

Coca, Poppies and Peace:

The Impact of Peace Processes on Conflict-Induced Narcotics Cultivation

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Abbreviations

AC4	Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict and Complexity
CCDAC	Central Committee for Drugs Abuse Control
CPB	Communist Party Burma
FARC	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
ICG	International Crisis Group
MTA	Mon Tai Army
NOREF	Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
NCA	National Ceasefire Agreement
ONDCP	White house Office on National Drug Control Policy
RCC/SSAS	Restoration Council of Shan State / Shan State Army South
SLORC	State Peace and Development Council
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UWSA	United Wa State Army

1. Introduction

The relationship between intrastate conflict and narcotics has become increasingly evident over the past three decades. Whereas in the '60s opium and coca production took place in relative peaceful countries such as Turkey, Iran and Peru, the cultivation has shifted over the years to conflict zones. The majority of the coca and opium is now cultivated in conflict-afflicted states such as Myanmar, Afghanistan and Colombia (Cornell, 2005).

The bulk of popular theories on conflict-induced narcotics production indicate that conflicts create conditions that “boost, exacerbate, transform and occasionally shift pre-existing patterns of narcotics production” (Cornell, 2005, p.757). Furthermore, research has also shown that the presence of either opium or coca cultivation increases the duration of intrastate conflicts (Ross, 2004). This research questions the existence of the reversed relationship of these popular theories. I analyse what happens with conflict-induced narcotics cultivation when the narcotic-producing regions find themselves in a peacebuilding process. Myanmar and Colombia are chosen as case studies because they both present unique and applicable cases. They are unique cases because both nation-states belong, after Afghanistan, in the top three narcotic cultivating countries induced by conflict. Both countries undergo significant political transitions and have both recently signed peace deals (Colombia) and nation-wide ceasefires (Myanmar). These two cases thus present unique “natural experiments” in which a research can take place that focuses on the impact of peace negotiations on the cultivation of opium and coca. I regard the following question as the key question of this thesis: What effect do peace processes have on conflict-induced narcotics cultivation in Myanmar and Colombia?

The relevance of this research is twofold. First, it contributes to the (lack of) academic knowledge on the strength, sustainability and effects of peace. By looking at peacemaking and its effect on narcotics cultivation, this thesis touches upon the strengths and sustainability of peace, an often forgotten topic in the academic discipline of peace and conflict studies. Second, this thesis strengthens the academic field that describes the relationship between conflict, narcotic cultivation and peacebuilding and establishes how peacemaking affects conflict-induced narcotics cultivation. Considering the consensus among academics that conflict has previously induced high levels of narcotics cultivation in both countries, the hypothesis is that the cultivation of narcotics in Colombia and Myanmar diminishes as the regions stabilize and become more peaceful.

The thesis is structured in the following order. The first section outlines the conceptual debate. This section is split in two parts. The first part discusses the conceptualization of peace and introduces the Peace Triangle, an analytical tool that identifies three elements of peace. The second part of the conceptual debate elaborates on conflict-induced narcotics cultivation. The conceptual debate is followed by a methods section. This section elaborates on the case studies and the research methods. The section that follows has an analytical nature and describes the case studies. Both the conflict, peace process and narcotics cultivation in of each of the two cases are analysed in this section. The final section the discussion and conclusion of this thesis.

2. Conceptual Debate

2.1 Conceptualizations of Peace and the Peace Triangle

Peace research is a discipline that commits to understand the causes of war and peace. It analyses how sustainable peace can be developed, and what indicators can prevent the recurrence of violence (Brosché & Höglund, 2016). Despite its focus on peace, the discipline is often more concerned with peace as the dichotomy of war. This means that peace is measured as the absence of war, also known as negative peace (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010; McDougal, 1955). The methodological explanation for the focus on peace as absence of war is that this definition lends itself to quantification, and can thus be easily observed. Along these lines, peace can be labelled upon a country by, for example, a maximum number of deaths per year (Brosché & Höglund, 2016).

Scholars have repeatedly argued that the concept needs to be reconceptualised for two reasons. First, the definition of peace as the absence of war leads to absurd categorizations (Diehl, 2016; Richmond, 2006; Richards, 2005) as relationships could, with this conceptualization, either be described as peaceful or war-torn. Take for example the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Since there was no direct violence between the two countries, the relationship therefore would be described as rather peaceful. The same goes for the relationship between Israel and Iran since there has not occurred any violence since 2000 between the countries (Diehl, 2016). Neither examples, however, are peaceful. Rather, the examples above contain urgent security issues that remain unsolved.

A second reason for the reconceptualization of peace is that the negative peace concept does not give any insights on the nature, strength or sustainability of peace (Diehl, 2016;

Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010; Richmond, 2006). By using the concept as the absence of war, it is difficult to understand why peace in some countries is taken for granted, whereas in other countries peace is very hard to sustain. In order to understand and explain the strength of peace, it is therefore necessary to look at peace beyond the absence of war and define which factors establish and undermine a peaceful society.

This alternative conception of peace is often described positive peace. It is a broadly defined conception that aims to understand the nature of peace by analysing interactions in societies. Positive peace can be measured by non-traditional aspects of security, such as development, human rights and human security in societies (Diehl, 2016). The Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict and Complexity (AC4), a research institute at Columbia University, argue that there are five key categories in the measurement of sustainable peace that move beyond the absence of war, namely: (1) well-being, (2) quality of relations, (3) conflict resolution, (4) access to resources, equality and human security, (5) institutional capacity (AC4, 2015). If an actor has high scores in all these categories, it can thus be characterized as peaceful in terms of positive peace. The elements of positive peace are able to describe the nature of a peace process. The presence or absence of these elements indicate how comprehensive a peace process actually is. As the thesis measures the impact of the peace processes, the elements described above are regarded as important indicators and will be discussed in the analysis section.

In order to systematically analyse the concept of peace, I also use an analytical tool that derives from Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs (2010). Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs have designed an analytical tool to operationalize the nature of a peace process. This tool is known as the Peace Triangle and is based upon Galtung's conflict-triangle (1996) that depicts conflicts as having three key elements: the conflict itself, conflict-behaviour and conflict-attitudes. The conflict itself describes the issues, positions and demands of a party (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010). Conflict-behaviour is the element that underlines the behaviour of the parties, and describes how they want to pursue their demands. The last element of the triangle is conflict-attitudes and concerns the attitudes, emotions and perceptions towards the other party. All of these elements influence and reinforce each other. Take for example conflict-attitudes: this element reinforces conflict-behaviour and strengthens the position of the combatants over the conflict-issues (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010).

Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs (2010) have transformed Galtung's (1996) analytical tool to identify the nature of peace in peace agreements. This results in the Peace Triangle that is represented in figure 1.



Figure 1: The Peace Triangle (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs, 2010, p.376).

The “issues” in the Peace Triangle range from unresolved to restored and contested. Unresolved peace means that there is a significant decrease in violence, but that the political conflict issues that caused the conflict in the first place remain unresolved. Restored peace means that the peace process has managed the issues at stake, but that there remain fractures in the society that cause structural grievance as a consequence of the conflict. Examples are: social and economic inequality, and unemployment. Contested peace means that the peace agreements that are made lead to renewed conflict issues due to the new political order that arises after the peace process. An example of contested peace is the treaty of Versailles and its accompanied interwar period. The treaty included problematic demands that contributed to the violence that reappeared in the form of the Second World War. The second element of the Peace Triangle is “attitudes” and is an indicator for the extent to which attitudes remain present after the conflict. These attitudes can produce “polarised peace” (where conflict attitudes remain and the two conflicting parties do not interact, “unjust peace” (where a party finds the peace situation unjust) and “fearful peace” (where the society is controlled through coercion and intimidation). The third

element of the Peace Triangle is “behaviour” and measures the continued level of violence in the country. This element is split into “partial peace”, “regional peace” and “insecure peace”. Partial peace represents a state in which violence remains to occur through dissatisfaction (from either the former combatants or splintered groups) in the peace process. Regional peace is a state in which a particular part is peaceful, but wherein the surrounding parts of this region remain in conflict. Insecure peace represents the development of insecurity in the society through rising levels of crime (Jarstad, 2015).

By using the Peace Triangle in this thesis, I can research which issues remain unresolved, what attitude actors have and how they behave after the peace process. It thereby becomes possible to examine the nature of the peace process (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010).

2.2 Conflict-induced Opium and Coca Cultivation

In the three major narcotics producing countries in the world - Afghanistan, Myanmar and Colombia - the cultivation of opium and coca existed long before the countries got affected by conflicts (Cornell, 2005). The cultivation of narcotics in these countries was very small before the conflict appeared and massively increased during the conflict. Several scholars have observed similar cases and conclude that there is a very strong correlation between conflict and narcotics production (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003; Cornell, 2005; Cornell, 2007; Lind et al., 2008). They found that in all cases where narcotics trade was present before the conflict, the narcotic production massively increased during the conflict. One of Cornell’s studies on conflict induced narcotics cultivation concludes that: “Conditions of armed conflict boost, exacerbate, transform, and occasionally shift pre-existing patterns of narcotics production. Where narcotics are present, armed conflict is likely to fundamentally alter the dynamics of their production—and to be fundamentally altered by it” (Cornell, 2007, p.222).

There are three rationales behind conflict-induced narcotics cultivation. The first rationale is that in countries where the production of narcotics exists before the conflict is present, armed groups almost always become involved in the production of narcotics. The reason for this is that narcotics such as cocaine and heroin derive from lootable resources, such as coca and poppy. The cultivation of these plants does not require any capital and is highly profitable. So armed groups can easily cultivate, trade or produce either coca or poppies. With the profit of the narcotic cultivation, armed groups can finance their own wars (Cornell, 2007; Stewart, 2011;

Lind et al., 2008). This rationale is also known as the drugs-for-arms mechanism because the cultivation of narcotics generates profits that can be used to pay fighters, acquire arms and even buy legitimacy from the local population (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003).

The second explanation for conflict-induced narcotics cultivation is related to the new environment that is created by the conflict. This is well explained by David Keen. He observes that “war is not simply the breakdown of order, economy and social organization, but the emergence of an alternative system of profit, power and even protection” (Keen, 2000, p.22). In an environment where the cultivation of narcotics is already present, conflicts create an alternative system of profit and social organization. Such systems build upon a power vacuum and give room to actors that engage in illicit activities, such as the production of narcotics (Mahan & Griset, 2012). The alternative systems are able to exist because the nation-state loses its territorial power during the conflict and is thus no longer able to practice the rule of law or deliver any kind of judiciary mechanism in the affected area. This creates the perfect environment for a criminalized economy, a lack in public security and a black market. It is exactly in this environment where criminal networks cultivate, produce and trade narcotics (Stewart, 2011).

Although the two rationales above are separated, the line between drugs-for-arms mechanisms and criminal activities is often blurred. Peter Andreas (2004, p.650) estimates that “[m]ilitary success on the battlefield can significantly depend on entrepreneurial success in the illicit economy”. Rebels groups often collaborate with criminal groups in conflict-affected states in order to secure financial resources and political control (Stewart, 2001). The armed conflicts in Myanmar, Afghanistan and Colombia are therefore deeply affected by the drugs trade and accompanied criminal networks that strengthen insurgent groups and weaken the state. The interaction between rebels and criminals can also move beyond the cooperation that is described above. Rather than cooperation, criminal and rebel groups also tend to converge into hybrid organizations (Cornell, 2007).

The convergence of criminal and insurgent groups is often referred to as the rebel-criminal nexus, and means that the motivational structures of either a rebel or insurgent group are affected by the possibilities that open up through conflict-induced narcotics cultivation. Ideal-typical models of insurgent groups fight for a self-defined political goal that serves a greater good and ideal typical models of criminal networks are interested in profit and personal

economic gains. But the motivational structure can easily change in a situation where narcotics are induced by conflict. While the insurgent group finances its wars with illicit narcotics cultivation, the group, or units of the group, can easily obtain an additional motivation that is based on profits and personal gain. Converged motivations can therefore turn political organizations in hybrid organizations that have both personal and political motivations to cultivate narcotics (Cornell, 2007; Makarenko, 2004).

The third rationale for conflict-induced narcotics cultivation is related to farmers. As conflicts destroy the infrastructure of societies, farmers often become unable to cultivate traditional crops because they are no longer able to irrigate traditional crops or transport them to the market (Koehler & Zuercher, 2007). Coca and poppy are able to substitute the traditional crops because they resist drought and do not require transportation over roads. Furthermore, coca and poppy crops can be easily sold in the new conflict environment (Koehler & Zuercher, 2007). Law-abiding civilians therefore often chose to cultivate opium and coca in times of conflict because the narcotics provide the financial support that is needed to survive (Stewart, 2011).

Conflicts thus often generate environments with a weak rule of law where the nation-state is unable to deliver public services. The conceptual debate has shown that the circumstances that derive from conflict are well-suited for insurgents, criminals and farmers to profit from the alternative economy. This thesis questions whether a peace process can revert conflict-induced narcotics cultivation. The following section explains which methods are used to answer this question.

3. Methods

Two case studies have been chosen for further analysis. The case studies require to be cases which have been affected by conflict-induced narcotic cultivation, and should thus have experienced increased levels of either opium or coca production over the years that the conflict took place. Furthermore, the cases require to be in a current zone of peace, either positive or negative, in order to measure the impact of peace on the cultivation of narcotics. Hence, there should be a peace treaty, bilateral agreement or ceasefire in place, so that the impact of such an agreement can be analysed. On top of that, data before and after the peace process on the cultivation of narcotics needs to be available in order to measure the impact.

Against this background, Myanmar and Colombia have been chosen as case studies

because they fulfil all the requirements necessary to conduct the analysis. Although the countries are very different, they have incredible similarities in relation to conflict, peace negotiations and drugs cultivation. Both countries undergo significant transitions at the moment and have recently signed either peace deals or nationwide ceasefires. Furthermore, both countries belong to the top three narcotics producing nation-states in the world. Hence, the increased production is in both countries induced by conflict.

However, differences between the two countries do exist. Whereas the government of Colombia only had the FARC as its main opponent, the government of Myanmar has been in conflict with approximately 30 insurgent groups since its independence in 1948 (Sherman, 2003). As fighting continues in some parts of the country, it is chosen to take a region in Myanmar as case study where peacebuilding is present and fighting has diminished. The chosen region for this analysis is called Easter Shan State and is known for both its conflicts and opium cultivation.

Process tracing is used as a research method to analyse the conflict and the peace process. The method marks the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2001, p.823). Since both conflicts in Myanmar and Colombia extend five decades of war, I trace both conflicts broadly, rather than analysing detailed events. The qualitative data that derives from process tracing gives an overview of the conflict. Furthermore, I analyse the data that derives from process tracing with Galtung’s analytical tool, known as the conflict triangle. Galtung’s analytical tool shows the (changes in) conflict behaviour, conflict attitudes and conflict issues. Process tracing is also used to analyse the peace processes in Colombia and Myanmar. The systematic examinations of the two peace processes are more detailed than the examination of the conflicts. The explanation for this is that the peace processes in both countries are relatively short compared to the duration of the conflicts. Similarly to the information that derives from the process tracing of both conflicts, I use process tracing to gather data on the peace process and compare this information with the elements in the Peace Triangle. Herein, the aim is to elaborate on the nature of peace in both countries. I relate the outcomes back to Diehl’s (2016) and AC4’s (2015) notions of positive peace.

This research is based upon a large variety of resources. I have used a lot of resources deriving from Uppsala’s Conflict Data Programme (<http://ucdp.uu.se/>). This website generates

an incredible amount of both quantitative and qualitative data on the conflicts in Colombia and Myanmar. For the analysis of the peace process I used, besides many newspapers and reports, detailed information from WOLA, an advocacy group for human rights in Latin America that has written down all the small details of Colombia's peace process in a very accurate timeline. The data on Myanmar's poppy cultivation derives from UNODC's yearly reports. UNODC gathered this data in cooperation with the Burmese government. The data on the cultivation of coca in Colombia is gathered by two organizations. The first dataset derives from UNODC. This data is gathered in cooperation with the Colombian Drug Observatory, a government-led platform. The second dataset derives from the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. The sources used in this thesis thus derive from governmental institutions. Although I regard the datasets as reliable, the three datasets lack extensive explanations on which methods and variables are used to establish the datasets.

Furthermore, the case study of Eastern Shan State is not well known. Although the peace process is sufficiently documented, it is a rather closed process that does not give much space for international audiences. As a consequence, the analysis on the Burmese peace processes is less extensive than the well-documented peace process in Colombia.

4. Myanmar

4.1 Conflict

Myanmar has experienced a large amount of intrastate conflicts for over the past five decades. Historically, the government of Myanmar has never had full control over the country. Before its independence in 1948, the system existed out of a rather feudal, decentralized system where peripheral communities paid an annual tribute to the state for their territory and independence (Sherman, 2003). When Myanmar gained independence, the government aimed to centralize the country. However, the communal groups rejected the government's eagerness to centralize and decided to pick up arms against the government. This has led to many conflicts. Violence also occurred in Eastern Shan State where two of the largest insurgent groups, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Shan State Army South, with its political wing "The Restoration Council of Shan State" (RCSS/SSAS), have fought each other and the government.

4.1.1 Conflict issues: autonomy, centralization and stolen territories.

From Myanmar's independence onwards, Eastern Shan State has experienced five

decades of war. Both the UWSA and the RCSS/SSAS have fought the government because they aimed for more independence and autonomy. The UWSA fractured from the Communist Party Burma (CPB) in 1989. Quartered next to the Chinese border in Panghsang, the UWSA is largest and most powerful insurgent group in Myanmar with approximately 20.00-25.000 troops (Meehan, 2015). The RCSS/SSAS is with its 10.000-15.000 troops one of the biggest ethnic armies after the UWSA. The RCSS/SSAS descends from a larger insurgent group, known as the Mon Tai Army (MTA) that came to existence in the '60s but was defeated in 1996 by the Burmese government in cooperation with the UWSA. The MTA soldiers who survived continued fighting against the government under the RCSS/SSAS flag for autonomy and ethnic rights. The RCSS/SSAS also took up the fight against the UWSA, since the UWSA gained large parts of the MTA's territory after it was defeated in 1996.

Briefly said, the Myanmar government thus deals with two relative big insurgent groups in Eastern Shan State. Both demand for more autonomy, wherein the UWSA demands for an independent statehood (Sun, 2016) and the RCSS/SSAS for autonomy, ethnic minority rights (Sherman, 2003) and lost territory (UCDP, 2017a).

4.1.2 Conflict behaviour: violence and poppy cultivation.

Periods of increased violence between the UWSA, the RCSS/SSAS and the Burmese government in Eastern Shan State have fluctuated over the years. The most violent conflicts took place between 1962 and 1989. This increased period of violence can be explained by the fact that the socialist regime of Ne Win introduced a repressive counterinsurgency against the MTA (predecessor of the RCSS/SSAS) and the CPB (predecessor of the UWSA), known as "Four Cuts" that aimed to defeat the insurgent groups. The strategy of the "Four Cuts" was based on cutting communication between armed groups, prohibiting civilians and trade to enter large parts Eastern Shan State and killing core members of the insurgent groups. The operation was a huge success, but also had its costs: many civilians died at the expense of the operation. The "Four Cuts" ends in 1989 due to a military coup by the SLORC (Behera, 2017; Myanmar Peacemonitor, 2017).

The newly created SLORC and the UWSA agree to sign a ceasefire in May 1989 (Meehan, 2015). Soon after the signing of this ceasefire, the SLORC and the UWSA form an alliance to collectively defeat the MTA. After its defeat in 1996, the violence in Eastern Shan State persists as the RCSS/SSAS arises and starts to attack both the Burmese government and the

UWSA. The violence between the three parties continues, but the intensity of the conflicts decreases significantly after 2005. Uppsala's Data Programme (2017a) shows that the last violent clash between the RCSS/SSAS and the UWSA in Eastern Shan State took place in 2005. Five combatants died in this clash (UCDP, 2017a). Furthermore, Uppsala's Data Programme (2017a) shows that the RCSS/SSAS and the Myanmar government had two violent clashes between 1997 and 2017 that can be identified as wars. The first peak was in 2001 (42 fatalities) and the second peak has been in 2005 (45 fatalities). The violent behaviour in Eastern Shan State thus largely disappears after 2005.

In addition to the violent behaviour of the combatants in Eastern Shan State, there is another important activity that is worth mentioning, namely: the cultivation of opium in Eastern Shan State. Opium cultivation was confined to a few areas in Shan State before Myanmar's independence. Mostly princedoms in Shan State cultivated poppy plantations in order to generate income. But the dynamics significantly changed in the 1950s, as the Kuomintang, the Chinese nationalists, who were defeated by Mao Zedong in 1949, entered Myanmar. The Kuomintang aimed to defeat the communist uprising in both China and Myanmar, with the active support of Thailand and the CIA (Meehan, 2011). In order to fund the conflict, the Kuomintang cultivated poppy in Shan State. But the Burmese insurgent groups that fought against the centralization of the Burmese government soon defeated the Kuomintang. The Burmese insurgent groups took over the poppy cultivation and this led to an explosion of the opium production at the end of the 1950s (Behera, 2017). At the same time, insurgent groups also started to take over the opium plantations that were still in the hands of princedoms and feudal lords, using the plantations to generate extra income for their conflicts (Sherman, 2003).

Over time, the poppy cultivation gave the insurgent groups in Myanmar the financial resources that were needed to arm themselves (Jonsson & Brennan, 2013). The Transnational Institute (2014, p.3) estimates that "almost all parties to the conflicts in drug producing regions have in some way been involved in or profited from the drugs trade". Sherman (2003) argues that all sides, including the Burmese government and the militias in Eastern Shan State, have used the cultivation of opium, as well as the taxation on it, to finance the conflict.

The UWSA is thereby one of the best-known insurgent groups that controls enormous parts of the opium cultivation. The profits that derive from the opium cultivation are used to finance their conflicts. This trend of financing conflict in Eastern Shan State through the

cultivation of opium is known as the drugs-for-arms mechanism discussed in the theoretic framework (Transnational Institute, 2014; Jonsson & Brennan, 2013). But the UWSA moves beyond the sole purpose of producing drugs for arms. The profits that derive from narcotics cultivation extend the aim to finance conflicts in Eastern Shan State. The UWSA's Leaders and middleman are affected by the enormous accumulation of capital that derives from the cultivation of narcotics. Scholars question whether the organization is still guided by political sincerity, or that leaders are tempted by personal greed. Sherman (2003) argues that the UWSA is tainted by corruption and is transformed in an armed business venture, rather than an armed group with a self-defined political goal. In his perspective, the UWSA does not only cultivates drugs for arms, but, more importantly, also cultivates drugs for personal gain. To moderate Sherman's observation, I would argue that the UWSA falls into the category of a hybrid organization in which the motivations of the armed group are mixed. In other words, there are two mechanisms in place: the drugs-for-arms mechanism and a drugs-for-personal-gain mechanism that drives the UWSA.

4.1.3 Conflict attitudes: fear and ruthlessness

The conflict attitudes have incredibly changed over a period of 50 years. From the Burmese government's side, the counterinsurgency "Four Cuts" showed an attitude of ruthlessness towards armed groups in Eastern Shan State. But after the change of the regime in 1989, the newly installed SLORC's attitude towards the UWSA was insecure, fearful and hesitant. The SLORC ended up offering the UWSA a ceasefire because it feared that the UWSA would form an alliance with other insurgent groups and become an even bigger threat to the government (Sherman, 2003). Meanwhile, the SLORC's attitude towards the RCSS/SSAS remained the same: conquer and rule. The perception that the SLORC could handle the RCSS/SSAS threat and defeat the armed group easily may have played a part in their attitude.

4.2 Peacemaking in Eastern Shan State: behaviour, issues and attitude.

Over the years, two significant peace processes have taken place in Eastern Shan State. The processes differ tremendously over time and nature. Therefore, the two peace processes are analysed individually. The upcoming section (4.2.1) analyses the peace process between the UWSA and the Myanmar government. The section that follows (4.2.2) analysis the peace process between the RCSS/SSAS and the Myanmar government. Both sections elaborate on the

elements of the Peace Triangle, and explain how we can understand peace in Eastern Shan State.

4.2.1 UWSA: the peace process and the elements of peace.

The UWSA and the SLORC signed a ceasefire agreement in May 1989. It is a peculiar ceasefire because it is the only ceasefire (out of 17 ceasefires that had been reached with other insurgent groups in the same decade) that was offered by the SLORC to the UWSA. It is highly likely that the SLORC offered the ceasefire out of fear that the UWSA would form an alliance with other insurgent groups (Sherman, 2003). The UWSA thus entered the peace negotiation table with a very strong bargaining position since the opposition had a huge interest in ending the violence (Behera, 2017). In the ceasefire agreement, the SLORC and the UWSA agree that the UWSA will join hands with the Burmese government. This includes that they will not arm other groups, and remain in their territory. In exchange for their compliance, the agreement includes that the UWSA will receive “the freedom to pursue any economic activities” (Sherman, 2001, p.231). This economic freedom includes free production and trade of all commodities, including the cultivation and trade of opium. Furthermore, the UWSA and the SLORC agree in the ceasefire that the UWSA has the right to trade inside Myanmar and can arm itself during drugs trafficking (Sherman, 2003).

The ceasefire has proved to be quite stable and is reaffirmed in 2011 by President Thein Sein (UCDP, 2017b). The only violent clash that broke out between the Burmese government and the UWSA has been in 1997. It was right after the period where the UWSA and the SLORC joined forces to defeat the MTA. Back then, the UWSA denied to remove its forces from the newly obtained territory that previously belonged to the MTA. Consequently, the SLORC attacked the UWSA (UCDP, 2017b). Nevertheless, with the exception of this violent uprising, the relationship between the UWSA and the Burmese government has been rather peaceful. This is, in terms of negative peace where peace is regarded as the absence of war.

A further analysis on the nature of the “peaceful” relationship between the Myanmar Government and the UWSA is needed to show the strength of the “peaceful” relationship between the UWSA and the Myanmar Government. I therefore use the Peace Triangle of Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs (2010) that contains three elements that operationalize peace, namely: Issues, Attitude and Behaviour. In the case of the UWSA and the Burmese government, the Issues that caused the conflict in the first place (more independence vs. centralization), are not under discussion at the moment, nor have they been included in any agreement or ceasefire.

Nevertheless, the two parties remain to interact with each other. The UWSA has participated in several peacebuilding efforts that have been organized by the government in the past few years. Hence, the UWSA has often been a participant in the meetings that discuss the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). This is a multilateral agreement that is created by the government of Myanmar. Although the UWSA participates in these meetings, and even hosts a meeting in 2015, they reject to sign the NCA and remain to have little interest in signing the NCA in the future because the ceasefire that has been signed in 1989 and ratified in 2011 offers them more freedom than the NCA (ICG, 2016a).

On the one hand, the ceasefire is thus successful because the conflict has been frozen for 28 years. But on the other hand, the ceasefire also causes a situation in which there is no real progression since the UWSA is unwilling to sign any other agreements. The 28-year old ceasefire has produced an attitude of polarised peace where the same conflict attitudes remain and the interaction between the two conflicting parties is minimal. Especially the UWSA seems to prefer the status quo. The government of Myanmar remains to be careful with the most powerful armed group in their country. Military troops are restricted from entering the region without the permission of the UWSA (Sherman, 2003). Thereby, conflict resolution has not taken place and the quality of the relationship between the UWSA and the Burmese government has not improved in the past 28 years. Eastern Shan State's society remains to live in an insecure environment where the levels of crime are high, especially in relation to the cultivation of drugs (Jarstad, 2015). Also in terms of well-being and human security, progression in Eastern Shan State is absent. In other words, peace might be present in terms of negative peace, but remains absent in terms of positive peace.

4.2.2 RCSS/SSAS: the peace process and the elements of peace.

The RCSS/SSAS and the SLORC have been in conflict from 1996 onwards. The conflict ends in 2011, when the newly elected President U Thein Sein invited the RCSS/SSAS for peace talks. The RCSS/SSAS agreed to participate in a preliminary peace programme and started its bilateral meetings with the Myanmar government. On 3 December 2011, just three weeks after the first peace talks, the RCSS/SSAS becomes the first armed ethnic group that signs the ceasefire agreement with President U Thein Sein's government (Keenan, 2013). Further agreements are made in January and May 2012. These agreements include the cessation of hostilities and more specific directives for the ceasefire. Furthermore, the Myanmar Government

and the RCSS/SSAS agree to designate new liaison offices in the RCSS/SSAS its territory. Hence, they decide to create special development zones that should receive aid for the well-being of civilians in those zones.

Also the eradication of poppy plantations becomes an important topic during the peace process. In October 2012, the RCSS/SSAS, the Burmese government and a representative of UNODC meet to discuss the possibilities to cooperate in the eradication of illicit drugs, as a part of the peacemaking process. An anti-drug agreement between RCSS/SSAS, the government and UNODC-observer is signed and an agreement is made to start pilot projects that substitute poppy by alternative crops (Myanmar Peace Monitor, 2016).

On top of the bilateral meetings, the RCSS/SSAS also becomes a signatory of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015. The NCA is signed by eight armed ethnic groups and is seen as the first step in the peace process to achieve long and sustainable peace. Furthermore, the NCA discusses specifics on the ceasefire, the importance of equality, political inclusiveness, humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians and political dialogues (ICG, 2016a).

Over the past five years, the relationship between the RCSS/SSAS and the Burmese government seems to be relatively peaceful. This is, in terms of negative peace, where peace is regarded as the absence of war. But the peace process also has some elements of positive peace. The issues in the region such as illicit drugs, inequality, poverty and protection of civilians are dealt with in discussions between the RCSS/SSAS and the Burmese government. Unfortunately, the solutions to the issues are not implemented yet, but the first steps towards peace are made. In terms of attitude, the two parties interact often through multilateral and bilateral meetings. New liaison offices are opened and cooperation in the field of drugs eradication is currently taking place. The attitude of both parties is improving and does not show any cases of increased polarisation between the parties.

The behaviour, in terms of direct violence, has remained limited. Especially after the 2011-ceasefire, the large-scale violence has remained absent. Nevertheless, Eastern Shan State still has to deal with the frozen conflict between the Burmese government and the UWSA. Thus, the situation between the RCSS/SSAS might go towards a peace agreement, the area still experiences levels of frozen conflicts and insecure peace. The following section outlines how the cultivation of opium relates to peace processes in Eastern Shan State.

4.3 Peace vs. Conflict-induced opium cultivation

UNODC's annual Southeast Asia Opium Surveys estimate how much opium is cultivated in Eastern Shan State each year. The organization has shared data on opium cultivation in Eastern Shan State for the past twelve years. The data derives from the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) of Myanmar, which UNODC supports in collecting statistics on the opium cultivation. In order to measure the amount of coca cultivation in hectares, satellite imagery and field surveys are used as methodologies to obtain this information (UNODC, 2015a). This chapter shows the trends of Eastern Shan State's opium cultivation and questions the relationship between the opium cultivation and the peace process.

There are three important events that mark an increased level of peaceful behaviour. According to the hypothesis, opium cultivation is expected to decrease after these dates. The first event is the end of the war between the MTA, the UWSA and the Myanmar government in 1997. The second event is the year 2005. This year marks the last clash between the UWSA and the RCSS/SSAS. Also the violence between the RCSS and the Myanmar government decreases after this year (UCDP, 2017b). The third event is the ceasefire between the RCSS/SSAS and Myanmar government in 2011. Figure 2 shows the opium cultivation in hectares per year.




Figure 2: Opium cultivation in hectares in Eastern Shan State, 2002-2015 (UNODC, 2004; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2015).

Overall, there is a massive increase of 150% in opium cultivation over the twelve illustrated years. Since data of the opium cultivation in Eastern Shan State is only available from 2002 on, not much can be said about the important event that marks peaceful behaviour. But the trend in the years after the second event (2005) shows a massive increase in the cultivation of opium. A “reversed” conflict-induced opium cultivation effect is thus non-existent after 2005. The end of the violent clashes in Eastern Shan State is rather followed by a significant increase in the cultivation of opium. Also the third important event (2011) shows a similar pattern. From 2011 to 2013, the cultivation of opium rises. Furthermore, data that derives from the Lahu National Development Organization in Shan State estimates that the cultivation of opium has even further increased in the period 2015-2016. This means that the cultivation of opium continues to increase after the RCSS/SSAS is signed (Nyein, 2016).

The entire peace process, and the two measured events in specific thus do not have any positive impact on the cultivation of opium. The opium cultivation has rather increased after the three main events. This finding is extraordinary. In the popular literature on conflict-induced narcotics cultivation, many scholars and international organizations have pointed towards the drugs-for-arms mechanism as the decisive factor for increased narcotics cultivation in times of conflict (UNODC, 2015a; Transnational Institute, 2014; Jonsson & Brennan, 2013; Cornell, 2007; Sherman, 2003). One would thus expect that now that Eastern Shan State is more peaceful, the drugs-for-arms mechanism does not longer apply and thus the cultivation of opium would decrease. However, this is not the case. The opium cultivation rather increases. There seem to be other factors at play that influence the levels of opium cultivation. The final section of this thesis elaborates on possible explanations that derive from the conceptual debate and a representative of UNODC. But before I elaborate on these explanations, the case of Colombia is examined in the next section.

5. Colombia

5.1 Conflict

This section analyses the conflict between the FARC and the government of Colombia with the help of the conflict-triangle. It then moves on to explain the peace process and elaborates on the current relationship between the FARC and the Colombian government.

5.1.1 Issues: right-wing governments, socialism and imperialism.

The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, better known as the FARC, is a famous Colombian armed group that has been established in 1966 as an organization that aimed to protect civilians in an era of violence. Originally established as a self-defence group, the FARC soon grew into an organization that strongly disagreed with the nature of the political and economic system. The FARC's aim was to throw over the right-winged regime and replace it by a Marxist regime, based on socialism. Such regime would resolve socio-economic grievances and redistribute the wealth in the country. Furthermore, the FARC aimed to defeat American imperialism (Guáqueta, 2003).

5.1.2 Behaviour: violence and coca cultivation.

For the past 50 years, the FARC has varied in its strength, size and strategies. Also the intensity of the conflict has varied over place and time in Colombia. The intensity of the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government has been relatively low for the first twenty years. During these first twenty years, policymakers in Bogota did not perceive the FARC as an urgent threat because there were not many military confrontations and the activities of the FARC took place outside the urban areas (Guáqueta, 2003). But the conflict deteriorated in the early '90s (ICG, 2014). In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe's (2002-2010) starts an unprecedented military offensive that further intensifies the conflict (ICG, 2014). With the support of the United States the Colombian government increases the effectiveness of its military operation against the FARC. The operation is successful; the FARC loses large parts of its territory and is forced to retreat in more remote areas (Webb-Vidal, 2005). The following president, President Santos, continues the military offensive and this leads to a significant reduction in the strength of the FARC.

The military offensive is also visible in Uppsala's Database in numbers of fatalities. UCDP estimates that almost 11,000 humans have lost their lives between 2000 and 2010 (UCDP, 2017c). The total number of deaths over half a century of fighting is around 220.000, of whom

approximately 80% are civilians that have either been killed by the FARC, the military or paramilitary groups (Bello, 2016). One of the explanations for the high numbers of civilian deaths is the high presence of landmines in the country. The use of landmines has been an important strategy for the FARC to remain in control over their territory. Over the past 25 years, landmines have hit 11,000 people, resulting in either death or injuries (Cosoy, 2015).

In addition to the violence in Colombia, there is another important activity that is worth mentioning, namely: the cultivation, production and trade of coca in relation to the conflict. Coca trade started in the 1970's in Latin America. In the first twenty years, the cultivation of coca mainly took place in Bolivia and Peru (Angrist & Kugler, 2008). Back then, Bolivian and Peruvian coca cultivators turned coca into coca paste and transferred the substance to Colombia where it was further processed into cocaine and exported abroad. From 1982 onwards, Colombia has been the largest exporter of cocaine in the world (Guáqueta, 2003) and it also gained the title of world's largest coca producer in 1996.

Several factors prompted this transformation in Latin America's illegal narcotics production. First, successful counternarcotic policies in Peru and Bolivia pushed the cultivation of coca towards Colombia, because it had more favourable conditions to cultivate narcotics in ungoverned areas (Angrist & Kugler, 2008). Second, Colombia already had access to the export market and could thus produce coca domestically in order to deliver the high narcotics demand. Third the agrarian crisis played its part in the regional transfer of coca cultivation. Due to a failure in economic liberalization policies and rural violence, an agrarian crisis broke out in the '90s. In order to generate income, the Colombian agrarian workforce turned to the cultivation of coca and thus facilitated in the regional transfer of coca cultivation from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia. The distribution of coca cultivation in Latin America is illustrated in figure 3 (Guáqueta, 2003).




Figure 3: the cultivation of coca leaves in hectares in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru from 1985-2000 (United Nations office for Drugs Control and Crime Prevention, 2001, p.67).

At the moment that the coca cultivation makes the regional shift from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, the FARC starts to engage in the coca-business. The FARC implements policies in 1982 and 1984 conventions that guide the taxation of coca production. From the 1980's on, the FARC taxes farmers and middlemen that process the coca into coca paste and cocaine. Exporters are also taxed for the distribution of the narcotics (Guáqueta, 2003). The taxation is used to finance the operations of the FARC (ICG, 2014). In the beginning of the '90s and especially after the conflict escalates in 1996, the organization becomes deeply involved in the cultivation of coca and the international trade of cocaine. The FARC acquires own plots and starts to cultivate coca on their lands. It further processes the coca into coca paste and cocaine. Furthermore, the organization starts to cooperate with drugs cartels that have access to the international market (Crisis Group, 2008; Otis, 2014; Schultze-Kraft, 2016; Guáqueta, 2003).

Rangel (2000) has made an estimation of the income distribution of the FARC. Figure 4 shows how the income of the FARC is distributed throughout the late 1990s. Almost half of the income derives from the illegal drug industry; this is good for \$3.2 billion (Guáqueta, 2003).




Figure 4: Income distribution of the FARC in percentages (Rangel, 2000).

5.1.3 Attitudes: distrust

The attitudes of the FARC and the government of Colombia have become more hostile over the years. From the '90s on, there has been more distrust and violence between the two parties than ever before. This is partly due to the collapse of the 1987 and 1998 ceasefires, which are to be discussed in the following section. The unprecedented counterinsurgency that started in 2002 also strengthened the Colombian government's attitude to not make any concessions, or engage in any further ceasefires that are based on trust. As the following section will show, the attitudes of both parties slowly change in 2011.

5.2 Peacemaking in Colombia: behaviour, issues and attitude

The first peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government started in 1984. But the peace talks collapsed in 1990, as military groups continued to attack the FARC (NOREF, 2016). The second major attempt for peace took place in 1998. The then newly elected Colombian president Andres Pastrana Arango arranged a safe haven for the FARC. The appointed area had the size of Switzerland and was given to the FARC to stimulate the peace negotiations. Also this ceasefire did not hold and the talks collapsed in 2001 (NOREF, 2016). The failed peace talks led to a military offensive which intensified the conflict in between 2002 and 2010. There have not been any peace negotiations during this period.

Finally, in August 2012, both the Colombian government and the FARC decided to go back to the negotiation table and start explanatory peace talks. The Colombian government enters the negotiations with a strong position: they reduced the FARC from 20,000 combatants to 15,000 combatants and killed the FARC's leader in 2011. Nevertheless, the FARC remained to have a strong army and a network counting 21,000 civilians when the organization entered the negotiation table (ICG, 2014). Military victory by either side was thus unlikely, and the conflict could have easily prolonged for another 50 years. But the death of the FARC leader Alfonso Cano in November 2011 and the assassinations of other key FARC members caused fear by the Colombian government that the FARC could decentralize in such a way that future peace talks could not be held anymore due to too many factions within the FARC (European Parliament, 2013; NOREF, 2016).

The explanatory talks in August led to the start of peace talks in November 2012 in Havana, Cuba (BBC, 2016). The agenda of the peace talks contains five agenda points dealing with: (1) rural development and land reform, (2) political participation, (3) ending armed conflict, (4) illicit drugs and (5) reparations to victims. The first round of peace talks starts in January 2013. The topic on rural development and land reform is one of the key issues of the conflict in Colombia. The distribution of rural property is highly unequal in the country, as 52% of the land in Colombia is owned by only 1% of landholders. Hence, peasants often have no formal rights over their lands and this makes them vulnerable for usurpation by armed groups (European Parliament, 2013). In May 2013, the FARC and the Colombian government reach an agreement on the first topic and agree that a land bank will be created that distributes rural lands. In addition, investments will be made in rural development, technical assistance and legal protection for farmers (European Parliament, 2013).

The round of talks on the second topic, political participation, starts just one month after the first agreement. This topic takes four months of negotiations and leads to agreements on the future transformation of the FARC into a political party in which security guarantees for the FARC are made. Also broader agreements are made on political participation, such as the agreement to strengthen the participation of citizens in politics (Government of Colombia, 2013). The third topic on the solution to the problem of illicit drugs starts in November 2013. The FARC pledges to cooperate with the government in order to eliminate illegal drugs in Colombia. The organization also promises to play a part in the alternative development projects, through

which coca-cultivating farmers are offered an alternative to illicit cultivation (Woody, 2016). In December 2015, three years after the start of the peace talks, the Colombian government and the FARC sign an agreement in which they state that they will pay reparations and guarantee justice for the victims (BBC, 2016).

In January 2016, the FARC and the Colombian government jointly request the UN Security Council to function as an international observer during the peace process. The Security Council unanimously adopts this mission. The Colombian mission will supervise the ceasefire and create demobilization zones wherein FARC-combatants are able to demobilize, hand-in their weapons and return to civic life (United Nations, 2017). The establishment of the international mission is a part of the last point on the peacemaking agenda that marks the “end of the conflict”. In June 2016, the FARC and the Colombian government agree on a bilateral ceasefire that will go into order on 29 August 2016. Furthermore, the disarmament process and personal security of FARC militias are also agreed upon on this date. On 26 September 2016, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Commander “Timochenko” sign the historic peace deal in Cartagena (ICG, 2016c).

The application of the Peace Triangle on the Colombian peace process indicates that the relationship between the Colombian government and the FARC changed significantly. In terms of behaviour, the behaviour of the combatants has become less violent. Although the Colombian government has not signed a bilateral ceasefire during the peace process and was not willing to do so, the intensity of the conflict in the numbers of fatalities decreased significantly during the peace process (UCDP, 2017c). Table 1 lists the number of fatalities in the years of the peace process.

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015
Fatalities	310	156	114	84

Table 1: overview of number of fatalities during the peace talks between the FARC and the government of Colombia

The bilateral ceasefire signed on 29 August 2016 further eliminated the violence between the FARC and the government of Colombia. Furthermore, the disarmament and demobilization continues: 40% of the FARC-combatants have entered the demobilization zones where they

disarm and reintegrate in Colombian society (Daniels, 2017). The relationship between the FARC and the government of Colombia is thus peaceful in terms of the absence of violence.

Unfortunately, not all aspects of Colombian society remain to be peaceful. New forms of violence are present in Colombia since the peace deal is signed, especially in areas that are now abandoned by the FARC. These areas often include spaces for illegal mining and coca cultivation, and are now a target for criminal armed groups. Hence, many activists, politicians and campaigners have been assassinated since the peace deal is signed (Graham-Harrisson, 2017). The violent crimes following the peace process in Colombia suggest that these situations reflect cases of insecure peace as they threaten the newly achieved peace. Also civilians continue to feel insecure since violence derives from other armed and criminal groups (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010).

The peace process has been meaningful if we look at the issues that are discussed during the peace process. The issues raised have been discussed for which solutions have been commonly found. But despite the agreement between the government of Colombia and the FARC on how to resolve the issues, they are not implemented yet. For now, not much can be said about whether these issues will be implemented in the future, or whether the agrarian inequality and political integration are dealt with, and thus cases of unresolved peace will remain to exist.

In terms of attitudes, the peace process also made significant changes. There has not been much trust in the beginning of the peace process. One example that shows the level of distrust is the continuation of the military conflict from the Colombian government's side as the Colombian government kept up the military pressure throughout the entire the peace talks (NOREF, 2016). The attitudes might also be affected by the tremendous amount of support for the peace process that derived from all over the world. In the four years of negotiations, numerous countries and regions have shown great appreciation for the process. Cuba and Norway, the two guarantor countries, have been observers throughout the process. The two countries attended negotiations and thereby supported both the FARC with logistics, trust building and problem-solving in times of crisis during the peace process.

Whether the large-scale support influenced the attitude of the conflict-actors or not, the attitudes did change. The conflict attitudes slowly faded away, as the FARC combatants continue to demobilize and reintegrate into civilian life. The future will tell whether this integration is

going to be successful. For now, the Colombian society has not ratified the peace deal and remains sceptical about the reintegration of the FARC in civic life and the political arena.

Has the peace process been successful in terms of producing the elements of positive peace? I wrote in the conceptual debate that non-traditional aspects of security are able to measure positive peace. Development, human security, quality of relations, access to resources and equality are thereby indicators of positive peace. By looking at the analysis that has been conducted with the help of the Peace Triangle, I can conclude that these non-traditional aspects of security are acknowledged in the peace process: human security, poverty and quality of relations (ea. reintegration) are all mentioned. However, only time will tell whether these non-traditional aspects of security are going to be implemented. Certainly, an equal Colombian society, a diverse economy, and the absence of high poverty levels will not be reached overnight. Such complex issues do not have a “quick fix”. In order to solve these issues, Colombia needs time. Thus at this moment, there is peace in terms of negative peace, but a lot of solutions need to be implemented before the country can regard itself as peaceful in terms of positive peace.

5.3 Peace vs. Conflict-induced coca cultivation

In order to measure the impact of the peace process on conflict-induced coca cultivation in Colombia, I identify one important event, namely, the start of the peace process that took off at the end of 2012. Table 1 already showed that the intensity of the conflict, in number of deaths, decreased after this date. Figure 4 shows the cultivation of coca in hectares from 2001 to 2016. There are two organizations that have gathered data. The first dataset derives from UNODC. This data is gathered in cooperation with the Colombian Drug Observatory, a government-led platform. The second dataset is gathered by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Figure 4 shows that the numbers of the coca cultivation (in hectares) differ between the two datasets, but that they show the same trends. From 1999 to 2002 there is a slight decrease, but from 2003/2004 on, the amount of coca cultivated land increases. Furthermore, the examination of figure 4 shows that since the start of the peace talks in 2012, the coca cultivation has massively increased with an enormous rise in 2013. This coca cultivated land increased steadily in 2014 and 2015. ONDCP’s newest data also shows a massive increase of coca cultivation in 2016. The impact of the peace process has thus not induced the cultivation of coca in anyway. The trend rather shows an increase in the cultivation of coca.




Figure 4: the cultivation of coca leaves measured by The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP, 2017) and the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2016).

The peace process in Colombia thus does not illustrate any positive impact on the cultivation of opium. The opium cultivation has rather increased since the peace process has started. Similarly to Myanmar's case, the outcomes can be regarded as extraordinary. The drugs-for-arms mechanism is the mainstream explanation for conflict-induced narcotics cultivation, but this mechanism does not influence the narcotics production now that the FARC is in the stage of disarmament and demobilization. There seem to be other factors at play that influence the levels of coca cultivation. The following section elaborates on possible explanations for this observation.

6. Discussion: Peace, Poppy and Coca Cultivation

Colombia and Myanmar have been affected by conflict for over the past five decades. This study shows that the conflicts in both countries have triggered the cultivation of narcotics and questions whether a reversed relationship of conflict-induced narcotics cultivation exists. This research answers the following question: What effect do peace processes have on conflict-

induced narcotics cultivation in Colombia and Myanmar? At the outset of this thesis I posed the hypothesis that peace will revert the conflict-induced narcotics cultivation mechanism. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that the decrease in the drugs-for-arms mechanism and the increase of more political control in the affected areas will decrease the cultivation of narcotics. As it turns out, however, this hypothesis is false. The peace processes in Colombia and Myanmar have not influenced the cultivation of narcotics. Instead of a decrease in the production of narcotics, both countries have shown rising levels of narcotics production. Thus, there must be other factors at play that affect the production of narcotics. The upcoming sections give explanations why the cultivation of narcotics in Myanmar and Colombia has not decreased. These explanations are based upon discussions in the conceptual framework and outline three factors that have influenced the outcomes. Awareness in this section is needed because the factors that explain the absence of a decline in the cultivation of narcotics are related to the conflict, whereas some factors that explain a rise in the cultivation of narcotics are unrelated to the conflict and have influenced the cultivation of narcotics independently.

6.1 The nature of the peace process

The analysis of the nature of the peace processes in Colombia and Myanmar show the strengths and weaknesses of both peace processes. I have found that both peace processes have been successful in producing negative peace. In Eastern Shan State, this means that the RCSS/SSAS and the UWSA both have signed ceasefires that have led to an absence of war. Similarly to Eastern Shan State, war is also absent in Colombia. The FARC is currently demobilizing and disarming its organization. Nevertheless, the outcomes of this thesis show another picture in terms of positive peace. In the case of the UWSA, positive peace is non-existent. The armed group continues to base peace on a ceasefire, and does not resolve any conflict related issues; neither do the parties change their attitudes. The conflict thus remains frozen. As a consequence, there is no political control over the area, and public services, the rule of law and overall human security remain fragile. Similarly, the RCSS/SSAS remains to have problems with reaching positive peace. Although agreements between the RCSS/SSAS and the Myanmar government are based upon positive peace, the implementation of these elements remains difficult. This is not surprising, because weak educational systems, poverty and drug problems do simply not have a “quick fix”.

Consequently, Eastern Shan State is facing high levels of opium cultivation. This cultivation even increased as levels of poverty continue to rise. With a continued absence of public services and a lack of political control farmers choose the cultivation of poppies over other crops in order to survive. It is clear that Eastern Shan State has not reached positive peace, and continues to function under an alternative system that is based upon an illegal economy. The question that arises is whether the absence of war in Eastern Shan State should actually be regarded as peace. The region has not been demobilized or disarmed. It is therefore also highly likely that the UWSA keeps up the drugs-for-arms mechanism to maintain its military power over the Myanmar government.

The nature of Colombia's peace process is also slightly problematic with regard to positive peace. The peace process has resulted in a Colombia that has become more peaceful in terms of behaviour (between the Colombian government and the FARC). But despite the successful negotiations, there is a need to implement the solutions that are agreed upon. Issues such as poverty, the unequal nature of the agricultural sector, and the criminalized economy still need to be dealt with. Colombia's peace process is thus based upon positive peace, but still has a long road ahead in terms of reaching positive peace.

By looking at peace beyond the absence of war, I have found that both peace processes still need time and serious efforts to implement the elements of positive peace. Many of these factors are still absent and this contributes to the fact that conflict-induced opium cultivation has not been reverted. The neglect of the importance of positive peace even played a part in the increased levels of narcotics cultivation. As long as both governments refuse to diversify their economies and fight poverty, farmers continue to cultivate narcotics and illicit economies remain to exist. By implementing the elements of positive peace, such as tackling inequality, poverty and criminalized economies, I expect that both countries will be closer to tackling the conflict-induced narcotics cultivation.

6.2 Farmers

The second factor that explains why the cultivation of narcotics has not decreased in both case studies relates to the incentives of farmers. The conceptual debate acknowledges that conflicts destroy the infrastructure of societies and thereby make farmers unable to irrigate their traditional crops or transport them to the market (Koehler & Zuercher, 2007). With their

infrastructure destroyed, farmers thus substitute the traditional crops for poppy and coca, because these crops are easily sold in the conflict environment. As a consequence, many farmers in the conflict-affected regions depend upon the cultivation of narcotics. In Eastern Shan State, 93% of the household is involved in poppy cultivation (UNODC, 2015a). In the territory of the UWSA, the peace process has not dealt with this dependence on narcotics cultivation. This results in the fact that farmers continue to cultivate poppies.

This continuing dependency on narcotics cultivation also applies to Colombia. Colombian farmers have limited options to diversify their crops and the high levels of poverty continue to push farmers towards the more profitable cultivation of narcotics. Although the Colombian peace process has acknowledged the problem of narcotics cultivation and the country's continuing dependency on coca cultivation, it has not yet implemented the solutions that have been agreed upon during the peace talks. So the farmers continue to cultivate coca and the cultivation of coca does not decrease.

Furthermore, there are four other factors that have strengthened the incentives of farmers to cultivate coca in Colombia. The first factor is that the Colombian government agreed upon giving farmers a subsidy if they decided to stop cultivating coca and start growing vegetables and fruit instead. Although it is a positive gesture, farmers now start to grow coca so they will receive subsidies in the near future. The opportunity to receive subsidies thus triggers farmers to cultivate coca instead of vegetables and fruit because they receive a reward for it in the near future. The second factor is that the Colombian government decided to end aerial fumigations because of health concerns in 2014. In order to continue eradicating coca fields, the Colombian government is now manually destructing the fields. This costs more time, and as a result, less fields are being destroyed. This also means that there is less risk for farmers to get caught. Hence, in response to the manual eradications, farmers have started to block roads to prevent the police from entering the coca fields (UNODC, 2015b). These blockades also play a part in the increased cultivation of coca crops in Colombia. The third factor that has strengthened the incentive for farmers to cultivate coca is the increase in value of Colombia's coca crop. I cannot relate the increased value to the peace process; nevertheless it remains a very important factor. In one-year time (2014-2015) the value of Colombia's coca crop sharply increased from \$ 2.150/kg to \$ 3.000/kg. As a result, farmers now have a financial incentive to cultivate more coca. The fourth and final factor is also unrelated to the peace process: due to a drought in some parts of

Colombia, farmers have decided to cultivate coca instead of fruits and vegetables because coca withstands drought (personal communication, UNODC representative Vienna, May 23, 2017).

6.3 Criminal Organizations

The third factor that explains an absence in the decrease of the narcotics cultivation relates to the presence of criminal organizations. In an environment where the cultivation of narcotics is already present, conflicts create an alternative system of profit and social organization. Criminals have the freedom to settle down and develop strong networks within a country due to the power vacuum and the overall absence of the rule of law. As a consequence, criminal organizations that cultivate and trade narcotics have emerged in both case studies. Herein, Colombia's rise in criminal organizations is marked by drug-cartels. These drug-cartels are nested in the country and are not affected during the peace process. It remains a difficult task for Colombian government to free itself from criminal organizations. It is going to be a long-term process that is only about to start. In the meantime, the drug-cartels continue to cultivate coca and trade cocaine in times of peace.

Similarly, Eastern Shan State has experienced a rise in criminal activities. The absence of the rule of law in combination with a relative stable Eastern Shan State enables criminal organizations to expand their businesses. This also applies to the UWSA. The end of the violent behaviour in Eastern Shan State might have ended the political motivation for the UWSA to cultivate narcotics, but personal greed as a motivation to cultivate poppies has grown and expanded after the 1989-ceasefire. As long as these criminal- and hybrid networks remain to exist, it is highly likely that the narcotics cultivation will not decrease any time soon.

7. Conclusion

This study has shown that, in the cases of Myanmar and Colombia, narcotics production does not decrease through peace processes. The explanation for this observation in Myanmar is related to (1) the nature of the peace process, (2) the farmers' continuing dependency on narcotics cultivation and (3) the remaining presence of criminal organizations. The explanation for this observation in Colombia relates to (1) the lack of implementation of the agreements made, (2) the farmers' continuing dependency on narcotics cultivation, and (3) the remaining

presence of criminal organizations.

Furthermore, this study has provided preliminary explanations for the observation that the cultivation of narcotics does not decrease, but instead increases. The peace processes have created favourable environments for both criminal organizations and farmers to cultivate narcotics. As the Colombian government and the Burmese government do not have (full) political control over the areas, criminal organizations profit from the stable environments and are enabled to expand their businesses and increase their production. On top of that, farmers continue to depend on the cultivation of narcotics and chose narcotics cultivation over the cultivation of fruit and vegetables in the post-conflict environment. The lack of economic diversification, the subsidies offered and the end of aerial narcotics eradication are all factors that seem to increase the farmer's incentive to cultivate of narcotics. Nevertheless, the observations above are preliminary and will need further research.

The conclusion of this study therefore is that peace processes in Myanmar and Eastern Shan State do not decrease the cultivation of narcotics. Instead, this study has found a rise in the level of narcotics in both countries and has outlined preliminary explanations that can account to this observation.

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