

# Nous sommes la France.

*We have to act.*

## **France's foreign policy discourse and behaviour towards the Syrian civil war**

*“France is a world power; we are one of the few countries that still have a very broad range of possibilities, a nuclear capability, and a country which is constantly involved in international life due to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council.”*

– François Hollande, 27/08/2012

Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations at Leiden University

Name: Marloes Smeets

Programme: International Studies

Year: 2014-2016

Supervisor: Dr. Maaïke Warnaar

Second reader: Dr. Eugenio Cusumano

# Index

---

List of figures and tables	5
Introduction	7
Chapter 1: Theoretical framework	15
Chapter 2: Research design and methodology	21
Chapter 3: French foreign policy ideology	27
Chapter 4: The official foreign policy discourse under the Hollande administration (2012-2015)	37
Conclusion	55
Bibliography	59



# List of figures and tables

---

Table 4.1 List of (positive) values of the <i>Self</i>	Page 39.
Table 4.2 List of (negative) ideologies/values of the <i>Other</i>	Page 40.
Table 4.3 List of attributes to the <i>Self</i>	Page 41.
Table 4.4 List of representations of the enemy (al-Assad)	Page 43.
Table 4.5 List of representations of the enemy (DAECH)	Page 44.
Table 4.6 List of representations of the situation in Syria	Page 45.
Table 4.7 List of allies	Page 46.
Table 4.8 List of performances by the Assad regime	Page 49.
Table 4.9 List of performances by DAECH	Page 50.



# Introduction

---

In the early morning of Sunday the 27<sup>th</sup> of September 2015, six French fighter jets carried out airstrikes on an Islamic State (or DAECH)<sup>1</sup> training camp near Deir al-Zour, close to the eastern border of Syria. The operation was the result of weeks of reconnaissance flights above Syrian territory. Up to mid-September, 2,362 (confirmed)<sup>2</sup> airstrikes had been carried out in Syria by an international coalition including the United States, Australia, Canada, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. France, however, had only committed itself to aerial attacks in neighbouring Iraq. Until that early Sunday morning in September.

The destruction of the DAECH training camp in Syria by French military aircrafts marks a turnaround in the French approach to the conflict Syria faces since 2011. At first, only anti-al-Assad movements positioned themselves as opposing the al-Assad regime. Later on, the conflict became more complex when militant organisations such as DAECH and several nations got involved. Eventually, the unrest spilled over to neighbouring Iraq.

Whereas France started attacking DAECH targets in Iraq in September 2014 after a formal request from the Iraqi authority,<sup>3</sup> Hollande had ruled out military action in Syria. That decision was the result of a 'division of tasks'<sup>4</sup>, as he phrased it, as part of the *Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve* (CJTF-OIR); some partners would concentrate on Syria, whilst others – such as France – would prevent DAECH expansion on Iraqi ground. This Task Force came into being in spite of the pledge by the international community to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Hollande's decision to intervene in Syria in September 2015 was not taken lightly. To France, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are high-valued principles.<sup>5</sup> Usually, these values

---

<sup>1</sup> Other names include Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or DEASH. President Hollande consistently uses the name DAECH; the Arab acronym for *al-dawlah al-islāmiyya fi-l-'irāq wa-al-shām*, literally Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Syria). In this thesis, Hollande's appellation will be adhered.

<sup>2</sup> "Strikes in Syria," accessed April 19, 2016, <https://airwars.org/>.

<sup>3</sup> 20140924(1)

<sup>4</sup> 20140923(1)

<sup>5</sup> 20140328

shape the Republic's foreign policy. But the situation in Syria led Hollande to decide to let go of these principles. Four-and-a-half years after the 2011 protests against the Ba'athist government of Bashar al-Assad took place in the Southern city of Dara'a; Syria plunged into a full-fledged civil war. That war turned into a regional conflict, threatening not only the security of Syria itself but also of neighbouring countries. As a result of this, the European continent faced an increased influx of migrants from conflict areas including Syria and Iraq. In addition, militant groups became active on European soil as well. France has witnessed this first-hand, with the January 2015 Île de France attacks and the November 2015 Paris attacks as the major incidents. The first, the Charlie Hebdo shootings and attack on a kosher supermarket, was claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The mass shootings and suicide bombings at multiple Parisian social venues were carried out by perpetrators linked to DAECH.

As a consequence of ever-present threat from terrorism on French territory, combined with the deteriorating situation in Syria, the Syrian civil war came out on top of the agenda of French foreign policy. In various statements, the French President advocated for military intervention as he believed the situation required it to do so. But to Hollande, it was not just an international obligation; it became the right and – above all – moral thing to do. Not only for the international community, but the right thing and the only thing to do *for France*.

In respect of France's high-valued principles and the international appraisal of sovereignty and territorial integrity, in order to legitimately intervene militarily, the mind-set of France's policy-makers and the public had to change. The aerial attack on the DAECH training camp proves that this change took place. This master thesis examines how the decision to intervene in Syria became thinkable, even logical, in the context of François Hollande's discourse. It aims to answer the question how François Hollande legitimises the military intervention in Syria in the context of foreign policy discourse, and how this discourse in return is constructed and reinforced by France's foreign policy ideology. Building on poststructuralist ontology, it inquires into the theoretical concept of



foreign policy identity and the underlying mechanisms that allow and legitimise actions.<sup>6</sup> It offers a thorough analysis of French foreign policy ideology as represented by the most influential political figure of France. In addition, it investigates how certain behaviour, e.g. the intervention in Syria, is made possible in the context of discourse. This thesis thus aims to illustrate how the discourse on a specific event – military action in Syria – relates to the foreign policy identity of France. It shows the mutual constitution of behaviour and ideology; French foreign policy behaviour is rooted in the context of ideology, but ideology in its turn also reinforces foreign policy.

Despite a vast scope of media attention concerning France's recent interference in the Syrian conflict, academic literature about this topic is lacking. After the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq invasions, various scholars researched how the American government legitimised its actions towards its own population. In the case of France's approach to the conflict in Syria, no such research has been conducted yet. In addition to that, in the academic field of International Relations, the concept of policy legitimacy is relatively unexplored; legitimacy is more commonly associated with states and/or regimes rather than (foreign) policy.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it provides fresh insight in mechanisms of current French foreign policy ideology. And secondly, it shows how foreign policy ideology is represented in François Hollande's discourse and in its turn is reinforced by that discourse, resulting in the acceptability of military intervention in Syria. In the end, the main contribution of this thesis is to provide insight into the mechanisms of the mutually constitutive relation between discourse and foreign policy, applied on the case of the Syrian civil war.

The first chapter proposes the theoretical framework required for the understanding of the relations between foreign policy ideology, identity, legitimacy and discourse. It argues that legitimacy is critical to foreign policy-making and implementation. Policy legitimacy can be achieved by creating a 'reality' in which certain behaviour is allowed. This reality, or discourse, is socially constructed and can be researched by means of subjects such as actions, language. Discourse has the power to legitimise

---

<sup>6</sup> Karin Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 82 .

<sup>7</sup> Richard Smoke, "On the Importance of Policy Legitimacy," *Political Psychology* 15 (1994): 82.

behaviour. That behaviour in return says something about the discourse. This thesis concentrates on the relation of foreign policy and discourse, and how they are mutually constitutive. This means that the French President derives legitimacy from the discourse, but that his actions also reinforce that discourse.

The second chapter provides the methodological foundation of this thesis, as it will explain how the French foreign policy discourse can be researched by means of official statements by François Hollande in the period 2012-2015. Hollande's speeches reflect the perceptions, beliefs and motivations regarding the Syrian civil war and therefore represent the French foreign policy ideology.

Chapter three discusses the context of France's foreign policy ideology. Starting with a historical synopsis of its roots, the chapter continues with a break-down of the factors shaping French foreign policy ideology. These factors will return in the fourth chapter providing guidelines for the analysis of the Presidential statements. This account of the French foreign policy ideology context serves as a starting point. Hence, the change in France's foreign policy ideology in respect to the Syrian civil war will be more elaborately discussed in the fourth chapter. By means of statements given by the French President in the period mid-May 2012 until November 2015, the discursive mechanisms in the foreign policy ideology are researched. Based on the features *values*, *worldview*, *multilateralism* and *use of force*, Hollande constructs a reality in which France is an influential worldwide player that accredits itself as morally superior to the enemy. Its concern with international security and the role France assigns to itself in the protection of that security permitted Hollande to change the discourse into one where intervention in Syria becomes thinkable.

In the end, the theory, the French foreign policy context and the results of the empirical research from the fourth chapter are linked in order to answer the question how François Hollande legitimises the military intervention in Syria in the context of foreign policy discourse, and how this discourse in return is constructed and reinforced by France's foreign policy ideology. The foreign policy is not merely rooted in the discourse, but makes it possible in the first place.

In order to set the scene in which President Hollande gave his orders to intervene, this chapter will continue with a short introduction to the Syrian conflict and the relationship between France and Syria. Five years into the conflict, the situation has become utterly complex. According to the deputy director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency more than 1,200 rebel groups are active in the country, alongside the major players as the Syrian government, the anti-Assad opposition, and the various nations that are involved too.<sup>8</sup> Due to the opaqueness and dynamic structure of the conflict, it is a difficult task to accurately outline the situation as of November 2015. The Syrian conflict has become a civil war, a proxy war and a sectarian conflict. It has spilled over to neighbouring countries and even to adjacent continents. Hence, the overview will be limited to the relevant events and actors.

### **French foreign policy towards the Syrian civil war**

Within days after his inauguration as the seventh President of the Fifth Republic, François Hollande first publicly addressed the situation in Syria. After a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, Hollande stated that France would 'remain concerned'.<sup>9</sup> He predicted that the Arab Spring would turn out to be a moment of lasting historical significance. The wave of political turmoil that swept the Arab world reached Syria mid-March 2011. Protesters initially demanded reform rather than the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. Then, when reforms fell out, the unrest spread through the country and only a couple months later, thousands of Syrians were taking the streets.<sup>10</sup>

The violent response to protesters did not go unnoticed in the rest of the world. The international community expressed its concern, but without any effect.<sup>11</sup> The violence escalated and Syria plunged into a civil war when the opposition formed armed militias against government forces. In 2015 the

---

<sup>8</sup> Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Intelligence Official Says Syrian War Could Last for Years," *The New York Times*, July 20, 2013, accessed May 12, 2016, [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/middleeast/us-intelligence-official-says-syrian-war-could-last-for-years.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/middleeast/us-intelligence-official-says-syrian-war-could-last-for-years.html?_r=0).

<sup>9</sup> 20120518(1)

<sup>10</sup> Lucy Rodgers et al., "Syria: the story of the conflict," March 11, 2016, accessed May 12, 2016, *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>

<sup>11</sup> Chris McGreal and Martin Chulov, "Syria: Assad must resign, says Obama," *The Guardian*, August 19, 2011, accessed May 12, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-obama>.

conflict has grown into a multidimensional war, affecting the stability of the region and the world. The various opposition fractions, remaining deeply divided, are still battling government forces, but the war has acquired sectarian undertones. The civil war opened a power vacuum, that by now has been filled with militant organisations, with the Islamic State and Jahbat al-Nusra (Al Qaeda-affiliate in Syria) and Islamic Front are the largest and most-well known.<sup>12</sup>

Mid-2016, the exact number of casualties remains unclear, since aid organisations officially stopped counting after two year due to limited access to the country. But with an estimate death toll of more than 400,000 (not an official number), as the United Nations and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria announced in April this year, the Syrian civil war is now the deadliest conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Politique arabe: France & Syria***

Fundamental to the understanding of French foreign policy regarding the situation in Syria, is the exceptional relationship between the country and the Arab world. The strong, and often good, ties with Middle Eastern nations are rooted in a long history of involvement by the French government. This is partly the result of France's colonial legacy, as large territories of the Arab world once belonged to the French empire.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, France also took a special interest in the region after the decolonisation, with its *politique arabe*. These region-specific policy objectives were to secure a special role for France in the Middle East, through close political, economic and cultural bonds with the main Arab countries.<sup>15</sup> French interest in the region is mainly driven by geostrategic and commercial reasons,<sup>16</sup> but a strong ideological attachment should not be underestimated. Evoked by Charles de Gaulle, the *politique arabe* has displayed a consistent presence in France's approach to

---

<sup>12</sup> Elliot Friedland, *Who's who in the Syrian Civil War* (Washington: The Clarion Project) accessed May 15, 2016.

<https://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/Clarion%20Project%20Syrian%20Civil%20War%20Factsheet.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> John Hudson, "U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000," *Foreign Policy*, April 22, 2016, accessed May 28, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revises-syria-death-toll-to-400000/>.

Al Jazeera, "Syria's Civil War Explained," May 24, 2016, accessed May 29, 2016,

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2009) 16.

<sup>15</sup> Patrick Müller, "The Europeanization of France's foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict: from leadership to EU-accommodation," *European Security* 22 (2012): 113, accessed December 5, 2015, doi:10.1080/09662839.2012.698266.

<sup>16</sup> Müller, "The Europeanization of France's foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict," 117.

Middle Eastern affairs, with positioning France as an independent and trustworthy partner. The Middle Eastern states are in return perceived as neighbours, whose political developments can strongly affect, both positively and negatively, French and European affairs.<sup>17</sup> With the current instability in the region and the ongoing debate on terrorism, France's *politique arabe* is an indispensable part of its foreign policy.

Hollande proves to be supportive of strong ties with the Arab world. He believes that developments in the Middle East have a powerful effect on French foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> However, the start of the Arab Spring in 2011 has proven to be a pivotal moment in the *politique arabe*.<sup>19</sup> Prior to 2011, the strong ties included supporting dictators in the Maghreb and Mashriq and since then, the removal of various Arab leaders brought new challenges for France's foreign policy.

France's bilateral relations with Syria have been generally good, especially under the Chirac administration, but were tense from time to time due to Syrian interference in Lebanon, one of France's closest allies in the region.<sup>20</sup> When the first eruptions of protest began in Syria, France was still on relatively good terms with Bashar al-Assad but apparently underestimated the unfolding conflict. Initially, a strong reaction fell out, but when the situation aggravated, the EU, led by France, adopted a sharper tone. Slowly, but surely, sanctions were imposed against the regime, nationally and multilaterally, until France became the first country to recognise the Syrian opposition as the legitimate representative of Syria. Subsequently, back in April 2011, four priorities were identified to terminate the regime's oppression: (i) all diplomatic means will be use to end the conflict, (ii) better cooperation with UNSC is needed to search for a political solution, (iii) France will impose sanctions unilaterally, and (iv) al-Assad and his regime are indicated as the culprits.<sup>21</sup> Despite various French initiatives, the conflict further intensified and remains unsolved today.

---

<sup>17</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 17.

<sup>18</sup> Belkin, Summary to *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*.

<sup>19</sup> Miron Lakomy, "The "Arab Spring" in French Foreign Policy", *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 6:3-4 (2012): 83.

<sup>20</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 17.

<sup>21</sup> Lakomy, "The "Arab Spring" in French Foreign Policy," 78.



# Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

---

This chapter elaborates on the relations between legitimacy, foreign policy ideology, discourse and identity. It focuses on the social construction of legitimacy and identity and how they are intrinsically linked to foreign policy ideology. In addition, it discusses the mutually constitutive relationship between foreign policy ideology and discourse, resulting in specific behaviour such as the intervention in Syria. Post-structuralist literature on foreign policy ideology and discourse will be discussed as well, but the chapter begins with an account of the role of legitimacy in foreign policy ideology.

Foreign policy theory concentrates on the concern with how states understand and respond to the outside world.<sup>22</sup> This master thesis is in particular concerned with how France's approach to the Syrian conflict. In May 2015, a survey carried out by French polling organisation BVA indicated that 55 percent of the French population would support an intervention in Syria by French forces, compared to a 2013 survey in which 64 percent stated to be against such action. Additionally, 92 percent of the French participants in 2015 claimed to be "personally worried by the situation in Syria".<sup>23</sup> The results of the survey showed that even months before the November 2015 Paris attacks, Hollande had already gained support of a (relatively) vast majority of the French population regarding the use of force in Syria. It gave him the legitimacy to implement certain policy or, in other words, display certain behaviour. This is an important notion, as at the core of policy-making, whether concerning domestic or foreign policy, lays political support. Without, governments do not have the legitimacy to act in the name of its population. To policy-making and implementation, legitimacy is fundamental.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (New York: Routledge, 2006), Kindle edition, chapter 2.

<sup>23</sup> John Irish and Raissa Kasolowsky, "French public back military intervention in Syria – poll", *Reuters*, May 24, 2015, accessed June 5, 2016, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-france-idUKKBNO080N120150524>.

<sup>24</sup> Smoke, "On the Importance of Policy Legitimacy," 98.

George distinguishes two features of policy legitimacy; a normative-moral factor and a cognitive basis.<sup>25</sup> From normative-moral perspective, the policy must be consistent with the country's political norms and values. The second element, the cognitive aspect, implies that that the President has to convince his population that he actually *knows* what he is doing.<sup>26</sup> In other words, the policy must be feasible and the population has to believe that the Head of State is capable to carry out that policy. Eventually, both the normative-moral and cognitive requirements have to be met in order to gain legitimacy.<sup>27</sup> To Hansen, political legitimacy rather exists when a link between policy and identity is constructed that is consistent with each other.<sup>28</sup> Hansen calls this *knowledge* and too emphasises its significance to establishing authority.<sup>29</sup>

According to Fierke, foreign policy legitimacy can be achieved by naturalising and conventionalising "a particular association as 'reality' and therefore [is a] part of the assumed world of culture". Fierke's argument complies with Becker, despite that he approaches the notion of legitimacy from a state-centred perspective. He reasons that legitimacy and acts of legitimisation shape a certain worldview that in itself reinforces the construction of policy.<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, Becker presents the assumption that legitimisation is not just reflected in actions; "Policies, language, and specific acts are [...] seen as justified or justifiable – in a word, legitimate – when they can be made sense of according to a dominant set of ideas about what are justifiable, legitimate policies and behaviour."<sup>31</sup> This dominant set material and ideational factors, or discourse, is defined by Doty as "a system of statements in which each individual statement makes sense [that]

---

<sup>25</sup> Alexander George, "Domestic constraints on regime change in U.S. foreign policy: The need for policy legitimacy," in *Change in the international system*, ed. Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) 235.

<sup>26</sup> George, "Domestic constraints on regime change in U.S. foreign policy: The need for policy legitimacy", 235.

<sup>27</sup> Smoke, "On the Importance of Policy Legitimacy," 104.

<sup>28</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, chapter 4.

<sup>30</sup> Derrick Becker, "The New Legitimacy and International Legitimation: Civilization and South African Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010): 134.

<sup>31</sup> Becker, "The New Legitimacy and International Legitimation," 134.



produces interpretive possibilities by making it virtually impossible to think outside of it.”<sup>32</sup> According to Hansen, foreign policy discourses in particular construct problems, objects and subjects, but at the same time comes up with policies to deal with them.<sup>33</sup>

Doty draws primarily on the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault. The latter however, argues that discourse refers to more than just a system of statements. He considers discourse as a certain method of constituting knowledge, based on social practices and forms of subjectivity. At the core of the concept, Foucault argues, lay power-knowledge relations which both produce and reproduce hierarchical meaning.<sup>34</sup> He describes these processes as “procedures which constitute, and are constituted by, our ‘will to knowledge’.”<sup>35</sup> In practice, a foreign policy discourse exists of various social subjects and objects that constitute both the practices and the actors themselves.<sup>36</sup> This process is indissoluble. It is inevitable and occurs both consciously and unconsciously.<sup>37</sup> This results in a particular discourse constituted of subjective characteristics that both includes and excludes possibilities and outcomes.<sup>38</sup> Bhatia shares that vision and emphasises that discourse (e.g. language, imageries, and identities) has a political significance and could have far-stretching implications. For example, by giving a certain *Other* subject a name such as terrorist, rebel or insurgent it can be used as a justification for one’s violent behaviour. Because of the normative dimension of the applied name, the action becomes more justified.<sup>39</sup>

The post-structuralist discursive ontology is intrinsically concerned with the understanding of language as constitutive for everything that is brought into being.<sup>40</sup> Doty puts it more boldly:

---

<sup>32</sup> Roxanne Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (1993): 302.

<sup>33</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>34</sup> Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Post-structuralist Theory* (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1987) 108.

<sup>35</sup> Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge, 1981) 48.

<sup>36</sup> Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” 300.

<sup>37</sup> Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Post-structuralist Theory*, 108.

Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 48.

<sup>38</sup> Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 298.

<sup>39</sup> Michael Bhatia, ‘Fighting words naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors’, *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005) 8.

<sup>40</sup> Hansen, chapter 2.

“language *does* things and is inherently powerful.”<sup>41</sup> The processes and their products become visible in *discursive spaces*, where meanings are (re)produced by i.e. metaphors, analogies, concepts and models<sup>42</sup> and subsequently attached to the social subjects and objects.<sup>43</sup> But, language allocates names to certain meanings, but is in itself not the producer of meanings.<sup>44</sup>

It is through language that ‘things’ are given meaning and identity.<sup>45</sup> Language, verbal as well as non-verbal, is a reflection of perceptions, beliefs and motivations. It is because of language that systems of objects and subjects come forward at the heart of the world as we know it.<sup>46</sup> The features of language are unique, but can transform over time, comprising an element of change.<sup>47</sup> According to Hansen, language is a system of signs, to which meaning is given through juxtapositions. A hierarchy is created in which elements are valued in relation to the other.<sup>48</sup> These hierarchical structures are often reflected in dichotomies such as good/evil, democratic/anarchic and rational/emotional, which are embedded in words, imagery, texts, behaviour and identity.

The construction of identities is inherent to foreign policy discourse. As Hansen suggests: “the post-structuralist view of language as relationally structured and ontologically productive is coupled to a discursive epistemology, which [...] produces an analytical focus on the relational construction of identity.”<sup>49</sup> Foreign policy discourse aims to create a stable connection between identity representations and policy.<sup>50</sup> Foreign policy and identity are therefore strongly interlinked.<sup>51</sup> Most importantly, identity is socially constructed.<sup>52</sup> Identity is always “established in relation to a series of

---

<sup>41</sup> Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 305.

<sup>42</sup> Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 302.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, 298.

<sup>44</sup> Doty, 301.

<sup>45</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>46</sup> Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Science”, 2.

<sup>47</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (Routledge: New York, 1989), 47.

<sup>48</sup> Hansen, chapter 2.

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Michael Bamberg, Anna De Fina and Deborah Schiffrin, “Discourse and Identity Construction,” in *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, ed. Seth Schwartz, Koen Luyckx and Vivian Vignoles (New York: Springer, 2011) 178.

differences that have become socially recognised".<sup>53</sup> The construction of identities occurs continuously, both consciously and unconsciously, and is the product of subjectivity and self-notion.<sup>54</sup> At the same time, identity is constructed to provide legitimation for certain policy.<sup>55</sup>

Identity can be broken down into four dimensions: multiplicity, fluidity, alterity, and constructedness.<sup>56</sup> It means that there are always multiple identities that overlap, coincide and can even contradict. Furthermore, identity is always constructed through its position towards something it is not. According to Hansen this is the relational representation of identity.<sup>57</sup> Fierke describes this as the concept of alterity: "Identity is a social category that expresses not only the meaning any one actor attributes to the self; rather self-definitions are related to definitions the *Self* gives to others and others to the *Self*."<sup>58</sup>

Often, a pattern can be discovered in how identities, objects and actions are represented in a dominant discourse. As Fierke argues, by analysing these patterns, one comes to understand *how* social meanings constitute a particular world that eventually becomes 'reality'.<sup>59</sup> The analysis of discourse is central to this thesis, taking language as the manifestation of that discourse. Discourse analysis aims to deconstruct the dichotomies, the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and the power hierarchies in order to explain certain actions. It does not seek to observe the world objectively, but looks at how the underlying mechanisms, the power-knowledge relations included, allow and legitimate identities and actions.<sup>60</sup>

This approach differs from other analyses in that it takes foreign policy as a social construction. It does not presuppose that subjects and objects are a *priori* in place nor the causality of things.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> William Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) 64.

<sup>54</sup> Bamberg, De Fina, Schiffrin, "Discourse and Identity Construction," 178.

<sup>55</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>56</sup> Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 76.

<sup>57</sup> Hansen, chapter 2.

<sup>58</sup> Fierke, 76.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibidem*, 85.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*, 82.

<sup>61</sup> Hansen, chapter 2.

Policy-makers play a particular role in the discursive space as they create a reality by assigning meaning to their course of action. Discourse analysis is not concerned with identifying a fixed centre or locus of certain subjects and objects at the core of the (re)production. That is, because post-structuralists would argue that there is none.<sup>62</sup> Nonetheless, a certain hierarchal order is apparent among the objects and subjects of foreign policy. According to Fierke, the legitimacy of intervention arises from the role of difference in the construction of hierarchies. By making use of the aforementioned dichotomies or binary oppositions, hierarchical representations of conflict situations legitimise intervention. Derrida points out that this hierarchy is the product of language constructions.<sup>63</sup> He introduces the tool of deconstruction to uncover the underlying systems, to position the subjects in relation to each other. This construction of the reality is based on linguistics and *intertextuality*, which means that all *signifiers* (words, images et cetera) refer back to other signifiers, who in their turn refer back to others as well.

The central theme of this thesis is how the intervention in Syria is legitimised through French foreign policy discourse, and how this discourse in itself reinforces France's foreign policy behaviour. In order to gain political legitimacy for military intervention in Syria, the French President has to construct a reality in which both the normative-moral and cognitive requirements are met.<sup>64</sup> Hollande uses official statements for this purpose. The statements give insight in the discourse and therefore in the construction of the foreign policy ideology. As foreign policy discourse legitimises behaviour, it legitimises the proposed course of action. In return, the actions underpin the foreign policy discourse as constructed by Hollande. The next chapter examines how the mutual constitutive relationship between discourse and foreign policy ideology can be researched.

---

<sup>62</sup> Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," 302.

<sup>63</sup> Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Science" (paper presented at the John Hopkins International Colloquium on "The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, Baltimore, Maryland, October 21, 1966) 2.

<sup>64</sup> Smoke, "On the Importance of Policy Legitimacy," 102.

## Chapter 2: Research design and methodology

---

The previous chapter discussed the relationship between legitimacy, foreign policy and identity as subjects of discourse. It also showed that discourse analysis serves as a tool to examine the various mechanisms in texts and to deconstruct the reality, based on linguistics and intertextuality. This chapter unfolds how discourse analysis is used as an instrument to deconstruct French foreign policy discourse.

Hansen describes the goals of discourse analysis as to show how certain issues are dependent on discursive framing and what the political effects are.<sup>65</sup> According to Fierke, discourse analysis is the construction of a map of a particular world, in which the structure of relationships, objects and actions produces a certain reality.<sup>66</sup> Another way to construct reality is by attributing various labels to subjects through *predication*.<sup>67</sup> It involves the linking of certain qualities to certain subjects and so reaffirming quality, attribute or property.<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, discourse analysis can be used to display the context of change. In this research, this applies to a transition in thoughts, in which military intervention used to be illegitimate but changed into the thinkable, even logical, thing to do.

Discourse analysis is relativistic and interpretive, and focuses on patterns across texts. It shows how social meanings constitute a particular reality, which influences certain behaviour.<sup>69</sup> The analysis, which results are described in chapter four, builds on recurrent subjects in the statements by French President François Hollande. The recurrence of subjects means that the same kinds of objects, subjects and/or relationships are found in different texts. The more a subject reappears, the higher it is valued.

---

<sup>65</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>66</sup> Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 82.

<sup>67</sup> Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," 302.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibidem*, 306.

<sup>69</sup> Fierke, 85.

All statements are available on the official website of the *Elysée*, the French Presidential Office<sup>70</sup> and are read and analysed in the original French language. This discourse analysis is focused on official communication of the French President only, as he yields significant power in foreign policy-making. For this purpose, the *discours* and *déclarations*, statements and speeches have been analysed and inductively coded. The final selection comprises statements from immediately after the inauguration of François Hollande as President of the French Republic in May 2012 up to November 2015, the month in which France fully committed itself to military intervention in Syria. It focusses on the most important factors that shape French foreign policy, as seen in the next chapter. Strengthened by quotes drawn from the statements, these factors (values, worldview, multilateralism and use of force) are useful to categorise the most important subjects. Through the analysis of various statements during the course of three-and-a-half years, the result gives a comprehensive picture that encompasses both corresponding as well as conflicting elements of French foreign policy discourse.

The following steps were taken to analyse the meaning of passages in the statements:

1. Select the data

The website offers the complete set of statements given by the French President since his inauguration in May 2012. Only the original French transcripts of the statements have been used, in order to stay as close as possible to the original meanings. Hence, only quotes directly extracted from the statements have been used throughout this thesis. No other media coverage was included, except for the occasional answers to journalists' questions at the end of certain statements. Any other coverage, as well as the sections delivered by other Heads of State or persons of interest in shared statements, is excluded, as it may give an inaccurate view of what is relevant for the discourse. The final selection comprised 144 documents, based on the research criteria 'Syrie'. All documents can be found in the appendix.

---


<sup>70</sup> <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations>, using the original French transcripts.

## 2. Analyse and re-analyse

The statements have been thoroughly read and reread. Based on other scholars' research of the French foreign policy context as discussed in the first chapter, a preliminary list of subjects could be drafted. However, to get a better understanding of the meanings, reading and rereading of the documents was necessary.

## 3. Identification of subjects and predicates<sup>71</sup>

Based on the preliminary list of subjects drafted at the previous step, a more elaborate identification of subjects had to be done. Examples of the subjects that frequently appear in the discourse are: 'values', 'France', 'Syrian crisis', 'we have to act'. In total, a number of 68 subjects were inductively identified, attached to full paragraphs. Here, discourse analysis differs from content analysis, as the latter focuses merely on the isolation and qualification of individual words.<sup>72</sup> Discourse analysis takes into account that words can have different meanings in different contexts. Hence full paragraphs were incorporated and meaning was distilled from there. This approach also secures the original meaning of the texts. To illustrate, below an excerpt from MAXQDA, the programme used to code the documents.



Next, the subjects were categorised based on predicates. These predicates included 'liberty', 'war against terrorism', 'extremist group' and 'mission'. This meant rereading and reanalysing all documents until all relevant paragraphs were included in the list of predicates.

<sup>71</sup> Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," 306-7.

<sup>72</sup> Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 85.

Category	Count
Identity	48
Description Enemy	455
Values / Ideology	110
Amitié	1
Progrés	1
liberté	58
Dignité	8
Pluralisme	4
Indépendance	9
Human rights	24
Liberté d'expression	7
Laïcité	13
Droit international	27

#### 4. The positioning of the subjects

Based on Doty's example of subject positioning, which is the identification of relationships between certain subjects, such as opposition, identity, similarity and complementary.<sup>73</sup> The statements have been deconstructed to locate these relationships and are described in the next chapter. The analysis is primarily based on identifying oppositional structures that result in hierarchisation of one subject in relation to the *Other*.<sup>74</sup> For each of the four features of French foreign policy, binary oppositions such as problems/solutions have been identified, which correspond with the predicates and subjects. These oppositions were useful in juxtaposing the different predicates used in different texts, thus critical to the intertextual analysis of the President's statements.

These four steps enable the distilling of meaning from the excerpts from the official statements. It helps in drawing the map of a particular world, in which the identified subjects and predicates produce a reality.<sup>75</sup> In this reality, military intervention in Syria becomes thinkable and even logical. Discourse analysis proves to be the tool to deconstruct that reality, with a particular focus on the notion of change. At first, intervention was unthinkable and even conflicting with international law. Due to a change in the discourse, the use of force became inevitable.

<sup>73</sup> Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," 306.

<sup>74</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>75</sup> Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 82.



The analysis of the discourse and the deconstruction of the official statements are critical to the understanding of how President Hollande legitimises the military intervention in Syria. Moreover, it gives insight in how French foreign policy discourse endorses that behaviour and how this behaviour concurrently reinforces the discourse. The next chapter provides more insight in the foreign policy ideology of the French Republic.



## Chapter 3: French foreign policy ideology

---

This chapter examines the context of France's foreign policy ideology and provides the context in which the analysis of discourse is possible. It follows Doty's argument that Hollande's statements do not speak for themselves, but always exist in relation to the foreign policy ideology context.<sup>76</sup> This account of the French foreign policy ideology context aims to serve as a starting point, from which the change in discourse will become clear. That change and its implications for foreign policy behaviour in respect to the Syrian civil war are further discussed in the next chapter. The chapter starts with a synopsis of the roots of French foreign policy and continues with a break-down of the factors shaping French foreign policy ideology.

### ***Le domaine réservé***

Known in French as *le domaine réservé*<sup>77</sup>, French foreign policy-making is centralized in the presidential domain, and put into action by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>78</sup> With the representation of France abroad, negotiating and ratifying treaties, and maintaining relations with foreign Heads of State, the most decisive elements of French foreign policy are invested in the Office of the President of the Republic.<sup>79</sup> Due to the role of supreme arbiter of the Republic, the President's judgement of when and which actions are needed under certain circumstances takes precedence over national legislation. In addition, he is the commander-in-chief of the military and presides over the higher defence councils. Hollande is directly involved when the military intervention is under consideration. This explains the reason why this master thesis comprises only Hollande's foreign policy discourse, rather than including the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

---

<sup>76</sup> Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," 306.

<sup>77</sup> "Qu'est-ce que le domaine réservé?" last modified January 2, 2014, <http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/qu-est-ce-que-domaine-reserve.html>.

<sup>78</sup> Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation," 220.

<sup>79</sup> Policy Analysis Unit- Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, *The French Socialists and Franco-Arab Relations: The Election of Francois Hollande and the Impact on France's Arab Policies*, 25 Jul, 2012, last accessed August 1, 2016, <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/6135e4c2-ec95-4709-ad7d-a843b52719ad>.

## Origins of current French foreign policy

The roots of the President's executive power over foreign policy can be traced back to the beginning of the Fifth Republic, which is the current constitution as established by *Général* Charles de Gaulle. Harrison credits the success and legitimacy of the Fifth Republic under De Gaulle to its "presidential-centred constitutional order and foreign policy model based on the principle of independence protected by a small but effective strategic nuclear force."<sup>80</sup> De Gaulle believed that France had to be a strong state, with a strong economy and stable society. Only then could France play the influential role in the world it was destined to. To achieve that, it was essential that the Republic could secure its own independence, without relying too much on former alliances with the United States and NATO in particular. De Gaulle's foreign policy, with its emphasis on France's high potential on the world stage and on safeguarding French interests at all times, can therefore be linked to realism and French exceptionalism, although French policymakers rarely base their policy on those categorisations.<sup>81</sup>

When François Hollande in 2012 became the second Socialist President in the history of the French Republic, political commentators forecasted a continuance of a Gaullist approach to foreign policy, combined with socialist influences. Former foreign policy advisor Hubert Vedrine predicted that Hollande will preserve a similar approach as his socialist predecessor François Mitterrand. This approach, described by Vedrine as "the essence of the Fifth Republic policy", is founded on "a realism that rapidly developed in line with world developments, while maintaining the institutional commitment to a distinct foreign policy for France".<sup>82</sup> Gaullist-influenced foreign policy ideology has not changed much over time. To a greater or lesser extent, all successors of De Gaulle have pursued

---

<sup>80</sup> Michael Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation," *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (1984): 220.

<sup>81</sup> Simond de Galbert, "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, September 8, 2015, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/hollande-doctrine-your-guide-today%E2%80%99s-french-foreign-and-security-policy>.

<sup>82</sup> Policy Analysis Unit- Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, *The French Socialists and Franco-Arab Relations: The Election of Francois Hollande and the Impact on France's Arab Policies*, 2011.

his policy.<sup>83</sup> French foreign policy ideology seems to be nearly immune to both internal and external changes: its objectives and aims remain practically unaltered over time.<sup>84</sup> A possible explanation could be that it is firmly anchored in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. But from post-structuralist perspective, it can be seen as a dominant discourse that stood the test of time. It also enables a thorough analysis of which factors shape the French foreign policy ideology

### **Factors shaping French foreign policy ideology**

Partially based on Belkin's analysis of factors that shape French foreign policy ideology, four features can be distinguished: 'values and ideology', 'multilateralism', 'worldview' and 'use of force'. Each factor will be discussed individually and illustrated with a quote from the French President.

#### *Values and ideology*

*"So, I will leave with our universal values, with which France has enlightened the world and which will continue to shape its international activities."<sup>85</sup>*

Back in the 1960's, De Gaulle foresaw a glorious future for France on an international stage, due to its 'unique value system'.<sup>86</sup> Today, Hollande seems to share that vision. The greater part of the 'unique value system' can be understood through the legacy of the French Revolution, a period in which France transitioned from a monarchy into a republic and democratic institutions and rule of law became commonplace.<sup>87</sup> The maxim *Liberté, Égalité & Fraternité* echoes the most central values of the French Republic. Nowadays, the triptych of republican values has become rather usurped globally, yet still manages to generate a strong sense of belonging to the French state.<sup>88</sup> Caron refers to Habermas' concept of constitutional patriotism, which elaborates on "*the identification to a*

---

<sup>83</sup> Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation," 244.

<sup>84</sup> Policy Analysis Unit- Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, *The French Socialists and Franco-Arab Relations: The Election of Francois Hollande and the Impact on France's Arab Policies*, 2011.

<sup>85</sup> 20120827

<sup>86</sup> Lakomy, "The "Arab Spring" in French Foreign Policy," 69.

<sup>87</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 3.

<sup>88</sup> Jean-François Caron, "Understanding and Interpreting France's national identity: The meanings of being French," *National Identities* 15 (2013): 230.

community through universal principles. This sense of belonging [...] does not lie upon cultural or ethnic elements. The idea is that members of a political community will develop a common political identity by feeling attached to universal political ideals."<sup>89</sup> These universal values are a manifestation of a form of political *fierté*, pride, and echo a normative and moral ideal for the rest of the world.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, it is a representation of France's political identity.

The principle of independence, bolstered by the possession of nuclear weapons, is considered fundamental to the French state.<sup>91</sup> Irondelle adds that French foreign policy ideology is without a doubt based on the dogma of independence, but also of sovereignty.<sup>92</sup> Here, Hollande continues the Gaullist line of thought; France can and must be the "master of its own fate", in terms of foreign policy-making. France's nuclear arsenal and its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are very examples.

From realist perspective, ensuring the sovereignty and independence is the primary task of foreign policy ideology. Post-structuralists however, will argue that they account for only two of many representations.<sup>93</sup> For example, human rights and democracy, through their distinct relation to the French Revolution, tend to mark France's identity as well.<sup>94</sup> In particular the idea that France is the birthplace of human rights is deeply rooted. It reveals a sense of superiority in relation to others. Hollande expresses himself in a similar way when it concerns the concept of *laïcité*. The separation between religion and state, which can even be considered as the 'fourth element of the triptych'<sup>95</sup>, serves as a guideline for the viewpoint on religion in foreign policy ideology. What applies to France, applies to the international world too; Hollande refrains from labelling the Syrian conflict as a sectarian/religious war.

---

<sup>89</sup> Caron, "Understanding and Interpreting France's national identity: The meanings of being French," 229.

<sup>90</sup> Ibidem, 230.

<sup>91</sup> Harrison, "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation," 220.

<sup>92</sup> Irondelle, "European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe?" 155.

<sup>93</sup> Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, 75.

<sup>94</sup> 20150226

<sup>95</sup> Caron, "Understanding and Interpreting France's national identity: The meanings of being French," 231.

Aforementioned values are the epitome of the French identity and in that way strongly connected to foreign policy ideology. France is far from modest in the display of its virtues, yet they are not considered exclusive. According to Dominique de Villepin, Prime Minister under Chirac, “at the heart of [the French] identity, there is a permanent search for values that might be shared with others”.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, one can conclude that France has a self-identity based on two elements: values, which are rooted in the French Revolution, and the vocation to spread those values over the world.

### *Worldview*

*“France is an active power, committed; it has the ambition to be of use to the world around. It is an ambition that is not new, it originates from our history, which makes that we carry values, principles that we have invented not only for ourselves but those we give to the world to share [...].”<sup>97</sup>*

Based on the aforementioned values, France truly believes it has a special position in the world. This view is deeply embedded in the concept of French exceptionalism. It stems from the idea that France has a unique system of values, and, above all, the desire to share those values with the rest of the world. Although generally associated with colonial times, Belkin argues that *la mission civilisatrice* remains a fundamental part of French foreign policy: assertive spreading of human rights, democracy and peace is inherent to France’s *politique étrangère*.<sup>98</sup>

France’s position and influence in the multipolar world is key to its foreign policy-makers.<sup>99</sup> It gives France the opportunity to play a mediating role between opposing sides. Despite France being a country of medium size with relatively modest resources, it plays a decisive role in international politics.<sup>100</sup> The permanent seat at the UNSC with veto-power, the possession of nuclear arsenal, membership of the G8, key positions within the European Union and amongst the largest

---

<sup>96</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 4.

<sup>97</sup> 20140506

<sup>98</sup> Belkin, 4.

<sup>99</sup> 20140328, 20130111, 20120827

<sup>100</sup> Belkin, 2.

contributors to NATO in terms of deploying troops, are all signals of how France aims to position itself in the world. In addition, the evocation to promote human rights worldwide and close bilateral and multilateral ties with most nations and international organisations show France's 'elevated position in the world'.<sup>101</sup> That position is central to the French self-identity in relation to the rest of the world. To France, all those elements, and its membership of the UNSC in particular, gives the country the legitimacy to play its current role in global politics.<sup>102</sup>

### *Multilateralism*

*"We are part of the international legal framework, and I confirm here that our country will only participate in peacekeeping operations or the protection of people in accordance with a mandate and thus with a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council."*<sup>103</sup>

Despite its prominent role on the international stage, the French government, however, does not have the illusion that it can solve every international issue on its own.<sup>104</sup> Engaging international issues through a multilateral framework is hence an essential feature of French foreign policy. Where possible, France advocates for responding to international threats through multilateral channels.<sup>105</sup> Also, the 'legitimation' of actions such as economic sanctions, political censure and the use of force ideally runs through the international network.

Since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, French foreign policy cannot be seen detached from the UN, EU and – since 2009 – NATO. While staying true to the De Gaullist legacy, French policy-makers have come to believe that France can best exert its power through multilateral frameworks.<sup>106</sup> This could be perceived as detrimental to France's key value of independence, but paradoxically, France has never renounced its independent foreign policy. Irondele describes that as follows: "France plays permanently on two levels: multilateral cooperation especially through EU, when it is to its

---

<sup>101</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 4.

<sup>102</sup> De Galbert, "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy," 2015.

<sup>103</sup> 20120827

<sup>104</sup> De Galbert, "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy," 2015.

<sup>105</sup> Belkin, 2.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibidem*, 5.



advantage or needed, and a sovereign approach, which it never renounced, notably when strategic interests are involved.”<sup>107</sup> This makes French foreign policy intergovernmental by nature.

According to French policy-makers, multilateralism does not hinder independence. It is rather a power multiplier, a springboard for French *splendour* in the world. Depending on the political context, decided is which – unilateral or multilateral approach – suits best. In case of the latter, French policy-makers also have to decide to make use of which multilateral format, e.g. EU, UN, G8 or NATO. In general, however, France’s political direction is to initiate missions through the EU, which act under mandate of the UN. And it wishes to see that others take the same path, which is one the reasons that France did not support the 2003 Iraq invasion and has urged the US ever since to confront threats multilaterally.

#### *Use of force*

*[...] France shall, because of its army, play a major role in solving this conflict, militarily, but also because of its diplomacy [and] politics.*<sup>108</sup>

With an increased budget of € 3,8 billion<sup>109</sup> for the years 2015-2019, France already has the fifth largest military expenditure (2015) in the world.<sup>110</sup> The Republic’s defence budget is used for both territorial protection, as well as external operations.<sup>111</sup> Regarding foreign military operations; France often participates and it does not hesitate to decide to use military force.<sup>112</sup> With François Hollande as supreme commander-in-chief, French forces have been militarily involved in Mali, Central African Republic, the Sahel/Maghreb and Iraq. Important notice here, is that all previous military interventions were endorsed by the UNSC. Additionally, the respective governments requested

---

<sup>107</sup> Irondelle, “European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe?” 138.

<sup>108</sup> 20151118

<sup>109</sup> 20151106

<sup>110</sup> “What are the biggest defence budgets in the world?” The Telegraph, October 27, 2015, last accessed July 2, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11936179/What-are-the-biggest-defence-budgets-in-the-world.html>.

<sup>111</sup> 20151106

<sup>112</sup> Irondelle, “European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe?” 163.

military support from France in their battle against terrorism and insurgency. Here the situation differs fundamentally from the Syrian conflict.

Despite the relatively frequent use of force by French troops, military action is only used as a tool and is always attached to a political and diplomatic initiative. For example, an anti-terror foreign policy must include elements of political, humanitarian and economic aid.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, strict criteria must be met in order to acquire legitimacy. It is only justifiable when (i) collective security or a humanitarian crisis requires it, (ii) it can only be the last recourse, when all other options have been exhausted, and (iii) the international community, through the UNSC, endorses the use of force.<sup>114</sup>

When a crisis requires the use of force, the multilateral approach to international questions prevails. However, it receives criticism based on claims that the country reacts actually remarkably slow to emerging issues in the parts of the world with which France has strong ties.<sup>115</sup> They argue that France seemed unable to make effective changes, partly the result of the country's desire to deal with international issues multilaterally.

According to former Foreign Minister Dominique Villepin, "the use of force is tempting when it concerns deep fear for terrorism and other threats".<sup>116</sup> At this moment, terrorism and proliferation of nuclear arsenal and weapons of mass destruction are identified as the largest threat to domestic and international security.<sup>117</sup> The identification of possible threats contributes to the construction of a reality in which actions to minimise that threat become legitimate.

This master thesis examines how the decision to intervene in Syria became thinkable, in the context of François Hollande's discourse and this chapter aimed to give insight in that context. Foreign policy ideology is critical to the relational construction of identity. It serves as a context for the analysis of

---

<sup>113</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 7.

<sup>114</sup> Belkin, 7.

<sup>115</sup> Policy Analysis Unit- Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, *The French Socialists and Franco-Arab Relations: The Election of François Hollande and the Impact on France's Arab Policies*, 2011.

<sup>116</sup> Belkin, 7.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibidem*, 1.

behaviour that is linked to identity. In addition, ideology is produced by and reproduces foreign policy, it has the power to influence course of action. Combined with a short historical overview of French foreign policy, this chapter shaped the background in which Hollande's discourse can be read. This account of foreign policy ideology in the French Republic must be understood as a starting point. The change in discourse, that constructs a reality in which military intervention in Syria became thinkable, will be further examined in the next chapter.



## Chapter 4: The official foreign policy discourse under the Hollande administration (2012-2015)

---

In chapter three, French foreign policy was deconstructed into four fundamental factors: values, worldview, multilateralism and use of force. Based on the methodology as set out in the second chapter, these factors are the main themes of the discourse analysis as proposed here. The themes are subdivided into binary oppositions, which represent the underlying dimensions of the texts. Doty identifies the binary oppositions as operational principles, used to disclose the deeper structure of the discourse.<sup>118</sup> This analysis is based on those operational principles, which are given meaning and at the same time are juxtaposed in relation to each other.<sup>119</sup>

With respect to the foreign policy ideology context, as discussed in the previous chapter, the notion of change is central to this chapter. Based the foreign policy ideology context, Hollande needs to create a ‘new’ reality in which his desired reality – that legitimises military intervention in Syria – needs to be accepted in order for his presidential statements to make sense.<sup>120</sup> Subsequently, certain practices, such as airstrikes on DAECH targets, are made possible.<sup>121</sup>

The presidential speeches are analysed according to the oppositional structure method. The outcome is that the dominant terms are highlighted in relation to the *Other*, the subordinate to the first one.<sup>122</sup> They include the positioning of positive values of the *Self* in relation to the negative values of the *Other*, of attributes assigned to the *Self*, of the representations of both the al-Assad regime and DAECH and of the situation in Syria. After establishing the relationships between those predicates, Hollande’s approach to the legitimation of the intervention in Syria does make sense.

---

<sup>118</sup> Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 312.

<sup>119</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, 308.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 306.

## Values

From normative-moral perspective, policy must comply with the norms and values that are considered part of a state's core.<sup>123</sup> Only then will a head of state gain legitimacy for its actions.

François Hollande portrays France with the values that he believes are illustrative for France: independence, sovereignty, human rights. Placed within an oppositional structure, it implies that the *Other* does not possess those values. Within the foreign policy discourse, a hierarchy is created in which those values are juxtaposed in relation to the other.<sup>124</sup> These hierarchical structures are often reflected in dichotomies. Here, the binary opposition good/evil is most relevant.

### *Good/evil*

The Republic's attachment to liberty, sovereignty and independence is reflected in Hollande's statements over the years (see table 4.1). This affirms the assumption that those are the cornerstone of French foreign policy. Liberty in particular appears as a key value of French foreign policy, but also of domestic politics. According to Hollande, France received overwhelming support from international community after the Charlie Hebdo shootings, "because France for the world represents liberty".<sup>125</sup> But France does not only want freedom for itself, it wants to share its message worldwide. Hollande declared that "he speaks in the name of universal values, which France has always proclaimed, rights that belong to every human being regardless of where they live: liberty, safety and resistance to oppression."<sup>126</sup> Thus, he wanted to be clear that, "France will assume all its responsibilities and will spare no efforts for the Syrian population to obtain its freedom and security".<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> George, "Domestic constraints on regime change in U.S. foreign policy: The need for policy legitimacy", 235.

<sup>124</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>125</sup> 20150825

<sup>126</sup> 20120925 (2)

<sup>127</sup> 20120827

**Table 4.1 List of (positive) values of the Self (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Liberty	Historical heritage
Peace	Moral obligation
Independence	Secularism
Responsibility	Equality
Democracy	Dignity
Security	Freedom of speech
(International) Justice	Pluralism
Human rights	Togetherness / Fraternity
Sovereignty	Amity
Solidarity	

The list of values also gives away the centrality of preserving peace / spreading a message of peace in French foreign policy. Though often mentioned in combination with the responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council, Hollande ardently portrays France as the epitome of a peace-making nation. In Hollande's 2014 New Year's address, he featured France as "always on the front row and, which makes [him] proud of, in the service of peace. It is France's honour. It is its obligation."<sup>128</sup>

With the various representations of values in Hollande's statements corresponding with the findings in chapter one, Hollande – from normative-moral perspective – achieves legitimacy for his policy. However, focusing on just the *Self* is not enough to change discourse into one where military intervention is legitimate. As seen in chapter two, just like identity, it needs to be positioned in relation with an *Other*.

In his statements, Hollande does not particularly use explicit dichotomies, but confines to describing the values of the *Self* and the *Other* independently. Referring to the aforementioned values as *positive*, in the sense of good, desirable, or respectable, Hollande puts apart the *negative* values and ideology of the enemy, i.e. the al-Assad regime and DAESH. Table 4.2 displays the various representations of the *Other's* ideologies.

Hollande refrains from qualifying the *Other* as explicitly 'anti-liberty' or 'anti-justice', he rather emphasises the harmful ideologies of the *Other*. In that way, he still juxtaposes the *Self* and the *Other*

---

<sup>128</sup> 20140101

as oppositional in a hierarchical system. He denigrates the *Other* by saying that ‘they’ threaten France’s positive values and ideologies; “[the Charlie Hebdo perpetrators ed.] wore the masque of hatred, a hatred of that loathes everything that France represents, diversity, democracy, pluralism, secularism, the ideal of peace.”<sup>129</sup>

Even stronger was Hollande’s reaction after the November 2015 Paris attacks. Hollande warned the enemy that: “France will respond to hatred with fraternity, France will respond to terror by the force of law, France will respond to fanaticism with hope that is inherent to life itself, France will respond by simply being France”.<sup>130</sup>

**Table 4.2 List of (negative) ideologies/values of the *Other* (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Fanaticism	Fundamentalism
Extremism	Intolerance
Jihadist ideology	Racism
Barbarity	Antisemitism
Ideology of hate	Islamophobia
Radical/Extremist Islamism	Xenophobia
Ideology of death	Insolence
Obscurantism	

By contrasting the negative values and/or ideology of the *Other* and the positive values of France, Hollande constructs a reality in which the *Other* is fundamentally different from the *Self*. Within the hierarchical order, the *Other* is also inherently subordinate in terms of goodness, which can strengthen the construction of new discourse in which military intervention becomes acceptable. It becomes a reason to act, as Hollande illustrates in his statement on January 14 2015: “when facing jihadists, fundamentalists, terrorists, France must act. Act for itself, act for the world, act to assist countries that have called upon us, within the framework of international law and with a UN mandate.”<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup> 20150113  
<sup>130</sup> 20151119  
<sup>131</sup> 20150114



## Worldview

France aims to be the ultimate embodiment of ‘good’ values, but above all, to share those with the rest of the world. Chapter three showed that France’s position and influence in the international arena is key to its foreign policy-makers. Hollande’s statements support that assumption. The worldview put forward by Hollande not only represents how he wants the rest of the world to see France, but even more importantly, how his domestic audience sees it.

In order to examine the position of France’s worldview in the foreign policy discourse, this section will discuss the dichotomies of Self/Other – including both al-Assad and DAECH – and problems/solutions.

**Table 4.3 List of attributes to the *Self* (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Defends international interests	Participates when needed
Guardian of universal values	It is our destiny
Grand nation	Defends its position in the world
Inclusive, open to dialogue with every party	Serves national interests
Represents the world	Valuable to the world
It is our vocation	Global power
Puts other interests before national interests	Nuclear power
Is exemplary	Always present on the international stage
Reliable partner	Leader, initiator
Influences the world	Serves French interests
Respected by the world	Capable
We are France	We are a promise
Unique nation	It is our mission
Defends European interests	Strong nation
Influential through permanent seat UNSC	Ambitious
Has a message to share	Crucial role in the multipolar world
Brings/stimulates progress	Factor of stability in the world
Solves international issues	Pioneers, avant-garde
Enlightens the world	Added value in the international scene
Bridge between nations, continents, civilisations	Vocation to be useful for the entire world
Always front-row	Obligated to do so
<i>Self/Other</i>	

As discussed earlier, the identity of the *Self* is constructed mainly in relation to the meaning that is given to the *Other*. Identity is a social category, but fluid and not singular. They can overlap, complement and even contradict. This is evidently the case regarding the attributes listed in table 4.3

Many of the representations Hollande uses overlap or complement each other. Hollande aims to represent France as an active, reliable and international partner for everyone that supports the French way. The Republic will lead the way in difficult situations, and is because of its unique characteristics truly indispensable on the international stage.

However, France's perception of the world and its role in it, goes beyond that. This position is not something fortuitous; there is a higher meaning to it. France believes that it plays a decisive part in the world's fate and future; "France [is one of the] nations that weigh in on the world's fate."<sup>132</sup> Within this constructed reality it becomes the right thing to do to interfere in situations that affect the global security. For France it becomes its duty or obligation to act.

Together with the assumption that France is seen as a reliable partner in international affairs, Hollande sometimes views this moral obligation as a burden, that can have serious consequences;

*[Other nations] often call upon us, when it concerns terrorism, when there is insecurity, when human rights are violated. It is always France they turn to. Sometimes that charge can be difficult; it is a responsibility that includes risks. We will respond to it, but always in respect of international law.*<sup>133</sup>

Particular emphasis is placed on the role of France as a mediator between other nations, continents or parties:

*"France's mission is to be a bridge between civilizations, between societies, between cultures, communicating with everyone. France is a balancing factor in the world. France is a major European nation that works for itself and for Europe. France is capable of speaking with all the populations of the world with the same respect and in the name of universal values."*<sup>134</sup>

It means that France sees itself at the core of the global community and that it aims to work together with everyone, provided that the others consent with France's strategy. Among foreign policy

---

<sup>132</sup> 20120518 (1)

<sup>133</sup> 20150227

<sup>134</sup> 20140118(2)

analysts, this evokes the discussion whether France pursues mainly national or international interests. Table 4.3 illustrates that Hollande attaches importance to the defence of international interests. From a realist perspective, however, France would act predominantly out of self-interest.

Eventually, all the representations Hollande uses can be summed up in one sentence: We are France. This sentence is used in various statements and incorporates everything that France stands for, within the country and abroad. Because of the repetition of this particular expression, its significance within the discourse is evident. It implies a sense of superiority, which complies with Hollande’s aim to position France above others in the hierarchy.

**Table 4.4 List of representations of the enemy (al-Assad) (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Regime	Extremist alliance
Syrian regime	Equivalent of terrorist group
Dictator	Principal responsible for the war
Undemocratic / illegitimate leader	Adversary
Instigator of war crimes and crimes against humanity	Head of state
Barbaric regime	Syrian government
Menace	

France’s identity does not stand on itself, as it is intrinsically related to the identity of the *Other*. The Syrian war started off with one *Other*, which was the regime led by President Bachar al-Assad. Throughout the course of the conflict the *Other* gained a second dimension when various extremists groups became involved. Table 4.4 lists the predicates of the al-Assad regime, while table 4.5 displays those of DAECH.

Despite relatively good bilateral relations prior to the conflict, Hollande from the start referred to the al-Assad administration as a ‘regime’. Only once did he use the word ‘Syrian government’. By using the terms ‘regime’ and ‘dictator’, and ‘adversary’, Hollande denotes the illegitimacy of al-Assad and his ministry. In general, Hollande speaks very negatively of al-Assad, stressing the contrasts between the self-identity of France and Syria. The domestic audience gets hence taken along in the negative

discourse, starting to believe that an innocent population is oppressed by an illegitimate and ruthless dictator. In light of the French attachment to values as freedom, sovereignty and democracy, an intervention to redeem the Syrian population becomes more acceptable.

This is further strengthened by the predicates given to the extremist movements that have become third parties within the war. Bar one reference to Jabhat al-Nusra or Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State is the only recurring terrorist movement in Hollande’s statements.

**Table 4.5 List of representations of the enemy (DAECH) (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Terrorist movement	Army of manipulation
Jihadist movement	Army of indoctrination
Extremist group / army	Barbarians
Global threat	Adversary
Extremist alliance with Syrian regime	Culprit of atrocities
The greatest danger to the world	Radical Islamists
Fanatics	Warmongers
Movement of hate	Terrorist forces

The predicates used for DEACH are similar to those describing the al-Assad regime. They are often mentioned in the same breath: “ [...] the alternative cannot be al-Assad nor the terrorists, because they are eventually the same. Because nowadays they sustain each other.”<sup>135</sup> Both are represented as a threat to the security in Syria, but eventually DAECH is perceived as a larger threat, the real enemy in the region.<sup>136</sup> The reason DAECH stands higher in the hierarchical order is the result of the terrorist attacks the organisation has carried out on French soil, the Charlie Hebdo shootings and the November 2015 Paris attacks in particular.

*Problems/solutions*

A large part of the discourse on the legitimisation of intervention in the Syrian war is based on the problems/solutions dichotomy. Foreign policy discourses in particular construct problems, objects and subjects, but at the same time comes up with policies to deal with them.<sup>137</sup> By identifying the problem in Syria, Hollande can present a discourse with solutions to his audience: it opens the door

<sup>135</sup> 20160116 (2)

<sup>136</sup> 20151116

<sup>137</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

for military intervention. As seen in table 4.6, the French President uses various negative predicates to describe the conflict. At times very explicit, sometimes slightly ambiguous, it is evident that Syria is scourged by war and that the situation deteriorates every day.<sup>138</sup>

**Table 4.6 List of representations of the situation in Syria (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

War	Humanitarian crisis
Syrian crisis	Largest factory for terrorists in the world
Syrian question	Arab spring country
Conflict	Demanding situation
Syrian situation	Repression
Civil war	Violence of horrible magnitude
Chaos	Terrible outcome
Tragedy	Dangerous situation
Urgency	Violent situation
Syrian drama	Escalation of violence
Dictatorship	International issue
Severe international crisis	Unacceptable situation
Escalating international situation	Regional crisis
Challenge	Major concern
Syrian issue	

The severity of the situation requires a strong approach. The solution Hollande proposes does not need to be listed in a table, as he foresees only one future for Syria, and that is without Bashar al-Assad as its President: “The idea is easy: Bashar al-Assad has to go. There won’t be a political solution when he is still there.”<sup>139</sup> Despite threatening with the use of force, Hollande truly aims for a political solution. He strives for setting up a transitional government, a new constitution and eventually elections including all involved parties, except al-Assad himself and the militant organisations.<sup>140</sup> Hollande’s goals perfectly correspond with France’s values, which will appeal to his audience and justify a particular course of action.

### **Multilateralism**

The discourse of Hollande is overflowing with references to France’s desire to engage international

<sup>138</sup> 20120706

<sup>139</sup> 20120827

<sup>140</sup> 20120706, 20151126 (1)

issues through a multilateral framework. A multilateral approach is more effective, because “sovereignty is not equal to isolation. It also means being capable of acting with others”.<sup>141</sup> In addition, Hollande considers the situation in Syria a threat to international security, demanding an international response.<sup>142</sup> France aims to seek dialogue with everyone, but in practice that seems to be a little more difficult. The next section discusses the dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion.

*Inclusion / exclusion*

“[...] the message is that France is always on the move, but it does not aim to be on the move by itself. It is useless to be on your own. What France wants is not only to be supported but is to be assembled.”<sup>143</sup>

This quote confirms that Hollande explicitly seeks for multilateral approaches to the Syrian conflict. Table 4.7 denotes the list of allies, both countries and institutions, France joints forces with.

**Table 4.7 List of allies (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

United Nations (including the Security Council)	Germany
Syrian opposition	Russia
United States	China
European Union	NATO
Arab world	United Kingdom
Turkey	

Holding a permanent seat in the UNSC is part of France’s foreign policy identity, therefore it comes as no surprise that Hollande prefers to address international issues at the United Nations. According to the President, [France] is ready to work with whomever with good will. We will continue mobilising at all possible institutions and with all our allies, and in particular with the United Nations.”<sup>144</sup>

The United Nations is *the* organisation for securing worldwide peace and France truly believes in its competence. But in the situation of Syria, Hollande accuses the institution of inertia, leading up to

---

<sup>141</sup> 20130524  
<sup>142</sup> 20140915  
<sup>143</sup> 20150227  
<sup>144</sup> 20120706

the point that he claims that the presence of militant organisations is partly to blame on the incapability of the UN to solve the Syrian conflict.<sup>145</sup>

The following quote gives a detailed account of where the UN stands for, and, according to Hollande, what it should do regarding the Syrian conflict:

“I first return to what is France’s position in relation to the United Nations. We hope that [the UN] sets the framework, as the very centre of global governance. We rejoice each time the Security Council or the General Assembly takes decisions, passes resolutions regarding peace and stability. At the same time, we deplore, and that is the case today, that there might be a paralysis, a blockage, divisions, which obstructs the UN from reacting to emergencies. I’ve pointed out earlier that the most urgent matter is the situation in Syria, which should call for the mobilisation of all powers to join and support a population that is massacred by a leader that was not chosen.”<sup>146</sup>

Together with humanitarian aid, support of the Syrian people to France means the acknowledgement and assisting the Syrian oppositional forces. Hollande was the first to officially back the anti-al-Assad coalition in November 2012 by declaring that the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces is the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people.<sup>147</sup> He called them courageous, determined and proud.<sup>148</sup> In addition to those qualities, Hollande praises the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) because of its sense of responsibility, its willingness to contribute to a political transition in the country and its respect for freedom and democracy.<sup>149</sup> The latter is remarkable: Hollande considers the SNC as the democratic representative of Syria, while there have never been elections to endorse that.

Hollande pursues close bilateral ties with the SNC, while excluding the al-Assad regime. The French President indicated that there will be no dialogue between France and al-Assad, as Hollande holds al-

---

<sup>145</sup> 20150116

<sup>146</sup> 20120925

<sup>147</sup> 20121117

<sup>148</sup> 20120706

<sup>149</sup> 20142005

Assad personally responsible for one of the worst civil wars in recent years. Assad is a dictator who bombs its own people, who uses chemical weapons to destroy lives and thus France will not open any talks with him, the culprit of the Syrian conflict.<sup>150</sup>

With the construction of a reality in which the SNC highly values concepts such as democracy and liberty as much as France, Hollande aims to highlight resemblance between his audience and the Syrian counterpart. It proves that there is an alternative to the al-Assad regime and DAECH, which is much more alike to how the French see themselves. Subsequently, it seems more reasonable to interfere in this conflict.

### **Use of Force**

As discussed in chapter one as well, the use of force is mainly instrumental to political and diplomatic initiatives. Before reverting to military action, three criteria have to be met. Military action is only appropriate when (i) collective security or a humanitarian crisis requires it, (ii) it is the last recourse, when all others options have been tried, and (iii) the international community, through the UNSC, endorses the use of force.<sup>151</sup> Based on these criteria, the binary opposition threat/action will be further discussed in the following section.

### *Threat / action*

To France, preserving worldwide peace is key to its foreign policy. Decisions to revert to the use of force can therefore not be taken lightly. Whereas France's initial reaction to the outbreak of unrest in Syria in 2011 was one of weak condemnations,<sup>152</sup> a pivotal moment in Hollande's approach occurred in the late summer of 2013. In his speech to the French diplomatic corps on August 27, François Hollande opened by disclosing the use of chemical weapons in Syria a couple of days earlier. He immediately claimed that evidence indicated that the al-Assad regime was to hold responsible and

---

<sup>150</sup> 20150226

<sup>151</sup> Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*, 7.

<sup>152</sup> Lakomy, "The "Arab Spring" in French Foreign Policy," 77.



that the international community unanimously condemned this despicable act, strengthened by international conventions.<sup>153</sup>

Nuclear proliferation is considered as one of the largest threats to international and domestic security. Hollande had warned for this to happen, when he ordered to remain vigilant to prevent the use of chemical weapons by the al-Assad regime. If al-Assad would deploy his chemical and biological arsenal, to Hollande, it would legitimise direct military intervention.<sup>154</sup>

**Table 4.8 List of performances by the al-Assad regime (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Uses chemical weapons	Upholds the war / violence
Massacres its own population	Commits war crimes
Bombs own population	Commits crimes against humanity
Carries out exactions	Carried out a chemical attack
Represses its own population	Destroys the population
Treats the population with ignominy	Upholds a dictatorial regime
Performs abject acts	Undermines the sole legitimate authority
Gasses innocent people	Is supported by external forces
Violates international law	Uses all means against own population
Detains its own population	Assassinates civilians
Tortures	Destroys lives
Destroys villages	Crosses red lines by using chemical weapons
Causes death	Is fully responsible for the situation
Abducts civilians	Commits atrocities
Rapes	Fuels the war
Threatens international, regional and local security	Uses hateful propaganda

However, immediate action from the international community fell out, much to the disliking of the French President. It took until September 2015 for Hollande to take the decision to carry out airstrikes on Syria, but over the course of the conflict, the French President has advocated for military action, but within a multilateral framework. Hollande said: “Especially at the end of August 2013, the beginning of September, the international community should have acted already. France was ready; orders had been given, the instruments in place. Another route was preferred. We now see the results.”

<sup>153</sup> 20130827

<sup>154</sup> 20120827

In the absence of an international approach, one of the requirements of military action is not met, hence the inaction from France's side. The second criteria used to be problematic too, as it seems to Hollande that political options to resolve the conflict were not exhausted yet. And France always opts for the political option, unless the international security is under threat. When Assad deployed chemical weapons against its own population, France concluded that it endangered the global safety. As seen in table 4.8, an extensive list can be made of the performances by Bachar al-Assad that are represented in Hollande's foreign policy discourse. With the use of chemical weapons on top, this confirms that France perceives nuclear proliferation as one of the largest threats to global security. This would contribute to the construction of a discourse in which intervention becomes justifiable. Yet, due to the fact that endorsement by the UNSC fell out, the performances by al-Assad have not been enough to legitimise military intervention in Syria.

**Table 4.9 List of performances by DAECH (in order of salience high-low, from left to right)**

Persecution of (religious) dissidents	Obstructs justice and rule of law
Massacres	Eradicates the population systematically and methodically
Persecution of minorities	Uses indoctrination
Destroys heritage of humanity	Kills on a large scale
Targets innocent people/civilians	Tortures
Commits acts of war	Detains civilians
Decapitation	Forces civilians into marriage
Alliance between terrorism and dictatorship	Forces civilians into prostitution
Threatens global security	Stimulates radicalisation
Commits atrocities	Creates disarray
Commits crimes against humanity	Represses (parts of) the population
Occupies territory illegitimately	Responsible for domestic and foreign attacks
Establishes a caliphate / state	Spreads death
Assassinates civilians	Rapes
Barbaric acts	Recruits foreign combatants
Spreads fear	Undermines the sole legitimate authority
Abducts civilians	Destroys villages
Rejects universal values	Crucifies civilians
Commits terrorist acts	Commits acts of hate

However, the second dimension of the Syrian war – the presence and dominance of militant organisations and DAECH in particular – adds another element to the discourse that diverges from

the al-Assad regime approach. In table 4.9 the performances by DAECH as represented in Hollande's discourse are listed.

Significant is the amount of corresponding performances listed in table 4.9 compared to the previous table. Both parties are accused of committing atrocities including repression, violating human rights and massacres. Together with nuclear proliferation, terrorism endangers the international stability, and each of the *Others* are held responsible for one of them. Theoretically, this would mean that both the performances by al-Assad *and* by DAECH would be reason to military intervene. Hollande however, constructed a discourse in which DAECH is clearly perceived as a larger threat to the international security, not only because of its involvement in the Syrian war but also due to the threat it poses to other nations. "That is why the necessity to destroy DAECH has become an issue that concerns the entire international community."<sup>155</sup> DAECH thus became a regional and international threat. However, to France, the pivotal moment was the November 2015 Paris attacks. The terrorist movement now became a threat to French domestic security. Hansen would argue that due to the terrorist attacks, the internal stability between proposed foreign policy and representations of identity becomes disturbed.<sup>156</sup> External constraints like attacks ask for a deliberation of the current identity as well as the dominant policy discourse. For example, a new discourse could be constructed, based on fear from terrorism. This does not agree with the proposed identity as reflected in Hollande's foreign policy discourse. And so, Hollande had to work on his discourse to construct a reality in which France remains superior to the other.

However, the second dimension of the Syrian war – the presence and dominance of militant organisations and DAECH in particular – adds another element to the discourse that diverges from the al-Assad regime approach. In table 4.9 the performances by DAECH as represented in Hollande's discourse are listed.

---

<sup>155</sup> 20151116

<sup>156</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

Significant is the amount of corresponding performances listed in table 4.9 compared to the previous table. Both parties are accused of committing atrocities including repression, violating human rights and massacres. Together with nuclear proliferation, terrorism endangers the international stability, and each of the *Others* are held responsible for one of them. Theoretically, this would mean that both the performances by al-Assad *and* by DAECH would be reason to military intervene. Hollande however, constructed a discourse in which DAECH is clearly perceived as a larger threat to the international security, not only because of its involvement in the Syrian war but also due to the threat it poses to other nations. “That is why the necessity to destroy DAECH has become an issue that concerns the entire international community.”<sup>157</sup> DAECH thus became a regional and international threat. However, to France, the pivotal moment was the November 2015 Paris attacks. The terrorist movement now became a threat to French domestic security. Hansen would argue that due to the terrorist attacks, the internal stability between proposed foreign policy and representations of identity becomes disturbed.<sup>158</sup> External constraints like attacks ask for a deliberation of the current identity as well as the dominant policy discourse. For example, a new discourse could be constructed, based on fear from terrorism. This does not agree with the proposed identity as reflected in Hollande’s foreign policy discourse. And so, Hollande had to work on his discourse to construct a reality in which France remains superior to the other.

### **Discourse of change**

This chapter has examined François Hollande’s foreign policy discourse by means of the analysis of 144 official statements about Syria. On the basis of the four features that shape French foreign policy ideology (values, worldview, multilateralism and use of force) predicates were assigned to recurrent subjects. The core argument of this chapter is that Hollande constructed a new discourse, a changed discourse, in which military intervention became thinkable. Hence, the changed discourse produces new policy that legitimises the intervention, which simultaneously reinforces the changed discourse.

---

<sup>157</sup> 20151116

<sup>158</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

This changed discourse identifies that there is an *Other* that is radically different from France, the *Self*. More important, the *Other* does not respect the same values as France. The *Other* only knows negative values while Hollande desires to represent France as a country with a unique system of enviable values. The *Other*, both the al-Assad regime and DAECH, and the *Self* not only contradict in respect to values. Hollande carefully portrays France as a trustworthy and reliable partner in international issues, a grand and unique nation, and as exemplary to the rest of the world. This explains why France believes it plays a special role on the international arena. The *Other* is oppressive (al-Assad) or barbaric (DAECH). Clearly the *Other* is regarded inferior.

Foreign policy discourse constructs problems in order to ensure internal stability in relation to external constraints. Initially, the external threat came from the deteriorating situation in Syria. A war is going on and it brings chaos, crises and violence. Hollande feared from the beginning the increasing scale of the conflict and more casualties: this is precisely what happened. The situation is deplorable, but there is only one solution: a peaceful and democratic Syria without Bashar al-Assad. The best way to achieve this is by working closely with the Syrian oppositional forces, allies and international organisations. Approaching international issues through the multilateral framework remains a priority for Hollande. Excluded from any cooperation is the enemy. The two figures in which the performances of the al-Assad regime and DAECH are listed, almost speak for themselves. It does not comply with how France aims to represent itself by working together with these parties. Eventually, not all requirements for the use of force are met. But when the situation became a direct threat to French security, through the terrorist attacks on French soil, this changed discourse produces foreign policy that legitimises military intervention in Syria.



# Conclusion

---

On November 16 2015, François Hollande declared that France was now at war, as a response to the attacks in Paris a day earlier.<sup>159</sup> The President identified the shootings and suicide-bombings as an act of war, against the French Republic, against its values and against its way of life.<sup>160</sup> The night after the attacks, Hollande immediately ordered the destruction of targets in Syria. Albeit the first French airstrikes had begun two months earlier, the frequency has increased significantly since mid-November.

This master thesis' ambition was to present a post-structuralist theory of foreign policy ideology and its relation to identity and legitimacy. Combined in a discourse methodology, it brought together an analysis of France's approach towards the Syrian conflict. The central question in this thesis is how the decision to intervene in Syria became thinkable, even logical, in the context of François Hollande's discourse. It aimed to answer the question how François Hollande legitimises the military intervention in Syria in the context of foreign policy discourse, and how this discourse in return is constructed and reinforced by France's foreign policy ideology.

This course of action, which is the military intervention, is made possible through the construction of a reality in which Hollande's statements make sense. This master thesis presented in the previous chapters how that reality was constructed through the mutually constitutive relationship between foreign policy discourse and foreign policy ideology. It showed how that relationship resulted in military intervention in Syria. Simultaneously, that action reinforces the foreign policy discourse: behaviour and discourse are mutually constitutive as well.

Built on post-structuralist theory, the theoretical framework as proposed in the first chapter elaborated on the relations between legitimacy, foreign policy ideology, discourse and identity. Central to post-structuralism is the notion that policy and identity are social constructions. It focused

---

<sup>159</sup> 20151116

<sup>160</sup> 20151116

on the social construction of legitimacy and identity and how they are linked to foreign policy ideology. Furthermore, it discussed the mutually constitutive relationship between foreign policy ideology and discourse. Particular attention was paid to the role of language as a space where subjects and identities are produced and reproduced, while at the same time excluding others. Language is a system of socially constructed signs, to which meaning is assigned through the positioning of those signs in relation to one another.<sup>161</sup>

The aim of foreign policy discourse is to produce a stable link between the representations of policy and identity to which internal stability between identity and policy is critical. At its core lay power-knowledge relations that produce and reproduce meaning within a hierarchical system.<sup>162</sup>

The tool to deconstruct how social meanings constitute reality, is discourse analysis. The second chapter discussed this methodology and the research design. Discourse analysis is an instrument to unravel textual constructions in official statements by French President François Hollande. It aims to reveal patterns of intertextuality that indicate which subjects are dominant within foreign policy discourse.

Foreign policy discourse is always related to foreign policy ideology as they reinforce one another. The third chapter examined the French foreign policy ideology context. French foreign policy ideology was broken down into four features: values, worldview, multilateralism and the use of force. This distinction served as a starting point from which a discourse of change can be understood. This change implied a shift in policy, from a situation in which military intervention is illegitimate to a state in which it was the thinkable, even logical, thing to do.

The fourth chapter showed by means of the analysis of 144 presidential statements, how Hollande constructed a reality in which interference in Syria became acceptable. The foreign policy discourse as represented by President François Hollande is built on the positioning of the *Self* in relation to the

---

<sup>161</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, chapter 2.

<sup>162</sup> Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Post-structuralist Theory*, 108.



*Other*, emphasising the fundamental contradiction in values and performances between the two. Placed in an oppositional and hierarchical structure, it aimed to depict the *Other* as inferior. The predicates of the *Other*, both the al-Assad regime and DAECH, are the complete opposite of France. This is part of the process of constructing France's self-identity, which is always related to the *Other*.

In respect to the way France aimed to present itself internationally, Hollande outlined France's perception of the world and the role France plays in it. This perception is particularly of interest in relation to problems. The Syrian war poses a problem for the identity of France; it clashes with French values and threatens the international security. By referring to the Syrian war as an increasing problem, in each statement Hollande step by step changed the discourse into one where military intervention to solve the conflict becomes a serious option. By addressing the Syrian issue, Hollande was able to draft a new reality in which President Bashar al-Assad would not take part.

Hollande remained to prioritise multilateral cooperation when it comes to international issues, but was crystal clear in with whom he wanted to cooperate. Through the process of *Othering*, Hollande's foreign policy discourse, some were included, while others, the al-Assad regime and DAECH, were excluded. A strong notion of us-versus-them appeared. This influenced the course of action, contributing to a discourse in which military action against the *Other(s)* became thinkable.

Albeit certain criteria have to be met before the use of force is justifiable, military engagement abroad is based on the belief in France's unique value system, its prominent position in the world and the desire to address it within the multilateral framework. France's foreign policy ideology is strongly focused on the presence of external threats, while it is the obligation of France to enhance peace and stability in the rest of the world. The direct threat of terrorist movement on French soil eventually formed the last piece to the discourse that legitimised military intervention in Syria.

Through a change in discourse with respect to the proposed foreign policy ideology context, the French President altered the course of action, resulting in the military intervention in Syria. The foreign policy discourse was in such a way instrumental to policy legitimacy.

This master thesis built on post-structuralist theory. As discussed in chapter one, discourse analysis does not aim to identify a fixed centre, as post-structuralists do not assume that objects and subjects are already in place. The world is constructed through social representations, explained within the discourse. Therefore, this research is based on interpretations. The discussion of the limitations of discourse analysis are not new. However, from post-structuralist perspective, a solution to deal with these limitations remains lacking.

In this thesis statements up to November 2015 were analysed. A follow-up research, perhaps after the Syrian conflict is solved, would be useful to inquire how the intervention in Syria was perceived after it took place. Did it meet expectations? Is such an intervention sustainable if a conflict takes years and years? It will be valuable to analyse the discourse in retrospect. On the other hand, France's foreign policy ideology is not likely to change drastically in the near future. It is firmly rooted in the discourse and foreign policy and not expected to change. France hence will be able to play its desired role on the international stage. Just because its France.

# Bibliography

---

**Bamberg, Michael, Anna De Fina and Deborah Schiffrin.** "Discourse and Identity Construction." In *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, edited by Seth Schwartz, Koen Luyckx and Vivian Vignoles. New York: Springer, 2011.

**Becker, Derrick.** "The New Legitimacy and International Legitimation: Civilization and South African Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010): 133-146.

**Belkin, Paul.** *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in U.S.-French Relations*. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2009.

**Bhatia, Michael.** "Fighting words naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors." *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 5-22.

**Caron, Jean-François.** "Understanding and Interpreting France's national identity: The meanings of being French." *National Identities* 15 (2013): 223-237.

**Connolly, William.** *Identity\Difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

**Derrida, Jacques.** "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Science." Paper presented at the John Hopkins International Colloquium on "The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, Baltimore, Maryland, October 21, 1966.

**Doty, Roxanne.** "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines." *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (1993): 297-320.

**Fierke, Karin.** *Critical Approaches to International Security*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.

**Fierke, Karin.** *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.

**Foucault, Michel.** "The Order of Discourse." In *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, edited by Robert Young. Boston: Routledge, 1981.

**Foucault, Michel.** *The Order of Things*. Routledge: New York, 1989.

**George, Alexander.** "Domestic constraints on regime change in U.S. foreign policy: The need for policy legitimacy." In *Change in the international system*, edited by Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander George. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.

**Hansen, Lene.** *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. New York: Routledge, 2006. Kindle edition.

**Harrison, Michael.** "Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation." *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (1984): 219-246.

**Irondele, Bastien.** "European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe?" *Journal of European Integration* 30 (2008): 153-168.

**Lakomy, Miron.** "The "Arab Spring" in French Foreign Policy." *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 6:3-4 (2012): 68-87.

**Müller, Patrick.** "The Europeanization of France's foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict: from leadership to EU-accommodation." *European Security* 22 (2012): 113-128. Accessed December 5, 2015. doi:10.1080/09662839.2012.698266.

**Smoke, Richard.** "On the Importance of Policy Legitimacy." *Political Psychology* 15 (1994): 97-110.

*Online sources*

**Airwars.** "Strikes in Syria." Accessed March 19, 2016. <https://airwars.org/>.

**Al Jazeera.** "Syria's Civil War Explained." May 24, 2016. Accessed May 29, 2016.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html>.

**Friendland, Elliot.** Who's who in the Syrian Civil War. Washington: The Clarion Project. Accessed May 15, 2016.

<https://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/Clarion%20Project%20Syrian%20Civil%20War%20Factsheet.pdf>

**Galbert, de, Simond.** "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, September 8, 2015.

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/hollande-doctrine-your-guide-today%E2%80%99s-french-foreign-and-security-policy>.

**Hudson, John.** "U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000." *Foreign Policy*, April 22, 2016.

Accessed May 21, 2016. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revises-syria-death-toll-to-400000/>.

**Irish, John and Raissa Kasolowsky.** "French public back military intervention in Syria – poll." *Reuters*,

May 24, 2015. Accessed June 5, 2015. [http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-france-](http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-france-idUKKBN0080N120150524)

[idUKKBN0080N120150524](http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-france-idUKKBN0080N120150524).

**McGreal, Chris and Martin Chuloy.** "Syria: Assad must resign, says Obama." *The Guardian*, August

19, 2011. Accessed May 12, 2016. [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-obama)

[obama](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/18/syria-assad-must-resign-obama).

**Policy Analysis Unit- Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies.** *The French Socialists and Franco-*

*Arab Relations: The Election of Francois Hollande and the Impact on France's Arab Policies*, 25 Jul,

2012. Last accessed August 1, 2016. [http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/6135e4c2-ec95-4709-ad7d-](http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/6135e4c2-ec95-4709-ad7d-a843b52719ad)

[a843b52719ad](http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/6135e4c2-ec95-4709-ad7d-a843b52719ad).

**Rodgers, Lucy et al.** "Syria: The story of the conflict". *BBC*. Accessed May 12, 2016.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>.

**Schmitt, Eric and Mark Mazzetti.** "U.S. Intelligence Official Says Syrian War Could Last for Years."

*The New York Times*, July 20, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2016.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/middleeast/us-intelligence-official-says-syrian-war-could-last-for-years.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/middleeast/us-intelligence-official-says-syrian-war-could-last-for-years.html?_r=0).

**La Vie Publique.** "Qu'est-ce que le domaine réservé?" Last modified January 2, 2014. [http://www.vie-](http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/qu-est-ce-que-domaine-reserve.html)

[publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/qu-est-ce-que-domaine-reserve.html](http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/qu-est-ce-que-domaine-reserve.html).

**"What are the biggest defence budgets in the world?"** *The Telegraph*, October 27, 2015. Last

accessed July 2, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11936179/What-are-the-biggest-defence-budgets-in-the-world.html>.

*Official statements by François Hollande, President of the French Republic*

Hollande, François. “Déclaration du Président de la République à l’issue de son entretien avec Barack Obama, Président des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,” Elysée. May 18, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-issue-de-son-entretien-avec-barack-obama-president-des-etats-unis-d-amerique/>.

Hollande, François. “Allocution de M. le Président de la République, devant la communauté française à Washington”. Elysée, May 18, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-washington/>.

Hollande, François. “Discours d’ouverture de M. le Président de la République à l’occasion de 3ème Réunion du Groupe des Amis du Peuple Syrien,” Elysée. July 06, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-d-ouverture-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-de-3eme-reunion-du-groupe-des-amis-du-peuple-syrien/>.

Hollande, François. “Allocution de Monsieur le Président de la République française devant la communauté française à Londres,” Elysée. July 10, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-de-monsieur-le-president-de-la-republique-francaise-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-londres/>.

Hollande, François. “Déclaration de M. le Président de la République à la Chancellerie de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne,” Elysée. August 23, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-a-la-chancellerie-de-la-republique-federale-d-allemande/>.

Hollande, François. “Discours du Président de la République à l’occasion de la XXème Conférences des Ambassadeurs,” Elysée. August 27, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-de-la-xxeme-conferences-des-ambassadeurs/>.

Hollande, François. “Déclaration du Président de la République à l’issue de son entretien avec Barack Obama, Président des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,” Elysée. September 25, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-francaise-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-new-york/>.

Hollande, François. “Discours du Président de la République à l’occasion de la 67ème Assemblée générale des Nations unies,” Elysée. September 25, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-de-la-67eme-assemblee-generale-des-nations-unies/>.

Hollande, François. “22ème sommet franco-espagnol - Déclaration commune,” Elysée. October 10, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/22eme-sommet-franco-espagnol-declaration-commune/>.

Hollande, François. “Déclaration conjointe du Président de la République et de M. Serge SARKISSIAN, président de la République d’Arménie,” Elysée. November 12, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-et-de-m-serge-sarkissian-president-de-la-republique-d-armenie/>.

Hollande, François. “Déclaration du Président de la République suite à sa rencontre avec M. Ahmad MOAZ AL-KHATIB,” Elysée. November 17, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-suite-a-sa-rencontre-avec-m-ahmad-moaz-al-khatib/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe du Président de la République et de Mme THORNING-SCHMIDT, Première Ministre du Royaume du Danemark,” Elysée. December 5, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-et-de-mme-thorning-schmidt-premiere-ministre-du-royaume-du-danemark/>.

Hollande, François. “Déclaration conjointe du Président de la République et de EVELINE WIDMER-SCHLUMPF, Présidente de la Confédération suisse,” Elysée. December 7, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-et-de-eveline-widmer-schlumpf-presidente-de-la-confederation-suisse/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux aux Français,” Elysée. December 31, 2012. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-aux-francais/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux du Président de la République au corps diplomatique,” Elysée. January 11, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-du-president-de-la-republique-au-corps-diplomatique/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux à la presse du Président de la République,” Elysée. January 16, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-a-la-presse-du-president-de-la-republique/>.

Hollande, François. “ Intervention du Président de la République devant le Parlement européen,” Elysée. February 5, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-europeen/>.

Hollande, François. “ Hommage aux victimes de Toulouse et Montauban,” Elysée. March 17, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-aux-victimes-de-toulouse-et-montauban/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours du président de la République au dîner du CRIF,” Elysée. March 20, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-au-diner-du-crif/>.

Hollande, François. “ Intervention du président de la République devant la communauté française au Lycée Lyautey de Casablanca,” Elysée. April 5, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-la-communaute-francaise-au-lycee-lyautey-de-casablanca/>.

Hollande, François. “ Intervention du président de la République sur la politique de Défense à l'Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale,” Elysée. May 24, 2013. Last accessed August 10,



2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-politique-de-defense-a-l-institut-des-hautes-etudes-de-defense-nationale/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours du président de la République lors du deuxième Congrès des Communautés Juives de France,” Elysée. June 1, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-du-deuxieme-congres-des-communautés-juives-de-france/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration au G8 de Lough Erne,” Elysée. June 19, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-au-g8-de-lough-erne/>.

Hollande, François. “ Allocution du président de la République devant la communauté française à Doha,” Elysée. June 23, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-la-communauté-française-a-doha/>.

Hollande, François. “ Intervention du président de la République lors de l'ouverture du forum économique franco - qatarien,” Elysée. June 24, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-de-l-ouverture-du-forum-economique-franco-qatarien/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration du président de la République lors du dîner de travail à Amman,” Elysée. June 24, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-du-diner-de-travail-a-amman/>.

Hollande, François. “ Intervention du Président de la République devant l'Assemblée nationale constituante de la République tunisienne,” Elysée. July 07, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-l-assemblee-nationale-constituante-de-la-republique-tunisienne/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe avec M. Ahmad AL-ASSI AL-JARBA, président de la Coalition nationale syrienne,” Elysée. July 24, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-m-ahmad-al-assi-al-jarba-president-de-la-coalition-nationale-syrienne/>.

Hollande, François. “ Allocution du président de la République à l'occasion de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs,” Elysée. August 27, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-de-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs/>.

Hollande, François. “ Allocution du président de la République à l'occasion du dîner d'Etat en l'honneur de M. Joachim GAUCK, président fédéral d'Allemagne,” Elysée. September 03, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-du-diner-d-etat-en-l-honneur-de-m-joachim-gauck-president-federal-d-allemande/>.

Hollande, François. " Point de presse à l'issue de l'entretien bilatéral avec M. Barack OBAMA, Président des États-Unis d'Amérique," Elysée. September 7, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-de-presse-a-l-issue-de-l-entretien-bilateral-avec-m-barack-obama-president-des-etats-unis-d-amerique/>.

Hollande, François. " Déclaration conjointe du président de la République et de M. Mahmoud ABBAS, président de l'Autorité palestinienne," Elysée. September 12, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-et-de-m-mahmoud-abbas-president-de-l-autorite-palestinienne/>.

Hollande, François. " Discours à l'occasion de la conférence ministérielle de l'Union pour la Méditerranée," Elysée. September 12, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-a-l-occasion-de-la-conference-ministerielle-de-l-union-pour-la-meditteranee/>.

Hollande, François. " Intervention du président de la République à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies," Elysée. September 24, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-assemblee-generale-des-nations-unies/>.

Hollande, François. " Conférence de presse à Bruxelles à l'issue du Conseil européen," Elysée. October 31, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/conference-de-presse-a-bruxelles-a-l-issue-du-conseil-europeen/>.

Hollande, François. " Déclaration du président de la République à son arrivée à l'aéroport de Tel-Aviv en Israël," Elysée. November 17, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-a-son-arrivee-a-l-aeroport-de-tel-aviv-en-israel/>.

Hollande, François. " Discours du Président de la République devant le Parlement de l'Etat d'Israël," Elysée. November 18, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-de-l-etat-d-israel/>.

Hollande, François. " Discours devant la communauté française à Tel Aviv," Elysée. November 19, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-tel-aviv-2/>.

Hollande, François. " Déclaration conjointe à l'occasion du 23ème sommet franco-espagnol," Elysée. November 27, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-a-l-occasion-du-23eme-sommet-franco-espagnol/>.

Hollande, François. " Déclaration conjointe à la presse à Brasilia, propos du président de la République," Elysée. December 12, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-a-la-presse-a-brasilia-propos-du-president-de-la-republique/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours devant la communauté française à Riyad en Arabie Saoudite,” Elysée. December 29, 2013. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-riyad-en-arabie-saoudite/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux aux Français,” Elysée. January 1, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-aux-francais-5/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux aux Autorités religieuses,” Elysée. January 9, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-aux-autorites-religieuses-5/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux du président de la République aux Corrégiens,” Elysée. January 18, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-du-president-de-la-republique-aux-correziens/>.

Hollande, François. “ Vœux au Corps diplomatique,” Elysée. January 18, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-au-corps-diplomatique-5/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours devant la communauté française à Amsterdam,” Elysée. January 20, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-amsterdam/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours lors de la visite de l’Organisation pour l’Interdiction des Armes Chimiques (OIAC),” Elysée. January 20, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-visite-de-l-organisation-pour-l-interdiction-des-armes-chimiques-oiac/>.

Hollande, François. “Discours devant les étudiants à l’Université de Galatasaray,” Elysée. January 28, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-les-etudiants-a-l-universite-de-galatasaray/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours devant la communauté française à Istanbul,” Elysée. January 28, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-istanbul/>.

Hollande, François. “ Point presse conjoint avec Mme Erna Solberg, Première ministre du Royaume de Norvège,” Elysée. February 2, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-presse-conjoint-avec-mme-erna-solberg-premiere-ministre-du-royaume-de-norvege/>.

Hollande, François. “ Allocutions à l’occasion de la cérémonie d’accueil à la Maison Blanche,” Elysée. February 12, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-et-de-barack-obama/>.

Hollande, François. “ Toast lors du déjeuner au Département d’Etat,” Elysée. February 12, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/toast-lors-du-dejeuner-au-departement-d-etat/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours devant la communauté française à San Francisco,” Elysée. February 12, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-san-francisco/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours lors du dîner du Conseil Représentatif des Institutions juives de France,” Elysée. March 04, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-du-diner-du-conseil-representatif-des-institutions-juives-de-france-2/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe avec Michel Sleimane, président de la République libanaise, et Jeffrey Feltman, sous-secrétaire général des Nations Unies, pour l'ouverture de la réunion du Groupe international de soutien au Liban,” Elysée. March 5, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-michel-sleimane-president-de-la-republique-libanaise-et-jeffrey-feltman-sous-secretaire-general-des-nations-unies-pour-l-ouverture-de-la-reunion-du-groupe-international-de-soutien-au-liban/>.

Hollande, François. “ Seconde déclaration conjointe du président de la République et du président de la République populaire de Chine,” Elysée. March 27, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/seconde-declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-et-du-president-de-la-republique-populaire-de-chine/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe avec M. Xi Jinping, président de la République populaire de Chine,” Elysée. March 27, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-m-xi-jinping-president-de-la-republique-populaire-de-chine/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours de commémoration du 50ème anniversaire des relations diplomatiques franco-chinoises,” Elysée. March 28, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-de-commemoration-du-50eme-anniversaire-des-relations-diplomatiques-franco-chinoises/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours lors de la commémoration du 99ème anniversaire du génocide arménien,” Elysée. April 25, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-commemoration-du-99eme-anniversaire-du-genocide-armenien/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration à l'occasion de la libération des ex-otages français en Syrie,” Elysée. April 29, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-a-l-occasion-de-la-liberation-des-ex-otages-francais-en-syrie/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe avec M. Ahmad AL-ASSI AL-JARBA, Président de la Coalition nationale syrienne,” Elysée. May 20, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-m-ahmad-al-assi-al-jarba-president-de-la-coalition-nationale-syrienne-3/>.

Hollande, François. “ Conférence de presse au Sommet du G7 à Bruxelles,” Elysée. June 5, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/conferences-de-presse/article/conference-de-presse-au-sommet-du-g7-a-bruxelles/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours du président François Hollande devant la communauté française à Niamey,” Elysée. July 19, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-francois-hollande-devant-la-communaute-francaise-a-niamey/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours du président François Hollande à la base militaire française KOSSEI, à Ndjamena,” Elysée. July 19, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-francois-hollande-a-la-base-militaire-francaise-kossei-a-ndjamena/>.

Hollande, François. “ Allocution au Mémorial de Coïnte,” Elysée. August 4, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-au-memorial-de-coïnte/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours du président de la République lors de la commémoration du 70ème anniversaire du débarquement en Provence sur le Charles-de-Gaulle,” Elysée. August 18, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-de-la-commemoration-du-70eme-anniversaire-du-debarquement-en-provence-sur-le-charles-de-gaulle/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours d'ouverture de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs,” Elysée. August 28, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-d-ouverture-de-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours de M. le Président de la République à l'occasion du dîner officiel offert à S.A.R. le Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz AL SAOUD, Prince héritier du Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite et ministre de la Défense,” Elysée. September 1, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-du-diner-officiel-offert-a-s-a-r-le-prince-salman-bin-abdulaziz-al-saoud-prince-heritier-du-royaume-d-arabie-saoudite-et-ministre-de-la-defense/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration du Président de la République lors du discours d'ouverture de la conférence sur l'Irak,” Elysée. September 15, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-du-discours-d-ouverture-de-la-conference-sur-l-irak/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration du président au sujet de l'Irak,” Elysée. September 19, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-au-sujet-de-l-irak/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration du président de la République - Irak,” Elysée. September 23, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-irak/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe à la presse avec le premier ministre irakien, M. Haïdar al-Abadi,” Elysée. September 23, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-a-la-presse-avec-le-premier-ministre-irakien-m-haidar-al-abadi-2/>.

Hollande, François. “ Débat d'ouverture de la 69ème session de l'Assemblée générale - Intervention du président de la République,” Elysée. September 24, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/debat-d-ouverture-de-la-69eme-session-de-l-assemblee-generale-intervention-du-president-de-la-republique/>.

Hollande, François. “ Conseil de sécurité - Intervention du président de la République,” Elysée. September 24, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/conseil-de-securite-intervention-du-president-de-la-republique/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration solennelle du président de la République au sujet de l'assassinat d'Hervé Gourdel,” Elysée. September 24, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-solennelle-du-president-de-la-republique-au-sujet-de-l-assassinat-d-herve-gourdel/>

Hollande, François. “ Point de presse lors de la 69e Assemblée générale des Nations Unies,” Elysée.

September 25, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-de-presse-lors-de-la-69e-assemblee-generale-des-nations-unies-2/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration au Sommet des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement Europe-Asie,” Elysée. October 17, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-au-sommet-des-chefs-d-etat-et-de-gouvernement-europe-asie/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours à l'issue de la rencontre avec les dirigeants sociaux-démocrates européens,” Elysée. October 30, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-a-l-issue-de-la-rencontre-avec-les-dirigeants-sociaux-democrates-europeens/>.

Hollande, François. “ Déclaration conjointe à la presse avec M. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, président de la République de Turquie,” Elysée. October 31, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-a-la-presse-avec-m-recep-tayyip-erdogan-president-de-la-republique-de-turquie-2/>.

Hollande, François. “ La déclaration lors de la cérémonie au Rideau Hall à Ottawa,” Elysée. November 10, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/la-declaration-lors-de-la-ceremonie-au-rideau-hall-a-ottawa/>

Hollande, François. “ Toast lors du déjeuner d'État à Banff #CanadaPR,” Elysée. November 10, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/toast-lors-du-dejeuner-d-etat-a-banff-canadapr/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours à l'arrivée du président de la République #CanadaPR,” Elysée. November 10, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-a-l-arrivee-du-president-de-la-republique-canadapr/>.

Hollande, François. “Discours à l'occasion de l'inauguration de l'Anneau de la Mémoire,” Elysée. November 12, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-a-l-occasion-de-l-inauguration-de-l-anneau-de-la-memoire/>.

Hollande, François. “Propos liminaire - Conférence de presse - G20 Brisbane,” Elysée. November 18, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/propos-liminaire-conference-de-presse-g20-brisbane/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours du Prix Elysée de la photographie 2013,” Elysée. November 27, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-prix-elysee-de-la-photographie-2013/>.

Hollande, François. “ François Hollande suite à son entretien avec Vladimir Poutine: "Nous devons utiliser tous les instruments pour sortir de cette crise",” Elysée. December 8, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/francois-hollande-suite-a-son-entretien-avec-vladimir-poutine-nous-devons-utiliser-tous-les-instruments-pour-sortir-de-cette-crise-2/>.

Hollande, François. “ Discours lors de la remise du prix de la Fondation Chirac,” Elysée. December 8, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-remise-du-prix-de-la-fondation-chirac/>.

Hollande, François. “ Point de presse conjoint avec M. Noursoltan Nazarbaev, président du Kazakhstan,” Elysée. December 10, 2014. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-de-presse-conjoint-avec-m-noursoltan-nazarbaev-president-du-kazakhstan-2/>.

Hollande, François. “ Hommage national aux trois policiers morts en service,” Elysée. January 13, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-national-aux-trois-policiers-morts-en-service-3/>.

Hollande, François. "Vœux aux forces armées," Elysée. January 14, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-aux-forces-armees/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors de l'ouverture de la Philharmonie de Paris," Elysée. January 15, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-l-ouverture-de-la-philharmonie-de-paris/>.

Hollande, François. "Allocution lors de l'ouverture du forum "Renouveaux du monde arabe" à l'Institut du monde arabe," Elysée. January 16, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-lors-de-l-ouverture-du-forum-renouveaux-du-monde-arabe-a-l-institut-du-monde-arabe/>.

Hollande, François. "Vœux aux corps diplomatiques," Elysée. January 16, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/v-ux-aux-corps-diplomatiques-3/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors de la présentation des vœux aux Corrèziens," Elysée. January 17, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-presentations-des-v-ux-aux-correziens/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours au Forum économique mondial de Davos," Elysée. January 23, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-au-forum-economique-mondial-de-davos-2/>

Hollande, François. "Discours au Conseil de coordination des organisations arméniennes de France," Elysée. January 28, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-au-conseil-de-coordination-des-organisations-armeniennes-de-france-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours sur la dissuasion nucléaire - Déplacement auprès des forces aériennes stratégiques. Istres (13)," Elysée. February 19, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-deplacement-aupres-des-forces-aeriennes-strategiques-istres-3/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors du dîner du CRIF," Elysée. February 23, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-du-diner-du-crif-2/>.

Hollande, François. "," Elysée. January 18, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

Hollande, François. "Relevé de conclusions du XXXIIème Sommet franco-italien," Elysée. February 24, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/releve-de-conclusions-du-xxxiieme-sommet-franco-italien/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration conjointe à la presse avec Benicio Aquino III, président des Philippines," Elysée. February 26, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-a-la-presse-avec-benicio-aquino-iii-president-des-philippines-2/>.



Hollande, François. "Discours devant la Communauté française de Manille," Elysée. January 18, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-devant-la-communaute-francaise-de-manille-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours au département des antiquités orientales du Musée du Louvre," Elysée. March 18, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-au-departement-des-antiquites-orientales-du-musee-du-louvre-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Cérémonie de commémoration de la rafle du 6 avril 1944 à la maison d'Izieu," Elysée. April 9, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/ceremonie-de-commemoration-de-la-rafle-du-6-avril-1944-a-la-maison-d-izieu/>.

Hollande, François. "'L'Europe doit être capable d'offrir des réponses à tout'," Elysée. April 24, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/l-europe-doit-etre-capable-d-offrir-des-reponses-a-tout-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors des commémorations du centenaire du génocide arménien," Elysée. April 24, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-des-commemorations-du-centenaire-du-genocide-armenien-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration conjointe entre le Président de la République et le Roi Salman bin Abdul Aziz AL SAOUD," Elysée. May 4, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-entre-le-president-de-la-republique-et-le-roi-salman-bin-abdul-aziz-al-saoud/>.

Hollande, François. "Point de presse à Doha au Qatar," Elysée. May 4, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-de-presse-a-doha-au-qatar-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration France - Conseil de Coopération des Etats Arabes du Golfe," Elysée. May 5, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-france-conseil-de-cooperation-des-etats-arabes-du-golfe/>.

Hollande, François. "Point de presse du président de la République à Riyad, au Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite," Elysée. May 6, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

Hollande, François. "Discours du président de la République lors de l'inauguration du Mémorial ACTe," Elysée. May 13, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-de-l-inauguration-du-memorial-acte/>.

Hollande, François. "Remise du Prix Charlemagne à Martin Schulz," Elysée. May 14, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/remise-du-prix-charlemagne-a-martin-schulz/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours aux élus de l'Aude," Elysée. May 19, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-aux-elus-de-l-aude/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors du forum MEDCOP21," Elysée. June 5, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-du-forum-medcop2-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Allocution à l'occasion de l'inauguration du nouveau Canal de Suez," Elysée. August 7, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-a-l-occasion-de-l-inauguration-du-nouveau-canal-de-suez/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration commune avec Angela MERKEL au sujet de la crise des migrants," Elysée. August 24, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-commune-avec-angela-merkel-au-sujet-de-la-crise-des-migrants/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours d'ouverture du président de la République à l'occasion de la Semaine des Ambassadeurs," Elysée. August 25, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-d-ouverture-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-occasion-de-la-semaine-des-ambassadeurs/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration conjointe avec Enda Kenny, Premier ministre d'Irlande," Elysée. September 3, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-enda-kenny-premier-ministre-d-irlande-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration du président François Hollande lors de l'inauguration de l'Exposition "Osiris, Mystères engloutis d'Egypte"," Elysée. September 7, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-francois-hollande-lors-de-l-inauguration-de-l-exposition-osiris-mysteres-engloutis-d-egypte-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors de la conférence sur les victimes de violences ethniques et religieuses au Moyen-Orient," Elysée. September 8, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-conference-sur-les-victimes-de-violences-ethniques-et-religieuses-au-moyen-orient/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration conjointe avec le président M. Muhammadu Buhari," Elysée. September 14, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-le-president-m-muhammadu-buhari/>.

Hollande, François. "Conférence de presse de M. le Président de la République dans l'amphithéâtre de Tanger MED," Elysée. September 19, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/conference-de-presse-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-dans-l-amphitheatre-de-tanger-med-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Allocution du président de la République sur l'égalité des genres," Elysée. September 27, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-l-egalite-des-genres/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration du président de la République à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies," Elysée. September 27 , 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-assemblee-generale-des-nations-unies/>.

Hollande, François. "Intervention devant l'Assemblée générale de l'Organisation des Nations unies," Elysée. September 28, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-devant-l-assemblee-generale-de-l-organisation-des-nations-unies/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration conjointe avec Angela Merkel à l'issue du sommet Format Normandie," Elysée. October 2 , 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-angela-merkel-a-l-issue-du-sommet-format-normandie/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours du président de la République au Parlement européen," Elysée. October 7 , 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-au-parlement-europeen/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration du président de la République à son arrivée au Conseil européen," Elysée. October 15, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-a-son-arrivee-au-conseil-europeen/>.

Hollande, François. "Conférence de presse lors du Conseil européen," Elysée. October 15, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/conference-de-presse-lors-du-conseil-europeen-5/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours lors de la Conférence internationale pour la relance économique et le développement du Mali," Elysée. October 22 , 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-conference-internationale-pour-la-relance-economique-et-le-developpement-du-mali-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours au Parlement grec," Elysée. October 23, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-au-parlement-grec/>.

Hollande, François. "Point de presse conjoint avec M. Werner Faymann, chancelier fédéral de la République d'Autriche," Elysée. October 30, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-de-presse-conjoint-avec-m-werner-faymann-chancelier-federal-de-la-republique-d-autriche-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Inauguration du nouveau ministère de la Défense," Elysée. November 6, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/inauguration-du-nouveau-ministere-de-la-defense-4/>.

Hollande, François. "Conférence de presse lors du Sommet sur la migration," Elysée. November 13 , 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/conference-de-presse-lors-du-sommet-sur-la-migration-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours du président de la République devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès," Elysée. November 16, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-devant-le-parlement-reuni-en-congres-3/>.

Hollande, François. "Intervention du président de la République lors de la 38e session de la Conférence générale de l'UNESCO," Elysée. November 17, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/intervention-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-de-la-38e-session-de-la-conference-generale-de-l-unesco/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours du président de la République au rassemblement des Maires de France," Elysée. November 18, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-au-rassemblement-des-maires-de-france/>.

Hollande, François. "Discours du président de la République lors de la remise du prix de la Fondation Jacques CHIRAC," Elysée. November 19, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-lors-de-la-remise-du-prix-de-la-fondation-jacques-chirac-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Conférence de presse conjointe avec Barack Obama à la Maison-Blanche," Elysée. November 25, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/conference-de-presse-conjointe-avec-barack-obama-a-la-maison-blanche-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration conjointe avec la Chancelière Angela Merkel," Elysée. November 25, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-avec-la-chanceliere-angela-merkel-2/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclaration des présidents François Hollande et Vladimir Poutine à l'issue de leur entretien," Elysée. November 26, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-des-presidents-francois-hollande-et-vladimir-poutine-a-l-issue-de-leur-entretien/>.

Hollande, François. "Entretien avec Vladimir Poutine, président de la Fédération de Russie," Elysée. November 26, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/entretien-avec-vladimir-poutine-president-de-la-federation-de-russie-3/>.

Hollande, François. "Point de presse à Malte," Elysée. November 27, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/point-de-presse-a-malte/>.

Hollande, François. "Hommage national aux victimes des attentats du 13 novembre. (Hôtel national des Invalides)," Elysée. November 27, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/hommage-national-aux-victimes-des-attentats-du-13-novembre-hotel-national-des-invalides/>.

Hollande, François. "Déclarations du président de la République à son départ du Sommet UE-Turquie," Elysée. November 29, 2015. Last accessed August 10, 2016.

<http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declarations-du-president-de-la-republique-a-son-depart-du-sommet-ue-turquie/>.