the literature (cf. Nuyts 2006). A problem for this proposal is that e.g. the conditional construction is not discussed. Is the antecedent (condition, protasis) of a conditional to be considered 'deontic'? Willmott (2008) points out that the categorization is too simple.

2.3 Willmott (2008): Different categories

Willmott (2008) argues against the conclusion of Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004). She lists the uses of the negators in Homeric Greek and links them to the functional categories proposed by Cinque (2004); her two tables are combined in Table 2 below. She concludes that the two different negators are found in a range of different contexts, "which may not be simply categorized as deontic/epistemic or ±modal". She claims that the negators can each operate at different 'levels' of the clause. I will not go into the (generative cartographic) details here, but the proposal of Willmott shows that the binary objective/subjective or epistemic/deontic view may not be sufficient.

Table 2. The uses of the negators in Homeric Greek

Mood	Construction	Negator	Functional category
Imperative/subjunctive	Directives	μή	Speech act
Optative	Wishes	μή	Speech act
Optative/subjunctive/indicative	Conditional antecedents	μή	Irrealis
Optative/subjunctive/indicative	Purpose clauses	μή	Irrealis
Optative/indicative	Conditional consequents	οὐ	Irrealis
Optative	Statements of obligation	οὐ	Obligation
Optative	Statements of ability	οὐ	Permission/ Ability
Indicative/subjunctive	Assertions	οὐ	

2.4 (Non-)standard negation

Ancient Greek is one of many languages that use different words (or affixes) to negate different constructions. Can we compare the difference between οὐ and μή with the use of negation in other languages?

The description of οὐ and μή above suggests that οὐ is what is called in the literature "standard negation", and μή "non-standard negation". Typological studies usually concentrate on what has been seen as the basic negation constructions in languages (Dahl 2010), such as "negation in simple indicative sentences with a verbal

predicate" (Dahl 1979, cited in Dahl 2010). Also Dryer (2013) shows only "clausal negation in declarative sentences". This tendency can be traced back to Aristotle, who explicitly excluded nondeclaratives from his treatise *De Interpretatione* because they were the subject of rhetoric, instead of logic (Horn 1989: 86 n. 68; Whitaker 2002: 72).

The focus on standard negation has the consequence that there are no systematic typological surveys on "non-standard negation", of which μή is an example (Dahl 2010).[5] The one systematic typological study (that I know of) in which *Modern* Greek μή is mentioned, is about prohibitives (Van der Auwera et al. 2013). This map shows that only one third (34%) of the languages in the sample uses "standard negation" to express a prohibitive. The majority uses "non-standard" strategies like Ancient Greek. The use of a distinct negative marker is extremely widespread in the world outside of Europe, and the same is true for a distinct negative marker for "the semantically related irrealis and potential" (Croft 1991: 14).

The fact that μή is considered "non-standard" must be the reason that literature on the use of this word (or counterparts in other languages) is not easy to find. Are there more languages that use different negative morphemes in these constructions? Do they follow the same syntactic, semantic or pragmatic parameters? It is known that Latin has two negative morphemes, *non* and *ne*, and they are used (almost) along the same lines as Ancient Greek[6], as is the case for Sanskrit and the ancient Anatolian languages (Horn 1989: 448). But I have not found any literature that describes the same phenomenon in modern languages. Van der Auwera et al. (2013) show some languages in and close to Europe that use a distinct negative marker for the prohibitive (e.g. Hebrew, Armenian, Welsh, Hungarian), but this prohibitive marker does not seem to be used like in Ancient Greek: e.g. in complement clauses after negative main verbs, in combination with the standard negation, or in conditional clauses.

In short: because of the traditional focus on assertions, research on non-standard negation like μή is rare, compared to research on standard negation. The few (Eurocentric) accounts that I have found are given in section 3 and 4 below.

3. Μή in complements after negative main verbs

Horn (2010: 112) uses the term "hypernegation" for two negations in a sentence with negative meaning. Hypernegation occurs (apart from negative concord) in cases of

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[5] Dahl (2010: 34): "There has so far been relatively little attention paid to the principles by which languages with more than one negative construction choose between them. In fact, there is a wealth of potential topics for research papers or even doctoral theses relating to the typology of negation, (…), the interaction with modality, etc."

[6] *Non* corresponds with οὐ, *ne* with μή. Latin does not have the nuance of different meanings like Greek using οὐ or μή with participle and relative clause with resp. specific or generic meaning.

"pleonastic negation", also called "sympathetic", "paratactic", "expletive" or "abusive negation" (Horn 2010: 121). Jespersen (1917: 75) describes this type of negation as follows: "a negative is placed in a clause dependent on a verb of negative import like 'deny, forbid, hinder, doubt'." This type of negation is found in Greek (μή), Latin, French, Catalan, Sanskrit, Old English, some German dialects. In some of these languages, it is also found in a clause dependent on a verb of 'fear' as well.

In this section, I describe four theories that explain why two negatives do not result in an affirmative, instead of what we would expect based on logic. Paratactic negation: the two negatives are not in the same clause (3.1); expletive negation: one of the two negatives is semantically empty (3.2); one of the two negatives is actually not a negative but a possibility marker (3.3); and the two negations are not functioning at the same semantic or pragmatic level (negation versus resistance, 3.4).

3.1 Paratactic negation

Jespersen (1917: 75) explains negatives in a complement of a verb like *deny, forbid, hinder, doubt* as paratactic negation. The complement is "treated as an independent sentence, and the negative is expressed as if there had been no main sentence of that particular kind." When two negatives are not in the same clause, they cannot form an affirmative together.

Jespersen continues by saying that this develops easily in languages in which the employed negative has no longer its full negative value, such as French (*ne*)[7] and Latin (*ne, quin*), but is also used in other languages ("by no means rare"), such as English, German, Danish. English examples are: *we have forbidden that they doe not shew any naturall worke* (Bacon); *I warned him not to do it*.

Joly (1972: 33) notes that this hypothesis of parataxis is untenable for French. When the complement is treated like an actual independent clause, *ne* disappears: *Il viendra, je le crains* "he will come, I fear it" (cf. *Je crains que il ne vienne* with equivalent meaning).

Kühner & Gerth (1904)

Kühner & Gerth's explanation fits into this category as well, although they do not use the term 'paratactic negation'. Μή is naturally not a connective particle, but the prohibitive particle in the corresponding independent clause (p. 391). Kühner & Gerth (p. 221) distinguish μή after main verbs with the meaning 'prevent' and 'deny', taking an infinitive as their object (ex. (1)), from μή after main verbs meaning 'fear', 'concern', 'uncertainty', 'consideration', 'doubt', 'distrust', 'danger', 'dangerous', 'suspect', etc.

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[7] Cf. section 3.2.

(ex. (2)). These verbs take a finite clause as their object, with subjunctive mood, optative mood or even indicative.

(1) εἴργω σε μὴ ἐλθεῖν (from Kühner & Gerth, p. 207)
     prevent.1sg you.acc MH come.inf
     'I prevent that you come'
(2) δείδω μή τι πάθῃσιν (from Kühner & Gerth, p. 391)
     fear.1sg MH something undergo.3sg
     'I fear that something happens to him'

Kühner & Gerth argue that the main verb with the meaning of 'preventing' or 'denying' (ex. (1)) is weakened to the notions of 'saying' and 'willing', and the infinitive is more independent. The implicit negation in the main verb is explicitly added to the infinitive. Thus we see μή in complements with infinitive, but also οὐ in a finite complement clause with conjunctions ὅτι and ὡς. Rarely clauses without a negation are found after verbs of preventing or denying.

In 'concern clauses' (ex. (2)), the subjunctive μή expresses the concern that something takes place. The main verb of fear may be omitted. The concern clause bears no formal signs of subordination [unlike the infinitive clause, DJ] (Kühner & Gerth, p. 391). As said above, μή is naturally not a connective particle, but the prohibitive particle in the corresponding independent clause. Formally, we are dealing with parataxis. According to Kühner & Gerth, an expression like ex. (2) might be interpreted as 'I am in fear: may nothing happen to him!', but the close [semantic] connection of the both sentences led to the idea that the second clause was dependent on the first and the connection was made by μή in the sense of 'that': 'I am afraid that something happens to him!'.[8] The latter interpretation fits well into the category of 'abusive/expletive negation'.

Important to note in this context is that μή often loses its meaning of 'not-willing' (Kühner & Gerth, volume 2, part 1, p. 224). The notion of concern "fades into the background" and μή becomes merely a particle that expresses a probability (my wording). It is not clear from Kühner & Gerth's description whether the negative evaluation is still part of the meaning. This interpretation would fit well into the theory described in 3.3 (marking a possibility) and 4.1 of this chapter. This tendency, that a word meaning 'concern' is also used for an epistemic stance, is seen in Dutch (Nuyts 2007) and English as well: *I am afraid so* 'that is very well possible (but not sure)'.

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[8] Asyndeton, i.e. lack of conjunctions, is very rare in Greek. Usually, even two main clauses are connected by one or more connecting particles.

This view on complementation, that the main verb is "weakened" and the complement more "independent", comes close to that of the intersubjective approach and to what I will argue in my analysis in chapter 4. In this approach, the complement is seen as the most informative part of the utterance, while the matrix verb only informs the addressee about how to interpret the content of the complement and what he should do with it (my wording). In chapter 3 and chapter 4, I come back to complement clauses in this approach.

3.2 Abusive (expletive) negation

The account of abusive negation originates from French linguistics. French "expletive" *ne* can be used three constructions:[9] in complement clauses of verbs that express fear, doubt, prevention or precaution; after conjunctions like *avant que* 'before' (e.g. *je suis parti avant qu'il ne soit arrivé* 'I left before he arrived'); and in the second part of the comparative construction *que ne* 'than'. Because complement clauses with *ne* are similar to those with Greek μή, it may be useful to look at this account.

Vendryès (1950): the faded negative value of ne

Vendryès (1950: 1) calls these uses of French *ne* "abusive negation", because it is "applicable to a notion that is already more or less implied in the idea that is expressed, and of which the expression is extended stealthily outside its domain overlapping with the neighboring domain".[10]

Ne in complement clauses of verbs that express fear, doubt, prevention or precaution is used in the same way as Greek μή. To express that one is afraid that something happens, *ne* is used in the complement clause; e.g. *je crains qu'il ne vienne* 'I am afraid he will come' and *cela n'empêche pas qu'il ne soit fort malade* 'That does not prevent that he is very ill'. On the other hand, to express that one is afraid that something will *not* happen, *ne…pas* is used; e.g. *je crains qu'il ne vienne pas* 'I am afraid he will not come'. In Greek, the complement clause contains μή οὐ, to express the fear of something not happening (see section 4.1). In such complement clauses, according to Vendryès (p. 15), the value of *ne* is really implied by the idea expressed by the verb.

Vendryès (p. 8) explains this as follows: "The negative value of *ne* has passed to the elements *pas* or *point* and has faded onto them (…), so that *ne* alone could be inserted improperly in a sentence that is not really negative and where the negation only floats in the idea to express." In my words, *ne* is semantically bleached, or at least

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[9] As opposed to "forclusif" *ne*, which is followed by *pas*. See e.g. Vendryès (1950) for details.
[10] « (…) le mot « abusif » s'applique à une notion plus ou moins impliquée dans l'idée à exprimer, et dont l'expression s'étend furtivement hors de son domaine en empiétant sur le voisin. »

has not enough power to negate a sentence anymore. The negating power is now only found in *pas, point, aucun* and *personne*.

However, negation in a complement clause is also found in other languages, where the negative morpheme is not semantically bleached, such as Greek, Old English, German (Middle Ages to eighteenth century). About these cases Vendryès (p.15) concludes that "we may say that the use of negation is a sign of a more free syntax, and it is natural that purists forbid it in the name of logic." For these other languages, he tends towards a more paratactic analysis (cf. section 3.1).

Müller (1978): ne *is dependent on negation in main verb*

Müller's (1978) hypothesis is close to that of Vendryès. He uses the term "expletive negation", because it "does nothing to the meaning of the sentence" (p. 76). One fundamental property of *ne* is that no negative/affirmative opposition appears between *P* and *ne P* (p.96)*.*

He observes that complements with *ne* carry negative polarity, e.g. *empêcher que ne P, eviter que ne P* 'prevent that P happens' "make sure P does not happen". Apparently, for French *ne* to appear in the complement clause, there must be a negative element in the main clause. He suggests (p. 96) that "*ne* is to be attached to the main clause, specifically to a negative term in the main clause". *Ne* becomes dependent on a negation in the main clause. Since the complement clause, due to the meaning of *empêcher* 'prevent', is always negative, *ne* is understood as inherent to the verb *empêcher*. The negation is semantically shifted from the subordinate clause to the main clause. To explain the complements of verbs of fear (*craindre que ne P* 'to fear P'), which main clauses have a positive polarity and thus not a negative term for *ne* to be dependent on, Müller rephrases *craindre* into *se demander si ne pas P* 'to wonder if not P' and *juger non impossible que* 'to deem not impossible that', so that *ne* is dependent on a construction with double affective polarity (question-negation and double negation).

Review

Both Vendryès and Müller (partly) explain the negative meaning of a sentence with two negations by suggesting that the negation in the subordinate clause is semantically empty or is merged with the main verb (my wording). Negation after a negative main verb in languages with a negation with full value (other than French *ne*) is explained by Vendryès by a "more free syntax". This is what Jespersen (1917) suggests as well (section 3.1).

It is interesting to see how Vendryès and Müller somehow mirror the account of Kühner & Gerth. Whereas the latter argue that the main clauses is semantically weakened compared to the complement, Vendryès and Müller argue that the value of

ne has faded and that the value of the main clause is stronger. The difference is obviously caused by the fact that μή in other environments has an inevitable negative value, whereas *ne* has not.

Joly (1972: 33) objects the expletive account: "If (having) meaning is the condition *sine qua non* the existence of language—language is made to *say* the experience: we do not speak *to not say*—it is surprising how many languages have preserved and continue the use of signs "useless of sense" (…)." I agree in the sense that we cannot just give the label "expletive" to μή in complements after negative verbs and verbs of fear, and that we should look for a function or meaning. It is well possible that this function is not similar to negation.

3.3 Marking a possibility or non-veridicality

Kühner & Gerth (1904, volume 2, part 1, p. 224) argue that in some constructions, the negative value of μή fades into the background and the word becomes merely a marker of possibility/probability (my wording). Müller (1978) hints that French expletive *ne* might have to do with the expression of a possibility as opposed to a fact, rather than negative polarity in the main clause.

Yoon (2010) shows that in Korean and Japanese also verbs with the (positive) meaning of *hope* and *want* take a complement with an expletive negation, rather than only verbs with negative semantics. This led Giannakidou & Yoon (2009) to believe that the negative morpheme is a marker for nonveridicality.

Yoon (2010: 59-60) lists all the environments in which expletive negation may be used in a small sample of (mostly European) languages, among which is Modern Greek: "Fear, Hope, Exclamative, Emphatic question, Dubitative, Concessive conditional, Before clause, Until clause, Polite request, Comparative". In these constructions either an expletive negation is used or the verb is in subjunctive mood (or neither or both). She proposes that expletive negation and the subjunctive mood are of a similar nature. The properties of expletive negation are characterized as "a certain inequality relation in terms of probability, certainty, desirability, directness of speech, temporality, or degree," and this relation is summarized on a undesirability scale or an unlikelihood scale. She states that the negative element is adopted for the purpose of circumventing a commitment to a truthful statement. She also argues that the pragmatic roles of expletive negation could be softening or strengthening illocutionary force, "which is strongly reminiscent of what subjunctive mood does." The crucial connection between expletive negation and the subjunctive is the fact that they both typically occur in nonveridical environments.

'Nonveridical' is defined by Zwarts (1995: 287) as follows: "expressions like *it seems that, it is possible that* and *Sue hopes that* are all nonveridical in the sense that

the truth of the statements [*It possible that Smith will survive; Sue hopes that Alice has won the prize*] does not necessarily imply the truth of the propositions expressed by the subordinate clause." The expressions *seems* and *possible* are examples of nonveridical operators, as are e.g. future tense, imperative mood, subjunctive mood, connectives *or* and *if,* adverb *perhaps,* non-factive *before*[11], intentional verbs like *hope* or *want*.

A problem is that μή is not used in some of these nonveridical constructions. Possibilities are sometimes expressed with optative with ἄν, negated with οὐ; idem for future tense and ἴσως 'perhaps'. This category 'nonveridical' seems able to be objected with the same remarks that Willmott (2008) gave to Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos (2004): it overlooks the different functions of all the different constructions that can be called 'nonveridical'. Within the category 'nonveridical', μή seems to have different senses and uses.

That there is a link between expletive/pleonastic negation and uncertainty is also shown by Espinal (1997; mentioned in Horn 2010: 133). In Catalan, the following minimal pair exist: *Tinc por que arribaran tard* 'I'm afraid they will arrive late' versus *Tinc por que <u>no</u> arribin tard* 'I'm afraid they might arrive late.' In the former the speaker regards the arrival as likely, while in the latter (with negation and subjunctive mood) the speaker is more doubtful about the occurrence of the event.[12]

As said earlier, Müller observed that *ne* in French is impossible with a proven fact. The same is true for μή in Greek (Rijksbaron 2006).

3.4 Different level: resistance or discordance

Instead of treating the pleonastic negative element like a negation that has to do with the semantics of the sentence, with polarity, or with epistemic modality, some scholars have proposed that it is an element functioning on pragmatic level, to express 'resistance' or 'discordance'.

Above, in section 2.1, Kvičala (1856) was cited, who connected μή to the will-activity of repelling. This sense of resistance is also found in Van Ginneken (1907: 199-200): "Negation in natural language is not logical negation, but the expression of the sentiment of resistance. (…) this is best seen in the fact that two or more negations do not compensate, but reinforce one another."

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[11] Non-factive *before* is found in *Max died before he saw his grandchildren*.

[12] However, I doubt if this is really the function of *no* here. Does it really express uncertainty or is it actually a way to bring a bad message: by mitigating it? If the latter is true, *no* would only be used with undesirable situations.

Damouret & Pichon (1931: 131-2) argue that *ne* in the subordinate clause always expresses a "discordance" between the subordinate clause and the "central fact of the sentence". With verbs of fear, there is a discordance between the desire of the subject of the main verb and the possibility that he considers. With verbs of precaution, there is a discordance between the efforts of the subject and the danger that exists despite of the efforts. With verbs of prevention, there is a discordance between the phenomenon that is expected to happen and the force that prevents it. Tesnière (1969: 225) follows them: "The discordant [*ne*] therefore marks nothing more than a mismatch of the mind to the content of a given proposition."

Joly (1972: 34-35) raises a problem: *ne* is nonobligatory in these constructions. It is strange that the 'discordance' is not expressed in clauses without *ne*.

3.5 Summary

Different strategies were described to explain the use of a negative element in a complement after a negative verb or a verb of fear, without giving the complement a negative meaning. The paratactic strategy treats the complement as a more independent clause that needs its own negative element. Kühner & Gerth argue that the main verb's negative meaning is weakened. This strategy, with some adjustments, comes close to the intersubjective approach. The 'expletive' strategy treats the negative element as (nearly) semantically empty, or at least dependent on the main verb for its negative meaning. This strategy seems not applicable to Greek μή. The 'possibility/nonveridical' strategy treats the negative element not as semantically empty, but as an element without a negative meaning. The element is a marker for a possibility, as opposed to a fact. A problem is that also Greek οὐ is used in these nonveridical environments, and that many constructions are included in one big category: their differences might be overlooked. Other strategies treat the negative element as an element that does not add something to the meaning of the sentence, but functions merely on the level of the mind of the speaker: it expresses resistance or discordance to the content of the sentence.

From these strategies, a few elements were brought into my analysis (chapter 4): the expression of resistance has become the starting point, and the paratactic account, or rather the 'weakened' main verb, proves to be useful.

4. Οὐ and μή together in one clause

The third logician's problem with Greek negation is that the negatives οὐ and μή can be used together in one clause, but in many cases, they do not annihilate each other like we would expect from a logical perspective.

The order of οὐ and μή matters: οὐ μή is not used in the same constructions as μή οὐ. In the following sections, the use of the two combinations in different constructions is described. For most constructions, Kühner & Gerth (1904), Tesnière (1969) and Rijksbaron (1991) have proposed an explanation.

4.1 Μή οὐ

The combination μή οὐ is used in three different constructions, and has a different meaning in either construction. Μή οὐ is used in complements with subjunctive after verbs of fear and in 'concern clauses' in which the main verb is 'omitted'. The combination is also used in complements with infinitive after negated negative main verbs and after negated positive main verbs. Because this combination occurs only once in my corpus 'without a main verb', I discuss only this construction briefly.

After verbs of fear (with finite verb) or 'without a main verb'
Verbs of fear (or concern, doubt, distrust) take finite clauses as their complement. As mentioned above (section 3.1), μή is used when the object of the fear will come or has come. The combination μή οὐ is used when it is feared that the object of the fear will not come or has not come (cf. French, section 3.2).

Frequently this μή and μή οὐ is seen without a main verb: only μή (οὐ) expresses the concern (Kühner & Gerth 1904: 221). These constructions express an anxiety and often function as cautious statements (Rijksbaron 2006). Rijksbaron (1991: 168): "The speaker simultaneously expresses fear and a general request that the state of affairs he fears shall not obtain."

Μή with subjunctive expresses "rather a cautious assertion" that something will be the case (Rijksbaron 1991). This 'cautious assertion' corresponds to Kühner & Gerth (volume 2 part 1, p. 224), when they argue that the notion of concern "fades into the background" and μή becomes merely a particle that is used for mitigation (my wording), or in their words: "als feinere Form der Behauptung". If only one of the two words is a negation and the other one only expresses mitigation, the meaning is logically negative. See example (3) and (4).

(3) μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι (Pl. Cri. 48d)
   MH not must.SBJ consider.INF
   "[I am afraid that] we must not consider"
   'it may be that we ought not to consider'
(4) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ χρηστήριον (Hdt. 5, 79)
   but rather MH not that be.SBJ the oracle
   'das wird wohl nicht der Sinn des Orakels sein' (translation Kühner & Gerth)

Tesnière (1969: 233) explains the negative meaning of μή οὐ by considering them in different clauses. They are "actually extremely shortened clauses", of which the first in the utterance would be part of a main clause and the second part of a subordinate clause. They function on different levels, or (in the words of Tesnière) in different propositions, and are actually not part of one clause. In this way, the two negatives do not annihilate one another, "but each preserve their full value in the proposition."

Tesnière (ibid.) says about the combination of μή οὐ after verbs of fear: "the first negation μή applies to the object of a sentiment like e.g. fear, while the second negation οὐ applies to the content of the fear."

After negated negative main verbs (with infinitive)

As shown in section 3.1, a negative main verb takes an infinitive complement with μή, e.g. denying, contradicting, doubting, distrust, prohibition, etc.. When this main verb is negated by οὐ or when the main clause is a question, then the dependent infinitive is constructed with μή οὐ "in the meaning of the German infinitive without negation" (p.210).

Kühner & Gerth assume that negative main verbs are weakened to the notions of 'saying' and 'willing', and the infinitive is more independent and therefore needs the negation. "Μή comes with the infinitive because the whole thought was negative" (p. 210). About negated negative main verbs, e.g. *I do not deny* μὴ οὐ, they argue: "here μή is cancelled by the insertion of οὐ, because the whole thought is affirmative." The idea that μή is cancelled by οὐ is supported by the fact that the complement may also appear sometimes without μή οὐ.

After negated positive main verbs (with infinitive)

Positive main verbs are e.g. verbs of volition, possibility, ability, necessity. The complement of these verbs are negated with μή. When this positive main verb is negated by οὐ or when the main clause is a question, then the dependent infinitive is constructed with μή οὐ.

We find this construction after expressions like: *it is not possible, it is not ready, it is not fit/proper, it is not righteous, I don't hope, I am not sure, it is not probable, it is illogical...* Kühner & Gerth (p. 212) describe them as "expressions, that hold a negative notion, in that they express something that the emotion or the morality conflicts with: it is immoral, I am ashamed." Besides μή οὐ also single μή is found with this meaning.

4.2 Οὐ μή

The combination οὐ μή (with subjunctive aorist or with indicative future) only appears in sentences (main clauses) that confidently express a negative assertion about the future; οὐ μή is used as a strong negation (Kühner & Gerth, p. 221). When the verb is

in second person, the assertion is interpreted as a strong prohibition. "A quite lively, excited, occasionally strict and bitter tone is unmistakable" (Kühner & Gerth, p. 222).

In (5) and (6), two examples of the combination οὐ μή are given: one with 1st person aorist subjunctive[13] and one with second person future.

(5) κοὔ μή ποτέ σου παρὰ τὰς κάννας οὐρήσω μηδ' ἀποπάρδω. (Ar. V. 394)
and.not MH ever your against the fence urinate.1SG.AOR.SBJ and.MH fart.1SG.AOR.SBJ
"And I will surely never urinate against your fence and let me not fart"
'I swear I will never make water, never, nor ever let a fart, against the railing of thy statue.'

(6) ὦ μιαρώτατε, τί ποιεῖς; οὐ μὴ καταβήσει. (Ar. V. 397bis)
PRT brutal, what do.2SG.PRS ? not MH descend.2SG.IND.FUT
'Ha, rascal! what are you doing there? You shall not descend.'

Kühner & Gerth (1904)

In the combination οὐ μή, the two negatives do not cancel each other, but rather reinforce each other. Kühner & Gerth (p. 221) assume that this works as follows: "μή originally points at a concern of the speaker, that by οὐ is put in negation." As mentioned earlier in section 3.1, μή sometimes loses the notion of concern, but functions more like a particle expressing a possibility (my wording), giving the sentence "a nuance" ("feinere Form der Behauptung").[14] According to Kühner & Gerth, this nuance of uncertainty is negated by οὐ, which results in a strong negation.

(7) οὐ μὴ γενήται (γενήσεται) τοῦτο (Kühner & Gerth, p. 221)
not MH happen.SBJ (happen.IND.FUT) that
"it is not (οὐ) to be feared, that (μή) this happens (will happen)" (translation K&G)
'it will certainly not happen'

Rijksbaron (1991)

Whereas Kühner & Gerth make no semantic difference between this construction with subjunctive and indicative future, Rijksbaron does. Rijksbaron (1991: 171) argues that sentences with the construction οὐ μή with future indicative should be taken as questions. It is the negative variant of οὐ with future indicative verbs in second person in questions. The question elicits a positive answer to the rejection of the state of affairs concerned. As in English: *Won't you stay?* 'please stay', Greek questions with οὐ

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[13] This gloss is debatable. It may also be 1st person future indicative, which has the same form. However, since ἀποπάρδω is subjunctive aorist, I think οὐρήσω is as well.
[14] Kühner & Gerth (1904), volume 2, part 1, p. 224.

and a verb in second person are meant as imperatives (or adhortatives). It is a variant of the imperative. With μή, this positive imperative (my wording) is turned into a prohibitive.

Rijksbaron (ibid.) summarizes the relationship between the construction οὐ μή with future indicative and the imperative as in (8-11) (μένω 'stay'):

(8)   μένε/μεῖνον
       IMP.PRS/IMP.AOR
       'Stay!'

(9)   οὐ μενεῖς;
       not IND.FUT?
       'Will you not stay?'

(10) μὴ μένε/μὴ μείνῃς
       MH IMP/MH SBJ.AOR
       'Don't stay!'

(11) οὐ μὴ μενεῖς;
       not MH IND.FUT?
       "will you not not stay?" 'Is it not the case that you will not stay?'

In fact, Rijksbaron adds an extra negation to these two by putting the assertion in an interrogative form (cf. section 2.1, or Kühner & Gerth p. 211). In doing this, he follows the logics of [− × − × − = −] (my wording).

I think Rijksbaron's strategy is farfetched. Turning this clause into a question in order to find a reason for the negative meaning is not attractive and appears artificial. More appealing is the explanation by Kühner & Gerth, but still the sort of meta-negation (οὐ negates the nuance of μή) is strange when in the construction μὴ οὐ, οὐ negates the content of the concern (expressed by μή).

4.3 Summary

In most cases, the combinations μὴ οὐ and οὐ μή have a negative meaning, instead of the 'logically' expected positive meaning.

After verbs of fear, μή and οὐ function on different levels, according to Tesnière (1969) and (implicitly) according to Kühner & Gerth and Rijksbaron (1991, 2006). In this way, the elements do not cancel each other. Tesnière: Μή applies to the object of a sentiment like e.g. fear, while οὐ applies to the content of the fear. Kühner & Gerth and Rijksbaron (1991, 2006) argue that μή is sometimes not a negative element, but expresses uncertainty about a statement, in which οὐ functions as a negation.

Main clauses with οὐ μή confidently express a negative assertion about the future. According to Kühner & Gerth, the uncertainty that is expressed by μή is

negated by οὐ. Rijksbaron argues that these assertions should be taken as questions. A polar question adds a negation, so that Rijksbaron ends up with three negations for a logical negative meaning of the sentence. I argued that both accounts are not very appealing.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to present an overview of the standard accounts on expletive/pleonastic negation: negation that does not seem to follow the rules of logic.

In section 2, I ended with the unsatisfactory conclusion that there has not been done much research on non-standard negation like μή yet. For this reason, the diversity of accounts may be somewhat limited. At the same time it is a justification for this thesis.

In section 3, I have shown the different strategies to cope with a negative element in a complement after a negative verb or a verb of fear. There are three main solutions: main clause and complement are not in the same clause (paratactic), the main clause has lost its negative value (Kühner & Gerth), or the complement clause has lost its negative value (expletive negation). Related to the latter solution, the expletive negative element may express nonveridicality, or it is not logically negative but it expresses resistance. From above strategies, the weakened main verb and the element of resistance are taken over into my analysis.

In section 4, I have shown the different constructions in which μή and οὐ occur together in one clause, and the different explanations for the negative meaning of the clause. For μή οὐ with subjunctive, two solutions are proposed: μή expresses no negation but concern, so that οὐ give a negative value to the clause (Kühner & Gerth); or both negations are in different clauses, with μή as a main clause and οὐ as a complement (Tesnière 1969). For οὐ μή with subjunctive or future indicative, Kühner & Gerth's explanation comes close to that by Tesnière: οὐ negates the expression of concern of μή. Rijksbaron (1991) proposes that all sentences with this construction should be taken as questions. Although the analysis of both negations being on different levels is not attractive, I think treating μή as a particle that expresses concern is the most helpful.

In chapter 3, the argumentative and intersubjective approach(es) are described as a preparation for chapter 4, in which I present my analysis.

3 | Theoretical framework: intersubjectivity, argumentativity and desirability

1. Introduction

In this thesis, μή is explored from the point of view of the argumentative approach (Anscombre & Ducrot 1989; Ducrot 1996) and intersubjective approach (Verhagen 2005). Recall that Kühner & Gerth (1904) μή is used to express 'concern', and they cite Kvičala, who calls μή a repelling particle. In this study, I want to explore this idea, within the context of the argumentative and intersubjective approach. For this purpose, the notion of *desirability* and *evaluative stance* is added to the approaches above, as described by Akatsuka (1997, 1999), Daalder (2006, 2009), Ducrot (1996), Verhagen (1995).

The goal of this chapter is to establish a (back)ground for the next chapter, in which the hypothesis is treated.

2. An intersubjective and argumentative framework for desirability

The background is sketched in 7 steps:
I.   An utterance is made to influence cognition/behavior of addressee.
II.   An utterance is an argument for some conclusion.
III. The bridge between argument and conclusion is a topos.
IV.   The construal configuration and the function of complementation
V.   Epistemic and evaluative stances towards an object of conceptualization.
VI.   Evaluative stance: Desirability as a descriptive concept
VII. Three motives for human communication

I An utterance is made to influence cognition/behavior of addressee.

The intersubjective approach is based on the following principle: "Communication reelects the fundamental processes of regulation and assessing the behavior of others, not of exchanging information." (Owings & Morton 1998: i, cited in Verhagen 2005: 8). People communicate, utter sentences, to influence the cognition or behavior of the other by influencing the attitude of the hearer towards an object of conceptualization. Every utterance is an invitation from the speaker to the addressee to entertain a certain stance towards an object of conceptualization.

II An utterance is an argument for some conclusion.

Expressions provide an argument for some conclusion; that is their default condition. They are oriented towards a conclusion (an attitude towards a state of affairs), and in this way they have an argumentative direction or orientation (Verhagen 2005: 10).

Consider the example (after Ducrot (1996)):

(1) A: Would you like to go out for a walk?
     B: Eh, it is raining outside.

The answer of B to A's question is an argument to the conclusion "No, I do not want to go out for a walk".

Verhagen (2005: 22): "Linguistic expressions are primarily cues for making inferences, and understanding does not primarily consist in decoding the precise content of the expressions, but in making inferences that lead to adequate next (cognitive, conversational, behavioral) moves." This conclusion may be a certain belief or attitude ('cognitive move') or the choice to act in a certain way ('behavioral move'). Or, in my words: the task for the addressee is not finding out 'What does this utterance mean?' but 'What does the speaker mean by this? Why does he say this?'. The focus is not on the content, but on the (motives of the) speaker of the utterance.

III The bridge between argument and conclusion is a topos.

The weather is beautiful, so let's go for a walk can be divided into an argument A (*the weather is beautiful*) and a conclusion C (*let's go for a walk*). To go from an argument to a conclusion, a bridge between the two is necessary. The speaker supposes there is a principle that bridges the gap between the weather and the walk, such as *Warmth makes a walk pleasant* (Ducrot 1996, lecture IV). The speaker also supposes that the addressee is familiar with this principle.

Ducrot calls this principle a *topos*, which ensures the validity or the legitimacy of the move from A to C. A topos is true *in general* (exceptions are possible; a walk in the hot desert is not necessarily pleasant, although warm), represented as a shared belief (i.e. a belief which a certain group of people already accepts), and it is scalar (the warmer the weather, the more pleasant the walk) (ibid.).

IV The *construal configuration* and the function of complementation

Every utterance by a speaker is meant for an addressee: there are two subjects of conceptualization involved in every communicative event. It is an invitation to

entertain an object of conceptualization[1] in a certain way. The object of conceptualization contains two parts, to express e.g. foreground/background or topic/focus. This is illustrated by the two circles on O-level. These four parts are illustrated in the construal configuration in Figure 1 (from Verhagen 2005). The object of conceptualization is on O-level, the subjects of conceptualization are on S-level.

O: *Object of conceptualization:*

S: *Subject of conceptualization (Ground):*

Figure 1. Construal configuration (Verhagen 2005).

Although this structure is 'present' in all utterances, not all the aspects of the construal configuration are always marked in utterances. There are utterances that do not mark the subject of conceptualization and may thus be called 'objective', e.g. *John owns a horse* (Verhagen 2005: 17). There is no marking of perspective; Verhagen calls this a "non-perspectivized utterance" (p. 106).[2] That 'objective' clauses are not purely objective and are always linked to some topos and oriented towards a certain conclusion, shows the addition of *so* or *but*: *John owns a horse, but he is actually very poor* or *so he must be rich*. (cf. Verhagen 2005).

Figure 2 shows an illustration of such an utterance; bold lines resemble 'marked in the language', dotted lines resemble 'not marked in the language'.

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[1] 'Object of conceptualization' is called 'Content' in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008), or 'State of Affairs' by Rijksbaron (e.g. 2006).

[2] There are utterances that may not represent any object of conceptualization and seem to play only between the subjects: interjections, greetings, apologies, calls for attention. Verhagen mentions also the "non-interactional" signs of disgust or frustration. Personally, I doubt the existence of non-interactional signs. It means that one would curse as loud when he bumps his toe if nobody is around.

O: *Object of conceptualization:*

S: *Subject of conceptualization (Ground):*

Figure 2. Construal configuration in 'objective' or non-perspectivized utterances (e.g. *John owns a horse*). (From Verhagen 2005).

O: *Object of conceptualization:*

S: *Subject of conceptualization (Ground):*

Figure 3. Construal configuration for first-person perspective (e.g. *I think John owns a horse*). (From Verhagen 2005).

In complementation constructions, e.g. *I think John owns a horse*, the speaker instructs the addressee to construe the object of conceptualization (in the complement clause) in a way that is specified by the matrix clause (Verhagen 2005: 97). This is not an 'objective' utterance anymore, because subjectivity is marked by language: by the English construction *I think (that)*. In this expression, both the conceptualizer and the object of conceptualization are marked. The matrix clause 'links' the S-level to the O-level. This is illustrated in Figure 3.

A third possibility is to add subjectivity, without making explicit whose perspective is spoken of. This happens in an utterance like *Obviously/Unfortunately/It is obvious that/Problem is that John owns a horse.* Something being obvious or fortunate is not an aspect of the object, but of the way the object is entertained. The addressee is invited to entertain the object as obvious or fortunate. The speaker does not make it explicit to whom it is obvious or (un)fortunate that John owns a horse. By default, the addressee interprets the perspective to be that of the speaker (cf. Verhagen 2005: 134). In Figure 4, these impersonal subjective constructions are illustrated.

Figure 4. Construal configuration for impersonal subjective constructions (e.g. *Unfortunately, John owns a horse*). (From Verhagen 2005).

A fourth possibility is to add subjectivity by making explicit that it is the view of a third person to which the addressee is invited to entertain: *Peter thinks that John owns a horse*. The same invitation, to adopt the stance of the onstage conceptualizer towards an object of conceptualization, is expressed in a complementation sentence with a matrix verb in third person. The speaker commits to the stance of the third person at least temporarily. This is illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Construal configuration for third person perspective (e.g. *Peter thinks John owns a horse*). (From Verhagen 2005).

> (2) a. *John owns a horse*
>   b. *I think John owns a horse*
>   c. *It is obvious/Problem is that John owns a horse*
>   d. *Peter thinks that John owns a horse*
>   *…so he must be rich*.

All the above mentioned examples (repeated in (2a-d)) are an argument for the same conclusion (have the same argumentative orientation), e.g. *so he must be rich.* The difference between the sentences above is that the argumentative strength is not

identical. The force with which the addressee is invited is stronger in (2a) and weaker in (2b) and (2d).

In chapter 4, section 2, the intersubjectivity view on complementation is more elaborated.

V Types of subjectivity: epistemic and evaluative stances towards an object of conceptualization

Every utterance is an invitation to the addressee to entertain the object of conceptualization *in a particular way*. Information about this particular way is added in an illocutionary predicate (complementation) or modifier,[3] e.g. *I think, probably, I promise, I hope, hopefully, I fear, unfortunately, presumably.* Verhagen (2005: 135, (71)) formulates complementation construction as in (3). The just mentioned modifiers and predicates fill *X*, the complement or content of the clause is in *B*. This formulation might be extended to illocutionary modifiers such as *probably* and *hopefully*.

> (3) Complementation Construction 2, generalized (Dutch)
> Construction form: $[_A[X_{\text{predicate}}]dat[_B...]\,]$
> Construction meaning: ENTERTAIN CONTENT OF B AS X.

All these different manners or stances can be seen as modalities, which many theories about modality have tried to categorize (see Nuyts 2006). Two types seem to be the most general: epistemic stance and evaluative stance. A speaker expresses his epistemic stance when he expresses some degree of certainty/probability. The speaker's evaluative stance (or that of a third person or the community) is his opinion as to how desirable the object is.[4] I treat *desirability* and *positive evaluative stance* as two sides of the same coin, i.e., some object is desirable if the subject has a positive evaluative stance towards it and vice versa. Similarly for *undesirability* and *negative evaluative stance*.

Since the analysis of μή in chapter 4 will focus on evaluative stance and desirability, the given examples will be only in this direction and not about epistemic stance.

Not only are there different stances towards the object, also the *force* with which the addressee is invited to entertain the stance varies (see above in IV). Because of these

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[3] *Illocutionary predicate or modifier*: term from Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008).
[4] I treat evaluative stance as a combination of deontic modality (degree of moral desirability) and boulomaic modality (degree of the speaker's liking or disliking of the state of affairs) (definitions in brackets from Nuyts (2006)).

differences in argumentative strength, many constructions exist to express evaluative stance with various forces. If the speaker wants to express his opinion about the addressee performing an action, he chooses among e.g. an imperative clause, a complement clause (e.g. *want, hope, would like…*), a conditional clause,[5] and many more. It is a basic function of communication to express evaluative stance.

VI Evaluative stance: Desirability as a descriptive concept[6]

Due to the large influence of logics on semantics, until recently desirability was not seen as a semantic property of words (Akatsuka 1997: 323). That seems odd, since desire and repulsion are such basic functions in any living creature. It might not 'know' or 'think', but it always 'wants' or 'repels', for his own good or that of his species.

Evaluative stance can be seen as a continuous scale with a positive and a negative end. Languages use many different ways to express evaluative stance, lexical and grammatical categories: adverbs and interjections (*unfortunately, alas*), matrix verbs (*I hope, I fear,*[7] *you must*), moods (*imperative, prohibitive*), adjectives (*good, reasonable, bad, ugly,*[8] *dirty*[9]), demonstratives (English construction *that…of yours*, Latin pronoun *iste*), conjunctions (Dutch *mits)*, conditionals. In this section, some examples of desirability as a necessary semantic property are given.

Daalder (2006, 2009) describes the meaning of the Dutch conditional conjunction *mits* 'provided that' in the construction Q, *MITS* P: "Q implies the existence of some specific desirability, for the fulfillment of which P names a strict ("necessary") condition." (2009: 242). The conjunction *mits* can be only used if Q is evaluated positively, and Q will be evaluated as such by the addressee when *mits* is used.

Both the Dutch verbs *beloven* 'promise' and *dreigen* 'threat', in impersonal use, have the meaning of being expected. The difference between the two is defined by the value +/-desirability. Consider the sentence *Het belooft/dreigt te gaan regenen* 'It promises/threatens to rain'. Farmers might use the first verb after a dry period, girls with stylized hair the second verb (Verhagen 1995).

Akatsuka (1997: 323-4; 1999: 201) argues that "conditionals are an important device for encoding the speaker's evaluative stance of desirability". The traditional focus on the logic of conditionals, the truth-conditional approach and Fauconnier's more cognitive approach using mental spaces (1985), did not reveal the function of conditionals in everyday language. Akatsuka claims that negative conditionals, e.g. *If*

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[5] See VI, on desirability in conditional clauses and chapter 4, section 5.
[6] *Descriptive concept*: term from Daalder (2009: 242).
[7] From Nuyts (2007).
[8] The word *ugly* is etymologically related to *fear*. Middle English, from Old Norse *uggligr*, from *uggr* 'fear'; akin to Old Norse *ugga* 'to fear' (http://www.merriam-webster.com)
[9] From Ducrot (1996).

you eat my cookies, I'll whip you, express the speaker's prediction, "undesirable leads to undesirable", and the speaker's attitude "I don't want it to happen". They are used typically for warnings and precautions. She found that in everyday language use, conditionals either have the form "desirable-leads-to-desirable" ("I want it to happen"; predictive conditionals) or "undesirable-leads-to-undesirable" ("I do not want it to happen"; negative conditionals).[10] Rarely, the two parts differed for +/-desirability.

The notion of desirability as a semantic concept cannot be ignored.

VII Three motives for human communication

According to Tomasello (2005: 87), human communication has three basic motives:

- requesting
  (I want you to do something to help me—requesting help or information)
- informing
  (I want you to know something because I think it well help or interest you)
- sharing
  (I want you to feel something so that we can share attitudes/feelings together)

Expressing an aversion to something, a negative evaluative stance towards some idea, is a way of sharing. The speaker invite the addressee to adopt this stance, and when they have the same stance towards something they are bonding. Gossiping and complaining about the weather are examples of this behavior. The speaker is not informing the addressee about the weather,[11] and probably (when gossiping) the addressee already knew what their colleague had done; they only share their evaluative stances towards it. Neither is the speaker asking the addressee to change the weather or change the behavior of their colleague: the expression of his aversion is not a request.

With some constructions, however, the speaker expresses his aversion to a situation *and* expresses that he thinks the addressee is capable to change or prevent

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[10] This observation has consequences for the interpretation of conditionals. Take the example: "If you behave nicely (P), we will go to McDonalds (Q)." Traditional logic gives that if NOT-P, Q still might be true. This is not how we interpret this in everyday language use; the only possible outcome of NOT-P is NOT-Q. The way Akatsuka treats conditionals is very similar to Ducrot's view of topoi and arguments (1996, lecture IV).

[11] Although that might be something that happens at the same time, it is not the goal or motive of the speaker. When a speaker utters a complaint, the addressee is expected to react on that, instead of the content of the complaint.
A: *I hate that it rained on my birthday.*
B: #*Oh, did it?* (Speaker A feels left alone; communication stranded. He might make another attempt: *Yeah, and I hate it.*)
B: *Oh, did it? Yeah, that's stupid.*

that situation. Implicitly, or explicitly in some cases, the speaker asks the addressee to do something about it. This is typically the case with imperatives, prohibitives and conditional clauses.[12] These constructions do more than just share an evaluative stance: they request help from the addressee to avert the undesirable situation, and even make him responsible for this task. They let the addressee know that the speaker expects the addressee to take responsibility for the situation. Addressees know this, because the speaker uses a conventional construction for these requests.

Why would an addressee take over the evaluative stance or take responsibility? I propose, based on Tomasello (2005), that we have an instinct to cooperate with the other. It is in our best interest to want what the other wants. Ignoring the expression of a wish or aversion may have bad consequences for your social life (in the case of requests), or for your health (in the case of expressions of fear), which is considered incredibly dangerous by our prehistoric instincts. If you ignore a request, it is considered impolite (and the speaker loses face in the sense of Brown & Levinson 1987). If you ignore someone's expression of fear for a bear or lightning, you might not recognize the danger with all its consequences. Not having the same taste or disgust about food or music or other customs might have an influence on your place in the group.

Something may be (un)desired by the speaker or by the community (uttered by the speaker). The instinct may be formulated as: *Be as the other or the community, therefore: Desire what is desired*. The addressee coordinates with the stance of the speaker; in case of an evaluative stance: 'I desire that too' or 'I repel that too'. The next step would be (planning to) undertaking an action.

3. Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to sketch a theoretical background for my hypothesis in chapter 4.

In the argumentative and intersubjective approach sketched above, all communication is meant to influence the cognition and/or behavior of the addressee. An utterance is an invitation from the speaker to the addressee to entertain an object of conceptualization in a certain way (if expressed). By 'a certain way', at least epistemic and evaluative stance are meant. The starting point of my analysis is that μή expresses a negative evaluative stance ("repelling particle", Kvičala in Kühner & Gerth (1904)). When expressing an evaluative stance, the speaker expresses the degree of desirability of the object according to himself, a third person or the community. That desirability is an important notion in semantics is shown by e.g. Akatsuka (1997, 1999)

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[12] These and other constructions will be discussed in chapter 4.

and Daalder (2009). A (negative) evaluative stance is found in utterances that have 'sharing' or 'requesting' for a motive for communication.

4 | Analysis: common characteristics of constructions with μή

1. Introduction

"μή however had (…) not at all the meaning of negation in the beginning, but was only a rejecting, repelling particle."
Kvičala (1856)

"μή [negates] subjectively, (…) when something from the subjective point of view of the speaker is negated, i.e. if only in the will or in the idea of the speaker not-being is meant. (…) an act of the imagination or of the will of the speaker is expressed."
Kühner & Gerth (1904: 178)

In the previous chapters, the problem of μή has become clear: it cannot be logical negation, because that causes difficulties in some constructions. We find μή in complements of verbs of fear, verbs of interdiction, but also verbs of wish and deontic constructions. We find μή in questions, where it does not follow the pattern in which negated questions are rhetorical questions, but keeps a negative value. And we see οὐ and μή used together in the same clause, without cancelling one another's negative value. But we cannot deny that μή means 'not' in conditional clauses, for example. In this chapter I look for features that above and other constructions have in common.

The idea of Kvičala and Kühner & Gerth, that μή is a repelling particle, is the starting point for my analysis, which has an intersubjective approach. I start with the following hypothesis: μή does not function as logical negation on the scale of epistemic stance (logical negation in Greek is οὐ), but it functions on the scale of evaluative stance, expressing undesirability.

During examining different constructions with μή from Aristophanes' comedies (see 1.4 below), the view of μή as a repelling particle will appear to be not sufficient. Three semantic characteristics of constructions with μή are necessary to describe all the constructions; the 'problem' of μή may be solved by making use of the prototype theory and family resemblances (Geeraerts 1997).

This chapter continues as follows. In section 1, I discuss how undesirability fits in the intersubjectivity account (1.1), and how negation is already described by Verhagen (2005) (1.2); I connect μή to the motives for human communication (Tomasello 2008)

(1.3) and then the corpus from Aristophanes is described that is used as a source for the constructions with μή (1.4). In the rest of the chapter, the constructions with μή are compared to find the common characteristics. In section 2, complement clauses as found in Aristophanes are treated. In section 3, prohibitive clauses and other main clauses with μή are distinguished and in section 4 main clauses with the οὐ μή construction. Conditional clauses are treated in section 5. In section 6, it is shown how these constructions can be connected through family resemblances.

1.1 Negative evaluative stance in the intersubjective approach

Before we examine the constructions in the following sections, I quickly sketch the place and function of undesirability and negation in the intersubjectivity approach.

The object of conceptualization (on the O-level) is separated from the subjects of conceptualization (conceptualizers, S-level), namely the speaker and the addressee (cf. chapter 3). Undesirability is not a property of the object of conceptualization, but only exists in the perspective of the subject of conceptualization (cf. Verhagen 2005: 133), hence the term evaluative *stance*. It is an aspect of the construal relation between the O-level and S-level (cf. Figure 1; further elaborated in section 2). This is true for all evaluating expressions, e.g. *problem, problematic, good, luckily*. By using μή, the addressee is invited to entertain the object of conceptualization as undesirable, to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the object. Μή does not express *who* evaluates the object of conceptualization as undesirable—that is expressed by other parts of the utterance or is part of the common ground.[1]

Figure 1. Construal configuration with μή.
(After Verhagen 2006: 326, figure 3.)

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[1] Daalder (2009) argues the same for the Dutch conjunction *mits*.

1.2 Negation and negative evaluation in the intersubjective approach: invalid conclusions and mental spaces

That μή is often considered negation is not strange: in some constructions, the function of μή can be compared to (and comes close to) the function of logical negation. Verhagen (2005: 32, 44) describes negation as follows:

> "Linguistic negation can be said to have a special function in regulating an addressee's cognitive coordination with other points of view. The addressee is invited to adopt (at least for the time being) a particular *epistemic* stance towards some idea, and to abandon another one that is inconsistent with it— possibly one that the addressee might entertain himself [emphasis mine]. These kinds of cognitive consequences do not necessarily follow when there is no linguistic negation. (…) [it] has the function of directing the addressee to infer that certain conclusions are invalid."

Negation, i.e. logical negation on the epistemic scale, invites the addressee to do three things, according to Verhagen: adopt an epistemic stance towards an idea, abandon an inconsistent stance, and infer that certain conclusions are invalid.

Other English words have the same impact as negation: *little* [chance], *barely*. Consider the sentence *There is no/little/barely a chance that the operation will be successful—so let's not take the risk* (after Verhagen 2005: 45).[2] The phrase *there is no chance* has the same argumentative orientation, points in the direction of the same conclusion as *there is little chance* or *there is barely a chance*. These three words invite the addressee to abandon the idea of 'a chance to success', and to infer that this conclusion 'pursuing the operation' is invalid, based on the epistemic stance that the addressee is invited to adopt and on a relevant topos, such as *Low chance > no operation*. The difference between the three words *no/little/barely* is the argumentative strength.

Invalid conclusions after expressions with negative evaluative stance

Although not discussed in Verhagen, there are also English words that a speaker uses to invite the addressee to adopt a particular *evaluative* stance towards some idea and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid. These are e.g. the four possible attitudes to danger: *courageous, rash, prudent, timorous* (Ducrot 1996: 186). *Courageous* and *rash* have the same informational value, but express a different evaluative stance; similar for *prudent* and *timorous*. Both words invite the addressee to infer a different

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[2] The argumentative direction of an utterance can be found by adding a clause with the conjunction *so* (identical argumentative direction) or *but* (opposite argumentative direction) (Ducrot 1996; Verhagen 2005: 53).

conclusion, which is illustrated in example (1).[3] Note that the conclusions inferred contain an evaluative stance as well.

   (1) A: Will Thomas be a good husband?
         B_1:   Thomas is a *courageous* man, *so* he'll make a good husband
         B_2:   Thomas is a *rash* man, *but* he'll make good husband
         B_3:   #Thomas is a *courageous* man, *but* he'll make a good husband
         B_4:   #Thomas is a *rash* man, *so* he'll make a good husband

Rash expresses a negative evaluative stance towards Thomas' thoughts about danger, and it invalidates the conclusion of Thomas being a good husband, making use of a topos like *Responsible men make good husbands*.

     Courageous on the other hand does not seem to necessarily invalidate the conclusion of Thomas being a bad husband. Apparently words with a negative evaluative stance are a stronger invitation to infer that certain conclusions are invalid than words with a positive evaluative strength (cf. Finocchario 1992: 66). Example (2) illustrates this idea.

   (2) a. Thomas is a *rash/timorous/avaricious/lavish* man, who lives *far away*, so he is *not* a good husband.
        b. ?# Thomas is a *courageous/prudent/thrifty/generous* man, who lives *nearby*, so he is *not* a bad husband.

The undesirability marker ("repelling particle") μή functions in the same way as *rash*. Μή is used by the speaker to invite the addressee to adopt a negative *evaluative* stance towards some idea, and to abandon another stance or idea that is inconsistent with it, and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid. The conclusions that are valid contain a negative evaluative stance as well. When μή is used, the sentence is oriented towards the conclusion: *this is undesirable, keep far from it*.

Two mental spaces with x *and not-x*

Another characteristic of logical (epistemic) negation is the opening of two mental spaces (in the sense of Fauconnier (1994)). Verhagen (2005: 29, ex. (1)) illustrates this with the following example:

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[3] Other examples of words with the same informative value but with opposite argumentative directions: *thrifty, avaricious; nearby, far.*

(3)   This time, there was no such communication [about the plans]. It's$_1$ a pity because it$_2$ could have resulted in greater participation by employers. [indexing mine]

In example (3), the two instances of *it* refer to two different situations: a situation in which there is no communication (it$_1$) and a situation in which there is communication (it$_2$). The negation *no* opens two mental spaces, one with NOT-P and one with P, and both of them can be referred to in the following discourse.

In some constructions with μή, as we shall see later, the speaker invites the addressee to imagine a world with NOT-P, in other words, to open a mental space with NOT-P. In these constructions, the function of μή comes very close to the function of logical negation. This is remarkable from the perspective that μή is only an undesirability marker. In section 3, this characteristic of certain constructions with μή is further elaborated.

Negative evaluative stance and logical negation

"Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought."
(Shakespeare, *King Henry IV Part 2* (1597)).

Negative evaluative stance and logical negation are closely linked. Horn (1989: 272 ff.) explains that we have the tendency to polarize concepts: something is either good or evil, clean or dirty, black or white, *p* v *q*. The expression that something is *evil* is easily interpreted as ¬*good*. Negative epistemic stance and negative evaluative stance are often mixed in everyday language use. This is seen in some phenomena, which I describe below.

A phenomenon in which we can clearly see the close connection between negative evaluative stance and logical negation is the English and German prefix *un-*, *in-*, and *a-* (Jespersen 1917: 144). These prefixes are only joint to adjectives with a positive evaluative meaning (*e-pos* in Horn 1989: 274) to then form a negative evaluative meaning (*e-neg*). Jespersen: "most adjectives with *un-* or *in-* have a depreciatory sense: we have *unworthy, undue, imperfect*, etc., but it is not possible to form similar adjectives from *wicked, foolish*, or *terrible*. Van Ginneken (*Linguistique psychologique* 208) counted the words in *un-* in a German dictionary and found that 98% of the substantives and 85% of the adjectives had "une signification defavorable"."

A caveat is necessary here: although *unhappy* may have the same informative value as *not happy*, it does not function the same. Unlike *not happy*, *unhappy* does not open a mental space with *not-x*, to which can be referred to in the following discourse (Verhagen 2005: ch. 2).

Jespersen (1917) mentions other words with a negative evaluative connotation that are used as a negation in some European languages, such as *devil* (e.g. *devil I go in there*), *deuce* 'two points on a dice, the lowest score', Irish *sorra* 'devil, sorrow', *pox* (disease), (Jespersen 1917: 31-35).

He also mentions conditional clauses in which undesirability is turned into a negative evaluative stance. "Another popular way of denying something is by putting it in a conditional clause with *I am a villain* or something similar in the main clause (…). A variant is *the devil take me* or *I will be damned* etc. in the main clause." (Jespersen (1917: 26-27)). *I will be damned* is surely something undesirable: the speaker does not want it to be true (evaluative stance) or, in everyday use, does not believe it to be true (epistemic stance). The wish is father to the thought. I discuss conditionals in section 5.

1.3 Cooperative motives for communicating and μή

As described in chapter 3, according to Tomasello (2005: 87), human communication has three basic motives: requesting (I want you to do something to help me— requesting help or information), informing (I want you to know something because I think it well help or interest you), and sharing (I want you to feel something so that we can share attitudes/feelings together).

If we assume that μή is primarily an undesirability marker, we may expect it to be used when a speaker shares his attitude. He invites the addressee to adopt this negative evaluative stance, and when they have the same stance towards something they are bonding. Some constructions, however, we have already seen to express requests to act: typically imperatives (purpose clauses; section 2.4) and prohibitives (section 3); conditionals are uttered with this motive as well (section 5). In these constructions, the speaker expresses aversion to a situation *and* he expresses that he thinks the addressee is capable to change or prevent that situation. Implicitly, or explicitly in some cases, the speaker asks the addressee to do something about it. These constructions do more than just share an evaluative stance: they request help from the addressee to avert the undesirable situation, and make him responsible for this task.

Constructions with μή are normally not used for the motive of informing the addressee about interesting things in the world. It is not usual to express an epistemic and evaluative stance in one clause. This has to do with the "one-commitment-per-clause principle" (Nuyts 2009), to which I will return in section 4.

1.4 The corpus

To find commonalities between the different constructions with μή and some information about the frequencies of these commonalities, a corpus was composed of

sentences with μή from one writer. That way, the problem of dealing with different periods of Greek is reduced (although not removed, see below). The corpus contains all 312 sentences with μή from 6 comedies of Aristophanes: *Acharnians, Birds, Clouds, Knights, Peace, Wasps* (abbreviated respectively: *Ach., Av., Nu., Eq., Pax, V.*). These plays were 'randomly selected', i.e. these were the first results shown in Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG).

The plays of Aristophanes (approx. 446–386 BCE) were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, they consist of mostly dialogues. There is a speaker and a listener, reacting to each other, as opposed to e.g. Herodotus' *Histories*. Secondly, the language of the comedies is more colloquial than that of tragedies, and I am more interested in colloquial language use than 'literary' language.

The language of Aristophanes' comedies

The language of Aristophanes' comedies is said to approximate colloquial Attic Greek: the Greek of the Athenians in the streets (albeit in meter, not in prose). This is in contrast to the language of tragedy, which aims to distance itself from colloquial Attic (Zimmerman 2014). However, there are some influences from tragedy, lyric, and from other dialects than Attic. Most of these influences are found on the level of vocabulary, morphology and phonology (cf. Willi 2010).

López Eire (1996) mentions some of the (lexical and morphological) features of colloquial Attic Greek: many metaphors, proverbial and semi-proverbial expressions, obscenities, insults. López Eire links the features of colloquial language to two basic functions of language in general: the function of expression (of e.g. admiration, grief) and conation (expressing desire, "evil desire", curse), more than the function of reference (ibid: 75).

Relevant for the topic in this thesis is the use of parataxis and particles. "Parataxis is far more frequent in comedy than in higher literary genres (obviously because spoken language avoids more-complicated hypotactic structures), and certain particles or function words are exceedingly common because of the oral stylization of comic language." (Willi 2010: 484; Willi 2003: 261).

Corpus

The corpus contains all 312 sentences with μή from the above mentioned 6 comedies. Sentences with compound forms of μή (e.g. pronoun μηδείς 'not one', and particle μηδέ 'and not') were excluded from this corpus for two reasons. Because this research is specifically concerned with the problems for μή as negation (verbs of fear, after negative matrix verbs, combination with ού), the pronominal forms of μή were excluded, such as μηδείς 'not one'. This research is about the single particle and not about the derived forms, that may or may not function in a different way (and asks for

a separate investigation). The forms μηδέ and μήτε 'and not', that might function in the same way as μή does, were excluded for reasons of space.

The corpus was categorized into 6 categories, based on form. The particle μή is part of the main clause, the complement clause (finite and non-finite), the antecedent (condition, protasis) of a conditional construction, a purpose satellite clause, a noun phrase (including relative clause), or a satellite clause which is not a purpose clause. In Table 1, the distribution of the sentences over the categories is shown.

Table 1. Type of clauses with μή

Clause type	Frequency	Percent
Main clause	98	32
Complement clause	50	16
- non-finite	- 31	- 10
- finite	- 19	- 6
Conditional clause	102	33
Purpose satellite clause[4]	33	11
Noun phrase	17	5
Other satellite clause	12	4
Total	312	100

In the rest of the chapter, these constructions with μή are compared to find the common characteristics.[5] In section 2, complement clauses as found in Aristophanes are treated. In section 3, prohibitive clauses (imperatives and subjunctives) and other main clauses with μή are distinguished and in section 4 clauses with the οὐ μή construction. Conditional clauses are treated in section 5. In section 6, it is shown how these constructions are connected through family resemblances.

2. Μή in complement clauses

One of the problems addressed in chapter 2 is μή in complement clauses after verbs of fear and negative orders. For this reason, this chapter starts by looking at the complement clauses.

The corpus as described above contains 50 complement clauses. They are complements of different types of matrix verbs. The matrix verbs were categorized in 6 semantic categories:

- verbs of fear (δείδω, φοβέομαι 'fear, be afraid'),
- deontic[6] constructions (χρή 'one ought', δεινόν 'terrible'),

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[4] See for the difference between purpose complements and purpose satellites section 2.4 of this chapter.
[5] Due to limited space, noun phrases and satellite clauses are not discussed in this thesis.
[6] Nuyts (2001): Deontic modality: indication of the degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs.

- verbs that express a wish or order (e.g. βούλομαι 'want', ἐθέλω 'want', εὔχομαι 'pray', ἅπτομαι '(touch to) beg', ὀμνύμι 'swear', ἀναπείθω 'convince', δοκεῖ μοι 'seems [good] to me, I decide', κηρύττω 'announce'),
- verbs that express a negative wish or order (e.g. ἀπαγορεύω 'forbid', ἀπολέγω 'forbid', ἀπαυδάω 'forbid', φείδομαι 'spare, use not', παύω 'stop', ἀρνέομαι 'deny'),
- verbs that introduce a purpose (e.g. εὐλαβέομαι 'be aware', προνοέομαι 'foresee', ὀφείλω 'be responsible for', σπεύδω 'hasten', φυλάττω 'keep guard', ἀθρέω 'watch', διασκοπέω 'consider', τηρέω 'take care of', φράζομαι 'beware of'), or when the matrix verb is missing, the clause was introduced by conjunction ὅπως
- verbs that express an ability (δύναμαι 'can, be able to', ἐπίσταμαι 'know (how)').

In Table 2, the frequencies of these categories of matrix verbs of the 50 complement clauses are shown, as well as the form of the complement clause (finite or non-finite).

Table 2. Semantics of the matrix verb and form of complement clause

	non-finite	finite	Total
fear		5	5
negative wish/order	6		6
wish, order	13		13
deontic	8		8
purpose[7]	3	14	17
dynamic	1		1
Total	31	19	50

2.1 Negative evaluative stance towards object of conceptualization

Let us consider a few examples of these complement constructions: verbs of fear and negative matrix verbs, such as *forbid*.

(4) Fear: δέδοικε μὴ διαφθαρῶ[8]
    He is afraid I should get lost

(5) Negative order: ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν[9]
    I forbid having the discussion of paying a wage to the Thracians

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[7] Purpose clauses and dynamic constructions seem to function a bit different than the former 4 types, and will be treated in sections 2.4.
[8] Fragment from:
ταῦτ' οὖν περί μου δέδοικε μὴ διαφθαρῶ (Ar. V. 1358)
those PRT about me fear.3SG.PF MH get.lost.1SG.AOR
'He is afraid I should get lost'
[9] Fragment from:
ἀλλ' ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν τοῖς Θρᾳξὶ περὶ μισθοῦ (Ar. Ach. 169)
but forbid.1SG.PRS MH do.INF discussion.ACC to.the Thacians.DAT about wage
'but I do oppose the discussion of paying a wage to the Thracians'

(6) Positive verb of wish: ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν μὴ φορεῖν τριβώνιον[10]

He tried to persuade him to wear the cloak no longer

(7) Deontic construction: τὸ μὲν σὸν σῶμα χρὴ πληγῶν ἀθῷον εἶναι, τοὐμὸν δὲ μή[11]

 Your body ought to be exempt from blows and mine not

(8) No matrix verb: μὴ ἐγχάνῃ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας[12]

Let him not taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having escaped

In the translations, μή is translated in different ways: sometimes with 'not' and sometimes 'neutral' or 'positive'. However, if we look at the complements without their matrix clause, μή is always interpreted the same: the object of conceptualization is undesirable. The speaker invites the addressee to adopt the negative evaluative stance and to invalidate conclusions that are inconsistent with this stance. In Table 3, the complements are shown split from the matrix clause (cf. Verhagen 2005: 96). It is clear that the most basic content of the examples above is expressed in the complements and not in the matrix clause, and that there is no negative/expletive difference between the sentences.

Table 3. Examples (4)-(8) simplified and split at matrix and complement clause.

Category	Matrix	Complement	English
(4') *Fear*	δέδοικε	μὴ διαφθαρῶ	'He is afraid I should get lost'
(5') *Negative order*	ἀπαγορεύω	μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν	'I forbid having the discussion of paying a wage to the Thracians'
(6') *Positive verb of wish*	ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν	μὴ φορεῖν τριβώνιον	'He tried to persuade him to wear the cloak no longer'
(7') *Deontic construction*	χρὴ	τοὐμὸν δὲ μή [πληγῶν ἀθῷον εἶναι]	'Your body ought to be exempt from blows and mine not'
(8') *No matrix verb*	—	μὴ ἐγχάνῃ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας	'let him <u>not</u> taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having escaped'

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[10] Fragment from:

ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν μὴ φορεῖν τριβώνιον (…), ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐπείθετο. (Ar. V. 116)

convince.3SG.IMPF him MH wear.INF cloak, the other not convince.3SG.IMPF.PASS

"He tried to convince him to not wear the cloak, but the other was not convinced".

[11] After:

πῶς γὰρ τὸ μὲν σὸν σῶμα χρὴ πληγῶν ἀθῷον εἶναι, τοὐμὸν δὲ μή; (Ar. Nu. 1414)

how PRT the PRT your body ought blows.GEN free be.INF the.mine PRT MH?

'For why ought your body to be exempt from blows and mine not?'

[12] Fragment from:

μὴ γὰρ ἐγχάνῃ ποτὲ μηδέ περ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας (Ar. Ach. 221)

MH PRT scoff.at.3SG.SBJ ever MH.and PRT old.ACC.PL being.PTC.ACC.PL escaped.PTC.SG.NOM Acharnian.ACC.PL

let him not taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having escaped

The sentences (4) to (8) have in common that the conceptualizer (whether identical to the speaker, a 3rd person or impersonal) has a negative evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization in the complement clause. This construal relation between the O-level and the S-level, expressed by μή, is shown in Figure 2 (repetition of Figure 1).

Figure 2. Construal configuration with μή.
(After Verhagen 2006: 326, figure 3.)

2.2 The role of the matrix clause

If we would swap the matrix verbs of (5) ἀπαγορεύω 'forbid', (6) ἀναπείθω 'persuade' and (7) χρή 'ought', the argumentative direction and conclusion of the addressee does not change: the addressee understands that he is expected to think of the object of conceptualization as undesirable and to invalidate certain conclusions (and somebody expects him to act on it). The matrix clause can even be "omitted" under some conditions, as in (8) (Kühner & Gerth 1904: 221; cf. ch. 2, section 4.1). If the matrix clause can be swapped or omitted and the most important message is captured in the complement clause, then what is the role of the matrix verb? The intersubjectivity approach to complementation is formulated as follows (Verhagen 2005: 97):

> "…complementation constructions have the primary function of instructing the addressee of an utterance (…) to coordinate cognitively—in a way specified by the matrix clause—with another subject of conceptualization in construing the object of conceptualization (the latter being represented by the complement clause)."

This means that the matrix clause is part of the instruction: it specifies the way the addressee should coordinate cognitively with the other subject of conceptualization. It tells the addressee how to treat the object of conceptualization, the content of the complement clause.

What is expressed with a matrix verb of *fear*? In the 'objective'[13] use of the verb, the subject believes the object of conceptualization will be harmful to him, hence he regards the object of conceptualization as undesirable.[14] It is an invitation to the addressee to coordinate cognitively (feel what the subject feels, or at least understand what the subject feels) and, in some cases but not explicitly, act in order to let the object of conceptualization not become true. To compare this construction with the motives of Tomasello (2005; cf. section 1.3) above: the primary motive to utter this construction of fear is to *share* your attitude. Hopefully, the addressee adopts the stance and drops inconsistent ideas (in the case of 'getting lost': drop the idea of wandering around without caring where you are being desirable), and he starts acting in a way that is consistent with the speaker's and the addressee's stance towards it. But the speaker does not ask for this behavior explicitly with *fear*, as opposed to e.g. *forbid*.

With the verb *forbid* (in 1st person), the speaker expresses that he regards the object of conceptualization as undesirable, and that he regards the addressee capable of preventing that object of conceptualization. He strongly requests the addressee to behave in such a way that the object of conceptualization is not realized. In this construction, a second mental space with *not-x* is opened. The addressee is invited to imagine a world with not *x*. On the go, he guarantees undesirable (harmful?) consequences for the addressee, when the addressee acts in the way the subject regards as undesirable.[15]

The verb *persuade* expresses (among other) that the subject regards the object of conceptualization as desirable, and that he strongly advises the addressee to take over this evaluative stance (because of possible consequences). The addressee is capable of realizing or (with μή) preventing the object of conceptualization and is requested to do so.

The deontic construction χρή with μή expresses that the community regards the object of conceptualization as undesirable; the speaker strongly invites, if not urges, the addressee to take over this stance. The instances in the corpus all express a state of affairs with μή that lies within the power of the addressee, or at least of an average human being, to prevent. So we might conclude that also with this construction a

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[13] Nuyts (2007) distinguishes 3 uses for the Dutch verb *vrezen* 'fear': (i) objective use, the description of a mental state; (ii) qualificational use, expresses a clash between the state of affairs in the complement and the expectations, which are present in context and/or earlier discourse and desired by the participants; (iii) interactive use, mitigator of utterance that goes against the expectation of the addressee . It is unknown whether Greek δέδοικα and φοβέομαι 'fear' have the same three uses.
[14] Merriam-Webster: *fear* "an unpleasant often strong emotion caused by anticipation or awareness of danger".
[15] Merriam-Webster: *forbid* "to say that (something) is not allowed"; *allow* "to regard or treat (something) as acceptable".

request is made to the addressee by the speaker to prevent or change the undesirable object of conceptualization.

Except for the complement construction with verbs of fear, the constructions above have two characteristics in common. Firstly, they are used to share the speaker's negative evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization. By using these constructions, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt the negative evaluative stance. Secondly, they are used to make a request to the addressee to change or prevent the undesirable object of conceptualization: at least the addressee is considered capable of doing that. Constructions with verbs of fear do not necessarily ask for the addressee's action—their main function is sharing the evaluative stance.

The verbs above represent points on a scale: they express how urgent it is that the addressee takes over the evaluative stance of the subject towards the object of conceptualization. One might also say that the matrix verb expresses the intensity of the commitment of the speaker/subject. It influences the argumentative strength.

2.3 Conceptualizer

In the examples above, we saw already that it is not always the speaker whose negative evaluative stance is expressed explicitly. In (4) and (5), the 3rd person is used, and an impersonal construction in (7). The intersubjective approach proposes the following as to the speaker's stance with different subjects. The subject of the verb influences the addressee's interpretation of the commitment of the speaker and therefore the argumentative strength of an utterance (and the urgency of the request or the invitation to adopt the same stance).

Consider example (9) (after Verhagen 2005: 105):

(9) A: Should this happen?
     B_1: I fear that this happens. (δέδοικα μή)
     B_2: I forbid you to let this happen. (ἀπαγορεύω μή)
     B_3: This ought not to happen. (χρὴ μή)
     B_4: He fears that this happens. (δέδοικε μή)

The import of the answer to A's question is the same in all of B's utterances: *no*. The sentences differ in the way they express the speaker's stance towards the object of conceptualization.

In Figure 1 above, it was shown how μή relates the O-level to the S-level. Without a matrix verb, it is not made explicit *whose* evaluative stance is expressed by μή. With a matrix verb, the speaker marks this object as a stance of conceptualizer 1. The addressee is invited to adopt the stance of the onstage conceptualizer (Verhagen 2005: 105). This is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Construal configuration for first-person perspective (B_1 and B_2 in (8)). After Verhagen (2005: 106, figure 3.2).

The same invitation, to adopt the stance of the onstage conceptualizer and to invalidate inconsistent conclusions, is expressed in a complementation sentence with a matrix verb in third person, or an impersonal matrix construction. The speaker commits to the stance of the third person at least temporarily. This is illustrated in Figure 4.

An impersonal construction, e.g. χρή, does not mark whose evaluative stance is expressed. It might be the stance of the speaker or of the community. The message is the same: the addressee is strongly invited to adopt the stance. The construal configuration of impersonal constructions is the same as Figure 1 (only the 'vertical' relation between the two levels is marked, not one of the conceptualizers is onstage).

Figure 4. Construal configuration for third-person perspective (B_3 and B_4 in (8)). After Verhagen (2005: 106, figure 3.3).

Impersonal constructions and 'omitted' matrix verbs

The difference between personal constructions (matrix verbs with a subject (agent/experiencer)) and impersonal constructions (matrix verbs without an agent-like subject) is that personal constructions explicitly invite the addressee to entertain the object of conceptualization in the way someone else does, whereas impersonal

constructions "'just' invite the addressee to entertain it in a particular way" (Verhagen 2005: 133-4). The clause is not explicit about the source of the judgment. "The default is that the addressee engages in cognitive coordination with the speaker, the assumption being that since this is the person who presents the object of conceptualization as [undesirable] to the addressee, he may be taken as holding those views in the absence of evidence to the contrary." (ibid.).

Therefore, impersonal constructions, such as χρή, or subjunctive clauses without a matrix verb, such as example (8) and those treated in section 3, are easily seen as an expression of the stance of the speaker. *A fortiori*, this default is the *reason* that the matrix verb can be omitted. When the speaker utters his own negative evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization, it is not necessary to explicitly mark the conceptualizer. It is only necessary to use a matrix verb, when the speaker wants to give the addressee more information about his motives: is he sharing or requesting?

Conceptualizers: frequencies
In Table 4, frequencies of the different onstage conceptualizers are shown.

Table 4. Matrix verb: subject and mood

	1st pers			2nd pers			3rd pers		impers	total
	subj	ind	non-fin	imper	ind	inf	ind	non-fin	ind	
- fear		2					1	2		5
- negative wish/order		2				1	2	1		6
- wish, order		4	1		3		3	1	1	12
- deontic									8	8
- dynamic					1					2
- purpose	2			6		1	2	1		12
Total (mood)	2	8	1	6	4	2	8	5	9	45[16]
Total (person)		11			12		13		9	

In Table 4, the amount of 2nd person subjects is remarkably high. Why would a speaker invite the addressee to adopt his own stance? Let's take a closer look at the forms. The 3 indicatives[17] in the upper part of the table are questions: "Do you want to not...?" in

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[16] The total is 45 and not 50, because 6 sentences were left out: they do not have a matrix verb, but are clearly a complement of some sort: they start with a conjunction (ὅπως).
[17] Ar. Ach. 1108, Ar. Ach. 1113, Ar. Av. 1026.

the sense of "Will you please not…?".[18] They kindly request the addressee to stop doing what they are doing, because the speaker evaluates it negatively.[19]

The non-finite form is an infinitive, which is used as an advice or order (request).[20] In purpose clauses, we see a high amount of imperatives and one more infinitive, used as an imperative. These are all matrix clauses of purpose complements, in the form: *Make sure this will not happen*. I will come back to the special nature of imperatives in section 4 on prohibitives.

The one 2nd person indicative introducing a dynamic clause is a prediction (and thus a strong advice?) for the future: "You will learn/know how to not act…", shown below in example (10). The question arises what dynamic modality has to do with desirability. In this case, the object of conceptualization, περὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ γονέας σκαιουργεῖν 'behave badly towards your parents', is considered undesirable by the speaker and expressed as such. Further research is needed to find out whether other complements of dynamic matrix verbs have the same value.

>(10) [κἀπιστήσει] καὶ μὴ περὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ γονέας σκαιουργεῖν (Ar. Nu. 994)
>and.know.2SG.IND.FUT and MH concerning the yourself parents behave.amiss.INF
>'[and you will learn] and not to behave ill toward your parents'

2.4 Purpose clauses

The final category of matrix verbs with complements containing μή is more complicated: the verbs that introduce purpose clauses ("verbs of contriving", Rijksbaron 2006). An example of a sentence is given in (11).

>(11) πρὸς ταῦτα τηροῦ μὴ λάβῃς ὑπώπια. (Ar. V. 1386)
>towards that watch.out.2SG.IMPER MH take.2SG.SBJ black.eye.PL
>'Therefore watch out that I don't blacken your eyes'

As described above, many different verbs are used in this type of sentences: e.g. εὐλαβέομαι 'be aware', προνοέομαι 'foresee', ὀφείλω 'be responsible for', σπεύδω 'hasten', φυλάττω 'keep guard', ἀθρέω 'watch', διασκοπέω 'examine', τηρέω 'take care of', φράζομαι 'beware of'. None of these verbs have a meaning that denotes a specific action; a common meaning comes close to: 'imagine this' or 'focus', and

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[18] Willi (2003: 179): "The deliberative subjunctive is often replaced by a periphrasis with βούλει/βούλεσθε ('you.SG/PL want') + subjunctive. This was a common way of formulating an utterance like βούλει μυρίσω σε; 'shall I perfume you?' (Ar. Lys. 938). (…) The pragmatic function of eliciting the addressee's support is typical for a cooperative, polite, and somewhat self-subordinating style."

[19] The counterpart of βούλει μὴ + infinitive 'Will you not…!' is οὐ βούλει 'Don't you want to…?'.

[20] Ar. Av. 557.

'handle it' or 'be responsible'. Again it is noted that the complement clause is the most informative part of this sentence. The matrix verb constitutes a frame to indicate that some action should follow the conclusion inferred from this evaluative stance—the addressee is given responsibility.

The matrix verbs of the former sections (fear, forbid, ought) express (a) an invitation to adopt an evaluative stance and to drop invalid conclusions and in most cases (b) information about the commitment of the speaker (e.g. consequences for the addressee; whether the motive is sharing or requesting). The purpose clauses express an invitation to adopt the evaluative stance, and an invitation to consider this evaluative stance so neatly that a plan of action arises. In the sentences with an imperative in the matrix clause (the majority), the addressee is given all responsibility to prevent the undesirable situation expressed in the complement, so these are clearly strong requests.

The moods of the matrix verbs used in this type are noteworthy. As shown in Table 4, 6 out of 12 purpose sentences had a matrix verb in imperative mood, 1 has infinitive mood with imperative meaning. The 2 sentences with 1st person are in subjunctive mood, of which the function is called 'adhortative'. That means that 9 sentences have an imperative-like or hortative-like construction. Only 3 sentences have a matrix verb in 3rd person and are merely 'descriptive' ("he made sure that not…"). From the high amount of matrix verbs in imperative(-like) mood, we may conclude that this is the prototype of this type of purpose sentences: the matrix verb has a meaning related to "caution/intention/effort" (Willi 2003), is in imperative or hortative subjunctive mood, the complement clause contains μή (starts sometimes with ὅπως) and is usually in subjunctive form.

Conjunction ὅπως

When the speaker asks the addressee to take care of something that is considered desirable, the conjunction ὅπως 'so that' is used to introduce the complement clause. If the complement is undesirable, simple μή (without ὅπως) is normal with verbs of caution/intention/effort (Willi 2003: 265). That is why only few[21] of the complement clauses in my corpus start with the conjunction ὅπως 'so that'.

There were 5 clauses[22] in the corpus that start with ὅπως with no matrix verb. Apparently, the instruction 'focus at' is not necessary (or even superfluous) to understand that the speaker wants the addressee to adopt a certain evaluative stance

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[21] After the verbs ἀθρέω 'watch', φυλάττω 'keep guard', τηρέω 'take care of'. ὅπως is also seen once after δέδοικα 'I fear' (Ar. Eq. 112).
[22] Ach. 343, Av. 1239, Av. 1494, Nu. 257, Nu. 824.
Willi (2010): "Since Aristophanes' contemporary Lysias, an orator with a most unpretentious style, avoids ὅπως (ἄν), it may be inferred that at least the number of occurrences of ὅπως (ἄν) in Aristophanic comedy is too high for true linguistic realism."

with certain responsibilities. Willi (ibid.) notes that these "imperatival independent subordinate clauses introduced by ὅπως" are a colloquialism.[23] It might be that ὅπως was used so often in this combination, that it has taken over the hortative sense of the matrix verb.

Related to this is the issue of μή being a particle and a conjunction. Greek typically uses conjunctions to link every clause to the previous and to express their role in or their relation to the context. For this reason, complement clauses introduced by μή without a (different) conjunction, led scholars to the conclusion that μή is also a conjunction: after matrix verbs of fear it means 'that', after verbs of caution/intention/effort it means 'so that' (e.g. Rijksbaron 2006). But the fact that Aristophanes uses sometimes bare μή, and sometimes ὅπως μή, even after a verb of fear, leads me to the conclusion that μή may not be a conjunction and that asyndeton may be more common than is thought. This discussion is not relevant for the main questions in this thesis; in either category, μή invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid. The conjunction ὅπως and/or the imperative/adhortative invites the addressee to conclude that action is needed and that the utterance should be taken as a request.

2.5 Concluding

In this section, complement clauses were discussed. The complement clause is the most informative part of the sentence: the object of conceptualization is negatively evaluated, which is expressed by μή. The addressee is invited to adopt this evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization to infer that certain conclusions are invalid.

The matrix verb adds information about the motive of the speaker: what is to be done with the stance. Is the speaker sharing his attitude in order to increase the common ground of speaker and addressee (e.g. fear), or is he merely requesting the addressee to prevent or to change the undesirable situation (e.g. 'watch that')? The matrix verb also expresses whose evaluative stance is contained in the complement clause and how severe consequences are when the addressee does not undertake action. These parts of information together inform the addressee about the commitment of the speaker towards the evaluative stance and thus give the invitation less or more strength.

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[23] Willi (2003: 265): "extremely common in Aristophanes, who has c. 40 out of the 80 examples in classical Greek."

3. Μή in the main clause: Prohibitive and optative clauses

The main function of communication is to influence the cognition and (thereby) the behavior of others. A way of doing that is expressing our negative evaluative stance towards the behavior or plans for behavior of the other, and implicitly or explicitly requesting the other to change his behavior. Useful constructions for this function are the prohibitive (treated in this section) and the warning (conditional, treated in section 5). The prohibitive, constructed as a main clause with μή and imperative, 2nd person aorist subjunctive or 2nd person future indicative (or without a verb), forms approximately a quarter of the whole corpus. The warning, a conditional clause with *unless/if...not*, can be more effective because it makes the consequences more explicit, and is (therefore?) used more frequently: one third of the corpus.

The corpus contains 98 sentences in which μή is used in the main clause. All of them express a negative evaluative stance; most of these are a prohibitive (used as a request to the addressee), but some are better described as an instance of sharing (without a directive sense). 88 sentences contain verbs with different moods (see Table 5), 10 sentences have no verb (section 3.2). Frequencies of the different moods are given in Table 5.

The imperative is the most frequent mood in main clauses with μή and directly after that comes the subjunctive, of which a large majority has a 2nd person subject. These 2 constructions are used to express the prohibitive. Some subjunctive have a 1st person or 3rd person subject; these constructions express an adhortative. Only 3 sentences have a verb in optative mood; this mood (without particle ἄν) is not suitable to express a prohibitive, as will be seen below. The indicative is used in only 6 sentences, of which 5 contain the peculiar οὐ μή + 2nd person future indicative construction (treated in section 4).

In this section I try to answer the question: what is the difference between these moods with μή or οὐ μή in the main clause? What have these constructions in common and what distinguishes them? I presuppose that moods give information similar to matrix verbs, about the motive of communication and speaker commitment.

Table 5. Moods, tenses and subjects with μή in main clauses.

		1st person	2nd person	3rd person	impersonal	Total
imperative	present		36	1		41
	perfect		4			
subjunctive	present	2	2	1		38
	aorist	6[24]	22	4	1	
indicative	present		1			6
	future		4[25]			
	aorist	1				
optative	aorist	1	1	1		3
Total		10	70	7	1	88

3.1 Expressing responsibility

> (12) σίγα, μὴ κάλει μου τοὔνομα (Ar. *Av.* 1506)
> be.silent.IMPER MH call.PRS.IMPER me the.name
> 'Sh! sh! Don't call me by my name'

> (13) μή, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἡμῶν κατείπῃς, ἀντιβολῶ σε, δέσποτα. (Ar. *Pax* 376)
> MH to the gods us report.AOR.SBJ beg.1SG you master.VOC
> 'I adjure you in the name of the gods, master, don't report us!'

By using μή, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards an object of conceptualization and to invalidate certain conclusions (such as "this behavior is desirable"). With verbs with 2nd person subject (imperative, subjunctive, future indicative), this object of conceptualization partly overlaps with the communicative event: the addressee is part of the object of conceptualization *and* takes part in the event. That makes the prohibitive a remarkable construction. A prohibitive expresses the evaluative stance of the speaker towards some (ongoing or anticipated) action of the addressee. The addressee is asked to take over that stance and draw the conclusion to not continue or start the action. The addressee is expected to be able to control the undesirable behavior and is requested to take that responsibility. The peculiarity about prohibitions is that the addressee is thus explicitly invited to adopt a negative stance towards his own behavior or plans. The addressee is involved in two ways; this might be the reason for the sense of "impulse" and "expressive appeal for hearer involvement" in descriptions of the meaning of the imperative (Fortuin & Boogaart 2009: 652, 656). The responsibility for the addressee is made explicit.[26]

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[24] 3 οὐ μή constructions
[25] All οὐ μή constructions.
[26] It is important to note that there are more constructions in Greek to express an order/request or prohibitive, e.g. potential optative + ἄν (negation οὐ), ὅπως + subjunctive (cf. 2.4) (negative μή), infinitive (negative μή).

Not only the addressee is involved in a special way, also the speaker is highly committed in these directive speech acts, as Takahashi (1994) argues. This speaker commitment is not observable, but can be made explicit with markers like English *please, do, for heaven's sake*. In the corpus, many of these markers are found with 2nd person verbs: ἀντιβολῶ σε, ἱκετεύω, λίσσομαί σε 'I beg you', μὰ Δία 'by Zeus', μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα 'by Heracles', πρὸς τῶν θεῶν 'in the name of the gods'. They are used for positive and negative directions.

Based on the description above, every 2nd person verb with μή invites to take a negative evaluative stance towards his own actions or plans. What is the difference in argumentative strength between 2nd person imperative mood, subjunctive mood, optative mood or even future indicative mood with μή?

First of all, Greek is one of many languages that use two strategies to express prohibition. In positive orders, imperative verbs occur in present and aorist tense. For the prohibitive the imperative is used in present (and perfect), and the subjunctive in aorist. The difference between these two tenses/stems is defined by whether the undesired behavior of the addressee was already going on or not yet. With present imperative, the speaker expresses his aversion to the addressee's *ongoing* behavior and asks him to stop it (example 12 above); with aorist subjunctive, the speaker presents the addressee *planned* behavior as undesirable and asks him to not start (example 13).

However, there are two sentences (Ar. *Nu*. 614 and Ar. *V*. 976)[27] with 2nd person subjunctive present. These two are interpreted as prohibitives as well, but with a more iterative meaning. In Ar. *Nu*. 614, the speaker said quite often to not buy a torch, since the moon is (often) beautiful. In Ar. *V*. 976, the speaker tries to convince the addressee to not kill the different dogs.

Responsibility in subjunctive

By using μή + 2nd person imperative or subjunctive, the speaker invites (urges) the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards his own plans or behavior (about which he has control or responsibility), invalidate inconsistent conclusions and to take responsibility for the situation. The (expected) result is that the addressee changes his plans or behavior as requested into something that is more consistent with the stance.

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[27] μὴ πρίῃ, παῖ, δᾷδ', ἐπειδὴ φῶς Σεληναίης καλόν. (Ar. Nu. 614)
MH buy.2SG.PRS.SBJ, boy, torch, because light moon.GEN beautiful
"Boy, don't buy a torch, for the moonlight is beautiful."
ἴθ', ἀντιβολῶ σ', οἴκτιρατ' αὐτόν, ὦ πάτερ, καὶ μὴ διαφθείρητε. (Ar. V. 976)
PRT beg.1SG you have.pity.AOR.IMPER him PRT father and MH destroy.2PL.PRS.SBJ
"Come on, please, be merciful to him, father, don't destroy!"

With verbs in subjunctive mood and 3rd person subject, the speaker does not literally ask the addressee to consider his own behavior; see examples (14) and (15). However, the addressee is considered capable of preventing the situation with the 3rd person to take place. Subjunctives with 1st person subjects are interpreted as adhortative (example (15)); the 1st person plural is meant inclusively[28] and the addressee is requested to join.

> (14) μὴ γὰρ ἐγχάνῃ ποτὲ μηδέ περ γέροντας ὄντας ἐκφυγὼν Ἀχαρνέας (Ar. *Ach.* 221)
> MH PRT scoff.at.3SG.AOR.SBJ ever MH.and PRT old.ACC.PL being.PTC.ACC.PL
> escaped.PTC.SG.NOM acharnian.ACC.PL
> '[Let us follow him,] let him not taunt [us] old Acharnians with his having escaped'

> (15) Αἰγεΐδη, φράσσαι κυναλώπεκα, μή σε δολώσῃ (Ar. *Eq.* 1067)
> son.of.Aegeus beware.AOR.IMPER foxdog.ACC MH you deceive.3SG.AOR.SBJ
> 'Oh, Aegeus' son! Beware of the foxdog, don't let him outfox you!'
> "It would be undesirable if he deceives you"

> (16) μή νυν ἀνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεντείνωμεν ἀνδρικώτερον. (Ar. Pax 515)
> MH now give.up.1PL.AOR.SBJ but get.stronger.1PL.AOR.SBJ manly.COMP
> 'Don't let us give up, let us redouble our efforts.'

No addressee's responsibility in optative

Imperative and subjunctive verbs with 1st, 2nd and 3rd person are used when the speaker considers an idea or behavior as undesirable, he expects the addressee to have the capability and requests him to take the responsibility to change it. This capability (and responsibility) to prevent something to take place or continue is what defines the difference between expressions in subjunctive and optative in this corpus. The optative is used when the speaker assumes (or expresses to assume) that the addressee cannot change an undesirable situation.[29] The only example of a 2nd person optative with μή is given in (17)—it is a complicated example, but it does support the idea that the addressee is not expected to be capable of changing the undesirable.

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[28] 'Inclusive *we*' means 'you and I', while 'exclusive *we*' means 'I and somebody else, but not you'. In many languages, although not in Greek, these two *we*'s have different forms. To this traditional pair I would like to add a third *we*, meaning 'you and maybe somebody else, but not me', often used in hortatives from higher-placed people to lower-placed people, e.g. a manager to an employee or a teacher to a class. But that aside.

[29] The expression of non-expectation is the reason that this construction is used for very polite requests or wishes. The addressee is not bound by the speaker, he would not lose face if he does not answer his request (in the sense of Brown & Levinson 1987).

(17) ἔρειδε, μὴ παύσαιο μηδέποτ᾿ ἐσθίων τέως ἕως σαυτὸν
work.IMPER MH stop.2SG.AOR.OPT never eat.PTC so.much until yourself
λάθῃς διαρραγείς. (Ar. *Pax* 31)
be.unaware.2SG burst.PTC
'Come, pluck up courage, I hope you never stop eating until you suddenly burst!'
"It is undesirable if you ever stop eating"

In (17), the speaker (a slave) expresses the wish that the addressee (a dung beetle) eat towards its explosion, or literally, the aversion to the idea of the beetle stopping to eat. In different translations[30] this sentence is interpreted as a directive/imperative clause, but there is a good reason that this verb is an optative and not a prohibitive. The speaker took the dung beetle as the subject, but actually expresses his wish towards the audience or the second slave (on stage). It is comparable to the situation after a conversation on the phone with a salesman, and when you have hung up the phone, you say something bad to that person ("I hope you choke on your special offer!"), with the intention that he does not hear it, but a third person in the room does. The subject/addressee is not expected to take responsibility. The "special offer" is ironic, as is the "never stop eating" in (17). The dung beetle eats feces, so the slaves are kneading cakes and cookies from feces; something they want to quit as soon as possible.

Also in (18), the speaker (1st person subject) has no influence on the situation he describes—it is definitely not an adhortative as 1st person subjunctive would be. In (19), although interpreted by different translators as a directive ("please kill him"), the speaker expresses his aversion to 'him' (Fury) coming back, but he does not make his addressee, Dionysus, responsible for preventing the situation.

(18) μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα μή νυν ἔτ᾿ ἐγὼ 'ν τοῖσι δικασταῖς κλέπτοντα Κλέωνα λάβοιμι. (Ar. *V.* 758)
by the Heracles MH now still I in the judges stealing.ACC Cleon.ACC take.AOR.OPT
'I swear by the great Heracles, that I hope I'll never be put on the jury that convicts Cleon of stealing!'[31]

(19) ἀλλ᾿, ὦ Διόνυσ᾿, ἀπόλοιτο καὶ μὴ 'λθοι φέρων. (Ar. *Pax* 267)
PRT PRT Dionysos perish.3SG.AOR.OPT and MH come.3SG.AOR.OPT bringing
'Ah! Bacchus! I wish he dies and does not come bringing [the pestle]!'

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[30] Eugene O'Neill, Jr., 1938 (Perseus); G. Theodoridis.
[31] Translation of Theodoridis. O'Neill interprets the opposite: 'By Heracles, may I reach the court in time to convict Cleon of theft.' Either way, the subject has not influence on being in the court or jury.

In sum, by using an imperative or subjunctive mood in the main clause with μή, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the situation expressed by the verb, and to discard inconsistent ideas, and he requests the addressee to take (some) responsibility in changing or preventing the undesirable situation. By using an optative mood in the main clause with μή, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards the situation expressed by the verb, and to discard inconsistent ideas, but he does not make the addressee responsible for changing or preventing the undesirable situation. This, the expression of non-expectation, is the reason that this construction is used for wishes or very polite requests (e.g. to gods). The addressee is not bound by the speaker, he would not lose face if he does not answer his request (in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987)) and neither does the speaker.

3.2 Aversion without a verb

10 main clauses with μή do not contain a verb. In example (20) speaker Philocleon expresses his wish to tell the baker's wife an anecdote; he invites her to adopt a positive evaluative stance towards this idea. The baker's wife (B) expresses her aversion; she invites him to adopt a negative evaluative stance for a while and requests him to drop any invalid conclusions, among which is 'I should tell an anecdote'.

(20) Ph.   ἄκουσον ὦ γύναι: λόγον σοι βούλομαι λέξαι χαρίεντα. (Ar. *V.* 1400)
              hear.IMPER PRT woman story you want.1SG tell.INF fine
      B.   μὰ Δία μὴ 'μοί γ' ὦ μέλε.
              by Zeus MH me PRT PRT friend.VOC
      'Listen, woman, I wish to tell you a lovely anecdote. —By Zeus, not for me'

All 10 sentences are to be interpreted as a prohibitive: the addressee is requested to prevent the 'situation' and has full responsibility, according to the speaker. Apparently, this is the prototypical use of μή in the main clause—it does not need a verb to express the subject (2nd person) or the high degree of responsibility (imperative or subjunctive mood). This idea of a prototype fits well with the frequencies as shown in Table 5: imperative and 2nd person subjunctive together form approximately 70% of the sentences with μή in the main clause.

3.3 Μή opens two mental spaces

Above, in section 1.2 in this chapter, I described how logical negation opens two mental spaces, one with *not-x* and one with *x*. We are able to refer to both spaces in the discourse. That μή is more than a marker of undesirability is proven by the following examples (21-22).

(21) πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ τύπτ'· εἰ δὲ μή, σαυτόν ποτ' αἰτιάσει. (Ar. Nu 1433)
    for that MH beat.2SG.IMPER; if PRT MH yourself ever blame.2SG.FUT
    'Therefore do not beat me; otherwise you will one day blame yourself.'
(22) καὶ λάβεσθε τουτουὶ καὶ μὴ μεθῆσθε μηδενί· εἰ δὲ μή, 'ν πέδαις παχείαις
    and take.2PL.IMPER him and MH give.2PL.IMPER nobody; if PRT MH in chains thick
    οὐδὲν ἀριστήσετε. (Ar. V. 435)
    nothing eat.lunch.2PL.FUT
    'Seize this man and hand him over to no one, otherwise you shall starve to
    death in chains.'

If μή only functioned as a marker of undesirability, to share the negative evaluative stance to some situation, the examples above would mean something different than the translation says. Above examples show that μή (at least in prohibitive constructions) is able to open two mental spaces. Consider example (21). With μή as an undesirability marker, the words μὴ τύπτε would mean something like 'it is undesirable that you hit me'. The second part of the sentence would not make sense: 'if not, you will blame yourself'.[32] This means that the negative evaluative stance has to be adopted by the addressee, at least: 'if you do not take over my evaluative stance towards you beating me, you will blame yourself'. But in fact, the addressee will not blame himself for not adopting the stance, but for not not carrying out the action. Μή τύπτε opens two mental spaces, like negation: a undesirable space in which the addressee beats the speaker (*x*) and a desirable space in which the addressee does not beat the speaker (*not-x*). εἰ δὲ μή must refer to the *not-x* space: 'if you not [not beat me]'.

Not every construction with μή opens this *not-x* space. Complement constructions with verbs of fear, e.g. *he is afraid I get lost*, cannot be extended with *if not, I/he will blame myself/himself.*

The constructions with μή that do open the *not-x* space (next to the *x* space) are at least the prohibitive constructions and the hortative constructions, among which are also the purpose complement clauses. These are also the constructions that give the addressee responsibility for the situation. These two characteristics, giving responsibility and opening space *not-x* seem connected.

3.4 Indicative

The moods that were mentioned above, imperative, subjunctive, and optative, are known for their use to express an evaluative stance: without μή, they express a positive

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[32] Conditional clauses are treated in section 5.

evaluative stance towards a situation they describe ('go on, start, let's, hopefully…'). It is thus not strange that μή, as a marker of undesirability, is used in this kind of evaluative constructions. However, μή is also used in constructions with verbs in indicative mood, known as expressing an epistemic stance, albeit it only 6 times in this corpus.

The indicative mood is in most cases part of a special construction, the οὐ μή + 2nd person future indicative construction, which is treated in section 4. Only 1 sentence is an example of μή + aorist indicative, which indicates a "passionate oath" about the past (Kühner & Gerth 1904: §510) (example 23). For this utterance about the past with a high degree of certainty, we would expect an assertion with indicative mood and negation οὐ—it is an epistemic stance towards a situation in the past. With μή the speaker adds "the feeling of dislike or disgust, with which he repels a thought" (ibid.). Μή behaves like epistemic negation in this construction (with the added sense undesirability) and therefore we may say that this construction opens a *not-x* space as well. To the epistemic stance expressed by the indicative, the speaker adds an evaluative stance with μή. The argumentative strength is increased by the combination of two stances. I elaborate on this combination of stances in section 4.

> (23) (A: Look! Between Earth and the gods is air, right? Well, look, if we from Athens have to go, say to the Oracle at Delphi, we have to ask permission from the Boetians, to let us pass through their country. It'll be the same with you. If you've got your city up there, the gods would have to pay you for the aromas of the sacrifices the humans make, to reach them.)
> B: μὴ 'γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω
> MH I perception clever.COMP hear.1SG.AOR.IND ever
> '[I swear] I never heard of anything more cleverly conceived' Ar. *Av*. 195

4. Οὐ μή in one clause: two stances?

The οὐ μή construction is a peculiar construction. Both particles οὐ and μή invite the addressee to invalidate certain conclusions that are inconsistent with the epistemic stance (οὐ) and the evaluative stance (μή) of the speaker. Both particles are able to open the *not-x* space next to the *x* space, although this is not true for all constructions with μή. The construction expresses "an emphatic prohibition" or "a strong conviction on the part of the speaker that the state of affairs will not be realized", dependent on the mood of the verb (Rijksbaron 2006: 59).[33]

Οὐ is logical negation, it has the function of inviting the addressee to adopt a particular *epistemic* stance towards some idea, and to abandon another one that is

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[33] See chapter 2, section 4 about the view of Rijksbaron (1991; 2006).

inconsistent with it, and the function of directing the addressee to infer that certain conclusions are invalid (Verhagen 2005). Μή on the other hand, invites the addressee to adopt an *evaluative* stance and drop certain conclusions on this ground. The speaker expresses that he is certain about some idea (i.e. epistemic stance) and that he considers that idea undesirable (i.e. evaluative stance). In theory, the addressee is directed to infer that certain conclusions are invalid, not based on one stance (epistemic *or* evaluative), but on two stances (epistemic *and* evaluative).

In practice, speakers do not express two stances (modalities) in the same clause. Nuyts (2009) introduces the "one-commitment-per-clause" principle, after observing that combinations of epistemic, deontic and/or evidential modality rarely occur in Dutch. The few combinations that do occur on a regular basis are constructions with a 'idiomatic' meaning, and not a compositional meaning based on the sum of the two modalities. For example, deontic *moeten* 'must' + epistemic *misschien* 'maybe': "this combination as a whole expresses a (weak) deontic meaning of the "directive" type, and this is not just a matter of adding up the meaning of the epistemic adverb (a small chance) and the deontic (or dynamic) auxiliary (an obligation or necessity)." (ibid. 149).

Following Nuyts' "one-commitment-per-clause" principle, the combination of οὐ and μή, the one with epistemic modality and the other with deontic modality, cannot possibly express both modalities. Rather, they form a construction with a single, non-compositional meaning. Using the οὐ μή construction, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative stance towards an object of conceptualization and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid. The verbal mood, indicative future or aorist subjunctive, informs the addressee about the type of stance and helps him figuring out what the motive of the speaker is. οὐ μή + 2nd person indicative future emphasizes a negative evaluative stance and is interpreted as an emphatic prohibition. The construction opens two mental spaces *x* and *not-x* (οὐ always does this, and some constructions with μή as well) and gives the addressee the responsibility to bring out *not-x.* οὐ μή + subjunctive emphasizes a negative epistemic stance and is interpreted as an emphatic denial about the future. The negative evaluative stance is not completely absent, as we will see below. The construction opens two mental spaces (*x* and *not-x*), but does not give the addressee any responsibility for realizing a situation.

The corpus contains 12 sentences with the οὐ μή construction, 6 with the subjunctive and 6 with indicative forms.

Table 6. Verbal mood and person in οὐ μή constructions.

	Indicative	Subjunctive	
1st person		4	4
2nd person	5	1	6
3rd person	1[34]	1[35]	2
	6	6	12

4.1 Οὐ μή + future indicative

6 sentences with οὐ μή in the corpus are formed with a future indicative form, expressing an "emphatic prohibition". An example is given in (24).

(24) οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοὶ (Ar. *Nu*. 505)
    not MH chatter.2SG.FUT.IND but follow.2SG.FUT.IND me
    "Don't chatter; you will follow me"

Different than we would expect from an indicative verb, in the οὐ μή + future indicative construction an evaluative stance is expressed, more than an epistemic stance. This construction may be comparable to the μή + indicative construction (section 3.4). For that construction, Kühner & Gerth state that with μή the speaker adds "the feeling of dislike or disgust, with which he repels a thought". With the 2nd person future indicative, it is a strong invitation to the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards his own behavior, and he is given full responsibility to change it. As argued above, also the mental space with *not-x* is opened.

It is not strange that a 2nd person indicative future verb form is interpreted as an order. The English sentence *You will not go out tonight* is more a prohibition than a prediction. If a particle of undesirability is added, there is no doubt anymore about the intention of the speaker: get the addressee to adopt the evaluative stance and drop all inconsistent conclusions, i.e. do not go on with the undesirable behavior but change the actions. Οὐ with indicative invites the addressee to adopt a negative epistemic stance towards the object of conceptualization ('it is not the case'), μή adds a negative evaluation to it: 'it will not and it'd better not happen'.

4.2 Οὐ μή + subjunctive

The οὐ μή + subjunctive construction expresses an epistemic stance about the future to which the speaker firmly commits. See examples (25) and (26).

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[34] Ar. *Pax* 1037 (see example (27)). Verb form differs in manuscripts, see 4.3. According to the grammars, 3rd person aorist subjunctive would be more appropriate.
[35] Ar. *Pax* 1226. Verb form differs in manuscripts, see 4.3.

(25) κοὔ μή ποτέ σου παρὰ τὰς κάννας οὐρήσω μηδ' ἀποπάρδω. (Ar. V. 394)
   and.not MH ever your against the railings urinate.1SG.AOR.SBJ and.MH
   fart.1SG.AOR.SBJ
   '[I swear] I will never make water, never, nor ever let a fart, against the railing of
   thy statue.'

(26) εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ἐγὼ σαφῶς ὅτι (…)
   good PRT know.1SG I wisely (…)
   οὐ μὴ 'πιλάθῃ ποτ', ὢν ἐκείνου τοῦ πατρός (Ar. *Pax* 1304)
   not MH forget.2SG.AOR.SBJ ever being that.GEN the father.GEN
   'For I well know for a certainty that (…) you will never forget [this song], being a
   son of a father like that.'

The firm epistemic stance about the future is also expressed by εὖ οἶδ' ἐγὼ σαφῶς 'I know well [and] clearly' in (26). The speaker invites the addressee with strength to adopt his epistemic stance towards an object of conceptualization. The addressee does not need to undertake action (so not a request), but the speaker considers the information valuable for the addressee. The speaker's motive for communication is between sharing and informing, at least in (26).

Because it is impossible to have epistemic certainty about the future, it is inevitable to (also) express the speaker's evaluative stance towards the object. In every assertion about the future, some hope or fear is captured. The same is visible in the οὐ μή + subjunctive construction: the object of conceptualization contains something undesirable for the speaker. In example (25) the speaker makes a promise about the future that he will not do this undesirable thing: 'have pity and save him, and I will never dishonor you.' In example (26), the speaker really hopes that the singer will never forget the song (although it is not in the singer's best interest). In Ar. V. 612,[36] the speaker will not and really does not want to ask other people to serve him than his wife, since they come καταρασάμενος καὶ τονθορύσας 'cursing and grumbling'. In Ar. Ach. 662,[37] the speaker is very certain about never hanging around the city ὢν (…) δειλὸς καὶ λακαταπύγων 'being a coward and a letch-arse'.

The construction οὐ μή + subjunctive seems to be similar to the Dutch expressions *zeker weten dat niet* 'to know for sure that not' and *vast en zeker niet* 'surely not'. These expressions are less certain than bare *weten* 'know', and are more linked to hope than to certainty. However, the use of the word *zeker* 'sure' adds a hint

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[36] κοὔ μή με δεήσῃ εἰς σὲ βλέψαι καὶ τὸν ταμίαν, ὁπότ' ἄριστον παραθήσει (Ar. V. 612)
and.not MH me needs.AOR.SBJ to you see.INF and the steward when best.ADV serve.3SG
'and I have no need to turn towards you or the steward to know when it shall please him to serve my dinner'. (Transl. Perseus)
[37] κοὔ μή ποθ' ἀλῶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν (Ar. Ach. 662)
and.not MH ever caught.AOR.SBJ around the city
'I won't be caught hanging around the city' (Transl. G. Theodoridis)

of epistemic stance, and a hint of promise. In the Greek οὐ μή + subjunctive construction, οὐ functions in a similar way: it adds certainty to the wish that is expressed by μή + subjunctive. Apparently this epistemic 'certainty' is so important, that the construction as a whole has an epistemic modality. However, the evaluative meaning of μή is still present to some extent, as is the mitigating value of epistemic *misschien* in the Dutch deontic construction *misschien moeten* (Nuyts 2009).

This construction is a clear example of how negative epistemic stance (logical negation) and negative evaluative stance (undesirability) are closely connected (cf. section 1.2 of this chapter). Both negative expressions are used. Again, "the wish is father to the thought"; this is applicable to both constructions with οὐ μή and in both constructions it is actually expressed: the wish *and* the thought.

4.3 Question: how important is verbal mood in this construction?

In Table 6, it is shown that verbs in future indicative mood have a 2nd person subject most of the time (if not always; see example (27)). Subjunctive forms in this construction are seldom in 2nd person and most of the time in 1st or 3rd person. If the verbal mood coincides so often with the subject, then how important is the mood?

Willi (2003: 258) observes that "[e]mphatic prohibitions with οὐ μή + future indicative (*Ach.* 166, *Nub.* 367, *Ran.* 202) are so common that the indicative occasionally spreads even into the domain of οὐ μή + subjunctive in emphatic denials (*Pax* 1037, *Ran.* 508-9)." The sentence in (27), Ar. *Pax* 1037, cannot be interpreted as a prohibitive and must be interpreted as a promise.[38] It is impossible to give the addressee responsibility for the way other people (in the future) look at his own glory.

    (27) οὐχὶ μὴ παύσει ποτ' ὢν ζηλωτὸς ἅπασιν. (Ar. *Pax* 1037)
        not MH stop.3SG.FUT.IND ever being enviable all.DAT
        "[your glory] will never stop being enviable to all"
        'your glory will be ever envied'

On top of these observations comes the fact that Aristophanes lived in a time when a change in pronunciation took place, in which the aorist subjunctive and the future indicative became phonologically identical (Petrounias 2007).[39] Scribes in later centuries probably lacked native speaker's intuition about the difference between these moods and may have made mistakes while copying these texts. Forms do indeed differ per edition. Examples are Ar. *Pax* 1037, which has the verb in future indicative

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[38] Verb form of Ar. Pax 1037 differs in manuscripts. TLG gives παύσει, Perseus gives παύσῃ.
[39] It takes too far to elaborate on this development, but it ended with two morphologically identical forms for indicative future and (aorist) subjunctive. See Christidis (ed.) (2007), part IV.

form in TLG,[40] but in aorist subjunctive form in Perseus,[41] and Ar. *Pax* 1226,[42] for which the forms differ vice versa.

Apparently, mood is not the most important part of the construction for the interpretation of the sentence. The addressee (and the reader) infers that the sentence is an invitation to adopt an evaluative stance and to conclude that (non-)action is requested from the person of the verb (probably 2nd) and the context. And the addressee infers that the sentence is an invitation to adopt an negative epistemic stance and to conclude that some inconsistent ideas are to be discarded when the verb has a 1st or 3rd person subject (the speaker promises and merely informs him about something he thinks is interesting and relevant for the addressee).

4.4 Concluding: constructions with μή in main clauses

We have seen different constructions with μή in main clauses: 2nd person present imperative, 2nd person aorist subjunctive, 1st and 3rd person subjunctive, optative clauses, main clauses with μή without a verb, οὐ μή with 2nd person future indicative and οὐ μή with subjunctive. Most of these constructions express a negative evaluative stance towards the object of conceptualization. Sometimes, in the constructions μή with indicative and οὐ μή with subjunctive, a negative epistemic stance is more present. Apart from the optative construction, all constructions open two mental spaces with *not-x* and with *x*. The constructions μή with imperative construction, μή with subjunctive, μή without a verb and οὐ μή with 2nd person future indicative express a request to the addressee to behave in such a way that *not-x* becomes or stays reality.

5. Conditional clauses

As argued above in section 3, the main function of communication is to influence the cognition and (thereby) the behavior of others. One way of doing that is expressing our negative evaluative stance towards the behavior or plans for behavior of the other, and implicitly requesting the other to change his behavior. Next to the prohibitive construction above, another useful construction for this function is the conditional construction.

In traditional views, the meaning of conditional constructions is described in logical truth tables. Akatsuka (1997; 1999; Akatsuka & Strauss 2000) has disputed that

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[40] N.G. Wilson, *Aristophanis Fabulae*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 283-338.
[41] Aristophanes, *Aristophanes Comoediae*, ed. F.W. Hall and W.M. Geldart, vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.
[42] οὗτος μὲν οὐ μή σοι ποιήσῃ ζημίαν. (Ar. Pax 1226)
that PRT not MH you.DAT make.AOR.SBJ loss
'Oh, you will lose nothing over it.'

by giving examples of conditionals in which F F = T (a False antecedent and a False consequent give True), but which express completely different attitudes from speakers and of which one can start a conversation and the other one must always be a repetition of what a previous speaker has just said.[43] She suggests that "natural language conditionals are an important device for encoding the speaker's evaluative stance of desirability" (Akatsuka 1999: 201). Conditionals in colloquial speech are best described as promises and threats (warnings): *if something desirable happens, something desirable will happen*, "desirable leads to desirable" or *if something undesirable happens, something undesirable will happen* "undesirable leads to undesirable". Only 3% of the clauses combined a desirable part (antecedent or consequent) with an undesirable part. She bases her conclusions on conditionals uttered in Japanese.

5.1 Desirability in Greek conditional clauses and the problematic role of μή

The present Greek corpus contains 102 conditional clauses with εἰ μή 'if not'. The consequence is negated with οὐ. For every sentence I have tried to decide whether the antecedent (the if-clause) and the consequence are desirable or undesirable, from the point of view of the speaker, while interpreting μή as 'not'. The results match Akatsuka's (1999), see Table 7. Only 3% has a combination of a desirable with an undesirable part.

Table 7. Desirability in conditionals

	Frequency
If desirable > desirable (promise)	13
If desirable > undesirable	0
If undesirable > desirable	3
If undesirable > undesirable (warning)	81
(unclear)	5
Total	102

A problem arises at this point: in all 102 antecedents, with varying desirability, μή is used. This is not consistent with the idea of μή as an undesirability marker, a characteristic of every construction with μή so far.

> (28) ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἔγωγε τἄρρεν', εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι (Ar. *Nu.* 660)
> but know.1SG I the.males if MH be.mad.1SG.PRS
> 'I know the males, if I am not mad.'

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[43] *If I hadn't given her the car keys, this accident wouldn't have happened* vs. *If this sandwich was made this morning, you're Shirley Temple.* Akatsuka (1999: 200).
The latter fits in the same category as described by Jespersen (1917: 26-27): e.g. *devil take me if…* (discussed in section 1.2 of this chapter).

(29) εἰ μή μ' ἀναπείσετ', ἀποθανεῖσθε τήμερον (Ar. *Eq.* 68)

    if MH me obey.2PL die.2PL.FUT today

    "If you do not obey me, you will die today"

In example (28), a conditional is given. This conditional can be interpreted as "desirable leads to desirable": "I am not mad" (desirable) leads to "I know the males" (desirable). The idea μαίνομαι 'I am mad' is marked as undesirable, the addressee is invited to invalidate the idea of 'being mad', and then he comes to the right conclusion that the speaker 'knows the males'. "It would be undesirable if I am mad, so discard that idea, invalidate the conclusion that I am mad and draw the conclusion consistent with my evaluative stance: 'I am not mad'. If this is the case (and it is), I know the males."

The part of invalidating conclusions seems much more important than the part of marking something as undesirable. This is even more the case in conditionals that are interpreted as "undesirable leads to undesirable" (example 29).[44] "You do not obey me" (undesirable) leads to "you will die today" (undesirable). The idea ἀναπείσετε 'you obeying me' is marked as undesirable with μή, although this *is* desirable for the speaker! "It would be undesirable that you obey, so discard that idea, invalidate the conclusion that you obey me and draw the conclusion consistent with the evaluative stance I just presented: 'you do not obey me'. If this is the case, you will die today."

The literal interpretation of μή as an undesirability marker does not work in conditionals. In positive conditionals, promises, like (28), μή does *mark* undesirability; but in negative conditionals, threats, like (29), μή is *part* of the undesirability.

Since there is no way around interpreting μή as 'not', we may conclude that μή in this construction comes very close to logical, epistemic negation.[45] It opens two mental spaces, one with *x* and one with *not-x*, just as logical negation does and a pure undesirability marker does not. Μή as a word alone does not express a negative evaluative stance in this construction, only the construction as a whole does so.

Since promises and threats are an important device to change the evaluative stance of the addressee towards an idea and thus his behavior, it is not surprising that μή is used in this construction. Promises and threats have in common with prohibitives that the speaker gives the addressee responsibility over changing or preventing a situation.

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[44] From these examples, it might seem that the order of antecedent and consequent matter for the desirability/undesirability interpretation, but these are not correlated. Neither does it play a role if a negation is in the consequent (*if not…, not*).

[45] This might be the reason that in Modern Greek conditional clauses, μή is replaced by δεν, which is the modern version of οὐ.

5.2 Moods in conditional clauses

The speaker expresses how likely he considers it that the antecedent becomes or is reality by using different verbal moods (Rijksbaron 2006: 68 ff.), which seem to be correlated with the desirability of the conditional clause.

The present indicative expresses no indication concerning the likelihood of fulfillment of the condition. The future indicative indicates that the speaker is skeptical about the fulfillment of the condition, and even considers it undesirable (ibid.): "It is clear that from the unpleasant consequences that the addressee had better take care lest the condition be fulfilled." The indicative of the past expresses that the fulfillment of the condition is not or no more possible. The subjunctive expresses either that the speaker considers fulfillment of the condition very well possible (with a future reference in the consequence clause), or that the condition is repeatedly fulfilled, that it is a recurring (iterative) event ("every time you do this, I will punish you"). The optative expresses that the fulfillment of the condition is possible "and no more than that".

Table 8. Verbal mood in the antecedent of conditionals

		desirable > desirable	undesirable > desirable	undesirable > undesirable	
no verb			1	14	
subjunctive	present		1	**15**	33 (41%)
	aorist	2 (15%)		**18**	
indicative	present	**6 (46%)**	1	6 (7%)	27 (33%)
	future	1		**15 (19%)**	
	perfect	1		1	
	aorist	1		3	
	imperfect	2		2	
optative	present			**2**	6
	aorist			**4**	
participle	aorist			1	1
		13	3	81	

These differences between moods are reflected in their use in desirable and undesirable conditionals, see Table 8. Most desirable conditionals (promises) contain a present indicative (6 sentences, 46% of all promises). Speakers do not make a judgment about the fulfillment of a desirable condition. Present indicative is not used so often in undesirable conditions (7%)—apparently, in these clauses speakers do like to express their attitude.

The future indicative is used quite often in undesirable conditionals (19%), as described in Rijksbaron (2006: 68). The speaker expresses his expectation that his threat will not become reality, or maybe advises the addressee. This is opposed by the large number of subjunctives in undesirable conditionals (41%). The speaker considers

fulfillment of the condition very well possible, and I expect that the addressee really experiences these sentences as a threat. The sentence *In the likely case you do something wrong, I will hurt you* (subjunctive in Greek) is much scarier than *Would you ever do something wrong, I will hurt you* (future indicative in Greek). What further stands out is the optative that is only used in undesirable conditionals and not in desirable conditionals, and that the past indicative (aorist, imperfect) is relatively more frequent with desirable than with undesirable conditionals; but the number is so low, that I leave it at this remark.

6. The three characteristics of constructions with μή

In the previous sections, many different constructions with μή were discussed. It has become clear that it is impossible to point one semantic characteristic that is present in all constructions. But we have seen that some characteristics came back in different constructions. I want to argue that constructions with μή have three semantic characteristics in common:

(I)   The speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards some idea (*x*) (μή as an undesirability operator: the content of its clause is undesirable, according to the speaker).

(II)   The speaker invites the addressee to imagine a situation without *x* (not-*x*), and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid.

(III)   The speaker expresses that the addressee is capable or even has the responsibility to undertake action in order to prevent or change *x*.

Not all constructions have all the three characteristics, but at least one characteristic is present in every one of the constructions. Μή is thus not seen as a word with one single meaning or function, but as a polysemous word that can be used in many constructions that are slightly different but also partly overlap. The constructions have some characteristics in common, but are not entirely the same. The three features together describe the function of μή in all the constructions treated in this chapter.

-    complement of fear (section 2)
-    wish complement (section 2)
-    deontic construction (section 2)
-    complement of negative order (section 2)
-    purpose clause (section 2)
-    prohibitive (section 3)
-    verbless main clause (section 3)
-    subjunctive (main clause) (section 3)

- optative (main clause) (section 3)
- indicative main clause (section 3)
- οὐ μή indicative (section 4)
- οὐ μή subjunctive (section 4)
- conditional (section 5)

6.1 Three characteristics of constructions with μή

I. Undesirability, negative evaluative stance, aversion

One of the central problems of μή was its uses in complement clauses. It is used in complements of fear without negating this complement and in complements of negative orders (forbid) without becoming positive. Treating μή as a particle that expresses the negative evaluative stance of the speaker is a solution for these problems of μή. By using μή, the speaker invites the addressee to adopt the negative evaluative stance towards an idea, the object of conceptualization.

(30) δέδοικα μὴ διαφθαρῶ
    'I am afraid I will get lost'
(31) ἀλλ', ὦ Διόνυσ', ἀπόλοιτο καὶ μὴ 'λθοι φέρων. (Ar. *Pax* 267)
    PRT PRT Dionysos perish.3SG.AOR.OPT and MH come.3SG.AOR.OPT bringing
    'Ah! Bacchus! I wish he dies and does not come bringing [the pestle]!'

In example (30) (repetition of (4)), an expression of fear (section 2), the speaker thinks 'me getting lost' is undesirable and by expressing that ("μή διαφθαρῶ"), he invites the addressee to adopt this negative evaluative stance and have the aversion to 'me getting lost'. He does not necessarily ask the addressee to imagine 'me *not* getting lost', but asks only to consider all the undesirable parts of 'me getting lost'. Μή is an undesirability marker.

The same is true for μή + optative in main clauses (section 3), example (31) (repetition of (19)). The speaker considers 'him coming back with a pestle' undesirable, invites the addressee to think this too and to imagine how bad it would be if 'he comes back with a pestle'. The addressee is not asked explicitly to imagine the opposite or to undertake action to bring about the opposite.

II. Imagine the (desirable) world: not x

In some constructions, after considering the undesirability of a situation, the addressee is asked, to imagine the world without that situation (*x*). This is a good preparation for an action plan if the addressee is given responsibility for preventing or changing a situation, but it need not necessarily be a preparation. Constructions for which the latter is true are μή + indicative in main clauses (example (32)) (section 3) and the οὐ

μή + subjunctive construction (33) (section 4). For these constructions it is well possible that the negative evaluative stance plays a minor role, and thus the most important aspect is to imagine the world without *x*. The addressee is not expected to make the world without *x* reality.

> (32) μὴ 'γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω (Ar. *Av*. 195)
> MH I perception clever.COMP hear.1SG.AOR.IND ever
> '[I swear] I never heard of anything more cleverly conceived'
> (33) οὐ μὴ 'πιλάθῃ ποτ', ὢν ἐκείνου τοῦ πατρός (Ar. *Pax* 1304)
> not MH forget.2SG.AOR.SBJ ever being that.GEN the father.GEN
> 'For I well know for a certainty that (…) you will never forget [this song], being a son of a father like that.'

III. Capability or responsibility of the addressee for the desirable world

The speaker may express that he regards the addressee to be capable to change or prevent the undesirable situation; he gives the addressee some responsibility to act. How much responsibility, or how severe consequences are if the addressee does not take (enough) responsibility (does not act), is expressed in different manners: by the matrix verb (μή in complement clause), by the verbal mood (μή in main clause), or by the consequence in a conditional construction. In section 2, 3 and 5, several constructions were described by which the speaker adds information about the addressee's responsibility:

- purpose clause (section 2)
- prohibitive (section 3)
- subjunctive (main clause) (section 3)
- verbless main clause (section 3)
- οὐ μή + indicative (section 4)
- promises and warnings in conditionals (section 5)

Without imagining the result of his actions (the desirable world without *x*), the addressee cannot plan his action. Therefore, feature II is part of the meaning of these constructions. In conditionals however, μή does not seem to function as an undesirability marker (feature I). Feature I is thus not part of every construction, just like feature III is not part of every construction with feature I and feature II.

6.2 Overview of constructions and their characteristics

An overview of the characteristics of all the described constructions with μή is given in Table 9. For every construction, it is indicated whether a pragmatic feature is present or not (or a little bit or only sometimes). I imagine the presence or absence of these

three features as a continuous scale. The table below may give the undesirable impression that the presence/absence of the features is a discreet or even binary scale. A better illustration is given in Figure 5.

The group of constructions shown below forms a continuum as well. From construction in the upper part of Table 9 that express only or mostly evaluative stance, via the group in the middle that express all three features, to the conditional clauses that express only features II and III. I have tried to illustrate this continuum in Figure 5.

Table 9. An overview of the features of all the described constructions with μή. ++ feature is present. + feature may be present. — feature is not present. ? not sure if feature is present.

	I. evaluative stance	II. imagine world with not-x	III. addressee's capability /responsibility
fear	++	—	—
wish complement	++	+	? (depends on verb)
deontic constr.	++	? (depends on verb)	? (depends on verb)
optative mc	++	+	—
negative order	++	++	++
purpose clause	++	++	+
prohibitive	++	++	++
verbless mc	++	++	++
subjunctive mc	++	++	+(+)
οὐ μή indicative	?/+	++	++
οὐ μή subjunctive	+	++	—
indicative mc	? (little evidence)	++	—
conditional	—	++	++

The question marks and the single + for a feature in the table are displayed in the figure as close by this feature. The 1st/3rd person subjunctive with μή in the main clause give the addressee some responsibility, but not with the same force as the 2nd person. The complement constructions: wish and deontic constructions are sometimes seen as requests, but sometimes they might be just an instance of sharing. It depends on the person (subject) and meaning of the matrix verb.

Figure 5. The continuum of constructions with μή with three characteristics.

6.3 Prototype theory

This way of looking at meanings of words comes close to the prototype theory of Geeraerts (1997). It is based on the idea of family resemblances from Wittgenstein (1953), and Geeraerts (1997:12) quotes Rosch & Mervis (1975: 574-5) to describe this:

> "Wittgenstein (1953) argued that the referents of a word need not have common elements to be understood and used in the normal functioning of language. He suggested that, rather, a family resemblance might be what linked the various referents of a word. A family resemblance relationship takes the form AB, BC, CD, DE. That is, each item has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items."

Family members that have all or many characteristics are seen as the most prototypical members of the family and can be visualized in the centre of a category. Members that have only one or few characteristic(s) are less prototypical and are visualized in the periphery. Not all characteristics have the same weight; it is less or more important to have a characteristic in order to count as a prototypical member of the family or not. Family members that have the same set of characteristics may be visualized as a cluster.

In Figure 5 is shown that the meanings of μή exhibit a family resemblance structure. Most constructions with μή have more than one characteristic, and we clearly see clustering of similar constructions in the scheme.

Degrees of typicality are difficult to measure. It would be interesting to do a survey under students of Greek in high school and university with the question: mention a construction with μή. The construction that is mentioned most often would be the most typical. For now, we can take a look at the frequencies of every construction. Do the frequencies match Figure 5? The most central constructions, with most overlap, would be the most typical. Frequencies and percentages per cluster of constructions are given in Table 10. Clusters of constructions share characteristics. The percentages are shown in Figure 6, a repetition of Figure 5 with added percentages.

Table 10. Frequencies and percentages per cluster of constructions with μή.

	Frequency	Percent	Total percent
imperative (I, II, III)	41	16,4	38,4
2nd subjunctive	23	9,2	
purpose complement	17	6,8	
no verb main clause	10	4,0	
οὐ μή + indicative	5	2,0	
conditional (II, III)	102	40,8	40,8
wish complement (I, III)	13	5,2	10,8
deontic construction	8	3,2	
negative order	6	2,4	
μή 1st/3rd subjunctive (I, II)	9	3,6	3,6
οὐ μή + subjunctive (II, I)	6	2,4	3,2
μή + indicative	1	,4	
dynamic complement	1	,4	
fear complement (I)	5	2,0	3,2
optative main clause	3	1,2	
Total[46]	250	100,0	

In Figure 6 it is visible that the gravity is in the centre. The most frequent are the constructions that have all three characteristics: (I) expressing a negative evaluative stance, (II) inviting to imagine the desirable world (*not-x*) and (III) the addressee is given responsibility to realize *not-x*. This cluster contains requests.

The conditional construction has the same frequency, although it does not have all three characteristics but only two. A reason for this might be that although μή does not function as a marker for undesirability, the construction as a whole does express (un)desirability. So maybe, on second thought, we might move conditionals more towards the centre as well. An extra reason for this move would be that promises and warnings may be seen as indirect requests (*if you don't do x, bad things happen* 'please do x').

The other constructions are found in the periphery of the figure, which corresponds with the frequencies of these clusters. These constructions are less typical because they only have one or two of the three characteristics.

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[46] Of the 312 sentences, 62 were not discussed. These sentences contain noun phrases and satellite clauses, topics which I save for another moment.

Figure 6. The continuum with clusters of constructions with μή with three characteristics, with frequencies.

5 | Conclusion

1. Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to propose an account for the different uses of the Greek particle μή with an intersubjective approach (Verhagen 2005). The particle is traditionally called "subjective negation", as opposed to "objective negation" οὐ (Kühner & Gerth 1904), because of its use in prohibitives, wishes and conditional clauses. However, that raises a problem for its use in complements of matrix verbs of fear and verbs with a negative meaning such as 'forbid'. The particle μή is also used in combination with οὐ.

My analysis of constructions with μή is based on a corpus composed of all sentences with μή in six comedies of Aristophanes. I have looked at complement constructions, prohibitive constructions and other main clauses with μή, main clauses with οὐ μή, and conditional clauses. The original hypothesis was that the speaker uses μή to express his negative evaluative stance (as opposed to an epistemic stance) towards a situation: μή as an undesirability particle. This idea is based on Kvičala (cited in Kühner & Gerth), who proposes that μή is a repelling particle.

The intersubjective approach proposes that complement constructions, the speaker invites the addressee to entertain the object of conceptualization (expressed in the complement) in a certain way. This 'certain way' is expressed by μή: the speaker presents the idea in the complement as undesirable. The matrix clause gives information about the commitment of the speaker and about the motive for communication of the speaker (Tomasello 2008): is he sharing his fears or wishes, or is he requesting the addressee to act upon it, in order to change or prevent the undesirable situation?

This function of telling the addressee about the motive of the speaker turns out to define the difference between imperative and subjunctive mood in prohibitive constructions on the one hand, and optative main clauses on the other. The prohibitive constructions have a requesting function, i.e. they give the addressee responsibility to change or prevent a situation which is presented as undesirable by μή, whether the verb is in 2nd, 1st or 3rd person. Optative clauses have a sharing function, i.e. the speaker shares his evaluative stance towards an idea, but he does not expect the addressee to be capable (or at least responsible) to change or prevent a situation, even when the verb is in 2nd person.

A difference between constructions used for sharing a negative evaluative stance and constructions used for requesting action by the addressee is that the former only open a mental space with *x* (being negatively evaluated), whereas the latter also open a mental space with *not-x* (mental spaces: Verhagen (2005) and Fauconnier (1994)). To this *not-x* space, the desirable world, can be referred with a warning: "And if you do not [do *not-x*]…". This possibility of opening a space with *not-x* is also a feature of logical negation. That both words can have this function shows how close repulsion (negative evaluative stance) and negation (negative epistemic stance) are connected and even intertwined sometimes.

This close connection is also visible in the combination of οὐ μή in main clauses. The idea of μή as an undesirability marker makes it possible to explain the combination and its interpretation. In requests with 2nd person future indicative, μή adds a negative evaluative stance to the negative epistemic stance expressed by οὐ with indicative. In clauses with subjunctive, with which μή is the usual negative element, οὐ adds 'epistemic certainty', expressing that the undesirable situation 'surely' will not happen.

In conditional clauses, μή cannot be interpreted as an undesirability marker, but must be logical negation. Although the conditional construction as a whole often functions as a promise or a warning and is thus an expression of an evaluative stance, single μή is not. The original hypothesis is untenable for this construction. However, the construction εἰ μή has in common with prohibitive constructions that it often gives responsibility to the addressee (promising or warning if he does something good or bad) and that it opens a mental space with *not-x*.

This brings us to the conclusion that all these constructions together show family resemblances in the sense of Wittgenstein (cited in Geeraerts 1997). They have three characteristics in common:

(I)   The speaker invites the addressee to adopt a negative evaluative stance towards some idea (*x*) (μή as an undesirability operator: the content of its clause is undesirable).

(II)   The speaker invites the addressee to imagine a situation without *x* (not-*x*), and to infer that certain conclusions are invalid.

(III)   The speaker expresses that the addressee is capable or even has the responsibility to undertake action in order to prevent or change *x*.

Some constructions have all these characteristics (e.g. prohibitives), some have only one (e.g. main clauses with optative) or two (e.g. conditional clauses). This is visualized in a Venn diagram such as Figure 6 on page 86. Constructions that have all three characteristics are the most prototypical and are in the centre of the category

(Geeraerts 1997). They are also the most frequent in the corpus. Constructions with only one or two of the characteristics are more peripheral and show lower frequencies.

This thesis shows that the prototypicality theory is not only applicable for nouns and adjectives, but can be useful to account for different uses of one particle as well (μή in e.g. complement clauses of fear and in conditional clauses), that originally seemed to be incompatible, but eventually show family resemblances. The characteristics that the different constructions with μή share were found with an intersubjective approach.

2. Further research

Although the topic of this thesis can be summarized with one word, μή, this thesis touched multiple areas in linguistics: semantics, pragmatics, negation, general theories about language and communication, detailed examination of Greek. It has been impossible to cover all the details. Some of these holes and new questions or suggestions for future research are mentioned in this section.

My corpus contained only sentences with μή from Aristophanes. It would be useful to examine composite forms of μή as well. Constructions that I have not discussed in this thesis are satellite clauses, noun phrases, and complements of dynamic verbs. I am curious about their position in the Venn diagram. Some constructions, e.g. the different complement constructions, I have only discussed very briefly. I have not looked into the role of the tense of the matrix clause of wish verbs, for example. Purpose clauses, whether complements or satellites, deserve more attention. Probably the diagram has to be adjusted when looking at these extra constructions or details of constructions. This is also possible if the same investigation is done with other writers and text types.

In this thesis I have described a semasiological approach to μή. I have found three characteristics, but I did not investigate the prototypicality of these characteristics. Not all characteristics are equally important, according to Geeraerts. Next to this semasiological approach, it would be interesting to take a onomasiological approach to the concept of undesirability and requesting, since οὐ is used in constructions expressing these concepts as well. It might tell us more about the complicated relationship between negative evaluative and epistemic stance.

Polysemy is associated with diachronic language change: it is a reflection of the development of a word. It would be interesting to see how the polysemy of μή has evolved, how this family of constructions with common characteristics has evolved. The use of μή has changed after the classical period. How did it evolve in the two millennia after Aristophanes?

This thesis has also shown that we have a world to win in research in non-standard negation. The majority of the languages in the world uses more than one strategie to express negativity (epistemic stance and evaluative stance). Do they follow the same division of labor? Are the non-standard negators used in the same constructions? Do they share characteristics with μή?

As said above, I look forward to the next decennium.

Appendix | Corpus from Aristophanes

In the table below, all the sources of the constructions with μή are given. They are sorted by type of clause (main clause with μή, main clause with οὐ μή, complement clauses, conditional clauses, other) and subsequent by source or by other relevant information.

In the first two columns, the source is given (works from Aristophanes; abbreviations given on p. 7). In the fifth column, additional information is given. In the most right column, the number of the corresponding section of Chapter 4 is given.

work	line	clause	verb	comment	section ch. 4
Ach.	345	main clause	no verb		3.2
Eq.	833	main clause	no verb		3.2
Eq.	960	main clause	no verb		3.2
Nu.	84	main clause	no verb		3.2
Nu.	696	main clause	no verb		3.2
Nu.	850	main clause	no verb		3.2
V.	1179	main clause	no verb		3.2
V.	1400bis	main clause	no verb		3.2
Pax	326	main clause	no verb		3.2
Av.	585	main clause	no verb		3.2
Ach.	334	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Ach.	496	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Ach.	655	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Ach.	1054	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Eq.	19	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	193	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	230	main clause	2nd perf imper		3.1
Eq.	241	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	580	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Eq.	1051	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Eq.	1356	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	821bis	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Eq.	841	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	860	main clause	2nd perf imper		3.1
Nu.	1138	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Nu.	1267	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Nu.	1433	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Nu.	189	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Nu.	614	main clause	2nd prs sbj		3.1
Nu.	716	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Nu.	761	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	25bis	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
V.	37ter	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	228	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
V.	336	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	371	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	415	main clause	2nd perf imper		3.1

V.	434	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
V.	652bis	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	751	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	919	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	922	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
V.	976	main clause	2nd prs sbj		3.1
V.	998	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
V.	1135	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
V.	1418bis	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
V.	1435	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	59	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	146	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Pax	151	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	337	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	376bis	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Pax	382	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Pax	384a	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	389	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	648bis	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	83	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	87	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	979	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Pax	1061ter	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	165	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	206	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	597	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	959	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Av.	961	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	1195	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Av.	1238	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	1364	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	1420	main clause	2nd aor sbj		3.1
Av.	1436	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	1504bis	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	1506	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Av.	1534	main clause	2nd prs imper		3.1
Nu.	267	main clause	1st aor sbj		3.1
V.	162	main clause	1st aor sbj		3.1
Pax	515	main clause	1st aor sbj		3.1
Pax	1051	main clause	1st prs sbj		3.1
Av.	353	main clause	1st prs sbj		3.1
Av.	195	main clause	1st aor ind		3.3
Ach.	221	main clause	3rd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	1067	main clause	3rd aor sbj		3.1
Eq.	1081	main clause	3rd aor sbj		3.1
Nu.	560	main clause	3rd prs imper		3.1
Pax	801	main clause	3rd prs sbj		3.1
Pax	267	main clause	3rd aor opt		3.1
V.	758	main clause	1st aor opt		3.1
Pax	31	main clause	2nd aor opt		3.1
Ach.	166	main clause	2nd prs ind	οὐ μή	4.3
Ach.	662	main clause	1st aor sbj	οὐ μή	4.1

V.	394	main clause	1st aor sbj	οὐ μή	4.1
V.	612	main clause	impers aor sbj	οὐ μή	4.1
Pax	1226	main clause	3rd aor sbj	οὐ μή	4,1
Pax	1304	main clause	2nd aor sbj	οὐ μή	4.1
Av.	461	main clause	1st aor sbj	οὐ μή	4.1
Nu.	296	main clause	2nd fut ind	οὐ μή	4.2
Nu.	367	main clause	2nd fut ind	οὐ μή	4.2
Nu.	505	main clause	2nd fut ind	οὐ μή	4.2
V.	397bis	main clause	2nd fut ind	οὐ μή	4.2
Eq.	112	finite complement	1st person	fear	2
Nu.	493	finite complement	1st person	fear	2
V.	109	finite complement	3rd person	fear	2
V.	1358	finite complement	3rd person	fear	2
Pax	606	finite complement	3rd person	fear	2
Ach.	169	non-finite complement	1st person	negative verb	2
Ach.	320	non-finite complement	1st person	negative verb	2
Ach.	634	non-finite complement	3rd person	negative verb	2
Eq.	572	non-finite complement	3rd person	negative verb	2
Eq.	1072	non-finite complement	3rd person	negative verb	2
Av.	557	non-finite complement	2nd person	negative verb	2
Ach.	625	non-finite complement	1st person	wish, order	2
Ach.	1108	non-finite complement	2nd person	wish, order	2
Ach.	1113	non-finite complement	2nd person	wish, order	2
Eq.	1273	non-finite complement	3rd person	wish, order	2
Nu.	433	non-finite complement	1st person	wish, order	2
V.	1047	non-finite complement	3rd person	wish, order	2
V.	1121	non-finite complement	1st person	wish, order	2
V.	116	non-finite complement	3rd person	wish, order	2
V.	414	non-finite complement	3rd person	wish, order	2
V.	720	non-finite complement	1st person	wish, order	2
Pax	1306	non-finite complement	impersonal	wish, order	2
Pax	438	non-finite complement	1st person	wish, order	2
Av.	1026	non-finite complement	2nd person	wish, order	2
Av.	29	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Ach.	1079	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Eq.	13	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Eq.	536	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Eq.	876	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Nu.	1414	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Nu.	931	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Pax	96	non-finite complement	impersonal	deontic	2
Nu.	976	non-finite complement	3rd person	purpose	2.4
V.	446	non-finite complement	3rd person	purpose	2.4
Pax	672	non-finite complement	3rd person	purpose	2.4
Ach.	258	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
Eq.	253	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
V.	1013	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
V.	1386	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
V.	141	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
V.	155	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
V.	247	finite complement	1st person	purpose	2.4
V.	372	finite complement	1st person	purpose	2.4

Pax	1099	finite complement	2nd person	purpose	2.4
Ach.	343	finite complement	no matrix	purpose	2.4
Nu.	257	finite complement	no matrix	purpose	2.4
Nu.	824	finite complement	no matrix	purpose	2.4
Av.	1239	finite complement	no matrix	purpose	2.4
Av.	1494	finite complement	no matrix	purpose	2.4
Nu.	994	non-finite complement	2nd person	dynamic	
Eq.	201	conditional clause	aor sbj	des > des	5
Eq.	210	conditional clause	aor sbj	des > des	5
Nu.	1347	conditional clause	perf ind	des > des	5
Nu.	327	conditional clause	prs ind	des > des	5
Nu.	415	conditional clause	prs ind	des > des	5
Nu.	645	conditional clause	prs ind	des > des	5
Nu.	660	conditional clause	prs ind	des > des	5
Nu.	1035	conditional clause	fut ind	des > des	5
V.	180	conditional clause	prs ind	des > des	5
V.	345	conditional clause	impf ind	des > des	5
Pax	10	conditional clause	prs ind	des > des	5
Pax	1070	conditional clause	impf ind	des > des	5
Pax	1151	conditional clause	aor ind	des > des	5
Ach.	619	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > des	5
Eq.	1158bis	conditional clause	no verb	undes > des	5
Nu.	295	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > des	5
Ach.	60	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Ach.	137	conditional clause	impf ind	undes > undes	5
Ach.	138	conditional clause	aor ind	undes > undes	5
Ach.	317	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > undes	5
Ach.	684	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Ach.	773	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > undes	5
Ach.	828	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	68	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	69	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Eq.	186	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Eq.	315	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	337	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	400	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	575	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	615	conditional clause	aor ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	694	conditional clause	aor opt	undes > undes	5
Eq.	698	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	700	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	700	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	767	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	769	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	770	conditional clause	perf ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	1019	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Eq.	1176	conditional clause	impf ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	1360	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	949	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	981	conditional clause	aor ind	undes > undes	5
Eq.	996	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Nu.	1183bis	conditional clause	aor opt	undes > undes	5

Nu.	1194	conditional clause	prs opt	undes > undes	5
Nu.	1433	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Nu.	1435bis	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Nu.	1439	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Nu.	1500	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Nu.	229	conditional clause	aor ptc	undes > undes	5
Nu.	801	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Nu.	885	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	1328/9	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
V.	1351	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	1444	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	190	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
V.	303	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	402	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	428	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	435	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	437	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
V.	524	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	558	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	568	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	594	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	614	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	650	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	653	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
V.	73	conditional clause	aor opt	undes > undes	5
V.	90	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	916	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
V.	930	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
V.	972	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Pax	102	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Pax	107	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Pax	1072	conditional clause	aor opt	undes > undes	5
Pax	1292	conditional clause	prs opt	undes > undes	5
Pax	1310	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Pax	176	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Pax	189	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Pax	262	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Pax	27	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Pax	318	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Pax	381	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Pax	384b	conditional clause	no verb	undes > undes	5
Pax	450	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	1086	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	1114	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	1523	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5
Av.	1534	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	1681	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > undes	5
Av.	191	conditional clause	prs sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	439	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	549	conditional clause	prs ind	undes > undes	5
Av.	555	conditional clause	aor sbj	undes > undes	5
Av.	932	conditional clause	fut ind	undes > undes	5

Eq.	1106	conditional clause	prs imper	0	5
V.	616	conditional clause	prs sbj	0	5
V.	493	conditional clause	prs sbj	0	5
V.	965	conditional clause	aor ind	0	5
Pax	828,bis	conditional clause	no verb	0	5
Ach.	441	noun phrase			
Ach.	722	noun phrase			
Ach.	900	noun phrase			
Ach.	903	noun phrase			
Eq.	265	noun phrase			
Eq.	803	noun phrase			
Eq.	1138	noun phrase			
Eq.	1288	noun phrase			
Nu.	1084	noun phrase			
V.	1045	noun phrase			
V.	1048	noun phrase			
V.	1121	noun phrase			
V.	264	noun phrase			
V.	535	noun phrase			
V.	656	noun phrase			
V.	762bis	noun phrase			
Av.	37	noun phrase			
Ach.	112	purpose satellite			
Ach.	928	purpose satellite			
Ach.	930	purpose satellite			
Ach.	1052	purpose satellite			
Eq.	14	purpose satellite			
Eq.	785	purpose satellite			
Eq.	1029	purpose satellite			
Eq.	1393	purpose satellite			
Eq.	851	purpose satellite			
Eq.	880	purpose satellite			
Nu.	195	purpose satellite			
Nu.	996	purpose satellite			
V.	1028	purpose satellite			
V.	1091	purpose satellite			
V.	113	purpose satellite			
V.	377	purpose satellite			
V.	531	purpose satellite			
V.	70	purpose satellite			
V.	929	purpose satellite			
V.	961	purpose satellite			
Pax	1037	purpose satellite			
Pax	1234	purpose satellite			
Pax	208	purpose satellite			
Pax	226	purpose satellite			
Pax	30	purpose satellite			
Pax	309	purpose satellite			
Pax	333	purpose satellite			
Pax	926	purpose satellite			
Pax	928	purpose satellite			
Av.	1427	purpose satellite			

Av.	1509	purpose satellite
Av.	560	purpose satellite
Av.	712	purpose satellite
Ach.	466	other satellite
Eq.	749	other satellite
Nu.	1243	other satellite
Nu.	619	other satellite
Nu.	777	other satellite
Nu.	792	other satellite
Nu.	966	other satellite
V.	648	other satellite
Pax	21	other satellite
Pax	314	other satellite
Pax	315	other satellite
Av.	1115	other satellite

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