


Policy failure and the Transantiago:

Theoretical analysis of a failed implementation



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Master Thesis Public Administration, Public Management: Between Politics and Policy

Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

December 16, 2016

Author Note

This thesis has confidential information from the Chilean government, hence some of this data cannot be communicated without the approval of the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications.

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Abstract

The following thesis is a qualitative case study, utilizing Congruence Analysis Approach to study the Transantiago, a public transportation policy implemented in Santiago, Chile on February 2007 that is still operating to this day. This policy was implemented in order to ‘fix’ the previous public transportation system, by imitating successful Latin American public transportation policies, the Transmilenio (Colombia) and the BRT (Brazil). The main theoretical puzzle is how this policy continued after its initial policy failure implementation and later evaluation on 2010. Hence, it was studied if the policy was a success by the year 2010 following McConnell’s (2015) conceptualization of successful policy. Also, two theoretical lenses (historical institutionalism approach and rational decision making approaches) were compared in order to establish which theory explains more holistically the structure and the behavior of policymakers since its implementation until the year 2010. It was concluded that the Transantiago continues to be a policy failure and historical institutionalism approach explains more holistically the implementation process rather than rational decision making approach. The findings prove Parsons’ (1995) policy cycle theory is no longer relevant for studying modern policy failures and policies cannot be studied in a vacuum: they are affected by a myriad of factors (actors, history, contingencies, among other factors).

Key words: failed public policy, Chile, public administration, Transantiago

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Abbreviations

AFT	<i>Administrador Financiero de Transantiago</i> Financial Administrator of the Transantiago
CONAMA	<i>Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente</i> National Commission for the Environment
CONASET	<i>Comisión Nacional de Seguridad de Tránsito</i> National Traffic Security Commission
DTPM	<i>Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano</i> Directory of Metropolitan Public Transportation
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
MBN	<i>Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales</i> Ministry of National Assets
MINVU	<i>Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo</i> Ministry of Housing and Town Planning
MOP	<i>Ministerio de Obras Publicas</i> Ministry of Public Works
MTT	<i>Ministerio de Transportes y Telecomunicaciones</i> Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications
OIRS	<i>Oficina de Informacion, Reclamos y Solicitudes</i> Information, Requests and Suggestions Office

PTUS	<i>Plan de Transporte Urbano de Santiago (2000-2010)</i> Santiago's Urban Transportation Plan (2000-2010)
SECTRA	<i>Secretaria de Planificacion de Transporte</i> Secretary for Planning Transportation
SOCHITRAN	<i>Sociedad Chilena de Ingenieria de Transportes</i> Chilean Society of Transportation Engineering
SERVIU	<i>Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanismo</i> Housing and Town Planning Services
SEREMI	<i>Secretaría Regional Ministerial</i> Ministerial Regional Secretary
SEREMITT	<i>Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Transportes y Telecomunicaciones</i> Ministerial Regional Secretarial Transport and Telecommunications

Main Characters Involved

Table 1: Main characters involved

Name	Position	Years in position
Ricardo Lagos	President of the Republic of Chile	2000-2006
Michelle Bachelet	President of the Republic of Chile	2006-2010
Sebastian Piñera	President of the Republic of Chile	2010-2014
Carlos Cruz	Minister of Transportation And Telecommunications	2000-2002
Javier Etcheberry	Minister of Transportation And Telecommunications	2002-2005
Jaime Estévez	Minister of Transportation And Telecommunications	2005-2006
Sergio Espejo	Minister of Transportation And Telecommunications	2006-2007
René Cortázar	Minister of Transportation And Telecommunications	2007-2010
Felipe Morandé	Minister of Transportation And Telecommunications	2010-2011

Table created by researcher.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction and research question

The following thesis will study the Transantiago, a public transportation policy implemented in Santiago, Chile. The Transantiago as a public policy can be conceptualized as “an integrated public transportation system (bus and metro) serving the metropolitan region of Chile, created under concession contracts awarded to private entities selected through competitive bidding processes signed with the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications” (Molina et al., 2008, p. 2). In Chile, before the implementation of the Transantiago, there was a lack of institutionalization regarding the public transportation in Santiago (Ureta, 2014). During the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1989), public transportation became systematically deregulated (Figueroa, 2013). When democracy returned in 1990, there was an attempt to regulate and institutionalize again public transportation, primarily due to the oversupply of uncoordinated, deregulated buses, known as *micros amarillos* or yellow buses (Witter and Hernández, 2012; Figueroa, 2013).

Therefore, to solve the city’s public transportation problem, on the year 2000, former President Ricardo Lagos’s administration, designed a policy entitled “Policy and Plan for the Urban Transportation of Santiago” (*Política y Plan de Transporte Urbano de Santiago*) (Olavarría, 2013). This new policy was designed in order for Santiago to have an integrated metropolitan public transportation system and was later renamed as Transantiago (Hales et al, 2007). Ricardo Lagos’ advisors formulated the Transantiago, based on successful transportation public policies, such as Bogota’s *Transmilenio* and Curitiba’s *Rede Integrada de Transporte*, in order to replicate these successful transportation public policies (Deng and Nelson, 2011; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007). The Transantiago was Chile’s “universal recipe” for having an ideal public transportation system (Tommasi and Scartascini, 2012).

The Transantiago’s implementation was on February 10th, 2007. February 10th, is considered by experts as the “Big Bang” due to its effect on citizens’ commute and daily lives (Olavarría, 2013; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007; Ureta, 2014). From one the one day to another, “the system pretended to impose to users a completely new system, with different routes, different buses, a different way to manage paying tickets” (Hales et al, 2007, p. 72). According to former Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications, Javier Etcheberry, the change of the public transportation in Santiago was as abrupt as changing a country’s currency, the previous currency becomes worthless (Ibid).

This policy was designed in order to enhance citizens' commute and wellbeing as well as improving the public transportation in Santiago (Ureta, 2014). The Chilean government tried to imitate the Colombian transportation system (Ibid). Nevertheless, political interest played a significant role in the eagerness to implement the policy, which outranked technical warnings and considerations from experts (Hales et al, 2007). Initially, the Transantiago was supposed to be implemented on October 22nd, 2005, 50 days before the presidential elections of 2005 but due to the lack of infrastructure and buses, the implementation date was moved to February 10th, 2007 (Ibid). On the official implementation day that the Transantiago was implemented, there were many technical errors which could have been avoided, such as lack of supervision and control of bus fleets, which resulted in insufficient amount of buses to carry out citizens' demands of transportation (Ibid).

The Transantiago, as a public policy, was designed to have a permanent subsidy. Nevertheless, politicians informed to civil society the Transantiago would be financially self-sufficient (MOPTT, 2000; Mardones, 2008). However, one month after its launch, the government struggled to find international loans from the IDB as well from the National Subway and Railway companies (Mardones, 2008; Molina et al, 2008). Additionally, the Senate was forced to approve a permanent subsidy to the public transport (Law N°20.378) to avoid increasing the transportation fares (Dirección de Presupuestos, 2015). According to Borndörfer, Karbstein and Pfetsch (2012) the state is forced to intervene in setting fares because these have a significant impact on travel choice and passenger behavior. Yet Chilean policymakers did not foresee that the implementation of the Transantiago would create a massive evasion from dissatisfied passengers, which would later on cause the increase of transportation fares (Moreno, 2008; Ureta, 2014).

This concluded in President Bachelet asking for the resignation of the Minister of Transportation, Sergio Espejo, whose position was replaced with René Córdazar, on March 26th, 2007 (Ureta, 2014). Additionally, that same day, she carried out a televised statement where she admitted the faults in the new policy and assumed the government's responsibility in the design and implementation of the Transantiago (Ibid).

1.2 Problem definition and research question

The initial policy failure has been studied at great lengths by the academia. This is due to the fact that there were serious structural problems which were not addressed during the design of this policy and were ignored by politicians, thus provoking severe difficulties in its

implementation (Hales et al, 2007). Furthermore, this policy was highly unpopular within the civil society, thus deficiently evaluated (Olavarría, 2013; Figueroa, 2013; Ureta, 2014). The public policy was an initial failure from a financial and institutional point of view.

The main theoretical puzzle in this thesis is how the Transantiago continued after its initial policy failure implementation and evaluation. Hence, to solve this conundrum, two theoretical lenses (historical institutionalism approach and rational decision making approaches) were selected. Rational decision making approach is the classical, traditional method to study public policies, thus studying Transantiago's implementation through a concise, economical and functional step-by-step method (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Parsons, 1995). Historical institutionalism is based on the belief that history matters, that history has the power to affect the efficiency and efficacy of public policies (Mahoney, 2000). Thus, the Transantiago is studied as a social institution, in order to narrate and study in detail how it has evolved throughout time (Ibid). Both of these theories will be thoroughly explained in Chapter Two.

To carry out this type of analysis, the Congruence Analysis Approach (CON) will be utilized. CON is a small-n research design in which case studies are utilized in order "to provide empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance or relative strength of one theoretical approach in comparison to other theoretical approaches" (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 144). This method will be further explained in Chapter 3. Also, it is noteworthy to explain some key concepts that will enable the reader to comprehend better the two theories utilized in the CON approach in order to shed light regarding Transantiago's implementation process. For example, the concept of incrementalism can help clarify the rational decision making approach, since it is as a type of analysis carried out by policymakers for establishing small solutions to a fixed problem within the policy (Lindblom, 1959). Likewise, concepts such as path dependency and critical junctures aids the reader to comprehend historical institutional theory. Path dependency theory is a theory that states that contingent events provoke institutional patterns with deterministic properties while as a critical juncture refers to when a specific policy option is selected from a myriad of alternatives, thus causing contingent events and path dependency (Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006).

Policymakers had very limited options after February 10th, 2007, after the critical juncture, therefore a new strategy was needed in order to stabilize this critical urban problem. This public policy was under high scrutiny from the international and local media, by policy

experts, by the academia and above all, by its users and the Chilean civil society. When policymakers carried out incrementalist reforms and after people became habituated to this new policy, the Transantiago continues to be part of every day's headlines. As a consequence, it is necessary to describe how this policy works and why the process of design and implementation evolved in such a way.

There are several objectives in this thesis. The general objective is to explain the process of implementation of the Transantiago and its effects. There are several specific objectives. First, to describe the process of implementing the Transantiago, particularly the antecedents and the events that followed after the implementation in order to understand how it was carried out. Second, to explain the process of implementing the Transantiago, specifically how the process evolved after the "Big Bang" and what did the policymakers did in order to resolve this problem. Third, to investigate and explain the effects of implementing the Transantiago in Santiago, Chile, specifically, the effects at an institutional level in order to explain why the implementation process evolved and took a certain path. Fourth, testing theoretical concepts, such as incrementalism, path dependency and critical junctures, in order to observe if these can be utilized to explain the Transantiago's implementation process.

Therefore, the following thesis question is proposed: Between historical institutionalism and rational decision making, which theory can explain more holistically the evaluation of the initial three years of implementation of the Transantiago? There will be three sub-questions in order to respond the main question:

1. To what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?
2. How did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure?
3. To what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010?

1.3 Theoretical and societal relevance

New policies often fail and therefore this research provides insight in how to continue or improve after a failed initial policy launch. A policy that fails its initial expectations from the beginning but was able to be carried out over time with gradual changes in its design is interesting and relevant to study for policymakers as well as for those involved in the academia. It is necessary to study what is policy success and policy failure in order to establish objectively if the Transantiago, after three years in operation, has become a policy success or continued to be described by the academia as a policy failure (Ureta, 2015; Cortázar, 2015). It has been

through discussed by the academia about what consists policy failure (Jenkins, 1978; Stein et al, 2006; Birkland, 2011; McConnell, 2010; Cortázar, 2015; OECD, 2000). There isn't a universal indicator to measure policy success or policy failure because not all policies are alike, they differ in their policy's goals, the country where the public policy is being carried out and the sector (transportation, health, education, among others).

McConnell (2015, p. 222) narrates that policy failure seem pervasive because there is "no policy sector or country appearing immune to the operational challenges and political pitfalls of failure". As McConnell (2010) also recounts, policy failure or success depends additionally of the context, from the eye of the beholder. Therefore, when a policy cannot fulfill the goals it was meant to carry out, a new policy must take place or new measures have to be carried out to improve it. Thus, by studying a policy that failed in accomplishing its goals, this will shed light regarding policy failure and recovery from policy failure in the public transportation sector in Latin America and which theory can explain these cases more holistically (historical institutionalism approach or rational decision making approach).

From the academic point of view, it is attractive to study this case from the perspective of policy implementation, such as testing concepts and applying them. It is theoretically relevant to study these concepts (incrementalism, path dependency and critical juncture) and observe until what length these can explain the process of implementing a public policy, such as the Transantiago. Also, it is noteworthy to compare historical institutionalism and rational decision making approach in order to study which perspective can explain better the case, the recovery from policy failure and the continuation of the policy per se.

Furthermore, there is an added value of applying these concepts to the study of this case because most of the papers written about these concepts, such as incrementalism, are American or European cases and not from Latin America. Therefore, it is pertinent to study if for example, incrementalism as a tool has aided in the implementation of the Transantiago. Maybe one of the obstacles for academics, regarding the subject of studying Latin American public policies is the language barrier or the ability to understand the political context. Eckstein (1992) states that an investigator has a special advantage if they have singular knowledge and cultural *verstehen* associated with the subject of investigation. Therefore, as an academic who understands Spanish and is well versed regarding this case, it has more probability of responding the thesis question holistically. As a consequence of the former, there will be a contribution to the existing literature, establishing if the application of concepts and theories

from the Public Administration field can or cannot explain a Latin American's public transportation policy implementation.

Therefore, it will enrich the existing literature and encourage other academics to study this subject. Academics specialized in public policies on transportation can compare the Chilean case with other countries' transportation policies (comparing public transportation policies within Latin America or comparing it with other countries, such as the United States). Additionally, if these concepts and theories can explain well the case of the Transantiago, then these same concepts can be utilized to understand better other public transportation policies in other countries.

Additionally, many academics have studied this policy from different angles (some seminal works includes those written by Mardones, 2008; Molina et al., 2008; Hales, 2007; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007), nevertheless, many of these were published during the implementation process when instrumentalist fixes hadn't been fully applied. Consequently, this study will update and enrich the literature by demonstrating how the implementation process of the Transantiago was carried until present day. Also, for academics, the application of these theories makes the Transantiago a classic textbook example for students and teachers about what not to do regarding public policy design, implementation and evaluation. It gives students in the classroom the ability to brainstorm what possible solutions could the Chilean government have done to avoid such an outcome in public policy implementation. Moreover, this case is relevant because it is unique: it is the study of how policymakers tried to implement a successful foreign public transportation policy inefficiently, thus provoking the public transportation in Santiago to follow a certain path dependency and forcing policymakers to utilize an incrementalist approach in order to stabilize an urban and social problem.

The Transantiago is a case that needs to be studied by policymakers because it teaches a lesson of what not to do. And also how to 'recover' from policy failure. Just because a policy is successful in one country, like Colombia, does not mean it will be successful in another.

1.4 Thesis outline

This thesis will be composed of seven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction chapter. The second chapter is the theoretical framework chapter, where there will be a revision of fundamental concepts to explain the Transantiago as a public administration case as well as the main two theories (historical institutionalism and rational decision). The third chapter is the

methodological chapter, which will be focused on the methodology utilized in this thesis. In such chapter, there will be an in depth explanation of the CON approach as well as document analysis.

The analysis of the data will be divided into three chapters. Therefore, the fourth chapter will be based on the analysis of the fulfillment of Transantiago's goals until the year 2007 in order to respond the first sub-question, 'to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?' The fifth chapter will be based on the study of the three predictions established in the theoretical chapter (structure, the role of the policymaker and objectives (which are in explained in great detail in chapter 2) and they will be compared with rational decision making approach and historical institutionalism approach. Through this analysis this chapter will be able to respond the second sub-question 'how did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure? The sixth chapter will be based on the analysis of fulfillment of Transantiago's goals until the year 2010 in order to respond to the third sub-question 'to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010?'

The seventh chapter is the conclusion chapter, in which based on the responses of the previous three chapters, the thesis main question 'between historical institutionalism and rational decision making, which theory can explain more holistically the evaluation of the initial three years of implementation of the Transantiago?' is answered. Later on, there is the bibliography and the list of appendix.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

In this second chapter, the theoretical framework for this thesis will be presented. What a policymaker observes depends on what he or she is looking for and the lens that he or she might be using (Hall, 2016). Therefore, in this section, there will be a description of several key concepts in order to be able to abstractly comprehend a policy from certain perspective or paradigm. This chapter will be divided into three sections to fully comprehend the distinctions between two main lines of thought (rational decision-making approach and historical institutionalism approach). These three sections are: outcomes of a public policy; structure of a public policy and the role of the policymaker.

2.1. Public Policies, Institutions and Policy Success and Policy Failure

2.1.1 Origin and definition of a public policy

In order to understand the concept of public policy, it is necessary to study its origin, through the concept of institution. Institutions are usually the unit of analysis of seminal works in Public Administration and in Political Science. According to Douglas North (1990, p. 3), institutions “are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic”. He states that in order to understand historical change, it is necessary to understand institutions. This is due because “institutional change shapes the way societies evolve over time” (Ibid). North (1990, p. 4) states that institutions “include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interactions”. Institutions can be formal constraints (rules that people prescribe) or informal constraints (codes of behavior and conventions) and these can evolve over time or be created spontaneously. Hall (2016, p. 40) states that institutions are the product of social coalitions and are “composed of actors powerful in the relevant arena and persist only as long as they retain an ample supporting coalition, even if the composition of that coalition changes over time”.

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that an organization and an institution are not the same concepts. An organization also “provides a structure to human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3). Within an organization, there are “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives” (Ibid, p. 5). Organizations can have political bodies (for example, political parties); social bodies (for example, churches), educational bodies (for instance, universities) and economical bodies (cooperatives) (Ibid). By studying organizations,

there is the possibility of analyzing a “governance structures, skills, and how learning by doing will determine the organization’s success over time” (Ibid). Organizations have multiple features such as existing and evolving due to existing institutional framework and influencing the evolution of institutional framework evolves (Ibid). According to Robbins (1991, p. 4) an organization is a “consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals”. Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1025) stated that from an institutional perspective, “regularized organizational behaviors are the product of ideas, values, and beliefs that originate in the institutional context”.

In spite of the unanimous agreement regarding a universal definition of institution, there have been disagreements within the academic community associated with a common definition of public policy (Howlett et al, 2009; Dye, 1998; Easton, 1953; Laswell and Kaplan, 1970; Jenkins, 1978). According to Dye, it is futile to search for a “proper” definition of public policy. Some famous definitions of public policy include public policy as “the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society” (Easton, 1953, p. 129) and as a “projected program of goals, values, and practices” (Laswell and Kaplan, 1970, p. 71).

Dye (1998, p. 2) has a more succinct definition of public policy, stating that it is “anything a government chooses to do or not to do”. Furthermore, this author states that the primary agent in the formulation in the creation of public policies is the government, whose has the main responsibility of selecting choices and decisions on behalf of its civil society. His definition is useful in the field of social sciences because they state that it should also be considered a public policy when a government chooses to take a negative or a non-decision, a stance of doing nothing, maintaining the status quo (Ibid).

A positive decision is when governments decide to change the status quo (Ibid). Both positive and negative decisions are conscious and deliberate decisions (Ibid). A government’s decisions and actions frequently produce unintended consequences (Dye, 1998; Howlett et al, 2009). The unintended consequences of a public policy are not a public policy in itself, just an unexpected by-product with productive or counterproductive results (Dye, 1998). Public policies have the function of organizing bureaucracies, extracting taxes, regulating behavior from society and distributing benefits (Ibid).

Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009, p. 4) use a more technical definition of public policy

and its formulation as policy-making “is a techno-political process of defining and matching goals and means among constrained social actors”. They add that governments are the institutions that formulate public policy (Ibid). These authors establish that public policies are:

Intentional government actions containing both some articulated goal or goals-however poorly the goals may in fact have been identified, justified, and formulated-and some means to achieve them-again, notwithstanding how well or poorly the means have in fact been connected to the goal(s).

They also have sub-concepts in order to explain in further detail who implements public policies and where the process of policy making takes place (Ibid). They state that policy universe is the actors who are involved and participate in the agenda-setting and that the policy subsystem is related to those actors who take decisions regarding which option will be implemented, these can be bureaucrats, officials or judges (Ibid).

Agenda-setting is the place where any and all policy actors can participate in defining problems and asking for government intervention (Ibid). Jenkins (1978) formulates his definition based on the content of policies, such as the goals, rather than the actors or the place where these take place. He defines public policy as a “set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (Ibid, p. 15).

Public policy can be evaluated through their outcomes: if a policy fails or succeeds. In Public Administration, this is studied through the concept of policy success and failure. These concepts have been very scrutinized because there are many points of view regarding what consists a failure in policy (Walsh, 2006, McConnell, 2015; McConnell, 2010; Stein et al, 2006). McConnell (2015), Birkland (2011) and Ingram and Mann (1980) all agree that the evaluation of policy failure or success can be highly subjective. McConnell (2015, p. 351) also states that “success is in the eye of the beholder, depending on factors such as a protagonist’s values, beliefs and extent to which they are affected by the policy”. Ingram and Mann (1980) narrate that the concepts of success and failure are highly subjective concepts which can reflect a person’s perception of needs, goals and psychological character toward life.

2.1.2 Definition of a successful public policy

Parallel to the debate in the academic community regarding the establishment of a universal definition of public policy, there is also a quarrel within the academia about establishing a universal definition of policy success and policy failure. McConnell (2015) clarifies the debate by studying the question “failure for whom?” because a failed policy in a specific sector does not necessary means that it is a failed policy if it does not affect people from another sector. McConnell (2015) states:

A policy that failed to deliver benefits for one group may be successful for another. (...) If a policy fails some groups/stakeholders but brings successes for others, there is a real difficulty in weighing-up these complex outcomes and ascertaining which matters most (p. 229).

Likewise, McConnell (2015) affirms that there are degrees of failure, policies cannot be seen through a black and white photo, there are also shades of grey. A public policy can also be evaluated as a failure due to temporality issues. A policy can be considered a failure or a success depending on when it is evaluated during the path of its policy cycle multiple points in the policy cycle (Ibid). There are two approaches for measuring failure and success: the rational scientific tradition and the interpretivist, constructivist, discursive tradition (Ibid). The rational scientific tradition states that a policy fails when it hasn't reached its objective goal (Ibid). The interpretivist, constructivist, discursive tradition states that failure is based on individual interpretations (Ibid). McConnell (2010, p. 356-357) defines “failure as the mirror image of success: a policy fails if it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent”.

While McConnell (2015) establishes that a policy success is based on the fulfilment of objectives and support from civil society, many other authors do not agree with his definition. For example, Cortázar (2015) establishes that a policy can be deemed successful if it had an efficient design and if there was a consensus of political actors associated with the design of the policy. Hence, the central theme behind the success of a reform is the ability to build an ample political and technical consensus through good administration and leadership in order for a policy to be implemented efficiently (Ibid). Good administration and leadership are the tools policymakers utilize in order to deal with civil and political actors who are unhappy with a policy. Good administration refers to the capacity of putting the necessary resources in order to achieve efficiently and efficacy established objectives (Ibid). Leadership

refers to choosing with accuracy which are the priorities (Ibid). Thus, opposing McConnell's conceptualization of policy success, Cortázar believes that a successful policy needs more than society's approval or the fulfillment of its initial objectives.

The author states that there are four different options in order to establish the constructions in agreements in public policy, hence achieving policy success. These options are win-win, win-lose, lose-win and sum zero (Ibid). The win-lose solution is when an actor leaves the scene in order to improve the situation of the whole. Other solution, lose-win, takes place "in order to exit a crisis, an actor must improve the relationship with another actor or at least not deteriorate it even if it comes by paying a cost"¹ (Ibid, p. 103).

Another option is the win-win angle, the most favorable by policymakers, which consists of permitting and encouraging "the cooperation between different actors to find a solution to a crisis"² (Ibid: 104). For Cortázar, it is important to aim for a win-win approach, depending also on which variable or goal the government is trying to achieve (Ibid). The win-win option is more probable to happen when there is loyalty among political actors (Ibid). The sum zero option is the least popular option among policymakers to reach consensus, thus, considered as inappropriate is not option because it is associated with badly focused negotiations, lack of competitiveness, where every political actor loses (Ibid).

Yet there are numerous explanations for explicating the reasons why a policy fails in the first place. A policy can fail when it does not fulfill its initial goals. Walsh (2006) states that policy failure occurs when the policymaker discovers that the present policy is no longer accomplishing the program's proposed goals. For Walsh (2006) policymakers are driven by their long term political interests, hence the policy fails when it obstructs the policymakers' capacity to achieve their political ambitions. Public policies can fail when they haven't been able to address their 'target groups' (McConnell, 2015). This means that the policy was unable to alter the behavior or the environment of the 'target group' (Ibid).

Additionally, public policies can fail when they do not receive enough support from political actors in order to efficiently implement them. When there is opposition and policies cannot be implemented, then a policy can be considered as a policy failure (McConnell, 2010). Furthermore, when there is lack of authority or low levels of political support associated to a

¹ Free translation by the researcher.

² Free translation by the researcher.

specific policy, then the policy itself becomes politically unviable, with low probability of success which in addition, encourages a drift among political actors (Walsh, 2006). When these constraints become absent, then policymakers can successfully implement new policies (Ibid). For Stein, Tommasi, Echebarría, Lora and Payne (2006), public policies fail not only when they do not obtain the support from government actors but also when they do not receive the support and approval from its citizens. Thus, a failed public policy can be perceived when they fail to “incorporate and respond to the needs and demands of all the citizens, resulting in vast sectors of the population being excluded from the benefits of growth” (Ibid, p. 115).

Sometimes, policy failure does not cause change in the policy itself because policymakers may lack coherent academic associations between desired outcomes and policy tools (Walsh, 2006). Thus, a policy may continue to exist or they’re just adjusted cosmetically or their origins of failure are not addressed (Ibid). Blaming policy direction or its timing of implementation for a failed policy, is an insufficient explanation (Ibid). Walsh states that some policies are masked as failed policies in order to create ‘change’, hence offering new politically enticing alternative policies for politicians, which as a consequence, gains the support from other influential actors (Ibid). Thus, a policy does not have to fail in order for policymakers to create new policies. A change in public policy can also occur when it is no longer the interest of actors to reproduce given public policy (Mahoney, 2000; Walsh, 2006).

Policy failure can also occur due to institutional reasons. According to Birkland (2011, p. 266) there is a problem with the assumption in top-down models that only a single national government can “successfully structure policy implementation and provide for direct delivery of services”. He states that most policies formulated by a government require significant amount participation from local government (Ibid). Birkland (2011) describes the paradigm of “if it isn’t broken, then don’t fix it” to explain the resistance of a government to change a successful policy. Underlying weakness in democratic processes can similarly affect the ability of a government in the delivery of public goods and carrying out public policies (Stein et al, 2006, p. 115). Nevertheless, Stein, Tommasi, Echebarría, Lora and Payne (2006) narrate that an institutional setting that permits the president to pass their agenda isn’t a sufficient condition in order to produce successful public policies.

A public policy becomes successful when it reaches its goal achievement and when “those who regard the original goal as desirable are likely to perceive its achievement in this way” (McConnell, 2015, p. 351). Therefore, McConnell merges these two approaches in order

to formalize the definition of a successful public policy. Hence, he states that a policy is successful is only if “it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually universal” (Ibid). Nevertheless, some programs that do reach their target goals do not necessarily are associated with political success, it may even hinder political interests (McConnell, 2010). For example, an efficient public policy may thwart leadership or electoral ambitions and influence negatively government agendas (Ibid). Failure does not always produce change; instead, its effects are mediated by the interests of important constituents and alternative policies’ accounts of past failures, and either of these can block the adoption of a new policy (Walsh, 2006: 499).

2.2 Structure of policies: different schools of thought

2.2.1 Rational Decision Making Approach

There are many forms of analysis of policies. The classical analysis of a public policy is through the ‘rational decision-making approach’. In the 1960’s, Political Science had the main task of studying power: the process of decision making and how to improve “the capacity of government to do things and ‘solve problems” (Parsons, 1995, p. xvi). Thus, a line of thought named as ‘stagist’ or ‘rational decision-making’ was established (Ibid). This type of approach can be observed as a very instrumental, concise, functionalist and economist way of carrying out public policies (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; March and Olsen, 1984; Parsons, 1995).

According to Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993), the best way to study public policy making is by studying public policy as a step-by-step method. This analysis starts with the identification of how policy problems occur and how they materialize on the political agenda. This step-by-step process involves the analysis of “how political actors formulate issues for action, how legislative or other action ensues, how administrators subsequently implement the policy, and how policy is evaluated” (Ibid, p. 10). Hales (2016) states that politics is a structured process in which political actors’ behaviors are conditioned as well as the outcomes of their political interactions due to numerous variables. Consequently, the main objective in this line of thought is to ‘solve’ the identified problems or issues in the agenda to later on solve other problems identified by the policymaker (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Hales, 2016; Parsons, 1995). For Parsons (1995, p. xvi), this line of thought is associated with the concept of analysis of a policy process, which he defines as “how problems are defined, agendas set, policy formulated, decisions made and policy evaluated and implemented”. This approach

establishes the “policy-making process as composed of a series of steps or sequences” (Ibid, p. 39).

Model 1: Policy cycle under the rational decision-making approach




Diagram from Parsons book (1995, p. 77)

In model 1, it can be observed Parsons’ (1995, p. 77) circle diagram, where he illustrates how this policy process works. First, there is a problem that arises, second the problem has been defined, third, alternative responses and solutions are identified, later the evaluation of the options take place (Ibid). After the former step, a selection of a policy option is carried out, the implementation of the policy takes place, then an evaluation of that policy is established and the cycle starts over if a new problem is exposed by the policymaker. This type of method of analyzing a public policy has received criticisms by establishing that the implementation process and agenda building are not separate entities, they sometimes clash into each other (Thelen, 2004). Also, policy evaluation, which is in this paradigm, the final step of the process, “does not actually constitute a ‘step’ in policy making unless it throws light on possible next moves in policy, in which case evaluation becomes intertwined with all other attempts to

appraise and formulate options for reshaping government activity” (Ibid: 10). The stagist model or the textbook approach has also been viewed as an artificial interpretation of the policy making process (Parsons, 1995).

2.2.2 Historical Institutionalism

The second school of thought that shall be utilized to study the structure of a policy is through the analysis of historical institutionalism. This type of approach originates from the theory of new institutionalism. Institutionalism and new institutionalism are very broad concepts, utilized in many disciplines and each with a different definition (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). In this thesis, new institutionalism is associated with the discipline of Public Administration and Political Science. Specifically, this concept focuses on “how and why institutions evolve, on the processes of institutional reproduction, and on institutionalization” (Gorges, 2001, p. 155).

Institutionalization can be defined as “the process whereby social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan, 1991, p. 43). New institutionalism has also been characterized by a ‘new’ revived interest from the academia regarding the subject of institutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This ‘renaissance’ has been seen as a “reaction against the behavioral revolution of recent decades, which interpreted collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate consequence of individual choice” (Ibid, p. 2). It is a revival of old questions from the areas of opportunity to challenge the deterministic point of view of studying institutions through macrosociology, cultural studies and social history, that were not answered because in the 1950’s-1960’s it was considered more appropriate for policymakers to focus on the importance of studying institutions from a functionalist, economist point of view (Ibid). Thus, thanks to new insights from anthropology, history and continental social theory, there is a new individualistic or functionalistic values (Ibid). As a consequence, from the paradigm of ‘new institutionalism’, arises historical institutionalism.

Sanders (2008, p. 39) defines historical institutionalism as a theory from social sciences that has the main assumption that it is more educational to investigate human political interactions within the environment of rule structures created by individuals and “sequentially, as life is lived, rather than to take a snapshot of those interactions at only one point in time, and in insulation from the rule structures (institutions) in which they occur”. This current, through a historical analysis of institutions, studies institutions’ origins and development and its

relationship to behavior and policy (Ibid). Historical institutionalism's main concern and objective is the construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions rather than individual preferences and rational choice activities (Ibid). Historical institutionalism is "concerned with the long term evolution and outcome (intended or not) of a welter of interactions among goal-seeking actors, both within institutions, and with their challenges outside" (Ibid, p. 42).

To comprehend the structure of the line of thought of historical institutionalism, it is necessary to conceptualize path dependence and critical junctures. According to Pierson (2000: 251), path dependence theory "is a social process grounded in a dynamic of 'increasing returns'". Path dependence is utilized to explain particular patterns of timing where the sequence matters, initializing from comparable circumstances where there are probable numerous social outcomes (Ibid). Sizable consequences may occur due to contingent or 'minor' events, whose specific course of action, once taken, can be impossible to reverse. Mahoney and Schensul (2006, p. 455-456) state that path dependence may "involve reaction-counter-reaction dynamics, such that an initial event triggers a reaction and thereby logically leads to another quite different event, which triggers its own reaction and so on, until a particular outcome of interest is reached". They develop their argument stating that when a particular outcome takes place, this is subjected to a self-reproducing mechanism, "causing the outcome to endure across time, even long after its original purposes have ceased to exist" (Ibid, p. 456). Besides its self-reproducing mechanism, it also has a reaction-counter-reaction dynamics (Ibid).

Nevertheless, there is a debate in the academic community regarding how history matters and the need of a formal definition of path dependence (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006; Pierson, 2000; Sanders, 2008; Dye, 1998, among other authors). Quite often, path dependence is defined as "'history matters' or that 'the past influences the future'" (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). Thus, Mahoney and Schensul (2006: 457) propose six characteristics to define path dependence: "the past affects the future; initial conditions are causally important; contingent events are causally important; historical lock-in occurs; a self-reproducing sequence occurs; a reactive sequence occurs". Mahoney (2000, p. 507-508) states that in order to identify path dependence, it is necessary to both trace "a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of proper historical conditions".

Path dependence is utilized to explain particular outcomes, often seen as instances of 'exceptionalism' or 'deviant outcomes' where a case whose predicted outcome by theory did

not occur (Mahoney, 2000). Mahoney (2000, p. 509) defines reactive sequences in order to explain “the chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events”. Sequences are ‘reactive’ because “each event within the sequence is in part a reaction to temporally antecedent events thus, each step in the chain is “dependent” on prior steps” (Ibid). The final event in a reactive sequence is the outcome studied by social scientists, where a chain of events leads to a path with a certain result (Ibid). In order for a reactive sequence to pursue a specific path-dependent path, the event that initializes the sequence must have contingency properties and sequentially (Ibid). For Mahoney (2000), when events lack the contingency property, they should not be conceptualized as path-dependent events. It is significant to highlight that within a reactive sequence, “each event in the sequence is both a reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events” (Ibid, p. 526).

An example of an institutional self-reproducing mechanism is how the Greek, French and United Kingdom’s Parliaments addressed the challenge of European integration through a path dependent, incremental manner (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). This can be justified that the small steps carried out by these governments’ policymakers are self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms that impeded institutions to investigate other solutions (Ibid). A second example of an institutional self-reproducing mechanism is the approval of the Maastricht Treaty by the French National Assembly and Senate (Ibid). The French approval of the treaty is a self-reproducing behavior because the French government has been progressively more involved in European politics over the years (Ibid).

Furthermore, the concept of path dependence has not only been studied from the field of political science but also in the field of economics. As path dependence has the characteristic of self-reinforcing properties, where “initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse direction” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 512). Economists named the self-reinforcing property as ‘increasing returns’, which can correspondingly be described as positive feedback processes (Ibid). There has been an academic debate regarding if increasing returns is the origin of path dependence (Pierson, 2000). Academics propose that increasing returns is the origin of path dependence because the costs of changing between alternatives will, in some social contexts, may augment over time and the sequence and timing of events influence the narrowing of choices that can be taken over time (Ibid). As a consequence, through the increasing return

concept, path dependence is not only about the content of change but also about temporality, in other words, when the change occurs (Ibid).


Historical institutionalism is also concerned about the concept of critical juncture. There is more agreement among the academia regarding the concept of critical juncture (Mahoney, 2000; Collier and Collier, 1991; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). For Mahoney (2000), a critical juncture can be defined as the selection of a specific institutional arrangement from an assortment of two or more institutional options (Mahoney, 2000). These junctures are bestowed with the adjective ‘critical’ because “once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Ibid, p. 513). Collier and Collier (1991) are famous for utilizing critical junctures associated with studies where the unit of analysis are countries. Thus, they define critical juncture as a “period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Ibid, p. 29). While Thelen (2004, p. 27) applies this concept to politics in general when she points out that “once a path is taken, previously viable alternatives become increasingly remote, as the relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern”.

Mahoney (2001) states that if there are no alternatives and only one choice can be made, then there is no critical juncture, thus not all choices can be considered critical junctures. Before a critical juncture, there are numerous outcomes possibilities, while as after the critical juncture, the range of events becomes considerably narrowed (Ibid). Critical juncture is associated with path dependence because the choices actors take are linked to prior processes and events (Collier and Collier, 1991). Within path-dependent analysis, critical junctures are contingent instances where unexpected events can have a future impact on the final result (Mahoney, 2001). Critical junctures are especially useful for historical researchers, it permits them to avoid the issue of infinite explanatory regression into the past, “this problem arises when analysts lack criteria for establishing a meaningful beginning point of analysis and keep reaching back in time for ultimate causes that underlie subsequent events and outcomes” (Ibid: 113). Thus, through critical junctures, the researcher concentrates on specific events in history where the range of possible results is narrower (Ibid).

Mahoney and Schensul (2006, p. 461) state that critical junctures usually develops immediately after initial conditions, “it is closer in time to the initial conditions than to the final outcome”. Butenschøn (2015, p. 112-113) states that critical junctures are an evolutionary

concept utilized in both social and natural sciences where an equilibrium has been altered by intense events over a short period of time, thus the system has an opportunity to change towards a radical direction. Collier and Collier (1992) goes through neither a quick change or a slow change, they can vary greatly: some can be associated to antecedent conditions while some are not; some can occur simultaneously across numerous, that it can be an immediate change or one that lasts through several years.

Model 2: Policy cycle under the historical institutionalism approach



Model created by researcher

In model 2, the policy cycle under the historical institutionalism approach is presented. As it can be observed, it is a figure that is larger in the beginning and grows narrower over time. Just like a tree trunk, the bottom of the figure is very wide. Just like when a tree branch grows, it becomes narrower over time, similarly, this is what happens to a policy as well. After the first

identification of the policy problem or issue, there several solutions are identified. Afterward the critical juncture, there is a selection of a specific policy solution. Just like the growth of a tree branch, which can only go forward, so is the public policy. It can only go further with restricted options, it can never change back like for instance in this model, change from solution ‘A’ to solution B’ or ‘C’. It can only advance into ‘A1’, ‘A2’ or ‘A3’ and stay in one course (‘A1’). Thus, the goal of this model is to portray the paradigm of historical institutionalism, where the social phenomenoms of critical juncture and path dependence can be observed. Also, it is important to highlight the arrow next to the main figure of model 2, which represents how a policy can only go forward over time and never retrocede after the selection of a solution regarding a policy issue.

2.2.3 Predictions for structure

After the overview of the general theoretical framework of the structure of policies within different schools of thought, certain predictions can be established.

Table 2: Predictions regarding the structure of different theories

Predictions	Rational Decision Making Approach	Historical Institutionalism Approach
Structure	The implementation process matches Parsons’ (1995) policy cycle theory	The implementation process follows Mahoney’s (2000) path dependency theory

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Mahoney, 2000; Parsons, 1995)

Observing Table 2, two predictions have been established, regarding the structure of policies under the lens of two different theoretical theories.

Structure of policies in rational decision making approach: A policy can have an identified structure associated with the rational decision making approach if the policy process matches Parsons’ (1995) policy cycle.

Structure of policies in historical institutionalism approach: A policy can have an identified structure associated with the historical institutionalism approach if the policy follows Mahoney’s (2000) path dependency theory.

2.3 Role of the policymaker: different schools of thought

Policymakers can take different roles when they confront the issue of change. Weick and Quinn (1999) state that agents (policymakers) can have different roles, such as having a role in

continuous change and episodic change. These authors conceptualize episodic change as a type of change that occur in organizations that is intentional, infrequent and discontinuous while as continuous change is a type of change that occur in organizations which is characterized by being cumulative, constant and evolving (Ibid). As a consequence of these two types of changes within organizations, two types of roles for change agents emerge, one in continuous change, the other in episodic change. In this thesis, episodic change will be associated with the rational decision making approach while as continuous change will be associated with historical institutionalism.

2.3.1 Role of the policymaker within the rational decision making approach

First of all, it is necessary to explain how episodic change is related with the rational decision making approach. Episodic change is highly associated with rational decision making approach because both can be described as linear and progressive models, which are motivated by disequilibrium, goal seeking and demands external intervention (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Parsons, 1999). Hence, the change agent is in charge of three stages: unfreeze, transition and refreeze. The state of 'unfreeze' is based of the failure of expectations, where there is a lack of psychological safety and the presence of learning anxiety (Weick and Quinn, 1999). The state of unfreeze occurs due to the phenomenon that leads before it, called 'inertia', which they define as the "the inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environment" (Ibid, p. 369).

Episodic change tends to occur when organizations are faced with external events, increasing environmental demands or inertia (Ibid). Implementing episodic change has its drawbacks: it tends to be infrequent, incomplete, lengthy (due to its vast scope) and disruptive (drastically replaces one program for another) (Ibid). After the state of 'unfreeze', leads to the state of 'transition'. The state of 'transition' is based on a conceptual enlargement and improved standards of judgment where the policymaker establishes new restructuring cognitive redefinition of semantics (Ibid). Finally, 'refreeze' is the state where the policymaker establishes supportive social rules in order to create changes that are congruent with the new change (Ibid).

The change agent in this type of model is the protagonist of change within the organization, the one who carries out the policy (Ibid). Hence, the change agent is "focused on inertia and seeks points of central leverage" (Ibid, p. 366). They can be identified as change

agents in episodic change because they exhibit the following behavior:

- Communicate differently by establishing alternative schema (Ibid).
- “Reinterpret revolutionary triggers” (Ibid).
- “Influence punctuation” (Ibid).
- Build commitment and coordination (Ibid).

2.3.2 Role of the policymaker within the historical institutionalism approach

The policymaker in historical institutionalism approach is very similar to the change agent in continuous change. Continuous change, according to the Weick and Quinn, is “a redirection of what is already under way” (Ibid). Furthermore, this type of change can be described as eternal, processional, searching for an equilibrium, cyclical and without an end date (Ibid). Consequently, the change agent is responsible for the undertaking of the following three stages: freeze, rebalance and unfreeze. The state of ‘freeze’ can be observed as making visible sequences and demonstrating “visible and show patterns through maps schemas, and stories” (Ibid). Later on, the stage of ‘rebalance’ is based on the use of attraction, where the policymaker is focused on reinterpreting, relabeling and remodeling “the patters to reduce blocks” (Ibid). The last stage, ‘unfreeze’, is where the policymaker resumes “resume improvisation, translation, and learning in ways that are more mindful” (Ibid).

Weick and Quinn (1999) state that continuous change takes place in the presence of organizational instability and contingencies, such as after contingent events and critical junctures (Mahoney, 2000). As a consequence, when studying continuous change under the lens of historical institutionalism, it can be observed that policymakers face those same instabilities and contingencies after a critical juncture. Therefore, as seen in model 2, once policy ‘A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’ is selected, the policymaker has to redirect change in the current selected policy choice (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Mahoney, 2000). Remembering that in that model, solution ‘A’ was selected, the policymaker can try to carry out intentional change in the margins of such policy ‘A’, through establishing ‘A1’, ‘A2’ or ‘A3’, but it may create a new change or in other words return to alternative ‘B’ or ‘C’ (Mahoney, 2000; Weick and Quinn, 1999).

Policymakers in continuous change are forced to follow a certain path as institutions are always evolving in a consistence, cumulative manner (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Sanders, 2008). Pierson (2000) mentions Levi’s ideas (1997) about the application of path dependence, the costs of reversal become extremely elevated if a country or region follow a certain path.

Boushey (2010) also establishes that policy innovations do not always go through a clear path trajectory. Thus, since the change agent is in a fixed route due to the lack of options that such organization is facing, they must utilize creative tools such as encouraging improvisation, learning and translation in order to carry out to completion a successful public policy.

The change agent in this type of model is the not the protagonist of change within the organization, they have to redirect the change that is already under way. A continuous change agent can be recognized through the following behaviors:

- “Recognizes, makes salient and reframes current patterns” (Ibid).
- Utilizes different language, thus altering meaning in certain parts of a policy (Ibid).
- Utilize different language to enrich dialogue and grant new identity to the policy (Ibid).
- “Unblocks improvisation, translation, and learning” (Ibid).
- Carries out intentional change at the margin of the policy (Ibid).

This last behavior, the ‘intentional, small change’ is associated with the theories of path dependence and incrementalism. Academics have discussed in depth the relationship between path dependence theory and incrementalism (Mahoney, 2000; Hay, 2011; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Kirk et al, 2007). Incrementalism, as a concept, was first coined by Lindblom in 1959. Lindblom defines incrementalism through three types of analysis. He names these incremental analysis, disjointed analysis and strategic analysis. Incremental analysis is an “analysis that is limited to consideration of alternative policies all of which are only incrementally different from the status quo” (Lindblom, (1979, p. 517). Disjointed analysis can be conceptualized through a “mutually supporting set of simplifying and focusing stratagems” (Ibid) which includes incremental analysis as well as:

- a. limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives;
- b. an intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem;
- c. a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought;
- d. a sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials;

- e. analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a considered alternative;
- f. fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policy making (Ibid).

The third type of analysis conceptualized by (Lindblom, 1979, p. 517) is strategic analysis which can be defined as “analysis limited to any calculated or thoughtfully chosen set of stratagems to simplify complex policy problems, that is, to short-cut the conventionally comprehensive ‘scientific’ analysis”. Other authors have also studied this concept from different angles. Boushey (2010) conceptualizes a concept inspired by incrementalism as policy reinvention. This is a phenomenon where governments instead of carrying out a holistic solution for each public policy problem, they copy solutions from ideological peers, neighboring states and regional programs (Ibid). This is a tool for decreasing uncertainty concerning the results of a new public policy (Ibid).

An incremental decision-making model is utilized by governments in order to learn and replicate public policies in the social and economic sector (Ibid). These types of policy reinvention are modified over time, through an incrementalist approach (Ibid). Nevertheless, numerous governments have struggled with replicating policies with little amendments in order for these to be adapted to their countries, which later may cause more harm than good (Ibid). However, an incremental learning model does have benefits in the process of policymaking because States are more prone to replicate policy successes rather than policy failures (Ibid). Under the lens of path dependence theory, policymakers tend to choose certain policies “which most closely resembles existing practice or previous choices” (Kirk et al, 2007, p. 252). The cost of new policies and the costs of obtaining new information to carry out such policy hinders policymakers into carrying out radical change (Ibid). Hence, policymakers may carry out new policies, yet in an incremental manner, because institutions tend to be conservative and restrictive towards change (Ibid).

2.3.3 Predictions of the role of the policymaker in different theories

After the overview of the general theoretical framework of the role of the policymaker within different schools of thought, certain predictions can be established. Observing table 3, two predictions have been established, regarding the role of the policymaker.

Table 3: Predictions regarding the structure of different theories

Predictions	Rational Decision Making Approach	Historical Institutionalism Approach
Role of the policymaker	The policymaker, as change agents (Weick and Quinn, 1999), are involved in episodic change.	The policymaker, as change agents (Weick and Quinn, 1999), are involved in continuous change.

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Mahoney, 2000; Parsons, 1995; Weick and Quinn, 1999)

Role of the policymaker in Rational Decision Making Approach: the role of the policymaker can be associated with rational decision making approach, if such policymakers, in the role of the change agents, are involved in episodic change (Weick and Quinn, 1995).

Role of the policymaker in Historical Institutionalism Approach: the role of the policymaker can be associated with the historical institutionalism approach, if such policymakers, in the role of the change agents, are involved in continuous change.


Chapter 3: Methodological Section

In this chapter, there will be a presentation and an analysis of the methodology utilized in this thesis.

3.1 Design

This research is a non-experimental, deductive, qualitative case study. The unit of analysis is an organization because the thesis studies a public policy designed, implemented and evaluated by the State of Chile (Babbie, 2013). This thesis is a case study because its main intention is to study intensively a single unit, a single public policy, the Transantiago, through the theoretical lens of two paradigms in order to observe which theory fits better (Gerring, 2004). The goal is to study the implementation case of the Transantiago intensively and not extensively studying different public transportation policies for example in Latin America (Sartori, 1970). It is also a cross-sectional study because it studies a specific moment in time, three years after the initial implementation, between the years 2007 to 2010, as it can be observed in model 3. The selection of years can be justified as well: the policy was first implemented by Bachelet's administration on the year 2007. Second, the policy is still in operation. Thus, due to the vast amount of information and the research time frame, it was decided in order to efficiently study the implementation failure, to study the first three years from its implementation in order to observe if the policy could recover from policy failure.

Model 3: Timeline of study



Model created by researcher

The purpose of this research is to explain a social process, such as the implementation of a Chilean public transportation policy. This research searches to go beyond exploring and describing an implementation process, therefore it has the aim of explaining the process of implementation and its effects. Specifically, applying idiographic explanation, which is an approach to explain idiosyncratic causes of a specific event or condition (Babbie, 2013).

According to Blatter and Haverland (2012), a defining characteristic of a case study is the diverse and vast amount of empirical observations.

To respond the thesis questions, there will be a collection of diverse data from primary and secondary sources (Babbie, 2013). By primary sources, this refers to governmental documents such as the proposal of the PTUS from the Chilean Congress' Library (MOPTT, 2000) as well as official documents published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development as well as from the Inter-American Development Bank. Some of these sources are available online, some are only accessible at the Chilean Library of Congress in Valparaiso while some are of confidential nature. By secondary sources, this refers to the academic literature that shall be studied (from EBSCO, JSTOR, Leiden University's library catalogue and Google Scholar). Furthermore, there will be a utilization of newspaper articles from Chilean newspapers such as *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*.

It must be stated that the evolution of the recollection of sources evolved as the thesis progressed. State documents were preferred over journalistic articles because the documents published by the State had much more detailed information regarding the fulfillment of objectives. There was a geographical obstacle regarding the issue of obtaining data. The proposal of the PTUS can only be accessed in the Chilean Library Congress in Valparaiso. This source is not online. Due to the fact that the thesis is carried out in the Netherlands, not in Chile, this document was obtained through Sebastian Ureta, who wrote a book about the subject. Some data, such as the accident statistics, which are of confidential nature, could only be obtained through appealing to the Transparency law, law number 20.285. Some statistics were not accessible, even by appealing to this law, hence the statistics published by Andrés Gomez-Lobo (the actual Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications) were utilized as well.

Furthermore, there was a preference of sources associated with Bachelet's administration rather than Piñera's administration because this thesis studies the first three years of implementation of the Transantiago (2007 to 2010). Bachelet was in office since March 2006 until March 2010, later on Piñera was president until the year 2014. Therefore, the sources studied were predominantly related to Bachelet's administration rather than Piñera's. Analogously, the memoire of René Cortázar (former Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunication during Bachelet's administration), where he narrates the experience of amending the Transantiago, was very useful in order to respond part of this thesis sub-questions.

Likewise, it must be also stated that Sergio Espejo (another former Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunication during Bachelet’s administration who was present during the ‘Big Bang’) as well as Felipe Morandé (former Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunication during Piñera’s administration) did not write a memoire about the Transantiago. If they had, it would have been incorporated in the analysis of data.

Table 4: Sources utilized to respond the sub-questions

Sources	To what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?’	How did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure?	To what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or policy success in 2010?
Chilean official governmental documents	X	X	X
Documents from International Organizations	X	X	X
Chilean presidents' speeches		X	
Chilean journalistic articles	X	X	X
Academic Literature	X	X	X
Interviews published in the media		X	

Table created by researcher.

As it can be observed in table 4, different types of sources were utilized in order to respond each sub-question. To respond the first sub-question, ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?’, numerous types of sources will be utilized. These are: documents from international organizations, Chilean governmental

documents, Chilean journalistic articles and academic literature. For responding the second sub-question, ‘how did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure?’ there will be the utilization of several sources. These include: Chilean presidents' speeches, interviews published in the media; documents from international organizations, Chilean governmental documents, Chilean journalistic articles and academic literature. To respond the third sub-question, ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or policy success in 2010?’ there will be the utilization of the following sources: documents from international organizations, Chilean governmental documents, Chilean journalistic articles and academic literature.

3.2 Methodology

What is analysis? According to Abbot, analysis “means the assembly, examination, and interpretation of the materials you have gathered to answer your research question” (2014: 169). Analysis means “preprocessing your various kinds of data so they can synthesize into the written text that speaks to your empirical and theoretical puzzles” (Ibid). To respond the thesis question: how did the policy implementation process of the Transantiago continue after the initial policy failure and how can its effects be explained? there will be the utilization of document analysis and the application of the Congruence Analysis approach (CON).

Document analysis is preferred over the process of carrying out interviews due to several reasons. It is a convenience sampling due to the utilization of ‘natural occurring materials’ that can be utilized directly without having to go through the haggles of interviewing government officers with very occupied schedules or obtaining the consent to utilize the recordings of interviews or documents (Rapley, 2007; Flick, 2014). Therefore, facilitating the task of obtaining the data, nevertheless, problems may arise in finding these sources.

Yet, when they have been successfully obtained, the analysis process can be carried out deftly. Second, as Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori (2011) states, most of social life in modern society has been transcribed in different types of written texts, therefore carrying out a thesis nowadays through the utilization of available public documents is a feasible task. Through the analysis of Blatter and Haverland (2012: 99), this case has been clearly justified in the first chapter and considered carefully. This case has accessible information in order to establish convincing causal claims and the case was selected in order to respond specific goals, such as studying a social phenomenon, investigating the effects of incrementalism on a public policy, among other goals (Ibid).

To carry out the case study, CON approach was preferred over other types of approaches. The CON approach is not grounded on comparing cases or searching for co-variation or correlation between variables (Blatter and Haverland, 2012). The prime condition for analyzing the data obtained is through verifying if the observations obtained can exemplify the theories, paradigms or concepts being studied in an accurate manner (Ibid). CON is a “small-N research design in which the researcher uses case studies to provide empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance or relative strength of one theoretical approach in comparison to other theoretical approaches” (Ibid, p. 144).

This is carried out by deducing series of explicit propositions and recognizable implications from abstract theories and comparing them with a large collection of empirical reflections (Ibid). An elevated degree of congruence between the observed evidence and the deduced implications from theory ‘A’ is later compared with the degree of congruence between the observed evidence and the deduced implications from theory ‘B’ (Ibid). The main goal of this exercise is “to discover which theory provides a better explanation in comparison to other theories as well to which theory can provide relevant explanatory insights that the other theories have not yet provided” (Ibid, p. 145). This approach is also known as a ‘three-cornered fight’ because the empirical observations are compared with the theoretical expectations from two different theories: historical institutionalism and rational decision-making.

To carry out a CON approach it is important to identify if the case is a crucial case, a least-likely case or a most-likely case. A crucial case has abstract characteristics that can be utilized to test a theory (Eckstein, 1992). According to Eckstein (1992, p. 157), a crucial case “must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed”. In a crucial case it must be extremely challenging to reject any observations contrary to theory as deviant (Ibid). Gerring (2007, p. 232) states that a case is crucial when “it can be explained precisely by a theory; no other theory can explain the facts of that case, and the theory is invariant (deterministic)”.

Gerring narrates that “a most-likely case is one that, on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted to achieve a certain outcome and yet does not. It is therefore disconfirmatory. A least-likely case is one that, on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome and yet does so. It is confirmatory” (Ibid). Therefore, the assumption is that the Transantiago is a crucial case which has a high degree of correlation with the paradigm of Rational Decision-Making

(Eckstein, 1992; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Gerring, 2007). It will also be observed as a ‘most-likely’ case or a ‘least-likely’ case if the Transantiago can to a certain degree explain the expectations from the paradigm deduced from rational decision-making or historical institutionalism.

There is one main reason for utilizing the CON approach in this thesis. Presently, there are theoretical disputes and gaps in the literature of public policies regarding which paradigm can explain more holistically and to a greater extent a public policy. There can be assumed expectations that “divergent theories lead to contradictory implications in the empirical world, that theories stand in stark opposition to each other, and that the goal is to identify the best or most important theory” (Ibid, p. 145). Additionally, there are “theories lead to complementary implications in the real world and that a plurality of theories is not a source of confusion and uncertainty but rather provides the basis not only for more comprehensive explanations but also for conceptual and practical innovations” (Ibid). Thus, by studying two paradigms and the number of relevant observations that are congruent with the expectations of each theory, then differentiated in order to establish which paradigm is more relevant and adequate for comprehending the Transantiago or if these overlap.

3.3 Techniques of study

The specific techniques of the CON approach can be narrowed in four main concepts: propositions, hypotheses, predictions and expectations. Blatter and Haverland (2012: 160) define propositions as “the constitutive concepts and formulate the causal connections to define and characterize a paradigm or theory. Paradigms are usually characterized by a broad set of constitutive propositions and without a clear specification of causal connections. Theories, in contrast, are usually specified with the help of a small set of constitutive propositions including causal propositions”. The propositions utilized in this thesis is the paradigms of rational decision-making and historical institutionalism.

Hypotheses are a subcategory of propositions because they identify “the expected causal connections between the constitutive concepts of a theory” (Ibid). These connections act as mechanisms of necessary and sufficient causal conditions that leads to particular results (Ibid). Predictions are “the concrete observations that we can expect in the empirical world. The term predictions should be reserved for those expectations that are on the same level of abstraction as the empirical observations” (Ibid). According to Haverland and Blatter (2012), expectations is an umbrella concept because it includes all predictions and propositions that can

be derived from theories and paradigms. Therefore, in this thesis, the expectations include the paradigms of rational decision-making and historical institutionalism as well as the predictions that can be deduced from those paradigms, which can be observed in table 5.

Table 5: Paradigms, predictions and expectations

Predictions	Rational Decision-Making Approach	Historical Institutionalism Approach
Structure	The structure of the Transantiago as a public policy matches Parsons' (1995) policy cycle theory.	The structure of the Transantiago as a public policy follows Mahoney's (2000) path dependency theory.
Role of the policymaker	The policymaker, as change agent (Weick and Quinn, 1999) is involved in continuous change.	The policymaker, as change agent (Weick and Quinn, 1999) is involved in episodic change.

Table created by the researcher.

3.3.1 Conceptualizations and operationalizations in order to respond the first and third sub-question

First, it is needed to conceptualize and operationalize what is policy success and policy failure. The use of these terms are utilized in order to address the 'effects' that are specified in the central research question: "how did the policy implementation process of the Transantiago continue after the initial policy failure, and how can its effects be explained?" Policies can be considered partly successful when it has achieved its objectives and the role of a policymaker is influenced by the support of civil society in relation to such policy (McConnell, 2015).

Conceptualization of policy success: when a public policy reaches its proposed goals and attracts no criticism from civil society (McConnell, 2015).

Operationalization of policy success: when the Transantiago reaches its proposed goals and attracts no or little criticism from civil society. By no criticism or little criticism, this refers to more than 50% of approval in a citizen poll towards the Transantiago.

Conceptualization of policy failure: When a public policy does not reach its proposed goals and attracts criticism from civil society (McConnell, 2015).

Operationalization of policy failure When the Transantiago does not reach its proposed goals and attracts considerable criticism from civil society. By considerable criticism, this refers to more than 50% of disapproval in a citizen poll towards the Transantiago.

Thus, in this thesis it will be studied the completion of a policy's objective from historical institutionalism approach and rational decision making approach. This will aid in establishing if the policy's objectives were fulfilled. Later on, it will be presented in the section of the role of the policymaker, statistics of approval of the policy. Therefore, this will permit to respond the second sub-question regarding how did the policy implementation continue after its initial failure and if after three years it continued being a policy failure.

There are two main documents that shall be utilized in this thesis in order to establish the Transantiago's initial objectives. The first document, is the 'original' document where the public transportation policy was first proposed. This document, "*Plan de Transporte Urbano de Santiago 2000-2010*" (known also as 'PTUS'), written on the year 2000, written by President Lagos' assessors. It was the official first proposal of what would later be known as Transantiago. now, was later rebranded as 'Transantiago'. This document can only be accessed from the Chilean Library of Congress in Valparaiso and it is not available easily.

Nevertheless, the researcher obtained a scanned version from the author Sebastian Ureta, who have written several articles and a book about the subject. The second document is called "*Comisión Investigadora del Transantiago: Conclusiones*" (Investigating Commission of Transantiago: Conclusions) published in December 2007. This document was written by members of the Chilean Congress, who published this manuscript in order to assign responsibilities about the failed policy. This document is available online. PTUS had established one general objective, five specific objectives, seven programs in order to tackle these propositions in order to to 'fix' public transportation in Santiago. The main general objective of PTUS was to contribute to a better quality of life for the inhabitants of Santiago. More precisely, in this document (MOPTT, 2000, p. 17), it establishes that the general objective of the policy is to:

Contribute to a better quality of life of its inhabitants to the extended level of the city as well as those neighborhoods or residential sectors. The quality of life in the context of a 'Transportation Plan' should be understood under the ample concept which includes from the necessity of travelling and the extension of those trips up to the way these are carried out. A city where the need to move from and

the extension of obligatory journeys is reduced, where the mobility of people is accomplished in secure and comfortable conditions, with a tariff structure of agreement with efficient costs, as well as with low or no negative effects towards the environment, implies attributes that links quality of life in the city with quality of the urban and transportation system. Living in a neighborhood where it is possible to walk, to move by bicycle, without the risks of suffering accidents, where the noise level is low, also represent attributes to like quality which one should aspire to.³

PTUS proposed five specific objectives, which can be observed in table 6.

Table 6: The five specific objectives of PTUS

Specific objectives	Operationalization of objectives
Efficient use of resources	Investments that have to maximize social profitability
	Efficient conditions in the regulation
	Implementation of rules and competition between transportation operators
	An efficient management and regulation of routes and terminals infrastructure that generates an efficient use of resources.
Efficient Quality of services	The quality of the buses (such as the height of the steps, the interior of the vehicles for public transportation, the ability of the driver to drive smoothly among others)
	A positive relationship ('niceness') between the bus drivers and the users.
	The quality of the transportation from different aspects: entries, bus stops, type of pavement and esthetics in general.
Promotion of social equity	Social groups and groups from different geographical locations must benefit from the access to transportation.
	The design of the transportation must be balanced with the designs of the rest of the vehicles from the private sector.
Environmental sustainability	Reduction of the negative impacts of transportation on the environment (noise and sound pollution and esthetic effects)

³ Free translation by researcher

Table created by the researcher utilizing additional	Security people goods	for and	Security during all the stages of a user's journey: from walking t vehicle of public transportation, waiting for it and during the journ well.
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information (MOPTT, 2000)

The document '*Comisión Investigadora del Transantiago: Conclusiones*' (Investigating Commission of Transantiago: Conclusions) established the several objectives for the Transantiago:

1. "Maintain and eventually increase the participation of public transport in the modal partition.
2. To make operative a system's network
3. Reduce the average length of trips
4. Stimulate and facilitate non-motorized trips
5. Diminish the contribution of public transport to the atmospheric contamination
6. Improve the security of the transportation system
7. Modernize the institutional sector at a metropolitan level⁴ (Hales et al, 2007, p. 9)

As it can be observed, the main objective and five specific objectives from PTUS overlap with those seven specific objectives identified by the Chilean Congress. There are other issues studied in PTUS, in their seven programs on establishing the Transantiago, which are not mentioned in the second document because they involve topics such as regulation of urban transport, of urban freight, regulation of other private services of transport of people (such as school buses and tourism buses) or the modernization of street lamps. Since the main subject of investigation which is the subject of public transportation per se in Santiago, this thesis won't study the seven programs proposed by PTUS. It must be acknowledged that the original document of PTUS had very high goals objectives because on the year 2000, policymakers firmly believed that by the year 2010, Chile would be a developed country. Thus, as it can be spotted in table 7, the five original objectives have been matched with the seven objectives proposed by the investigative commission. Utilizing the implementation requirements rather than its proposed seven programs in the operationalization of the case has permitted to observe

⁴ Free translation by researcher.

the real requirements needed for observing if the policy has succeeded or not regarding its objectives.

Furthermore, to measure the specific indicators of PTUS, some additional clarification is needed. The indicator of “Citizens Participation” was not mentioned in the initial objectives of the PTUS in the document written by the members of the Chilean congress, yet it was later mentioned several times during the length of the document. Since it was also one of the requirements established by PTUS in order to have a successful policy, it was deemed acceptable to include in within the indicators. Regarding the objective of efficient use of resources, specifically what was required by PTUS in order for the policy’s success was citizen participation through the creation and establishment of a ‘citizen inspector’. According to MOPTT (2000, p.103) there is a necessity for the citizen to:

Assume a role of observation and vigilance of the proper functioning of the set of the urban transportation system, as well as citizen inspection regarding the accomplishment of diverse norms associated to quality of service by the concessionary businesses, collaborating actively with the authorities.⁵

Policymakers knew that “since there are not enough resources from the State to cover all the journeys, citizens will be needed to inspect, observe. These would be young volunteers, who have the legal capacities and have been duly trained to fulfill such tasks”⁶ (Ibid). The objectives from the Investigative Committee state seven other similar yet not identical specific objectives of the public policy. It must be noted that they do not document their interpretation of how to operationalize these objectives. Therefore, a combination of the specific objectives proposed by PTUS with the objectives from the Investigative Committee was established in order to analyze in depth which were Transantiago’s initial objectives. This fusion of objectives can be observed in table 7.

It must be informed to the reader that the indicator of ‘efficient quality of services’ which had the aim of reducing the average length of trips cannot be studied in this thesis because the information available is incomplete. The only think tank who studied this indicator, did not carried out continuous studies. Hence, it only carried out a study of average length of trips in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 but not on 2009 nor 2010. They only continued

⁵ Free translation by researcher.

⁶ Free translation by researcher.

their study in 2011. Since this thesis studies the first three years after the implementation of the Transantiago (2008, 2009 and 2010), utilizing such indicator would not bring the insight necessary for understanding the policy process. Furthermore, it is not a crucial indicator because there are four other indicators that provide a holistic view of the policy itself. As a consequence, only four official indicators of the Transantiago will be studied in this thesis.

Table 7: Official objectives of the Transantiago as well as their conceptualization and operationalization

Specific objectives (PTUS)	Objectives from the Investigative Committee	Conceptualization	Operationalization
Efficient use of resources	Citizens Participation	Establishment of a 'citizen inspector'	Observe if there has been the establishment of such 'citizen inspector'
		Citizens respect the norms needed to implement policy	Evaluate and compare evasion between the years 2006 with the years 2007 to 2010
	Institutional modernization at a metropolitan level	Creation of Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transport	An institution that has political as well as administrative power, created by supreme decree or from article 43, law number 18.575
			Creation of a Coordination Committee of Public Transportation that represents different sectors
			Reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds
	Policy efficiency	Establishment of budget	The maximum subsidy by the State towards public transportation in Santiago cannot overpass US two billion dollars.
Efficient Quality of services	Reduction in the average length of commutes	Obtain data that shows that citizen's commutes have been reduced since the implementation of the Transantiago	Comparison of length of time of commutes from the years 2006 with the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010

Promotion of social equity	Maintain and increase the use of metropolitan public transport	Encourage citizens to prefer the use of buses and the subway rather than the utilizations of cars or motorcycles	Comparison of utilization of public transport in Santiago from the years 2006 with the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010
Environmental sustainability	Reduce public transportation's contribution to the atmospheric contamination	Compare the air quality in Santiago with the year 2006 with the years 2007 to 2010	Comparison between the number of days of 'emergency', 'pre-emergency', 'environmental-alert' between the years 2006 to 2010
Security for people and goods	Improve the security of public transportation	Reduction of street accidents caused by buses	Compare the amount of metropolitan bus associated accidents between the years 2006 with 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010.

Table created by researcher with information from other sources (Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT, 2000)

Concerning the objective of environmental sustainability, there will be a comparison of numbers of 'emergency', 'pre-emergency', 'environmental-alert' between the years 2006 to 2010. These are indicators to measure the quality of air, specifically the amount of 'particulate matter'. This quality of the air and its association with the amount of particulate in the atmosphere can be observed in table 8. Particulate matter are different particles that are suspended in the air (MMA, 2016b). They may be a mixture of solid, liquid or liquid and solid particles and these differ in composition, origin and size (Ibid). Researchers are interested in the breathable particulate matter, which penetrate the respiratory system, provoking irritations and can worsen different diseases as well (Ibid).

Table 8: Indicator of quality of air, associated with the amount of particulate

Quality of Air	Particulate's indicator
Good	0-99
Regular	100-199
Environmental Alert	200-299
Pre-Emergency	300-499
Emergency	Over 500

Table created by researcher (MMA, 2016)

Thus, for clarification reasons, only these four objectives will be searched:

1. Efficient use of resources.
2. Promotion of social equity.
3. Environmental sustainability.
4. Security for people and goods.

3.4 Conceptualization and operationalization in order to respond the second sub-question

In order to respond the second sub-question of this thesis, there will be a throughout analysis of two predictions, structure and role of the policymaker, under the lens of rational decision making approach and historical institutionalism approach.

3.4.1 Conceptualization and operationalization to measure the prediction of ‘structure’:


3.3.1.1 Structure from the rational decision making approach

From the rational decision making approach, there will be a utilization of Parsons’ model in order to identify the final two steps in his diagram: the implementation of the Transantiago and the evaluation of the Transantiago.

Observing model 3, it can be identified that the Transantiago’s case following Parsons’ diagram would be established in the following order:

1. There is an identification of a problem.
2. Definition of Santiago’s transportation as a problem.
3. There is an identification of alternative responses/solutions.
4. There is an evaluation of the options available.
5. The selection of PTUS (which would later be renamed as the Transantiago)
6. Implementation of the Transantiago
7. Evaluation of the Transantiago

Model 4: Parsons' policy cycle adapted to the Transantiago's case



Model based on Parsons's diagram (1995, p. 77)

As a consequence, in this thesis, there will be a search for identifying the final two steps in Parson's policy cycle: step 6 (the implementation of the Transantiago) and step 7 (the evaluation of the Transantiago).

3.3.1.2 Structure from the historical institutional approach

From the historical institutionalism approach, the structure of the Transantiago as a public policy follows Mahoney's (2000) path dependency theory, which includes also the concept of critical juncture.

Path Dependence: There are six specific path dependence properties defined by Mahoney and Schensul (2006, p. 457).

1. "The past affects the future" (Ibid): past actions affect the development of future actions. When the Transantiago was implemented, it also needed to change incrementally, taking into consideration its past: such as the

transportation culture, the behavior of citizens, among other factors. A policy is not implemented in a vacuum.

2. “Initial conditions are causally important” (Ibid): the critical juncture of February 10th, 2007 as well as the reaction of the people from the capital towards the new policy affected its efficiency and how people adapted to the change of policy.
3. “Contingent events are causally important” (Ibid). Contingency relates to the random, unpredictable relationship between the beginning of the policy to the final outcome (Ibid). According to the experts, there was a high probability of having an unsuccessful policy while as for the government, they thought that the experts’ point of view was only a probability (Hales et al, 2007.) No one from the government imagined the final outcome (Ibid).
4. “Historical lock-in” (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457). The policy is forced to follow a certain path and gets narrower over time.
5. “A self-reproducing sequence occurs” (Ibid): a “given outcome is stably reinforced over time” (Ibid, p. 465).
6. “The occurrence of a reactive sequence” (Ibid): the past events related to the transportation in Santiago along with the Transantiago itself as a policy are both a “reaction to earlier occurrences and a cause of subsequent occurrences” (Ibid, p. 467).

Critical Juncture: Mahoney (2000, p. 513) defines critical junctures as “the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are critical because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”. Before a critical juncture, there are numerous outcomes possibilities, while as after the critical juncture, the range of events becomes considerably narrowed (Mahoney, 2001). There will be a search to identify:

1. If there were more than one options before the Transantiago was selected as a policy option.
2. If the implementation of the Transantiago did not permit returning to the initial point.

3. After the implementation of the Transantiago, the range of possible solutions became narrower.

3.3.2 Conceptualization and operationalization to measure the prediction of ‘role of the policymaker’

3.3.2.1 Role of the policymaker under the lens of rational decision making approach

Observing table 9, it can be seen how under the lens of the rational decision making approach, it will be studied how policymakers used ‘episodic’ change during the initial years after the implementation of the Transantiago (Weick and Quinn, 1999).

Table 9: Role of the policymaker under the lens of the rational decision making approach

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Weick and Quinn, 1999)

Conceptualization	Operationalization
Communication of alternative schema	The alternative schema will be observed when policymakers communicate about new, dramatic, intentional and planned change.
Reinterpretation of revolutionary triggers	Policymakers reinterpret the errors and faults of the Transantiago
Build commitment and coordination	Policymakers will try to seek leverage with different civil and political actors in order to remedy the policy

The policymaker involved in ‘episodic change’ is the main responsible of carrying out changes within the policy. It will be analyzed if Transantiago’s policymakers communicate differently after the implementation of the Transantiago, if they reinterpret revolutionary triggers differently and if they build commitment and coordination (Weick and Quinn, 1999).

3.3.2.2 Role of the policymaker under the lens of historical institutionalism approach

Under the lens of the historical institutionalism approach, it will be studied how policymakers used ‘continuous’ change during the initial years after the implementation of the Transantiago (Weick and Quinn, 1999). As a consequence, based on table 10, there will be search to observe the prime role of the policymaker as the one who is redirecting change rather than being the prime responsible of establishing.

Table 10: Role of the policymaker under the lens of historical institutionalism approach

Conceptualization	Operationalization
Recognizes and reframes current patterns	Policymaker recognizes errors of the Transantiago and tries to reframe the Transantiago
Carries out intentional change at the margin of the policy	Carries out Lindblom's (1959) incrementalist change: trial, error and repeat.
Policymakers will utilize mechanisms such as learning, improvisation and translation	Policymakers carry out learning, improvisation and translation through incremental mechanisms (Lindblom, 1959)
Utilizes new language, thus altering the identity of the policy	Policymaker will utilize new language to alter perception of the Transantiago as a policy

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Lindblom, 1959)

3.4 Validity and reliability of the data collected

The data collected will contribute in different ways to the thesis. The documents obtained will serve as Flick (2014) says for different purposes such as representing the essential data on which the analysis and conclusions are delivered, as the foundation of interpretations as well as the main medium to present and communicate findings. The data will contribute in reliability because it will be systemic and be studied under two different paradigms, different angles, thus there will be a systematic study of the implementation of the Transantiago.

According to Babbie (2013, p.191), validity refers to “the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration”. Thus, in this thesis, only relevant information that can answer the thesis’ question will be utilized and analyzed to generate conclusions. Furthermore, it will be taken into consideration the bias obtained from primary documents due to their political origins. In those cases, a different document with a different political origin will be utilized as well in order to respond in an unbiased way. Also, there is an increased validity by utilizing two types paradigms instead of one in order to explain the implementation process of the Transantiago. Researchers who study only one paradigm under the CON approach run the risk of selecting only empirical observations that confirms their theory (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).

Through the utilization of two paradigms, there is a smaller probability that empirical information about the implementation process of the Transantiago that disconfirm the paradigm of historical institutionalism or rational decision-making would not be sidelined (Ibid). Also those same observations that do not explain both paradigms would not be neglected (Ibid). Blatter and Haverland (2012) state that there is an increased validity of an academic finding through the confirmation of more than one theory because it is more convincing and shows that there are other alternatives. If the study strongly disconfirms a theory through the CON approach, the contribution to the academic literature increases if another theory is displayed (Ibid).

Chapter 4: Transantiago's implementation: between its Big Bang until 2007

In this chapter, it will be analyzed Transantiago's implementation between its Big Bang until the end of the year 2007. The first sub-question in this thesis is 'to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?' In order to respond this question, it will be analyzed if Transantiago's initial implementation was a success or a failure. Thus, it will be studied in this section to what extent the Transantiago was a policy failure or a policy success by the end of the year 2007. Following the thesis' conceptualization and operationalization of policy success and failure, it will be analyzed up to what extent Transantiago's initial objectives were accomplished by the year 2007 and the approval rate of civil society towards the Transantiago.

4.1 Fulfillment of objectives by the year 2007

To carry out such analysis, it will be studied up to what extent the four official objectives of the PTUS were accomplished by the end of the year 2007. These four official objectives were efficient use of resources, promote more social equity, environmental sustainability and security for people and goods.

4.1.1. Efficient use of resources:

This section of efficient use of resources is segmented into three parts: citizens' participation, institutional modernization at a metropolitan level and policy efficiency.

4.1.1.1 Citizen Participation

To measure 'citizen participation', there were two main indicators: observing if there was an establishment of a 'citizen inspector' and if citizens were respecting the norms needed in order to implement the policy.

Studying the first indicator, the establishment of a citizen inspector', it can be established that by the end of the year 2000, this indicator was not fulfilled. As it was stated in the same document of PTUS, political analysts knew that there were not enough funds from the government to finance inspectors (MOPTT, 2000). On the year 2006 to 2007, citizens were not offered an active role regarding the inspection of good behavior of transportation users (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014). Only after the Big Bang, bus operators started hiring staff who

could observe and inspect if users were paying the bus tariffs (Cortázar, 2015). Later on, police officers were incorporated in the scheme due to the lack of force that these hired staff had (Ibid).

The second indicator, if citizens were respecting the norms needed in order to implement the policy, was measured by observing if citizens were paying their transportation tariffs. One of Bachelet's administration main concerns regarding the Transantiago was the high evasion rate. Academics are unsure about the concrete reason of why people were avoiding paying the tariffs: it could be a cultural phenomenon, citizens' reaction to the service, due to the increase in bus fares or by a "contagion effect of the unethical behavior where potential fare evaders learn by observing others" (Guarda et al, 2015, p. 56). It all started when the former system was replaced by the Transantiago. In the previous informal transportation system, there were hundreds of micro-entrepreneurs, who drove their own buses and their salaries was based on the fares collected (Ureta, 2014; Guarda et al, 2015).

Thus, evasion was never measured because there was never evasion in the former public transportation system (Ureta, 2014). Bus drivers would make sure that passengers pay the fee or they would not be allowed to enter the bus. These fees were all charged in cash (Ibid). While as in the new system, the Transantiago, buses became "operated by large companies overseen by a government authority with drivers paid a set wage and having much better working conditions" (Ibid). When the Transantiago was implemented, many paradigms shift occurred: bus drivers were no longer the owner of their buses, passengers had to pay differently their tariffs and bus drivers had stable salaries.

The transformation in Santiago's public buses administration was very notable: from the hundreds of micro-entrepreneurs it shrunk into "15 areas of business operated by one independent company each, centrally managed by an independent entity" (Ureta, 2014, p. 374). There was also a change in paradigm regarding to how citizens paid: from cash to a contactless card called BIP card (Ibid). Policymakers foresaw that the competition for passengers would stop or decrease, which would increase the safety on the streets (Ibid). It is important to note that the fare evasion has been carried out on buses and not on the subway, the fare evasion in the Chilean subway is almost nonexistent (Ibid). Nevertheless, policymakers did not foresee that bus drivers would stop charging the bus fees (Cortázar, 2015; Mardones, 2008; Hales et al, 2007). The relationship between incentives and tariff evasion is a relationship that is frequently mentioned throughout articles, news and books. Authors state that less monetary incentives for bus drivers, equals higher tariff evasion (Ureta, 2014; Ureta;

2015; Hales et al, 2007; among many other authors). Cortázar stated that the Transantiago did not function initially as planned because there was a lack of incentives for bus drivers (“Cortázar culpó”, 2008, October 6).

The percentage of evasion of public buses by the year 2007 was 13,4% (Valencia, 2011). There are no records of evasion for the year 2006 (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014). This is due to the main reason that in 2006 there was still the former transportation system where bus drivers were in charge of controlling the evasion. Bus drivers’ salaries came directly from the tickets they would sell, thus academics believe that there was very little to no evasion (Ureta, 2014; Guarda et al, 2015).

As a summary of this section, it can be concluded that citizen participation in the initial year of implementation of the Transantiago was not fulfilled. In the indicator ‘citizen inspector’, this was not created. Regarding the indicator ‘citizens’ respect towards norms’, this was not present due to the high amount of tariff evasion (13,4%) (Valencia, 2011).

4.1.1.2 Creation of a Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transport

In order to establish if there is an efficient use of resources, it is needed a strong institution that has the institutional capacities and strengths to organize and maintain the well function of a public good such as public transportation. There are three ways to study this indicator: observing if such institutions uphold administrative power, if there is a creation of a Coordination Committee of Public Transportation and if there has been a reformulation regarding the Administrative Counsel Funds.

The first indicator studied was observing if an institution was created which could uphold administrative power. According to PTUS, for the policy to work, it needs an institution with the force of laws or decrees (MOPTT, 2000). Therefore, the Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transportation in order to work as it is stipulated to do so in theory, in practice it needed political power. This enables the institution to establish orders and tackle issues, which without it becomes only a decorative institution. Thus, it can obtain this political power through two routes: a) through a supreme decree established by the President and Congress or b) it should have its power from article 43, law number 18.575 (MOPTT, 2000). This law is called ‘*Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Bases Generales de la Administración del Estado*, in other words, the ‘Organic Constitutional Law of General Bases for the Administration of the State’ (MOPTT, 2000). According to the Chilean Library of Congress (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de

Chile, 2000), article 43 enunciates the conditions for how an institution can delegate its power to another institution:

The exercise of attributions and own faculties can be delegated, on the following conditions:

- a) The delegation must be partial and fall on specific matters;
- b) The delegates must be officials from the dependency of the delegating;
- c) The act of delegating shall be published or notified as corresponds;
- d) The responsibility for the administrative decisions that shall be adopted or for performances that shall be executed will befall on the delegate, without prejudice for the responsibility of the delegated due to negligence in its obligations of leadership or inspecting, and
- e) The delegation shall be essentially revocable. The delegate can not exert its delegated competency without previously revoking the delegation. It can, equally, delegate the faculty of signing, by order of the delegating authority, in determined acts regarding specific issues. This delegation does not modify the responsibility of the corresponding authority, without prejudice which could affect the delegate due to negligence in its exercise of the delegated authorization.⁷

Therefore, this article applied to the case of the Transantiago would refer that the new metropolitan institution would have power of its own, having its own law to justify it or from the Ministry of Transportation. Hence, it was searched in the online Chilean library of Congress for the presence of law 18.575 with an association with the ‘Transantiago’ or if the ‘Transantiago’ had been given a law on its own to be able to tackle issues. Thus, seven months after the Big Bang, the law 20.223 was promulgated on October 18th, 2007. This law states that the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications:

Can designate a provisional administrator for the concessionaires that have been expired, between natural persons who are registered in the public record of provisional administrators which shall be carried out by such Ministry. The administrator will have the necessary powers to ensure

⁷ Free Translation by the researcher

compliance with the concession contract and, especially, those corresponding to the ordinary course of the enterprise whose concession has been expired, that the law and status indicate that the directory or who does his substitute and manager. The Provisional Administrator will respond even to the slight fault in the exercise of its functions. Without prejudice to ordinary negligence in the exercise of their functions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the person to whom has an expired concession due to the causes already established in the tender basis, will be disqualified to present again by himself or through an intermediary, whether natural or legal, in the bidding process for the concession expired⁸ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2007).

Consequently, by the year 2007, a law was created that enables an administrator to foresee the fulfillment of activities of the policy.

The second indicator to fulfill the objective of the creation of a Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transport was to observe if Coordination Committee of Public Transportation was created by the year 2007. On April 7th, 2003, President Lagos wrote a presidential cabinet memo number '001' with the title "presidential instructive that creates committee of ministers for urban transport for the city of Santiago"⁹ (Presidencia de la República, 2003). In that memo, he states that the committee that would oversee the proper functioning of the PTUS would be presided by the Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications and the Minister of Public Works (Ibid). The vice presidents of the committee would be the Ministers of Housing and Urban Planning and Minister of Public Goods (Ibid). The permanent guests according to the memo is the Sub-Secretary of Transportation, the Metropolitan Regional Governor, the Executive Director of CONAMA, the General Coordinator of Concessions of the Ministry of Public Works, the Executive Secretary of SECTRA and the President of the Directory of the Subway (Ibid).

In the original manuscript of PTUS it stated that the committee should have three main participants in order to represent the different sectors of the metropolitan public transportation in Chile. The committee had to be integrated by public institutions, transportation operators

⁸ Free Translation by the researcher.

⁹ Free Translation by the researcher.

and civil society (MOPTT, 2000). Nevertheless, this committee by the end of the year 2007 only had representatives from public institutions and not from transportation operators and civil society. Hence, by the year 2007, the creation of the committee was fulfilled but to a certain extent due to the absence of the proposed heterogeneous committee. As a conclusion, the Committee has not fulfilled PTUS' objective of having an inclusive committee to discuss and compare solutions for issues associated with the Transantiago.

The last indicator is to observe if the 'Administrative Counsel Funds' or '*Fondo de Mejora de Locomoción Colectiva*' was reformulated (MOPTT, 2000). This fund is an institution that was created in 1975, during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, based on DFL 391 (*decreto con fuerza de ley*; decree with force of law). The fund is established by a commission from different representatives of urban transportation and the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (MOPTT, 2000). PTUS proposed that this committee had to be decentralized, bestowing its authority from the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications to an exclusive metropolitan transportation authority. By the end of the year 2007, there was not a reformulation of the funds.

As a summary of this section, it can be concluded that in the year 2007, the creation of a metropolitan authority of urban transport' was fulfilled to a certain extent. There was a creation of the coordination committee of public transportation but it did not have the heterogeneous committee that the policy proposed in its design. The establishment of a metropolitan transportation authority was fulfilled because by the year 2007, a law was created that enables an administrator to foresee the fulfilment of activities of the policy. The third indicator, reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds was not fulfilled.

4.1.1.3 Policy Efficiency

This indicator is studied by analyzing if there has been respect towards the budget by the end of the year 2007. The State decided that the subsidy from the State to finance the Transantiago between the years 2000 to 2010 could not surpass US \$2 billion dollars (MOPTT, 2000). In other words, the policy established that the State could not spend annually more than US \$200 million dollars. Thus, to be specific regarding this indicator, on the year 2007, the Chilean State could not spend more than US \$200 million dollars on the Transantiago. This figure was obtained from the official PTUS official manuscript. The following fragment states:

With the objective to deliver figures, even when they are of a very preliminary character and based on intermediary assumptions, it has been estimated a fiscal budgetary requirement for the period 2000-2010 in a figure approximate to US \$2 billion dollars, which would signify an increase between 20 to 30% of the budgetary frame for Santiago's public transportation in the last years¹⁰ (MOPTT, 2000, p. 107).

Contrary to what many politicians said to the press (Cortázar, 2015), the Transantiago from its design was planned to never be a self-sufficient policy (MOPTT, 2000). Cortázar (2015) blamed the Transantiago's fiscal deficit on its policy design. He argued that in its design, a permanent subsidy from the State should have been included in the blueprints. Little did he know that a permanent public subsidy was included in the initial design, establishing that it should have a permanent subsidy from the Administrative Counsel Fund (MOPTT, 2000). Furthermore, this subsidy had to be adjusted, in other words, it would need more resources in order to deliver a more efficient public transportation to citizens (Ibid). The second fragment narrates the obligation of the Chilean State to finance the Transantiago:

The State, on its part, will have to also invest, considering that the yearly average of such investment should be something superior to the average that has been annually been invested in the sector in the past six years (which has been around US \$140 millions). It exists, in this sense, a direct relationship between the amount of resources that is incorporated to the system and the better or worse quality of public transportation services that is possible to offer the social benefits are of great magnitude, by improving the quality of the journeys, increasing in a considerable manner the efficiency of the system, more efficient use of vehicles and roads, by diminishing the levels of congestions as well as the negative impacts on the environment and improving the conditions of safety in the trips¹¹ (MOPTT, 2000, p. 9).

After the Big Bang, the Transantiago had a deficit that kept on increasing. The exact numbers of the deficit are very hard to obtain because the State had not published them, the press and the academic sphere have stated different figures as well. In this thesis, it will be

¹⁰ Free translation by researcher.

¹¹ Free translation by researcher.

used Andrés Gómez-Lobo's statistics. He is the actual Secretary of Transportations and Telecommunications in Bachelet's second term, had the access to this information and was able to publish the statistics in his paper. Through the data he obtained from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, the deficit of the Transantiago by the year 2007 was US \$371,5 million dollars (Gómez-Lobo, 2012, p. 35). René Cortázar, Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications had another point of view. He said that after the Big Bang, the normalization of the Transantiago had a high cost for the State, specifically an investment of US \$500 million dollars (Cortázar, 2015). The implementation of the policy caused a political crisis and in order to normalize the situation, the government could not increase the tariffs for users (Ibid).

Table 11: Loans solicited by the State to finance the Transantiago

Institution	Year	US dollars (millions)
The World Bank	2005	4,8
The World Bank	2005	30
International Development Bank	2007	35,4
Banco Estado	2007	160
Total		230,2

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Cortázar, 2015; World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2010; Molina et al, 2008)

It is important to highlight that the Transantiago was not only financed through the arcs of the Chilean State. The Chilean government had asked for international and national loans to finance the construction of infrastructure of the Transantiago as well as its maintenance (Cortázar, 2015; World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2010; Molina et al, 2008). Observing table 11, by the year 2007, the Chilean State had solicited several loans which had a total of \$ US 230,2 million dollars. Academics have stated numerous reasons for the initial financial deficit of the Transantiago, there are three main causes that academics agree upon: the change of tariff, the lack of functioning of the 'Bip!' card after the Big Bang and and the massive tariff evasion (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014; Gómez-Lobo, 2012; among many others).

First, once a standard transportation tariff was established for the utilization of both subway and buses, this meant a lower recollection of revenue (since ticket subways were historically more expensive) (Cortázar, 2015). Second, the lack of functioning of the 'Bip!' card during the first week of Transantiago's implementation caused a loss (Ibid). Third, the

financial deficit became aggravated due to citizens' tariff evasion. As a summary of this section, it can be concluded that in the year 2007, the policy efficiency of the Transantiago was blatantly inefficient. The establishment of the budget, first forecast by policymakers in the year 2000, was not respected by policymakers in the year 2007, causing a grave State deficit.

As a conclusion of the analysis of the objective efficient use of resources, it can be established that by the end of the year 2007: policy efficiency was not achieved, citizen participation was not fulfilled and only the creation of a metropolitan authority of urban transportation was fulfilled to a certain extent. Therefore, the goal of efficient use of resources by the year 2007 was not fulfilled to completion.

4.1.2 Promotion of Social Equity

In this section, it will be studied if the policy has encouraged citizens to prefer the use of buses and the subway rather than the utilizations of cars, have citizen transportation prefers remained the same or have changed in a different manner.

Table 12: Number of millions of people using the metropolitan subway between 2006 and 2007

Years	2006	2007
Amount of people using the subway (millions)	331	601

Table created from Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano (2015, p. 8)

Table 13: Total amount of cars in the Metropolitan Region between 2006 and 2007

Years	2006	2007
Total number of private cars	1018261	1091947

Table based on the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2007; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2008)

The government has a lack of statistics for the year 2007 regarding the use of the public buses, hence it will be studied how many people utilized the metropolitan subway. In table 12, it can be observed that the amount of people using the subway has doubled since the implementation of the policy, increasing the demand by 81,6%. In table 13, it can be observed that between the years 2006 and 2007, the amount of cars in the Metropolitan Region increased 7,2%. Gallego, Salas and Montero (2013) state that there is a direct relationship between the increase of amount of cars and the implementation of the Transantiago. The increase of amount of cars in the capital is due to the reason that commutes are now longer (Ibid). The policy has promoted social equity because there has been an increase in the use of the metropolitan

subway, nevertheless, the quality of the service has motivated people to prefer private vehicles. It can be observed that by the year 2007, the amount of passengers increased by 81,6% (Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano, 2015). However, the amount of cars in the Santiago increased by 7,2%. Therefore, this indicator was not completed by the year 2007.

4.1.3 Environmental Sustainability

According to numerous academics, Santiago is one of the most contaminated cities in the world (Awe, Y. et al, 2015; Garcia-Chevesich et al, 2014). Santiago is a city located in a valley, surrounded by the Andes Mountains and the Chilean Coastal Range, provoking no adequate air drainage (Garcia-Chevesich P, et al, 2014). Furthermore, “Santiago has thermal inversions during winter months (April-August) that make atmospheric conditions highly vulnerable, preventing polluting particles in the air to be dispersed” (Ibid, p. 202). They state:

Particles in the air disperse or decrease significantly only when precipitation occurs or fronts bring in relatively clear cold air masses, temporally improving air quality. However, this situation continues for a couple of days and air pollution then comes back to pre-rain levels, or even worse. When such phenomena reach critical levels necessitating environmental alerts, pre-emergencies, or emergencies, hospitals often become overloaded with the increase of respiratory problems among the local population (Ibid).

As a consequence, one of the most important goals of the Transantiago was improving air quality for citizens by reducing the negative contribution of public transportation towards the hemisphere. Policymakers had the firm belief that utilizing newer technologies and different types of gasoline would reduce the contamination impact of the Transantiago (PTUS, 2000; Córdazar, 2015).

Table 14: Number of days with ‘emergency’, ‘pre-emergency’ and ‘environmental alert’ between the years 2006 and 2007

	Emergency	Pre-Emergency	Environmental Alert
2006	0	3	21
2007	0	4	27

Table based on statistics from Health SEREMI (SEREMI Salud RM, 2016)

As it can be observed from table 14, there have been no ‘emergency’ alerts and if compared between 2006 with 2007, an increase of one pre-emergency alert and six more

environmental alerts. This can be read through the lens that the Transantiago had a negative effect in the environment. Nevertheless, academics who specifically work in the area of environmental public policies have stated repeatedly that it is difficult to identify the effect of the Transantiago on Santiago's air quality because other phenomena also affect the general air quality of the capital, not only public transportation (Figueroa et al, 2013).

Furthermore, since Santiago is located in a valley with deficient air circulation, it is incorrect to blame public transportation for the air pollution rather than geographical factors. There are many other negative sources such as enterprises that pollute, private cars that use diesel, houses that utilize wood instead of gas for indoor heating purposes and "*la niña*" weather patterns (it provokes the dry season in Chile, thus reducing the frequencies of rain to clean the air). However, a specific contingent event could explain the increase of 'environmental alert' and 'pre-emergency' days on the year 2007. During 2007, the economic relationship between Argentina and Chile became constrained. As a result, Argentina stop exporting natural gas to Chile, forcing the Chilean industrial sector to substitute natural gas to petroleum (Figueroa et al, 2013). Consequently, air pollution increased in spite of Transantiago's new bus fleets and utilization of cleaner energy sources (Ibid).

It can be observed that by the year 2007, the air contamination in Santiago increased. Analysts could state that this could be associated with the Transantiago. Hence, the Transantiago did not fulfil its goal of reducing air contamination by the year 2007. However, this interpretation of results is not conclusive. Air pollution in Santiago could have increased, not due to the Transantiago but due to the Chilean industrial sector, which was forced to utilize more fossil fuels due to a constrained economical relationship with Argentina.

4.1.4 Security for people and goods

The reduction of accidents was of primary concern for policymakers when designing the proposal for the policy on the year 2000. In the previous transportation system, bus drivers had no stable earnings and had to compete with other bus drivers for each passenger. This was known as 'bus racing' and buses ran over red lights buses yet a fact of life for citizens residing in Santiago (Ureta, 2014; Mardones, 2008). Since bus drivers drove so hazardously, passenger accidents were high. PTUS had the goal to "stop seeing users as merely bodies to transport from one place to another in the city (similar to freight), but had to see them as consumers, or clients, who demand 'quality services'" (Ureta, 2015, p. 34). Therefore, policymakers

predicted that by eliminating the need for chasing customers out of the equation, there would be a reduction in the number of passenger accidents (Ureta, 2014; PTUS, 2000).

It is important to state that the Metropolitan SEREMI of Transportation do not have statistics regarding the number of accidents in metropolitan subways. It must be informed that the following statistics regarding the number of severity of accidents caused by buses, is considered as classified and of restricted divulgation by the Chilean Sub-Secretary of Transportation. Hence, through the authorization by the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, the following data has been processed. Any type of distribution or copy of this information without the authorization of the Chilean government is constituted as a felony.

Table 15: Number of accidents involving buses in Santiago between the years 2006 to 2007

Year	2006	2007
Number of accidents involving a bus in Santiago	4951	3406

Table replicated from Gómez-Lobo (2012, p. 8)

Analyzing table 15, it can already be observed that there has been a reduction of 31,2% associated with accidents involving a bus in Santiago between 2006 and 2007. These statistics were obtained from Andrés Gómez-Lobo, a famous Chilean politician. The researcher tried to contact CONASET and they refused to bestow this information. Therefore, this information is classified and is very difficult to access. In his report, Gómez-Lobo states that his sources are the local police (Carabineros de Chile) and CONASET.

Table 16: Number of passengers deceased, seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured in inter urban buses between the years 2006 and 2010

Years	Deceased	Seriously Injured	Medium Injured	Mildly injured	Total
2006	3	136	128	1579	1846
2007	2	136	110	1255	1503

Table created by researcher based on statistics given by Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016)

The statistics from table 16 are from the National Security Commission of Transit (Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, personal communication, July 13, 2016). It can be highlighted that the number of deceased, medium injured, and mildly injured passengers decrease between 2006 to 2007. The number of seriously injured

passengers are the same. It is notable to observe the decrease of 14% of medium injured passengers and 20,5% mildly injured passengers between the years 2006 to 2007. This is a direct consequence of the elimination of the *micreros*' cartel and the establishment of the Transantiago, the security for passengers increased. As a conclusion, it can be observed that by the year 2007, the security for of passengers increased dramatically from the year 2006 to 2007 (Gómez-Lobo; 2012; Carabineros de Chile, 2016). Therefore, this indicator was completed by the year 2007.

4.1.5 Summary of fulfilled objectives by 2007

As it can be observed in table 17, several objectives were fulfilled while some were not. The efficient use of resources, the promotion of social equity and environmental sustainability were not fulfilled. The indicator security of people and goods was fulfilled.

Table 17: Summary of objectives fulfilled by the year 2007

Specific objectives (PTUS)	Conceptualization of the objectives from the Investigative Committee			Fulfilled by the year 2007
Efficient use of resources	Citizens Participation	Establishment of a 'citizen inspector'		No
		Citizens respect the norms needed to implement policy		No
	Institutional modernization at a metropolitan level	Creation of Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transport	Establishment of a metropolitan transportation authority	Yes
			Creation of a Coordination Committee of Public Transportation	Yes
			Reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds	No
	Policy efficiency	Respect towards the pre-established budget		No
Promotion of social equity	Maintain and increase the use of metropolitan public transport			Yes
Environmental sustainability	Reduce public transportation's contribution to the atmospheric contamination			No
Security for people and goods	Improve the security of public transportation			Yes

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT 2000)

4.2. Approval rate of civil society towards the Transantiago in the year 2007

It can be observed from table 18 that the average of approval of the Transantiago since its implementation until December 2007 was 12,62%. The range of approval was between 9% to 15,3%. The highest approval was on March while the lowest was on December. while as the lowest was in August. On December 2007, 91% of Chileans did not approve how Michelle Bachelet and her administration were managing the Transantiago. It must be highlighted that there is no statistic available for the month of February 2007.

Table 18: Citizen Poll between March 2007 to December 2007: Do you approve the way Michelle Bachelet and her administration is managing the “Transantiago”?

Months	Percentage (%)
March 2007	15,3
April 2007	14,4
May 2007	13
June 2007	13,3
July 2007	15,5
August 2007	14,5
September 2007	10,2
October 2007	10,9
November 2007	10,1
December 2007	9

Table created by researcher with statistics from Adimark (2007)

4.3 Chapter Summary: Transantiago’s implementation: between its Big Bang until 2007

It can be observed that the Transantiago was a policy failure by the end of 2007, not only due to the lack of approval from civil society but also, due to the lack of completion of its official objectives.

Chapter 5: Theoretical analysis of Transantiago's structure and policymakers

In this second section, it will be analyzed Transantiago's implementation after its Big Bang. The second sub-question in this thesis is how did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure? In order to respond this question, it will be analyzed if Transantiago's structure through the lens of historical institutionalism and rational decision making approach in the structure of the policy and the role of the policymakers.

5.1 Structure of policies

5.1.1 Structure under the rational decision making approach

In this section, it will be analyzed the structure of the Transantiago as a public policy from the lens of rational decision making approach. Remembering that the structure under the rational decision making approach would study only the last two steps of Parsons' (1999, p. 77) diagram: the implementation of the Transantiago and the evaluation of the Transantiago.

Utilizing Parsons's model (1999), the Transantiago is implemented on February 10th, 2007. The Transantiago was supposed to be implemented on October 22nd, 2005, but due to the lack of infrastructure and buses, the implementation date was moved to February 10th, 2007. The change of dates had the advantage that during February is the Chilean summer holidays where the demand for public transportation is at its lowest level thus according to policymakers would be susceptible to less problems during its implementation (Ibid).

The evaluation of the policy was catastrophic by policymakers, international and national media, civil society and politicians (Mardones, 2008; Olavarría, 2013; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007; Hales et al, 2007; Ureta; 2014, among many other authors who agree on the failure of the implementation of the Transantiago). According to Cortázar (2015), Transantiago became more than a failed policy, it became a social crisis and a political crisis that lasted over a year because it gave great responsibility towards the government and the political coalition Concertación. Nevertheless, before a full evaluation that was carried out by the Senate and the Congress of Chile on December 2007 (Hales et al, 2007; Allende et al, 2007), the government was already establishing which was the new problem in the metropolitan transportation. The following story line can be observed in model 5.

Model 5: Parsons' model applied to the Transantiago




Table created by researcher, utilizing different sources (Parsons, 1995)

As it can be observed in model 5, Transantiago as a public policy cannot be associated under Parsons' policy cycle. When Cortázar was appointed as Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications on March 27th 2007, he skipped the evaluation process, the observation of a problem and the identification of a problem. He immediately worked on a new alternative solution. He then skips the evaluation of options and the selection of a policy option and implements directly the application of incrementalist fixes on April 2007. It must be observed that the evaluation phase of the implementation of the Transantiago was only fulfilled on December 2007. Therefore, Cortázar's incremental changes were carried out before the final evaluation from the Chilean Congress and the Chilean Senate. Therefore, Parsons' model was not respected nor followed.

Cortázar and his team had to carry out an incrementalist posture after the the Big Bang because Bachelet wanted to salvage the policy and 'normalize' the metropolitan public transportation in Santiago (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2015). Cortázar became the government's soldier in shining armor when he was chosen to be Secretary of Transportation and

Telecommunications because as soon as he took his office, gradual changes started to occur (Ureta, 2014). As Ureta (2014, p. 375) narrates “this normalization was aimed not only at repairing a series of massive failing technical devices but also at the performance of ‘normal’ subjects”. As Ureta (2014) and Cortázar (2015) highlights, Cortázar’s protagonism took main stage while he “fixed” the Transantiago through quantitative standards: reshuffling routes, extending night bus routes, changing contracts, bringing larger bus fleets, increasing number of bus stop shelters and implementing new technology. By the end of Bachelet’s presidential term, the 4,000 buses in 2007 incremented to 6, 400; created 2,700 additional bus stops, increased the 222 established routes to more than 350 and strengthened the subway system (Ureta, 2015; Cortázar, 2015).

One of the features of the policy was the built infrastructure, a lane of segregated corridors to separate buses from cars: the goal was to have 225 kilometers in order for the policy to function according to plan (Cortázar, 2015; PTUS, 2000; Allende et al, 2007; Hales et al 2007). Nevertheless, as observed in table 19, only 11 exclusive bus lanes were available during the debut of the Transantiago. After Cortázar’s involvement in normalizing the policy, almost half of the proposed bus lanes were constructed by the end of Bachelet’s term.

Table 19: Amount of exclusive bus lanes available between the years 2006 and 2010

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Bus lanes (km)	11	77	101.1	101.1

Table based on additional information (Gómez-Lobo, 2012, p. 36)

Additionally, Cortázar strived to discipline and seek negotiation with all the actors involved in order to normalize the Transantiago. Essentially, he was able to institute the ‘Metropolitan Authority of Transportation’ and a ‘Provisional Administrator’ as well as directing political actors to efficiently fulfil their tasks associated with the policy (Ibid). For instance, he strengthened political alliances with international organizations such as the IDB and the World Bank (Ibid). However, there were several detractors in his intent of establishing alliances such as the with opposition and even think tanks such as *Libertad y Desarrollo*, who would not support the new law due to ‘conflict of interests’ (Ibid).

He condemned those actors who did not cooperate in his incremental plan (Cortázar, 2015). He chastised the presidents of all the banks who were involved in the AFP and stated how they were directly responsible for the failure of the Transantiago: that their inefficiency

regarding the lack of buses, roads and infrastructure had aggravated the political crisis in Chile. (Ibid). The Secretary warned them about the sanctions that would be applied if there were not any drastic changes in the quality of services in a short period of time (Ibid).

5.1.2 Structure under the historical institutionalism approach

In this section, it will be studied the structure of the Transantiago as a public policy from the lens of historical institutionalism approach. The structure of a policy under the historical institutionalism approach is based on two concepts: path dependency theory and critical juncture.

5.1.2.1 Path Dependence Theory

Mahoney and Schensul's first indicator "the past affects the future" (2006: 457) is clearly illustrated in the Chilean case of metropolitan public transportation. Chilean governments, for many years, have struggled with public transportation for its capital residents. For instance, Chile's political administration affected the way public transportation was administered in Santiago. During Pinochet's dictatorship, he privatized the public transportation, liberating it to the market (Ureta, 2014; Ureta, 2015; Cortázar 2015). On October 5th, 1988, citizens of Chile participated in a plebiscite in order to vote 'yes' or 'no' to the permanence of General Pinochet, in his self given title of 'President', to remain eight more years in power: the result was that the 'no' won (NDI, 1989). As a consequence, Patricio Aylwin was elected in 1989 and Chile officially returned to democracy in 1990. Keeping in mind that Aylwin's administration faced the struggle to consolidate the transition towards democracy, his administration also had the task to regulate and create new laws towards Santiago's 'liberated public transportation' (Ureta, 2014).

Second, the former 'past' of president Ricardo Lagos, who designed the Transantiago, had a direct relationship regarding to its implementation. Ricardo Lagos, when he was the Secretary of Public Works during Aylwin's administration, had already a clear target, to create a grand legacy during his 'future' presidency conceptualized as Transantiago (Ureta, 2015). He said, during his post on April 16th, 1996: "my priorities are, first, to improve the public transportation, create exclusive roads for buses¹²" (Quijada et al, 2007, p. 11). When he was President, he wanted launch ten colossal infrastructural projects in several cities throughout

¹² Free translation by researcher

Chile's bicentennial as an independent country (Ureta, 2015).

However, his only obstacle was the effects of 1997's Asian Crisis on the Chilean **economy** (Ibid). As a consequence, his hopes of constructing bicentennial memorials vanished because there were not enough resources in the Chilean's arcs to finances them (Ureta, 2015). Yet, his hopes returned when he heard from his advisors about PTUS, which was a policy that could theoretically be carried out without investing significant part of the Chilean budget (Ibid). He started campaigning for PTUS, which would solve a metropolitan social problem, produce growth with equity and would eliminate the *micreros*' cartel (Ureta, 2015, Allende et al, 2007). He wanted to rush the implementation and inaugurate it before the end of his term (March 2006) to mark his administration's legacy (Ureta, 2015). Many think tanks and policymakers were not heard when they advised Lagos and his advisers about postponing the policy (Hales et al, 2007; Mardones, 2008; Allende et al, 2007).

The second indicator, "initial conditions are causally important" (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457) can be seen on the implementation day of the Transantiago, known as the Big Bang of February 10th, 2007, considered also as a critical juncture. by the existing literature affected drastically Santiago's residents. The transportation from one day to another ceased to be efficient (Allende et al, 2007). According to famous senator Isabel Allende, the routes created by policymakers were illogical and inefficient because they did not consider routes close to hospitals, subzones or job markets, did not have the minimum conditions for the system to work efficiently and primarily did not incorporate the urban culture of taking only one form of transportation in order to reach from point A to B (Ibid). Thus, the Big Bang provoked a slow, uncomfortable and uncertain public transportation in Santiago (Ibid).

The third indicator, "contingent events are causally important" refers to how spurious, unpredictable events can have a profound effect in a final policy outcome (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457). There were several contingent events in the first three years of the implementation of the policy. First, there was the Big Bang, which was foreshadowed by experts, stating that there was a high probability of having an unsuccessful policy while as for the government, they thought that the experts' point of view was only a probability (Hales et al, 2007). Chilean politicians never imagined that the policy would fail because the advisers promised them a successful policy (Ibid). However, they had theoretically proposed the policy, pressured by Lagos' advisers in creating the most economical policy that would not utilize too many resources from the state, thus they gambled the success of the policy by hoping that all

actors would coordinate as planned and if no errors occurred, leaving no space for mistakes (Hales et al, 2007; Allende et al; 2007; Gómez-Lobo, 2012; Quijada et al, 2007; Gallego et al, 2013).

On July 2007, a confidential report was published by the press, narrating how the president of the Chilean subway (Bas Tomic) foreshadowed that the Transantiago would cause a financial, social and political crisis (Mardones, 2008). Some analysts state that the political upheaval and spontaneous riots from civil society had not been seen since the return of democracy in 1990 (Mardones, 2008; Olavarría, 2013; Gómez-Lobo, 2012; ““Bachelet sustituye a cuatro ministros”, 2007, March 27). According to Cortázar (2015, p. 14), it was likely that the policy was going to have serious problems:

It seemed impossible that it could be applied an integral reform of the public transport system in a city of more than five million people, implementing new technology, changing all the routes immediately, without producing an important disarray. (...) The question was not if there would be problems. The doubt is what would be the magnitude of those. And, certainly, they exceeded the imagined¹³.

The second contingent event was the opposition in Congress regarding the approval of the IDB credit and the law to permanently subsidize the Transantiago (Hales et al, 2007; Cortázar, 2015). Bachelet's team had planned that the Transantiago could be solvent through the loan from Banco Estado, afterwards when that loan was fully utilized, then the administration would employ the IDB loan until the Congress could agree on a permanent law to subsidize the Transantiago. For Bachelet's surprise, the opposition carried out a fierce refusal towards the IDB credit, questioning its legality and towards the establishment of a permanent public transportation subsidy for the Metropolitan Region (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2015; Ureta, 2015; Hales et al, 2007). As a consequence, the Transantiago was unstable financially and the government was forced to utilize the constitutional 2% of the budget, which is only utilized during catastrophic events (Cortázar, 2015). The opposition was fierce regarding forbidding the validation of the IDB credit as well the bestowment of a permanent subsidy due to political reasons (Ibid). For the Chilean opposition, Bachelet's administration decision of utilizing the constitutional 2% for financing the Transantiago, meant a political

¹³ Free translation by the researcher

victory (Ibid). Through the lens of the opposition, Bachelet had recognized that the Transantiago was a ‘catastrophe’ (Ibid).

The third contingent event, was the earthquake of 2010. The earthquake of February 27th, 2010 was 8.8 in the scale of Richter, is Chile’s second strongest earthquake and one of the top ten fiercest earthquakes worldwide (Contreras and Winckler, 2013). Unfortunately, this occurred during Bachelet’s last days in power, leaving the reconstruction of public institutions to the next administration. Sebastian Piñera took oath in March 2010 and his administration had to confront the aftermath of the earthquake, thus, the reconstruction of the south of Chile. His government estimated that the catastrophe would cost the State US \$30 billion dollars: US \$9 billion dollars in goods and services (that were stopped being produced due to the earthquake) and US \$21 billion dollars in public and private infrastructure (Lefin, 2011, February 20). Hence, the government made a fiscal reform, increasing taxes to tobacco, enterprises, among others, in order to finance the reconstruction (Ibid).

The earthquake brought certain consequences to the Chilean policymaking sphere. First, it meant that the Transantiago was no longer an immediate priority for the government on 2010. Second, according to Alfred Joignant (professor at Diego Portales University and currently a Counsellor in the Chilean Electoral Service), the magnitude of the earthquake provoked symptoms of anesthesia in Chilean politics (“El futuro de Bachelet”, March 2). This can be observed when Piñera recommended an increase of Transantiago’s subsidy in the proposal of the annual Chilean fiscal budget for the year 2011 and it had little to no discrepancy from the Opposition (Cortázar, 2015). Therefore, policymakers were able to take advantage of the catastrophic earthquake in order to increase funds for the Transantiago.

The fourth contingent event was the Argentinean lock down of natural gas supplies to Chile between 2007 to 2009 which as a direct consequence, negatively affected the air quality of Santiago (Figuerola et al, 2013). This provoked that the Chilean industrial sector to substitute natural gas to petroleum, which as a consequence increased the air of pollution in Santiago, in spite of the new fleet of the Transantiago (Ibid). Therefore, it was very difficult for policymakers to state to the press and to civil society about the ecological advantages of the new transportation system. Chile’s dependency on Argentinean natural gas stopped when the regasification plant of natural liquefied gas in Quintero started operating and the industrial sector commenced again to utilize this energy source, instead of petroleum (Ibid). This meant that only after 2010, the benefits of the Transantiago were discerned by policymakers.

The fifth contingent event was the creation of law 20.285, also known as Law of Transparency. The State lacked the resources to finance a ‘citizen inspector’ nevertheless the creation of this law established that “every person has the right to request and receive information from any organ of the Administration of the State”¹⁴ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016a). A citizen can request this information electronically, by sending an email to the institution or using the Transparency website or physically by mail or by going to a OIRS (Office for Information, Claims and Suggestions; *Oficina de Informaciones, Reclamos y Sugerencias*) (Consejo de Transparencia, 2016). These OIRS were established in every public institution, including one for the *Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano* (Directory of Metropolitan Public Transportation). The participation of citizens in inspecting or giving their opinions regarding the Transantiago was more of a byproduct of law 20.285 rather than a byproduct of the implementation of the Transantiago.

The fifth indicator to identify path dependence theory in the Transantiago case is “historical lock-in” (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457). This can be observed when Transantiago’s faulty design issues were discovered after its implementation. The Transantiago was already implemented and millions of people already using this public good, thus, it was too late to change the policy (Cortázar, 2015). Therefore, as a policymaker, Cortázar and his team had to learn from the errors, fix issues, restructure the system but it was unthinkable to return to other previous system (Ibid). Literally, the policy was locked in, he stated how there was no other alternative than to move forward and continue operating the Transantiago (Ibid).

The sixth and final indicator, “a self-reproducing sequence occurs” (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006, p. 457) can be observed in numerous ways. The Transantiago is a self-reproducing sequence because it is already, as previously stated, in a historical lock-in. This means that the Transantiago as a policy can only be modified, not changed (Mahoney, 2000). Hence, if there is a new public transportation policy in Santiago, it won’t be a new radically public policy, it will be a policy based on the learnings of the previous policy and with minor, cosmetic changes (Ibid).

¹⁴ Free translation by researcher.

5.1.2.2 Critical Juncture

The first indicator of critical juncture is observing if there were more than one option before the Transantiago was selected as a final policy option. Policymakers had several options in order to handle the issue of Santiago's public transportation. First, they could do nothing at all. Before the return of Chilean democracy in 1990, the dictator Augusto Pinochet privatized public transportation, thus, liberating it to the market (Ureta, 2014; Ureta, 2015; Cortázar 2015). After the return to democracy in 1990, the administration struggled to regulate the metropolitan public transportation due to the government's difficult relationship between bus drivers (Ureta, 2015). According to Ramon Acevedo, a consultant hired by the State, bus drivers were very difficult to handle (Ibid). When dealing with the bus drivers, Acevedo knew that the bus drivers' requests if not fulfilled would end in threats (Ibid). Bus drivers, known as *micreros*, were organized cartels, who were "largely successfully resisted substantive regulation of the sector during the 1990s, especially through the use of strikes that paralyzed the city almost completely"¹⁵ (Ibid, p. 24).

The old transportation system in Santiago fulfilled its main purpose yet had numerous negative externalities that affected the day to day living of the average citizen. Policymakers identified that the transportation system had to go through several substantial modifications in order to fix three main issues: congestion, contamination and insecurity (Ureta, 2015). There was an issue regarding congestion because there was a disproportionate number of buses (in average 8500 buses) which could often generate a chaotic situation (Ibid). There was a second issue regarding air pollution: policymakers found a direct relationship between the amount of buses and the quality of the air, thus there was a need to reduce and improve the buses (Ibid). Third problem was the insecurity: bus drivers drove relentlessly and recklessly in the city to obtain as many passengers as they could which provoked numerous accidents (Ureta, 2015; Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT, 2000).

The second option in order to tackle the issues of the metropolitan public transportation was through completely nationalizing the public transportation system in Santiago since the subway system was already under the administration of the Chilean state (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2015). This would be a new transportation reform program that would not only discipline micreros but fully abolish their cartel (Ibid). Political actors and policymakers knew that the public transportation in Santiago was unsustainable in the long run (Cortázar, 2015,

¹⁵ Free translation by researcher.

Ureta, 2014; Allende et al, 2007). Policymakers saw that by not confronting the public transportation problems in that previous moment of time, “the high social costs and costs of quality of life would be of such magnitude, that it would be difficulty reversible by then”¹⁶ (MOPTT, 2000, p. 9).

The third option was to try to replicate the Colombian and Brazilian successful public policy transportation. Bogota’s Transmilenio and Curitiba’s BRT were known internationally for being efficient and effective public transportation (Ureta, 2015; Mardones, 2008; Figueroa and Orellana, 2007). Chilean policymakers believed that they could imitate the best parts of these two successful policies and create a transportation reform program that would improve the quality of life of Santiago’s residents. The proposal was designed in the year 2000 during former President Lagos’ administration and later implemented during President Bachelet’s firm term.

The second indicator to measure critical juncture is to observe if the Transantiago did not permit returning to the initial point. The implementation of the Transantiago did not permit a return to the previous transportation system. There was a change from one day to the other and it was impossible to return to it: everything had changed, bus routes, management, payment, buses and drivers, metro, infrastructure and the information available (Ureta, 2014). As Cortázar (2015, p. 43) states:

There was no way of returning to the old system of yellow buses and starting all over again, it was ok. They were no longer there. Many had left to regions. There was no room other than moving forward, step by step.

Furthermore, Cortázar (2015) remembers that after two years of the Big Bang, the metropolitan residents stopped asking politicians for the return of the yellow buses because there was finally an acceptance that the previous system could not be restored.

5.1.3 Responding the prediction associated with ‘structure’

After the overview of the data obtained regarding how the Transantiago could be analyzed from the rational decision making approach and the historical institutional approach, certain predictions can be accepted while others not. The initial predictions of this sub section were the following:

¹⁶ Free translation by researcher

Structure of policies in rational decision making approach: A policy can have an identified structure associated with the rational decision making approach if the policy process matches Parson's (1995) policy cycle.

Structure of policies in historical institutionalism approach: A policy can have an identified structure associated with the historical institutionalism approach if the policy follows Mahoney's (2000) path dependency theory.

It can be concluded, after an in depth analysis, that the structure associated with the Transantiago, can be more holistically analyzed throughout the historical institutionalism approach rather than the rational decision making approach. The policy did not function as a clock and it did not operate without obstructions. It did not follow Parsons' policy cycle because it was affected by a myriad of actors: civil society (who did not pay their tariffs), Congress and the opposition (who would not approve increasing the subsidies) and bus drivers (who did not enforce citizens to pay their tariffs). The policy was even affected by the economic relationship between Chile and Argentina, due to the cuts in exportation of natural gas, it did not permit the government to observe the reduction of contamination of the Transantiago compared to the former public transportation. This caused the policy to skip Parsons' steps because it had to adapt to the shocks of the environment, in other words a critical juncture and five contingent events.

Furthermore, the policy had an identified structure associated with the historical institutionalism approach because as narrated previously, it followed Mahoney's (2000) path dependency theory and the concept of critical juncture. As a conclusion, the prediction associated with historical institutionalism is accepted and the prediction associated with rational decision making approach is dismissed.

5.2 Role of the policymaker under the lens of two different theories

For clarification purposes, it must be stated that there is a utilization of the same sources to study the different roles of policymakers. Therefore, there may be a frequent use of the same evidence to observe the presence of indicators of episodic change as well as continuous change. Even if the data is the same, the interpretation is different.

5.2.1 Role of the policymaker under the lens of rational decision making change

It must be recalled that in this thesis, 'episodic change' is associated with rational decision

making change. Weick and Quinn state that “the role of the change agent in episodic change is that of prime mover who creates change” (1999: 373). Thus, it will be observed through three indicators if Transantiago’s policymakers exhibit traits of a change agent in episodic change. (Ibid).

The first indicator utilized to identify episodic change is observing if policymakers communicate differently by establishing alternative schema. The alternative schema will be observed when policymakers communicate about new, dramatic, intentional and planned change (Ibid). Hence, policymakers set out new series of policy strategies, focused on immediate, short term fixes rather than long term solutions.

During Bachelet’s administration, there was a reinterpretation of an alternative, intentional and planned schema, this was communicated through the word ‘solution’. This word had the intent of symbolizing the administration carrying out short term goals rather than long term goals. For example, on March 26, 2007, Bachelet decided radically that it was necessary to change her cabinet (Ureta, 2015). This is an example of short-run adaptation (Weick and Quinn, 1999). Therefore, the concept of solution materialized in the change of the Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications: by asking the resignation of Sergio Espejo, a lawyer, and replacing him with René Cortázar, an economist. Cortázar was perceived by the public sphere as the adequate person to “capable of delivering the technical steering needed to put Transantiago to work as expected without doing any kind of risky experiment” (Ureta, 2015, p. 138)

The strategy of her Secretary to amend the Transantiago was through the ‘normalization’ of the policy. Cortázar mentioned frequently to the press the word ‘normalized’ and ‘normalization’. The reinterpretation of ‘normal’ was associated with stabilization of the public policy (“Cortázar dice”, 2009, January 9; Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2014; Ureta, 2015). Ureta (2015, p. 17) establishes that the concept of normalization has two uses for a policymaker: to describe and prescribe, “the normal always lies in this tension; it describes a supposedly average reality while at the same time it performs a desirable state toward which the existing reality should evolve”. Ureta (2015, p. 17) quotes Foucault (2007, p. 17) in order to define normalization as a Normalization has a double process:

First of all in positing a model, an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result [;] and the operation of disciplinary normalization consist of trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model.

Hence, this concept was utilized to explain to the public how immediate, short term fixes would occur to ‘fix’ the initial errors of the implementation of the Transantiago. Cortázar ‘normalization’ strategy went through two stages. The first, when he admitted the failures of the Transantiago, as abnormal results and as “a result of erroneous implementation of the system’s blueprint” (Ureta, 2015, p. 140). This is another example of short-run adaptation (Weick and Quinn, 1999). A ‘normal’ implementation of the Transantiago would have been in accordance with the original PTUS policy manuscript. Hence, when he accepted the failure of the implementation of the policy of delivering a ‘world-class’ public transportation, this became a reaffirmation of the government’s commitment of achieving a technocratic and efficient solution (Ureta, 2015). In summary, “progress and the normal state became inextricably linked” (Hacking, 1990, p. 168)” (Ibid: 140).

The second step of the ‘normalization’ strategy was to implement numerous disciplinary devices so all actors within the political, public, societal and entrepreneurial sphere would follow the new ‘normalization’ plan (Ibid). His normalization strategy was based in quantitative standards within a temporal framework: extended bus routes, larger bus fleets, reshuffling of routes, increasing the number of bus stop shelters, among other solutions (Ibid). Some of these actors immediately aligned with the new script from the MTT. Cortázar was forced to utilize “more direct disciplinary devices, even threatening the most rebellious components (such as the entrepreneurs running the bus network) with outright exclusion from the system” (2015, p. 140). He furthermore promised to quit by the end of the year 2007 if these short term implementations had not been carried out (Cortázar, 2015). In the end, Bachelet did not allow him to quit and he continued in his position until the end of her first administration (Ibid). It must be highlighted that Cortázar’s immediate effort of implementing a ‘solution’ to amend the Transantiago on the year 2007 is an example of short-run adaptation (Weick and Quinn, 1999).

Nevertheless, the continuation of the ‘normalization’ strategy became a long-run adaptation or a permanent manner to fix this failed policy which is aligned to continuous change rather than episodic change. This ‘normalization’ strategy continued during Piñera’s administration, in the search of efficiency of a public good. For example, he has stated that his government is committed to solve Transantiago’s problems through efficient mechanisms (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016f).

As a summary, this indicator could be considered as fulfilled by the year 2007 because it was an intentional and planned change. Nevertheless, it was not a new change (it was the intent of applying the measures of the PTUS document) nor it provided a new public transportation. A new change would have been the implementation of a drastic, radical new policy such as nationalizing the metropolitan public transportation or returning to the former system of public transportation (with the *micros amarillas*, yellow buses) (Cortázar, 2015). Therefore, the communication of alternative schema was carried out but it became later on reinterpreted as a continual mechanism to adapt and improve the policy. Therefore, it is contradicted.

The second indicator is the reinterpretation of revolutionary triggers (reinterpretation of the errors and faults of the Transantiago). Weick and Quinn (1999, p. 369) define inertia as “the inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environment”. Transantiago’s ‘Big Bang’ was a consequence of inertia, the inability of Bachelet’s administration to adapt a public policy to the demands of the environment. Big Bang is the consequence of the inertia, in other words, the failure of the government to implement efficiently the Transantiago. Therefore, policymakers acknowledged the inertia of the government after the Big Bang.

Numerous policymakers started to apologize for the faulty implementation and for the learning anxiety that this had caused on civil society as well as the political sphere (Figueroa, 2013; Weick and Quinn, 1999). Former President Ricardo Lagos, who is the author of Transantiago’s design was the only policymaker who did not apologize immediately for the faulty implementation. He simply did not assume his responsibility for the policy (“Lagos y el Transantiago”, 2008, September 1). He declared to the press that his responsibility was in the design and not in the implementation in the year 2008, therefore, since the Transantiago was not implemented during his administration, he was clear of fault (Ibid). After the pressure of the senators and the press, he did a ‘mea culpa’ and admitted his responsibility. He later confessed in an interview that the worst thing he accomplished during his administration was designing the Transantiago: “I was wrong when we designed the Transantiago. In what sense? Nobody obliged me because everyone accepted the yellow buses, but a decision had to be taken and a different way of ordering the transit in Santiago”¹⁷ (“Ricardo Lagos”, 2015, May 4).

¹⁷ Free translation by researcher.

It must be highlighted that Bachelet and Piñera are known to have very different communicational styles. Bachelet has the capacity to interact better with citizens, who identify more with her because she is a woman, a doctor and a mother. She uses more adjectives to describe events or public policies (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016). President Bachelet said during the change of cabinet on March 27th, 2007 that “here things have not been done well... and the civil society deserves an apology”¹⁸ (Cortázar, 2015: 37). According to Cortázar (2015), ‘Transantiago’ became a ‘bad word’ for Bachelet: she would not pronounce it nor mention the word ‘Transantiago’ during her annual presidential speech for three years in a row (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016c; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2006d; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016e; Cortázar, 2015). When questioned in an interview about the worst part of 2007, she responded “the worst of 2007, Transantiago, there is no question about it. The biggest mistake is the Transantiago”¹⁹ (Bachelet: Lo peor del 2007, 2007, December 26). It must be highlighted that the Chilean Congressional Committee never held responsible former President Lagos or President Bachelet (Allende et al, 2007).

Former President Sebastian Piñera, a famous businessman, has a contrasting manner of communicating towards civil society compared with Bachelet. Piñera is more laconic towards citizens and communicates to the press in a more succinct, technical discourse with less adjectives (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016f). He started talking about the Transantiago after 2010 because his administration was focused on the reconstruction of the south of Chile after the 2010 earthquake. Hence, most of comments about the Transantiago occur later on during his administration and cannot be mentioned in the thesis because the time frame of the study is between the years 2007 to 2010.

Secretary Morandé utilized frequently the word “lament”, to state his apologies towards civil society regarding the increase of tariffs and of the implementation of the policy. He once described the Transantiago as “it’s a great sorrow, I am very sorry”²⁰ (“Ministro Morandé proyecta”, 2010, June 9). He also mentioned in interviews several times the word ‘backpack’ in the sense that the Transantiago was a baggage that Piñera’s administration inherited (“Ministro Morandé presenta”, 2010, September 7).

¹⁸ Free translation by researcher.

¹⁹ Free translation by researcher.

²⁰ Free translation by researcher

As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that policymakers did reinterpret the revolutionary triggers of the Transantiago. Hence, this indicator was present.

The third indicator to measure episodic change is that the policymaker needs to build commitment and coordination in order to amend a policy (Weick and Quinn, 1999). For successful policies to occur, it is needed the support of political actors to concur and agree on the subjects, such as the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cortázar, 2015; Cofré, 2015). The deep and structural reforms which have been most successful in Chile and are stable thought out long periods of time have been due to the technical and political ample agreements between actors (Cofré, 2015). The error of the Transantiago was that it was designed and implemented through an administrative way, without political consensus from political actors or civil society (Cortázar, 2015; Cofré, 2015). Due to the Transantiago's administrative implementation, policymakers, such as Cortázar, had to learn to create gradual changes in the policy with the participation of civil society as well as political actors (Cortázar, 2015; Ureta, 2015).

In the search of building commitment and coordination among different political sectors, Bachelet would often use the expression "*mirada país*" (a country look)²¹. This expression signifies to have an overall view of the country's problems and priorities. For example, she would state that senators and congressmen needed to have 'a country look' in order to approve a subsidy for the Transantiago (Ibid). Cortázar was the prime actor who sought for leverage between numerous actors within the public sphere. He utilized different methods for the construction of agreements within the Transantiago: win-win, win-lose, lose-win and sum zero (Ibid). The win-lose solution was used when some operators who were not being financially successful had to stop operating with the AFT (Ibid). Other solution, lose-win, took place when senators who criticized the Transantiago and Cortázar tried to not to respond to their statements because the administration needed the support of the opposition for passing subsidy laws (Ibid). Other approaches such as win-win, was used when dealing with the renegotiation of the contracts of 2007 and 2009 with the bus operators, permitting the immediate improvement of bus transportation (Ibid). Furthermore, the win-win approach can be acquired more easily though loyalty with political actors and it was the main tool used in order to obtain more subsidies in congress for the transportation service (Ibid).

²¹ Free translation by researcher.

Cortázar tried to seek leverage with civil society, stating that if he was not able to fulfill his promises, he would quit as minister of transportation and telecommunications (Ibid). Cortázar furthermore aimed for leverage within Bachelet's administration. During political crisis, it is usual to change the whole cabinet: which meant not only the secretary of transportation but also all the chain of command (Ibid). Nevertheless, Cortázar decided that the initial cabinet of the Sub-Secretary of Transportation had knowledge which could not be easily obtained or transferred to new workers (Ibid).

Sebastian Piñera's Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications, Felipe Morandé, also searched for commitment and coordination. Morandé had a political priority to seek agreement with the opposition as well as urgently dialogue with the Parliament in order to obtain more subsidies in order to stop the increase of tariffs (Toro, 2010, August 2). He stated: "the route is clear, correct the errors of the model and search consensus among all political sectors"²² (Ibid). He would argue that it was essential to fix the Transantiago because it was a policy that in the long term was financially unsustainable, he affirmed that the costs of the Transantiago are double of its income (Ministro de Transportes: "Situación financiera del Transantiago es insostenible", 2010, May 11):

For every peso that enters there are two that are spent. This is an unsustainable situation from a financial point of view. There is a subsidy that exists that aids to finance this, but currently it is not sufficient and that is why we need to fix the system by reducing its costs.²³

As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be concluded that policymakers did build commitment and coordination among different actors in order to amend the Transantiago. Hence, this indicator was present.

5.2.2 Role of the policymaker under the lens of historical institutionalism approach

It must be remembered that in this thesis, 'continuous change' is associated with historical institutionalism change. There are three indicators which shall be utilized to identify the change agent in continuous change. It is important to also observe if the policymaker does not have the prime role of establishing change, the change agent redirects change (Weick and Quinn,

²² Free translation by researcher.

²³ Free translation by researcher.

1999).

The first indicator is that the policymaker recognizes and reframes current patterns (Ibid). This indicator will be interpreted when the policymaker recognizes the errors of the Transantiago and tries to reframe the policy. Therefore, the first thing that Cortázar (2015) did when he assumed as Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications was to recognize the gravity of the Transantiago and the failure of its implementation. Other political actors associated with the policy were deemed directly responsible by the Congressional Committee for the failure of the Transantiago. These actors were Sergio Espejo (Secretary of Transportation), Danilo Núñez (the Sub-Secretary of Transportation), Pablo Rodríguez (the SEREMI of Transportation), Fernando Promis (Coordinator of Transantiago), Henry Malbrán and Aldo Signorelli (Directors of SECTRA) (Ibid).

Other actors recognized their involvement in the implementation of the policy. Andrés Navarro, president of SONDA, said “I make myself completely responsible personally of SONDA” being the technological operator of the Transantiago (“Sonda revela su verdad sobre el Transantiago y pone de manifiesto los errores del Gobierno”, 2007, May 10th). Furthermore, Pablo Rodríguez, SEREMI of Transportation recognizes his responsibility in not foreseeing the social impact that the lack of infrastructure and technological support of the Transantiago (Allende et al, 2007). He stated to the Commission that if he had reflected more about the subject, he would have postponed the implementation of the Transantiago (Ibid).

President Bachelet referred to this policy as the worst public policy of her government and of the former reigning Chilean political coalition called “*la Concertación*” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016e). Bachelet stated in her presidential annual speech in 2009 that the transportation in Santiago:

Needed a radical change and the decision was to confront that challenge. But I have already said in its moment: things were done poorly. This reform has been a bad and frustrating experience for an immense majority of *santiaguinos*, and especially for the poorer sectors²⁴ (Ibid).

After the recognition of policymakers of their errors and involvement regarding the Transantiago, a reframing of the policy occurred. Remembering that Weick and Quinn (1999) described continuous change as cumulative, evolving and ongoing, the reframing of the policy

²⁴ Free translation by researcher.

is also accumulative and evolving. The authors stated that this type of change is based on notion of “small continuous adjustments, created simultaneously across units, can cumulate and create substantial change” (Ibid: 375). The policy was ‘reframed’ through Cortázar’s ‘normalization’ strategy after he took the role as Secretary of MTT. The ‘normalization’ strategy has been mentioned in the previous section, remembering that it was composed of short term goals. Nevertheless, these incremental adjustments were carried out over a period of time in order to provide a better metropolitan public transportation service.

Cortázar declared on November 21, 2007, to a Parliamentary Committee, that amending the policy itself would take time, which is parallel to the definition of Weick and Quinn (1999) conceptualization of continuous change, of a continuous, evolutionary change. Continuous change can be observed when the changes that are needed to improve the Transantiago without an end date: the policy is “still very much under repair, it has never become fully normalized in accordance with the script set out in 2000” (Ureta, 2015, p. 155). Cortázar’s ‘normalization’ strategy is furthermore, a reframing of a public policy which is already in a self-reproducing sequence because it is in a historical lock-in, in other words, it can only be modified, not changed (Ureta, 2015; Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006).

As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that policymakers did recognize and reframe the Transantiago. First, policymakers and actors involved in the implementation recognized their responsibilities regarding the failed implementation of the Transantiago. Second, they reframed the Transantiago within its historical lock-in (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). Hence, this indicator was present.

The second indicator is that the policymaker carries out intentional change at the margin of the policy. This indicator is measured by Lindblom’s (1959) definition of incrementalism. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that most successful public policies in Chile, associated to the creation of laws, pensions, health system, are created incrementally (Cortázar, 2015). The Transantiago was a radical public policy because it was not created in the historical manner that public policies are usually established in Chile. Successful Chilean policies are those that are gradually improved, from administrative and legal variables, in order for policymakers to comprehend which action is preferable (Ibid). However, not all policies can be carried out gradually, in absence of reforms, these can explode from a social, political or economic standpoint (Ibid).

Lindblom mentions that policymakers face limitations due to its short term solutions, in other words, the intentional changes at the margin of the policy (Lindblom, 1959; Weick and Quinn, 1999). Not only did were the changes to stabilize the Transantiago were of short-term solutions, the modifications had to occur one at a time. According to Cortázar (2015), modifications to the Transantiago had to occur one at a time and not all at once. This was not due to the lack of political willingness from Bachelet's administration, it was simply due to the feasibility of carrying these changes all at once (Ibid). It was not possible to carry out all of the changes to 'normalize' the Transantiago because the Transantiago was operating while the changes were carried out (Ibid).

Nevertheless, Transantiago was not a public policy that needed to be implemented radically, its implementation caused a culture shock, where people's routines were drastically changed 180 degrees, it was not necessary to produce this cultural shock to the civil society and it could have been avoided if politicians had considered experts' advice and knowledge regarding the subject (Cofré, 2015; PTUS, 2000; Hales et al, 2007; Ureta, 2014; Mardones, 2008). Therefore, after the Big Bang, the administrations of Bachelet and later on Piñera, had to carry out gradually, intentional changes (Ureta, 2015; Cortázar, 2015). The Transantiago had to go through different administrations, which redirected the policy's goals because the policy as well as society's needs evolved over time. Political crises, such as the implementation of the Transantiago, according to Cortázar (2015) had to be fixed with a compass rather than a watch due to the limitation of short term solutions in spite of the necessity of long term changes in the policy (Ibid).

Cortázar states that it is a common error for policymakers to prefer to establish quick changes rather than use a compass to identify and establish the priorities that a policy and a country needs (Ibid). Bachelet used the 'logic of attraction', modifying her cabinet and replacing Sergio Espejo and replacing with René Cortázar as Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications in order to appeal to politicians as well as civil society, that by modifying her cabinet, her administration would redirect leadership in order to make the Transantiago an effective policy. After René Cortázar accepted his role of Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications on March 27th, 2007, he and his team decided to gradually confront the Big Bang's problems (Cortázar, 2015). Later on, during Piñera's administration, his Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications, Felipe Morandé, also carried out the intentional changes at the margin of the policy. He decided to adapt the policy and update it through 15

measures in order to improve the Transantiago (“Ministro Morandé presenta plan”, 2010, September 7). He said that these 15 measures would:

Solve this mega error from the previous administrations and to return the dignity of the users of the Transantiago and we will do it with real, concrete actions and which will go in direct benefice for the users²⁵ (Ibid).

As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that Chilean policymakers did carried out intentional change at the margin of the Transantiago. Hence, this indicator was present.

The third indicator utilized to identify continuous change is by observing if the policymaker utilizes mechanisms such as learning, improvisation and translation (Weick and Quinn, 1999). Remembering that incrementalism is based on trials and errors (Lindblom, 1959), Cortázar utilized this technique in order to remedy the public transportation policy. According to Cortázar (2015), the Transantiago had grave design issues but were discovered after its implementation, thus it was impossible to stop the policy and modify it because it would signify denying millions of residents in Santiago the access to public transportation. Due to its fault design “we had to learn from the errors and correct them, redesign the system, but while this continue to be in operation”²⁶ (Ibid: 55). His team had to “develop new solutions and extend them to the entirety of the system once they had been proven to be effective”²⁷ (Ibid: 54). The improvisation tool was utilized through incremental changes, which were carried out because there was a lack of options for amending the Transantiago. Due to the Big Bang as a critical juncture, Bachelet’s administration could not go back in time and prevent the policy from being implemented. Therefore, her administration was forced to use incrementalist measures, which were per se difficult because actors from different spheres (civil society, press, the senators, the government) all wanted an immediate solution (Cortázar, 2015).

Morandé also applied techniques such as improvisation. Differently from the previous Secretary of Transportation and Telecommunications, Cortázar, Morandé utilized Twitter in order to communicate to citizens about the Transantiago (“Panel de expertos”, 2010, August 12). He also implemented braille system in Transantiago’s buses, which is another way to improve communication between users and government (Valencia, 2010, November 12)

²⁵ Free translation by researcher.

²⁶ Free translation by researcher.

²⁷ Free translation by researcher

Another form of improvisation was when he encouraged citizens to utilize Transantiago's app so they could learn the buses' schedules. ("Internet y SMS", 2010, November 4). He even decided to start a campaign of recollection of suggestions to improve the Transantiago (Coordinación General de Transportes de Santiago, 2010, December 1). All of these improvisation techniques were incrementalist measures in order for Piñera's administration to 'learn' what citizens wanted from this public good. As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be stated that Chilean policymakers used mechanisms such as learning, improvisation and translation in order to amend the Transantiago (Weick and Quinn, 1999). Thus, this indicator was present.

The fourth indicator to identify continuous change is to observe if policymakers' language was altered, thus giving a new identity to the Transantiago, hence changing civil society's perception of the policy. It must be distinguished the differences of studying politicians' and policymakers' discourse in episodic change and continuous change. The policymaker who carries out episodic change communicate differently in order to establish alternative, new, dramatic, intentional and planned change (Ibid). The policymaker who carries out continuous change will also communicate differently, yet the justification of the nature of speech is to bestow a new identity to the Transantiago, by altering civil society's perception of the policy.

As the policy evolved over the years, so did the meaning of the policymakers' words towards the Transantiago. The concept 'Transantiago' was associated with policy failure. Ureta (2015, p. 141) obtained a declaration of Matias Rojas, a high authority from the MTT, who described the Transantiago:

Nowadays Transantiago has become a villain, it is a generic word. As when people say that they're going to make a Xerox: it wasn't a brand, it was a synonym for a photocopy. Transantiago is a synonym of... the trans-this, the trans-lousy, the trans... it has become a synonym of a traumatic situation. It is quite difficult to fight against a generic name once it has been born, and therefore what we have to aspire to is to continue improving the system, to consolidate it, and know that these are social processes that have a periodicity, have a slow tempo and...take time (Ibid).

Furthermore, over the years, the word 'Transantiago' acquired a double meaning. It was not only the name of a policy, it became the synonym of a political, avoidable mistake or

a policymaker's error in judgment. For example, while describing Bachelet's second term, Piñera said in an interview:

Yes, we have to make reforms, the crossroads is how we do them, good reforms versus bad, and that is why we all have to make the, not some against others, better well thought reforms. I thought that the Transantiago had gave them a lesson, but I see that human beings are capable of tripping twice with the same rock (López and Sapag, 2014, December 26).

Ureta (2015, p. 160) described that the Transantiago became an example of policy failure: “instead of territorializing a world –class public transportation s systems and its happy users, the implementation of Transantiago has remained a world–class mess, the ultimate materialization of a failed policy assemblage”. Furthermore, he describes it as perpetual failing public policy ““which continues to exist yet fails to achieve...[its] avowed objectives over long periods of time” (Hood, 2000, p. 44)” (Ureta, 2015, p. 55). As a summary of the study of this indicator, it can be established that Chilean policymakers used new language to describe the Transantiago as a failed policy rather than an efficient policy. As a conclusion, this indicator was present.

5.2.3 Responding the prediction associated with ‘role of the policymaker’

Before concluding regarding the predictions associated with the ‘role of the policymakers’ these must be remembered. These were:

Role of the policymaker in Rational Decision Making Approach: the role of the policymaker can be associated with rational decision making approach, if such policymakers, in the role of the change agents, are involved in episodic change (Weick and Quinn, 1995).

Role of the policymaker in Historical Institutionalism Approach: the role of the policymaker can be associated with the historical institutionalism approach, if such policymakers, in the role of the change agents, are involved in continuous change.

Therefore, rational decision making approach was associated with policymakers carrying out episodic change while as historical institutionalism approach was associated with policymakers carrying out continuous change. It is important to state that after the implementation of the Transantiago, policymakers carried out continuous change rather than episodic change. Both Presidents studied in this thesis (Bachelet and Piñera) redirected their leadership and authority, towards their Secretaries of MTT, who later became in charge of

‘redirecting’ change (Weick and Quinn, 1999). A very notable example of this type of leadership was carried out when Bachelet once said in a rally she said “we are going to call again Secretary Cortázar to tell him that he needs to fix the routes once and for all” (Morales, 2008, September 4). Furthermore, the maneuvers carried out by these two Secretaries between the years 2007 to 2010 were predominantly of long term goals.

Table 20: Predictions regarding the role of the policymaker according to different theories

Type of change	Indicators	Present
Episodic Change	Communicate differently by establishing alternative schema	No
	Reinterpretation of revolutionary triggers	Yes
	Build commitment and coordination	Yes
Continuous change	Recognizes and reframes current patterns	Yes
	Carries out intentional change at the margin of the policy	Yes
	Policymakers will utilize mechanisms such as learning, improvisation and translation	Yes
	Utilizes different language, thus altering meaning in certain parts of a policy	Yes

Table created by researcher.

The behavior of policymakers, as it can be observed in table 20, establishes that their behavior was more parallel to continuous change rather than episodic change. Policymakers involved in the Transantiago carried out both types of changes: continuous and episodic. Nevertheless, through the throughout analysis of the indicators, the change agent carries out continuous change more than episodic change.

As a conclusion to this sub-section, it can be stated that the prediction for the role of the policymaker in historical intuitionism approach is accepted and the prediction for the role of the policymaker in rational decision making approach is rejected.

5.3 Chapter Summary: Theoretical analysis of Transantiago’s structure and policymakers

In this chapter, there was an analysis of “how did the policy implementation continue after the

initial failure?” This was carried out through the theoretical study of two predictions (structure and role of the policymaker). Regarding the prediction of structure as well as role of the policymaker: historical institutionalism explains more holistically these two predictions compared to rational decision making approach. After Transantiago’s initial failed policy implementation, the structure of the policy was carried out in a historical institutionalism structure and its policymakers, as change agents, carried out continuous change rather than episodic change. Hence, the rational decision making predictions were rejected and the historical institutionalism predictions accepted.

Chapter 6: Transantiago by 2010, policy success or policy failure?

In this last section, the Transantiago will be scrutinized and evaluated, to observe if after three years of its implementation, if it has become a policy success or policy failure. The third sub-question in this thesis is to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010? Therefore, it will be utilized the same four indicators of the official objectives from section one as well as the approval rates of the policy.

6.1 Fulfilment of objectives by the year 2010

This section of efficient use of resources is segmented into three parts: citizens' participation, institutional modernization at a metropolitan level and policy efficiency.

6.1.1 Efficient use of resources

Efficient use of resources was segmented into three sections: citizens' participation, institutional modernization at a metropolitan level and policy efficiency.

6.1.1.1 Presence of 'citizen participation'

Remembering that by the end of the year 2007, a formal 'citizen inspector' was not accomplished. Policymakers who designed PTUS had envisioned that the 'citizen inspector' would be a volunteer citizen denouncing to the Sub secretary of Transportation regarding tariff evaders (MOPTT, 2000). However, by the year 2010, the Metropolitan Transportation SEREMI has not done much regarding enforcing passengers to pay their tariffs. They have been more involved regarding the measuring of evasion more than actually taking concrete steps to end it. As Guarda, Galilea, Paget-Seekins and Ortúzar describe (2015, p. 56):

The Enforcement Commission of the Chilean Transport Ministry (MTT) collects data about evasion on a sample of bus routes of each private operating company every month using plain-clothes observers. Within the sample of bus routes a sample of runs (bus trips) are selected. Observers are stationed at each door of the sampled bus and register the number of people boarding and alighting at each bus stop, by each door of the bus, as well as other conditions such as bus occupancy. They also register the number of evasions, but do not interact with the passengers in an enforcement capacity.

By the year 2008, a new law offered an innovative way for citizens to state their opinions about the policy and as a by-product, denounce tariff evaders and other irregularities

of the Transantiago. Hence, the promulgation of law 20.285 was decisive for citizens to feel more encouraged to participate in overseeing the proper functioning of the Transantiago. This law, published on the 20th of August of 2008, regulates the principle of transparency of state administration, establishing that “every person has the right to request and receive information from any organ of the Administration of the State”²⁸ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2016a). As a consequence, this law permits citizens to access information elaborated by the State budget as well as State’s acts and resolutions (Ibid). These documents come from ministries, regional governments, municipalities, Armed Forces, among other institutions and public services as well as public companies and those which the State owns more than 50% of the actions (Ibid). A citizen can request this information electronically, by sending an email to the institution or using the Transparency website or physically by mail or by going to a OIRS (Office for Information, Claims and Suggestions; *Oficina de Informaciones, Reclamos y Sugerencias*) (Consejo de Transparencia, 2016). The State by law has five working days to respond to the citizens’ requests (Ibid).


These OIRS were established in every public institution, including one for the DTPM (Directory of Metropolitan Public Transportation; *Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano*). Thus, people had finally an outlet permitting them to voice their concerns and stating irregularities that were not seen by inspectors. This is the closest the concept of ‘citizen inspector’, a citizen who states information regarding the Transantiago, out of sheer public duty, not paid. As a consequence, a type of citizen inspector had emerged but it was not due to the State ‘good will’ to make people participate more regarding the process of inspecting the Transantiago. As a conclusion, the State was never able to create a ‘citizen inspector’, thus this objective was not fulfilled. The participation of citizens in inspecting or giving their opinions regarding the Transantiago was more of a byproduct of law 20.285 rather than a byproduct of the implementation of the Transantiago.

The second indicator, ‘citizens’ respect towards paying transportation tariffs can be measuring if citizens are respecting the norms of utilizing the Transantiago through measuring the rate of evasion. As it can be observed in table 21 and graph 1, since 2007, the evasion has grown almost 1 % every year. In Graph 1, the observation of the steady growth of evasion during the first three years of implementation is substantial. In table 21, it can be observed that the percentage of evasion was 13,7% in 2007 and by 2010, it was 18%. In other words, in

²⁸ Free translation by researcher.

between 2007 until 2010, the tariff evasion grew 30%. The problem with evasion of tariffs is that it is a transversal issue for policymakers, it does not respect socioeconomic statuses, gender or age (Araus, 2013). There is even a taxonomy for the Chilean transportation tariff evader. There are two type of tariff evaders: the *opportunity* tariff evader and the *hard* tariff evader (Ibid). The *opportunity* tariff evader is the evader who due to having insufficient amount on his/her card will take advantage of not paying while as a *hard* tariff evader is someone who permanently transgress the law (Ibid).

Graph 1: Percentage of evasion in the Transantiago between the years 2007 to 2010



Graph created by researcher with additional information (Valencia, 2011)

Table 21: Percentage of evasion in the Transantiago between the years 2007 to 2010

Years	2007	2008	2009	2010
Percentage of Evasion (%)	13,4	14	15	18

Table created by researcher with additional information (Valencia, 2011).

The main problem associated with evasion is the lack of incentives for bus drivers to enforce passengers to pay and vice versa. From the year 2007, after the instalment of the better working conditions, bus drivers had no longer the incentive of obliging passengers to pay the transportation fee. Similarly, passengers no longer felt the need to pay the tariff since the bus driver was not forcing them to do so. As the General Coordinator for the Transantiago, Ana

Luisa Covarrubias once said that those ‘civilians’ who haven’t paid the tariffs had not fulfilled their ‘duty’ with the public transportation (“Transantiago: Realizan”, 2010, April 23). Hence, the word ‘duty’ and ‘civilians’ has a heavy connotation and association with good citizen. She describes that through establishing inspectors to observe if users are paying their tariffs, the government is dealing with an ethical issue. The government thus is trying to appeal to citizens’ civic values regarding the issue of tariff evasion, stating that evaders should take conscience of their actions (Ibid). The General Coordinator states that the majority of ‘honest’ citizens are those who do fulfil their citizen commitments (Ibid). Thus, just like John Stuart Mill once said “a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury” (1865, p. 7).

Adam Smith once said that “public services are never better performed than when their reward comes in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them” (2003, p. 719). He also narrates that:

The interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does, or does not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest...either to neglect it altogether, or...to perform it in [a] careless and slovenly a manner (p. 760).

Thus, when bus drivers become at ease with their stable salaries and without the need to compete for passengers, they also felt the ease to neglect part of their obligations as bus drivers which was to oblige citizens to pay the bus tariffs. This is problematic for the government because they are then forced to increase subsidies to the metropolitan transportation and reduce subsidies in other areas such as health or to request international loans, which increases the country’s debts. As a conclusion for this section, citizens do not respect the norms needed to implement the policy because the tariff evasion is diminishing the efficiency of the Transantiago.

As a summary of this section, it can be observed that by the year 2010, a formal ‘citizen inspector’ was never created, however civil society behaved as ‘citizen inspectors’ when they denounced to the OIRS about problems associated to the Transantiago. Regarding the Citizens’ respect towards the norms, by the year 2010, 18% of passengers were not paying their transportation tariffs. Therefore, the indicator of citizen participation was not fulfilled.

6.1.1.2 Creation of a Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transportation

As analyzed in the first section of this chapter, a Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transportation was established.

When studying the second indicator, the creation of the Coordination Committee of Public Transportation, as mentioned previously, former President Lagos, on the year 2003, created a committee that could oversee that the public transportation in Santiago had the proper authorities in order for the policy to operate efficiently (Presidencia de la República, 2003). This committee had the authority regarding the operations of the Transantiago and remained to do so until the year 2013, when former President Piñera replaced the committee and created a new institution called *Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano* (DTPM) or Directory of Metropolitan Public Transportation that had similar sub-departments and carried out alike multidisciplinary tasks (Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano, 2015). As a conclusion of this section, it can be affirmed that the objective was fulfilled and there was the creation of the authority needed to administer the Transantiago as a public policy.

The committee proposed in the year 2000 in the policy PTUS. Nevertheless, this committee nowadays is not the identical representation of what was proposed in PTUS on the year 2000 (MOPTT, 2000). PTUS stated that there should be a ‘Coordination Committee of Public Transportation’ that represents three different sectors: the different institutions, the transportation operators and civil society. There would be meetings between the three groups in order to evaluate thoroughly the functioning of the policy in itself and propose tasks to improve it to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. In DTPM, there only a committee of representatives of different institutions. A group representing civil society and a group representing transportation drivers and operators is not present. As a conclusion, the Committee has not fulfilled PTUS’ objective of having an inclusive committee to discuss and compare solutions for issues associated with the Transantiago.

PTUS stated that there should be a ‘Coordination Committee of Public Transportation’ that represents three different sectors: the different institutions, the transportation operators and civil society. There would be meetings between the three groups in order to evaluate thoroughly the functioning of the policy in itself and propose tasks to improve it to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The committee in the year 2007 only represented the politician sector. A group representing civil society and a group representing transportation drivers and operators is not present. As a conclusion, the Committee has not fulfilled PTUS’

objective of having an inclusive committee to discuss and compare solutions for issues associated with the Transantiago.

The third indicator was the reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds or ‘*Fondo de Mejora de Locomoción Colectiva*’ (MOPTT, 2000). Only by September 1st, 2009, this fund was replaced by a new national subsidy for public transportation, law n° 20.378 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2009). This law bestowed ah permanent subsidy of \$US 267,857 dollars to the metropolitan transportation (Ibid). It was later reformulated on the year 2013, due to the contingent event of the earthquake in 2010. As a consequence, law n° 20.378 was annexed to law 20.696, which bestowed an additional US \$690,909 dollars to the metropolitan regions as well as to the rest of the regions in Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013). The Administrative Counsel Funds has been efficiently reformulated thus, this objective can be considered as completed.

As a summary for the fulfilment of the objective, the creation of a metropolitan authority of urban transportation between the years 2007 to 2010, it can be concluded that this objective was fulfilled by the year 2010. Therefore, this objective has been fulfilled to completion.

6.1.1.3 Policy efficiency

Policy efficiency refers to the government’s respect towards the initial planned budget, which bestows the Transantiago from the State arcs an annual budget of US \$200 million dollars (MOPTT, 2000). Observing table 22, it can be observed that by the year 2010, Transantiago had a deficit of US \$755,3 million dollars (Gómez-Lobo, 2012).

Table 22: Transantiago’s deficit between the years 2007 to 2010

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Deficit (million USD)	371.5	824.6	794.8	755.3

Table replicated from Gómez-Lobo (2012, p. 35)

Cortázar (2000) has three main explanations to justify why this public policy failed in its objective to be financially efficient. First, there was a lower recollection of revenue from tickets once a standard transportation tariff was established for the utilization of both subway and buses (since subways tickets were historically more expensive) (Cortázar, 2015). Second, the lack of functioning of the ‘Bip!’ card during the first week of Transantiago’s

implementation caused a significant loss of revenue (Ibid). Third, the financial deficit became aggravated due to citizens' tariff evasion. The magnitude of the deficit, which doubled three years after the implementation of the Transantiago can be observed in the following table.

The government of Chile had its hands tied regarding how to solve this economical dilemma. Thus, they had to apply to international and national credits. They had previously been bestowed two credits (one of US \$ 4,8 million dollars and US \$ 30 million dollars) by the World Bank in 2005 to finance the Transantiago, later on by the same institution they lent to the state of Chile US \$6,8 million dollars in 2010 (World Bank, 2010; "Banco Mundial otorgará tres préstamos", 2005, July 6; Goller, 2013, April 11). The Chilean government applied for a credit from the IDB of US \$35,4 million dollars (MOP, 2007). Furthermore, it also applied for a credit of US \$160 million dollars from Banco Estado (the official national bank) to finance the system between January to April 2007 and later on planned to use a credit from the IDB until the law 20.206 (regarding the increase of subsidy from the Administrative Counsel Fund) could be modified in the parliament (Cortázar, 2015). The Constitutional Tribunal, on September 2nd 2008, decided to make not constitutional the authorization of the credit bestowed by the Inter-American Development Bank (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008). In table 22, it can be seen the magnitude of the deficit, which doubled three years after the implementation of the Transantiago.

As a consequence, President Bachelet had to state an emergency decree (article 32, number 20 from the Chilean Constitution) in order to authorize payments not authorized in the State Budget, which permits to access 2 percent (2%) of the total amount of the State Budget (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008). Thus, the President authorized \$453.705.220.952 Chilean pesos (roughly around US \$6.7 million dollars) to be utilized in order to solvent the transportation system in Santiago (Ibid). Her cabinet tried to cooperate with the opposition to increase in the subsidy, yet the opposition only approved only a thousand Chilean pesos (which is roughly US one dollar and fifty cents) (Ibid). Thus, between the years of 2007 to 2009, the 2% of the annual State budget was utilized to finance the Transantiago. Bachelet once stated that it was important for the metropolitan transportation to not be financially supported by the 2% because that 2% was reserved for national disasters, foreshadowing the earthquake of 2010 (Cortázar, 2015).

On the first of September of 2009, a new law was passed in the Chilean Congress, called law number 20.378 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2009). This law is national

subsidy for public transportation has an annual budget of US \$584 million dollars which can be annually readjusted in the Fiscal's budget law (Ibid). When Sebastian Piñera became President of Chile, his cabinet determined that in order for the Transantiago to be operative during his term (2010-2014), it needed annually \$US three hundred million dollars more (Cortázar, 2015). Later, on September 15th 2010, a consensus was agreed between the government and the opposition, where the fiscal budget would bestow US \$300 million dollars more in order to finance the Transantiago and to balance the increases of tariffs (Ibid). The same amount was also bestowed to the rest of Chilean regions in order to finance their transportation systems (Ibid).

The policy did overpass the preliminary budget and ended in deficit, hence, it was not able to complete PTUS' financial objective. As a summary of the indicator policy efficiency it can be established that Bachelet's administration did not respect since the Transantiago's preliminary budget. This provoked that by the year 2010, the Transantiago as a public policy, has created a deficit for the Chilean State of US \$755,3 million dollars (Gómez-Lobo, 2012). Therefore, this objective has not been fulfilled.

Finally, as a summary of the fulfillment of the objective, efficient use of resources, between the years 2007 to 2010, three indicators were used. The results indicate that policy efficiency was not achieved, citizen participation was not fulfilled and the creation of a metropolitan authority of urban transportation was fulfilled. Therefore, this objective was not fulfilled by the year 2010.

6.1.2. Promotion of Social Equity

In this sections, it will be studied if the policy has encouraged citizens to prefer the use of public transportation, comparing the use of this public good between 2006 (before the implementation of the Transantiago) and 2010.

Table 23: Number of millions of people using the metropolitan subway between the years 2006 to 2010.

Years	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Amount of people using the subway (millions)	331	601	642	608	621

Table created from Directorio de Transporte Público Metropolitano (2015, p. 8)

Table 24: Total amount of cars in the Metropolitan Region between 2006 and 2010

Years	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total number of private cars	1018261	1091947	161930	1195505	1272887

Table based on the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2007; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2008; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2009, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile, 2010)

In table 23, it can be observed that the amount of people using the subway has doubled since the implementation of the policy, increasing the demand by 187%. Table 24 shows that amount of private cars in Chile which have increased between 2006 to 2010 by 25%. As a summary of the objective social equity, it can be established that it has not been fulfilled. In spite that the use of the subway has increased, there has also been an increase in the use of cars in Santiago since the implementation of the Transantiago. This is contradictory to the objective of the PTUS (MOPTT, 2000) to encourage citizens to prefer public transportation over the use of private automobiles. Thus, this objective is not fulfilled.

6.1.3 Environmental Sustainability

Remembering that in the first sector of this chapter, associated with the results of the environmental sustainability, the following data must be observed knowing that there are other factors that affect the amount of air contamination in Santiago, such as industries, the weather pattern ‘*la niña*’, among other factors. Furthermore, there was a contingent event regarding the economic relationship between Argentina and Chile which affected the air quality of Santiago. Argentina, between the years of 2007 to 2009, intensified the cuts of supplies of natural gas, reaching almost to 100% (Figueroa et al, 2013). This provoked that the Chilean industrial sector substituted natural gas to petroleum, as a consequence, increased the air pollution in Santiago, in spite of the new fleet of the Transantiago (Ibid). Fortunately, from September 2009, when the regasification plant of natural liquefied gas in Quintero started operating, Chile’s dependency on Argentinean natural gas stopped (Ibid). Hence, the industrial sector commenced again to utilize this energy source, instead of petroleum (Ibid).

As it can be observed from table 25, between the years 2006 to 2010 there have been no ‘emergency’ alerts and there has been a gradual decrease regarding ‘environmental alert’ days. There were 21 ‘environmental alerts’ days on 2006, which was almost reduced by half by 2010, with only 11 days. The almost complete renovation of the bus fleet by the year 2010

and the more intensive use of the subway generates the inference that the Transantiago could have generated a decrease in Santiago’s air pollution, specifically MP10 (Ibid). It could be inferred that the Transantiago reduced its impact on air contamination, specifically the contribution towards the particular matter, in the Metropolitan Region due to its fleet renovation, which replaced old buses with buses that the standard of ‘Euro III’ or above (Ibid).

Table 25: Number of days with ‘emergency’, ‘pre-emergency’ and ‘environmental alert’ between the years 2006 and 2010

	Emergency	Pre-Emergency	Environmental Alert
2006	0	3	21
2007	0	4	27
2008	0	8	21
2009	0	0	23
2010	0	2	11

Table based on statistics from Health SEREMI (SEREMI Salud RM, 2016)

Thus, it could be implied that when Chile stopped its dependency in Argentinean natural gas supplies, the benefits of the Transantiago became evident regarding the reductions in the level of contamination (Ibid). It must be highlighted that Santiago’s winter of 2010 was the winter with less amount of ‘pre-emergencies’ days since the year 1997 (Ibid). The reduction of air contamination from public transportation has a positive effect of savings by a yearly average of US \$2.216 million dollars, in other words, the Chilean State has saved 12% of its healthcare budget (Ibid). Furthermore, these savings are quite similar to the permanent subsidy for Santiago’s public transportation (Figueroa et al, 2013).

As a summary of the study of the objective environmental sustainability, between the years 2007 to 2010, some clarifications must be stated. It is necessary to observe these previous statistics through objective lens because Santiago has a unique geographical location as well as atmospheric conditions (thermal inversions during winter months) that do not promote the dispersion of air nor the adequate amount of rainfall to improve permanently the air quality. Also, there are other factors that may affect air quality such as the use of fossil fuels by large enterprises. Transantiago implemented its new bus fleet on 2007 but only after Santiago’s industrial sector started utilizing natural gas on 2009, the effect of Transantiago’s eco-friendly buses became evident. It could be inferred that Santiago’s air quality improved due to the

implementation of the Transantiago. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a fulfilment of this objective.

6.1.4 Security for people and goods

It is important to state that the Metropolitan SEREMI of Transportation do not have statistics regarding the number of accidents in metropolitan subways. It must be informed that the following statistics regarding the number of severity of accidents caused by buses, is considered as classified and of restricted divulgation by the Chilean Sub-Secretary of Transportation. Hence, through the authorization by the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, the following data has been processed. Any type of distribution or copy of this information without the authorization of the Chilean government is constituted as a felony.

Table 26: Number of accidents involving buses in Santiago between the years 2006 to 2010

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Number of accidents involving a bus in Santiago	4951	3406	3291	3047	2937

Table replicated from Gómez-Lobo (2012, p. 8)

Table 27: Number of passengers deceased, seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured in inter urban buses between the years 2006 and 2010

Years	Deceased	Seriously Injured	Medium Injured	Mildly injured	Total
2006	3	136	128	1579	1846
2007	2	136	110	1255	1503
2008	2	95	98	1116	1311
2009	3	109	78	980	1170
2010	1	80	62	968	1111


Table created by researcher based on statistics from the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016)

Table 26 shows that the number of accidents involving buses between 2006 and 2010 in Santiago have significantly decreased. These statistics were obtained from Andrés Gómez-Lobo, a famous Chilean politician. The researcher tried to contact CONASET and they refused to bestow this information. Therefore, this information is classified and is very difficult to access. In his report, he states that his sources are the local police (Carabineros de Chile) and

CONASET. Between 2006 and 2010, the number of buss accidents in Santiago have been reduced to 40,67% and there has been a reduction of 2554 annual deaths regarding to bus accidents.

Table 27 and graph 2 were created by the researcher based on statistics given by Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016). In table 27, it can be observed that there is not a significant difference regarding the deaths of passengers in bus accidents between the years 2006 to 2010. Nevertheless, the changes in seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured are dramatic: there was a reduction in every type of injury with a minimum reduction of 38,7%. Considering the total of passengers who have suffered an accident (which caused injury or death), in 2006 the number was 1846 while as in 2010 it was 1111, which represents a reduction of 39,9%. In 2006, those who had suffered mild injuries were 1579 while as in 2010 the number decreased to 968 persons, which is a reduction of 38,7% in mild injuries. Regarding medium injuries, in 2006 there were 128 injured and in 2010 there were only 62, which represents a reduction of 51,6%. Finally, in 2006 there were 136 seriously injured passengers, while as in 2010 there were 80, which symbolizes a reduction of 41.2%.

Graph 2: Number of passengers deceased, seriously injured, medium injured and mildly injured in inter urban buses between the years 2006 and 2010



Graph created by researcher based on statistics from the Chilean Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (personal communication, July 13, 2016)

In graph 2, it is clearly illustrated in the line graph the steady decline of accidents within the three categories. It can also be spotted distinctly the reduction of injuries in all three categories. As a consequence, it can be inferred the direct relationship between the implementation of the Transantiago and the reduction of injured bus passengers.

As a summary of the study of the objective security people and goods, between the years 2007 to 2010, several observations can be established. This is the least mentioned objective due to its confidential nature. The increased security of passengers in the metropolitan public transportation has proven that the Transantiago is safer public transportation system compared to the former public transportation system in Santiago. As a conclusion, the government can confidently state that they have provided to civil society a more secure public transportation, thus fulfilling their initial objectives.

6.1.5. Summary of Transantiago’s fulfilment of objectives by the year 2010

As a conclusion of this section, table 28 narrates if the Transantiago has fulfilled its objectives by the year 2010. It can be analyzed that out of the four objectives, some were fulfilled to a certain extent while others were not. Regarding the efficient use of resources, by the year 2010, half of the sub-objectives were fulfilled. The promotion of more social equity was not fulfilled. The objectives ‘security for people and goods’ and ‘environmental sustainability’ were fulfilled. In conclusion, the Transantiago did not fulfill all of its objectives.

Table 28: Transantiago’s objectives fulfillment by the year 2010

Specific objectives (PTUS)	Conceptualization of the objectives from the Investigative Committee			Fulfilled by the year 2010
Efficient use of resources	Citizens Participation	Establishment of a 'citizen inspector'		No
		Citizens respect the norms needed to implement policy		No
	Institutional modernization at a metropolitan level	Creation of Metropolitan Authority of Urban Transport	Establishment of a metropolitan transportation authority	Yes
			Creation of a Coordination Committee of	Yes

			Public Transportation	
			Reformulation of the Administrative Counsel Funds	Yes
	Policy efficiency	Respect towards the pre-established budget		No
Promotion of more social equity	Maintain and increase the use of metropolitan public transport			No
Environmental sustainability	Reduce public transportation's contribution to the atmospheric contamination			Yes
Security for people and goods	Improve the security of public transportation			Yes

Table created by researcher utilizing different sources (Hales et al, 2007; MOPTT, 2000)

6.2 Transantiago's policy approval between the years 2007 to 2010

The support of the Transantiago by civil society has never been continuously elevated. Bachelet's approval plummeted after the Big Bang, primarily because one of her biggest campaign promises ended as a "failure of epic proportions" as it can be observed in table 29 (Cortázar, 2015, p. 15).

Table 29: Citizen Poll between March 2007 to January 2010: Do you approve the way Michelle Bachelet and her administration is managing the "Transantiago"?

Months	Percentage (%)	Months	Percentage (%)
March 2007	15,3	December 2007	9
April 2007	14,4	January 2008	19,1
May 2007	13	February 2008	18,6
June 2007	13,3	March 2008	25,4
July 2007	15,5	April 2008	18
August 2007	14,5	May 2008	15,5
September 2007	10,2	June 2008	14,5
October 2007	10,9	July 2008	10,2
November 2007	10,1	August 2008	10,9

Months	Percentage (%)
September 2008	10,1
October 2008	9
November 2008	10
December 2008	14
January 2009	15
February 2009	20
April 2009	21
May 2009	20

Months	Percentage (%)
May 2009	19
June 2009	24
July 2009	32
August 2009	30
September 2009	31
October 2009	33
November 2009	30
December 2009	35
January 2010	39

Table created with statistics from Adimark (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010)

Table 30 studies civil society's approval rate of the Transantiago between the months of March 2010 to December 2010. Specifically, how Piñera's administration managed the policy. The average of approval was 35,6%. The range of approval was between 30% to 46%. The highest approval rate of the Transantiago during his first year as president was 46% on April 2010. The lowest approval rate, 30%, occurred two months in a row: July and August 2010.

Table 30: Citizen Poll between March 2010 to December 2010: Do you approve the way Sebastian Piñera and his administration is managing the "Transantiago"?

Months	Percentage
March 2010	41
April 2010	46
May 2010	38
June 2010	37
July 2010	30
August 2010	30
September 2010	35
October 2010	34
November 2010	33
December 2010	32

Table created with statistics from Adimark (2010)

Tables 29 and 30 show the approval rate of the policy between the years 2007 to 2010. The range of approval during this period was between 9% to 46%. The average of approval

between these three years was 22,36%. Studying both tables, it can be established that civil society approved more how Piñera's administration managed the policy rather than Bachelet's administration. In other words, Piñera's average was 35,6%, a difference of 17,02% when compared with Bachelet's average, 18, 58%. During both administrations, the approval rate of the Transantiago was never 50% or higher. The most important inference established in this thesis while studying the objective for security for people and goods is the direct relationship between the implementation of the Transantiago and the reduction of injured bus passengers. The total number of accidents has diminished by 39,9%: mild injuries by 38,7%; medium injuries by 51,6% and serious injuries by 41.2%. If this confidential information were to be released to the press, it could be inferred that the approval rate towards the Transantiago would improve.

6.3 Summary Chapter: Evaluation of Transantiago as a policy failure or policy success by 2010

Remembering that the third sub-question was "to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010?" it can be concluded that Transantiago continued to be a policy failure by the year 2010. After three years of its initial implementation, the policy did not have an approval rate of over 50% and it did not achieve all of its objectives to completion. Therefore, under the conceptualization used in this thesis, it can be established that the Transantiago as a public policy by the year 2010 was still a policy failure. It had recovered from a political crisis in the year 2007, after the Big Bang, yet it hasn't achieved to a full extent its goals and it hasn't been approved by more that 50% of civil society.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this section, there will be a response to all three sub-questions and the main thesis question, a theoretical discussion, a methodological discussion and a section dedicated to practical findings.

7.1 Answering the three sub questions and the main question

The first sub-question was ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2007?’ In this section, the objectives and the civil society’s approval of the policy were studied between its initial implementation until the end of 2007. The entirety of objectives was not achieved and the average citizen’s approval of the policy on the year 2007 was 12,94% and never achieved higher than 17,6% (Adimark, 2006; Adimark, 2007). The response of this question succinctly stated is that the Transantiago was a policy failure by the end of 2007.

The second sub-question was ‘how did the policy implementation continue after the initial failure?’ The goal of this question was to answer through a theoretical lens (rational decision making approach or historical institutionalism approach) could explain the structure of how the policy continued after its failed implementation and the behavior of policymakers between the year 2007 and 2010. Therefore, two predictions (structure and the role of the policymaker) were established. The policy’s structure did not follow Parsons’ policy cycle because the policy was affected by five contingent events, a critical juncture and a historical lock-in. The role of the policymakers, as change agents, carried out continuous change rather than episodic change furthermore because the policy itself followed a continuous change rather than an episodic change. Therefore, the predictions of historical institutionalism regarding ‘structure’ and ‘role of the policymaker’ was accepted and both predictions of rational decision making rejected.

The third sub-question was ‘to what extent was the Transantiago a policy failure or a policy success in 2010?’ In this section, the objectives and the civil society’s approval of the policy were studied between the years 2007 to 2010 in order to establish if the policy was a success or failure by the end of 2010. Between 2007 and 2010, the average approval rate was of 25,15% and never equal or above 50%. (Adimark, 2007; Adimark, 2008; Adimark, 2009; Adimark, 2010). It could be inferred that if citizens knew about the reduction in accidents after the implementation of the Transantiago, the policy could have had an approval rate of over 50%. Nevertheless, the response of this question is that the Transantiago continues to be a policy failure by the end of 2010.

The three responses from each sub-question were essential to be able to respond the thesis question: “between historical institutionalism and rational decision making, which theory can explain more holistically the evaluation of the initial three years of implementation of the Transantiago?” Remembering that the topic of this thesis is policy failure and the case study is the Transantiago, several affirmations can be established. Comparing both theories, the Transantiago, as a case of policy failure, can be more holistically explained through historical institutionalism approach rather than rational decision making approach. This is justified because the case does not follow Parsons’ policy cycle (1995) nor Chilean policymakers follow a strict episodic change behavior.

Historical institutionalism explains more holistically, more depth and detail, the reasons why the Transantiago continued to be a failure after three years of its implementation. The 6 indicators of path dependence, established by Mahoney and Schensul (2006) and its critical juncture were identified in the case. Therefore, evaluating its implementation, on 2010, shows that historical institutionalism is the most adequate theory to explain Transantiago’s policy failure.

7.2 Theoretical Discussion, Implications and Recommendations

In this section, there will be a theoretical discussion about the topic of the thesis, policy failure and to observe if the theories about historical institutionalism and rational decision making approach can be utilized to explain such phenomena. The main theoretical lesson searched in this thesis is finding a theory that could aid academics to recover from policy failure. It has been studied to great lengths, both theories and their application to the case study.

From a historical institutionalism point of view, a recovery process is evolutionary, continuous and takes time (Mahoney, 2000; Weick and Quinn, 1999). Recovery from policy failure cannot be immediate through this lens because the policy is not in a vacuum: it is affected by political actors and external events that delay or impeditment the ability of institutions to carry out their initial goals. From a rational decision making point of view, a recovery process is an efficient process, where specific goals are obtained by precise steps through a timetable that is respected by policymakers (Parsons, 1995). Policies follow a certain route, if the policy is unsuccessful, they implement the same cycle all over again (Ibid).

As a consequence of this analysis, rational decision making theory and approach is no longer valid to explain modern public policy failures. In an ideal world, the theory’s policy

cycle would operate like a clock: efficiently, without errors. If there is an error, it could be completely replaced by a new policy. This theory is useful to teach students of public administration regarding the theoretical framework of a policy cycle. The theory of a policy cycle under this lens is not identical to the implementation of an actual policy. This theory needs to be updated: the implementation of policies in the real world is not a linear cycle. Policymakers return to the writing board if a policy implementation fails, they do not wait until a formal evaluation occurs.

Historical institutionalism is more efficient and useful for academics to comprehend and amend policy failures in comparison with rational decision making. This theory explains why some policies cannot be conceptualized as successful policies, not due to the design of the policy, it is due to how policies are affected by external factors that cannot be controlled by institutions (political actors, history, environment, contingent events, among other factors). Through the analysis carried out in this thesis, historical institutionalism explains more holistically the lack of recovery process, while as rational decision making approach does not. An institutional recovery process is a continuous process, vulnerable to external factors, history and the limitations of the State. When the policy fails, it must overcome its initial errors in order to continue to provide a public good. Therefore, a recovery process cannot follow a rational decision making approach because when a policy fails, the same policy cycle does not occur again, it evolves and adapts to its surroundings.

7.3 Methodological implications

This section will carry out a reflection of the methodological approach used in this thesis. This thesis was a single case study, utilizing Blatter and Haverland's (2012) Congruence Analysis approach (CON). The main methodological goal was to study the implementation case of the Transantiago intensely and not extensively (Sartori, 1970). The thesis was of qualitative nature due to the utilization of theories, even the analysis quantitative data was in a qualitative manner. A case study was preferred in comparison to implementing a large-n comparison study because the benefit of studying specific, detailed about policy failure permits to create new theory in the field of public administration. The disadvantages of carrying out a case study intensively is the need to obtain very specific information and the difficulty to generalize about the findings.

The advantage of implementing a CON case study was the ability to carry out a thesis without carrying out interviews or surveys. The shortcomings of the approach and the main

methodological issue confronted in this thesis was the lack of access to information. The information needed to carry out a CON approach case study based on a Chilean public policy is very difficult to obtain. First of all, not all of the information utilized in this thesis is of public domain. When such information is denied, a citizen has the right to apply to the 'Transparency Law' in order to access the necessary information. Nevertheless, some institutions stated that the information did not exist, while politicians such as Gómez-Lobos (2012) wrote a paper based on the data that the MTT would not bestow the researcher. Think tanks do not carry out papers with the exact time frame of the thesis, therefore their data was discarded. Some books were not available at Leiden University, there was Cortázar's memoirs that had to be bought from Chile while the PTUS manuscript existed in a physical version at the Chilean Library of Congress. In spite of these limitations, the researcher obtained all the information necessary in order to carry out this thesis.

The main methodological reflection is that information within the academic community is not shared. The lack of information regarding failed public policies do not permit academics to carry out large-n studies or generalize about the subject depending on the region. Therefore, it impedes the creation, validation or dismissal of theories. This should be amended.

7.4 Practical reflection

This section will narrate the practical learnings from carrying out a case study regarding a failed public policy. From an academic point of view, it can be recommended to carry out large-n, quantitative comparative studies in areas such as health care, justice or transportation in order to generalize about the concept of policy failure and success in specific public administration areas. Large-n, comparative qualitative studies should also be carried out, by comparing how authorities in high levels address failed public policies. A Co-Variational Analysis (COV) should be carried out to analyze how Brazil, Chile and Colombia, similar countries with similar public transportation policies (BRT, the Transantiago and the Transmilenio) have different policy outcomes (Blatter and Haverland, 2012). Additionally, it is necessary to update the articles that have already been published in the past about the Transantiago. It is necessary to enrich McConnell's (2015) operationalization of 'successful public policy'. Besides the fulfilment of outcomes and citizen support towards a policy, it is necessary to include citizens' knowledge regarding initial policies objectives. By studying if citizens know the initial goals of a policy, this might change their approval towards the policy itself. Hence, this suggestion could explain more holistically what a successful public policy is from the lens of civil society.

From a governmental point of view, there are several recommendations in order to amend a failed policy. First, recognize publicly the errors of the implementation to civil society and state that the government is implementing solutions as efficiently as they can. Second, set up a plan with short term goals and long term goals in order to amend the policy with the aid of academics from the area of public administration. Third, carry out a survey with the population in order to know which are their main concerns and their main suggestions to amend the policy. Fourth, obtain support from all sectors (civil society, entrepreneurs and the opposition) in order to implement the new solutions. Fifth, if there is a lack of funds, it is necessary to obtain loans from international organizations.

The main topic of this thesis is policy failure. The expectations were that after a certain amount of years, a policy could be 'fixed'. The selection of the thesis' case study, the Transantiago, is a complex case. Policymakers tried to fix the policy and in a perfect black and white world, it would have been amended. Yet after several years, this policy was not able to change its course because it was affected by several contingencies, a historical lock-in and many other factors mentioned in this thesis. More studies are needed to conclude the feasibility of amending complex failed policies. It can be concluded that the expectation of recovering from a failed policy, in the Chilean metropolitan public transportation, was not feasible. Yet, this failed public policy was about transportation and it is necessary to study other areas of failed public policies such as healthcare, environmental issues, among many other issues in order to establish in the academic sphere a universal generalization regarding how complex failed policies can be amended or analyzed.

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