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Accountability and Opposition Parties in Dutch Municipal Councils

Abstract:

The democratic legitimacy of Dutch municipalities has been under stress. Decreasing voter turnouts in municipal elections questions the democratic credentials of municipalities. Even council members question the strength of the councils to hold their executives accountable. The perceived need to strengthen local democracies has also come forth by clearly separating the functions of the executive and the municipal council or by decentralising responsibilities to municipalities. This thesis is written to show if the council members are capable of holding the executive accountable. This is done by comparing different circumstances and how these affect the degree in which council members vote along the lines of coalition and opposition. Three cases were used for this, namely The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude. The results show that council members show similar voting patters compared to Dutch members of parliament. While unanimous votes occur often, it can also be seen that local opposition parties are equally capable of holding the executive accountable compared to the national opposition parties.

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Introduction

Ever since the 1980s the Dutch national government has followed a trend of delegating increasing numbers of tasks to municipalities. The arguments for doing this vary, but they mostly involve the quality or efficiency of how the tasks are performed, and that this increases the democratic legitimacy of municipalities (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 230). However, the idea that democratic legitimacy is increased is based solely on the assumption that because municipalities have more responsibilities, citizens can hold them accountable for these tasks and demand changes through elections, citizen initiatives or referenda. If this assumption does not hold true and municipalities are not able to change the policies that govern their responsibilities, then the argument of democratic legitimacy is in itself false.

Wim Derksen and Linze Schaap's research points to this. According to them, local administrators are disappointed at their lack of a liberty that would enable them to make policies (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 233). They had expected more freedom in how they could choose to implement the responsibilities municipalities had been given. Furthermore, Elzinga claimed in 2009 that if local governments were to be given more responsibilities, their space and freedom to take up new initiatives would be diminished (Elzinga, 2009: 67). This would effectively turn municipalities into executive offices of the national government. Certainly with the new cases of decentralisation that are being implemented in 2015, the question of democratic legitimacy is one that needs to be answered. Are local democracies in the Netherlands being threatened? An inquiry performed by TNS Nipo in the face of the municipal elections of 2014 suggests that this might be the case. Their results show that two months before the election, disinterest in

voting was at an all time low (TNS Nipo, 2014). Many people do not see any use in voting, think they know too little about local politics or they have no interest in politics at all.

What is even more striking is that the confidence of council members in municipal councils is also decreasing. Two months before the elections the Dutch 'Association for Council members' published results of an inquiry they had held. The most important findings they discovered are that 7 out of 10 council members see the increasing amount of municipal regulations as a threat to the functioning of a local democracy (Raadslid.nu, 2014), 4 out of 10 council members think that because of regional collaboration (with other municipalities), the municipal council becomes less important and 3 out of 10 council members do not agree with the statement that the municipal council is the most important part of a local government. According to them, the demand for more efficiency and the increasing amount of regulations and collaborations with other municipalities decrease the importance of the municipal council.

If council members see local democracy (that is, the municipal council) being threatened and if voters do not have any interest in municipal politics, can we therefore say that local democracy is not functioning? This might very well be just a perception, while at the same time the parties in municipal councils may have various legitimate policy alternatives to choose from that are not found due to a lack of creativity in finding new solutions. The question that needs to be answered is whether it possible for political parties and their council members to really be distinct from one another in a municipal council. And can these parties provide valid alternatives to citizens so that they really have a meaningful choice when it comes electing their representatives? In

other words, can council members hold the executives of Dutch municipalities accountable for the policies that they implement and can voters in turn hold the council members, their representatives, accountable for their responsibilities?

This thesis aims to answer this question by answering the question of whether opposition parties are capable of providing alternatives in municipal councils. It is probable that coalition parties do not criticise the executives as much as opposition parties do, so looking at the voting behaviour of opposition parties is the best way to determine whether municipal councils hold the executive accountable for their policies. No research has yet been done on the voting behaviour of parties in Dutch municipal councils, but such research has been done on the national level. Visscher has done research on bills that were processed in the Dutch parliament from 1963 to 1986 (Andeweg et al., 2008: 99). One of his findings was that the party that opposed government bills the most, the Communist party, voted against only 16% of the bills. Bills and amendments from the opposition are passed less often, but they are still not all doomed for failure. The success rate of bills and amendments from the opposition also seemed to increase through the years. Furthermore, Andeweg comments that a blurring between coalition and opposition will occur if parties are growing less distinctive sociologically and ideologically (Andeweg, 2013: 111). Otjes and Louwerse, however, come up with a slightly different conclusion. They see that the division between coalition and opposition is not an absolute one (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013: 19). Dutch members of parliament change their behaviour within different contexts (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013:18). Thus they nuance the blurring between coalition and opposition since it largely depends on the context of the issues that are at stake.

As stated above, no similar research has been done on the municipal level. This thesis will aim to fill this gap. This will be done in the context of recent developments, including decentralisation, the lack of interest in local politics amongst citizens and the concern of council members about the importance of the municipal council. Thus it will aim to give an outline of the voting behaviour of council members and it will disclose the differences in voting behaviour between coalition and opposition parties and the patterns that govern these differences. The following parts of my research proposal will explain how I want to do this.

Chapter 1: Accountable municipalities?

The aim of this chapter is to provide information to help the reader understand the function of municipalities in the Netherlands. It will start by explaining what accountability is in the context of (democratic) systems and how this works in Dutch municipalities. Afterwards it will provide information on the debate on how municipalities and local politics in the Netherlands are developing. A third goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of how democracies function. The Netherlands has long been known for its tradition of using consensus in politics in order to bring different and competing groups together. Scholars have also written on what could happen if the differences between groups in society and politics were diminished. It is relevant for this thesis to visit this body of literature, since ideological distinctions between parties seem to matter less in municipalities, resulting in unclear differences between different parties. The fourth part of this chapter is on the rise of local parties in the Netherlands and what may have caused this development. Finally, a conclusion will summarise the results that will be used for the following chapter on the research design of this thesis.

Democratic accountability and Dutch municipalities

It was shown in the introduction to this thesis that various contemporary developments around Dutch municipalities are causes for concern over the democratic legitimacy of this institution. Council members feel threatened in the liberty they have to come up with new policies. The decentralisation of responsibilities to municipalities did not bring new space to come up with new initiatives. Municipal regulations and

collaborations between various municipalities on certain policies are seen as a threats to the health of local democracies by a relatively large group of council members. And one third of the council members in the Netherlands disagree with the question about whether the municipal council is the most important part of the local government.

At the core of these issues lies the question of democratic accountability. If decentralisation does not come with the liberty to implement new initiatives, how can council members hold the executive accountable for their policies? If municipal regulations and collaborations grow in importance and policies are therefore outsourced to new institutions, how do council members hold these institutions accountable for their work? And if one third of the council members are right in saying that the municipal council is not the most important part of a municipality, does that not mean that the council fails in its task to hold the executive accountable? A lack of means to hold those who create and implement policies accountable could threaten the democratic legitimacy of the municipal council.

Academic literature has written broadly on the topic of democratic accountability. Mark Bovens sees two patterns in the writing on accountability (Bovens, 2010: 947-948). He first mentions a body of literature in which the writers seemingly see accountability, or 'being accountable', as a virtue or a positive quality for officials and institutions to have. Examples he names are the works of Considine (2002), Klinger (et al., 2001), Koppel (2005), O'Connell (2005) and Wang (2002). A second body of literature on accountability focuses more on the mechanisms or relations between different actors. The behaviour of individual agents is not in mind within these works, but more how institutional arrangements operate. Examples of scholars who write on

accountability as a mechanism are Aucoin and Jarvis (2005), Day and Klein (1987), Goodin (2003), Mulgan (2003), Philp (2009) and Scott (2000).

It goes too far for this thesis to elaborate their work. Much of it is abstract and rarely if ever looks specifically at municipalities. It suffices to point to Bovens (2010) who sees two different kinds of concepts when it comes to accountability, namely accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism. According to him, accountability as a virtue is being used as a synonym for words like clarity, transparency and responsibility (Bovens, 2010: 949). Being accountable in this sense shows "a willingness to act in a transparent, fair and equitable way" (Bovens, 2010: 949). However, it is difficult to measure whether someone or something is accountable enough, since the application of this virtue differs according to the organisation, system or any other context. The standards to measure accountability as a virtue will thus vary and according to Bovens it is impossible to come up with a single definition or standard for accountability when it is thought of in this way (Bovens, 2010: 950).

Accountability as a mechanism is a type of accountability that Bovens deducts from a second body of literature. Two different types of persons or institutions are important with this kind of accountability, namely the actor and the forum (Bovens, 2010: 952). Three factors are necessary between the actor and the forum in order to have an 'accountable relationship'. Firstly, it is important that the actor "is, or feels, obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct" (Bovens, 2010: 952). Accountability as a virtue is necessary for the actor to show a willingness to be open about his conduct to the forum. Secondly, the forum has the ability to question the actor on the adequacy of the information provided or the legitimacy of the actor's conduct. And thirdly, the forum

can pass judgment and possibly sanctions on the actor if that is necessary (Bovens, 2010: 952).

Within municipalities there are at least two different mechanisms in place that are relevant for this thesis. First, there is a connection between the executive (with the mayor and aldermen) and the municipal council. Here the executive is the actor and the council is the forum. The council holds the executive accountable for their conduct and their policies. They can approve or disapprove the plans of the executive and thus question them or pass a verdict on them. A second connection is between the council and the citizens. Here the council holds the role of actor and the citizens are the forum. The council members should, as their representatives, inform the citizens of their choices and be open about their ideas. Citizens, in turn, can question whether their representatives carry out their responsibilities correctly and with elections they can pass judgment on the council members. As Bovens (2010: 955) says: "At the end of the accountability chain are the citizens, who pass judgment on the conduct of the government, and who indicate their displeasure by voting for other popular representatives." The following part of this chapter will show how municipalities in the Netherlands have developed and how the topic of accountability is relevant for the evaluation of this development.

Dutch municipalities and how they developed

Wim Derksen, an expert on Dutch municipalities, in a interview from 2005, made the following statement, which generally follows public opinion on the functioning of municipalities (Bekkers, 2005; own translation): "You can easily say that the

Netherlands have no local governance. Ninety percent of what municipalities actually do is carrying out the policies of the national government. They are not stimulated to develop their own policies. They are more like a counter for the citizens, but not a place where matters are decided. It is incredibly hard to make something fun out of local politics. The municipal elections are in fact about nothing special. They are just polls for the national elections."

In this statement, Derksen highlights certain key elements of Dutch municipalities: municipalities have the autonomy (Dutch: *autonomie*) to make their own policies, but in practice they mostly carry out the policies of the national government. This last task is called 'co-governance' (Dutch: *medebewind*). The difference between these two concepts is that autonomy highlights the freedom municipalities have to come with their own plans and initiatives as long as these are within the bounds of the law, either national or European laws (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 102). Co-governance highlights the responsibilities that municipalities have been given by the national government (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 102). We can speak of 'co-governance' because municipalities have limited freedom to choose how they implement their responsibilities. They thus work together with the national government. The fact that municipalities are not stimulated to develop their own policies has several causes, such as a lack of financial means, but also the lack of time and energy resulting from the need to spend this on the implementation of national policies. It indicates that municipalities are not as autonomous as they are officially described as being and that co-governance is difficult to achieve and looks very like carrying out the national government's orders. This part of this chapter is meant to show how this situation came into being.

It can be said from a historical perspective that municipalities have been around for a longer time than the national government in the Netherlands (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 96). Originally their tasks were distinct, but in the 19th century they increasingly started to coincide. Municipalities started to take care of the poor in their cities and villages, ensure the removal of trash, public hygiene and more. The national government in turn came up with laws to increase the welfare of the people by writing policies for housing, education and taking care of the poor and unemployed (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 96-99). A new development came after the financial crisis of the 1930s. Municipalities had gained more tasks than they had before, but the financial crisis revealed that the policies in municipalities and means that they had were unequal. A new concept that everyone should have an equal right for support from the government resulted into the centralisation of tasks form the local to the national government.

Municipalities lost the right to implement taxes on income in 1929 and from then onwards they have been largely financed by the national government with a special fund, in Dutch: *gemeentefonds* (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 178). They had lost, for many of their original tasks, the autonomy to conceive their own policies and in return had to implement the policies of the national government (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 100). It can be said that during this change the mechanisms of democratic accountability changed too. Municipalities had become accountable to the national government that provided them with the financial means. At the same time citizens lost the opportunity to hold municipalities accountable for the policies that were now created by the national government. They could still hold the municipalities accountable for how they managed their tasks during elections, but at the same time these elections became less 'political'.

The tide turned in the 1980s. The national government became convinced that centralising tasks was not always the most efficient and best way to handle problems. Instead they found reasons to decentralise tasks to local government. Arguments for doing this involved arguments for efficiency and the potential for tailor-made solutions for specific problems (Boogers et al., 2008: 13). Another important argument was that voters could exercise more control over the policies and that this would strengthen local democracies (Boogers et al, 2008: 13). Reasons to believe this include the fact that the policy makers are closer to the voters if these are created locally instead of nationally. Furthermore, the potential for tailor-made solutions could mean that policymakers have more alternatives to choose from. This has the result that they have more to be accountable for to the citizens of the municipalities than they previously were. Norman Loayza (et al., 2014: 56) says it well that "the belief behind these reforms is that local jurisdictions remain "more accountable" to the people and are in a better position to understand and address the needs of the local population."

However, while municipalities gained more responsibilities, they remained dependent on funding by the national government and hereby remained limited in creating specific policies. Research in other countries has showed that financial autonomy has a positive effect on the involvement of voters in municipalities, especially when it comes to issues of cost efficiency (Geys et al., 2009: 274). Benny Geys, Friedrich Heinemann and Alexander Kalb found such results with German municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg (ibid, 270). This federal state of Germany has municipalities that are dependent on grants from the federal government, but it also has municipalities that are independent from such grants (Geys et al., 2009: 268). Furthermore, Claus Michelsen, Peter Boenisch and Benny Geys found that the

decentralisation of decisions on public groups has a positive effect in German municipalities on the voter turnout (Michelsen et al., 2014: 470). Fully centralised municipalities tend to have a lower voter turnout than 'federal municipalities' that spread the decision-making process over multiple levels (Michelsen et al., 2014: 482). They say that "allowing voters to express more detailed preferences regarding local public goods depending on the geographical reach of these public goods thus increases turnout" (Michelsen et al., 2014: 482). Michelsen and his colleagues have built their theoretical framework on the literature on fiscal federalism, which assumes among other things a congruence between government actions and their finances (Michelsen et al., 2014: 471). This indicates their assumption that the decentralisation of responsibilities and tasks in German municipalities coincides with financial autonomy.

Research on German municipalities shows that voter turnout in elections increases when municipalities are independent from government grants and the voter turnout also increases when responsibilities are decentralised. The fact that voters tend to hold their municipalities more accountable when these are financially autonomous creates uncertainty in the Dutch situation. Is decentralisation of responsibilities without financial independence enough to strengthen democracies and increase accountability? Or does it turn municipalities in a counter for the national government, like Derksen suggests (Bekkers, 2005), without having any effect on the ability of council members to hold the executive accountable or on the ability of the citizens to hold their representatives (the council members) accountable?

How can we assess the ability within municipalities to hold different parts of these local governments democratically accountable? Derksen generally assesses

municipalities critically by looking at what they can and cannot do, both formally and informally. In this way, he comes to the conclusion that municipalities are severely limited when it comes to their freedom to act autonomously and their ability to make tailor-made solutions for their given responsibilities. It might be said from this perspective that municipalities are politically insignificant or that they do not practice politics at all. Instead they mostly carry out the policies of the national government. A different and more positive view on local politics is held by Marcel Boogers (2010). He holds the opinion that local politics have a special character and that viewing local politics from different perspectives helps us to assess the qualities of it (Boogers, 2010: 18-19). However, he remains critical about local politics, saying that it stands too much in the shadow of national politics (Boogers, 2010: 124). Or in other words, that local politics is not local enough and that national interests overshadow local interests during elections. He also mentions that alternative views in local politics are presented in a unclear manner and that citizens now, more easily than in the past, can come up with solutions. Political parties and council members have therefore become less important.

According to Boogers, one of the more positive aspects of local politics is that it can function like a school to teach the participants about politics (Boogers, 2010: 40-41). Because local politics is also closer to the citizens than national politics, it is also easier to come into contact with politicians and discuss or debate the future and thus have influence over the outcome (Boogers, 2010: 45-46). Citizens can also bring forth new problems or wishes for improvements for in their neighbourhood. By stimulating this, municipalities can create people who are actively engaged in the creation and implementation of policies. Another way local politics can function is that talented people can be recruited from local politics into other levels of governance or political

representation (Boogers, 2010: 66-68). All of these aspects of local politics are indeed important to describe how local politics is functioning or can function. But also important in local politics is the ability of the council to hold the executive accountable.

Van der Brug and Van Praag describe that in 2002 a new law separated the responsibilities of the executive and of the municipal council in order to create a dual system (Van der Brug & Van Praag, 2006: 125). The intention of this separation of responsibilities was to provide an incentive for the council members to hold the executive accountable. Citizens in municipalities can vote people in and out of the municipal council and thus also have influence on who will be on the executive board and who will keep them accountable. However, can citizens also change the policies of their municipality by choosing different representatives for their council? If yes, then it can be said that citizens can actually influence policies through their representatives and that these representatives are thus accountable to the citizens for the decisions they make. If not, then it can be said that there is a democratic deficiency in municipalities. A dual system was created so that political representatives can hold the executive politically accountable.

The following part of this chapter will describe how politics in Dutch municipalities function. It will also take a deeper look at the necessity of having alternatives to choose from in politics. This will be done by looking at the literature on consociational and consensus democracies. The Netherlands has long been characterised as a model for one or both of these systems. Many have also written on what is necessary for systems such as these to operate and what could happen if these necessities were to change. This will

give extra insight on how the Dutch municipalities should operate, how they actually are operating and how theories predict that they could operate in the future.

Consociational democracy in the Netherlands

In trying to describe the various patterns of opposition in democratic systems, Robert Dahl observed that "the competitiveness of opposition (..) depends in large measure, though not completely, on the number and nature of parties, i.e., on the extent to which opposition is concentrated" (Dahl, 1966: 337). Thus the party system and the way in which a democracy is shaped determine for a large part how competitive the opposition will be.

Arend Lijphart provides relevant research describing the institutional and practical differences between the different kinds of democracy. In his book 'Patterns of Democracy' (1999) Lijphart states a relevant question that follows the definition of democracy as "government by and for the people". He asks: "who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?" (Lijphart, 1999:1) The answers that he observes are either 'the majority of the people' or 'as many people as possible'. Much of Lijphart's work emphasises the ways in which majoritarian and consensual political systems work. Helpful is Lijphart's concept of consociational democracy. This concept arose from the question of how a stable democracy is possible in deeply segmented societies whilst being largely behavioural by nature (Lijphart, 2007: 7). Lijphart observed that there were countries that were both highly divided socially and divided politically as well (Lijphart, 2007: 25-28). However, some of these countries had stable

democracies while others had not. Lijphart eventually concluded that while the elites competed against each other, the same elites also worked together and made "deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation" (Lijphart, 2007: 28). One of the characterising ways this happens is that the seats in parliament are divided proportionally and that elites work together in 'grand coalitions'. Lijphart names a democracy that is characterised by a segmented society and cooperating elites a 'consociational democracy'.

Other types of democracies also emerged from his analyses. Lijphart named homogeneous and stable democracies as centripetal democracies, while the fragmented and unstable democracies where named centrifugal democracies (Lijphart, 2007: 36-37). Elites compete in both types of democracies, although Lijphart also sees some elements of consociationalism in centripetal democracies (Lijphart, 2007: 38-39). The different kinds of democracy that Lijphart conceptualised all have in common that they assume some sort of an underlining division within politics. Either society itself is divided which has an effect on the political arena, or the political parties are divided and compete with each other for the favour of the voters. A type of democracy that Lijphart omits, but Andeweg includes, is the 'depolitized democracy' (Andeweg, 2000: 510-511). This is a democracy wherein elites work together and are not so much divided but where social segmentation is also absent (Andeweg, 2000: 532). This is a description that seems to typify municipalities. The fear that municipalities function as counters for the national government and barely make policies of their own, assumes that the municipal council cannot come up with alternatives to choose from. Thus there is no competition between the elites.

Katz and Mair (1995) describe something similar with the rise of what they call the 'cartel party'. They look at the development of parties in the twentieth century. A general summary of their observation is that they see that parties are becoming increasingly more professional and are also becoming more part of the government. Politicians are becoming more and more like professionals and less like representatives. The culmination of this development is the cartel party (Katz & Mair, 1995: 17). Two of the characteristics of this kind of party are that competition is contained and that the limited competition that remains is increasingly more based on claims of efficient and effective management (Katz & Mair, 1995: 19). Accountability for policies will become less important in a system like this. The effect, according to them, is that none of the major parties are at risk of being excluded from a government position, that party programs are becoming more similar and that the distinction between parties in office (coalition) and parties out of office (opposition) are becoming blurred (Katz & Mair, 1995: 22). The blurring of distinctions between parties may eventually cause the rise of newcomers seeking to "break the mould" (Katz & Mair, 1995: 24). Andeweg comments on this, saying "the absence of true opposition within the system is likely to result in opposition against the system" (Andeweg, 2000: 533). This shows that it is necessary for the municipal council to hold the executive accountable for the policies that they implement. A lack of opposition or a lack of ability on the part of a municipality could potentially cause a lack of democratic legitimacy for the system and the politicians operating within it.

According to Andeweg, the distinctions between coalition and opposition parties can be blurred in different ways with majority coalitions. Firstly, opposition parties can support the policies of the government (Andeweg, 2013: 103-106). In other words, they

will work with instead of against their opponents. And secondly, coalition parties can align themselves with the opposition (Andeweg, 2013: 106-107). Both ways of blurring can happen more easily in instances when the ideological profile between parties is becoming less important. This is precisely the case in municipalities. Here it is difficult for parties to come up with strong ideological profiles. It is, for example, difficult to implement a socialist or liberal ideology into plans that involve issues like the planting of trees or maintaining roads. The implications of this are not totally clear. Many authors believe that a lack of distinctions between parties can result voters to conclude that there is no meaningful option within the system. This might result in a vote against the system (Andeweg, 2013: 111). One way this might become apparent is that people will vote for populist parties that promise an alternative compared to the already existing establishment (Katz & Mair, 1995: 24). Another way could be a lack of interest in elections.

Are local parties a reaction to a lack of ideological profiles?

It has been seen over the previous decades that municipal politics is followed with less interest than national politics (Boogers, 2010: 29). Interest amongst voters for municipal elections has also been declining for quite some years, but it cannot easily be concluded that this is because parties are becoming less distinct. (TNS Nipo, 2014). It is difficult to ascertain whether there are new local parties in Dutch municipalities that are against the system, but local parties are growing in importance. Local parties are parties that are not a branch of a nationally operating party, but only operate in one municipality. There are several potential reasons for the rise of local parties. Boogers, Lucardie and Voerman mention the increasing dissatisfaction among voters with the

national parties that rule in The Hague (Boogers et al., 2007: 8). They refer to Joop van Holsteyn who called this the 'paradox of the local list'. Distaste for national parties causes the rise of local alternatives. Derksen also mentions another reason that could point to an increase in local parties. Parties are becoming less distinct on ideological grounds and this can provide chances for local parties who often do not have a strong ideological profile (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 33).

Local parties are characterised by their emphasis on the specific problems of the municipality they are from and some say that they can also be more sensitive to the wishes of the voters (Boogers, 2010: 69). Local parties are not all alike. Derksen points out that no-one has yet managed to come up with typologies of different local parties that are based on empirical grounds (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 31). This makes it clear that while local parties have some common denominators, they are also very different from each other. The positions of these parties on traditional left-right scales are often unclear, according to Boogers and Voerman (2010: 85). Instead, they see local parties introducing three new political divisions that separate and shape the political landscape.

First, local parties tend to emphasise municipal interests over regional, provincial or national interests (Boogers & Voerman, 2010: 85). Secondly, they introduce a dividing line between the establishment and anti-establishment (Boogers & Voerman, 2010: 85-86). The reason for this is logical. If local parties arise out of a neglect of local interests by the establishment, then it follows that local parties place themselves against the establishment. Thirdly, local parties tend to stress geographical and demographic divisions within a municipality (Boogers & Voerman, 2010: 86). Examples of this are parties which uphold the interests of a specific village, neighbourhood or part of the city.

Islamic parties in the municipal council of The Hague are examples of parties that defend the interests of certain demographic groups.

Conclusion

To determine whether municipalities have mechanisms in place to keep the executive and council members accountable, we need to determine whether they exhibit the three characteristics that Bovens (2010) mentions (see above). These characteristics are necessary in order to have an 'accountable relationship' between the actor and the forum. Firstly, it is important that the actor "is, or feels, obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct" (Bovens, 2010: 952). Secondly, the forum has the ability to question the actor on the adequacy of the information provided or the legitimacy of the actor's conduct. Thirdly, the forum can pass judgment and possibly sanctions on the actor if that is necessary (Bovens, 2010: 952). These mechanisms are officially in place within municipalities. Council members are the forum that holds the executive accountable for the implementation of policies. In turn the voters are function as a forum that holds the council members accountable.

These mechanisms are in place, but it is unclear whether they are functioning well. It can be argued that the lack of distinctions between local parties limits them in holding the executive accountable. If the main thing that municipal governments do is that they carry out the responsibilities of the national government without any possibility for alterations, then we could argue that municipalities cannot be held accountable for the policies that they implement. If municipalities lack this ability, it could be said that their

legitimacy as a functioning democratic system is in danger. This is especially the case in the face of decentralisation of responsibilities and the limited freedom that municipalities have concerning their finances. Choices and alternatives are needed for a democracy to function. If these are not in place, then it could result in dissatisfaction or disinterest with how municipalities are functioning.

Chapter 2: Research Design

Hypotheses

The previous chapter showed that a municipal council should be able to hold the executive accountable. If the council members are not able to this, then it follows that the voters cannot hold the executive accountable either since the voters choose the council members. This would create a democratic deficiency in the functioning of municipalities wherein voters cannot control, change or judge the policies of the executives of their municipalities. Thus the role of the municipal council is critical for finding out how democracy is working in local governments. The research in this thesis intends to find out whether municipal councils demonstrate an ability to hold the executive accountable by looking at the voting behaviour of coalition and opposition parties.

Otjes and Louwerse have shown in similar research that members of the Dutch parliament vote differently depending on the context. It can be assumed that this is also the case in municipal councils and multiple hypotheses are needed to test whether certain topics or conditions favour or do not favour a larger division in voting behaviour. Since Otjes and Louwerse (2013) have done similar research in the Netherlands at the national level, we will borrow four of their hypotheses for this research on parties in municipal councils. This will also create an opportunity to add an hypothesis to see if voting patterns in the Dutch national parliament and the patterns in municipal councils are the same or whether they are different. Furthermore, three additional hypotheses are added to test conditions that are specific to municipalities. The first of these

hypotheses will test whether decentralisation has a positive or negative effect on the coalition-opposition gap. The second hypothesis will be used to determine whether 'local' opposition parties follow different patterns than 'national' opposition parties. The third and final hypothesis will determine whether the size of a municipality strengthens or weakens divisions between the coalition and opposition. Thus, multiple hypotheses are going to be used in order to answer the research question: what are the differences in the voting behaviour of coalition and opposition parties in Dutch municipal councils?

Hypotheses from Otjes and Louwerse

The first hypothesis from Otjes and Louwerse that will be used is what they called the 'Proposal Type Hypothesis'. They formulated it in the following way: "the division between coalition and opposition is weaker regarding votes on bills than on other votes" (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 7). They made this prediction on the premise that bills tend to be rather technical by nature and that these bills might receive broader support for this reason. Another argument Otjes and Louwerse named was that bills tend to be package deals and that many parties can often find at least something in it that they see as an improvement, thus resulting in broader support. A strong effect was found for this hypothesis (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013: 19). Votes on motions and amendments show a stronger division between coalition and opposition than votes on bills. The reason for this is that many bills were adopted unanimously, thus lowering the mean for votes on bills (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 15). The tables turned when all the unanimous votes were deleted. Then bills were more likely to show a higher division between opposition and coalition than motions and amendments.

This hypothesis will be altered in order to make it more in line with the ways municipal councils work. Thus the 'proposal type hypothesis' that will be used here is: the division between coalition and opposition is weaker regarding votes on proposals from the executive board (*college van burgemeester en wethouders*) than on other votes like amendments and motions. Proposals for new policies are being sent by the executive board to the council for approval. A majority of the council has to vote in favour of the proposal for it to pass. Council members also have other methods to alter the propositions of the board. Amendments and motions are the foremost methods. One or more council members can suggest an alteration of a proposal from the executive board by amending it. Thus the rough edges of a proposal can be shaved off or the council can create more support for a proposal by heeding the wishes of council members. Motions are statements from the council to the executive and can be used to officially convey their wishes for changes in current policies or their disapproval of what the board does or plans to do. For this hypothesis it will be expected that municipal councils will follow the same pattern as members of parliament and that this hypothesis will thus be affirmed. This also makes it able to easier compare the results to the results of Otjes and Louwerse.

The second hypothesis from Otjes and Louwerse is the 'sponsorship hypothesis', which says: "the division between coalition and opposition is stronger on proposals sponsored exclusively by opposition parties than on proposals sponsored exclusively by coalition parties" (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 8). For this hypothesis they found what they called "a strong and complex effect of the sponsor's party-affiliation and the divisiveness of the issue" (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 18). They do see the coalition parties closing ranks when the opposition could drive a wedge in the coalition by making controversial

propositions. The opposite happens when the coalition comes up with a controversial proposition. The opposition does not always close ranks when such a proposition is made by the coalition. Divisions in the opposition can thus lower the rate of differences in voting patterns between coalition and opposition parties. It can be expected that with a similar multi-party structure the same effect woud be seen with parties in municipalities and that coalition parties would want to protect their plans against proposals from the opposition. The sponsorship hypothesis from Otjes and Louwerse will be used without any adaptation.

The third hypothesis from Otjes and Louwerse is the 'time hypothesis'. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that coalitions need to be strong in the beginning of a parliamentary term, but when elections come close, the need for parties to express their distinct policy profiles becomes stronger (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 9). For this reason, coalition parties will act more without their coalition partners to show the voters what they stand for. The urge of coalition parties to distance themselves from the coalition they are in will result in a lower difference between coalition and opposition. The following hypothesis was formulated to test this reasoning: "Coalition-opposition voting declines over the course of a parliamentary term" (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013: 10). However, the results of Otjes and Louwerse demonstrated a significant, but very weak effect (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 19). It remains to be seen what the effect will be in municipalities. The wording of the hypothesis will be changed slightly for the use for municipal councils, but will otherwise stay the same. This thesis will be that 'Coalition-opposition voting declines over the course of a municipal council term.'

The fourth hypothesis from Otjes and Louwerse that will be used is the 'budget hypothesis', which they formulated as: "the division between coalition and opposition is stronger on budget votes than on non-budget votes" (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 8). They expected that because of the importance of having control over taxes and government spending, the gap between coalition and opposition parties would be larger with votes on the budget than on votes that are not related to the budget. What they found was that the effect was insignificant (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 19). Within municipalities this might be the same. Municipalities have less freedom to choose how they want to spend their money. What restricts them is that they have been given responsibilities by the national government (decentralisation). They also have less freedom than the national government to impose taxes on citizens. It can thus be expected that the division between coalition and opposition will be insignificant because municipalities have less freedom in their spending.

Other hypotheses

Added to the hypotheses from Otjes and Louwerse will be a fifth hypothesis that will aim to uncover whether disagreement in the municipal council is possible with issues related to decentralised tasks. There are already concerns that the continued decentralisation of responsibilities will cause local administrations to become nothing more than local executive branches of the national government (Elzinga, 2009: 67). Also Derksen and Schaap point to the fact that municipalities have less space to use their autonomy due to the tasks that they have been assigned by the local government (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 102-105). Therefore a hypothesis related to decentralisation is used. This hypothesis will be: the division between coalition and opposition parties is

stronger on issues related to decentralisation than on issues that are not related to decentralisation. If the division between coalition and opposition is smaller with issues related to decentralisation than on other issues, than that would mean that decentralisation does not reinforce local democracies. An opposite result would mean that decentralisation does reinforce democracies. Issues that will fall under this category are those covered by the comprehensive examples from Derksen and Schaap (2010: 233).

The sixth hypothesis that will be used will try to determine whether local parties vote differently compared to other opposition parties. Based on the academic literature on consensus democracies, we can expect that if parties work extensively together (see the concept of the cartel party of Katz & Mair, 1995, above), that this will inevitably result in more parties that are against the system. Because these parties are caused by a lack of serious opposition, they arise as an alternative for the voters to cast their confidence on. We can thus expect that they will vote differently compared to other opposition parties, but it could also be the case that there is barely any difference in voting behaviour. Throughout the Netherlands we see that there is an increase in local parties that enter the municipal council. Thus the following hypothesis will be used: local opposition parties show a larger division between coalition and opposition than national opposition parties.

A seventh hypothesis will be tested to compare the voting behaviour of municipalities to those in the Dutch national parliament. The results of the first four hypotheses will be compared to the results that are found in the work of Otjes and Louwerse. Their hypotheses are identical to those used here. This will also provide a reference to

measure whether the patterns that are found in municipalities show that municipalities are more or less capable than the parliament at holding the executive/government accountable. The seventh hypothesis will therefore be: Voting behaviour in Dutch municipal councils shows a lower division between coalition and opposition parties than voting behaviour in the Dutch national parliament. The reason for the direction of this hypothesis is due to current concerns about how municipal councils are functioning.

The final hypothesis that will be used will determine whether the size of the municipality matters in determining the patterns of coalition-opposition voting. Small municipalities have limited recourses and collaborate with other municipalities more often, in order to perform tasks that would be difficult to perform on their own. It can be expected that these limitations result in fewer alternatives from which council members can choose. In the worst case, council members of opposition parties might have little to no choice other than to accept the proposals of the board of executives. This will result in less of a division between coalition and opposition parties. The following hypothesis will be used to test this: smaller municipalities will have a lower level of division between coalition and opposition than larger municipalities.

Variables

To determine the dependent variable, we need to measure the gap between the coalition and opposition for each vote. This

$$\phi_{co} = \left| \frac{(C_y * O_n) - (C_n * O_y)}{\sqrt{(Y * N * O * C)}} \right|$$

thesis will do this by using the formula used by Otjes and Louwerse that is displayed to the right (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 11). In this formula C_y stands for coalition members of parliament voting yes, C_n for coalition members of parliament voting no, O_y for opposition members of parliament voting yes and O_n for opposition members of parliament voting no. Y, N, O and C stand respectively for the total of yes votes, no votes, opposition votes and coalition votes. The result is a coalition-opposition coefficient where a perfect division between coalition and opposition is 1, whereas a result of 0 stands for no division at all amongst the members of parliament. The results make it possible to easily make comparisons within the data and between datasets from different municipalities. Two extra coefficients will also be made to measure whether local opposition and national opposition parties vote different compared to each other. This will be done by making a separate coalition-opposition coefficient in which either local or national opposition parties are omitted. These coefficients will measure the difference between local opposition parties and coalition parties on the one hand, and national opposition parties and coalition parties on the other hand. Thus a comparison can be made between both types of opposition parties when it comes to their voting behaviour.

The following independent variables will be used to test the hypothesis. The variable 'proposal type' will label each vote according to its type (a proposal from the executive, a motion or a amendment). Most of the issues on which councils vote fall under these three categories, but there are exceptions. Notable exceptions are the proposals by the 'praesidium' (a commission within a council with the task of managing the agenda), an initiative proposal (a policy proposal not coming from the board of executives, but from one or more members of the council) and citizen initiatives. However, these exceptions

are relatively rare and in many cases only involve issues surrounding how the council operates, not policies. For some of these exceptions it was also difficult for to make a category for the sponsorship variable. Because of this the decision has been made to omit these exceptions and only focus on the proposals from the executive, on motions and on amendments.

The second independent variable, the 'sponsorship' variable, will divide each vote into three categories, each indicating by what kind of council member the proposition, motion or amendment is sponsored: opposition, coalition or both. There is no distinction made between proposals sponsored by the executive and motions or amendments by coalition parties. These are all labelled as 'coalition'. The third independent variable, time, will group each vote according to the year in which the vote was cast. The fourth independent variable, budget, determines whether the voting concerns anything related to the annually-made budget or to changes made to the budget, where no = 0 and yes is 1. A similar method will be used to distinguish votes that are related to decentralisation and votes that are not. Issues that are not related to decentralised tasks will be marked with a '0'. Issues that are related to decentralised tasks will be marked with a '1'. Topics that fall under this categories are the ones mentioned earlier with the decentralisation hypothesis, but also subsidies on public libraries, social work, emancipation, sports, care for the elderly, public housing and taxes on real estate (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 233).

Case selection

A selection had to be made out of the many possible cases, since time is limited and because it would be impossible to gather data from all municipalities in the Netherlands. Data on the voting behaviour of the council was gathered from the minutes of council meetings made by the council clerk (*raadsgriffier*). These minutes should register every vote and are thus the best source from which to gather the necessary data. Since 2002 every municipality has been obliged by law to have a clerk (Derksen & Schaap, 2010: 58-59). This ensures in theory that it is possible to gather the minutes from every municipality in the Netherlands. But this has been more difficult in practice. Smaller municipalities do not always have their minutes available online. If they do, then in most cases it was only for the time-period of 2009 till early 2014. This is in contrast with the larger municipalities like The Hague and Rotterdam that offer the minutes from 2002 to now.

The lack of data for smaller municipalities was one of the reasons why it was not possible to use the data of more than one council term for the datasets of this thesis. A choice had to be made between either using small municipalities as cases and stick with one term (2010 till 2014), or to abandon the comparison between large and small municipalities and also compare different terms (ideally also with different coalition and opposition parties in each term). The latest option would have been helpful to discover more patterns in voting behaviour and could have potentially strengthened the conclusions, but it would have made it impossible to witness the effect of the size of municipalities. This is currently a topic of debate now that the Dutch government wants

to merge smaller municipalities. Because of this a choice has been made to stick with one term, but with multiple municipalities.

Finally a decision was made to choose municipalities from one province: South-Holland. One of the largest municipalities of this province is The Hague. Amongst the smallest municipalities of this province are Strijen and Zoeterwoude. These two municipalities had enough minutes online to make the data gathering easier.

Statistical Methods

The datasets that were created after the extraction of the necessary data from the minutes of the council meetings vary in size. In the municipality of The Hague, 1450 votes were cast on proposals from the board, motions and amendments. 208 votes in Strijen and 300 votes in Zoeterwoude were cast in the same time period. The means vary as well. Votes cast in The Hague have a mean of 0.4556, while Strijen and Zoeterwoude have means of 0.0826 and 0.1907 respectively. There are other issues with the data, namely that the distribution of the data in all datasets seems not to be normal. Appendix 1 contains the histograms that show the frequencies of the data. 269 of the 1450 cases that were voted upon in The Hague were unanimous. For Strijen 182 out of 208 cases were unanimous and in Zoeterwoude this was the case with 229 out of 300 cases. These deviations from normally distributed data cause some trouble for the analysis. It means that parametric tests are not suitable for these datasets (Field, 2005: 96). Practically this means that a t-test cannot be used to compare the different groups in the datasets of The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude. The same can be said for the

ANOVA or regression analysis. These tests function well when the data is normally distributed, but if this assumption is violated, then the results are not reliable any more.

Fortunately there are also 'non-parametric tests' in case the assumption of normally distributed data is violated. In this thesis the Kruskal-Wallis test will be used when three or more groups of data need to be compared to each other. The Kruskal-Wallis test can function as an alternative for the ANOVA analysis (Field, 2005: 542). The Mann-Whitney test will be used as an alternative for the t-test in tests where no more than two conditions are compared to each other (Field, 2005: 522). Because the Kruskal-Wallis test can only test whether there is a difference between the different groups that are being compared and because it cannot tell where the differences lie, the Mann-Whitney test will also be used to follow the Kruskal-Wallis test in tests where it points out the existence of differences. However, the Mann-Whitney test cannot be used too many times. In normal cases a Mann-Whitney test that is significant for 95% will tell us that there is a 95% chance that the effect is genuine and that we accept a 5% chance that the effect we witness is fake (Field, 2005: 31). But conducting multiple tests will produce the same effect as conducting multiple t-tests (Field, 2005: 550). For example, performing three Mann-Whitney tests for one comparison will mean that three tests will be done that each have a 95% chance of showing a genuine effect. This will mean that there will be 0.95 x 0.95 x 0.95 = 0.857 chance that the effect is genuine. Stricter criteria for the Mann-Whitney test will thus be used when multiple tests are required. The 5% margin of error will be divided through the number of tests that are needed. By using this method it is ensured that there is at least a 95% chance of the effect being genuine in every comparison that will be made.

Chapter 3: Research Results

This chapter will present the results of the research that was described in the previous chapter. The results will be presented by comparing the means of the dependent variables to each other. The dependent variable is a coefficient that measures whether the votes that were cast are aligned along the division between coalition and opposition parties. A result with a perfect division between coalition and opposition has a value of 1. If this happens, then all coalition parties have voted in favour and all opposition parties were opposed (or vice versa). A result of 0 stands for no division at all amongst the members of the council. This would indicate a unanimous vote. Most of the results are somewhere between 0 and 1. This happens when only several, but not all, members of the opposition vote with the coalition parties. The opposite can also happen when one or several coalition members vote with the opposition. A blurring between coalition and opposition happens in both instances (Andeweg, 2013: 106-107).

Proposal Type Hypothesis

The first hypothesis to be tested is the proposal type hypothesis. This hypothesis was formulated in the following way: the division between coalition and opposition is weaker regarding votes on proposals from the executive board than on other votes on amendments and motions. For this hypothesis Simon Otjes and Tom Louwerse have found a strong effect in the Dutch national parliament (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013: 19) and it is also expected that municipal councils will follow the same pattern. A first look at the data indeed confirms this expectation. In Figure 3.1 below we can see the means of The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude and how much they differ. The first thing that

can be seen is that the means of Strijen and Zoeterwoude are lower than that of The Hague. This could already be seen in the previous chapter when the statistical methods were explained. Furthermore, in each municipality it can be seen that the means of propositions from the board are significantly lower than those of motions and amendments. It can also be observed that the means of amendments are higher than the means of motions in The Hague and Zoeterwoude, but not in Strijen. However, the medians of the amendments are higher than the medians of the motions in every municipality as can be seen in the boxplots shown in Appendix 2. The reason for this lies in the fact that most motions in the smaller municipalities (Strijen and Zoeterwoude) are accepted unanimously.


Figure 3.1: Means aligned to proposal type for each of the three municipalities.

The Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there are indeed significant differences between the three groups for every municipality at a level of 0.0. Afterwards three comparisons were made with the Mann-Whitney test. This means that the tests need to be significant at the level of 0.05/3 = 0.0167. The three comparisons that were made were between

motions vs. propositions, motions vs. amendments and amendments vs. propositions. Motions vs. propositions showed a significant difference in all three municipalities (scores of 0 in The Hague and Zoeterwoude and 0.001 in Strijen). Scores for the effect size (r) can also be calculated by dividing the Z-score of the Mann-Whitney test by the root of the number of cases (Field, 2005: 532). This produces a result of r = 0.31 in The Hague, r = 0.24 in Strijen and r = 0.23 in Zoeterwoude. If Cohen's suggestions are followed for interpreting these results, then it means that a medium effect can be seen in The Hague and small effects in Strijen and Zoeterwoude (Field, 2005: 32). By taking the square of these results, we can even calculate how much variance can be explained. This would mean that the percentage of variances that can be explained is 9.4% in The Hague, 5.6% in Strijen and 5.3% in Zoeterwoude.

The Mann-Whitney test between amendments and propositions show similar results. All tests are significant with a result of 0.0. The effect sizes are slightly higher than with motions. The Hague has an effect size of 0.38, while Strijen and Zoeterwoude have effect sizes of r = 0.30 and r = 0.38 respectively. These are all medium-sized effects that account for 14.21% of the effect in The Hague, 8.69% in Strijen and 14.32% in Zoeterwoude. We can say clearly that the voting behaviour between propositions and other kinds of votes are different, but that does not automatically mean that there is also a difference between motions and amendments. The Mann-Whitney test for this comparison shows different results. In The Hague there is a significant difference (0.001), but the effect size is only r = 0.10. This means that only 1% of the variance can be explained, so the effect is negligible. In Strijen and Zoeterwoude the Mann-Whitney test shows insignificant results of 0.9 for Strijen and 0.142 in Zoeterwoude. This means

that there is barely any difference in voting behaviour between votes on motions and amendments in these municipalities.

It was explained in the previous chapter that when Otjes and Louwerse omitted unanimous votes, votes on bills showed a stronger pattern of coalition-opposition voting than motions and amendments. In other words, a completely opposite result was seen. A similar thing was done with the data from The Hague. The means increased for all kinds of votes, but it increased more for propositions from the board than for motions or amendments. Propositions and amendments both get a mean of 0.61, whereas motions get a mean of 0.53. This shows a slight increase of the mean for motions and amendments, but almost a doubling for propositions from the board. This indicates, just as Otjes and Louwerse saw, that many propositions from the board are politically uncontroversial. However, all other votes on propositions from the board seem to strongly contested.

It can be concluded that the proposal type hypothesis has been approved for municipalities. It can be seen in all of the three municipalities that propositions from the executive board show a weaker division between coalition and opposition than with other kinds of votes, like amendments and motions. Furthermore, the same effect as with Otjes and Louwerse can be seen in The Hague when unanimous votes are omitted from the data. All the means rise, but the effect is strongest for propositions.

Sponsorship Hypothesis

The second hypothesis is the sponsorship hypothesis, which was formulated in the following way: the division between coalition and opposition is stronger on proposals sponsored exclusively by opposition parties than on proposals sponsored exclusively by coalition parties. A first look at the means in figure 3.2 seems to confirm the hypothesis. It can be seen in all municipalities that motions and amendments from the opposition show a higher degree of coalition-opposition voting then proposals, motions and amendments from the coalition. What is also noteworthy is that votes that were initiated by council members who belonged to both a coalition and an opposition party barely made any difference compared to votes that were initiated only by the opposition. Furthermore, it can also be seen that the votes that were initiated by both have a mean of 0 in both Strijen and Zoeterwoude. However, in Strijen coalition and opposition parties initiated only 1 vote out of 208 together whereas in Zoeterwoude this only happened 4 times out of 300 votes in total (see Appendix 3). This is in stark contrast with The Hague where both type of parties came 126 initiatives out of 1450. Initiatives issuing solely from the opposition occur also more often in The Hague then in Strijen and Zoeterwoude. 846 out of 1450 in The Hague (58%), 8 out of 208 in Strijen (4%) and 8 out of 300 in Zoeterwoude (2.7%). A last remarkable mean in Figure 3.2 below is the mean of opposition in Zoeterwoude. The 8 initiatives from the opposition show an almost perfect division between the coalition and opposition. 7 out of 8 initiatives from the opposition were rejected by the entire coalition, whereas 1 amendment was rejected by only one council member of the coalition.

The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that there is indeed a significant difference between the groups with a significant value of 0.0 for The Hague and Zoeterwoude and 0.002 for Strijen. Three Mann-Whitney tests followed the Kruskal-Wallis the find the differences between the groups. There appears to be no significant difference between initiatives from only the coalition and initiatives from both coalition and opposition. The Hague got a result of 0.66, whereas Strijen and Zoeterwoude got results of 0.726 and 0.295 respectively. All these results are highly insignificant. Only for The Hague can it safely be said that there really is no difference in voting patterns. The N in Strijen (1) and Zoeterwoude (4) for joined initiatives are so low, that it is highly likely that a low N causes the insignificance of these results.


Figure 3.2: Means aligned to sponsorship type for each of the three municipalities.

The other Mann-Whitney tests show expected results. Initiatives from the coalition that are compared to those of the opposition show highly significant results (0.0 in the case of The Hague and Zoeterwoude and 0.001 in Strijen). The effect sizes show the following results: 0.33 in The Hague, 0.23 in Strijen and 0.31 in Zoeterwoude. This means that the difference between coalition and opposition accounts for 11.1% of the

variance in The Hague, 5.5% of the variance in Strijen and 9.4% of the variance in Zoeterwoude. For The Hague and Zoeterwoude these results show a medium effect, whereas for Strijen it is low. The Mann-Whitney test for the comparison of joined initiatives (both) and initiatives from the opposition show varied results. The Hague shows a significant difference (0.0) with an effect size of r = 0.27 (7.5%). Strijen has an insignificant difference (0.394) that would have and effect size of r = 0.28 (8.1%). Zoeterwoude is significant at a level of 0.002 and shows an effect size of r = 0.89 (80%). This can be explained by the rejections of the coalition of all but one initiative that was highlighted earlier.

Interesting findings also emerge when the datasets are split according to which votes are accepted and which are not. In The Hague 785 cases were not accepted by a majority of the council (mean = 0.5698) and 665 cases were accepted by a majority of the council (mean = 0.3234). Furthermore, when votes are accepted, the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates an insignificant difference between different kinds of sponsors (0.157) for the votes that were accepted, but it remains highly significant with those that were rejected. Only 5 cases were not accepted by a majority in Strijen (mean = 0.6737) and 203 were (mean = 0.0681). The Kruskal-Wallis showed an insignificant result for both accepted and rejected cases. This is in contrast with the small but significant difference that was found earlier between coalition and opposition. In Zoeterwoude 14 cases were rejected (mean = 0.6387) and 286 were accepted (mean = 0.1666). The Kruskal-Wallis shows the same result as in The Hague: an insignificant result for the accepted cases, but a significant result for the cases that were rejected. A Mann-Whitney test shows that for the unaccepted votes, the difference between coalition and opposition accounts for 80% of the variance (effect size of 0.8996, 90%).

Time Hypothesis

The third hypothesis, about time, was: "Coalition-opposition voting declines over the course of a municipal council term." An initial look at the means in Figure 3.3 shows that it is not immediately clear whether the hypothesis has to be approved or rejected. A slight rise in coalition-opposition voting can be noted in The Hague, although the 53 votes of 2014 in The Hague (the last two months before the elections) show a decline. The effect of the first four years shows a different trend compared to what would be expected from the hypothesis. However, the last two months do seem to follow the expectations. In Strijen everything seems to stay similar with the exception of 2012 and 2014. In Zoeterwoude we see a decline from 2010 till 2012, only for the mean to rise in 2013 and drop to 0,0 for the final 4 votes in 2014.


Figure 3.3: Means aligned to years for each of the three municipalities. The results for 2014 in Strijen and Zoeterwoude seem to be missing due to the presence of only unanimous results.

The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that there are no significant differences between the years in any municipality. If the data however had been split into national and local opposition parties (which will be done at the final hypothesis), then there is one notable exception. If all the years after 2010 were compared with 2010 (so 2010 compared with 2011, 2012, etc..), then there is a significant difference (at 0.002) between 2010 and 2013 with an effect size of r = 0.127. This accounts for 1.6% of the variance between 2010 and 2013. An effect size of this size is quite low and is also negligible. The time hypothesis thus has to be rejected.

Budget Hypothesis

The last hypothesis in the work of Otjes and Louwerse (2013) that is also used in this thesis is the budget hypothesis, which was formulated as: "The division between coalition and opposition is stronger on budget votes than on non-budget votes." Figure 3.4 below shows that the means for these votes. In every municipality it can be seen that the hypothesis would have to be affirmed. The means of the votes that are not on the budget are always lower than the means of votes that do concern the budget. A further look at the distribution of the data can be seen in Appendix 5 with boxplots. It can be seen in the boxplot for The Hague that the median for votes on the budget is also higher than the median of the votes that are not on the budget. It can also be seen that votes that are labelled as 'no' have a higher tendency to have a coefficient value of 0 and that votes that are labelled as 'yes' tend more often to have a value around or above the medium than the no-votes. The same can be seen in Strijen en Zoeterwoude, although there are so many unanimous votes in these municipalities that there are barely any visible boxplots left.

A further look with the Mann-Whitney tests also shows that the difference in The Hague is significant at a level of 0.0. However, the effect size is only r = 0.10 and this only accounts for 1% of the variance. The budget hypothesis in the work of Otjes and Louwerse was proven to be insignificant. In The Hague it is significant, but the effect is negligible and barely explains the difference. Strijen and Zoeterwoude show different results, but here the effects are highly insignificant (a result of 0.617 for Strijen and 0.238 for Zoeterwoude). So it has to be concluded that the budget hypothesis is rejected in the cases of Strijen and Zoeterwoude, and affirmed but negligible in The Hague.


Figure 3.4: Means aligned to whether a vote was on the budget or not for each of the three municipalities.

Decentralisation Hypothesis

The decentralisation hypothesis was formulated in the following way: "the division between coalition and opposition parties is stronger on issues related to decentralisation than on issues that are not related to decentralisation." The means in

Figure 3.5 below seems to affirm the hypothesis. Votes that are related to issues concerning decentralisation tend the have a higher mean than votes that are unrelated to these issues. However, the difference between yes and no seems to be quite small in every municipality and almost non-existent in Zoeterwoude. A look at the boxplots (Appendix 6) seems to indicate that in The Hague the votes tend to cluster a little more around and above the median with votes on decentralisation than with votes that are not on decentralisation. Whether this is also the case in Strijen and Zoeterwoude is unclear, since most of the votes tend to be unanimous and all the votes that are not are in the boxplot shown as outliers. The same pattern was seen with the budget hypothesis.


Figure 3.5: Means aligned to whether a vote was related to decentralisation or not for each of the three municipalities.

The Mann-Whitney test shows different results. The Hague has a significant difference (the value is 0.0) when it comes to decentralisation. The effect size is r = 0.10, so that only means that 1% of the variance is explained by the decentralisation. Strijen has shown an insignificant result (0.114) and the results in Zoeterwoude are highly

insignificant (0.94). The decentralisation hypothesis has to be declined, with a slight exception for The Hague.

Local-National Parties Hypothesis

A different test was used for the local-national parties hypothesis than the tests that were used above. This has been done because in this instance it was necessary to compare different results from the same votes. Besides the normal coefficient that was created with all parties, two separate coefficients have been created that have also been used as dependent variables. In the first of these coefficients all the local parties were excluded. In the second coefficient the opposite was done, all the national parties were excluded. This resulted in three coefficients that have been compared to each other by using Friedman's ANOVA. Friedman's ANOVA is an alternative to the ANOVA and can be used to test the differences between several related groups. When the data have violated certain statistical assumptions, as is the case with the data for this thesis, then Friedman's ANOVA is a way around that problem (Field, 2005: 557). Friedman's ANOVA can tell us if there is a different between one of the groups, but like the Kruskal-Wallis test, it cannot tell where there difference lies. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test will be used to follow Friedman's ANOVA and will function as an (non-parametric) alternative to the dependent t-test for the comparison of two groups (Field, 2005: 534).

The hypothesis to test the difference between local and national opposition parties has been formulated as follows: Local opposition parties show a larger division between coalition and opposition than national opposition parties. This means that we should expect higher results for local parties in the datasets. The municipality of Zoeterwoude

will have to be excluded for this hypothesis, because this municipality did not have any local parties in the opposition (there is a local party in the coalition, but that party was created by several left-wing parties that operate nationally). A first look at the means can be done in Figure 3.6 below. The main thing that is striking in this graph is that local parties actually have a lower coefficient than the national parties. This could indicate two things: either local opposition parties vote more in line with the ruling coalitions than the national opposition parties, or the coalition parties tend to favour the motions and amendments of local parties more then those of national parties. Either way, local parties do seem to align more with the coalition than other parties.


Figure 3.6: Means with coalition-opposition coefficients from all parties, only national parties and only local parties.

The municipalities of The Hague and Strijen both had a significant result with Friedman's ANOVA. The Hague was significant at 0.0 and Strijen at 0.042, which is within acceptable parameters. Three Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests were done to find the differences between the groups: local coefficient vs. the national coefficient, national vs.

overall coefficient and local vs. overall coefficient. Significant results were found for the comparison between the local and national coefficient in both municipalities. The Hague was significant at 0.0 and had an effect score of $r = 0.31$. Strijen was significant at 0.009 and had an effect score of $r = 0.18$. So it can be said that there is a medium-sized effect in The Hague between local and national parties and a small effect in Strijen.

The Wilcoxon tests done between the national coefficient and the overall coefficient and between the local coefficient and national coefficient show significant results for The Hague and insignificant results for Strijen. A comparison between the national coefficient and the overall coefficient for The Hague results in an effect size of $r = 0.4084$ (16.7%) and between the local coefficient and overall coefficient in $r = 0.2664$ (7.1%). Both are significant at 0.0. The results in Strijen were insignificant, but only at a result of 0.02. Since three tests were used, it would only have been significant at a level of 0.1667.

There is also another way to test the hypothesis and gain more insight into what causes the differences between national and local parties. This is by doing the same tests that were done for the other hypotheses, but this time the national and local coefficients will be used instead of the overall coefficient. It would be unnecessary to mention all the results in the same way that was done above for the overall coefficient, but there are a few observations that are worth noting.

In the analysis of the proposal type hypothesis it can be observed that, in every instance, the means and effect sizes generally are a bit lower with the local coefficient compared to the national coefficient. An interesting difference can be seen with the comparison between motions and amendments. Earlier it was observed that these were

all insignificant, with the exception of The Hague, although only with an effect size of r = 0.10. A comparison between national and local parties shows that for national parties this comparison is actually insignificant (0.021) and that for local parties it is significant and has an effect size of r = 0.139. This is slightly higher than the results for the overall coefficient, but it shows that the significance and effect size, however small, come mostly from the voting behaviour of local parties.

Another interesting observation comes with the budget hypothesis. While local parties still seem to vote more in line with the coalition than the national opposition parties, the change in the means is a lot bigger. Local parties have an effect size of r = 0.1625 compared to the r = 0.0776 for the national parties (the overall effect size is r = 0.1002). While the average coefficient of local parties with budget votes is still lower compared to national parties, the change is not nearly as high. National parties show a mean of 0.4752 when votes are not on the budget and a mean of 0.5449 when they do. Local parties have a mean of 0.3405 when they do not vote on the budget and 0.4909 when they do vote on the budget. It might be that local parties are less critical then national parties, but that when the budget is involved, they become more critical.

The same effect can be seen with votes on decentralisation. Local parties have a lower average coefficient on votes than national parties, both on the votes that do and do not concern decentralisation. However the median for votes that concern decentralisation is higher for local parties than national parties. The difference on decentralisation with national parties is also insignificant (0.064), whereas it is highly significant with local parties (0.0) where it also has in effect size of r = 0.1637. This is higher than the result for the overall coefficient that was mentioned earlier and the fact that a significant result

could be seen in the overall coefficient is mostly because of the voting behaviour of local parties with relation issues concerning decentralisation.

Local-National Politics Hypothesis

The Local-National Politics hypothesis was formulated as follows: "voting behaviour in Dutch municipal councils shows a lower division between coalition and opposition parties than voting behaviour in the Dutch national parliament." This hypothesis was tested by comparing the results of the first four hypotheses (proposal type, sponsorship, time and budget) with the results from Otjes and Louwerse. Similar effects were found with all four hypotheses. Otjes and Louwerse found a strong effect between different kinds of proposals. With the municipalities a medium-size effect was found. It cannot be easily determined whether this means that the effect size is weaker with municipalities. This is because Otjes and Louwerse used different statistical methods (multi-level regression). However, the results do point in the same direction. A very weak difference between motions and amendments was found with municipalities and the same was found within the Dutch parliament (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 24). Furthermore, proposals from the executive, that otherwise would have shown a weaker pattern of coalition-opposition voting compared to other proposal types, show an equally strong pattern compared to other votes when unanimous votes are omitted.

Slightly weaker results were found for the sponsorship hypothesis. The patterns were similar. There was barely any difference between votes that were sponsored exclusively by the coalition and votes that were sponsored by both coalition and opposition parties (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 24). Otjes and Louwerse did find a strong effect (0.31) with a

comparison between votes that were sponsored by both type of parties and votes that were sponsored exclusively by opposition parties. Effects of 0.27 for The Hague, 0.28 for Strijen and 0.89 for Zoeterwoude were found in this research. With Zoeterwoude being an outlier, it shows slightly weaker results. However, as stated above, Otjes and Louwerse have used different methods, making a comparison difficult. No significant results were found for the time hypothesis with the municipalities. Otjes and Louwerse did find a significant effect, although it was a small one (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 16). The opposite happened with the budget hypothesis. A significant but weak result was found in this research, but Otjes & Louwerse found no significant effect (Otjes & Louwerse, 2013: 16).

A comparison between municipalities and the national parliament thus shows that most of the voting patterns are similar. Slightly weaker effects were found in The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude compared to the parliament, but we do have to bear in mind that using different statistical methods could have caused this. The budget and time hypotheses showed either insignificant or weak effects, although it is interesting to note that votes on the budget seem to be slightly more important in municipalities than in the parliament. Based on these comparisons, it cannot be said with certainty that municipalities show a lower division between coalition-opposition voting than the national parliament. Instead it could be said that the patterns appear to be similar.

Size of the Municipality Hypothesis

The hypothesis to test whether the size of the municipality matters was formulated as: smaller municipalities will have a lower division between coalition and opposition

than larger municipalities. No statistical analysis has been done to test this hypothesis, so instead the results of the previous analyses will be discussed further. The first observation made that showed the difference between large and small municipalities was with the results of the histograms in Appendix 1. From here it could be concluded that out of 1450 cases in The Hague, 269 of them were unanimous. For Strijen 182 out of 208 cases were unanimous and in Zoeterwoude this was true for 229 out of 300 cases. In percentages this would mean that 18.5% of cases in The Hague, 87.5% in Strijen and 76.3% in Zoeterwoude were unanimous. Unanimous cases lower the mean because a unanimous result has a coefficient of 0.0. It follows from this that the means in Strijen and Zoeterwoude were lower than The Hague. The only exception found was with motions and amendments that were sponsored by the opposition in Zoeterwoude. Here a mean was found of 0.8918. However, in this municipality there was only one opposition party that otherwise often voted with the coalition, namely the VVD. Their initiatives were most probably just a means to express their dissatisfaction with certain coalition plans. It can thus be safely assumed that the size of the municipality does matter in terms of the patterns of coalition-opposition voting.

Conclusions and Implications

This thesis started with stating the question of whether it possible for political parties and their council members to really be distinct from one another in a municipal council. The reason why this matters is due to the issue of accountability. Are municipal councils, and opposition parties in particular, capable of holding the executive board accountable for the policies that they implement? This thesis also aimed at discovering under what circumstances the voting behaviour of opposition parties changes. In the literature review it became clear that Dutch municipalities are facing multiple challenges. They are tight on their budgets and the budgets are becoming even tighter because the national government is decentralising responsibilities to municipalities. This could indicate that municipalities are becoming more limited in their freedom to alter policies. In time it could also potentially jeopardise the democratic credentials of municipalities. If municipalities become severely limited in their freedom, then it would be difficult for council members to hold the executive accountable. It would also be difficult for voters to elect new representatives who could alter council policies. What would remain is the option to vote for new administrators without any influence to bring change (if that would be the thing the voters desire). Eight hypotheses were used to uncover the patterns of coalition-opposition voting and to discover the voting behaviour of municipal councils, using the municipalities The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude as case studies. The hypotheses that are used for this thesis are:

1. Proposal Type hypothesis: the division between coalition and opposition is weaker regarding votes on proposals from the executive board (*college van Burgemeester en Wethouders*) than on other votes like amendments and motions.

2. Sponsorship hypothesis: the division between coalition and opposition is stronger on proposals sponsored exclusively by opposition parties than on proposals sponsored exclusively by coalition parties.

3. Time hypothesis: Coalition-opposition voting declines over the course of a parliamentary term.

4. Budget hypothesis: the division between coalition and opposition is stronger on budget votes than on non-budget votes.

5. Decentralisation hypothesis: the division between coalition and opposition parties is stronger on issues related to decentralisation than on issues that are not related to decentralisation.

6. Local-National parties hypothesis: local opposition parties show a larger division between coalition and opposition than national opposition parties.

7. Local-National politics hypothesis: voting behaviour in Dutch municipal councils shows a lower division between coalition and opposition parties than voting behaviour in the Dutch national parliament.

8. Size municipality hypothesis: smaller municipalities will have a lower division between coalition and opposition than larger municipalities.

For the proposal type hypothesis significant results were found between motions and proposals and also between amendments and proposals in all municipalities. Slightly larger effects were found between amendments and proposals than between motions and proposals. This indicates that both votes on motions and polls for amendments result in a stronger division between coalition and opposition than proposals. Amendments, however, produce a stronger effect. This indicates that either the coalition

tries to avoid any alterations of the proposals of the executive or that the opposition works together more with amendments than with motions.

Insignificant results were found for the sponsorship hypothesis when a comparison was made between initiatives from the coalition and initiatives from both coalition and opposition. This indicates that when one or more opposition parties actively work together with the coalition, it produces the same results as when only a coalition party came up with an initiative. A significant result was found when comparing initiatives from a coalition party and initiatives from an opposition party. Medium-sized results were found in The Hague and Zoeterwoude and a weak result in Strijen, meaning that the result in this municipality is negligible.

No significant result was found for the time hypothesis. The only (slight) exception was a significant difference between 2010 and 2012 for local parties in The Hague. However, the results for 2013 and 2014 went back to normal, indicating that for unknown reasons, local parties voted less in line with the coalition in 2012 than they did in other years. The time hypothesis must be rejected. Weak results were found in The Hague for the budget and decentralisation hypotheses, while the results in Strijen and Zoeterwoude were insignificant. So also the budget and decentralisation hypotheses must be rejected, since there was no real change in voting behaviour to be found.

The local-national parties hypothesis has produced results opposite from what was expected. Local parties in both The Hague and Strijen did not vote more against the coalition than national parties; it was the other way around. In The Hague the results were significant and a medium-sized effect was found. While Strijen was also significant,

only a weak result was found in this municipality. This indicates that local parties, at least in The Hague and Strijen, did not introduce a new division between the establishment and anti-establishment like Boogers and Voerman suggested. What local parties probably did do was raise awareness for specific issues in the council, but otherwise they voted more in line with the coalition than national opposition parties did.

It can be said for the hypothesis concerning the size of the municipalities in almost every case that smaller municipalities show a weaker division between coalition and opposition than in The Hague, a large municipality. Of the 1450 cases in The Hague, 269 of them were unanimous (18.55%). For Strijen 182 out of 208 cases were unanimous (87.5%) and in Zoeterwoude this was the matter with 229 out of 300 cases (76.33%). It follows from this that the means for Strijen and Zoeterwoude were also lower than the means from The Hague. This shows that the issues that are voted for in The Hague are often more debated than those in Strijen and Zoeterwoude.

The seventh hypothesis, the local-national politics hypothesis, provides an external reference point that can be used to determine whether the results from The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude demonstrate that the council can hold the executive accountable. Otjes and Louwerse have analysed the voting behaviour of the Dutch parliament during seven different coalitions and from 1994 to 2012. In this period the cabinet Kok-II got the lowest mean of 0.36 and the highest score went to the cabinet Rutte-I that had a score of 0.57. If all the votes were taken together, than the average vote from 1994 till 2012 would get a result of 0.45 (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013: 23). This can be compared with the means that are shown in figure 4.1 below. This graph shows

that The Hague has a mean of 0.4556, Strijen has a mean of 0.0826 and Zoeterwoude has

a mean of 0.1907. Furthermore, it was concluded in the previous chapter that the results

of the sponsorship, proposal type, budget and time hypotheses appear to follow similar

patterns.

Figure 4.1 Overall mean for all casted votes from 2010 till 2014

It can be concluded that voting behaviour in the Dutch parliament and in the

municipalities The Hague, Strijen and Zoeterwoude follow roughly similar patterns. This

is especially the case for The Hague and less for Strijen and Zoeterwoude, which both

have far lower means. What does this mean for the question of democratic

accountability? It can be concluded that the voting patterns in the municipal council of

The Hague are similar to those in the parliament. Not only the overall means are similar:

even the means for initiatives from the opposition (0.56 in the parliament and 0.55 in

The Hague), coalition (0.23 in the parliament and 0.32 in The Hague) or both (0.21 in the

parliament and 0.33 in The Hague) are similar. It cannot be said that council members in

The Hague vote more similarly than members of parliament, actually the opposite seems to be the case.

The story is different for Strijen and Zoeterwoude. The overall means are far lower than those of the Dutch parliament. The only exception would be the mean for initiatives from the opposition, which is higher in Zoeterwoude than in the parliament. But it should be noted again that the opposition of Zoeterwoude proposed only 8 motions/amendments and that 7 of them were rejected. This accounted for a high coefficient and the result is probably an outlier. Also the percentages of how many votes were unanimous are higher in Strijen (87.5%) and Zoeterwoude (76.33%) than in the parliament. Otjes and Louwerse briefly mention that in their data three out of five bills were adopted unanimously (Otjes and Louwerse, 2013: 15). This, however, is without motions and amendments. So the percentage of unanimous votes could actually be lower.

The percentage of unanimous votes is higher in Strijen and Zoeterwoude than in the parliament and as a result we can see a lower coalition-opposition coefficient. But it would be too simple to say that the councils in Strijen and Zoeterwoude are not accountable because their members are voting together. These municipalities are among the smallest in the province South-Holland. It follows that there are far fewer problems to solve than in a larger municipality like The Hague. In such a context there would be no need for the opposition to initiate as many proposals, motions or amendments as in The Hague in order to hold the executive accountable. Furthermore, the coalition-opposition coefficient does increase in these municipalities when the opposition comes up with a motion or amendment. If this is taken into account and if the results from The Hague are

added, then the conclusion follows that Dutch local democracy is at least as strong as its

national counterpart.

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
Scott, Colin (2000), 'Accountability in the Regulatory State', *Journal of Law and Society* 27 (1), p. 38-60

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
Appendices

Appendix 1: Histograms of the data

Coefficient Strijen

Mean = .0826095551628908
Std. Dev. = .2399546796975554
N = 208

Coefficient Zoeterwoude

Mean = .1907476752060685
Std. Dev. = .3757728469404043
N = 300

Appendix 2: Boxplots Proposal Type Hypothesis

Case Processing Summary (The Hague)

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Proposal	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	Motion	830	100.0%	0	0.0%	830	100.0%
	Amendment	213	100.0%	0	0.0%	213	100.0%
	Proposition	407	100.0%	0	0.0%	407	100.0%

Coefficients (y-axis)

1.0000000000000000
.8000000000000000
.6000000000000002
.4000000000000000
.2000000000000000
.0000000000000000

Motion   Amendment   Proposition board

Proposal (Strijen)

Chart outlier labels: 42, 45 68, 60 28, 104 183, 199 176, 163 67, 105, 182, 184 155, 111

Case Processing Summary (Strijen)

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Proposal	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	Motion	9	100.0%	0	0.0%	9	100.0%
	Amendment	6	100.0%	0	0.0%	6	100.0%
	Proposition board	193	100.0%	0	0.0%	193	100.0%

Case Processing Summary (Zoeterwoud)

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Proposal	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	Motion	41	100.0%	0	0.0%	41	100.0%
	Amendment	21	100.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
	Proposition board	238	100.0%	0	0.0%	238	100.0%

Appendix 3: Boxplots Sponsorship Hypothesis

Case Processing Summary (The Hague)

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Sponsor	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	Coalition	478	100.0%	0	0.0%	478	100.0%
	Both	126	100.0%	0	0.0%	126	100.0%
	Opposition	846	100.0%	0	0.0%	846	100.0%

Case Processing Summary (Strijen)

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Sponsorship	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	Coalition	199	100.0%	0	0.0%	199	100.0%
	Both	1	100.0%	0	0.0%	1	100.0%
	Opposition	8	100.0%	0	0.0%	8	100.0%

Case Processing Summary (Zoeterwoude)

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Sponsorship	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	Coalition	288	100.0%	0	0.0%	288	100.0%
	Both	4	100.0%	0	0.0%	4	100.0%
	Opposition	8	100.0%	0	0.0%	8	100.0%

Appendix 4: Boxplots Time Hypothesis

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Years	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	2010	268	100.0%	0	0.0%	268	100.0%
	2011	423	100.0%	0	0.0%	423	100.0%
	2012	359	100.0%	0	0.0%	359	100.0%
	2013	347	100.0%	0	0.0%	347	100.0%
	2014	53	100.0%	0	0.0%	53	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Years	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	2010	56	100.0%	0	0.0%	56	100.0%
	2011	49	100.0%	0	0.0%	49	100.0%
	2012	45	100.0%	0	0.0%	45	100.0%
	2013	50	100.0%	0	0.0%	50	100.0%
	2014	8	100.0%	0	0.0%	8	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Years	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	2010	75	100.0%	0	0.0%	75	100.0%
	2011	80	100.0%	0	0.0%	80	100.0%
	2012	60	100.0%	0	0.0%	60	100.0%
	2013	81	100.0%	0	0.0%	81	100.0%
	2014	4	100.0%	0	0.0%	4	100.0%

Appendix 5: Boxplots Budget Hypothesis

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Budget	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	No	1188	100.0%	0	0.0%	1188	100.0%
	Yes	262	100.0%	0	0.0%	262	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Budget	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	No	166	100.0%	0	0.0%	166	100.0%
	Yes	42	100.0%	0	0.0%	42	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Budget	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	No	216	100.0%	0	0.0%	216	100.0%
	Yes	84	100.0%	0	0.0%	84	100.0%

Appendix 6: Boxplots Decentralisation Hypothesis

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Decentr	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	No	1207	100.0%	0	0.0%	1207	100.0%
	Yes	243	100.0%	0	0.0%	243	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Decentralisation	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	No	166	100.0%	0	0.0%	166	100.0%
	Yes	42	100.0%	0	0.0%	42	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	Decentralisation	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Coëf	No	258	100.0%	0	0.0%	258	100.0%
	Yes	42	100.0%	0	0.0%	42	100.0%