The Defence Strategy of the Brazilian Navy:

Hard, Soft or Smart Power?

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Abbreviations and Translations

BRIC(S)		Economic Association of Brazil, Russia, India, China (and South Africa)
CSIS		Commission on Smart Power of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
DSN	*Doutrina de Segurança Nacional*	National Security Doctrine
EEZ		Exclusive Economic Zone
EGN	*Escola da Guerra Naval*	School of Naval Warfare
END	*Estratégia Nacional da Defesa*	National Defence Strategy
ESG	*Escola Superior de Guerra*	National War College
NATO		North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PT	*Partido dos Trabalhadores*	Workers' Party
R2P		Responsibility to Protect
RwP		Responsibility while Protecting
UN		United Nations

Introduction

The recent rise of Brazil as an emerging power brings a worldwide attention to its current decisions and actions on the international stage. Brazil is a peaceful country by tradition. It lives in peace with its ten neighbours and runs its international affairs adopting the constitutional principles of non-intervention, defence of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This pacifist trait is part of Brazil's national identity and as it is rising to the first stage in the world, the country is neither promoting hegemony nor domination. In the past decade, Brazil's international actions have become more assertive instead of reactive. Its aim for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council has become more important than ever in the preceding decades. In spite of its ambitious approaches to global politics and participation in international organizations, Brazil is not known for its military capacity. Brazil wants to grow without dominating others, which is the reason why Brazil has never before conducted a wide discussion about its own defence affairs throughout its history. However, if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself: not only from aggressions but equally from possible threats.

On March 27th, 2014, Brazilian Minister of Defence Celso Amorim[1] was questioned during a public hearing of the Brazilian Senate. In his opening speech Amorim emphasized the importance of Brazil's Armed Forces, now that its role on the world stage is becoming bigger. He stated that the Armed Forces must be parallel to Brazil's status as a world power and that they should be able to repel a potential attack or form of aggression in today's complex world. This is fundamental for Brazil's interests within an international context. To get the Armed Forces at this level, Amorim emphasized the importance of investment, especially in Brazil's Navy.

What is the reason of Brazil's focus on defence in general and the Navy in particular and its changed attitude towards national defence? Is it purely out of economic interests, because of the large oil and gas reserves that were recently discovered in Brazil's territorial waters, or does Brazil have the intensions to display its military capabilities – although it has no enemies – to compete with other emerging powers on the world stage? Brazil's National Defence Strategy from 2008 (which was adapted in 2013) will be researched to answer this question, and to see

[1] Speech by Celso Amorim, Brazilian Minister of Defence, during a public hearing in the Commission of International Relations and Defence of the Brazilian Senate, Brasília, 27 March 2014.

whether its current defence policies can be classified as the traditional soft power Brazil has practiced for decades, as a new strategy of hard power to fit with their new status on the world stage, or as smart power, a term coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his 2011 book *The Future of Power*. The focus will lay on Brazil's naval power, which is, as Minister Celso Amorim stated in the public hearing as well, currently the most important compartment of the Armed Forces.

The first chapter analyses the concepts of hard, soft and smart power, as they were introduced by Joseph Nye and studied by other scholars. These concepts are important to present and comprehend when studying Brazil's defence issues, as they are an academic approach to the policymaking process, and form a base on which conclusions about Brazil's changed position in security matters can be drawn. The second chapter will focus on Brazil's history and traditions in the defence and security area as well as the context in which the National Defence Strategy of 2008 was written. The third chapter will present the National Defence Strategy, its concepts, and analyse the views of several scholars from the *Escola da Guerra Naval* in Rio de Janeiro on Brazil's current decisions and actions in the defence area, especially regarding its investments in the Navy. Finally a conclusion will be drawn to give an answer to the question why Brazil has changed its attitude towards national defence and shifted its focus to the Navy.

1. Hard, Soft and Smart Power

Since the end of the Cold War, International Relations scholars have been eager to redefine the concept of power – the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes. The initial division was that of "soft" power versus "hard" power, where soft power referred to diplomacy and cultural influences whereas hard power as relating to coercive power, both military and economic. Joseph Nye analyses the changing nature of power in the twenty-first century in his book *The Future of Power* (2011) and by then distinguishes three kinds of power: soft, hard and "smart" power. Nye demonstrates the different forms of power on a spectrum, with hard power on one end and soft power on the other end (Nye 2011: 21). He then defines smart power as 'the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies' (*Ibidem*: 22-23).

The ideas of hard and soft power have developed from academic concepts to everyday usage and have been used by leaders from China to Europe and from Brazil to Russia. Soft power appears to be an alternative to the hard power politics that have mainly been used by the United States, and is often embraced by idealistic scholars and policymakers. But soft power can be used for both good and bad purposes and is a descriptive rather than a normative concept (*Ibidem*: 81). Albeit this descriptive origin of soft power, its distinction from hard power does make a difference in global politics nowadays: 'China, a rising power in economic and military resources, has deliberately decided to invest in soft power resources so as to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbours' (*Ibidem*: 23). This example shows that the idea of soft power strategies is attractive to emerging powers, like Brazil and the other BRICS countries, because it gives and makes them an alternative to the United States at the same time. One could argue that for the rising world powers it is important to have the distinction between hard and soft power, as it gives them a clearer idea and understanding of their foreign policies compared to the United States.

In this chapter, the emergence and definitions of the three different kinds of power according to Joseph Nye will be explained more thoroughly to give a clear understanding of the different views from him and other International Relations scholars on the concepts.

Hard power:

In the field of International Relations, the concept of power has mostly been associated with the domain of Realism[2]. For ages, realist thinkers have argued that power is the crucial factor in relations among states. The definition of power used by realist scholars primarily included what would now be defined as hard power. Soft power was not studied as a serious form of power until the last decades of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the term hard power only arose when Joseph Nye coined the term soft power in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990) as a new and different form of power. Edward Wilson defines hard power as the capacity to coerce others to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Hard power sources are military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions: all strategies to enforce a nation's interests (Wilson 2008: 114).

One can affect others' behaviour through hard power in two ways: threats of coercion, also known as "sticks", and inducements and payments, the so-called "carrots" (Nye 2008a: 94). Military power, a threat of coercion, is the most obvious and conventionally known source of hard power. Military sources that underlie the hard power behaviour of fighting and threatening to fight, and thus matter when it comes to a conflict are soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, and so forth. These sources provide the ability to dominate in wars and are traditionally portrayed as the most important form of power in world politics. But according to Joseph Nye there is more to military power than fighting or threatening to fight, as its sources can be used to protect and assist a nation's allies, and can thus create soft power (Nye 2011: 25). Nowadays, many states find it more costly to use military force to achieve their goals than before and Nye argues that 'the utility of military force is declining in the twenty-first century' (*Ibidem*: 29). Even though force remains a precarious instrument in international politics, changes in its costs and effectiveness make today's military power more complicated than in the past. Colin Gray argues that hard military threat and use are more difficult to deploy on the current world stage, 'in part because of the relatively recent growth in popular respect for universal humanitarian values' (Gray 2011: vii). 'However,' he says, 'this greater difficulty does not mean that military

[2] Realism has been the dominant theory in International Relations studies over the last hundred years. Realists see the world as it "really" is rather than how we would like it to be. International politics are driven by an endless struggle for power, and anarchy leads to a logic in which states maximize their security. Important Realist thinkers of the past were Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli.

force has lost its distinctive ability to secure some political decisions' (*Ibidem*). Military force is and will long remain an essential instrument of policy. Gray observes that military force may not always be the right tool to employ and that there is no guarantee that it will have the desired effects, but 'there are conflicts that cannot be resolved politically, sufficiently alleviated by diplomacy or any other non-military means, or settled by some tolerable compromise' (*Ibidem*: 47). According to Nye, the use of force is taking on new forms: the lines between the military front and civilian rear are blurred and 'the focus lays on the enemy's society and political will to fight' (Nye 2011: 32). 'The quality of justification required for the use of force has risen, which means that the policy domains for military relevance has diminished, but has by no means disappeared' (Gray 2011: vii).

The use of economic power on the other hand is a "carrot-like" manner in which one can affect a nation's behaviour, yet it is harder to define as a source of power. Though it is referred to as hard power by Joseph Nye, compared to academic research on military power, other scholars rarely address economic power as a source of hard power. Nye argues that economic sources can produce both hard and soft power behaviour: 'a successful economic model not only produces the latent military resources for the exercise of hard power, but it can also attract others to emulate its example' (Nye 2011: 52). Aid programmes are an example of this complex definition: even when it is designated for development and humanitarian purposes only, and would thus generate soft power, it can still be used to create hard economic power, by building up the economic and administrative capabilities of an allied nation (*Ibidem*: 77). As fighting is often considered the heart of military power, sanctions – measures of encouragement or punishment designed to reinforce a decision or make a policy authoritative – are the most visible instrument of economic power (*Ibidem*: 71). As a conclusion Joseph Nye states: 'a robust and growing economy provides the basis for all instruments of power. In addition, economic tools like sanctions and aid will be crucial in this century because they are often the most efficient instruments in terms of relative costs' (*Ibidem*: 80).

Soft power:

The concept of soft power was first developed by Joseph Nye in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. Since then, the term has entered the public discourse, being used by political leaders as well as academics around the

world. In this book, Nye argued that soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power: 'if a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes' (Nye 1990: 32). Soft power thus contributes to a nation's positive image in world affairs. This positive image of a nation can be the result of different sources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies (Nye 2011: 84). A positive image generates respect and admiration, which in turn make soft power nations more attractive in the eyes of other nations. This attraction can be so powerful that other nations may even pursue the policies and actions of soft power nations, either domestic or foreign (Gallarotti 2011: 9). The success of a nation's soft power efforts thus depends on its ability to attract and create credibility and trust (Nye 2011: 91).

Since the end of the Cold War and Nye's *Bound to Lead*, world politics have undergone changes, which have increased the importance of soft power compared to hard power. In this transformed international system, soft power is a crucial element in exercising influence over international outcomes, because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors through the principles of hard power, such as threats and force. According to Giulio Gallarotti, 'the world stage has become […] more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the soft opportunities and constraints imposed by this new global environment' (Gallarotti 2011: 5). Gray argues on the other hand that, theoretically speaking, soft power can potentially be a dangerous idea, because of the poor conclusions that can be drawn from it by reckless observers: 'such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied in practice by those unwary observers' (Gray 2011: 29). Believes about soft power can thus have unfounded negative implications for a country's stance towards military and economic hard power: 'soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration' and 'the seeming validity and attractiveness of soft power [can] lead to easy exaggeration of its potency' (*Ibidem*: 30).

Moreover, it has become common to equalize the concept of soft power with the influence resulting from attractive cultural values created in the media, but both Joseph Nye and Giulio Gallarotti claim that soft power is much more than that. According to Gallarotti, 'soft power can be systematically categorized as deriving from two general sources: international sources (foreign policies and actions) and domestic sources (domestic policies and actions), with multiple sub-sources within

each' (Gallarotti 2011: 20). All of these sources ultimately contribute to a positive image that attracts nations with soft power to other nations, which in turn increases the influence of these soft power nations in world politics. International sources include a nation's respect for international law, norms and institutions. This would demonstrate dependability, sensitivity, legitimacy, and disposition against violence and the commitment is the principal source of international soft power (*Ibidem*). Domestic sources of soft power can be created through culture – by social cohesion, an elevated quality of life, freedom, abundant opportunities for individuals and tolerance – and through political institutions, which have to be founded on strong principles of democracy. Both domestic and international sources of soft power show an emphasis on principles of political liberalism (*Ibidem*: 21).

Public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilize these sources to attract other countries, preferably their citizens rather then merely their governments: 'public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth. But if the content of a country's culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that "broadcasts" them cannot produce soft power. It may produce just the opposite' (Nye 2008a: 95). According to Joseph Nye, culture, values and policies are not the only sources of soft power. As stated earlier, economic resources can produce, besides hard power, soft power as well, as they can be used to attract as well as coerce. In some cases it can be difficult to distinguish which part of an economic relationship is composed of hard power and which is made up of soft power (Nye 2011: 85). Public diplomacy has become a central element of diplomatic practice. The basic distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy states that the former is about relationships between the representatives of states and other international actors, whereas public diplomacy targets the general public of a foreign country (Melissen 2005: 4).

Soft power sources may appear less hazardous than hard power sources like economic or military power, but can often be 'hard to use, easy to lose and costly to re-establish […] as incorporating soft power into government strategy is more difficult than may first appear' (Nye 2011: 83). It often takes a long time for results to be seen; governments do not always have full control over their instruments of soft power; and the target controls success in terms of outcomes more than is the case with hard power (*Ibidem*). The latter makes Janice Bially Mattern argue that soft power is

not as soft as it pretends to be, 'for actors who aim to deploy soft power, success will ultimately depend on knowing how exactly to make their ideas and themselves attractive to a target population' (Mattern 2007: 98). She criticizes Nye's formulation that 'the distinction between hard and soft expressions of power turns on whether power is enacted through attraction or coercion' (*Ibidem*: 116). Mattern claims on the other hand that 'since representational force is a form of coercion, attraction may rest upon coercion' (*Ibidem*). The distinction Nye made between hard and soft power thus evaporates, according to Mattern, and the analysis and expectations of the term soft power are in need of reassessment. Nevertheless, 'political commentators and diplomats in many countries have become gripped by the notion of soft power and ministries of foreign affairs wonder how to wield it most effectively' (Melissen 2005: 2).

Recent emphasis on soft power:

The principal difference between soft and hard power can be explained in the following way: 'hard power extracts compliance principally through reliance on tangible power resources – more direct and often coercive methods […], soft power cultivates it through a variety of policies, qualities, and actions that endear nations to other nations – more indirect and non-coercive methods' (Gallarotti 2011: 10). Because hard power nations compel other nations to do what they would normally not do, and soft power, on the other hand, makes target nations to voluntarily do what the soft power nations would like them to do, there is less conflict of interests in the processes of soft power nations (*Ibidem*: 11). In this sense, hard power carries several disadvantages for the image of a nation if it is used in an aggressive-unilateralist style like invasion, imperialism, economic sanctions, and threats, especially in the new age of global interdependence (*Ibidem*: 25). In addition to that, soft power is much cheaper than the hard power of military force (Gray 2011: iii). Hence the recent changes in world politics and International Relations studies, in which the focus shifted from hard to soft power policies. But the question remains if this cheaper soft power has the same impact as hard power does. According to Gallarotti, 'the diminishing utility of hard power is […] the result of a specific political, social and economic context created by modernization: that context is interdependence' (Gallarotti: 33). Likewise, in the field of International Relations, other paradigms such

as Constructivism[3] and Neorealism[4] have arisen and studied the notion of power, challenging the scholarly monopoly of Realism and introducing alternative visions of power that are more oriented around soft rather than hard power (*Ibidem*: 32). The utility of soft power has thus augmented as a result of a transformation in international politics, as well as a transformation in academic paradigms. In contrast, Gray argues that, at this moment, there are no compelling reasons to believe that the "hard times" of the past have definitely ended, and that the proposition that military force has lost much of its utility should thus be taken into careful consideration (Gray 2011: 22). Accordingly, the use hard power is very much in favour in current international politics. Gallarotti states that much of the recent emphasis on soft power is a reaction to the long tradition of neglecting the benefits of soft power and the over-reliance on hard power in decision-making, but he argues that it would be as disruptive to a nation's influence to become over-relying on soft power (Gallarotti: 43).

Smart power:

Regardless of how positively it has been received in the past two decades, in many global politics scenarios the use of only soft power is not enough. Although the difference between hard and soft power lies in the distinction between attracting compliance with tangible sources and fostering voluntary compliance through positive images, the relationship between soft and hard power is not simple, but rather it is complex and interactive. 'The two are neither perfect substitutes nor are they rigid complements', according to Gallarotti: 'often, they can actually reinforce one another' (Gallarotti 2011: 24). 'Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other' (Nye 2008b: 41). Gallarotti claims that each set of power sources frequently requires one or more components of the other to be more effective: 'Hence soft power resources can enhance hard power, and vice versa' (Gallarotti 2011: 24).

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[3] Constructivism became one of the leading schools in International Relations studies in the past decades. The main idea is that the international structure is defined and shaped by the identities, interests and foreign policies of states and non-state actors. Constructivists have a strong interest in global change.

[4] Neorealism is one of the most influential contemporary approaches in International Relation studies and holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by anarchy, but that every state is formally equal in this system. States seek their own interest and will not subordinate this to the interests of other states.

In 2007, Nye was one of the leaders of the Commission on Smart Power of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS 2007) and made the term smart power – 'the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy' (Nye 2008b: 43) – widely known to the public. Smart power in de twenty-first century is not about nations preserving hegemony or maximizing their power. Nye argues that it is about finding ways to combine resources in the new world order of emerging powers (Nye 2011: 208). In other words: 'the combination of the hard power coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction' (Nye 2011: xiii).

Nye introduced the term "smart power" in his 2004 book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, but the concept has much earlier roots in international politics. Former United States President Theodore Roosevelt's statement "Speak softly and carry a big stick – you will go far" [5] in 1901 is perhaps the most commonly known example of smart power in the twentieth century (Coutu 2008: 56). It can be argued that the term was coined by Suzanne Nossel in her 2004 article in *Foreign Affairs*, although her definition focuses primarily on the United States: 'smart power means knowing that the United States' own hand is not always its best tool: U.S. interests are furthered by enlisting others on behalf of U.S. goals, through alliances, international institutions, careful diplomacy, and the power of ideals' (Nossel 2004: 138). On the contrary, Nye argues in his 2011 book *The Future of Power* that although some analysts think the term only refers to the United States, it is by no means limited to the only superpower in the world. According to Nye, 'small states are often adept at smart power strategies' and 'historically, rising states have used smart power strategies to good avail' (Nye 2011: 209-210).

Paul Cammack criticizes Nye's "invention" of the term smart power. He argues that it is a reformulation of soft power – "smart" being easier to sell to the public and policy-makers than "soft" – and that his arguments have remained the same for two decades and are thus no different for smart power than the ones he used for his term soft power (Cammack 2008: 5). If we look at Cammack's argument that the notion of smart power would in general be the same as the well-known concept of soft power, Gray would argue – although he does not mention the term in his report - that smart power will not be an efficient policy in the 21st century, as we should not

[5] This phrase was used by Roosevelt in his speech at the Minnesota State Fair on September 2, 1901 (available at: http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches/678.pdf), and became known as his style of foreign policy.

simply assume that military power is no longer of great importance. Nevertheless, Cammack's observation that Nye's smart power does not differ from soft power may be well-grounded and Nye indeed "reinvented" soft power, but it can be argued that Nye's intention with both soft and smart power would then be that soft power is a suitable complement to hard power in current international politics, and not a substitution. With smart power, Nye does not neglect or downgrade the role of military power, but advocates to combine it with soft power.

Accordingly, Ernest Wilson, insists on the positive use of smart power, as 'smart strategies must […] take into account the shifting influence among traditional states, with the rise of India, China, Brazil, and other actors on the world stage, since the old cold war dichotomies have collapsed. Their new power imposes new constraints on the unilateral actions of the more established G-8 nations, [and] designing foreign policies cognizant of new technological capacities and new actors requires greater sophistication than in the past' (Wilson 2008: 113). His argument in favour of smart power is perhaps the most important motive for emerging powers to start introducing smart power in their policies when it comes to global affairs.

2. The Context of Brazil's National Defence Strategy

In order to get a clear understanding of Brazil's position in current security issues and policies, it is necessary to look into the country's national defence policies in the past. This chapter will analyse and describe Brazil's history in security issues, defining its main points of view and principles, such as non-intervention and multipolarity, which have formed Brazil's position in the current world order and are part of its national identity. Throughout the twentieth century up to the years preceding the 2008 National Defence Strategy, Brazilian security policies have undergone major changes that have influenced the status quo. Corresponding to these developments, the difficult relationship between the military and politicians has seen a shift in the past decade. An analysis of Brazil's international security issues and strategies is not complete without a careful observation of its foreign policies, whereas they are subject to one another. In addition to that, Brazil's substantial participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations will be examined, as it has been one of the most important aspects of Brazilian defence strategy of the past decades. But first of all, it is essential to look back at the beginning of the past century to get an insight into Brazil's current security policies.

Escola Superior de Guerra

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Brazil was divided over the question to either give priority to a superior navy – which was very urgent – or to obligatory military service – to form a modern army –, but by the 1920's it became clear that Brazil lacked fundamental infrastructure in both industrial and human resources to pursue either one of them. An all-inclusive concept of national security became the common ground for what had been up to that time a divided debate for prioritizing either the army or navy. The 1937 Constitution established a National Security Council to overlook all matters of defence: raw materials, personnel, weapons procurement and production, military deployment, training and employment, as well as Brazil's political and commercial diplomatic priorities (Proença and Diniz 2008: 6).

By the end of World War II it became apparent that it was necessary to start from scratch in the field of Brazilian security. The *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG)

was created in 1949 as a result of these required development needs and security balance (Proença and Diniz 2008: 6-7). Founded by officers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, which fought with the Allies in Italy in World War II, the war college strongly identified with democracy, support of capitalism, a moderate variety of nationalism, and cooperation with the United States for Brazilian defence and development (Selcher 1977: 10-11). 'Rarely if ever has one educational institution […] had so profound an impact upon the course of a nation's development', says Ronald Schneider (Schneider 1971: 244). The Brazilian founders viewed the military as a source of informed nationalism and a legitimate participant in political processes. One of the main purposes of the ESG was to serve as a "school for statesmen," to educate national leaders, civilian and military, in technocratic management techniques and a philosophy which would unify the national elite and rationalize the decision-making process' (Selcher 1977: 11). ESG's first class, graduating in 1950, was thus made up of politicians, scholars, senior civil servants, diplomats and military officers and formulated a common language for thinking about Brazilian national security. This attempt at a common Brazilian national security language became the *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional* (DSN) (Proença and Diniz 2008: 7).

According to the doctrine, the recipe for national power is proper harmonization of priorities and the balance of their mutual influences, providing both security and development. Development is defined as the increase of national power, security as the ability to make use of national power without facing any obstacles. National power is the collection of all means available for mobilization, in order to achieve domestic or external objectives. The notion of power in the doctrine would be composed of five independent expressions: 'the political, economic, military, psychosocial and […] the scientific-technological (*Ibidem*). During the military regime, the doctrine's strategic and methodological formulations were so widely accepted that they were the dominant vocabulary and frame of reference in security matters (Selcher 1977: 16). Though democracy is one of the doctrine's "permanent national objectives", it loathes dissent, as its idea of democracy only stands for "a form of government that is not communism". As a result of this anticommunism, the doctrine was particularly concerned with the domestic enemy: those who oppose the "permanent or current national objectives" (Proença and Diniz 2008: 7).

The doctrine, freed from its anti-communist raid after 1991, ended as the single conceptual framework that could claim durability or a dimension comparable to

that of Brazilian diplomatic traditions. Some of its concepts and notions reoccur throughout Brazil's legislation, official statements, and documents on security issues, and are referred to by journalists and academics from the whole political spectrum. This apparent pervasiveness of the DSN can be misleading, as it attempts and claims to hold the sole definition of all vocabulary of government, power, security and defence, and any notice of any term can be perceived as reflecting the doctrine of the ESG. From time to time, definitions by the ESG can be found in official documents and state discourses and are uncritically taken as ordinary language. Vice versa, much of the new conceptualization of security of the 1990's has been added to the ESG doctrine's all-inclusive definitions (*Ibidem*). The first decade of the new millennium saw the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) coming to power and brought a change in Brazil's security policies that led to a new National Defence Strategy in 2008.

Politics preceding the National Defence Strategy

Although PT President Luiz Inácio da Silva (known popularly as Lula) had announced relevant and necessary measures at the beginning of his first mandate (2003), these did not prosper rapidly as he kept the National Defence Strategy out of his government's priorities until mid-2007. In his 2003 message to the Congress, Lula stated that in that same year, the Ministry of Defence should promote the upgrading of the "National Defence Policy", invigorating the debate on security issues within the civil society. The new version of the National Defence Policy only passed in 2005 and was the most prominent factor regarding the national defence in the president's first term (Oliveira 2009: 72).

In the years preceding the National Defence Strategy of 2008, the uncomfortable relationship between the political power and military apparatus was the background of the fragile structure and performance of the Ministry of Defence, which did not effectively direct the Armed Forces nor defended their interests on behalf of the National Defence towards the president and the powerful ministries in the economic area. It was under this low regard of the National Defence that President Lula switched the Minister of Defence – from Waldir Pires to Nelson Jobim – and thus improved the Ministry's relationship with the Armed Forces (*Ibidem*: 73).

The Brazilian Ministry of Defence was rising as a new actor, as the plea for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council became one of the most important foreign policy objectives during the Lula administration. Since the beginning of his

presidency, Lula has made getting a permanent seat in the UN Security Council a goal, remarking at his inaugural speech that he would strive towards a reformed UN Security Council, representing modern-day reality, with developed and developing countries of all regions of the world among its permanent members (Silva 2003: 11). As a result, 'the most important income that derived from the emerging role of the Ministry of Defense was that global goals were associated to the goal of strengthening the national defense agencies, especially the Armed Forces and the construction of a collective and regional body on security' (Villa and Viana 2010: 97). Another important element of the context in which the decision to prepare a National Defence Strategy was taken, was the goal to reaffirm its regional leadership (*Ibidem*: 93). The acquisition of armaments, military ships and planes by Venezuela under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez, who promoted a strategic alliance with Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, disturbed Brazilian military echelons, which feared the loss of Brazil's military capacity in the region (Oliveira 2009: 73). Moreover, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador went through political instability in the first years of the 2000's, and were objects of the Brazilian government's special attention. Its reaction was aimed at avoiding internal crises escalating towards political instability in the region (Villa and Viana 2010: 94).

It can be argued that Lula's first presidential term was reactive in its approach towards security issues. Consequently, in 2007 it prevailed that a country with the geopolitical stature of Brazil had to change its course of action or otherwise would fall behind. (Oliveira 2009: 74). During Lula's second mandate, Brazil showed a more assertive approach towards its foreign and security policies, with the 2008 National Defence Strategy as the most important representation of this shift. However, the much lauded traditions and principles of Brazil's foreign policy were not neglected by this new agenda, and became crucial elements of the strategy.

Traditional principles of Brazil's foreign policy

Brasília strongly adheres to multilateralism and views its participation in international organizations as a mechanism to address the imbalances in the international system, which it sees as favouring wealthier nations. The basic elements of Brazil's foreign policy thus embrace many of the principles of the United Nations Charter: the peaceful mediation of conflicts, the self-determination of nations, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and respect for international law. For reasons of

economic and political pragmatism, Brazil contributes most frequently to United Nations peacekeeping operations in countries it considers to be strategically important, including Latin American nations, other Portuguese-speaking countries and the developing world. Through its multilateral relations with especially the Global South, Brazil is aiming to expand its influence on the international stage. By combining its military power with institutional influence through its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, Brazil emphasizes the importance of military force in global politics. The decade-long aspiration of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council stresses the importance for Brazil to gain a reputation as a military power in order to become a world power.

Brazil is proud of its long tradition of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries (Bodman & Wolfensohn 2011: 54), which is established in article 4 of the Federal Constitution (1988) and reflects its principal of respecting a state's sovereignty. In addition to that, it is neither promoting hegemony nor domination. Brazil's traditional position on sovereignty – interpreted as an absolute concept, hence deriving the adoption of the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of other states - makes it difficult to fully comply with the innovative concept of "responsibility to protect" (R2P), which is always evolving and in part determining the role of the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the independent Brazilian position allowed the introduction of some innovations in the international debate, such as the concepts of "responsibility while protecting" (RwP) and the principle of "non-indifference" (in partial contrast to that of non-intervention) (Kenkel & de Moraes 2012:2). The most important instrument of the concepts R2P and RwP are the UN peacekeeping operations, in several of which Brazil has been, and currently is, a reliable partner and important actor.

UN peacekeeping operations

Typically, in the current international system, the fastest route to a larger strategic profile is to develop the expression of military power and demonstrate its incline by putting it at the disposal of the international community's efforts to resolve conflicts, mitigate humanitarian disasters and safeguard human rights. This raises the question of how an emerging power with a limited military potential that is strictly rooted in non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes, could seek to maximize its international position. For numerous reasons, participation in peacekeeping operations

– in Brazil's case especially the operations of peace consolidation (peace-building) – is an answer to this question. Peace-building – an endeavour located at the intersection between security and development – provides a window of opportunity for Brazil, directly linked to the most serious concerns of the international community. Domestic successes of the recent past in Brazil – such as poverty reduction, fighting hunger, innovation in agriculture, external and internal focus on the global South in regions with lasting underdeveloped infrastructure – join the professionalism and effectiveness of its Armed Forces, to compose an innovative peace-building paradigm that directly addresses the problems currently faced by more complex UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, peacekeeping operations occupy a role of fundamental importance in the Brazilian performance on the international stage: serving as a bridge between the historical traditions of the country, the astonishing progress in its internal socioeconomic consolidation and the significant advances in standards of intervention and human rights on an international level (Kenkel & de Moraes 2012: 11).

Because Brazil has not had to deal with serious threats along its borders and in the region, over the past decades its security agenda has focused on interventions sponsored by the UN. The nature and scope of Brazil's contributions to peacekeeping are based on the principles of its foreign policy. Brasília believes that participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations will increase its voice in world affairs by enhancing its international reputation and attracting global attention. The motivation for Brazilian participation in UN peacekeeping operations was thus one of prestige, which is further linked to its goal to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council: 'a position which would grant it more regional clout in Latin America and a forceful presence in international military and economic affairs' (Bracey 2011: 315).

Moreover, political and economic pragmatism should be considered the most critical determinants in Brazil's decision to send troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Minister of Defence, Celso Amorim, has articulated this strategy stating, 'Our attitude is pragmatic and defends Brazilian interests' (Amorim 2007). Brazil's focus on pragmatic peacekeeping has been visible through its participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mozambique (1992-1994) and Angola (1997-1999) and in its pursuit of stronger relations with other Portuguese-speaking countries. Brazil's ambitious foreign policy agenda was a critical factor in its initial decision to deploy

troops to East Timor (1999-2000). 'During the late 1990s, the Cardoso administration pursued stronger political and economic ties outside of the European and American circles. Southeast Asia became an attractive region due to the emergence of newly industrialized economies in the regions' (Bracey 2011: 320). Through its contributions in the UN peacekeeping operation in East Timor, the Cardoso administration sought prestige. The Brazilian government had formally announced its pursuit for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1994, and East Timor allowed Brazil to further legitimize its desired status.

This prestige was also a visible factor accounting for Brazil's leadership over MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti since 2004 that is currently active, especially regarding its pursuit to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 'Although diplomatic officials do not publicly associate Brazil's leadership in Haiti with this goal, certain members of the Brazilian Congress, military leaders and ministers from the Defence Ministry connect the two issues' (*Ibidem*: 322). In addition to that, sending troops to Haiti can be interpreted as a message to the United States that Brazil is capable to share costs related to peacekeeping missions, both politically and economically. This message would be positive for the United States, as they are looking for partners in the region to share the costs of regional security with (Villa and Viana 2010: 96-97).

Furthermore, the pursuit of prestige through MINUSTAH is related to Brazil's own aspiration for regional solidarity, as it is the first United Nations peacekeeping operation of which the majority is comprised of Latin American countries, particularly Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay, apart from Brazil. Brazil's expanding military agenda is another connection that could be made to its decision to lead MINUSTAH. The UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti serves as an opportunity for the military to deepen its ties with Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to show Brazil's more active role in international security issues.

3. The "Smart" Strategy of Brazil's Navy

In this chapter on Brazil's National Defence Strategy the focus will be on Brazil's Navy. As the important concept "Blue Amazon", launched by the Brazilian Navy in 2004, has become much more significant in the past couple of years, Brazil's Defence Strategy prioritizes investing in its Navy. All three branches of the Armed Forces are still important, but the emphasis lies mainly on the Navy. The question is: is this shift purely out of economic interests, is it because of the large amounts of oil and gas that were recently discovered in Brazil's territorial waters, or does Brazil intend to warn possible future enemies by displaying its military capacities – even though it currently has no enemies. In other words, are Brazil's intentions a soft power strategy or one of hard power? Perhaps it cannot clearly be defined as such, but can it be seen as smart power, that is, according to Joseph Nye: 'the combination of the hard power coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction' (Nye 2011: xiii). As this research focuses on the Brazilian Navy, I have conducted interviews with academics from the EGN in Rio de Janeiro, about their view on Brazil's current decisions and actions in the defence area, especially regarding its investments in the Navy. The EGN is an organization of the Brazilian Navy and an institution for higher military studies, which aims to contribute to the training of officers, prepares them for staff-functions and positions of command, leadership and direction in the upper echelons of the Navy (Escola da Guerra Naval) and provided an important contribution in the creation of the 2008 *Estratégia Nacional da Defesa* (END).

Estratégia Nacional da Defesa

Brazil's National Defence Strategy was developed in about 15 months under the management of Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim and Minister Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs Roberto Mangabeira Unger. These ministers are considered the public authors of the END, while the institutional authors were the military institutions, which for a long time had addressed the necessary changes in the Armed Forces (Oliveira 2009: 71). The joint document of the Ministry of Defence and the Secretary of Strategic Affairs, originally released in December 2008, was to be the base of strategic thinking in Brazil, but it should also offer some sort of operational guidelines and a manual renovation of its Armed Forces, aiming to

achieve the basic national goals. These goals could briefly be presented as the following: safeguarding the national sovereignty was the fundamental issue; preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of the country was crucial; and technological autonomy and economic and social development were of great importance. All these goals were to ensure that the Armed Forces would be competent in an international context that was still marked by strong asymmetries among states, as well as latent threats and diffuse challenges to national defence (Almeida 2010: 21). Since its publication the END has received criticism and analyses from academics and the media, both Brazilian and international.

The END is based on the theory that Brazil is destined to be a power with the capacity of defending itself: 'if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself not only from aggressions, but equally from threats' (Federal Republic of Brazil 2008: 8). Regarding the place in the international order that befits Brazil, the END states that 'Brazil […] shall rise to the first stage in the world neither promoting hegemony nor domination. The Brazilian people are not willing to exert their power on other nations. They want Brazil to grow without reigning upon others' (*Ibidem*). Brazil thus needs to be prepared for conflicts and threats that are on its path to gain the status of a first world power. Moreover, the idea of fighting occupies a prominent place in this document. But the END not only wants to position Brazil on the world stage and a greater inclusion in the international decision-making process. It mainly refers to the reorganization of the three Armed Forces, the restructuring of the Brazilian Defence industry and redefining the composition of the Armed Forces (*Ibidem*: p. 5-6).

Nevertheless, João Fábio Bertonha implies that the axes of the Brazilian strategy remain, in short, the same: to ensure a better relative position for Brazil on the 21st century world stage through the unification of South America, the growing exclusion of the United States in this region, and by strengthening the legal and multilateral global system, including the creation of coalitions with other states that also seek to overcome the unipolar world (Bertonha 2013: 122). Similarly, the country is trying to achieve these goals while seeking to avoid confrontation or the use of force, through negotiation, the use of soft power and investment. The Brazilian END stresses the unique situation of Brazil in terms of its stability, both domestically and in the immediate surroundings, as well as the new phase in which the Brazilian State is going in terms of its international relations, but without abandoning its

diplomatic and strategic traditions. In this sense, the END prioritizes technological development (in the area of military equipment and nuclear energy for peaceful purposes), border security and, above all, the deterrence against enemies outside of South America (*Ibidem*: 123). Therefore, the Navy prioritizes submarines, especially nuclear, for the defence of its jurisdictional waters and the Air Force focuses on surveillance of the Amazons.

The END intends to prioritize two "Amazons" – the Green (rainforest) and the Blue (ocean) Amazon, although not mentioned in the document as such – since the main problems of defence, security, and deterrence strategy are concentrated in these regions. However, Paulo Roberto de Almeida argues that the document does not clearly identify what these threats are and against who or what Brazil should be defending itself. Threats are classified as diffuse, but the idea that it would be a power or a coalition of powers provided with superior offensive means – a clear euphemism for the United States and European countries – runs through the document (Almeida 2009: 6-7).

The "Blue Amazon" and the role of the Brazilian Navy in the South Atlantic

The Brazilian Navy is the first branch of the Armed Forces mentioned in the END, which implies its importance compared to the Army and Air Force. Although the concept "Blue Amazon" – *Amazônia Azul* – is not mentioned in this document, the notion has become of great importance since its was coined ten years ago by the Brazilian Navy itself, both in political and academic contexts, and was registered as a trademark in 2010. It comprises the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Brazil that is considered to be Brazil's jurisdictional waters (Martins 2010: 84). This region has great riches and economic potential of various types, such as fishing, polymetallic nodules, an enormous biodiversity of marine species, hydro and wind energy, and oil and gas reserves.

But the Navy's field of action is not limited to the Blue Amazon (Wiesebron 2013: 114) as the South Atlantic in general is a region of high strategic value to Brazil, particularly after the 2007 discovery of large oil reserves in this area. It is thus of no surprise that the Brazilians aim to have this part of the ocean without the presence of the "North" endangering the interests of the bordering South-American and West-African countries in general and those of Brazil in particular (*Ibidem*: 124). The "North" is considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries,

with two of its biggest powers present in the South Atlantic: the United States, which since 2008 have its Fourth Fleet present in these waters (U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command), and Great Britain, which has a number of islands located in the middle of the South Atlantic (Wiesebron 2013: 121), with the United States Air Force present on the island of Ascension. Besides these islands, the on-going Falklands/*Malvinas* dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom is of great concern to the Brazilian government, as the United Kingdom government now wants to extend its area of influence on the Falkland Islands to other islands in the South Atlantic and around Antarctica as well (*Ibidem*: 114).

Besides threats from the "North", Brazil's Navy must be present throughout the South Atlantic because most African countries gained independence only in the second half of the twentieth century, and are still building their institutions and military power, which are facing major challenges (*Ibidem*: 121). To help these countries in taking steps to protect their EEZ's and claim their territorial rights, and to achieve its goal to keep the South Atlantic under the sovereign control of the countries on both sides of the ocean, Brazil cooperates with African countries through military strategic partnerships (*Ibidem*: 123).

In addition, the Brazilian Navy cooperates with other countries' navies in various activities. Among these collaborations are the Coordination of the Maritime Area in the South Atlantic – together with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay – and the International Maritime Organization (Barbosa 2012: 227). The responsibilities of these multilateral organizations are directed to the monitoring of maritime traffic, safeguarding human lives and the protection of national heritages. Through these collaborations, efforts are constantly and seamlessly made to improve and strengthen national sovereignty in the South Atlantic (*Ibidem*: 228). Furthermore, Brazil has outlined issues relating to sovereignty over the South Atlantic within various laws, treaties and resolutions on both domestic and international level (More 2012: 243-245).

Likewise, the END states that the first priority of Brazil's Navy is the 'proactive defense of the oil platforms'. Energy resources in Brazil's maritime areas are of the highest economic importance, and thus require to be controlled by its Armed Forces. The Navy's second priority is the 'proactive defense of naval and port facilities, archipelagos and oceanic islands located within the Brazilian jurisdictional waters'. 'Promptness to respond to any threat against sea lanes of trade, by States, or

by non-conventional or criminal forces' and the 'capacity to join international peacekeeping operations outside of the territory and the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, under the aegis of the United Nations or other multilateral organizations in the region' are the other priorities for Brazil's Navy according to the END (Federal Republic of Brazil 2008: 20).

These priorities and strategies mentioned in the END are focused on both Brazil's economic interests as well as possible threats to its sovereignty in Brazil's EEZ. To ensure its objectives, Brazil invests in a powerful underwater naval force, consisting of both conventional and nuclear-propelled submarines (*Ibidem*: 21). The Navy needs to be equipped to secure the country's sovereignty and power of deterrence and thus needs to possess modern equipment and technology, for which it works closely with several European countries. The END plays a crucial role and indicates the different direction that was chosen by the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the Navy in particular, to move from a reactive to a proactive attitude (Wiesebron 2013: 124).

Hard, soft or smart power?

This move has gradually taken place since the country's return to democracy, which has made recent Brazilian presidents both more willing and more capable of assuming an active role in regional and world affairs. Democratic Brazil, unlike the country during the two decades of military rule, possesses considerable soft power. In their 2007 article 'Brazil, to be or not to be a BRIC?' Paulo Sotero and Leslie Armijo state that 'Brazil's potential to influence international outcomes is likely to be determined more by the capacity of the country's elites to identify and harness qualitative assets associated with its stable and democratic governance than by any hard-power assets' (Sotero and Armijo 2007: 43). They argue that 'within a military-security framing of international relations, Brazil's vast territory seems a safe area to the powers that dominate contemporary global security arrangements, and thus a hardly noticeable one. Even within Brazil, for decades foreign policy principally has been about commercial relations, not security issues' (*Ibidem*: 48). Moreover, Sotero and Armijo argue that 'Brazil's power projection is fundamentally one of soft power and largely depends on the quality of the democratic institutions that confer legitimacy on the country's recent diplomatic assertiveness' (*Ibidem*: 44). This soft power means that Brazil is shaping regional and global governance regimes in ways that it finds

congenial (*Ibidem*: 51). According to Sotero and Armijo, Brazil's continental and hemispheric economic as well as political soft power will continue to increase if it can avoid frightening its neighbours (*Ibidem*: 58). They conclude by stating that Brazil's future status in the international system depends on how well the country's leaders manage its domestic challenges of economic management and that only if these are met, Brazil will play a global role in the twenty-first century (*Ibidem*: 69). However, as their article was published in 2007, the expressed visions do not apply to the 2008 END and its emphasis on investments in and focus on the Navy.

Nowadays, academics from within the Brazilian Navy do not share these views. Regarding the power of Brazil's foreign affair policies in general, Captain Francisco Eduardo Alves de Almeida[6] agrees that there has been a tradition in Brazil´s foreign policy to have a soft power concept: 'although Brazil desires to have a more effective performance in world affairs, it does not have intrinsic power to act otherwise'. With intrinsic power, Capt. Almeida means a mixture of military power and the will to use it in case of need. However, the Brazilian END in particular he considers a mixture of hard and soft power, and thus a real form of smart power: 'these two proclaimed instruments emphasize the use of the Armed Forces against "exterior" threats, indicating the use of force in a typical hard power concept. In case of territorial defence, I truly believe Brazil is going to use all its resources to repel an intervention. The discourse is soft though.' Captain Luiz Carlos de Carvalho Roth[7] states that he sees an attempt to build smart power in the END: 'not that Brazil would abandon its conciliatory stance, but the expected economic growth combined with an increase of its presence on the world stage as a global player leads the country to assume a deterrent strategy of defence'. This deterrence, which has to be backed by credibility in order to be effective, leads to a certain degree of hard power, according to Roth. Accordingly, Captain André Panno Beirão[8] agrees that Brazil's foreign affair policy contains a combination of soft and hard power and thus a form of smart power. He argues that Brazil's traditional defence policy of possessing Armed Forces capable of defending its interests does not exactly comply with the actions that Joseph Nye

[6] Captain Francisco Eduardo Alves de Almeida is professor of Strategy at the EGN. Interview by the author, Rio de Janeiro, 26 August 2014. Continues through chapter.
[7] Captain Luiz Carlos de Carvalho Roth is responsible for the intelligence sector at the EGN. Interview by the author, Rio de Janeiro, 1 September 2014. Continues through chapter.
[8] Captain André Panno Beirão is professor and coordinator of the Masters Programme in Maritime Studies at the EGN. Interview by the author, Rio de Janeiro, 12 September 2014. Continues through chapter.

considers characteristics of soft power, and that it has always sought autonomy and good material means for both defensive and, if necessary, offensive actions.

Furthermore, Daniel Flemes states in his 2010 article '*O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança?*' that despite its capacity to operate within the international order and its high level of economic power, Brazil does not possess a military power with the ability to compete with other dominant powers in a conventional war (Flemes 2010: 143), which is one of the criteria that characterize a great power, according to Andrew Hurrell (Hurrell 2006: 5). According to Flemes, Brazil's soft balancing involves institutional strategies, such as the formation of coalitions or limited diplomatic alliances, such as BRICS, to restrict the power of the established great powers (Flemes 2010: 145). Flemes' argument is that although the foreign policy options of Brazil are limited in view of the superior hard power of these established great powers, it has the potential to substantially influence the outcomes of future global politics through its soft balancing. Like Sotero and Armijo, Flemes is thus arguing that Brazil's soft power will be enough to become a global power in the future.

Although Almeida, Roth and Beirão do not agree with Flemes, Sotero and Armijo that soft power will be enough for Brazil to become an important international actor, they all concur in general with Flemes' statement (2010) that Brazil does not possess a military power with the ability to compete with other dominant powers in a conventional war, although it has a good potential defence industry that can be a competitor in case a conflict lasts long enough. However, Capt. Roth states, it is not Brazil's aim to compete with these powers, but to deter them: 'Brazil's goal is to show the powers that challenge them that it is capable of producing such a high costs for these powers that are not compensated by their expected benefit from military actions.' Moreover, Capt. Beirão argues that, in addition to its technological means of combat, Brazil's Navy and Armed Forces in general possess a great force of manpower. In his point of view, the professionalism and preparation of the Brazilian forces is much better than that of many countries that have better material conditions. Under these conditions, it has the ability to recover much faster, says Beirão. According to Capt. Almeida, Brazil is a "potential" power: its soft power will not be enough to become a global power in the future, as dominant powers have hard power to implement their goals.

Accordingly, Andrew Hurrell argues, against Flemes, Sotero and Armijo as well in his 2010 article 'Brazil and the new global order'. He states that Brazil is far more dependent on formal institutions than other emerging powers: 'they provide the setting in which its institutional soft power can be most effective and where it can maximize its claims of southern representativeness and its well-established coalitional strategies' (Hurrell 2010: 67). This would mean that other emerging powers could depend on their military force when they get into a conflict that cannot be solved through diplomacy or soft balancing. Brazil does not have this option, which would make it less powerful, according to Hurrell's earlier characteristics of great powers (Hurrell 2006).

Moreover, João Fábio Bertonha gives a closer look on Brazil's END and observes that 'the Navy must keep some capacity for power projection. This is not an absurd goal: it is even desirable, in the light of Brazil's international goals for the near future' (Bertonha 2010: 119). However, it is a very expensive and complex task for the Navy to project power, because it means having huge ships, an aircraft carrier and a full-time Marine Corps ready for action. Bertonha proposes that in its 'quest for a better position on the international scene', Brazil should use its soft power resources within its peaceful diplomatic tradition, but should not forget the hard power it can find in economic and military power: 'Without "hard power", cultural links or diplomacy become less important or credible and by themselves they cannot change reality' (*Ibidem*: 121). He thus advocates for Brazil to execute smart power, although this academic term was not yet implemented at the time he wrote this article.

Regarding the emphasis on Brazil's Navy in the END, Capt. Beirão looks back at recent historical aspects, as the Brazilian national defence industry almost ceased to exist in the last 30 years because of priority and investment decisions in other sectors. There was thus a great lack of liability, and to recover from this, investments were needed. 'The current movement arises precisely at a time of serious international crisis which implies a reduction of investment in defence, even in countries that traditionally invest a lot in their defence industry,' says Beirão. He argues that 'the increased investment in the Brazilian Navy is due to the need to recover its operational capacity, and to defend the country's riches found in marine environment, as well.' Capt. Almeida believes that within Brazil's Defence there is a concern about the country's economic interests, especially in the Blue Amazon, although he questions the financial resources to maximize the defence objectives as

they are stated in the END. Almeida and other EGN strategists question if the proposed nuclear-propelled submarine, aircraft carrier with air wing and large number of patrol vessels will be enough to defend the oil platforms.

Furthermore, Capt. Almeida is very certain that Brazil does not have the purpose of showing off its naval capacities or even defy any future enemies, as it does not yet have the capacity for that. Therefore, he states that the Brazilian defence policies are a smart power posture, as they comprise hard power with a very bold and far reaching acquisition of ships, but a very peaceful discourse that derives into soft power at the same time. 'In international forums Brazilian diplomatic speeches have been towards people´s self determination, peaceful solution of controversies and understanding among nations. Hitherto the Brazilian defence policy has been a smart power posture.' Capt. Beirão argues that two aspects need to be analysed: regarding the evolution of acquisition, development and research of naval assets, the policies are typical smart power, while the acquisition of ships, typically defensive types like oceanic patrol vessels and the nuclear submarine project, is more a form of hard power. Furthermore, 'we can consider the international and joint missions undertaken by the Brazilian Navy typical soft power actions, as it has sought to contribute increasingly in multinational forces led by the United Nations (peacekeeping operations) and to cooperate with countries in its strategic environment (South America, Africa and Portuguese-speaking countries),' says Beirão.

According to Capt. Roth, it is always important to remember that the guidance for the preparation of each branch of the Armed Forces, as the END is, takes time to become fully implemented and in the case of the Marine, the EGN would consider 15 to 20 years a reasonable time to achieve the goals. Regarding the emphasis on the naval branch and thus the investments made in the navy to protect Brazil's EEZ, Roth believes that 'the awareness by various segments of the Brazilian society about the Blue Amazon concept, contained in the END, is key to back the investments that have been made in the naval forces'. He argues that for the strategy to be realized, it unquestionably needs financial support and thus needs to be a state project, contrary to a government project, because only then financial expenses for such a long period can be allowed. Capt. Beirão agrees that defence investments require a certain institutional maturity that pervades in government policies and consolidates them into state policies: 'The recent past has not yet ratified this longevity, and despite the great excitement and anticipation surrounding the decisions and investments that were

taken, it is thus unclear whether it will remain when political and economic conditions change'.

The EGN scholars thus agree with Bertonha and Hurrell, and argue that Brazil needs hard power on top of its soft power to become an important and influential actor on the world stage. They all advocate for Brazil to execute a combination of hard and soft power within its international relations, and therefore to implement smart power into its foreign policies. According to the EGN academics, the 2008 END is a real form of smart power, because it is a mixture of hard and soft power. Correspondingly, the investments in the Brazilian Navy in particular can be considered a form of smart power, since they are made out of both economic and security interests.

Conclusion

With the National Defence Strategy of 2008 a new phase in Brazil's security and defence policies started: instead of a reactive attitude, the country adopted a more assertive and proactive stance towards its international relations. The country's aim to become a global power on the twenty-first century world stage contributed to its view on national security, its Armed Forces and in particular the Brazilian Navy. With the discovery of large oil reserves in Brazil's jurisdictional waters, the concern of a naval force with the capability to protect the national interests became more urgent than ever. However, the END not only pleads to invest in the Navy because of Brazil's economic interests that should be defended, but was furthermore based on the theory that if Brazil wanted to rise on the world stage, it had to be prepared to defend itself from both aggressions and threats.

The recent importance of a stronger military force, with great investments in military equipment such as (nuclear-propelled) submarines and an aircraft carrier, suggests that Brazil is relinquishing itself from its traditional soft power politics and moving towards a hard power policy regarding its international issues. But despite the large investments that will be made in the coming years and the growing importance of Brazil's Armed Forces in its domestic politics, the country's military power cannot yet compete with other great military powers. It is thus safe to say that Brazil is not aiming to defy potential exterior enemies or trying to show off its military power, because it simply does not have the capacity to do so. However, Brazil does want to warn and deter those dominant powers – in case there would be a situation in which this is necessary – by showing that it has the capacity to take care of its national defence and security issues and can defend itself towards potential threats in the future. It wants to show that its defence is strong, precisely in order to keep the peace, as its possible enemies will be more cautious and think twice before attacking. This deterrence leads to a certain degree of hard power in Brazil's END.

The adoption of hard power in its international policies and its change of position towards national defence has consequences for both Brazil's national and international soft power image. However, apart from advocating great investments and a more important role for the Armed Forces, Brazil's END and defence policies in general contain a soft power discourse, promoting its principles of non-

intervention, defence of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The focus on deterrence in the END is without giving emphasis to the use of force as a valid instrument of Brazil's foreign policy.

Present-day academics from the EGN concur with João Fábio Bertonha that without hard power, soft power resources become less important or credible, because they cannot change reality by themselves. Brazil thus needs military power to be an important and influential actor in international politics. Military power is one of the criteria that characterize a great power, according to Andrew Hurrell, and it is therefore important for Brazil to possess a certain amount of it. Its emphasis on military power - not only to protect its economic interests - on the one side and the soft power discourse on the other side, make the END a form of smart power, as it was introduced by Joseph Nye: 'the combination of the hard power coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction'. It combines Brazil's traditional values of non-intervention and self-determination with the importance of military force to protect the country from external aggressions. Although other BRICS countries, such as Russia, China and India, are among the greatest military powers in the world, the use of smart power is, as Ernest Wilson advocated, broadly applied by emerging powers to give an alternative to the mainly hard power strategies of a unipolar world, combining resources in the new world order.

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