Is South-South Cooperation Changing the Agricultural Development Landscape?
A Case Study Analysis of ProSAVANA

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Abstract

This thesis investigates whether South-South Cooperation can lead to agricultural growth in Africa, based on the transfer of knowledge and best-practice techniques developed in Brazil. Using a case study analysis of ProSAVANA, a triangular cooperation project between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique, this thesis analyses the effectiveness of the project in combining financial aid with technical knowledge transfer to cultivate the Nacala Corridor of Northern Mozambique. Based on the findings of the case study, this thesis argues ProSAVANA has been largely unsuccessful in achieving agricultural development in Mozambique. This is primarily due to its focus on private investment and commercial gains, which has been heavily criticised by civil society groups and local farmers in Mozambique. This paper concludes by arguing that ProSAVANA is damaging the long-term reputation of SSC, following claims of land grabbing and exploitation of resources, which is in stark contrast to its principles of shared development goals and mutual respect. This harms SSC's chances of changing the development landscape in the long run.

Keywords: Brazil, Mozambique, Embrapa, Agricultural Development, South-South Cooperation, ProSAVANA, PROCEDER

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

ABC	*Agência Brasileira de Cooperação* / Brazilian Cooperation Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Embrapa	*Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária* / Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
PD	*Plano Director* / Agricultural Development Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor
PE	*Projecto de Extensao* / Improvement of Agricultural Extension Services
PI	*Projecto de Investigacao* / Improvement of Agricultural Research Capacities & Technology Transfer
ProSAVANA	Triangular Co-operation Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique
SSC	South-South Cooperation

Introduction

In 1973, Embrapa was created as an agricultural research institution in Brazil, tasked with achieving growth in the agricultural sector in order to overcome a major food shortage crisis. Today Embrapa is hailed as a great success, having overcome Brazil's food scarcity issue and becoming one of the world's largest food exporters. Brazil now uses its success in tackling a wide range of issues in its own country, to promote international development and advocate for South-South Cooperation (SSC). Having significantly increased its presence in Africa, Brazil has led many development projects in areas such as health, education and agriculture. Combining financial assistance with a transfer of technical expertise, it hopes to help its developing partners achieve the same successes and overcome similar problems. This thesis will focus on agriculture specifically and analyse how effective SSC has been in developing the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique, based on similar practices previously developed in Brazil.

Beginning with a discussion on why states offer international development assistance, based on various theories of international cooperation, this thesis shall look at the difference of SSC in comparison to traditional North-South aid assistance. This traditional form of aid is often tied with conditionalities such as the implementation of good governance and neoliberal economic policies, irrespective of whether these suit the needs of the recipient country. SSC focuses on shared development goals and is designed to better suit the needs of the countries receiving assistance. In order to expand on this, the paper shall provide context to the ProSAVANA project, by looking at previous instances of SSC between Brazil and African nations and the development of Brazil's own agricultural sector as a result of cooperation with Japan.

Using a case study analysis of ProSAVANA, a triangular cooperation project between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique, this thesis shall discuss how effective this particular project has been in achieving agricultural growth in Mozambique. This project was modelled on PROCEDER, which saw the cultivation of the Brazilian Cerrado, with the help of Japan, to adapt the soybean to what was

previously unfertile land. The primary objective behind ProSAVANA is to combine financial resources from Japan with technical expertise from Brazil, in order to positively transform the Nacala Corridor in Northern Mozambique, leading to increased agricultural growth in the region. However, this project has received a great deal of criticism, with many local farmers in Mozambique branding it as an attempted 'land-grab' due to the major role of private investors and commercialisation of farming practices. This criticism draws attention to the well-debated motives behind inter-state cooperation and who really benefits. In order to address this, the thesis shall briefly look at why Brazil cooperates with other states and more importantly, the impact that these criticisms of Brazil exploiting African resources have on the long-term legitimacy of SSC.

By analysing the case of ProSAVANA, this thesis will investigate whether this new form of development assistance offered by Brazil through SSC is really changing the development landscape and providing assistance to developing countries based on their specific needs, with respect for their sovereignty and shared goals of development. Or, whether this is simply a new 'scramble for Africa' with emerging donors like Brazil gaining access to Africa's untapped resources and using SSC as a foreign policy tool for its own strategic benefit. While this latter option may seem quite a bold claim to make, based on the outcome of just one case study, it draws attention to a bigger issue. As developing nations like Brazil continue to rise and establish a greater presence within the international community, it is important their relations with other developing nations are closely monitored and scrutinised, in order to prevent an exploitation of resources, as we have seen between traditional North-South relationships. It is this critical approach to SSC that has led to the decision to study ProSAVANA in this thesis.

Although ProSAVANA is a SSC project, critics claim it offers little long-term benefit for Mozambique, instead profiting private investors from Brazil and Japan. The impact of this, is that the reputation of SSC as a form of development partnership between developing countries will be tarnished and the role of Brazil and other BRICS nations credited with leading the way for global reform

and international development, will be exposed as using development projects such as these, in order to benefit at the expense of weaker countries. By analysing this particular case study, this thesis will look at the extent to which ProSAVANA actually benefits Mozambique and the long-term impact of this heavily criticised project on SSC as a future tool for development assistance and cooperation. This thesis concludes with the findings that ProSAVANA lacked sufficient transparency and failed to address the concerns of local famers and civil society groups, leading to protests and negative media attention. As a result, many of the private investors involved in the project have attempted to distance themselves, in order to avoid tarnishing their own reputation, leading to a lack of progress in reaching the targets set out for development.

While recognising the many successful SSC projects that have taken place between Brazil and African nations and even with Mozambique itself in areas such as health and education, this paper offers recommendations for improving SSC projects in the future. These are increased transparency, ensuring government legislation to protect locals from private investment, maintaining an open dialogue during the process, in order to address concerns immediately and avoid negative speculation, which as we saw in this case, can lead to halting progress. Ultimately, this paper argues SSC is a welcome development to the international development assistance arena, but it important it continues to receive adequate scrutiny, to maintain its legitimacy going forward.

1. Why do States Offer Development Assistance?

In order to understand how successful efforts to transfer technical expertise from Brazil to Africa have been, it is first important to look at *why* Brazil is seeking to cooperate with other countries and share its knowledge. While there are many theories of interstate cooperation that would attempt to explain this, the following chapter shall draw on the academic debate from leading *neoliberal institutionalist* thinkers, as this theory has largely dominated explanations for Western development assistance in the past. This will be compared with the *Power Asymmetries Hypothesis*, which helps explain the more recent rise of SSC, in contrast to the traditional North-South, donor-recipient form of development aid. Through a discussion of these theories, this chapter shall also define the concept of SSC and review some of the leading academic debates surrounding Brazil's use of SSC as a foreign policy tool.

Before discussing why states offer assistance, it is first important to define what exactly 'development assistance' is. According to a report by the World Bank (2002: 9), development assistance can encompass both financial and non-financial instruments, to increase growth and reduce poverty. Essentially, while the transfer of financial resources is an important part of assistance, so too are countries offering advice, analysis and capacity building. The best instrument for assistance will depend entirely on that country's specific needs. This is important, as in recent years there has been a growing debate as to how best to offer development assistance based on these instruments and has raised the question as to whether financial aid really 'works'.

There have been many critics of financial aid, particularly those who claim it's damaging to developing countries in the long run, who become 'aid dependent'. According to Clements *et al.* (2012: 561), when the duration and amount of financial aid is too high, it begins to have a negative impact on the recipient country, due to the government relying on that source of income. In contrast, Glassman (2011) claims that long-term economic aid to countries like Tanzania has led to the successful development of roads, sanitation and water projects,

with an estimated economic gain of well over $1 billion. This debate over whether financial aid is effective and similarly, what is 'effective' aid has surged in recent years and has fierce proponents on either side. It does show that there has been growing interest in how aid is delivered and what are the best practices for different countries. With that in mind, this thesis shall now draw on two major theories of international cooperation, in order to understand *why* states offer assistance, before returning to the discussion of how best to provide development aid and more specifically, the rise of 'needs based' development assistance in the form of SSC.

1.1 Neoliberal Institutionalism vs The Power Asymmetries Hypothesis

One of the leading theories of international cooperation comes from neoliberal institutionalism. Leading Neo-Liberal Institutionalist thinkers, such as Keohane & Nye (2001: 23) argue that international institutions can increase inter-state cooperation and facilitate mutual gains. This counters the neorealist argument that the anachronistic nature of the international community makes cooperation unlikely. An example of an institution that increases inter-state cooperation would be the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was developed as a way to distribute aid to poor countries. The desired result of this foreign aid is repeated cooperation and interaction between nation states, which leads to mutually beneficial arrangements. However, given that these aid practices have been taking place for over fifty years and relatively little improvement in many African countries has occurred, one must question how effective these mutually beneficial arrangements really are.

A common theme of development assistance through DAC members is providing aid with conditionalities attached, such as adopting neoliberal economic policies or promoting a more transparent government. The result of these recipient countries adopting the conditionalities often benefits the donor's through access to resources, but has clearly not led to significant economic growth domestically.

This has led many to criticise this neoliberal institutionalist form of providing development assistance. According to Howard (2014: 3) nations are motivated to give aid based on economic self-interest. This would offer one explanation as to why aid institutions like the DAC are created and why countries choose to offer assistance to other states. It would also explain the imbalance that is prevalent through this form of assistance. As mentioned previously, despite over fifty years of development assistance from DAC members, many recipient countries remain in very poor conditions and the economic gains appear to have been reaped by those providing the assistance.

The impact of this has been a rise in a different form of development assistance. Alongside the wealthy countries in the global North, providing assistance through institutions like the DAC, there have been a growing number of developing countries in the South, offering development assistance to fellow global South partners, without the conditionalities and with a long-term goal of *mutual* development. This is known as South-South Cooperation (SSC) and can be defined as the mutual sharing and exchange of development solutions between countries in the global South (OECD 2011:2). It is very important to make the distinction here between traditional North-South 'aid' and South-South 'cooperation' as much of the discourse surrounding SSC rejects the terms 'donor' and 'recipient'. Rather than a top-down approach, SSC is more horizontal, with countries mutually benefiting from an exchange that results in development for all parties involved, with little interference in domestic affairs (Zimmermann & Smith 2011: 724-732). That being said, SSC involves a more developed country, in this instance Brazil, helping a less developed country, Mozambique. It's important to mention that while the aim might be horizontal cooperation, there is always going to be one country that benefits more through this interaction and that is what this case study of ProSAVANA will investigate.

While neoliberalism offers a solid framework for understanding inter-state cooperation, other theories have been developed to further explain this rise of

SSC and the growing inequality that comes as a result of traditional North-South development aid. Milner (1992) provides a thorough review of the literature on international cooperation and discusses one hypothesis in particular, the *Power Asymmetries Hypothesis.* This theory suggests imbalances in power, usually in the form of hierarchies, are common in inter-state cooperation. '*These differences in influence allow stronger actors the greater role in organizing the system…with stronger actors obtaining more favourable terms*' (Milner 1992: 480). This would provide a good framework for understanding the political conditionality's generally tied with foreign aid from traditional donors. For example, in 2007, the European Commission introduced the *Governance Incentive Tranche,* which 'topped up' the aid to a recipient country, if it's government was willing to negotiate with the EU to implement democratic reforms (Molenaers, Dellepiane & Faust 2015: 2). This example supports the hypothesis that power imbalances between economically stronger EU countries and the recipient nations, allowed the EU to play a greater role in the foreign aid system and ensure the terms favoured the EU more.

Applying the Power Asymmetries Hypothesis can help us to understand the rise in SSC from a theoretical perspective. The discourse surrounding SSC moves away from the unequal exchange tied with conditionality's, as evident in the example above, and gravitates towards a more balanced engagement with mutual goals. Purushothaman (2014: 3-5) claims the theoretical impetus for SSC came from dependency theorists, who elaborated their ideas in the Latin American context. During the immediate post-Cold War era, when economic growth in some Global South countries began to overtake some Northern countries, for example the economic growth of India and China. These 'emerging donors' began offering assistance at a regional level, referring to themselves as development partners, rather than donors, thus moving away from the colonial connotations associated with the traditional donor-recipient relationship. The underlying principle of SSC is to support each other for a win-win partnership on all sides, which would certainly contrast that of the Power Asymmetries hypothesis. It is within this line of thought that has led to choosing to analyse the effectiveness of SSC between Brazil and Mozambique. By applying the Power

Asymmetries hypothesis and combining it with SSC, one would assume that Brazil, being the stronger nation, would not manipulate the cooperative project ProSAVANA to its own advantage as that would imply SSC is no different to traditional aid projects. By analysing the case study of ProSAVANA it will be possible to see whether this is the case and therefore discuss the effectiveness of SSC as a new model of development assistance.

2. Methodology

In order for this thesis to effectively analyse whether the agricultural successes achieved by Brazil's Embrapa can be replicated in Africa through SSC, this thesis will use a single, in-depth case study analysis as its methodological framework. The case study used will be 'ProSAVANA', a form of Triangular Cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique. This combination of financial aid from Japan combined with expert technical knowledge transfer from Brazil to Mozambique, will allow this paper to adequately asses the effectiveness of this method of SSC. Based on the findings of this case study, this thesis will be able to make claims regarding SSC and its ability to provide a different form of development assistance to its Southern partners based on technical knowledge and the partner countries needs.

According to Yin (1994: 23), a case study is '*an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used'.* For the purpose of this thesis, due to limitations on word length and availability of resources, a single case study method, rather than a large-*N* cross-case method, is the most viable option. There are of course, certain factors that must be addressed, regarding case selection and generalisation of findings, based on a single case.

Given this paper is specifically addressing whether the success of Embrapa can be replicated in Africa through SSC, the case selection began by using Klotz (2009) method of defining the concepts that this paper is researching. 'Agricultural success' is very difficult to conceptualise, therefore this paper will use Embrapa's 'technical cooperation' to incorporate SSC and agricultural projects under Embrapa. This technical cooperation can be defined as '*an instrument of the Brazilian Government to support capacity building activities and technology transfer in developing countries'* (Embrapa 2016). According to Klotz, once this concept is defined, the researcher is left with a *'universe of cases'* that most suitably apply to what it is being studied. Those cases that do not match the

concept the researcher has defined are deemed 'non-cases' and are unsuitable for study. This application will avoid stretching concepts and help generalise the findings later (Klotz 2009: 18). In this instance, the transformation of the Brazilian Cerrado region, its own 'Savannah', which was previously unsuitable for farming, is widely considered a major success and has played an enormous part in Brazil's agricultural development. The Cerrado now produces 70% of Brazil's agricultural output, thus makes for a suitable study when analysing whether it can be successfully replicated in Mozambique as a form of technical cooperation in tropical agriculture (Piaui, *The Economist,* 26/08/2010).

When selecting a particular case study, it is important to address the issue that this individual case will represent a range of cases, despite the fact generalization as a result of one individual case study's findings are often delivered in a tentative fashion (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 294). If this case study supports the hypothesis that SSC can replicate the agricultural success of Brazil in Africa, in this instance if the success of the Brazilian Cerrado can be replicated in Mozambique's Savannah, one could argue that this case represents the possibility to replicate a range of agricultural successes achieved in Brazil, across African states in the future. There have already been several case studies conducted on ProSAVANA and analysis of the discourse surrounding the project, so this paper will use data from these studies, combined with primary source information taken from the ProSAVANA website, which contains original copies of stakeholder meetings, project plans and funding allocations. This thesis shall also analyse the critical discourse surrounding ProSAVANA, put forward by civil society groups and its coverage in the media. Due to some original documents, such as the amended Master Plan (2015) being presented in Portuguese, this thesis does rely on translations from previous studies and interviews with local farmers in Mozambique conducted by other researchers. Having now established the theoretical framework from the debate surrounding SSC and discussed how the case study analysis will be carried out, the next part of this thesis shall provide some context to the ProSAVANA project and discuss Brazil's role as a provider of development assistance.

3. Brazil and its History of South-South Cooperation

Brazil has been providing development assistance for over forty years. Despite this, much of the literature still refers to Brazil as an '*emerging donor*' given that its is not part of the DAC. According to Weinstock & Cabral (2010: 64-66), Brazil provides an estimated $1 billion in development assistance annually; placing it above DAC donors like Finland and Portugal. Weinstock & Cabral also link Brazil's aid strategy with the emergence of trilateral/triangular cooperation, which involves three countries working together: a traditional DAC donor providing financial aid, a pivotal country such as Brazil providing technical assistance and a donor recipient. This trilateral/triangular cooperation will be discussed in more detail later, but one of the major strengths of emerging donors providing development assistance is the ability to offer technical assistance based on their own experiences as a recipient themselves or due to circumstantial similarities between them and the partner country.

According to Schlager (2007), '*Brazil works consistently as an advocate and initiator of South-South cooperation in the interest of the global South…In many sectors Brazil has also built expertise of its own, which can be used by other countries as a guideline for action designed to improve socioeconomic development*' (Schlager 2007: 3). Brazil has assumed this role as a leading advocate of the global South, identifying itself as a link between developed and developing countries, yet has also received criticism for its motives behind this. Stolte (2012: 3-5) analyses Brazil's increasing engagement with Africa, having doubled its diplomatic presence from 17 to 37 embassies and increasing trade from $4.2 billion to $27.6 billion over the past decade, making it is a key driver behind SSC projects in Africa. However, Stolte also claims this is due to Brazil seeking African support for a permanent UN Security Council seat and using its policies in Africa to strengthen its reputation as a major global power. This is interesting, as this paper seeks to investigate the effectiveness of ProSAVANA in benefiting *all* countries involved. The fact that Brazil is claimed to have its own motives behind cooperative projects with Africa, other than simply increasing development could help explain why ProSAVANA has received such criticism,

but this will be discussed in more detail following the case study section. In order to better understand Brazil's cooperation with Africa, we must look at its previous involvement in the continent and how successful its other development projects have been.

3.1 Brazil's Presence in Africa

The Agencia Brasileira de Cooperacao (ABC) was created in 1987, with the primary aim of improving the management and coordination of the Official Development Aid (ODA) received by Brazil. However, in recent years, the ABC has become a development provider in the international development landscape. John de Sousa (2008: 2) comments on Brazil's increased SSC engagement with Africa since 2003 and claims this is largely due to its close historical and cultural ties with the region, as well as sharing similar development challenges with many African countries as a result of similar climate, environmental, linguistic and social conditions. This would support Mawdsley's (2012: 64) claim that emerging donors often provide technical expertise that suits the recipients needs better, due to sharing similar circumstances and having experienced similar challenges.

Unlike China, Brazil's development assistance provided by the ABC does not generally involve hard infrastructure, rather its main focus is on skills development, strengthening institutional capacity and sharing of best practices, primarily in health, agriculture, education and social policies (Alves 2013: 2). These are areas that Brazil has achieved domestic success in reforming and its Southern partners have recognized this. These reforms have provided Brazil with technical expertise that it can export to other countries as part of its development cooperation projects. A good example of this is Brazil's technical cooperation in the health sector. Russo & Shankland (2013: 102) discuss how Brazil made a concerted effort to increase public spending to improve its domestic health policies, providing around 80% of the population with free health care. These movements, such as the 'Movement for Health Reform' (1988), saw a coordinated effort to develop an adequate national health system

and overcome major health issues facing its citizens at the time. Its control of diseases such as cholera and diarrhea and its stabilization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is an example of Brazil successful efforts to improve the living conditions of its own citizens. Having achieved success in meeting its own health targets, Brazil then began to expand this effort to tackle major health issues at the regional and global level, leading to increased technical cooperation with other nations.

3.2 Brazil-Africa Technical Cooperation Projects

Unlike traditional DAC donor aid programs that simply provided aid, Brazil used SSC as a way to transfer technical and scientific knowledge it had gained domestically when tackling health issues like HIV/AIDS, to African nations such as Mozambique, Nigeria & Angola (Lee & Gomez 2011: 64). Using the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (*Fiocruz*), an institution that has been in place in Brazil since 1900 develop technical expertise in public health, Brazil was able to develop 'focal points' to assist other Portuguese speaking nations in the development of health policies. This is in line with the neoliberal institutionalist theory of cooperation, using an institution like *Fiocruz* to facilitate cooperation between Brazil and other African nations. The community of Portuguese speaking nations, *Comunidade de Paises de Lingua* (CPLP) were able to develop agreements on tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and medical visa's based on the success of treatment in these areas already developed in Brazil. This cooperation was not limited to just health however, with education and environmental policies also being made a priority (Almedia *et al.* 2010: 27).

What makes this cooperation between Brazil and Africa distinctive compared to traditional DAC assistance, is its focus on strengthening the partner country's institutional capacity. The receiving countries greatly appreciate Brazil sharing its knowledge based on its own experiences in overcoming the same challenges and have welcomed this technical cooperation, coupled with investment in institutional development, such as capacity building courses in Lusophone nations and in Mozambique, the creation of the Teenage Health Institute and the

development of an antiretroviral drug factory (Chagas 2013). The strengthening of institutional capacity in developing countries is vital to their long-term development and makes them less dependent on aid in the future. Having made great progress in this area of health development, this paper shall now begin to look at how Brazil continued to transfer its knowledge and expertise, within the agricultural sector. However in order to understand the challenges Mozambique faces and its current institutional capacity in areas like agricultural research and development, the next section will provide a brief overview of Mozambique's agricultural sector and domestic efforts to improve it, which led to the decision taken by Brazil to offer a triangular cooperation project to help transform the Nacala Corridor.

3.3 Mozambique's Agricultural Struggles

Agriculture is the backbone of the Mozambican economy. Its population is around 23 million, of which 69% depend on agriculture for their employment and livelihoods (Chilonda *et al.* 2011: 7). In order to tackle poverty reduction and stimulate sustainable economic growth in the country, it is vital the agricultural sector is improved. The Mozambican government has always made agricultural development a priority. In 1998, the government launched the Agricultural Sector Expenditure Program (PROAGRI I), which was designed to improve public expenditure, secure environmentally sustainable growth, reduce poverty and improve food security (World Bank 1990: 2). Although PROAGRI had the right goals in mind, it lacked a clear policy and expenditure framework, as well as insufficient major stakeholders and resources in agriculture. In 2005, PROAGRI II was introduced as an improved version. The impact of PROAGRI II was an increased role of government in the agricultural sector and better communication and cooperation with small-scale farmers (Cabral, Shrivastava & Muendane 2007: 7). That being said, PROAGRI II was criticized for focusing too much on building financial management and planning systems within the Ministry of Agriculture and not providing enough attention to actually ensuring this made a positive impact at the field level. Essentially it had good ideas and goals in theory, but failed to implement these in practice.

In 2007, the lack of tangible results from the PROAGRI projects, combined with the global financial crisis meant food shortages were increasing and decisive action was needed. The Ministry of Agriculture, under President Guebuza, responded to this crisis by launching the Green Revolution Strategy (Ministry of Agriculture 2010: 1). India famously adopted its own Green Revolution strategy in the 1960's when facing similar food shortages and this was largely recognized as a great success in helping it quickly achieve food self-sufficiency (Fujita 2010: 3). The Mozambican Green Revolution set out very similar goals to those of India in the 1960's, with its primary objectives set out to increase growth of small and medium-scale producers and increasing food supply through sustainable measures. These objectives were to be achieved through: improved technologies, utilizing natural resources, formation of human and social capital and development of up-to-date information (Ministry of Agriculture 2010: 8).

As part of its Green Revolution, Mozambique signed the G8 New Alliance for Food Security & Nutrition (NAFSN) in 2012, which aims to increase the private sector's role in achieving the African Union's 'Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program' (CAADP). This program is committed to promoting competitive private sector input markets, reforming land use rights to promote private sector investment, liberalizing agricultural marketing and trade and increasing farmers access to credit (African Centre for Biodiversity 2015: 6-7). Following a UN General Assembly meeting in 2008, the 'African Agricultural Growth Corridor' was proposed as a method of converting millions of hectares of land to industrial agriculture, through the building of infrastructure, led by private companies. *'It refers to the regions of Africa whose agricultural potential has not been realized and whose population remains almost entirely reliant on subsistence agriculture'* (Paul & Steinbrecher 2013: 2). One of the major providers of funding under NAFSN is Japan and under the Nacala Corridor Project, which is part of the African Agricultural Growth Corridor, ProSAVANA was developed as a private investment opportunity. The following chapter will provide a case study analysis of ProSAVANA, discussing the objectives of the

project, along with a discussion on its effectiveness and implications for future agricultural development in Mozambique.

4. Case Study: ProSAVANA

ProSAVANA is a Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah in Mozambique. It was launched in 2009 and the three countries that make up this 'triangle' are Japan, Brazil and Mozambique (Roman-Alcala Okada 2015:8). The way a triangular cooperation program works is fairly straightforward. This relatively recent mode of development cooperation involves a traditional donor from the OECD/DAC club, an emerging 'global South' donor, and a recipient country. The idea behind triangular cooperation is enabling technical cooperation and knowledge transfer, based on the successful cooperation between previous donors and recipients (Ashoff 2010: 22-24).

When Embrapa was created in Brazil in 1973, one of its biggest projects was PROCEDER a project, which saw the transformation of the Brazilian Cerrado. A tropical savanna that was infertile due to its high soil acidity levels and high levels of aluminum. The *Plinio Souza* of the Agricultural Research Centre for the Cerrado (CPAC) was created specifically to address these issues and conduct research and development to overcome these obstacles. CPAC received tremendous financial assistance from Japan during this period and after attempts to grow various different crops and grains in the Cerrado, CPAC created the *DOKO*, which was a tropical soybean capable of growing in the region. Although the soybean can generally grow in unfavorable conditions anyway, this was a major breakthrough and soybean production began to increase very quickly in Brazil. Today, the Brazilian Cerrado is a leading producer of the world's soybeans providing 24.8% of global soybean production (Masuda & Goldsmith 2009: 145).

Today, Mozambique faces similar challenges to Brazil in the 1970's, with low agricultural production and food shortages; Mozambique desperately needs to undergo a major agricultural transformation. The Nacala Corridor is the largest of six agricultural corridors in the country, which shares similar land characteristics to the Brazilian Cerrado and it is this area that will be developed

under the ProSAVANA project, in an attempt to cultivate it in much the same way Brazil did to its Cerrado.

The ProSAVANA project involves three nations, each of which providing their own institutions to oversee the operation. Japan's institution is JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) this is the official Japanese institution behind all of its official development aid and technical cooperation (JICA 2016). Brazil's ABC is its own national equivalent. As discussed earlier, this institution controls aid and technical cooperation to partner countries, as well as the funds it still receives from DAC donor countries. Of course, the other Brazilian institution involved is Embrapa, which has the primary purpose of providing knowledge of tropical savannah agriculture. Finally, Mozambique's institution is the IIAM (Institute of Agrarian Investigation of Mozambique), which is part of the Ministry of Agriculture in Mozambique. These institutions all work together under the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), a decision making body representing the interests of all three countries involved (Chichava *et al.* 2013: 12). Once again, the creation of institutions to foster and maintain cooperation fits nicely within the framework of neoliberal institutionalism.

The ProSAVANA Program is divided into three main components: The first is the *Projecto de Investigacao* (PI) and its primary aim is the improvement of the research capacity of Mozambican institutions. The second component is the *Plano Director* (PD), which involves the formulation of an Agriculture Development Master Plan and finally the *Projecto de Extensao* (PE). This involves the improvement of the rural extension and technical assistance capacity of Mozambican institutions (Campos 2012: 20). This case study shall outline each of these three key components of the project, looking at the objectives, timeline and funding of each component, before moving on to a discussion of their impact and effectiveness.

4.1 Improvement of the Research Capacity of Mozambican Institutions (PI)

The ProSAVANA PI project was designed to run from 2011-2015, however it ended up taking until March 2016. Its objective was to improve Mozambique's domestic research capabilities and this was to be achieved through the creation of two new research laboratories, establishing a database of agricultural information and development of mechanisms to distribute the new information and new technologies to farmers. The funding for the PI component of the project can be broken down as follows: 42.1% came from the Brazilian ABC, 43.8% came from Embrapa and the remaining 14.1% came from the Mozambican government itself (Ekman & Macamo 2014: 8).

A more detailed description of exactly how the strengthening of research capabilities was achieved under the PI project are provided by the Ministry of Agriculture & Food Security of Mozambique (MASA 2016):

- Strengthening the operational capacity of IIAM Northeast & Northwest research centers. This will be achieved through training of IIAM staff at experimental stations in Lichinga and Nampula, modernization of infrastructure and equipment and implementing research programs in the region.
- Development of soil improvement technologies for agricultural use in the Nacala Corridor.
- Appropriate development of cultivation technologies and livestock production of the Nacala Corridor.
- Evaluation of natural resources and the environmental impact resulting from the use of new agricultural technologies and socio-economic conditions in the Nacala Corridor.
- Development of a 'Decision Support Model' designed for farmers to use when selecting an appropriate cropping system.

As we can see, the PI project is split between strengthening local research capacity and passing this technology on to the farmers to use effectively.

4.2 Support of the Agricultural Development Master Plan (PD)

The ProSAVANA PD project was designed to create an agricultural 'Master Plan', which contributes to social and economic development, by engaging private investment to promote sustainable production systems and poverty reduction in the Nacala Corridor (Ikegami 2015: 9). It began in 2012 and has two phases, the first from 2012-2013 was designed to research and develop the Master Plan. The second phase from 2013-2030 is to mobilize public and private capital to finance the implementation of the Master Plan and its associated projects. According to Ekman & Macamo (2014), unlike the PI project that was primarily funded by Brazil, the PD project receives most of its budget from Japan. Mozambique provides $300,000, Brazil provides $800,000 and Japan provides $6,254,000 (Ekman & Macamo 2014: 8). This breakdown of figures also shows us exactly how this triangular cooperation works, with Japan providing the largest funds, Brazil providing a combination of lesser funds along with considerable knowledge and technological experience and Mozambique as the 'recipient' nation.

In 2013, a draft of the Master Plan was leaked. The objectives of this Master Plan were to increase the agricultural productivity of small and medium sized farms and to maximize the impact of this increased productivity on the regional economy by increasing private investment and large-scale commercial agricultural investment (Shankland & Gonçalves 2016: 18). The table below (Table 1) contains the three timeline phases of the Master Plan and the objectives of each phase.

Table 1: Overall Master Plan

	Phase I (2014-20)	Phase II (2021-25)	Phase III (2026-30)
Individual Farmers (Small to Medium-Scale)	Unit yield of major crops increases through transformation of small to medium scale farmers' practice into fixed farming	The unit yield further increases through accelerated improvement in farming technology of small to medium farmers. The farmers also start to diversify their producing crops	Small to medium scale farmers are well-empowered to improve their farming by their self-reliant efforts. Diversification of agriculture has expanded, and some of the farmers specialize in specific crop production
Farmers Organiza-tion	Involvement of small and medium scale farmers in agribusiness starts	Participation of small and medium scale farmers in agribusiness is strengthened by fostering a sound farmers organization	The development of agribusiness makes a considerable progress, and many agricultural clusters are established and in operation
Agribusi-ness	Private investment in agribusiness (production, processing and marketing) starts in consistency with PRAI	Private investment in agribusiness starts the expansion, and the development of agricultural cluster starts	

Source: *ProSavana-PD, Master Plan: Support Agriculture Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor Mozambique,* Report No. 2, March 2013, p. 12.

As the table shows, the Master Plan is divided between small/medium-scale farmers, farming organizations and agribusiness. As these farmers begin increasing their agricultural productivity as a result of the PI project (increased research and development), they begin to become more involved with private investors, along with the support of farming organizations and this leads to significant growth in agribusiness. This creates 'agricultural clusters' across the 19 regions involved in ProSAVANA. These are an important part of the Master Plan and will lead to accelerated development within a specific area. The benefit of creating these *clusters* is that all producers, companies and institutions are involved within the same 'central value chain', which is essentially the input suppliers, machinery suppliers and specialized infrastructure suppliers. This is combined with the same marketing channels, governmental institutions, R&D institutions and training centers. The impact of these clusters is to improve the development and growth of the agricultural sector, as each cluster produces crops suitable to that particular region, thus productivity is more efficient (ProSAVANA PD: Master Plan 2013: 12-14).

This Master Plan received a great deal of criticism when it was leaked in March 2013, as it confirmed many peoples fears that ProSAVANA was laying the foundations for an enormous 'land grab' by private investors within the Nacala Corridor. The main contention many had with this Master Plan was that it was supposed to support small farmers, but the plan was pushing farmers out of traditional shifting cultivation practices and forcing them into intensive cultivation practices using commercial seeds, chemical inputs and privatized land. It was also appeared to force farmers into contract farming arrangements with corporate farms, which many critics described as a '*paradise for corporations*' (Ambiental *et al.* 2013). This is certainly not the typical SSC approach to development assistance.

This 'leaked plan' led to protests, civil society campaigns and even a call to stop the program until further consultation with small-scale farmers had been established. In response to the widespread criticism of ProSAVANA following the leaked Master Draft in 2013, the Japanese Cooperation Agency JICA worked with Embrapa, ABC and the government of Mozambique to develop a Civil Society Dialogue Platform represented under MAJOL (*Consultoria & Servicos*). This would allow a major discussion on any misinterpretations or major concerns of the agribusiness model of ProSAVANA. A stakeholder engagement plan was organized, providing an opportunity for those behind the project to calm the storm and discuss the concerns of local farmers (MAJOL Stakeholder Engagement 2016: 1). The major issues that were addressed were concerns of mass land grabbing by large investors and the displacement of small/medium-scale farmers. The Mozambican government reassured those opposed to ProSAVANA that the mission objective was not to exploit land opportunities, but to benefit those small farmers through the transfer of technology, leading to increased production and growth, which was the initial plan for the project. However, this did little to ease concerns and the project was temporarily halted while these issues were addressed.

In April 2015, a revised 'Draft Zero' Master Plan was made public. This document was released in Portuguese only, however according to Shankland & Gonçalves

(2016: 137), this Master Plan was very different from the 2013 version discussed above, having undergone 'many metamorphoses'. These changes involved moving away from the heavily focused private investment in large-scale agriculture and ensuring protection for assets and land rights of small-scale farms in the Nacala Corridor. This was to be achieved through maintaining an open dialogue between investors and small-scale farmers when making decisions on any plans or contracts (Tawa, Anameishi & Noguchi 2014: 9).

Clements (2015) provides a good comparison between the 2013 Master Plan and the 2015, Draft Zero version. '*In an attempt to distance ProSAVANA from the strong agribusiness orientation embodied in the first draft of the Master Plan, Draft Zero clarifies that ProSAVANA is not specific to an agribusiness model, but rather seeks to support farmers at all scales of production- small, medium and large*' (Clements 2015: 159). The issue of contention is that this vast territory of the Nacala Corridor is not readily available to cultivation, as it is in fact used by small-scale farmers who do not want to be pushed out of their land or have new practices forced upon them.

While the 2015 Master Plan acknowledges these concerns, it does discuss the need to change the current farming practices used by small-scale farmers. '*Producers in the region are at a crucial point and need to change the practice of family farming in order to survive…it is necessary to realize that there will not be vast areas available for agriculture if the current predominant extensive cultivation continues to be practiced*' (Clements 2015: 160). Essentially the 2015 Master Plan confirms that private investment will be a primary tool for increasing agricultural growth in the Corridor, but the government will take steps to avoid the feared 'land grabbing' by enforcing strict Land Law's between private investors and communities and/or individuals. To recap, this revised Master Plan has taken into account the fears over large-scale private investment and commercialization of agricultural production, yet reinforces the need to introduce it in a controlled and measured way. This is vital to achieving the goals of ProSAVANA-PD. Given that this Draft Zero Master Plan is still relatively new,

there are of course many who are still opposed to the project and have grave concerns over the impact on small-scale farmers.

4.3 Project for Establishment of Development Model at Communities Level with Improvement of Rural Extension Service (PE)

The final component of ProSAVANA (PE) has the objective of ensuring agricultural production and the adoption of agricultural development models in the target areas. This began in May 2013 and is expected to continue until May 2019. According to MASA (2015) the PE project will (ProSAVANA PEM 2016):

- Carry out agricultural surveys
- Define Development Models to be implemented
- Select target groups, areas and partners for 'reference projects'
- Implement, monitor and evaluate those reference projects
- Conduct training for agricultural producers and extensionists
- Compile public policy recommendations for the improvement of the extension services for sustainable rural development.

The main agencies involved in PE are the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture, JICA, Brazil's Association of Technical Assistance & Rural Extension (ASBRAER) and Brazil's Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) (Chichava & Duran 2016: 14). There is not a great deal of information on the PE project at this stage as its formulation is to be based on outputs from PI and PD (Ekman & Macamo 2014: 9-10).

4.4 Outcome & Implications of ProSAVANA

Having looked at the aims and objectives of the project, this paper shall now investigate the impact of ProSAVANA to date. Given that the major criticisms regarding PROAGRI were its inability to transfer its aims into tangible results, has ProSAVANA achieved what it set out to? It is important to note that the project is of course still in the early stages and the PD component will not be

complete until 2030. This will limit the extent to which one can comment on its effectiveness, but it is possible to review the existing literature on whether it looks likely to be hailed as successful as the Brazilian Cerrado transformation, or rather a great failure. What is most important to this thesis is whether this project represents great progress for SSC and development assistance, or whether it is evidence of a new form of exploitation by stronger countries such as Japan and Brazil, over weaker countries like Mozambique. Essentially, does SSC really look to achieve shared goals based on mutual respect or is it simply a new 'scramble for Africa'?

According to Shankland & Gonçalves (2016), the optimism that was evident at the start of the project has all but vanished. Given how much controversy the project has raised following the leaked Master Plan of 2013, development agencies are *'wary of even discussing the program as the political costs of promoting it rises'* (Shankland & Gonçalves 2016: 18). In order to understand why ProSAVANA has not achieved the great success status intended, Classen (2013) looks at the transformation of the Brazilian Cerrado, upon which ProSavana was based (PROCEDER).

Prior to cultivation, the Brazilian Cerrado was described as '*barren and not inhabited land'*, yet this simply wasn't accurate. The project damaged large amounts of forestlands and was rich in diversity due to its sparse population (Classen 2013: 27). The Brazilian Cerrado transformation was deemed a 'big success' by JICA and many others involved in the project, yet there was little consideration for environmental issues or the impact on the rights of the indigenous peoples. Ikegami (2015) claims this same approach was used for the ProSAVANA project in Mozambique. The discourse surrounding the transformation of the Nacala Corridor frequently discusses the '*vast unused or underused lands'*. However, small-scale farmers in Mozambique have been using these lands for more than just agricultural production, but as graveyards and symbolic ceremonial sites, as places to collect water, firewood and medicine (Ikegami 2015: 12). ProSAVANA largely ignores the views of these indigenous small-scale farmers and instead serves to generate large profits for multinational

corporations. This is not in keeping with the SSC discourse and its philosophy of providing sustainable, 'needs-based' assistance.

Another major criticism of ProSAVANA is the projects lack of transparency and poor communication of its goals and more importantly, its methods of achieving them. As discussed above, ProSAVANA was based on the project in Brazil, PROCEDER. This has led many to look at the criticisms surrounding that project, particularly in regards to displacement of indigenous people and deforestation and apply those same concerns. There have been two Master Plan's released for ProSAVANA, as discussed in the case study, the 2013 version outlined large scale private investment and focus on developing agribusiness as its methods for achieving the project goals. When this received widespread criticism, the revised Master Plan tried to disassociate itself with sweeping commercialization, but insisted that some new commercial practices must be adopted in order to achieve success.

The agricultural NGO Grain claims the lack of transparency, and public consultation on the project has naturally led to a hostile reception from local farmers. '*While agribusiness corporations have been part of government delegations to investigate business opportunities in the Nacala Corridor, the 4 million farmers living in the affected area have received no information about the intentions shown in the Master Plan. Three governments have refused to make this version, or earlier versions of the Master Plan available to the public*' (Ambiental 2016). The fact that ProSAVANA failed to release a clear, concise Master Plan outlining the guidelines of the project, based on research and consultation with current farmers would help explain the protests by civil society and the fears of land grabbing and economic exploitation that have underlined the project so far.

Conclusion

Based on the evidence provided in this paper, ProSAVANA has been largely ineffective in replicating the success of Brazil's agricultural transformation in Africa. The case study provided in this thesis has shown that the major obstacles for ProSAVANA have been resistance from civil society groups in Mozambique, who see the project as damaging to their future, rather than beneficial. This in turn, has led to a decline in willing investors and decreased the projects momentum. The case of ProSAVANA makes for an interesting study when analysing SSC, particularly when championed by Brazil. In the past Brazil has used its solidarity with its Global South partners, as an effective foreign policy tool. It aligns itself with 'solidarity diplomacy' and its cooperation is presented as non-profit and unlinked to commercial interests (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013: 7). However, ProSAVANA's predominant focus on private investment and commercialisation of agricultural production would suggest otherwise.

Earlier this paper defined SSC as *'the exchange of knowledge, skills, expertise and resources between two or more countries of the Global South, aimed at their common development through concerted efforts'* (UNOSSC). Based on the outcome of the case study presented, one must ask to what extent does ProSAVANA offer 'common development' rather than large profits for private investors, many of which are from Brazil. When analysing the 'common development' aspect of ProSAVANA, Wise (2015) points to the democratic government in place in Mozambique that is *'rooted in peasant farmers struggles for land rights'* and draws a comparison with the military dictatorship in Brazil at the time of the Brazilian Cerrado transformation in the 1980's. This transformation is often dubbed a 'great success' but as the last chapter discussed, many indigenous farmers lost their land and it had quite damaging effects on the environment. Had ProSAVANA been able to go ahead without any protest and civil unrest, it may well have replicated the land transformation of the Brazilian Cerrado, but at what cost? Could the displacement of indigenous famers following the cheap purchase of land from private investors actually be deemed a 'success'? The fact that ProSAVANA received such criticism and has failed to

attract major investors as a result further highlights the exploitative nature of this project, rather than a strategy for 'common development'. Analysis of the discourse surrounding ProSAVANA highlights the Mozambican media approach to the project as a form of Brazilian 'neo-colonialism' (Chichava & Duran 2016: 18-20) and a statement from the 2012 National Peasants Union (UNAC) states: *'ProSAVANA is a result of top-down policy, which does not take into consideration the demands, dreams and basic concerns of peasants, particularly those within the Nacala Corridor'* (UNAC ProSAVANA 2012). This would further support the argument that ProSAVANA as a project does not appear to be in line with the principles of SSC, particularly that of achieving 'common development'. This is largely due to a large role of private investors combined with a lack of transparency, leaving Mozambican farmers anxious as to how this will affect them in the future.

Finally, with academics such as Carmody (2013) discussing the 'New Scramble for Africa' that is taking pace among emerging donors, it is vital SSC projects in the future avoid making the same mistakes as ProSAVANA. Brazil has chosen to portray itself as a leader of SSC and development assistance based on mutual respect and shared goals, yet ProSAVANA does not appear to reflect that, despite good intentions. There is already growing academic debate surrounding China's role in Africa, with many discussing whether it really is a key promoter of SSC or simply exploiting its natural resources (Ayodele & Sotola 2014: Dollar *et al.* 2015: Pigato 2015).

In order for SSC to continue to be effective, there must be greater transparency in projects, especially when dealing with such sensitive issues, such as land reforms in countries like Mozambique. There have been calls for the Brazilian government to accept greater responsibility in ensuring SSC projects are based on shared goals of development and mutual respect of fellow developing countries. Projects like ProSAVANA that have attracted a great deal of negative attention draw speculation to the rising power status of Brazil and suggest Brazil is using SSC as a foreign policy tool at the *expense* of African nations, rather than as a *partner* of African nations (Mbaye 2011: Esposito & Tse 2015). This issue

must be addressed immediately and greater efforts must be taken to prevent similar claims in future SSC projects. As discussed earlier in this paper, previously successful projects between Brazil and African nations in areas such as health and education have seen Brazil transfer its technical expertise effectively and help African nations tackle major health issues while strengthening their institutional capabilities to enable these developing countries to be less dependent on foreign assistance. This paper does recognise the benefits of SSC and the success it has achieved. However, taking World Systems Theory into account, it is vital Brazil and other 'semi-periphery' countries that promote SSC, are not seen to be extracting wealth and resources from developing countries such as African nations and damaging the image of SSC in the long-term. ProSAVANA has been largely unsuccessful in replicating the success achieved in Brazil and has attracted considerable criticism due to its lack of transparency combined with its focus on private sector investment. Brazil must learn from this and ensure future SSC projects are transparent, open for discussion and clearly promote the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and shared development goals between all nations involved.

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