

# **Influence of Nationalism on Shinzo Abe's Foreign Policy**

Version 1 (06-01-2017)

Master Thesis

Masters program International Relations, specialisation International Studies

G.W.Gerrits

# Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Methodology	6
Chapter One: Post World War II Nationalism in Japan: A Brief Overview	11
Chapter Two: Abe's Policy Behavior	17
Chapter Three: Abe's Domestic Considerations	21
Chapter Four: Domestic Balancing	24
Conclusion	29
Bibliography	33

## Introduction

Japan and its neighbours South Korea and China have had a troubled relationship ever since the end of the Second World War, before which Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and during which Japan invaded China and committed what China perceived as grave atrocities and war crimes. During Japanese rule in the Korean peninsula, cultural assimilation became mandatory for Koreans and especially during the Second World War Korean life and production was in large part in service of the war effort. For the crimes committed during this period Japan has since made multiple monetary reparation payments, the two countries have declared each other allies and affirmed their friendly status repeatedly, most importantly at the *Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea* of 1965 that was to normalize Japanese-South Korean relations. However, historical tensions have the tendency to get in the way of these efforts and eventually negate their initial positive effects on Japan-South Korean relations. Specifically, Japanese conservatives tend to release statements and take decisions that can be construed as nationalist and dismissive of its wartime past.

Despite these issues, Japan and South Korea have seen long-term progression regarding cooperation on many levels such as increased economical transactions, mutual cultural influences and participation in multilateral talks on economic and security issues. The reason the historically rooted antagonism repeatedly returns to the forefront seems to be mainly due to conservative Japanese and South Korean politicians aggravating these underlying feelings of historical injustice by making and performing antagonising statements and actions. Examples of this would be the occurrences of Japanese politicians visiting the Yasukuni shrine to honor the war dead of Japan, and South Korean politicians raising the question of further compensation for wartime sexual slavery of Korean women multiple times during multilateral summits. So why does Japan continue to antagonize its neighbours with controversial statements and actions, that are interpreted by its neighbours as nationalistic and offensive?

The literature on this subject within the International Relations school tends to look at the problematic relations between these two countries in one of two ways. The first is scholars who analyze the issue from a more classical International Relations perspective in which balancing for power and threat is most important. The most notable scholar who takes this approach is Cha

with his quasi-alliance model, for which his main argument is that as long as Japan and South Korea have a shared ally in the United States who is very involved in the region, Japan and South Korea have no reason to strengthen their relationship because they are protected (Cha 2000, 263-264). Other notable scholars who use a similar approach are Tae-Ryong Yoon who argues that high threat perceptions of outside states would encourage more cooperation between Japan and South Korea (Yoon 2006, ), and Key Young Son who argues that Japan and South Korea are just 'middle powers' which need an alliance to a great power such as the US or China and thus have no need for extensive cooperation with each other (Son 2014, 110-112). The other approach is that historical tensions and issues stemming from these tensions play the central role in the analysis. Notable scholars are Cheol Hee Park who blames lack of trust and prevailing nationalist sentiments for the poor relationship between Japan and South Korea (Park 2009, 257-265), Hyung Gu Lynn who argues that there is a 'systemic lock' in place of Japanese financial compensation payments towards South Korea when it pressures Japan on the historical issues, and Japanese politicians then use the outrage this causes in Japan to increase their domestic influence (Lynn 2000, 80-84). Gavan McCormack takes an approach different than these two, saying that the Japanese government is using nationalistic sentiments in Japan to achieve national objectives such as the revision of the Japanese constitution (namely the pacifist article 9), disguising their further committedness to the United States by making nationalistic gestures, ignoring the international backlash to these actions and thus seeming more committed to their own country's ideals and values than foreign relations (McCormack 2004, 43-45). This approach is interesting, but McCormack does not further explore how these domestic influences operate.

These domestic influences on Japanese international relations policy remain on the periphery of many theories but are never fully explored. In this thesis we will examine what this domestic influence is, focusing on the influence of nationalism and nationalist organisations since Japan has a very strong undercurrent of nationalist organisations that have many politicians as members. The strongest of these organisations is the Nippon Kaigi, or 'Japan Conference'. Organised nationalism is the strongest clue of what might be causing the continued provocation by Japan of its East Asian neighbours, and this is what will be the central research question of this thesis: *How and to what extent did nationalism and nationalist organisations influence the decision making process on foreign policy, particularly toward South Korea, of the Abe administration from 2012 to the present?*

By answering this question I will argue that the ongoing troubles between Japan and South Korea are not satisfactorily explained by the classical approach of analysing it as a struggle for power between the two nations trying to carve out the most beneficial position for themselves. I will argue instead that domestic interests are, when looking at this issue, the most crucial influence on these countries' relations, focusing more on how domestic interests are balanced against international considerations and the influence and power smaller domestic groups, in this case nationalism, have on international relations. The importance of this approach is twofold. Firstly, as stated above this perspective on the subject has not yet been properly explored in the International Relations field. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, domestic influences on relations between states are underexplored in International Relations as a discipline and theoretically. By using this approach we can shine new light upon the subject but also find new ways to engage issues in the International Relations field. The method which we will be using to explore this domestic influence is that of Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game. In the next chapter we will explain this theory and review the scholarly critique of it, ending in an explanation of how the method will be applied to answer the research question and an outline of the thesis' structure.

## Methodology

Since we are trying to answer the question of how a particular group, nationalist conservatives in Japan, has influenced the foreign policy of Prime Minister Abe, realist or other state-focused theory does not suffice. To uncover and analyze the chain of events and subsequent influencing and decision making we have to turn instead to a methodology that covers the domestic as well as the international. The most suitable theoretical framework is that of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This framework deals with how the decision making process of foreign policy works and thus how decisions are made. However, FPA is a very broad framework that can encompass many types of theories and methods. Considering the limited scope of this study, we require a somewhat more compact framework that looks at domestic influences on the making of foreign policy. A fitting candidate is Two-Level Game Theory, proposed by Robert Putnam in 1988.

Putnam argued that frameworks that focus on events in either the international or the domestic sphere are too limited and that a synthesis of the two where they are entangled gives a more complete picture. The Two-Level Game consists of these two levels: Level 1, the international level where bargaining occurs between chief negotiators which represent states. Level 2, the domestic level, in which bargaining occurs about whether or not the international agreement bargained for by the chief negotiator on Level 1 is to be accepted. Any achievement in Level 1 has to be approved by Level 2, or the international 'deal' will be either outright dismissed or have to be renegotiated. To figure out what to bargain for, the chief negotiator in Level 1 has to define what Putnam calls 'win sets': all the different potential Level 1 proposals that Level 2 would accept and thus result in a 'win'. The chief negotiator will have the easiest time finding win sets if the range of win sets on Level 2 are very broad, thus leading to acceptance of a broader range of proposals. Often times the major players on Level 2 will try to narrow the Level 1 win sets down by agreeing only to specific things, since this heightens the Level 1 bargaining power as their chief negotiator will not accept proposals that might be vastly in the advantage of the other party or leave potential spoils (political or economic) on the table. Win sets are most easily recognized after the deal has been made, since the outcome of the deal itself has to fall within the win set determined by Level II considerations beforehand. After analysing the outcome the situation on Level II can be researched to determine what domestic

groups and factors made the deal possible, thus revealing the win set that was fulfilled by the negotiator (Putnam 1988, 427-429, 433-459). In our case, the chief negotiator would for example be Shinzo Abe, and the Level 2 players would be his constituency and governmental administration. The reason the theory is helpful in determining nationalist influences on Abe is because as the chief negotiator we can see where he has to adjust his international bargaining to accommodate for domestic influences, and thus we can see more clearly who he has to adjust for more than others.

There have been varying critiques of Putnam's Two-Level Game theory. Knopf made 3 criticisms of Putnam's Two-Level Game. First of all, Knopf argued that Putnam did not adequately address the differences in transgovernmental, transnational and cross-level domestic-international interaction. What Knopf means by this is that both governmental and non-governmental actors in Level 2 in both countries of the negotiation can interact with and influence each other. His second criticism was that Putnam had not acknowledged that alliances, such as the alliance between Japan and the United States, could change the situation in negotiations between two countries. Knopf's thirdly argued that there is not always a single chief negotiator. For example, domestic groups can in some cases also act as international negotiators. (Knopf 1993, 599-623). Knopf's second critique is echoed in part by Mitchell, who states that Putnam assumes that negotiations are always bilateral while in reality states are almost always influenced by international organisations and the constraints they place upon these states. Mitchell states that in Two-Level Games theory most scholars look at the international Level 1 as a simple bilateral negotiation and then focus on the domestic Level 2. Since this trivializes a complex level of analysis, you must look at international influence from outside the two negotiating parties and appreciate the complexity of these negotiations (Mitchell 2001, 43-44).

More recently, Yasuaki found two flaws in Putnam's assumptions: political culture seems to matter more than homogeneity or politicization of issues and aside from side-payments to domestic parties, negotiators can expand their win-sets simply by using appealing rhetoric and by avoiding a clear position so that domestic parties are left confused as to what is actually being bargained for. In short, Yasuaki expands the role of the individual negotiator and their options (Yasuaki 862-863).

Patterson added to Two-Level Game theory and made it their own. Patterson wrote not about a Two-Level, but a Three-Level Game. The third level is an international organisation, the

European Communities. Patterson added this level because she believed that during the bargaining for a policy shift in European agricultural policy, these third level also played an integral part and actors in the other two levels took this third level into account for their strategies (Patterson 1997, 135-137.) My conclusion is that many scholars criticize Putnam's theory, but mostly not for inherent flaws but for things Putnam had not considered. Most scholars go on to add to or make changes to Putnam's theory, such as Patterson above or Savage and Weale who created a new Two-Level Game that mirrored that of Putnam: instead of an empirical Two-Level Game, they created a Normative one in which each actor has to consider the reasonableness of their demands. In practice this means that even when faced with an opposing party who holds a weaker position, concessions might still be made for them since it is expected within the normative logic of the international situation (Savage, Weale 2009, 63-81).

The Two-Level Game Theory is a good place to start when considering domestic factors in foreign policy making. However, it is not immediately applicable to all questions and it is not a comprehensive system for analysis. It also does not take into account that the Chief Negotiator is not necessarily a purely rational actor since they are almost without exception human beings, and so are the domestic influencers. Another interesting point is that the win-set is not necessarily determined by the entire domestic sphere, but simply by those elements the negotiator needs to satisfy the minimum requirements for ratification of agreements. In the case of Abe this might be the conservative party and their constituency, and he may not need to consider other parts of society. Despite its flaws, Two-Level Games Theory has shown that it is very malleable, perhaps precisely because it is not a closed analytical system.

What we will research in this study is why the necessary elements to be influenced were nationalist conservatives for Abe, why those specific elements were chosen to be appealed to and what the 'win sets' were for them. Two-Level Games is fitting to find a comprehensive answer to these questions as it will lead us to the sources of domestic influence by analysing Abe's win-sets. We will come to our conclusion by using Two-Level Games in reverse order: we will look at what the win-sets were for them by looking at policy outcomes, which domestic elements were vying for these terms and then consider their policy goals and why they were in this position of power.

In this thesis we will largely be making interpretative analyses, and relying less on quantitative research. We will be analysing previous scholarly research, newspaper articles and



speeches made by the prime ministers. The first two types of sources will be used to collect scholarly work and general information on the subjects, while the speeches will be analysed to identify what kind of rhetoric the prime minister uses. By doing this we can see which groups they are trying to appeal to. The lack of quantitative evidence is this thesis' greatest potential weakness, but there is no effective method of putting the analysis of the questions we are asking in quantitative terms: it is my opinion that the decision making process can not be neatly fitted into a causal system and that we have to interpret each part of the process individually to come to a greater understanding. For the scholarly research we will be looking at different ways of approaching the topic and the newspaper articles, press releases and speeches contain valuable information that we need to complete our picture of the situation.

We will be splitting this thesis into 4 chapters. The first chapter will give a brief overview of Post-World War II Nationalism and how it has changed since then, giving valuable information on the place of nationalism in Japanese society and politics. The second chapter will identify Abe's win-sets by looking at his policy behavior. The third chapter will identify the domestic groups that Abe has to balance for in his foreign policy decision making, and the final chapter will analyze how exactly Abe realizes this domestic balancing.

## Chapter 1: Post World War II nationalism in Japan: a brief overview

After the Second World War, many nationalist writers fell out of grace due to the new system imposed upon Japan by the United States wherein the Emperor became a symbolic figurehead and the explicit locus of politics was on the elected government. Nationalism reemerged in 1955 when a group of nationalist scholars and politicians started what became known as the first textbook controversy. Nozaki and Selden argue that this controversy took place as a sort of substitute for the struggle over the 1946 constitution and its pacifist nature: since that argument was settled and no longer up for debate, school textbooks became the new battleground for nationalist thinkers. This first textbook controversy centered on what some believed to be anti-capitalist propaganda being inserted in textbooks which glorified China's culture and made Japan look like the inferior country in ages past. The most important consequence of the first textbook controversy was that the Ministry of Education became more bold in actively encouraging school textbook authors to write more favorably about Japan's history and now called for the cultivation of nationalism. The Ministry of Education became quite persistent and dominant in their revisionism and authors had only limited success in fighting their censorship. One of the Ministry's comments on a 1950s textbook, taken from Selden and Nozaki's research, makes the tone of the conversation clear: "Do not write bad things about Japan in the Pacific War. Even though they are facts, represent them in a romantic manner" (Nozaki, Selden 2009, 1-3).

In the 1960s, most prominently at the hand of Hayashi Fusao, nationalism reared its head once more. Once a communist thinker who turned to nationalism based on the Emperor as a means to keep writing on societal and governmental issues in the 1930s, he returned to prominence in the 1960s when he wrote an essay for *Chūōkōron* (*Central Review*) and now turned to what many called Ultrationalism. He proposed that Japan's imperial ambitions in Asia had been justified in multiple ways: it had tried to unify Asia so as to protect it against Western Colonialism and it had only reacted to the Western 'threat', which was the threat of colonization or otherwise domination of East Asia. This essay became very controversial immediately and shocked those who adhered to the new 'pacifist way' (Long 2000). The reason

this is relevant is because it shows that what public expressions of nationalism and resistance to war apology were often espoused for those not now involved in politics. It signifies the loosening of the taboo on nationalism since the Second World War ended.

At the end of the 1970s, several LDP members once more raised concerns about the content of school textbooks. They apparently found communist sentiments and foreign influences in the way the textbooks described Japanese actions in the Second World War. A portion of LDP members called the ‘young hawks’ by their progressive counterparts took this opportunity to severely tighten the leash of government censorship on school textbooks when Morita Masaaki wrote an influential book on ‘self-flagellating’ history in school textbooks. They changed the way they described the invasion of China and the abuse of the so-called ‘Comfort Women’. This led to the textbook controversy of 1982 when China took offense to the new textbooks, and Japan promised to change some of the language back. This meant that the contents of school textbooks were now accepted to be shaped by government policy. This led to the heightened activity of a group called the *Nihon wo mamoru kokumin kaigi* or the National Conference to Defend Japan who then published their own, very revisionist, textbook. This loosely organised group later merged with others of its kind to become the *Nippon Kaigi* or Japan Conference, which we will come back to later (Shibuichi 2008). What is interesting about this ‘wave’ of nationalism is that it was a concerted effort by both politicians and scholars, giving it an air of authority.

The next peak in nationalism occurred in 1995. In the early 1990s, the knowledge that the Japanese military had forced many South Korean women into prostitution as so-called ‘Comfort Women’ became widespread and caused civil unrest in South Korea and Japan. This prompted several progressive Japanese politicians to rephrase their stance on the war, now calling it unjust, mistaken and colonial in nature. This in turn motivated conservative politicians from the LDP to form the Committee for the Examination of History, which funded newly revised textbooks and the spread of scholarly research which glorified the ‘Great East Asian War’. What followed was a struggle between nationalist politicians and those who wished to issue a formal apology to those who had suffered from Japanese actions during the war. This culminated in the issue of a formal apology by Prime Minister Murayama, and the push for the newly revised textbooks by the nationalist faction. The organisation behind the textbooks was called the *Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai* (Society for the Creation of a New History Textbook), Tsukurukai in

short. (Nozaki, Selden 2009, 9-22). These textbook controversies served a major role in heightening the public profile of nationalist politicians and groups, helping them spread their ideas and influence. These books were not used by a large portion of school districts in Japan but at the time they sold incredibly well to the general public, reaching bestseller lists and making it into newspaper publications (Japan Times 2001). This commercial success and widespread diffusion signified that the harsh nationalism which had come from a small vocal minority, was now becoming acceptable to a mainstream audience. South Korea was not pleased with this, and the ‘comfort women issue’ became a recurring problem in international relations from then on and the debates surrounding it became increasingly heated.

An important influence on the nationalism peak of the 1990s was the backlash against Iris Chang’s book *The Rape of Nanking*. Chang wrote of the atrocities that Japan had committed during the Battle of Nanking, mainly sourced from interviews and original research. Japanese scholars, especially nationalist and conservative scholars, reacted heavily to this by starting research of their own into this event and those surrounding it. One of the most high profile and controversial cases is that of Higashinakano Shudo, a researcher from Asia University in Tokyo. He authored several publications in which he argues that the atrocities Chang writes about were almost entirely fictional, that the death toll was grossly inflated and the testimonies given by Japanese interviewees were fabricated (Higashinakano 2005, 152-162). His works are on the extreme side of the spectrum, but its tone and stance is typical of the works produced by nationalist scholars who are part of the so-called ‘Illusion School’: those who believe the Nanking Massacre never took place. Publications about the Nanking Massacre had already been in the spotlight before in the 1970s due to a book by the Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi, but it did not provoke the same amount of controversy. One of the important reasons for this is that Chang used images and accounts published by the Chinese government that were proven to be fake, which provided the perfect ammunition for conservative and nationalist scholars to be outraged about (Askew 2002). None of these events or initiatives served to resolve the issue of international friction over historical disagreements, as these are ongoing until this day. Koide Reiko believes that it is currently worse than ever before: the progressive thinkers and educators have lost, and history classes are now in almost full control of politicians. One of the major driving forces of this is the current prime minister, Shinzo Abe (Koide 2014, 9-11).

In the late 1990s a different kind of nationalism which involved the public to a great degree started appearing. Gavan McCormack describes this new style as more vocal and using bombastic rhetoric, moving away from the nationalism based on scholars and politicians and instead focusing on nationalist organisations. One of these nationalist organisations that came into being in this period is the Nippon Kaigi, or Japan Conference. This group states that Japan no longer needs to apologise for its history and past actions and needs to become an independent (mainly from the United States) and normal, militarized country once more. Since then, the Nippon Kaigi has become one of the most influential pressure groups in Japan, touting many conservative politicians among its members such as Shinzo Abe (McCormack 2000, 248-252). Possible reasons for the growth of nationalist group at this time are diverse, and the most obvious one is the end of the Cold War and the shifts of power that happened at the same time. In the early 1990s, China completed its economic reforms and started its own economic miracle while Japan's economic miracle was ending, signaling the start of long lasting economic stagnation. This could have struck fear into Japanese nationalists, instilling a sense of urgency for Japan to find a solution to the changing balance. Another likely reason is that internet connections were becoming more commonplace. This allows groups like the Nippon Kaigi to spread its message and ideals more easily, and establish a loose web of influence within which communication is efficient and cheap. Another reason could be the growing influence of globalization, which comes with its own fears and worries that might lead people to embrace a more conservative and in this case nationalist way of thinking. Lastly, the new style of nationalism could simply be due to a new generation of nationalists taking over. The men and women who had seen the war were starting to decline in number, and young nationalists and especially politicians were looking for a way to prove themselves. Because they did not experience the war firsthand, they would have had a more detached view of the war that explains a different perspective, and thus a different way of expressing their nationalistic feelings and views. One of the organisations that sprouted from this new movement was the Group of Young Diet Members Concerned with Japan's Future and History Education, notably with Shinzo Abe as its secretary general (Nozaki, Selden 2009, 12).

Good examples of the new type of nationalism are the now very high profile public visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by government officials. The Yasukuni shrine is internationally controversial since it enshrines several war criminals from the Second World War. Previously to

the 2000s these visits had also been made but much more low-profile. Despite the international controversies that these visits provoke, conservative politicians continue to visit the shrine, albeit not at every chance they get. Pollman believes that the reason behind these visits are to drum up nationalistic sentiments so that politicians are able to garner more domestic support for their goals when their international support is unstable. The most obvious goal that the current prime minister is trying for is the revision of the Japanese constitution, specifically the pacifist article nine, so that the Japanese state may remilitarize and thus 'become a normal country again' (Pollman 2016, 124-128, 148-150). This goal has antagonized South Korea in recent years. On top of South Korea's protests against Japanese historical revisionism of its wartime past, mainly the Comfort Women issue, the South Korean government has also proclaimed itself wary of increased Japanese military activity in East Asia due to Abe's plans for constitutional changes to the pacifist article 9 and is worried that Abe is putting Japan back on the path to its wartime ways (Lee 2014). Aside from being a genuine worry, South Korea could also be seen as balancing between Japan and China. South Korea is already an ally of the United States, but if they are too approving of Japan they risk losing a friend in China which endangers their position as a 'middle power' between these two countries.

In this chapter we have seen the reemergence of nationalism after the Second World War and the changes it has undergone since then. At first it was mostly a reaction to the defeat and the shame that people felt about the events of the war. In the 1980s and 1990s the textbook controversies indicated that not only were nationalists willing to reinterpret history on a grander scale, but nationalism became politicized more than before and led to the interpretation of history as being something political rather than a subject of research. When in the 1990s nationalism shifted again, we can see that it changed from something on a smaller, social scale and a political tool to nationalist organisations such as the Nippon Kaigi. While this could be interpreted as nationalism becoming less political, the reality is that many conservative politicians are members of such organisations. The shift we have seen over several decades is that nationalism grew into both a social and political force with strong ties to political parties and heads of state through personal connections and membership of nationalist organisations. Officially, nationalist organisations such as Nippon Kaigi have no governing power but when a large portion of the conservative party is a member it cannot be ignored when considering how politicians are influenced and by whom. We established that the main worries of South Korea have been Abe's

plans for constitutional changes and his historical revisionism, most notably in the Comfort Women issue. In the next chapter we will look at Abe's policy behavior more in-depth to further analyze what his goals are and how he has tried to achieve them, and in doing so establishing what his win-sets were in trying to balance relations with South Korea and domestic interests.

## Chapter 2: Abe's policy behavior

In the previous chapter we discussed the development of post World War II nationalism in Japan, and saw how it led to a new style of nationalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Building on that knowledge, in this chapter we will go into the 'behavior' portion of our analysis, looking at the effects of nationalism on Abe's politics that affect relations with East Asia: the decisions that were made and how they were put into practice by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016. In between these two prime ministers there was a period of rule by LDP conservatives, but they were decidedly less nationalist in nature. We will look at and analyse the major controversies and decisions made.

To determine what constituted a win-set for Shinzo Abe, we must review his actions on an international scale. His behaviour on this level would logically fall within a win-set. We already know that Abe is internationally perceived as a nationalist from the conservative party. During his first presidential year in 2006, Abe's nationalism was not so apparent although he had been known as a member of nationalist organisations such as the Tsukurukai and Nippon Kaigi. This is probably due to him following party politics which were more moderate at this time. During his campaign and subsequent prime-ministership from 2012 until today, he followed a new strategy that was decidedly nationalist in nature. While Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine at all during his first presidential year, he later expressed remorse for not doing so during his campaign for his second term in 2012. He did, however, send financial offerings to the shrine. In 2013 Abe made the first official visit to Yasukuni shrine in seven years, stating that it was an anti-war gesture and not meant to provoke neighbouring countries. Both China and South Korea reacted negatively to this event (Gentry 2014, 33-39). Abe's assurance that it was an anti-war gesture unsurprisingly fell on deaf ears: known as a staunch nationalist in East Asia, Abe had supported historical revisionism projects in the late 1990s and had proven himself to be a financial supporter of Yasukuni shrine. It is also very unlikely that Abe would be unaware that a positive international reaction to his visit could only be a negative one, so it is likely that Abe was subordinating international relations to the interests of his nationalist constituents. While Abe was fiercely nationalist during his campaign, he has shown to be more pragmatic during his tenure. He has been diplomatically careful in negotiating on territorial disputes, only



visited Yasukuni shrine once and has not pushed educational revisionism as much as someone with his background could be expected to. However, two key nationalist themes have reoccurred during Abe's prime-ministership that stand out as nationalist: the way that he accomplished the enactment of his economic plan colloquially called 'Abenomics', and his pursuit of constitutional revisionism in order to remilitarise Japan. While Abenomics is not essentially nationalist in itself, Abe touted it as a way to make Japan great again and as a way to re-entrench Japan as one of the most powerful countries in the world. Nagy argues that Abe used nationalism and nationalist rhetoric to get people excited about his plan and as a way to strengthen his political position so that he could force the necessary laws through government in a top-down approach which allowed him to bypass much of the factional politics (Nagy 2014, 8, 9-12). Abe's goal of constitutional revisionism has not proven to be so easily attained. The reform that Abe wants so badly is the revision or removal of Article 9, which is the article that states Japan cannot have its own offensively equipped military and will never participate in acts of war. Abe stated it is his duty to revise the constitution, and that in doing so he can turn Japan into a 'normal country': a country that can participate in international security operations instead of merely supporting its allies financially. He also stressed that if Japan is equipped with a standing military, it will be less vulnerable to international coercion and violence (Yellen 2014).

In the previous chapter we mentioned Gavan McCormack, who has a theory that the increased nationalism in Japanese politics is a disguise for the further subordination of Japan to international goals. One of the visible ways that Abe has tried push an international agenda in Japan itself (in this case for its most important ally, the United States) is in Okinawa. Approximately twenty percent of Okinawa's surface area is occupied by US military bases, which were installed after the Battle of Okinawa during which most of Okinawa's cities were destroyed. One of these bases, the MCAS Futenma, is located inside of a large city named Ginowan. A number of high profile controversies and accidents surrounding this military base have rallied Okinawans behind the removal of this base. The United States and the Japanese government rejected a total removal and instead offered to move the military base to Henoko Bay in Nago. The people of Okinawa were strongly opposed to this plan since they feared that the construction would cause environmental damage and cause nuisances to the surrounding area. To this end they elected Hirokazu Nakaima as governor, who was strongly opposed to its construction and promised he would block it. However, Nakaima changed his mind when the

Abe administration offered a large amount of financial compensation for the Okinawan prefecture in exchange for the green light (McCormack, Norimatsu 2012, 90-92, 158-160). Okinawans were outraged, and reacted by electing governor Susume Inamine who vowed to do anything in his power to block and hinder construction (Fackler 2014). Abe then opted to not react at all and instead force construction to go ahead, ignoring the governor and local resistance. The reason that he was able to force this issue is that Okinawa constitutes only a small part of Japan, and Okinawans tend to feel quite disconnected from their mainland countrymen. Thus, Abe's hands were free to push this issue as hard as he wanted. If this took place on the mainland, Abe would likely lose a large part of his domestic support. Interestingly, the strategy did not work as in 2016 Abe settled in the lawsuits of the Okinawan prefecture and agreed to suspend construction for 2 years, although he stated he remains committed to the construction plans in Henoko (Fifield 2016). These events suggest that Abe is working hard to accommodate the security goals of the United States, among which being the increased activity of the Japanese military in the region. In the light of Abe's constitutional revisionism, more advanced weaponry and bases being in place in Japan could greatly aid remilitarization efforts in the future.

A recent example of Abe's negotiator role in East Asia has been in the comfort women issue described in the previous chapter. While previously there had been no progression in the matter, in the end of 2015 Abe and South Korea's prime minister Park agreed to a new compensation plan for the comfort women. This plan was intended to improve relations and put international discussion of the issue to rest, constituting of a Japanese payment of 1 billion yen to be put into a foundation to help the aging victims. What is quite interesting is that during the negotiation of this settlement, at no point were the victims themselves consulted on what might fulfill their needs. This indicates that the deal was directly aimed at silencing international debate (Japan Times 2016). The victims reacted by harshly criticizing the deal and demanding personal apologies from the Japanese government. Shinzo Abe responded that the Japanese government had no intention to implement further measures for the comfort women issue (Japan Times 2016). This 'comfort women deal' could also have had more implications for international relations than apparent on surface level. A good reason to improve international relations with South Korea is to pave the way for changes to the Japanese constitution: if South Korea - Japan relations are more amicable South Korea is likely to protest constitutional changes on the international stage and it is also less likely to damage existing ties with South Korea.

In this chapter we have analyzed Abe's behaviour and it strongly suggests that his win-sets are predicated on not seeming too submissive to international interests to his domestic nationalist base while avoiding serious international conflict. Abe has pursued two main goals: the revision of the pacifist constitution article 9 and he has resolved the comfort women issue to the South Korean government's satisfaction. The second goal was made possible by Abe realizing that his domestic base would not be too upset by a business-like financial solution, thereby satisfying a win-set for this issue. Resolving the Comfort Women issue might also be a step in making South Korea more accepting of his other goal, changing the constitution to allow for increased regional involvement of the Japanese military. Abe's nationalist base already approves of this goal, so it is likely in this area that Abe has to solve a problem in order to fulfill this objective. We further established that the Comfort Women issue and constitutional revisionism are the two issues that South Korea has the biggest stake in. Therefore, we will mainly address these two issues in the next chapters: What Abe needs to consider domestically in dealing with these issues and how he balances to achieve international stability and domestic approval.

## Chapter 3: Abe's domestic considerations

In the previous chapters we have looked at what constituted a win-set for Abe in international relations with Japan's close neighbours by looking at their behaviour on the international stage. In this chapter we will examine what priorities on the domestic level seemed to have played a part in their role as negotiators. Since we are trying to uncover the nationalist influences on their behaviour, we will mainly be looking at nationalist organisations and sentiments. We have already mentioned the most important nationalist organisation several times in the previous chapter: the Nippon Kaigi. Abe is a member and in fact the vast majority of the LDP is part of the Nippon Kaigi. After its founding in 1997 as a merger of several conservative groups, Nippon Kaigi rapidly became the most famous and powerful nationalist organisation in Japan. This is a nationalist political and religious (Shinto) organisation which is not a political party unto itself. Its mission is officially to rebuild a beautiful and independent Japan, which includes restoring the position of the Japanese emperor and Japanese traditions; patriotic education; revision of the Constitution and to sanction official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine at which war criminals are enshrined. At the time of writing, Mark Mullins wrote that two of the Nippon Kaigi's principal aims were to revise education on the events of the Second World War, and the restoration of the military as a normal part of the Japanese state (Mullins 1997, 110-121). These two principal aims are both goals that the LDP has worked toward under Abe.

An important domestic consideration for Abe that does not concern nationalism is that he cannot afford to alienate the majority of domestic voters apart from his nationalist base. The immediate obvious problem is that the majority of Japanese people are in favor of a pacifist Japan, and Abe is trying to revise the pacifist article 9 of the constitution. More than a few people are wary of his chosen course of action, expressing their doubts in ways such as calling the planned revision a 'war bill'. According to Van Buren, voters opposed the legislation to enable the revision by two to one because they are proud of the pacifist article in the constitution as is. If Abe continues to alienate the majority of the population he cannot count on their support when he comes up for reelection (Van Buren 2015).

Out of all the things Japanese voters care about, they seemingly care most about economic plans and prosperity. This is partially why Abe has been able to be so successful while

making changes, such as plans for constitutional revision, that a large portion of the electorate is opposed to. During the elections for his second term, he mainly focused on what is now called Abenomics. The promise for economic rejuvenation is likely the most important factor in his success. We have argued earlier that his economic plans were presented and packaged with strong nationalist rhetoric to make Japan great and prosperous once more. While Abe's international policy is controversial, he can remain in power as long as there is no economic downturn. A crucial part of his strategy is keeping the domestic front happy by producing economic results, so that he can continue his streak of increasingly assertive international policy-making. Pollman noticed this strategy at work when Abe lost approval ratings after proposing the legislation on constitutional revisionism, and surmised he would focus on economic rejuvenation based on his first term as prime minister when he lost the elections due to economic malaise (Pollman 2015). In the next chapter we will see that this is exactly what happened.

If we assume Abe was mainly drawing on support from nationalist elements to generate win-sets, there has to be a sizeable enough base of nationalists and those who don't strongly disagree to offset those who would oppose a nationalist strategy. This is another domestic consideration for Abe. As we have seen in the first chapter, there is a sizeable nationalist faction in Japanese politics to draw support from. This is likely how Abe is able to rely on these groups to keep supporting him through his international relations strategy: to get support for a decision, such as further integrating security strategies with the American military, Abe does so under the guise of nationalist goals such as revising the pacifist constitution. That way, he can fulfill both an international objective and a domestic (in this case nationalist) objective at the same time, thus satisfying a win-set. Despite Abe seemingly relying partially on nationalist backing, the majority of Japanese outside of members of organisations such as Nippon Kaigi are not likely to be extreme nationalists. Therefore, Abe must be somewhat careful to not seem too overzealous in his nationalism. If he does, he risks being seen as a dangerous politician since most Japanese are not likely to support ideas such as bringing back the pre-war system of the Emperor and Shinto religion as the central pillars of society, or using an aggressive policy to deal with conflicts in East Asia. Both the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun newspapers of Japan conducted large-scale polls in which a majority of Japanese said they opposed a legally revised article 9 (Asaoka, Teraoka 2016). Moderate nationalism on the other hand is not seen as dangerous, won't drive away the general public and assures Abe of the support of nationalists if they see him as

being their best representative. It stands to reason that Abe needs to consider his more moderate constituency also.

As for other groups of citizens who aren't easily categorized as either nationalists or the bulk of moderates, the amount of Japanese citizens that feel disenfranchised by moderate nationalism are likely only a small portion of the population. This category would contain smaller groups such as the Okinawans, who we discussed briefly in the previous chapter as being disenfranchised from Japan for a long time, the native Ainu of Hokkaido and other such groups. These groups barely number a few million citizens, and therefore are not likely to be risks to Abe's or the LDP's political positions. These groups are simply not numerous enough for Abe to take them into serious account for domestic balancing efforts.

Taking the factors discussed in this chapter into consideration, we can conclude that Abe has to balance sincere nationalism with being seen as a rational, balanced leader to the non-nationalistic voters. His nationalist base, including organisations such as Nippon Kaigi, and the more moderate masses are the most important groups Abe has to balance for in his planning. Smaller groups are not very numerous of themselves and Japan is a fairly homogeneous nation, making it easy for Abe to ignore this audience to a certain extent. How Abe balances the relevant domestic interests with his goals that affect Japan's international relations will be discussed in the next chapter.

## Chapter 4: Domestic Balancing

In this chapter we will be uncovering and analysing how Abe balances between domestic considerations and international concerns when he is playing the role of negotiator. One of the ways in which we can see Abe balancing the international with the domestic is his use of public speeches. In these speeches he usually outlines his international policies and the intent behind the policies. The international policies themselves are often not nationalist in and of themselves, but the part where he describes the intent often carries nationalist sentiment. The method we will use to analyse how Abe is pandering to nationalist groups is to compare his speeches to a list of goals that most Japanese nationalist groups have in common. For this purpose, we will use the official objectives list from Nippon Kaigi as they are the largest and most influential nationalist organisation. Their objectives are as follows.

1. A beautiful tradition of the national character for Japan's future.
  2. A new constitution suitable for the new era.
  3. Politics that protect the country's reputation and the people's lives.
  4. Creating education that fosters Japanese sensibility (which in this context has meant historical revisionism).
  5. Contributing to world peace by enhancing national security.
  6. Friendship with the world tied up with a spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity
- (Mizohata 2016, 3)

Objective 6 seems vague and broad, and is a goal that most democratic leaders would say they are striving for, so we will disregard this for the purposes of this chapter. The rest however are very specific or their intent is discernible from the context of Nippon Kaigi's past behaviour, such as constitutional revisionism which is visible in objectives 2 and 5 and historical revisionism and protection of Japan's reputation in objectives 3 and 4. Nippon Kaigi is also keen to 'restore Japan's pride' from the prewar era, and to stop being apologetic over the events of World War II. Nationalistic historical revisionism is part of this vision.

In Abe's address to the 189th Session of the Diet, he opened with a peculiar statement: "To take Japan back - this is the only way forward". Abe then goes on to say that this means economic revitalization, restoration from disaster, social security reforms and other such domestic policies.

He also notes the revitalization of security, which is a nod to Abe's wish for constitutional and military reform. Abe then draws from an entirely different sentiment when discussing the same vision: "There is no reason why the Japanese people of today cannot achieve what their predecessors achieved in the Meiji era" (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet 2015). This type of wistful remembrance of a supposedly superior bygone era is something that Japanese nationalists fully embrace according to their ideology. This speech is quite focused on national pride and patriotism, but doesn't go further into anything specific. There is an interesting difference between these kinds of speeches, and those that are geared toward a specific topic. For example, on September 25 in 2015 Abe made an opening statement in which he directly addressed concerns about his plans for constitutional revisionism, stating that it was not a 'war bill' as domestic concerned parties had called it. Internationally he notes that his proposition had gained widespread support, ignoring the sounds of protest from Japan's neighbours. What makes this speech interesting is that it shows how Abe avoids speaking in nationalist or patriotic rhetoric almost entirely when trying to gain support for a Japanese military with offensive capabilities. Instead he speaks of peace and international diplomacy (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, September 2015). We can clearly see Abe balancing between nationalism in speeches like the first one we discussed which address the Japanese nation. This kind of speech is more likely to be paid close attention to internationally because of its more focused topic and Abe then chooses something more acceptable to international audiences. This is also visible during Abe's statement during the 70th anniversary of the Second World War. Abe repeatedly expresses deep remorse for the events of World War II while reiterating that Japan felt pressured to go to war by international circumstances. Abe then uses this platform to promote his plans for constitutional revisionism and military reform by saying that this will contribute to a 'proactive contribution to peace'. It is quite clear that Abe is trying to spin a proposition that is seen by Japan's neighbours as a threat into something that is meant for peace (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, August 2015).

In a different speech in May 2015 Abe elaborates on his vision of proactive peacekeeping, saying that Japan will never want to go to war and simply needs more tools to defend itself. He does not mention how this contributes to peace internationally. In this speech he appeals to fear: he repeatedly mentions that Japan is in danger from neighbouring countries who are sending their military into Japanese territory, but does not specify which countries that would



be. Once again, he says that fears of war are unwarranted. He also notes that the current situation makes no sense since Japan cannot help its ally, the United States, even if they are protecting Japan. Here he is appealing to the sense that Japan lacks international normalcy (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, May 2015). When Abe is talking about hostile navy vessels and aircraft entering Japanese territory that sounds scary to Japanese citizens, but in actuality this mainly concerns the disputed territories between Japan, China and Russia.

In the previous chapter we already discussed how Abe is alienating a large portion of the Japanese population by pushing through this constitutional revisionism. So how does he plan to get reelected when this is such a large part of his international policy? The way that the domestic and the international in this case is two-fold. He starts by pushing through legislation that allows for revision of the pacifist article 9. This legislation is not voted upon by the population and then proceeds to go through the upper house who can vote on the matter. However, it is not likely that they will vote on it and the vote will then move back to the lower chamber, where Abe holds a majority through his coalition. In short, there is almost nothing that can stop this legislation from going through apart from serious internal conflicts in Abe's coalition (Van Buren 2015). The second part is that once the elections come around, he stops mentioning his plans for constitutional revisionism. During the elections of 2016, Abe and his allies ran on the platform of Abenomics. Since this is something Japanese have voted for in the past, it is unlikely that Abenomics is an offensive platform to a large group of people. If the LDP had focused on constitutional revisionism as an election platform, they would likely have failed. When Abe himself comes up for reelection, he will likely adopt the same strategy of avoiding risk and presenting himself as the safe option. This is an effective tool with which politicians can do controversial things in the middle parts of the terms they serve, and then scale back during the end when they have to win (re)elections. In these last three paragraphs, we can see Abe's actions coinciding with Nippon Kaigi's second objective of revising the constitution.

In Abe's handling of the Comfort Women issue, we can clearly see the limits of the win-set Abe had to work with. The win-set allowed for an international monetary settlement but clearly excluded personal apologies and affirmations of guilt. These seem like simple concessions to make, but are of a decidedly different nature than a financial solution. By avoiding an outright apology or a sweeping admission of guilt, Abe manages to avoid besmirching Japan's name or making admissions that nationalist elements of the Japanese nation

would abhor, but he still manages to fix an issue that was becoming an increasingly international diplomatic problem and a stain on Japan's international relations record. By stretching the domestic win-set into yet another, albeit this time larger, monetary compensation than in previous attempts, he was able to make a deal with the South Korean government and bypass the victims themselves. This way, he was able to fix an international problem and keep Japanese nationalists satisfied. Comparing this settlement with the list of Nippon Kaigi's objectives, it satisfies both objective 3 by safeguarding Japan's reputation while also fulfilling objective 6 by improving co-prosperity and co-existence in the region.

One of the tools Abe uses to balance between the domestic and international is to fund scholarly research on controversial topics in place of commenting on them himself. For example, in his speech on Japan's role in the Second World War, Abe states his stance will follow a report made by the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century. That sounds very impartial, but in actuality their report is very supportive of an increasingly active role for Japan in international security matters, mentioning that it is imperative that Japan 'ramp up' its efforts for a 'pro-active contribution to peace'. This is not an unbiased report or scientific article, it is an advisory piece which largely mimics what had already been Abe's stance on the issue (Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century 2015, 45). It is worth mentioning at this point that Nippon Kaigi is not only deeply connected to government through member politicians, but also to the academic world in the same way. Mizohata notes that Nippon Kaigi supporters in academic circles are prominently visible in the discussion surrounding the pacifist constitution and perhaps form the majority of academics not opposed to the revision of the pacifist article. Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide claimed during a Diet discussion that there were many constitutional scholars who were in favor of constitutional revisionism. When pressed, he could only name academics who were Nippon Kaigi members. These academics were also the founders of two lobbying groups supporting constitutional revisionism (Mizohata 2016, 2-3). When Abe vows to fund scholarly research or follow independent reports, this does not ensure that organisations such as Nippon Kaigi have no influence in the matter.

In this chapter we analyzed how exactly Abe executes his balancing act between international concerns and interests of domestic groups. In the speeches we looked at we could see that many of Abe's goals and visions are paralleled by mission statements and interests held

by Nippon Kaigi, at least when the speeches are meant for a domestic audience. In speeches directed outward at the international stage he takes a more moderate stance, and of course he can't use nationalist rhetoric to influence international audiences. This is how Abe promotes and uses nationalism domestically while placating international concerns of a pre-World War II Japan reemerging. The Comfort Women issue was handled in a way that was acceptable to his nationalist and conservative base since it did not offend their sensibilities overtly, while still being acceptable to the South Korean government. As mentioned in chapter 2, this conflict resolution with South Korea might also be a way to convince its government to be less resistant to the idea of an expanded role for Japan's military in the region once Abe achieves his goal of a non-pacifist constitution. In his election strategy, Abe tends not to use nationalism or his goal of constitutional change as an election platform but instead focuses on economic reform and recovery which appeals to a much broader audience. Once he is elected he can shift his own focus toward these more controversial policies. He does not need to run on these issues exactly because he is so entwined with his nationalist constituency: they already know he will be striving for these goals.

# Conclusion

In this thesis I have set out to answer how and to what extent nationalism and nationalist organisations influence the decision making process on East Asian foreign policy of the Abe administration. To gather pertinent information and answer this question I have considered the domestic considerations of Abe during his prime ministership that he had to work with in his international considerations and negotiations. To do so, I have used the methodological framework of the Two-Level Game by Robert Putnam, identifying win-sets which are the terms that if accepted lead to an agreement on the international level because it is agreeable to the domestic players.

In the first chapter we explored the historical context of Post-World War II nationalism in Japan and how it has changed since then. Here we established that nationalism grew from being a largely localised and individual matter into a politicized issue in the 1980s and then took an organized form in the 1990s with the establishment of the Nippon Kaigi and historical revisionism efforts. Most importantly, we concluded that this organised form of nationalism became deeply intertwined with Japanese politics as a whole due to the mass membership of politicians. This chapter set up our analysis of what kind of domestic players Abe has to balance with to fulfill win-sets.

In the second chapter, we analysed Abe's international policy behaviour to learn what his win-sets were. Here it became quite clear that Abe's negotiator role in the international sphere is to prevent conflicts while preventing damage to Japan's integrity which can be understood as a minimum amount of groveling and apologies for the events of World War II and backing down too much on territorial conflicts. We learned that there are two win-sets that Abe actively pursued, one of which has been fulfilled. The Comfort Women issue was becoming too much of an international scandal which led Abe to pursue new avenues to resolve it with South-Korea, something nationalist politicians had largely been opposed to doing. The domestic balancing he had to do to attain a win-set was to make it a financial compensation and not an apology or a widespread admission of guilt. This way it was acceptable for his nationalist constituency as it is more akin to a business transaction than anything else. The second win-set Abe is still actively pursuing is that of constitutional revisionism. Internationally, he wants to appease American

pressure to increase Japanese involvement in regional security matters. Domestically, this has been a goal of nationalists and conservatives for many years. The balancing he has to do here is make the non-nationalist citizens approve of this project or find a way to push his legislation through without them.

This became further elucidated in chapter 3 in which we addressed what domestic concerns are most important in negotiating for decisions that change Japan's international strategy. We established that while the Nippon Kaigi is the largest immediate influence on Abe's considerations, Abe has to be careful not to alienate the mostly non-nationalistic voters which are in the majority and are mostly opposed to constitutional revisionism. We concluded that Abe's nationalistic base and the more moderately inclined majority are the two groups he needs to balance for the most. Smaller groups such as the native people of Hokkaido or Okinawa, or communists are small enough to ignore.

In the fourth and final chapter we analysed how exactly Abe coordinates his domestic balancing efforts. To this end we analysed a number of his speeches in which we encountered nationalistic rhetoric in speeches aimed toward the domestic audience and switches to more moderate statements intended for an international audience. In this way, he can promote nationalism inward while dissuading international concerns that his constitutional revisionism plans are a threat to Japan's neighbours. We also analysed Abe's election strategy when it comes to his plans for constitutional revisionism. We can clearly see that Abe uses Abenomics as the platform for the average Japanese citizen as this is something they can support and isn't seen as dangerous or risky. When the elections come around, Abe and the LDP go completely silent on constitutional matters and keep the nationalistic rhetoric to an absolute minimum. It is not necessary for Abe to appeal to nationalists, since he can already count on their vote due to their knowledge of his strategies and his continued support of nationalist organisations and goals. As long as Abe can promote economic prosperity and focuses on economic issues during elections the public will tolerate his more controversial international strategies. Once he is elected and safely in office for the next four years, Abe can essentially use all the political tools available to him to pursue other strategies such as constitutional reform. We also observed that Due to Nippon Kaigi's integration with the political and scientific world, it can be difficult for the average Japanese citizen to know exactly which information is trustworthy as coming from an

unbiased source and that this is a tool that could be used to appease domestic concerns of risky decisions that endanger Japan's regional relations.

Using two-level game theory we can clearly see the role of nationalism in Abe's international negotiations. In the case of the Comfort Women issue, a win-set that was agreeable to both countries already existed if you didn't take nationalism into account: a sincere apology combined with additional financial compensation is something that the majority of Japanese citizens would have had little to no qualms with. However, since Abe counts on support from conservatives and nationalists, the win-set from the Japanese side was too narrow to overlap with South Korea's win-set. When the issue became too much of an international nuisance, Abe attempted to find a wider Japanese win-set by a marginal amount to allow for a very formal and general apology and additional financial compensation which Japanese conservatives and nationalists could agree with. In this way, he found the win-set he needed and we could observe that Abe is strongly influenced by nationalist concerns in international negotiations since he specifically balanced for them in this instance.

As for Abe's plans for a revised constitution, we ascertained that to change Japan's security role on the international stage, a goal long held by Japanese nationalists and conservatives, Abe has had to balance domestically since this is a change that is not supported by a majority of citizens. Internationally, this change can be made rather unilaterally with regards to its East Asian neighbours since there are no crucial advantages being lost if Japan reemerges as a military power: economic agreements are unlikely to unravel and superficial relations based on historical differences are unlikely to be fully resolved in any case. Despite that, it is still likely that Abe made the comfort women deal to soften the South Korean backlash to constitutional changes. The win-set that Abe had to fulfill on the domestic level involved balancing nationalism to appeal to nationalists and conservatives who supported it in the first place and increasing economic prosperity for those that are opposed to or don't care about the constitutional changes. Putnam's original version of the Two-Level Game was useful but not completely adequate in this research and the scope had to be expanded. Yasuaki and Knopf's criticisms of Putnam's theory have proven correct in our case. Yasuaki said that a leader can use nationalist or otherwise situationally appealing rhetoric to influence domestic groups leaving them confused as to what's being negotiated or what they are voting for. In Abe's case this has proven absolutely correct: he diverts attention from controversial issues when he and his party are in the middle of elections,

and uses different rhetorical styles for different audiences to present his plans in a different light each time. Knopf was also correct in his argument that alliances outside of the two countries that are negotiating are highly influential: in the case of Japan and South Korea this would be the United States of America which is allied to both countries separately. The stabilizing influence of the American military presence reassures both countries on security issues, and the knowledge that the USA might reduce its presence might convince South Korea of the necessity of an increased military presence in the region that is not China, such as Japan. Overall, Two-Level Game Theory has provided critical insight into how organised nationalism and its connections to politics and Abe himself have influenced his decision making and how he used it and balanced for it in his international decision making and negotiation. This has largely been unexplored in research on Japan - South Korea relations and it shows further research in this vein is required to see how domestic influences affect leaders in their decision making process on an international level, and how this type of research can be integrated in International Relations theory.

## Bibliography

Abe, Shinzo, Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 189th Session of the Diet, *Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet* (2015), accessed at:  
[http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97\\_abe/statement/201502/policy.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201502/policy.html), 30-11-2016.

Abe, Shinzo, Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, *Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet* (2015), accessed at:  
[http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97\\_abe/statement/201509/1213465\\_9928.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201509/1213465_9928.html), 12-12-2016.

Abe, Shinzo, Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, *Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet* (2015), accessed at: [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97\\_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html), 12-12-2016.

Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century, Report of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century, *Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet* (2015), accessed at: [http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/21c\\_koso/pdf/report\\_en.pdf](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/21c_koso/pdf/report_en.pdf), 29-12-2016.

Asaoka, Masatoshi and Ayumi Teraoka, Japanese Public Opinion on Constitutional Revision in 2016, *Council on Foreign Relations* (2016), accessed at:  
<http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/08/01/japanese-public-opinion-on-constitutional-revision-in-2016/>, 29-12-2016.

Askew, David, The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends, *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies* (2002), Retrieved 01-10-2016,  
<http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew.html>



Cha, Victor, Abandonment, Entrapment and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan and Korea, *International Studies Quarterly* (2000), Vol. 44, No. 2, 261-291.

Fackler, Martin, In a City on Okinawa, Mayor's Re-election Deals a Blow to Marine Base Relocation Plan, *New York Times* (2014). Accessed at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/world/asia/city-on-okinawa-deals-blow-to-plan-to-move-marine-base.html>, 11-10-2016.

Fifield, Anna, Japan's Abe suspends construction at U.S. Marine base on Okinawa, *The Washington Post* (2016). Accessed at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/japans-abe-suspends-construction-at-us-marine-base-on-okinawa/2016/03/04/be38239d-c5b5-4b93-aec1-01253b2ba881\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japans-abe-suspends-construction-at-us-marine-base-on-okinawa/2016/03/04/be38239d-c5b5-4b93-aec1-01253b2ba881_story.html), 11-10-2016.

Fouse, David, Japan's Dispatch of the Ground Self Defense Force to Iraq: Lessons Learned, *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies* (2007). Accessed at: [http://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Japans-Dispatch-of-the-GSDF-to-Iraq.Fouse\\_.doc.pdf](http://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Japans-Dispatch-of-the-GSDF-to-Iraq.Fouse_.doc.pdf), 10-10-2016.

Higashinakano, Shudo, *The Nanking massacre: fact versus fiction: a historian's quest for the truth*, Tokyo 2005.

Hope, Dewell Gentry, Japanese Nationalism and Shinto, Then and Now: The Quest to Recover Lost Values, M.A., *Department of Global and Area Studies of the University of Wyoming* (2014).

Japan Times, Abe, Park Agree to Implement Comfort Women Deal, *Japan Times* (2016), Accessed at: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/01/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-park-agree-implement-comfort-women-deal/>, 29-11-2016.

Japan Times, Abe Confirms Japan not Considering Apology Letters to Comfort Women, *Japan Times* (2016), accessed at: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-confirms-japan-not-considering-apology-letters-comfort-women/>, 29-11-2016.

Koide Reiko, Critical New Stage in Japan's Textbook Controversy, *The Asia Pacific Journal* (2014), Vol. 12, Issue 13, No. 1.

Koga, Kei, The Yasukuni question: histories, logics and Japan-South Korea relations, *The Pacific Review* (2015), Vol. 29, No. 3, 332-359.

Lee, John, The Stubborn South: Why Seoul Needs to Mend Ties with Japan, *World Affairs Journal* (2014), accessed at:  
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/stubborn-south-why-seoul-needs-mend-ties-japan>, 03-01-2017.

Long, Jeff, Overcoming Marxism in early Shōwa Japan: Hayashi Fusao's seinen and the turn to ultranationalism, *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses* (2000).

Lynn, Hyung Gu, "Systemic Lock: The Institutionalization of History in Post-1965 South Korea-Japan Relations", *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* (2000), vol. 9, no.1-2, 55-84.

McCormack, Gavan, Nationalism and Identity in Post-Cold War Japan, *Pacifica Review* (2000), Vol. 12, No. 3, 247-263

McCormack, Gavan, Remilitarizing Japan, *New Left Review* (2004), Vol. 29, 29-45.

Mizohata, Sachie, Nippon Kaigi: Empire, Contradiction, and Japan's Future, *The Asia Pacific Journal* (2016), Vol. 14, Issue 21, No. 2, 1-19)..

Mullins, Mark R., The Neo-Nationalist Response to the Aum Crisis: A Return of Civil Religion and Coercion in the Public Sphere?, *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* (1997), Vol. 39, No. 1, 99-125.

Nagy, Stephen Robert, Nationalism, Domestic Politics, and the Japan Economic Rejuvenation, *East Asia* (2014), Vol. 31, 5-21.

Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001).  
Accessed at: [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou\\_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html), 10-10-2016.

Park, Cheol Hee, “The Pattern of Cooperation and Conflict between Korea and Japan: Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Realities”, *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (2009), vol. 10, no. 3, 247-265.

Pollmann, M. Erika, The Politics of Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine: Explaining Japanese Politicians’ Behaviors, *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* (2016), Vol. 2, No. 2, 123-152.

Pollman, Mina, Japan’s Abe is in for a Successful September but at a Cost *The Diplomat* (2015),  
accessed at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-abe-is-in-for-a-successful-september-but-at-a-cost/>, 20-12-2016.

Shibuichi, Daiki, Japan’s History Textbook Controversy, *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies* (2008), Retrieved 04-10-2016:  
<http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2008/Shibuichi.html>

Shinoda, Tomohito, Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq, *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (2006), Vol. 7, No. 1, 71-91.

Son, Key-Young, “Middle Powers and the Rise of China: ‘Identity Norms’ of Dependency and Activism and the Outlook for Japan-South Korea Relations *vis-à-vis* the Great Powers”, *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (2014), vol. 15, no. 1, 91-112.

Van Buren, Peter, *Reuters* (2015), accessed at: <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/07/20/japans-pacifism-fades-but-most-japanese-arent-happy-about-it/>, 17-12-2016.

Yellen, Jeremy A., Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions, *The Diplomatic* (2014). Accessed at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions>, 11-10-2016.

Yoon, Tae-Ryong, “Fragile Cooperation: Net Threat Theory and Japan-Korea-U.S. Relations”, Columbia University 2006.

Yoshiko Nozaki, Mark Selden, Japanese Textbook Controversies, Nationalism, and Historical Memory: Intra- and Inter-national Conflicts, *The Asia-Pacific Journal* (2009), Vol. 7, Issue 24, No. 5.