COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF CITY NETWORKS

A comparative study on the C40 and the UNEP

Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

BACHELORTHESIS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS &

ORGANIZATIONS

Ines (I.) Kaljee

1386050

i.kaljee@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Leiden University

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Supervised by: Dr. Hans Vollaard

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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

In September 2016, a new city network, the Global Parliament of Mayors (GPM), will be convened in The Hague, the Netherlands. This global network of mayors, initiated by political theorist Benjamin Barber, will unite cities from all over of the world to work together on issues such as climate change, refugees, pandemic diseases, inequality and urban security (Global Parliament of Mayors Project, 2016). By cooperating on these global problems, the GPM is not only argued to be tackling the world's most urgent problems, it is also argued to be "rescuing democracy for the twenty-first century" (Barber, 2013, back cover). According to Barber (2013), nation-states in global governance are "dysfunctional". Cooperation between nation-states, for example on the issue of climate change, often ends up in gridlocks (Chan, 2016). Also, nation-states are increasingly struggling with a "democratic deficit", breaking down the legitimacy of their policies (Chan, 2016). Cities, on the contrary, can cooperate pragmatically with an indifference for borders (Barber, 2013). Thus, city networks will "democratize globalization" (Barber, 2013, p. 4).

Barber's claim that city networks, and the GPM specifically, will "save" democracy is build on two assumptions. First of all, Barber's democratic alternative is build on the idea that democracy *should* be saved in the first place. Transformationalist scholars over the last couple of decades have argued that globalization has caused a democratic deficit in todays state-centered liberal democracy, in which the accountability of democratic institutions has become increasingly unclear (Bäckstrand, 2006; Chan, 2016). Next to this, globalization is argued to be favoring developed countries or the "Global North", leaving the "Global South" behind and increasing the gap between rich and poor (Bardhan, Bowles, & Wallerstein, 2006). Second, by arguing that cities and city networks will democratize globalization, Barber takes on a certain perspective on democracy. Barber builds on the idea of *cosmopolitan democracy,* in which the world exists of one political community and the individual is central to democracy (Held, 1995). Taking these two assumptions into account, Barber's argues that cities and city networks should democratize global governance.

The increasing role of cities and city networks in global governance is not only a normative idea, it is also an empirical development. Global membership of cities in city networks has grown rapidly over the last couple of decades (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004). Especially on the issue of climate change, cities and city networks have received signifiant international recognition as a potential addition to, or alternative for, inter-state cooperation due to their local expertise and direct involved in the consequences of climate change (Gordon, 2013). In terms of democratic level, however, the increase of city networks remains a relatively unexplored development within the field of political

science (Aarsæther, Nyseth, & Bjørnå, 2011). Thus, to assess Barber's claim and investigate the role of city networks in global governance, the research question of this study is: *Do city networks enhance democracy in global governance?*

To answer the research question, this study will consist of two parts – a normative part and an empirical part. In part I, a theoretical framework will be set up by elaborating on the work of Barber (2013). It is argued that Barber takes on a cosmopolitan perspective on democracy. Thus, the subquestion of this section is: *What are the core principles of a cosmopolitan democracy?* After the literature on cosmopolitan democracy is discussed, it will be explained how Barber's notion of democracy reflects a cosmopolitan democracy perspective. Ultimately, two democratic criteria are distinguished – accountability and inclusive participation. In part II, the criteria defined in the first section will be applied on two environmental networks – the transnational municipal network C40 and the international network UNEP. By comparing a city-to-city network and a nation-to-nation network, it will be possible to answer the second subquestion: *Do city networks enhance accountability and participation in global governance?* It will be concluded that city networks do not have a higher level of accountability or inclusiveness than international networks, and thus do not necessarily enhance democracy in global governance.

PART 1: SETTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2. THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

This section will explore the relation between globalization and democracy and defines the theoretical framework on todays democracy. It will discuss the consequences of globalization for liberal democracy and explain the alternative of a cosmopolitan model of democracy. Elaborating on the work of Held (1995) and other cosmopolitan scholars, two core democratic principles will be defined: accountability and inclusive participation. Finally, the cosmopolitan model of democracy will be described.

Globalization and Liberal Democracy

Over the course of the last decades, interconnectivity has increased rapidly. The global economy nowadays depends upon complex chains of production and exchange, stretching from one side of the globe to the other. Moreover, global interconnectivity does not only address the economy, it is evident in virtually every aspect of contemporary social life (McGrew, 1997, p. 6). Money, information, crime, pollution, migrants, ideas, news, images, amongst other things, frequently flows across national territorial borders. In the broad sense of the word, globalization can simply be defined as the growing global interconnectedness (McGrew, 1997, p. 7). Using the concept in this paper, however, globalization mainly refers to its effect of blurring the line between state borders and the deepening enmeshment of the local and global. As the world becomes more interconnected, the distinction between what is internal and what is external of the state is blurring increasingly (McGrew, 1997, p. 7).

It is argued that this effect of globalization has significant consequences for liberal democracy, as it challenges the basic principles of Westphalian democracy (McGrew, 1997, p. 6). The democratic system of Western countries still dates back to the seventeenth century, when the state-centered Westphalian system was set up. The central principles of this Westphalian order are (1) *territoriality* – states have fixed boundaries which define the scope of their political authority; (2) *sovereignty* – the state claims effective and legitimate supremacy and the right to rule over its territory; (3) *autonomy* - the state is entitled to have their own internal and external affairs and (4) *legality* - there is no legal authority beyond the state; even international law can be ignored by states (McGrew, 1997, p. 3). After the Westphalian order had consolidated the rulers' sovereignty over their territories, the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has strengthened the relationship between the Westphalian order and sovereign states even more. Today, liberal

democratic principles and practices have almost exclusively become associated with the sovereign territorial nation-state (Held, 1996).

However, scholars vary enormously on their perspectives as to what extent globalization affects liberal democracy (McGrew, 1997, p. 9). One of the main debates on globalization is about the continuity and change of globalization. Some scholars argue that the contemporary phase of globalization is a radical break with the past, whereas others argue that globalization is a process of historical continuity (McGrew, 1997, p. 9). The first group is also referred to as *the transformationalists*, whereas the latter are called *the sceptics*. Skeptic scholars, such as Gilpin (1978) and Krasner (1993), dispute the view that globalization necessarily diminishes the power, functions or authority of the nation-state (McGrew, 1997, p. 11). Skeptics point out that states are becoming more important in regulating and facilitating processes of globalization. Some would even argue that globalization is not decreasing the power of the state at all, but is instead controlled by hegemonic powers to stimulate the international political economy (Gilpin, 1987, p. 10). Transformationalists scholars, on the other hand, argue that contemporary globalization fundamentally compromises the institutions of the Westphalian order and thus poses distinct challenges to liberal democratic forms of governance (McGrew, 1997, p. 11).

Transformationalists also argue that globalization is linked to the emergence of new political institutions, such as international non-governmental organizations, transnational social movements and transnational municipal networks. The political role of such actors on the international stage is often described by the term *global governance*. Global governance not only describes formal political institutions, it includes "systems of rule at all levels of human activity" (Rosenau, 1995, p. 13). This means that informal institutions, for example the 'civil society', are also seen as actors in governing. Organizations such as Amnesty International or the transnational municipal network C40 conduct their own foreign policy and actively participate in global governance. Global governance acknowledges that world politics consists of both international actors as well as transnational actors (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 190). The focus of global governance is thus not only that of specific actors, it is also about norms, rules, and standards that structure and constrain social activity (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 190).

Although a distinction is made between transformalist scholars and sceptic scholars of globalization, many theories and studies do not specifically belong to one of these perspectives but are somewhere in between. *Cosmopolitan democracy* is one of those theories that cannot be qualified as either transformalist or sceptic. However, it is important to keep in mind that

cosmopolitan democracy as well as Barber's perspective do argue that nowadays democracy is challenged by globalization (Held, 1995; Barber, 2013). They do not, however, reject the state entirely and are therefore skeptical on the effects of globalization as well. In the following section, cosmopolitan democracy and its core principles will be discussed in further depth.

The Core Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy

In his book *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance,* Held (1995) introduces the notion of cosmopolitan democracy. In his book Held (1995) argues that democracy has to be rethought, and along with it the underlying principles and practices of democratic politics (Held, 1995, preface p. x). The cosmopolitan perspective could be defined as transformationalist, as it identifies the current globalization as the emergence of a post-Westphalian order in which sovereignty and territoriality are irreversibly getting loose from modern political life (McGrew, 1997, pp. 19-20; Held, 1995, pp. 89-92). Yet, it also states that the age of the nation-state is by no means over. According to Held (1995, pp. 94-96), the importance of the nation-state and nationalism, territorial independence and the desire to maintain sovereignty have not significantly diminished in recent times. Globalization largely remains in the domains of communication and information, and does not challenge the state in creating a sense of common human purpose, interest and value. Thus, Held states that scholars predicting the "end of the state" fail to recognize the enduring capacity of the state (Held, 1995, p. 96).

However, Held (1995) does argue that globalization affects liberal democracy and that the meaning and place of democratic politics has to be rethought. He defines three clear consequences of the globalization processes. First of all, the increasing interconnectedness is changing the nature, scope and capacity of the sovereign state from above as its regulatory ability is challenged. Second, the regional and global connectedness that creates chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes alters the nature and dynamics of national political systems themselves. Third, local groups and movements are questioning the nation-state from below as a representative and accountable power system (Held, 1995, p. 267). These developments are problematic as the *accountability* of states decreases. While the principles and practice of liberal democracy are still expressed in the institutional structures and domestic politics of the nation-state, the state can decreasingly be held accountable (McGrew, 1997; Held, 1995). Thus, Held defines the lack of *accountability* in global governance as being problematic. This arguments is supported by many other scholars, arguing that international institutions are increasingly facing a 'democratic deficit' and inadequate accountability mechanisms (e.g. Bäckstrand, 2006; Chan, 2016). Consequently,

Held (1995, preface ix) argues that if democratic theory is concerned with 'what is going on' in the political world, it is necessary to rethink the nature, form and content of democratic politics.

In rethinking democracy, Held (1995) starts off by defining the main purpose of democracy. According to Held (1995), the idea of democracy derives its power and significance from the idea of self-determination. Citizens should be able to choose freely the conditions of their own association, and their own choices should thus constitute the ultimate legitimation of policies (Held, 1995, p. 147). On the basis of the justification of public decision-making lies the promotion and enhancement of this autonomy. By 'autonomy', Held refers to 'the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and the be self-determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of actions in private as well as public life, bearing the democratic good' (Held, 1995, p. 146).

The principle of autonomy as the main purpose of democracy is reflected in the way democracy should be constituted. As noted in the previous section, the traditional doctrines of the relation between the state and its citizens, namely the idea of state sovereignty and territoriality, have been contested. As an alternative for sovereignty, Held thus argues for the 'principle of autonomy'. The principle of autonomy is explained as follows:

> *"Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate to rights of others"*
> (Held, 1995, p. 147)

The principle of autonomy, however, is not an individualistic principle. In relation to the state, this concept not only means that people should be self-determining, it also means that the democratic government should be a government in which the principle of autonomy is ensured as much as possible (Held, 1995, p. 147). After Held has defined the principle of autonomy as the main purpose of democracy, he elaborates on the question how, and in what ways, this principle of autonomy should be realized in relation to the state. Held (1995) argues that to incorporate the principle of autonomy in existing institutions, *inclusive participation* is crucial. Citizens should be able to participate in the decision-making process as much as possible to ensure their autonomy. If people cannot fully participate in their political community, their potential autonomy will remain

unfulfilled. By maximizing political participation, citizens would have the ability to make choices and to determine the course of their lives (Held, 1995, pp. 207-211).

Archibugi (2008) – also a cosmopolitan democratic scholar – argues that todays global governance does not enhance inclusive participation. Instead, the global market economy and the consolidated institutions of global governance are dominated by the West. It is argued that global governance today decreases inclusive participation as globalization is considered to be favoring richer, more developed countries (Bardhan, Bowles, & Wallerstein, 2006). Due to these unequal access in global governance, the gap between the rich Global North and the poorer Global South is increased. According to Archibugi (2008, p. 4), cosmopolitan democracy opposes this idea of a "fortress in the western area" by introducing the idea of one political community in which it is impossible to draw a line between "us" and "them", or between "friends" and "enemies". Hence, inclusive participation of both citizens from the South as well as citizens from the North is a core principle of cosmopolitan democracy.

Held (2009, pp. 538-540) has defined more principles of cosmopolitanism such as "active agency", "consent" and "avoidance of serious harm". However, he acknowledges that these principles are hard to sustain in a world with a plurality of values and a diversity in moral conceptions. But although the principles of, for example, consent and tolerance could be rejected, a cosmopolitan democracy should at least set down a set of procedural principles for political life, to "pursue the deliberative justification […] and ensure the accountability of power in all its forms" (Held, 2009, p. 540). In this paper it is argued that the core principles of cosmopolitan democracy are best defined as *accountability* and *inclusive participation*.

A Cosmopolitan Model of Democracy

To address the principles of cosmopolitanism, Held (1995; 2009) pleas for an alternative democratic model which he calls a *cosmopolitan model of democracy*. To enhance the principle of autonomy, humanity must be viewed as one universal community. This means that, according to cosmopolitism, the world order exists of both states and people (Brown, 1992). It is argued that to ensure the cosmopolitan principles, citizenship cannot be based on an exclusive membership of a community. Instead, citizenship should be based on the general rules and principles that are defined by cosmopolitanism (Held, 2009, p. 541). If freedom is threatened by the behavior of nations and states, this will go at expense of what is right for the political community – namely the principle of autonomy. A cosmopolitan law transcends the claim of political legitimacy of nations and states and extends it to the universal community (Held, 1995, p. 233). However, as noted before, Held also

acknowledges that this is not to say that states and national politics would become redundant. They would just 'wither away', so that they would no longer be the sole centre of legitimate power within their own border (Held, 1995, p. 233).

To realize this universal community and cosmopolitan law, a democratic cosmopolitan order should be constituted. Held (1995, pp. 268-272) argues that, as the hierarchical structure of the states has been disputed in times of globalization, democratizing global governance would need a horizontal structure. To govern the cosmopolitan community, the global order would consists of multiple and overlapping networks of power. These networks would involve the body, welfare, culture, civic associations, the economy, coercive relations and regulatory and legal relations. It would constitute the interconnections of the different people and nations in the world, as people can enjoy membership in the diverse communities which significantly affect them. This idea of networks governing one political community is also reflected in Barber's perspective of democracy, which will be explained later on.

Several scholars have elaborated on Held's idea of a cosmopolitan democracy more recently. Whereas Held has a top-down approach by proposing the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic state and agencies, more recent students of cosmopolitan democracy have argued for a bottom-up approach (Dryzek, 1996; Bohman, 1999; Cochran, 2002). Held's idea for a "world government" in a cosmopolitan democracy has been criticized, as it would yield the same hierarchical structure that Held has been criticizing himself in nowadays global governance (Cochran, 2002, pp. 520-523). A bottom-up approach of cosmopolitan democracy, on the contrary, emphasizes the role of the *individual* in producing the kind of change that a cosmopolitan democracy requires (Cochran, 2002, p. 543). As the cosmopolitan model of democracy states that the autonomy of individuals is the main purpose of democracy, the individual should also be the starting point of decision-making. Moreover, democratizing global governance will not happen at all, if there is no positive movement by citizens towards democratization in the first place (Dryzek, 1996, pp. 6-8).

In conclusion, it is argued that the principle of autonomy is defined by cosmopolitan democracy as the main purpose of democracy. To obtain this principle in global governance, two related principles are defined – namely accountability and inclusive participation. These core principles are reflected in Held's idea of a cosmopolitan democratic order, in which governance consists of overlapping networks on multiple issues. The networks are argued to be increasing accountability, as they would all obey one cosmopolitan democratic law. Next to this a cosmopolitan democratic order will

increase inclusive participation, as all people belong to the same community and thus have the same access to the variety of forms of participation. In the next session, it will be argued how Barber (2013) builds on this argument by stating that cities should be the main actors of decision-making.

3. BARBER'S DEMOCRACTIC PERSPECTIVE

In the next section, the democratic alternative of Barber (2013) will be examined according to the cosmopolitan principles of democracy defined above. Comparing Barbers perspective and the model of cosmopolitan democracy, the argument is made that Barber's perspective of democracy is build on the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy. Finally, it will be argued how the democratic criteria of accountability and inclusive participation are reflected in Barber's argument.

The City as the Main Actor

Although Held (1995) raises the idea of one world government, several other scholars have put forward alternatives to achieve a cosmopolitan democracy. One of those alternatives is governance through *the city*. Today, over fifty percent of the world's population lives in cities, a percentage that will only increase over the next couple of decades (Barber, 2013). Due to the high density of citizens in cities, issues such as climate change, terrorism and migration have a huge impact on cities. As a result, the city is increasingly becoming an important political actor on the world stage (Van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2009). Introducing the term 'global city', Sassen (2001) was one of the first to write about the growing influence of the city in international relations. Sassen states that cities constitute the place where globalization materializes, combining global flows of money, information and people through transnational networks of cities. She therefore argues that "the city is a far more concrete space for politics than the nation" (Sassen, 2004, p. 655).

Elaborating on Sassen's argument, Barber (2013) pleas for a democratic system of global governance in which cities take on a more important role. According to Barber, cities share unique qualities that make them more suitable to govern in the 21st century than states. These qualities include pragmatism, civic trust, indifference to borders and sovereignty, and a penchant for networking, creativity, innovation and cooperation (Barber, 2013). Cities are pragmatic because mayors have to face and solve practical problems directly. This also makes the civic trust higher, since mayors stand closer to the people and are more directly involved with the local community (Barber, 2013). Whilst their mandate is local, cities can also easily participate on the global level due to their indifference to borders and sovereignty. Cities do not have tensions or conflict with other cities as nation-states have with other nation-states and thus they can cooperate more pragmatically (Barber, 2013). This makes that they are more useful in networking, innovation and cooperation. Whereas nation-states cities mainly think in terms of sovereignty and nationalism, cities can think globally, but act locally (Barber, 2013).

Although Barber also acknowledges the pitfalls of the city such as its inequality, corruption, and predatory markets, he argues that these problems are most effectively tackled by cooperation of cities (Barber, 2013). Mayors specifically are the right public officials to realize this, since they are presumed to be pragmatic problem solvers. Not only do mayors stand closer to the people and the problems coming with them, they are also less ideological and thus more pragmatic. A striking example of such pragmatism that Barber gives is Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem. Getting into power in 1965, Kollek had to deal with the consequences of the '67 war and the occupation of East Jerusalem shortly after his election. His response, however, was to act solely pragmatic. He pledged full equality for services and parity of Jerusalem. Amidst of all the conflict and tensions, Kollek focused on managing basic facilities such as picking up the garbage and fixing roads. Illustratively, he once said: "Look, I'll fix your sewers if you knock off the sermons" (Kollek, 1985 in Barber, 2013).

Despite the great emphasis on the role of mayors, Barber does not plea for mayors to get more involved in global governance independently. More specifically, Barber (2013) argues for cities to rule through networks. Cooperation between cities, especially in the form of networks, will decrease gridlocks in international decision-making. Barber states that cities are naturally networked. Cities are interdependent from other cities, not just because of modern globalization but also because they have always defined themselves through "bridging capital" instead of "bonding capital" (Barber, 2013, p. 113). Whereas states have borders that define their territory and are unified internally, cities do not have this internal bonding and derive their identity from hooking up with domains outside their boundaries. According to Barber (2013), the internal bonding of nations, propagated by nationalistic symbols such as flags and anthems, is exactly what gives them a disadvantage over cities on the world stage. Therefore, states do not, in theory, need each other. Cities, on the other hand, are naturally interdependent. In many cases, trade has been at the heart of how cities originate and are constituted – for example in the case of Amsterdam, Hong Kong, San Diego or Rio de Janeiro. And even if trade is not at the heart of some cities, they are still networked in their great diversity of functions. Cities already "naturally" cooperate on a myriad of issues such as environment, migration, terrorism, transportation, housing and heritage, among others (Barber, 2013, pp. 113-121). Hence, governing pragmatically through such networks is and must be, according to Barber, the future of democratic governance.

The networking that is happening now is usually informal. It governs through voluntary cooperation and shared consensus, often without any formal commitments written down. Barber (2013), however, pleas for a formal network of mayors which he has named the *Global Parliament of*

Mayors (GPM). According to Barber (2013), cities should have a more important role in global governance with mayors as the main public officials to fulfill this role. The GPM, however, is not a proposal for an entirely new network that replaces other networks that will give a mandate for top-down governing of megacities. It is, using Barbers words, "no more than a final step down a road already well traveled". Since cities are cooperating on so many levels already, the GPM would just enhance and improve collaborations of the already existing networks. To exert influence it would only use soft power, not hard power, and announce and share best practices. It would, however, be innovative in that it would empower cities by giving them a "megaphone" that allows them to be heard in their urban resistance (Barber, 2013, pp. 336-339).

From Independent Polis to Interdependent Cosmopolis

According to Barber (2013, p. 53) "the story of cities *is* the story of democracy". Although Barber frequently mentions the democratic nature of the city, it remains somewhat unclear what kind of democracy Barber has in mind (Denters, 2015). In many aspects, however, it can be argued that his proposal to democratize governance reflects a cosmopolitan democracy perspective. One of the main similarities is the acknowledgement that global governance should be democratized *globally*. Whereas some IR scholars still argue for the nation-state as the main actor in international politics, Barber (2013) argues in line with cosmopolitan democracy scholars that other actors, in Barber's case the city, play an increasingly important role in global governance. Moreover, to democratize global governance the role of other actors should not only be acknowledged, they should also get more power over decision-making in the international policy-making process. Consequently, Barber (2013) and Held (1995) both argue for a reform of the international order towards a system in which the nation-state is not the main actor of decision-making any longer.

The main argument that Barber (2013) takes on from cosmopolitan democratic theory is the development from a state-centric democracy to a democracy in which the individual is at the centre of democracy. As Held (2009, p. 542) points out: "There is only a historical contingent connection between the principles underpinning citizenship and the national community; as this connection weakens in a world of overlapping communities of fate, the principles of citizenship must be rearticulated and re-entrenched". According to both Held (1987; 1995) and Barber (2013) this rearticulated citizenship takes place in the global community of an interdependent world, in which the autonomy of the individual is the main purpose of democracy. This argument is coming back in Barber's perspective, as he argues that "the citizen is the sovereign" (Barber, 2016). By defining the citizen as the sovereign instead of the nation-state, Barber pleas for a cosmopolitan democracy in which, in his own words: "cosmopolitanism trumps patriotism" (Barber, 2013, p. 115).

In accordance with cosmopolitan democracy, Barber (2013) also argues that there should be a transitional process from state-centric governments to a networked form of governance with decentred, distributed nodes of authority (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2015, pp. 213-214). Barber (2013) states that the existing city networks will democratize global governance as they are open, horizontal networks. This horizontal structure that lacks the 'authoritative' and 'hierarchical' aspect that nation-states have, is seen by Barber as a democratic quality of city networks. If city networks would be the main actors in global governance, this would give expression to the "unique urban potential for cooperation and egalitarianism" of cities (Barber, 2013, p. 9). Networks, in general, are often portrayed as more equal institutions because of their horizontal character (Bouteligier, 2013, p. 251). City networks specifically, are assumed to be even less hierarchical, because of their penchant for networking and cooperation (Barber, 2013, pp. 106-107).

Not only does Barber (2013) built on the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy in general, he also takes on the underlying principles of cosmopolitan democracy – accountability and inclusive participation. In both principles, the notion of "glocality" is important. This means that cities can connect the local to the global, creating "glocal" governance (Barber, 2013). Barber states that if the role of cities in global governance increases, the accountability of global governance will increase because mayors will be held accountable by their citizens. As mayors and local governments stand closer to their citizens than national governments, the popular control will be higher (Barber, 2013, pp. 95-100). As for inclusive participation, Barber (2013) also argues that the role of cities in global governance is essential. Cities connect the local to the global and thus increase inclusive participation. The cosmopolitan characteristics of cities do not only empower cities to act on the global stage, but it also connects the distinct global governance to everyday local life (Barber, 2013; Chan, 2016).

In short, Barber's perspective on democracy reflects the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy in three ways. Just like Held (1995), Barber states that liberal democracy is challenged by globalization and that the state should no longer be the main actor of decision-making in global governance. He argues in line with cosmopolitan democracy that the *individual* should be the main subject of democracy instead. Therefore, democracy needs to be reformed. Although Barber, unlike Held, pleas for cities to realize this cosmopolitan democracy, both scholars argue for governance through *networks*. Also, Barber (2013) uses the same *core principles* to define democracy – namely inclusive participation and accountability. Overall, it can be concluded that Barber takes on a cosmopolitan perspective of democracy. The two principles of cosmopolitan democracy can

therefore be applied on the comparison of two governance networks, to examine whether Barber's claim – that city networks will democratize governance – is true.

PART 2: COMPARING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

4. DATA AND METHOD

A Comparative Study

To assess whether city networks enhance democracy in global governance, a comparative study between a city-to-city network and a nation-to-nation network will be conducted. Building on the democratic criteria defined in the previous section, the C40 and the UNEP will be analyzed and compared. If the city-to-city network indeed has a higher level of accountability and inclusive participation than in the nation-to-nation network, it could be argued that city networks enhance democracy in global governance. Data are collected from databases, public documents, media reports and secondary sources in the form of published journal articles.

For this study, it is decided to compare two environmental networks. There are two main reasons why environmental networks are the most suitable to compare. First of all, a considerable number of city networks are focused on environmental issues (Barber, 2013, p. 130). Compared to transnational networks on other issues, environmental networks are often more far-reaching in city cooperation. If city networks thus democratize global governance, this should most possibly be apparent in transnational environmental networks. Second, cities face similar challenges to nation-states in cooperating together on climate change issues (Koski & Lee, 2014). This makes that environmental city networks and international networks are more comparable than, for example networks on security, in which city networks discuss very different issues than international networks. Thus, if there is a difference in the level of democracy in both networks, it will be likely due to the different actors and it will unlikely because of the nature of the subject.

C40

The city network that will be analyzed is the C40. The C40 Climate Leadership Group is a transnational organization of 83 megacities that cooperate on climate change. Members commit to make an effort in cooperating on global environmental issues in order to make more impact globally (Chan, 2016). They "collaborate effectively, share knowledge and drive meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on climate change" (C40, 2016a). The C40 is one of the most influential and most active city-networks engaging in global climate governance (Gordon, 2013). It has gained international recognition as a political power and has achieved significant results in several cities (Chan, 2016). Although there are several other environmental city networks, such as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the Climate Alliance, the

C40 is the only environmental network that focuses on cooperation between *cities* specifically, giving less priority to municipalities or regions (Chan, 2016). Since 2015, it has introduced a "city diplomacy strategy" to further accelerate city action (C40, 2016b). Since Barber's claim is also specifically focused on cities (and not local governments in general), the C40 is pre-eminently a network that Barber would claim to be democratizing global governance. Moreover, the C40 specifically represents a governance models that wants to bring together different actors and different levels (Bouteligier, 2013). Thus, if there is one city network that would be expected to increase inclusiveness and accountability in global governance, it would be the C40.

UNEP

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is one of the most prominent intergovernmental networks on climate change. As part of the UN, it sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of sustainable developments within the UN system and serves as an advocate for the global environment in general (UNEP, 2016a). The UNEP is more of an integrated organ of the UN than an independent network, but it does consists of separate networks on several different issues, creating a "networking mechanism" (Shende, 2015, p. 139). Its mandate was formulated by the General Assembly of the UN, and gives the UNEP the authority and responsibility for the environment across the entire United Nations system (UNEP, 2016b). It plays a significant role in organizing international environmental conventions, such as the COP conferences, in which it brings together national governments, regional institution and non-governmental organizations. Even though there are more nation-to-nation environmental networks, the UNEP is the leading authority that sets the global environment agenda and is therefore best to compare with the C40 (UNEP, 2016a).

Operationalization

Accountability

The principle of accountability can be defined as a relationship in which "an individual, group or other entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose costs on the agent" (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 77). This principle could be hard to operationalize in analyzing global governance, as typical democratic accountability mechanisms function along principle-agent relationships using formal, hierarchical channels. These channels are often not present in informal and little institutionalized global governance (Hazenberg & Mulieri, 2013). However, both the C40 and UNEP are intergovernmental networks and are, in the end, governed by elected officials. Accountability mechanisms between (city) governments and the networks must therefore be present in the C40 as well as in the UNEP. The degree of accountability

of the C40 and UNEP will be defined by analyzing the role of city or national governments within the structure of the C40 and UNEP. By examining the extent to which national or city governments are involved, it can be defined to what extent the organizations can be held accountable be citizens through their governments. The data on the level of accountability are retrieved from the websites of the C40 and the UNEP, public documents and secondary sources in the form of published journal articles and interviews.

Inclusive participation

To examine the inclusiveness of the C40 and the UNEP, the ratio of membership of cities or countries in of both organizations will be studied along the North-South divide. The North-South divide is crucial in studying inclusiveness, since research has shown that there are still common interests and norms that unite actors from the North and actors from the South in global governance which can be decisive of inequality within an organization (Bouteligier, 2013). Moreover, as noted above, globalization is argued to be increasing the gap between the global North and the global South. Hence, if city networks democratize global governance, this would include more inclusiveness from the global South. In this study, the global North is referring to wealthy industrialized nations including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and EU member states, whereas the global South refers to Asia, Africa and Latin-America.

The divide can also be tricky, as it could suggest a clear-cut distinction between two worlds and ignores the variation within the North or the South (Eckl & Weber, 2007). However, analyzing this divide will give the greatest insight in the inclusiveness of the organizations. As cosmopolitan democracy takes the individual as the main purpose of democracy, the North-South ratio will not only be defined by the membership of countries or cities, but also by how many citizens those countries and cities have. If there are more members of the South represented in city networks than in nation-to-nation networks, this would mean that city networks give voice to actors that might otherwise not be heard. This would mean that they would indeed democratize global governance. The data on the membership and population of cities in the C40 and UNEP are retrieved from the websites of the organizations and the United Nations Statistics Division.

5. RESULTS

Accountability

The C40 presents itself as being a network that facilitates dialogue amongst city officials (C40, 2016d). The C40 stimulates more cooperation between city governments and their citizens, for example by using "polisdigitocracy" – using social media and data networks to decrease the gap between city governments and the citizens living in the city and therefore get the citizens more involved in the decision-making process (Chan, 2016, p. 149). C40's strategic direction clearly focuses on linking the global to the local by improving connections and, thus, accountability. Another example is the C40 Citizens' Choice Award, which gives cities international recognition for local initiatives. By interviewing mayors and city officials that participate in the C40 network, Chan (2016) has found that although the C40 does not directly increases local democracy in cities, it does make that cities can represent their citizens' interests directly on the global stage. The other way around, this would mean that citizens can hold their mayors directly accountable for their actions within the C40 network. The link between the C40 mayors and local citizens is short, which would assume a high level of accountability.

One of the main difficulties of the level of accountability of the C40 is that the organization in general does not have a lot of power. As noted before, the C40 is mainly an organization for knowledge exchange and collaboration (C40, 2016a). It does not make policies for the member cities and it does not enforce member cities to take certain measures or actions to tackle climate change. This horizontal and open structure makes that accountability is not strictly arranged. Cities can participate in initiatives and collaborations if they think that it is in the interest of their citizens. However if it is not, citizens will probably never know. This could become a problem as soon as the C40 increases in power over cities. The "City Diplomacy" strategy that the C40 has set up is already a development towards a more united policy strategy of cities in environmental governance (Chan, 2016). If this development continues, the accountability of the C40 towards the citizens of the member cities might become problematic.

The UNEP, on the other hand, does not only facilitates collaboration and knowledge-sharing, it also facilitates multilateral environmental agreements and stimulates the development of international environmental law (Bauer, 2009). Moreover, it also sets the global environmental agenda, promotes coherent implementation and warrants scrutiny. Hence, the UNEP has a bigger mandate than the C40 and is accountable for more subjects than the C40. The accountability mechanisms are, therefore, more formal than those of the C40. The UNEP secretariat operates under the auspices of

the UN secretary-general, who also appoints the executive director (Bauer, 2009). The Governing Council of the UNEP is consisting fifty-eight members, in which all five United Nations regions are represented. The council members are elected by the members of the UN General Assembly, and mostly consist officials of the environmental ministries of states (Haas, 1994). This means that governments officials are highly involved in the decision-making process of the UNEP (Bauer, 2009).

As the UNEP is by far a larger organization as the C40 (see *inclusive participation* section below), the organizational structure is far more complex as well. It consists of a myriad of agencies and institutions, which it has to govern based on an even more fragmented policy arena. It is argued that the UNEP secretariat has always struggled to coordinate these agencies and institutions (Ivanova, 2010). Despite UNEP's flat hierarchy, concerns have been raised regarding a lack of accessibility at executive levels, the prevalence of a top-down management approach, and internal politicking (Bauer, 2009). Many countries complain of regime saturation, arguing that the UNEP and its agencies exceeds their ability to effectively participate in the management and development on particular environmental issues (Haas, 1994). The complex structure of the UNEP decreases the level of accountability, as not member states are involved but also NGOs and corporations (UNEP, 2016b). In this way, the transparency of the accountability mechanisms of the UNEP is less clear than that of the C40 which has a simple structure. Although the UNEP has undergone some reforms after these concerns were raised in the 1990s, many shortcomings in coordination and accountability have remained (Ivanova, 2010).

Inclusive participation

The procedures to participate in the C40 or the UNEP are different. The UNEP is a program of the UN and is not an independent network of countries. As part of the UN the UNEP has a universal membership, meaning that all members of the UN are automatically a member of the UNEP. Membership of the C40, on the other hand, is voluntarily and the C40 does not have a universal membership. This is also supported by the fact that just 83 cities are members of the C40. In the tables below the member states and cities of the respectively UNEP and C40 are shown by the North-South divide in percentages, as well as the North-South divide of the population of the member states and cities.

UNEP	Global North	Global South
Member states in %	17	84
Population member states in %	16	83

C40	Global North	Global South
Member cities in %	41	59
Population member cities in %	27	73

The table of the UNEP shows that the North-South ratio between the number of member states and the population of those member states is nearly the same (one percent difference). Contrary, the table of the C40 shows a clear difference between the North-South ratio of the population of member cities and the ratio between member cities in general. Whereas the member cities are not far from equally divided between the global North and the global South – 41 percent from the North and 59 percent from the South – there is still a large gap between the size of the population of those cities – namely 27 percent is from the North and 73 percent from the South. This difference is largely due to the 'innovator cities', which are member cities that are too small to be qualified as megacities but have shown 'clear leadership' in environmental and climate change work (C40, 2016d). From the 22 innovator cities, 15 are from the global North and 7 from the global South.

When analyzing the role of the cities from the global North and the global South within the C40, it is found that the important functions of the organization are dominated by cities from the North. In the C40 today, the C40 Secretariat, the Chair and the Steering Committee set the agenda and framework for action through C40 (Bouteligier, 2013). The Northern countries dominate these functions – the Secretariat is in London, the C40 Chair is New York City (and previously London and Toronto) and the Steering Committee is currently consisting of Berlin, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, New York, Saõ Paolo, Seoul, Tokyo. Next to this, the South has not hosted any summits, conferences or workshops between 2005 and 2010. The events during that time are hosted in Basel, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hong Kong, London, Los Angeles, New York, Rotterdam, Seoul and Tokyo. By hosting events, cities can get the opportunity to influence the content and direction of the issues on the agenda. They can influence how problems and solutions are frames and which practices are seen as the best practices (Bouteligier, 2013). Thus, by Northern cities hosting all C40 meetings, it is probable that cities from the North have had more opportunities

to influence in the policy-making process of the C40. This inequality in participation is less visible in the UNEP, as all the important functions and events are equally distributed among the five UN regions (UNEP, 2016a).

In terms of effort, both the C40 and the UNEP stimulate the Global South to participate more. According to Chan (2016), the C40 has made "*ongoing* efforts" promoting more equality between cities in participating in environmental decision-making (Chan, 2016, p. 16). Despite the fact that most best practices are still selected from the North (Bouteligier, 2013), the Secretariat of the C40 has been actively trying to overcome the North-South barrier (Chan, 2016). The C40 has continually strived to an equal participation of cities from the North and cities from the South, for example in the decision-making process. (Chan, 2016). Moreover, the C40 was found to decrease technical barriers between cities from the North and cities from the South, by sharing knowledge between municipal officials. Member cities do not have to participate in every networks of the C40, but can solely participate in the networks which they find most useful, so that the sharing of knowledge can be on a deep and detailed level. This means that cities, also from the South, can use practical information shared by other cities (Chan, 2016). These examples show that although in theory cities from the North have more say in the decision-making process of the C40, it does make an effort to get cities from the South involved and overcome barriers between developed cities and less developed cities (Chan, 2016).

The UNEP has been actively supporting environmental activities in developing countries and regions of the South (UNEP, 2016c). By rectifying the General Assembly resolutions and UNEP Governing Council decisions (UNEP/GC/24/12 and UNEP/GC/25/9), the UNEP has set up a South-South Cooperation program to enhance knowledge sharing between countries from the Global South. According to the UNEP, South-South cooperation is "an essential cross-cutting mechanism to enhance UNEP's ability to deliver environmental capacity." (UNEP, 2016c). This strategy is not only supported by the developing countries itself, but is also supported by the donor community, acknowledging that the experiences and successes that many countries of the Global South have achieved can provide valuable input, ideas and means for other countries in the South (UNEP, 2016c). The office for South-South Cooperation has, among others, developed and implemented a policy guidance to facilitate and enhance the systematic integration of South-South Cooperation in the UNEP programs and it has set up the UNEP SSC Exchange Mechanism, which is an online tool that promotes the sharing of SSC initiatives, events, and success stories (UN Office for South South Cooperation, 2016). Not only does the UNEP facilitate more South-South cooperation, it is also reinforces progress in South-North cooperation and technology transfer (Shende, 2015).

6. DISCUSSION

The results found by the comparison of the C40 and the UNEP are important because they contradict the assumption that city networks enhance democracy in global governance, at least when looking at accountability and inclusive participation as democratic criteria. The results do not show any significant difference between the democratic performance of the C40 and the UNEP. However, the inclusiveness of members of the UNEP seem to be more higher than the inclusiveness of the C40. How should these finding be interpreted?

On the principle of accountability, the C40 and the UNEP are hard to compare, as they take on a very different role in global governance. Whereas the C40 is mainly an organization for knowledge sharing and advocacy, the UNEP is the main authority on environmental policies in global governance. It is found that the accountability mechanisms of the UNEP are more formal and strictly organized, whereas this remains unclear for the C40. Although the C40 is a horizontal and open network, there is no clear accountability mechanism which ensures that the interests of the citizens of cities are represented. Moreover, the criteria of accountability seems not the be of much concern in the C40 organization. An explanation for this finding could be that environmental governance networks are often set up because they are effective and innovative, rather than democratic per se (Aarsæther, Nyseth, & Bjørnå, 2011). These qualities of city networks are also acknowledged by Barber (2013) stating that they enhance "efficiency and productivity" in solving global problems (Barber, 2013, preface xx). Thus, the fact that city networks are often not primarily set up to democratize global governance, might cause that accountability is not a clearly embedded in these networks.

As for the inclusive participation criteria, is it found that the C40 does not enhance participation by the Global South. Some scholars have argued that city networks are networks "of pioneers for pioneers" (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 329). Networks in which cities can voluntarily participate often have a more *laissez-faire* approach, which means that networks do not have the authority to force their members to apply specific strategies at the local level. This *laissez-faire* approach is found to be reinforcing differing patterns of network participation between leading cities and cities that are already lagging behind (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Even among city networks in which cities join deliberately, there is a clear distinction between the active 'pioneers' and a periphery of passive cities (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Pioneer municipalities are cities that cities often have joined the networks in the early stages of their development. They benefit from the networks as they gain new ideas, access to funding and legitimacy at the local level (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Passive network

members, on the other hand, often lack financial, human and political resources to participate in network activities (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). City networks are thus also described as an "elite-driven" afffair (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2003). This argument is also reflected in the case of the C40. As shown in the results, cities from the North are overrepresented in holding important offices, but also in organizing summits, conferences and other types of meetings. Assuming that cities from the North often have more resources and thus are more often 'pioneers', this would explain why they play a more active role in the C40 network.

There are several limitations to this study that should be acknowledged. First of all, there are plenty of other democratic criteria to assess networks, from a cosmopolitan democratic perspective as well as criteria derived from Barber (2013). The principle of equality, for example, is often mentioned in the literature as a third criteria for democracy (e.g. Hazenberg & Mulieri, 2013). This principle, however, is not explicitly defined by cosmopolitan democracy or Barber (2013) as such. As Held (1995, p. 208) states: "the ideal [of autonomy] is not in itself an ideal of equality in all political, social and economic spheres. Inequality is only significant […] to the extent that it bears on participative possibilities and enables or restricts autonomy". The same goes for other principles that could be defined as criteria to define democracy: although these might be important as well, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all the criteria that could be defining democracy. Moreover, as shown in the first subquestion, inclusive participation and accountability cover the main purpose of democracy as described by Barber (2013).

Also, it should be acknowledged that intergovernmental networks between nation-states are still more powerful and renowned than city networks, and that environmental problems are generally managed by nation-states and international organizations controlled by them (Feldman, 2012). In the UNEP every member of the UN participates, whereas the C40 just consists of 83 affiliated cities. This makes that the two networks differ in organizational structure. For example, the UNEP has 21 different secretariats whereas the C40 has just one secretariat. The UNEP also has regional offices on every continent. This makes that the UNEP is automatically more inclusive in participation, simply because the organization is bigger. On the other hand, however, more participants does not necessarily mean more inclusiveness. Also, the fact that the UNEP is more powerful than the C40 could be an incentive for nations to join this program, instead of participating in city networks such as the C40. If cities can already have a saying in a influential network such as the UNEP, it might be less of a priority to join a city network as well. The inclusive participation of states in the UNEP could thus have an effect on the participation of cities in the C40.

7.   CONCLUSION

As John Dryzek (2000, p. 135) once commented: "experimenting with what democracy can mean is an essential part of democracy itself". If this is true, Barber (2013) has made a good start introducing the Global Parliament of Mayors. Barber (2013) argues that in order to democratize global governance, cities should be the main actors of decision-making. By governing through city networks, cities are assumed to be increasing the democratic performance of international politics. In this study, the underlying democratic criteria of Barber (2013) are defined from a cosmopolitan democracy perspective. It is argued that the two main principles of cosmopolitan democracy – *accountability* and *inclusive participation* – are reflected in Barber's perspective of democracy as well. Elaborating on these criteria, two intergovernmental networks are analyzed and compared – the city-to-city network C40 and the nation-to-nation network UNEP. Overall, this study has found that there is no significant difference between the level of accountability and inclusiveness of the C40 network and the UNEP. Thus, this study contradicts the assumption that city networks would enhance democracy in global governance, at least when using these two democratic criteria based on the work of Barber (2013).

These findings have implications for Barber's idea that cities should 'rule the world'. If cities might in fact not rule more democratically than nation-states, then it could be stated that cities would not be the best decision-makers in international politics per se – at least when arguing in favor of democracy in general. Although this study has only focused on city networks, it can be stated that in this case cities do not fill in the 'democratic deficit' that nation-states are argued to be having in global governance. However, further research should find out whether cities in general indeed rule evenly democratic as nation-states or not. Research could be done on the role of cities in other types of cooperation than networks, for example when cooperating with nation-states or when cities act individually. Also, the democratic performance of cities could be studied by defining to what extent the party politics of municipalities still plays a role when cities act on the global stage.

Barber not only argues that cities are more democratic, he also puts forward several other arguments supporting his claim that cities are the best decision-making actors in governance. For example, Barber argues that mayors should be the main policy-making officials, as they are more pragmatic and thus govern more efficiently (Barber, 2013). To assess this broader claim, further research should be done on how cities govern and what the role of mayors is. Especially as Barber is setting up a Global Parliament of Mayors, convening at the end of 2016, it would be useful to study what the consequences of this network are on global governance. Although "experimenting" with

democracy could be the solution to a democratic deficit in governance, this experimenting should be studied in itself as well.

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