A Bourdieusian Account of EU Terrorism Expertise

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1. Introduction

The last decade marked a significant change in the European Union's approach towards terrorism. As a result of terrorist attacks (9/11, Madrid and London) the EU terrorism policy turned from a counter-terrorism approach, stressing repressive efforts targeting an outside threat, towards a counter-radicalization approach, targeting domestic radicalization processes. Led by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the latter approach based itself on a homegrown dimension of terrorism in which identification and resolving underlying causes of radicalization took center stage (Coolsaet 2012, 868). This shift was quite a significant one, since it influenced the traditional sovereignty of member states to deal with these issues themselves (Coolsaet 2012, 689).

This so-called "counter-radicalization turn" of the EU led to a call for research and expertise. Therefore, a number of expert networks and forums were established with the objective to inform and advise the Commission on policy. There are, however, three interesting events that pose questions about the role and function of these experts in the European Union. First, not all terrorism experts in these networks were characterized by a traditional security profile, but instead included civil society experts, academics, and interior/integration ministry personnel. Second, there was a notable discrepancy in the timing of these expert groups, as the European Commission had established its official line of policy in 2004-2005 and most of the reports were issued a few years later. And last, the Commission discarded one of the reports because it took a critical stance against EU's counter-terrorism policy (Bossong 2012, 6).

To provide an answer for the role and function of expert networks in the European Union, this study will build on the paper *Five accounts of the "making of a terrorist": A micro-political sociology of EU experts on radicalisation* written by Francesco Ragazzi (2013).[1] It starts by providing conventional interpretations on transnational expert groups: first, the "propagandist" interpretation, which argues that experts primarily serve a function of propaganda of governing elites; second, an "epistemic community" interpretation, which identifies experts as a homogeneous and independent body of knowledge and strategy. The third and central hypothesis is based on a Bourdieusian sociology. It argues that European terrorism expertise can best be interpreted as a "field" in which a heterogeneous group of experts struggle for the legitimate classification of violent-radicalization as well as the best practices to prevent it from taking place. In this case the European field of expertise can best be interpreted as a "weak field," that is, a field that is largely dominated by neighboring fields that are constituted more firmly, allowing agents to access it for personal strategy.

[1] Many thanks to Francesco Ragazzi for allowing me to adopt and extend his study for my bachelor thesis.

Multiple expert networks will be explored for the purpose of analyzing the role of these experts in the European Union: The Policy Planner’s Network on Counter Radicalization (PPN), the European Commission’s Expert Groups on Violent Radicalization (ECEGVR), the Change Institute, The Center for European Integration Strategies (CEIS) and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICR) based at Kings College in London. Most of the data for the expert networks in this study are derived from Francesco Ragazzi's (2013) original paper. The main contribution of this study is the expert network PPN, of which the inclusion should be seen as an attempt to extend and possibly complement the findings of the original study.

Besides offering an interpretation of expert networks in the EU, another objective of this study is to provide an alternative way for analyzing European expert networks using the theoretical framework of a Bourdieusian sociology. It promotes a micro-sociological approach, using methodology that enables a relational analysis. The aim is to analyze the stances (position-takings) of expert networks in relation to the positions they occupy in the field of expertise. The data collected for this study consists of stances externalized in the expert network reports as well as biographical data collected from the responsible authors. The analysis consists of two parts. The first part maps expert stances on the process of radicalization using Factorial Correspondence Analysis. It allows one to draw a conclusion on the question whether the propagandist and epistemic community interpretations of experts can be discarded or not. The second part includes an analysis of the social positions of experts, first by analysis of the relative social capitals using a Social Network Analysis, and then by mapping capitals on a visual plane using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis.

2. Counter-radicalization and expertise in the European Union

Dealing with terrorism issues at the level of the European Union (EU) took a long time to develop. Although treaties and organizations at the European level facilitated coordination and information sharing among member-states, terrorism policy long remained a national issue (Coolsaet 2010, 857). However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 significantly boosted Europe’s cooperation and political integration on the issue of terrorism (Coolsaet 2010, 858). This increase in cooperation coincided with a shift in the European approach to terrorism. Traditionally the terrorist discourse in the EU was framed as a security issue. However, with the advocacy of member states (in particular the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) the European approach changed from a counter-terrorism strategy, which focused on repressive measures towards terrorism as an external threat, towards a strategy of prevention, which focused on the underlying factors that can lead to acts of terrorism (Coolsaet 2010, 860).

The so-called "violent radicalization turn" in the EU marked a significant change. As Coolsaet (2010, 689) notes: "Without fully realizing it, the EU thus found itself in new and uncharted territory, since the issue clearly impinged upon national sovereignty by going to the heart of political, social and cultural differences among member-states. From the start, radicalization was essentially intertwined with issues of integration, social policy, multi-culturalism and the representation of minority groups." Consequently, there was a need for more knowledge and expertise, both to inform on the nature of the threat as well as advise on the best practices to prevent violent-radicalization from taking place (Bossong 2012, 868-9).

However, some peculiar facts can be observed in the context of EU terrorism expertise. First, many of the experts that were appointed to provide information and advice the Commission on the issue of radicalization did not derive from the field of security, which is a profile that traditionally matched terrorism expertise. Second, expert networks and their reports were commissioned around the year 2008. However, EU documents of 2004 and 2005 had already established the "existence" of radicalization, the factors leading to it, and the most efficient course of action (Ragazzi 2013, 6). And last, the Commission rejected the concluding reports from the European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalization (ECEGVR) because it provided a critical stance by shunning a concept of violent-radicalization and detailed policy advice (Bossong 2012, 6).

These peculiarities pose a question on the role and function of these experts in the context of the "counter-radicalization turn" of the European Union. Although this may be a peripheral case, this study contends that a micro-sociological analysis of experts in line with a Bourdieusian sociology allows for insight on the underlying logics of European expertise. A few cases will be explored for this purpose. First, the *European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization* (ECEGVR), appointed in April 2006 by EU commissioner Franco Frattini. The group consisted of academics from multiple EU member states that served as a policy advisory group (Coolsaet 2010, 869). Second, *Policy Planners Network on countering Polarisation and Radicalization* (PPN) established in 2008 by an initiative of the UK and the Netherlands. It consists of informal group of multiple member-state. Its members consisted for a large part of ministry-related personnel.[2] Furthermore, four expert reports that were ordered by the Commission: "The beliefs, Ideologies and Narratives of Violent Radicalization" and "Best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation" commissioned to the think tank *Change Institute* (The Change Institute 2008b; 2008a), "Factors of creation or modification of violent radicalization processes, particularly among the youth", commissioned to the *CEIS*, a Brussels based think tank, and "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant

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[2] http://www.strategicdialogue.org/programmes/counter-extremism/ppn/

Movement in Europe", commissioned to the *International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence* (ICSR) based at Kings College, in London.

3. A weak field of EU terrorism expertise

There are a number of hypotheses that could explain the role of terrorism expertise in the European Union. The first hypothesis is based on the so-called "propagandist" approach. It suggests that experts systematically reproduce governmental security frames and thus have a function of justification (Burnett and Whyte 2005, 13-14). Mueller (2006, 29), for instance, argues that terrorist experts are part of a "terrorism industry", where they systematically align themselves with a politics of fear set out by governing elites. These cynical accounts may find audience within general public, media or activist circles (Ragazzi 2013, 2), but might arguably also share some common ground with Intergovernmentalist literature by underlining a primary role of nation-states (Kauppi 2003, 776). This study criticizes, however, that the propagandist argument neglects an independent part played by terrorism experts; it deprives experts from having agency and rules out the possibility of a multiplicity of positions they might adopt (Ragazzi 2013, 2).

Because it forms an important part in the literature on European governance, the second hypothesis argues that European terrorism experts may constitute an "epistemic community". Building on the definition of Peter Haas (1992, 3), an epistemic community is defined as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area." In order to be considered an epistemic community, experts are assumed to share four properties: first, principled beliefs about what is considered the right course of social and political action; second, causal beliefs about social and political phenomena; third, notions of validity about accepted and neutral knowledge; and last, a common policy enterprise (Cross Davis 2011, 19-20). In the European context, for example, Mai'a Cross Davis (2011) contends that experts can serve as a pro-active knowledge based network to advance policy options. In her analysis on the epistemic community of Coreper diplomats experts are argued to have transcended its formal task of preparing work for the council, hereby pushing the issue of radicalization on the agenda of the European Union (Cross Davis 2011, 109).

The epistemic community hypothesis is valued for its emphasis on an independent part played by terrorism experts, thereby departing from a submissive and state-centric account provided by the propagandist hypothesis. Moreover, the epistemic community thesis takes into account the role of values and social norms, the process of socialization and social learning among institutions, and adds a notion of the social construction of knowledge (Cross Davis 2013, 141-142). However, one could question the fact that in the epistemic community

thesis experts are treated as a unitary and independent group of actors, persuading others – mostly governing elites – through an instrumental deployment of knowledge (Epstein 2013, 168). This study argues that, through this largely functionalist perspective of politics, the epistemic community thesis severely generalizes and de-contextualizes contents as it ignores the social characteristics and conflicting strategies of experts involved (Dezalay and Madsen 2008, 4; Cross Davis 2013, 145-146).

In order to give an alternative interpretation of terrorism expertise that takes into account the deficiencies of both the propagandist and epistemic community thesis, this study proposes a more sociological account of terrorism experts in the EU. Building on Francesco Ragazzi's (2013) exploratory paper, this study uses a theoretical framework developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and recent developments in International Political Sociology and sociological approaches to the EU. This Bourdieusian hypothesis argues that EU terrorism expertise can best be understood as a "weak field" in which a variety of actors, holding unequal proportions of capital, compete for the legitimate characterization of violent-radicalization as well as the best practices for counter-radicalization.

Although it may share some of their conclusions, the Bourdieusian theoretical framework is not bound to the theoretical underpinning of most International Relations research models on expert networks (e.g. rationalism for the propagandist approach or constructivism in epistemic communities thesis). What is central for a Bourdieusian approach is neither instrumental rationality nor adherence to social norms; actors base their actions instead "on the dispositions that they have been crafted over time (habitus) which, at the point of intersect with their socially defined positions (in the field), are actualized in the form of practices" (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 31).

Stances (position-takings in Bourdieusian terms) are mostly a reflection of an experts' position in the field, which are the result of a unique trajectory through different fields (Bigo 2011, 241). As these fields contain different "rules of the game", they are incorporated in agents' dispositions (habitus), ultimately defining their interests (*illusio*) and strategies (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 33). In other words, a Bourdieusian approach suggests that stances must be analyzed through the positions experts occupy in the field in order to get a grasp the underlying structural order of the European field of expertise. This has implications for the object of "knowledge" and "expertise", which in the case of European terrorism expertise could be analyzed as a stake in a struggle to legitimately define the legitimate security logic (Berling 2013, 68).[3]

[3] This "reflexive" account of knowledge is what distinguishes a Bourdieusian approach from an epistemic community approach. The former approach takes knowledge as a stake in a social struggle for power, whereas the latter analyzes knowledge more from an instrumental point of view, i.e. as a "capability" to bring about change (Epstein 2013, 168).

In contrast to the propagandist approach, therefore, the Bourdieusian hypothesis argues that terrorism experts do not necessarily align themselves with governments due to the fact that both governing elites and experts are positioned in different fields. In other words, because they operate in their own specific fields, they are exposed to different "rules of the game" and therefore have a different illusio. In similar vein, arguing against the epistemic community thesis, the Bourdieusian approach argues that European terrorism experts do not necessarily form a common body of knowledge with shared strategies; expert might well share some of the characteristics outlined above (principled beliefs, causal beliefs, notions of validity, a common policy enterprise) but are seldom as homogeneous and autonomous as the epistemic community thesis would suggest. Instead, it is argued that expert stances and strategies are structured by a variety of incorporated dispositions, which is the result of specific trajectory in institutional, academic, national or international fields.

Fields can be defined as a configuration of objective relations between positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 20). It therefore exists independently of agents - imposing its structure on them - but is not deterministic in the sense that it is formed by agents who invest properties in them (Bigo 2011, 239). As European expertise is analyzed here as a field, it is important to note that this concept is not dependent on a level of analysis; fields focus on the "'totality of relations' involving the positions that are uncovered, structured, and conceptualized in the field" (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 32). In other words, "the field description depends on the specificities of the group investigated" (Bigo 2011, 239).

Fields can be strong or weak, autonomous or dominated (Bigo 2011, 239). When fields have clear rules of the game, clearly demarcated borers, and struggles around stakes that are sufficiently understood by actors, a field can be called a strong and autonomous field (Pouliot and Mérand 2011, 34). This study, however, hypothesizes that the European field of terrorism expertise should be interpreted as a "weak field" (Vauchez 2008; 2011), i.e. a "field which is completely immerged into other fields that are mapped out and constituted more firmly" (Topalov 1994, 464). Opposite to strong fields as isolated and self-sufficient social universes which imposes certain logics on its occupants, a weak field is heterogeneous and made up of agents whose characteristics are mostly structured outside the field in consideration (Vauchez 2008, 137). In the European field of expertise, therefore, it is expected that experts are largely dependent and dominated by the logics of neighboring fields, e.g. the academic field, the field of professionals of security, or the field of professionals of politics (Ragazzi 2013, 3).

Because of this proximity to other fields, together with the fact that there are low barriers of entry (no institutionalized exams, tests or degrees), the European field of terrorism expertise is expected to serve a conversion of capitals for experts; actors from a variety of national fields invest in it to strengthen their expert and neutrality credentials (Vauchez 2008,

139). In other words, this study argues that the weak field of European expertise serves as a springboard for social mobilization; actors who normally do not have access (emerging or marginalized academics, minority NGOs, national civil servant) invest in networks at the level of the European Union, endowing them with capitals that they can subsequently reinvest in the (national) field of origin. Furthermore, from the perspective of the European Union, this study argues that European expert networks serve a function of legitimization; experts ensure validation and evidence for the radicalization frame established by the Commission (Ragazzi 2013, 3).

4. Methodological Considerations

When applying a Bourdieusian sociology one must take into account its relational ontology; the inextricable and interactive character between *habitus* and *field*, in which "a field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations 'deposited' within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation and action" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 16). It stems from Bourdieu's theory that any analysis of practices focuses on the apparent invisible relations between agents. As Bigo (2013, 124) describes: "bodies are not autonomous points, but relations to other points". In other words, a Bourdieusian analysis on expert should not focus on properties of agents themselves, but on immanent relations in which they are embedded.

With these theoretical considerations in mind, this study will analyze both *stances* (position-takings) of expert in question, in relation to the objective *positions* they occupy in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 11). In practice, this requires – to paraphrase Bourdieu – a methodology that is able to "think" in terms of these relations. For this purpose three methods were used: *Factorial Correspondence Analysis* (FCA), *Multiple Correspondence Analysis* (MCA) and *Social Network Analysis* (SNA). These methods are "exploratory" in the sense that they do not need a priori expectations about relationships in the data (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, 2). Instead, conclusions are established inductively from results by the apparent associations as a result of these analyses. In this way the methods used in this study differ from mainstream IR methodology in that it does not derive causality from a relationship between a pre-constructed dependent and independent variable.

The population for the analysis consists of all the authors of multiple reports provided by six European expert networks (Table 1). The first consists of seven reports published between 2009 and 2011 of the *Policy Planner's Network on Counter-Radicalization and Polarisation* (PPN). The second is a 2008 report from the *European Commision Expert Group on Violent Radicalization* (ECEGVR). Other cases include four reports commissioned by the European Commission, which include a report by the Brussels-based think-tank *CEIS*

(2008), the *International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence* (ICSR) based at Kings College in London (2008), and two reports from 2008 by the think-tank *Change Institute*, here distinguished as the "Beliefs" and "Best Practices" reports.

TABLE 1 – Expert Network Reports

PPN:
- "Developing an Assessment Framework for (Muslim) Movement and Organisations" (2009)
- "Crisis Communications and Management: Discussion Document on Developing more Effective Strategies" (2009)
- "Development of Religious Instruction and Institutions: 'Imam Training' in Europe" (2010)
- "De-radicalization" (2010)
- "Comparative Evaluation Framework for Counter Radicalization " (2010)
- "The Role of Civil Society in Counter-Radicalization and De-radicalization" (2010)
- "Radicalization: The Role of the Internet" (2011)

ECEGVR:
- "ECEGVR Report" (2008)

CEIS:
- "Factors of Creation or Modification of Violent Radicalization Processes, Particularly Among the Youth" (2008)

Change Institute:
- "The Beliefs, Ideologies and Narratives of Violent Radicalization" (2008)
- "Best Practices in Cooperation between Authorities and Civil Society with a view to the prevention and Response to Violent Radicalization" (2008)

ICSR Kings College:
- "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamism Militant Movement in Europe" (2008)

In order to map out stances, discursive contents were established through coded reading of each expert report. Frequencies of codes were entered in a contingency table of which the content was then plotted using a Factorial Correspondence Analysis (FCA), a technique used to transform numerical data into a two-dimensional plane to allow for visual exploration of how expert reports relate to each of the specific stances. The positions of experts were plotted using a *Multiple Correspondence Analysis* (MCA), likewise a visual technique for exploring associations, but with a set of qualitative variables. The MCA will map capitals as variables (modalities) and project experts on a factorial space on the basis of these properties. For this an intermediary step was taken by mapping the underlying structure of expert relationships using a *Social Network Analysis* (SNA). With this method an index of centrality is calculated, capturing the "*relative social capitals*" of actors. These capitals were then used as an additional modality in the MCA.

5. Expert Stances

The first part of the analysis consists of a review of expert network stances with respect to the process of radicalization. Stances were recorded through coded readings of expert network documents. In the reports three themes seemed to reoccur: first, *aspects of radicalization*, concerning the notion of radicalization itself. It included what reports posited to be the main features, locations, ideological character, modalities of recruitment as well as the radicalization process itself. Second, *factors of radicalization*, based on the what the reports assumed the political, ideological, mobilizing, psycho-social and structural factors of radicalization. And last, *recommendations for counter-radicalization* grouped prescriptions, such as addressing root causes, community dialogue, counter-narratives, de-radicalization, education, hard policing, political engineering, research, learning, media and target location.



FIGURE 2 – Aspects of Radicalization (R) – R stands for Radicalization.

Because the FCA is a visual method that establishes associations between stances and expert networks, one can look for lines of demarcation, i.e. dimensions on the plot that indicate oppositions between expert network stances. These lines of demarcation allow for the identification of differences between expert network stances, which, in turn, enables assessment on the role and function of these expert networks. Additionally, as this study builds on the analysis carried out by Francesco Ragazzi (2013), it takes into account the effect the added expert network PPN has to the original results.

The FCA in Figure 1 identifies a few oppositions that characterize the different stances in relation to the process of radicalization itself. These lines of demarcation are similar to the analysis without the PPN reports (Ragazzi 2013, 8-9). The first is based on the very notion of radicalization. The Kings College report, located at the left side of the FCA,

established a direct link between radical organizations ("gateway organizations") and violent extremism. According to the report, these organizations "form part of a "conveyor belt" through which people get primed for their later involvement into terrorism". On the opposite side are the reports that question the relevance of the term. The ECEGVR, in particular, took an adverse stance as it dismissed the very notion of radicalization. It argued that the term "violent radicalization" lacks academic currency and stated that "one of the most significant understandings gained from academic research over recent years is that individuals involved in terrorist activities exhibit a diversity of social backgrounds, undergo rather different processes of violent radicalization and are influenced by various combinations and motivations."

However, where the FCA without the PPN shows a clear opposition between the ECEGVR and the other reports (Ragazzi 2013, 8), the addition of the PPN stances has led to a redistribution the plot; the analysis shows that the PPN positions itself in clear opposition to the other networks. Located at the bottom-right of the plot, the PPN shared some of the skepticisms with its notions about "differing theories about when certain behaviors or attitudes become 'dangerous'." The PPN stances are therefore not far removed from the ECEGVR stances. Unlike the EVEVGR, however, it did not dismiss the concept in its totality; the PPN underscored instead that "the way that radicalization [is] defined and interpreted in practice differs from place to place", a stance that characterizes its role to provide for common ground in European counter-radicalization approaches.

A second line of opposition, overlapping the previous one between Kings College and the PPN, focuses on the role of the Internet in the radicalization process. According to the Kings College report, located on the left of the plot, the Internet plays a large role in radicalizing individuals. It argued that "the Internet can be dominant, if not the sole, factor that facilitates radicalization and recruitment." On the other side is again the PPN. It disagreed with Kings College on the sole role of the Internet in the radicalization process, as it stated that "there are few examples of individuals radicalizing entirely online, but there are signs that this could increase over time" and emphasized that "offline socialization remains important." The CEIS and Change Institute reports also acknowledge the increasing role of the internet and do not consider it a sole factor of the radicalization process. In the original study of Ragazzi (2013, 9) the CEIS and Change Institute reports are therefore opposed to the Kings College report. However, this line of demarcation has disappeared in current analysis as the PPN was added to the distribution.

A third line of demarcation is similar to the one identified in the original study (Ragazzi 2013, 9). It locates an opposition between a view on an ideological continuum between moderate and radical organizations. Located on top of the plot, both CEIS and Change Institute ("Beliefs") supported the idea of a continuum, as illustrated by a link

between the Tabligh movement and Jihadi organizations: “the experience of militancy in a group like the ‘Tablighi’, which has no political dimension but a sectarian functioning, can be influential in provoking attitudes and sentiments of frustration in which the more active means and ideologies of the militants may become of more interest.” Conversely, the networks that do not consider this continuum are located at the bottom of the plot. For example, the ECEGVR argued in line with its previous arguments, stating that “the espousal of a particular ideology does not guarantee that radicalization process will ensue […] and in fact previous studies of several European terrorist groups have made clear that ideology had a varying degree of relevance in that process.”



FIGURE 2 – Factors causing Radicalization; R stands for Radicalization.

The reports also contain different stances with regard to the factors causing radicalization (Figure 2). With the exception of the ECEGVR, which had little to say about radicalization factors and is therefore located near the origin at the plot. The clearest line of demarcation in the plot is a strong opposition on the horizontal axis. Similar to the the FCA without the PPN (Ragazzi 2013, 10), the left side of the plot is occupied by the Change Institute (“Beliefs”) report that, somewhat in line with the ECEGVR, focused on “root causes” of radicalization. The reports emphasize contexts of social injustice with factors such as exclusion, racism and islamophobia as factors for radicalization. Radicalization is described as searching for political emancipation, reacting to foreign policy choices where no other political socialization is available. These stances are based on descriptions that carry agency, where radicalization is the result of a combination of structural factors and enabling circumstances. The views that contrast with these stances are depicted on the other side of the plot, describing individuals as devoid of agency. The PPN linked the radicalization-process to polarization in society and manipulation of vulnerable individuals, with special emphasis on

Internet accessibility. And both Kings College and CEIS shared a focus on psychological features: phenomena that are linked to exploitation of identity conflicts.

In contrast to the plot without the PPN - as given in the study of Ragazzi (2013, 10) - the lines of Figure 2 are less clearly demarcated. For instance, oppositions between the Kings College and CEIS report on the role of so-called "gateway organizations" have disappeared. In comparison to this plot it can therefore be argued that the addition of the PPN spoiled the existence of a clear vertical line of demarcation, of which the top part is now reserved for internet accessibility as a factor for radicalization. This can be explained as the PPN issued a report dedicated entirely to the subject of Internet radicalization; a bias that should be taken into account in future research.



FIGURE 3 – Recommendations for Counter-Radicalization; CR stands for Counter-Radicalization

Stances that concerned recommendations for counter-radicalization also establishes multiple dimensions (Figure 3). On the bottom of the vertical axis the ECEGVR dismissed the whole enterprise of counter-radicalization. It stated that there are no clear profiles of radicalization and argues that every process of radicalization is individual and contingent. However, the inclusion of the PPN in the plot disposes the clear demarcation between the ECEGVR and the other reports, as shown in the analysis without the PPN (Ragazzi 2013, 11). The PPN is positioned near the ECEGVR as it also dismissed a fixed one-size fits all policy. It added, however, a recommendation for counter-radicalization performance evaluation and exchange between national policy experiences with the goal to "speed up the learning process further, and develop understanding of the relative effectiveness different of types of national approaches." Through this inclusion of the PPN, the ECEGVR is less isolated than in the original analysis (Ragazzi 2013, 11). This can be explained because the PPN shared some stances with the other expert networks. However, most these stances are opposed to the Kings

College report, located at the top of the plot, which emphasized a repressive approach with zero-tolerance, targeting gateway organizations and activists.

The second line of demarcation is on the horizontal axis. On the left side the recommendations addressing "root causes", submitted by Change Institute ("Best Practices") and CEIS. Both promoted to address discrimination, the diversity of research on Islam, ensuring broad political representation, and a focus on educational policies instead of security measures. Opposite to these stances, are measures focused on civil society organizations, associated with both PPN and Kings College. It includes building on social capitals of communities, relying on local governments, and focusing on the Internet.

Multiple stances on radicalization and counter-radicalization

The FCAs show different lines of demarcations through the inclusion of the PPN. However, the original conclusions remain intact (Ragazzi 2013, 12). The visual analysis of stances provided by the FCA points to a multiplicity of stances on violent-radicalization process as well as the best practices to prevent it. The results undermine the hypothesis that the EU terrorism expertise essentially serves a function of propaganda; a result most clearly illustrated by the ECEGVR as it dismissed the violent-radicalization frame of European Union policy. Similarly, the analysis dismisses the hypothesis that terrorist experts might form an "epistemic community"; the results indicate that experts do not share all of the four characteristics: principled beliefs about what is considered the right course of social and political action; causal beliefs about social and political phenomena; notions of validity about accepted and neutral knowledge; a common policy enterprise. The analysis shows instead a wide variety of discourses on the issue of radicalization and provides a range of policy-advices to prevent it.

In sum, the ECEGVR called into question the term of radicalization, describing it as a contingent process, and thus dismissed the possibility of a prevention-policy altogether. The PPN also called into question a definitive model of radicalization, but emphasized policy evaluation and learning, vigilance for Internet radicalization and civil society based solutions. Kings College focused on radicalizers manipulating vulnerable individuals calling it a "conveyor belt." It advocated repressive and zero-tolerance prevention measures targeting organizations and ideologies, also in an online context. The CEIS identified radicalization as psychosocial phenomenon and advocated counter-measures based on addressing "root causes". And last, the Change Institute described radicalization as an expression of political grief and also expressed that counter-terrorism policy should address "root causes".

6. Expert Positions

As the previous section provided an indication of expert stances on the topic of

radicalization, this next section will move to an analysis of the positions from which these views are expressed. Taken together it allows for a reconstruction between what experts express in their documents and their own strategic positions. This next section is divided into two parts. The first part utilizes a Social Network Analysis in order to derive the relative social capitals of experts. The second part will consist of a Multiple Correspondence Analysis, enabling a two-dimensional representation of the distribution of social, academic and institutional capitals and the interrelationships between stances and positions.

Social Network Analysis.

Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be used as a methodological tool to organize relational data. "It detects patterns of relations within a social space, thereby creating a representation of social structure through interactions within the field" (De Nooy 2003, 323). From a Bourdieusian perspective, it provides an indication of social capitals as "the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of a more or less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119). In other words, the larger number of social ties, the more social power the expert possesses (De Nooy 2003, 325).

The intention of the SNA here is to derive the *relative social capital* of each expert (Ragazzi 2013, 13). Relative social capital is different to social capital in that it is determined by the degree of centrality, that is, the relative importance of an organization, actor or report measured by the amount of connections. For this purpose the size of the nodes represent the Eigenvector Centrality value[4]; it measures the importance of a node in a network in relation to the wider network. In other words, the bigger the node, the more central the actor, and the more social capital it possesses from a Bourdieusian point of view.

The data used to graph the social network consists of the authors who contributed to the reports and their biographical data – current and past educational and institutional background. The resulting network is shown in Figures 4 and 5, which map the authors of the reports as well as their connection through multiple memberships. The reports are colored red, organizations dark blue and individuals light blue. In addition, numbers are given to experts that are grouped together to facilitate the reading of the SNA. Figure 4 displays the connections through the authorships of the reports, while Figure 5 displays the same connections but without the reports in order to see how experts are connected without their mutual authorships.

[4] As opposed to measures of Betweenness or Closeness Centrality, the Eigenvector Centrality allows for an account of the number of connections between each node as well as the importance of each node in relation to its position in the wider network.



FIGURE 4 – Social Network Analysis of experts with reports

FIGURE 5 – Social Network Analysis of experts without the reports

As the SNA uses the same data of expert network members as Francesco Ragazzi's study (2013), the sociograms displayed in figure 4 and 5 distinguish similar groupings - although some interconnections and centrality indexes have shifted by the added data of the PPN members. The PPN members are located at the center of the SNA (Figure 4 no. 1), which consists of 66 connected agents. Because the network consists of a large number of ministry-related personnel, many of the nodes surrounding the PPN report consist of individuals closely knitted together by their membership of European ministries, consisting mostly individuals from the UK (Communities and Local Government, Home Office) and the Netherlands (Ministry of Security and Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) but also from Sweden (Ministry of Justice) and Denmark (Ministry of Integration and Ministry of Interior). Leaning to the left side are the PPN reports' contributors associated with NGOs and think-tanks (Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Institute for Strategic Studies and Demos), Muslim civil society organizations and Islamic research institutes such as the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS London) (Figure 4 no. 2). PPN contributors also seem to group themselves at the bottom of the sociogram (Gaume, Godard, Senat, Schlumberger) (Figure 4 no. 3). These consist of multi-positioned, high ranked, security experienced officials, that share memberships in Bureau Central des Cultes, Paris Police, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and an educational background at L'Institut d'Études Politiques (IEP Paris/Sciences PO).

The degree of centrality of PPN members is quite large in the sociogram of Figure 4, but this is caused primarily by the high number of membership connections through the PPN. Figure 5 therefore shows the same SNA without the reports. It redistributes connections between particular national ministries: a large group of UK experts in the middle of the sociogram (Figure 5 no. 1), the Dutch ministry related individuals pushed to the top (Figure 5 no. 2), and the French contributors isolated at the bottom of the plot (Figure 5 no. 3). The result is lower degrees of relative social capitals for ministry related actors, but higher on the part of NGO and Muslim civil society organization members (Briggs, Hussain and Abdul Azis) (Figure 5 no. 4).

The second group that can be distinguished from the sociogram is the authors of the ECEGVR report, located at the top left of both Figure 4 (no. 4) and 5 (no. 5). It comprises a group of multi-positioned experts, sharing memberships in leading research institutions (St. Andrew's University Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence CSTPV, Leiden University and Kings College London), high-level policy institutions (United Nations Terrorism prevent Branch UN-TPB and the World Economic Forum WEF), and European expert networks (European Network of Experts on Radicalization ENER, The European Radicalization Awareness Network EU-Ran and the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues EENET). Author Rogers establishes a link between Kings College Report (Neumann

2008 report) and the ECEGVR report. Furthermore, Neumann and Rogers are marginally connected through Neumann’s connection to some of the European expert networks (START, ENER, CGCC and EENET). In Figure 5, the sociogram without the reports, displays a reinforcement of the centrality of the multi-positioned experts such as Coolsaet, de Vries, Ranstorp, Schmid and Silke.

The third group that can be distinguished in the sociogram is that of the authors of the Change Institute reports (“Best practice” and “Beliefs”). As Figure 4 illustrates (no. 5), and Figure 5 emphasizes (no. 6), is that this subgroup of experts consists of a loose coalition of individuals, who share few organizations beyond the same report. The groups consist mostly of academics at universities (University of Grenada, Babes Bolyai University, Grenoble II University) and members of anti-discrimination and Muslim civil society organizations (Muslim Academy, Muslim Omroep, Muslim Policy Forum, National Muslim Women Advisory Group). The exception being authors Muller, Hilali, Fiaz, Birt and Dijkman who share connections with the other networks; Muller and Birts present more policy oriented memberships connected to the ECEGVR, Dijkman being also a contributor in the PPN reports.

Last, the CEIS-group seems isolated and unconnected to the rest of the network (Figure 4 no. 6 and Figure 5 no. 7). It consists of authors located in the journalism field (Le Monde, Diplomatique, El Globo), two academics (University of Warwick and University of Girona) and the director of the CEIS think-tank, Dyevre.

Multiple Correspondence Analysis

Because the Social Network Analysis (SNA) remains a one-dimensional analysis – it does not reveal much about other structuring properties beyond social capitals – this next section moves on to a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Just like in the FCA the MCA allows to understand the content of the associations among (qualitative) variables by visualizing it on a two-dimensional plane. The MCA, however, allows for an identification of social patterns by the interrelation between multiple social elements (modalities), i.e. patterns of relationships between both the position-takings and positions of experts (Pouliot 2013, 54).

In the MCA, modalities that co-occur relatively often are drawn closely together and modalities that co-occur less often are drawn apart. The Bourdieusian logic is that it is deemed meaningful that one property usually entails another and excludes a third: “people are supposed to think in terms of distinctive properties or intuitively recognize them” (De Nooy 2003, 309). In addition, the dimensions of the map can be interpreted as the order of the space represented (De Nooy 2003, 309). In other words, dimensions represent the “objective social structure” Bourdieu speaks of, i.e. the distribution of the relevant types of capital or power. As the MCA in this study adds the PPN to the analysis, three dimensions are revealed to be relevant - this in contrast with the two dimension found in the paper of Ragazzi (2013).

The sample of experts in all the European expert network reports consists of 111 individuals.[5] Countries represented are mostly Northern European countries such as the UK (29%), Sweden (6,3%), Spain (5,4%), the Netherlands (9,9%), Germany (6,4%), France (9%), Denmark (7,2%) and Belgium (5,4%). 51,8% holds a Ph.D, 41% a Bachelor and/or Master. In the academic disciplines that are represented, political science dominates (32,5%), along with law (9,6%), oriental studies (8,4%) and sociology (8,4%). Experts are generally nationally rooted in higher education, 68,7% obtained their degrees in their countries of origin and 26,5% abroad. Furthermore, 25,3% hold an academic position, 36,2% is NGO member or director, 65,1% have no policy experience, 4,8% have no political experience and 83,1% have no security experience.

Individuals are mapped on a plot on the basis of their academic capital (H-index[6], academic title, highest degree, field of highest degree) and institutional capital (previous policy experience, previous political experience, previous security experience and previous NGO experience). In addition, the "relative social capital" provided by the social network analysis is coded in the variable "centrality index" and added as separate modalities (central, average and marginal centrality).

The MCA produces multiple factorial axes on which the expert network reports and their authors are distributed according to their characteristics. In total there were 34 active modalities. As the axes were ranked in decreasing order of importance, the first three axes are used for this study (Appendix Table 2). As a baseline criterion for retaining the modalities for interpretation of an axis it was decided to take modalities that exceed the average contribution (100/34 = 2,94%). The modalities that exceeded this baseline criterion and their contribution are shown below:

- Axis 1: Former high rank official (14,30%), Security Agency Experience (4,3%), Average H-index (7,39%), High H-index (9.34%), No H-index (4.86), No Ministry (3, 74%), Bachelor & Masters degree (4,23%), PhD. (5,4%), Full Professor (6,49%), No Academic Position (6,12%), Centrality (9,33%) and marginal centrality (2,92%)
- Axis 2: High rank Official (17,13%) No policy Experience (4,28%), Political Experience (8,08%), Security Agency Experience (11,96%), Average H-index (2,95%), NGO Think Tank (3,17%), Lecturer (4,60%), Full Professor (15,39%).
- Axis 3: International Education (5,29%), National Education (4,22%), Midrank Official (5.02%), Political Experience (3,29%), NGO member (6,39%), No NGO Experience (5,72%), NGO director (5,60%), Justice (9,19%), Not Ministry (12,67%), NGO-think-tank (6,34%), No Degree (16,85%), Lecturer (3,00%).

[5] Because the PPN sample was incomplete, missing values were replaced by the mean of samples that were available.
[6] The H-index was calculated using the software Publish, which calculates H-indexes on the basis of Google Scholar citations. It was then categorized as three separate modalities: Central, Average and Marginal centrality.



FIGURE 6 – Multiple Correspondence Analysis of active modalities in axes 1 and 2



FIGURE 7 – Multiple Correspondence Analysis of authors on axes 1 and 2, distributed by individual capitals



FIGURE 8 – Multiple Correspondence Analysis of active modalities in axes 2 and 3

Axis 1 and 2 are displayed in Figure 6 and 7 - Figure 6 shows the distribution of the active modalities, Figure 7 shows the distribution of authors on the same axes. Axis 1 is foremost an academic capital axis. On the left side of axis 1 are four modalities which indicate low educational capitals (no academic position, no H-index, Ba&Ma), and marginal centrality. On the right side eight modalities indicate higher educational capitals (Ph.D, full professor, centrality, average and high H-indexes) together with non-ministry positions and security agency experience. Axis 2 distributes individuals at upper section of the plot with high levels of institutional capital (political experience, high rank official, security agency experience, lecturer), opposed by four modalities at the bottom that indicate non-institutional positions (no policy experience, NGO/think tank experience, full professor, average H-index). Axis 2 is therefore primarily an institutional capital axis.

Figure 8 shows axes 2 and 3. Axis 2 is the same axis as in Figure 6, which is now displayed horizontally. Displayed vertically, axis 3 shows modalities on the lower part of the plot that refers to NGO experience (NGO – think-tank, NGO director, not ministry). It associates with international education and no educational degree. On the upper part of the plot are five modalities that indicate to an absence of NGO experience (no NGO experience, mid-rank official, lecturer, national education and justice ministry position). Axis 3 is therefore primarily an NGO capital dimension.

The ECEGVR and its critical stance on radicalization is positioned at the lower right in the plot of Figure 6 and the left side of Figure 8. It indicates that ECEGVR experts possess high amounts of academic capital in relation to the other networks (81,8% of the members hold a Ph.D. and are full professors, 36,4% were educated abroad) and some institutional capitals (36% are former high rank officials). These findings are also evident in Figure 7, which distributes most of the individual authors on the bottom. The Kings College report, with its emphasis on ‘conveyor belt’ radicalization and Internet radicalization, also consists of actors with high amounts of academic capitals (75% are full professors), and are therefore positioned on the far left side in Figure 8. They are also positioned lower in Figure 6 and 7 because they have fewer institutional experiences in relation to the other networks.

These findings more or less correspond with the MCA without the PPN members, provided in the paper of Francesco Ragazzi (2013, 18); the authors of both the aberrant ECEGVR and Kings College reports are positioned having relatively more capitals than members of the other networks. However, a difference is that in the MCA of this study the ECEGVR is not positioned high on the institutional capital dimension. This can be explained by its separate modality of "former high ranked official", which does not appear in correspondence with "midrank official" and "highrank official" modalities - which many

members of the PPN possess. Future research should probably take this issue into account, for example by joining these modalities.

Authors of the Change Institute (“Beliefs” and “Practices”), CEIS and PPN are clumped together on the left side of the origin in Figure 6, as they both associated with lower academic and institutional capitals. Figure 8 positions them near the origin. This impedes the interpretation of differences, especially when compared with the analysis without the PPN (Ragazzi 2013, 18). However, the results still more or less concur with the original study, as it uses the same data. Change Institute (“Best Practices”), with its emphasis on ‘root causes’ has distinct NGO profiles (55,2%), together with low academic capitals (55,2% have no academic position, 10,3% no academic degree). The CEIS report, with its emphasis on psycho-social factors of radicalization with a focus on eliminating root causes, consists of marginal academics; they have no or very low H-index scores and marginal centrality scores. Furthermore, its authors are mostly national educated (100%) and have no experience in NGOs, policy or political positions (100%).

The PPN members are positioned relatively close to the CEIS and Change Institute reports, although on average their position on both the academic and institutional capital axes are higher. With its emphasis European cooperation, learning, Internet and community based action, seems to consist for a large part of ministry related personnel (high rank official 27%, mid rank official 35,1%), for a large part coming from national ministries of interior and integration. Furthermore it consists of relatively high-educated authors (51,4% holding a Ph.D.), but 64,9% hold no academic position and 64,9% do not have NGO positions.

7. Discussion and Conclusion

Both the analysis of the stances and the analysis of the social positions dismiss interpretations provided by the “propagandist” and “epistemic communities” hypotheses. The addition of the PPN has not changed this conclusion. The analysis of expert network stances indicates to multiple narratives on the characterization of violent-radicalization as well as the recommendations to prevent it from taking place. From these results it can be concluded that European expert networks do not necessarily align themselves with policy drawn by governing elites, but have in fact “distinct cards to play”. In addition, the results seem to indicate that experts cannot be interpreted as an epistemic community as they do not form a common body of knowledge nor share equal strategies; experts display instead a wide variety of stances and strategies might equally differ.

When expert stances are analyzed in conjunction with the social positions they take in the field, the results point to a number of insights that might provide ground for further research. For instance, this study confirms the hypothesis that the European field of expertise is a “weak field” i.e. a field that is dominated by other more autonomous fields. This is most

clearly corroborated by the example of the ECEGVR. The analysis shows that this expert group consists of the most multi-positioned group as they have a vast trajectory in both academic and institutional fields. Together with their critical stances on the issue of violent-radicalization it could arguably be that these capitals provided them with enough legitimacy to counter-balance the radicalization direction set out by the EU without losing their status as experts. In addition, it can be argued that the ECEGVR's proximity to the field of security and politics made them unwilling to endorse the radicalization turn of the EU (Ragazzi 2013, 21).

However, as this critical stance provides an indication of the weak autonomy of the field of expertise vis-à-vis the field of politics or security, the weak field hypothesis may further be confirmed by the fact that the Commission had rejected the report of the ECEGVR; because the report did not validate the violent-radicalization discourse, the Commission did not consider these experts as legitimate voices to define what the "real threat" is. The Commission looked therefore to other sources of expertise, finding it with expert networks that did not have a traditional security profile. These sources of expertise could arguably have been found in reports provided by the PPN, Kings College, CEIS and Change Institute, as their stances indicate that they (re)produced a soft-line and community-based discourse that was acceptable within the discourse of the Commission.

More evidence for the "weak field" hypothesis can be found when looking from the perspective of actors who invest in the European field of expertise. The experts' stances in relation to social positions may indicate to a function of conversion of capitals; those who have low institutional capitals or limited academic recognition could invest in a European network of expertise to provide them with capitals at the European level. For instance, the Kings College report seems to consist mainly of experts with high valued academic capitals but considerably low institutional capitals. Their access to the field of expertise could indicate to a personal strategy to gain acknowledgement as a legitimate voice in European terrorism field. This might also explain their hardline stances on the topic of counter-radicalization, as they were dominated by and tried to secure support of the political and/or security field. A similar strategy of conversion of capitals can also be identified with the authors of the CEIS and Change Institute reports. These actors had limited social capitals, academically marginal positions and were often positioned in civil society institutions. Because of these scarce capitals it could equally be argued that their access to European field of expertise served them the means to gain institutional and international capitals, thereby endowing them with more legitimacy and prestige that, in turn, could be reinvested in the field of origin.

And last, the authors of the PPN consist of a large and diverse group of experts. A large group is located in national bureaucratic fields (e.g. ministries of interior and integration). They therefore show more institutional capitals in relation to other networks. As

stances of the PPN seem more or less in line with those of the European Union, this might be explained by the positioning of experts in national bureaucratic fields of countries that affiliated with the counter-radicalization turn in the EU - for instance, a large part of bureaucrats come from the UK and the Netherlands, where counter-radicalization is the dominant paradigm. Even the position of experts from France, a country that officially does not recognize counter-radicalization as a policy-direction, seem to be located in more moderate positions of their national fields (e.g. Bureau des Cultes, France). A large part of the experts, however, also have low academic capitals and marginal institutional capitals (midrank officials) and predominantly positioned in national fields. Investment at the level of the European Union might therefore equally serve a strategy to gain capitals at the European level. In addition, the group of NGO members in the PPN might also perform a strategy of acknowledgement by cooperating in this European field of expertise.

The conclusions in this study may provide grounds for further research. First of all, more expert networks could be explored, such as the more established EU bodies (Europol, Eurojust, EPCTF and SitCen), formal and informal groups (CTG, PWGT and G6) and additional experts such as the Network of Experts on Radicalization (ENER) and the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). Second, further research could focus more on the individual specificities of experts by including individual stances of experts instead of collective stances through expert reports used here. Third, more biographical data could be added to get better sense of the positions from which the experts express their view - for example, by a more thorough method of prosopography or qualitative interviews with experts. And last, additional hypotheses could be drawn for European terrorism expertise. For example, it may be argued that experts' access to European fields may function an import/export strategy (Dezalay and Garth 2011), or the analysis could include a hypothesis of a (trans)national field of power (Bourdieu 1994; Bigo 2011, 246).

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Appendix

TABLE 2:
Contribution of the active modalities - in bold, contributions of categories for the interpretation of each axis (>2.94).

	Relative Weight (%)	Square of the distance from the origin	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Academic Education (Inter)national					
International Education	2.523	2.96429	2.35	0.55	**5.29**
National Education	7.207	0.38750	0.58	0.31	**4.22**
TOTAL	9.730		2.93	0.86	9.51
Policy Experience					
Former High Rank Off	0.631	14.85710	**14.30**	0.01	1.31
Highrank Official	1.171	7.53846	1.58	**17.13**	1.09
Midrank Official	1.441	5.93750	0.93	0.49	**5.02**
No Policy Experience	6.757	0.48000	1.52	**4.28**	1.25
TOTAL	10.000		18.33	21.91	8.68
Political Experience					
No Political Experie	9.640	0.03738	0.02	0.30	0.12
Political Experience	0.360	26.75000	0.65	**8.08**	**3.29**
TOTAL	10.000		0.68	8.38	3.41
Security Experience					
No Security Experien	8.468	0.18085	0.78	2.16	0.03
Security Agency Expe	1.532	5.52941	**4.30**	**11.96**	0.17
TOTAL	10.000		5.08	14.12	0.20
HC-Index					
Very Low H-Index	3.063	2.26471	0.09	0.72	0.16
Low H-Index	0.811	11.33330	0.41	0.89	0.69
Average H-Index	0.631	14.85710	**7.39**	**2.95**	0.02
High H-Index	0.721	12.87500	**9.34**	0.15	0.00
No H-Index	4.775	1.09434	**4.86**	1.14	0.52
TOTAL	10.000		22.09	5.85	1.39
NGO Experience					
NGO member	1.982	4.04545	2.19	0.14	**6.39**
No NGO Experience	6.757	0.48000	0.35	0.06	**5.72**
NGO Director	1.261	6.92857	0.23	1.10	**5.60**
TOTAL	10.000		2.78	1.30	17.71
Ministry Types					
Interior	2.793	2.58065	1.71	1.70	0.44
Communities and Loca	1.712	4.84211	1.49	2.45	0.00
Justice	1.351	6.40000	0.44	0.06	**9.19**
Not_Ministry	1.261	6.92857	**3.74**	0.03	**12.67**
NGO - Think Tank	0.901	10.10000	0.15	**3.17**	**6.34**
Integration	1.081	8.25000	2.70	1.20	2.66
Other	0.901	10.10000	0.01	8.80	0.00
TOTAL	10.000		10.24	17.42	31.31

Max Degree					
BA & MA	4.505	1.22000	**4.23**	0.76	0.18
No Degree	0.450	21.20000	1.72	0.03	**16.85**
Ph.D.	5.045	0.98214	**5.46**	0.77	2.66
TOTAL	10.000		11.41	1.56	19.70
Academic Position					
Lecturer	2.252	3.44000	0.69	**4.60**	**3.00**
Full Professor	2.793	2.58065	**6.49**	**15.39**	0.43
No Academic Position	4.955	1.01818	**6.12**	2.25	2.76
TOTAL	10.000		13.30	22.24	6.18
Centrality (qualitative)					
Central	2.252	3.44000	**9.33**	2.41	1.47
Average Centrality	6.036	0.65672	0.91	2.52	0.40
Marginal	1.712	4.84211	**2.92**	1.44	0.04
TOTAL	10.000		13.17	6.36	1.91