Universiteit Leiden

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Master in International Relations and Diplomacy

Master Thesis, June 2013

MEDIATION'S PROMISE

MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

Christine Jane Grant

(s1174789)

First Supervisor

Dr Niels van Willigen

Second Supervisor

Dr Francesco Ragazzi

What factors ensure the success of an international mediation effort in an intractable conflict? Academics and practitioners remain divided on the issue, with previous research offering many and varied explanations. Existing studies have focused on the conflict's intensity, the nature of the issues, the parties' motivation to mediate, and the international context in order to understand the causes of a successful mediation. This research employs a framework incorporating contextual, behavioural, and procedural factors in order to determine the explanatory value of (a) the timing of a third-party's entry into the conflict, (b) mediator impartiality and (c) legitimacy, and (d) the mediator's strategy in two cases of international mediation in intractable conflicts. Through an in-depth analysis of Northern Ireland and Kosovo, this thesis argues that Northern Ireland's successful mediation experience may be attributed to propitious timing and the presence of an impartial and legitimate mediator. Similarly, the failure of the mediation effort in Kosovo may have resulted from a combination of inauspicious timing and the presence of a mediator who was perceived by one of the negotiating parties as biased and illegitimate. While mediation is not necessarily a panacea for all conflicts, an understanding of which conditions lead to mediation success will aid practitioners in future mediation efforts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

DUP   Democratic Unionist Party

EU   European Union

FRY   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

ICG   International Contact Group

IRA   Irish Republican Army

KLA   Kosovo Liberation Army

LDK   The Democratic League of Kosovo

MHS   Mutually Hurting Stalemate

NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation

RPF   Rwandan Patriotic Front

RUC   Royal Ulster Constabulary

SDLP   Social Democratic and Labour Party

UK   United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UN   United Nations

UNGA   United Nations General Assembly

UNOSEK   UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo

US   United States

UUP   Ulster Unionist Party

UUUC   United Ulster Unionist Council

UWC   Ulster Workers' Council

Since the early 1990s, the nature of warfare has changed dramatically. The proxy wars which characterised the Cold War have made way for devastating civil and inter-communal conflicts in places as diverse as Sudan, Rwanda, Central Asia and Bosnia. At the same time as these conflicts have increased in both number and severity, there has been a corresponding proliferation in the appetite for negotiated settlements, as witnessed in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, and Mozambique (Crocker et al. 1999, 3). The vicious nature of these contemporary conflicts, and the high costs for the international community of failing to prevent or end these wars have together inspired a third development: namely, an increased role for the international community in peacemaking and peacekeeping. The heightened interest of international actors in attempting to manage these pernicious conflicts is manifested in their increasing involvement in efforts – both formal and informal – to mediate political agreements. Nevertheless, despite the involvement of third-party intermediaries, many of these conflicts have continued to stubbornly resist attempts at conflict management or resolution.

In most disputes – be they interstate or intrastate – the parties involved have a variety of means at their disposal to respond to or resolve their conflict. The most destructive option entails the resort to violence and coercion. A more constructive approach involves various forms of negotiation between the parties. However, in those instances where violence is an unfeasible option, and negotiations between conflicting parties are either difficult to initiate or have reached an impasse, the parties may require assistance from a party – or parties – external to the dispute. In these circumstances, mediation – most succinctly defined as third-party assistance to two or more interacting parties (Kressel and Pruitt 1989) – offers an appropriate method of conflict management.

Why have some international conflict management endeavours succeeded while others have not? The intention of this thesis is to explore the reasons behind the success and failure of two recent cases of third-party mediation efforts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. This research aims to contribute to the wider academic debate concerning which factors lead to successful outcomes in mediation processes. It seeks to answer: "why were the mediation efforts of external actors in Northern Ireland successful, whilst the attempts by the international community to mediate the crisis in Kosovo failed?"

In an effort to resolve this puzzle, a qualitative approach is adopted. Four hypotheses are tested against the aforementioned cases. Process-tracing is used to exhaustively analyse the

sequential processes within the two cases. The cases are then compared, and John Stuart Mill's 'method of difference' – which relies on the logic of elimination – is employed in order to identify the variables which may be causally associated with the outcome of a successful mediation process. This thesis will argue that the timing of the third-party intervention, in addition to the mediator's leverage and impartiality help to explain the ultimate success of Northern Ireland's mediation process and the failure of Kosovo's.

This thesis is structured as follows: in the first chapter the theoretical background of third-party mediation is established. The intellectual foundations of this thesis are found in the work of I.W. Zartman, whose concept of a 'Mutually Hurting Stalemate' (MHS) highlights the importance of timing to successful mediation. However, as demonstrated by an overview of the mediation literature, factors other than propitious timing may also contribute to a successful outcome. The second chapter develops the hypotheses to be tested in the two case studies, and reviews the chosen methodology (the case study approach, process-tracing, and Mill's 'method of difference'). The third chapter considers the third-party mediation efforts in Northern Ireland. It highlights the sources of the conflict's intractability and analyses previous notable attempts to manage the conflict. This within-case analysis demonstrates the importance of propitious timing and argues that these efforts failed because the conflict was not yet ripe for resolution. The chapter continues by considering the impact of the external environment on the conflict, before studying the process which ultimately led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of April 1998. Chapter four follows a similar structure, but instead considers the failure of the 2005-2007 Ahtisaari-led mediation process to determine Kosovo's final status. In the final chapter, the two cases are compared and the logic of elimination employed in order to identify those variables which could be causally associated with mediation success in Northern Ireland. This thesis concludes with an examination of possible avenues for future research.

1.1 INTRODUCTION: MANAGING CONFLICTS

Conflict is the most insidious and costly of all social processes. Intractable conflicts – also referred to as 'protracted conflicts' (Azar 1990) and 'enduring rivalries' (Goertz and Diehl 1993) – are a particularly vicious sub-category of conflict which continue over an extended period of time, are characterised by ever-present tension and violence, and are arenas for many futile attempts at management or resolution (Bercovitch 2007, 101). Such conflicts are characterised by negative-sum outcomes in which there are no winners, as all the parties are victimised by the process (Azar 1990, 15).

The question of how to manage intractable conflicts is complex, as they most often herald the breakdown of communication within a society and produce high levels of animosity and distrust. Disputing parties may therefore find it preferable to delegate the management of their conflict to a third-party mediator. The main focus of this research is therefore mediation, the most extensively employed method of conflict management. Almost half of all crises in the post-Cold War era have been mediated by third parties (Beardsley et al. 2006, 59). The method's popularity is often attributed to the voluntary and non-binding nature of mediation, which makes it ideally suited to managing conflicts where the relationship between the parties has deteriorated to such an extent that direct negotiations are deemed impossible.

1.1.1 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT VS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Protracted conflicts are often fought over important issues such as identity or struggles for power and self-determination (Deutsch 2006; Coleman 2006). Compounding the difficulty of managing these conflicts is the inter-generational perpetuation of the conflict, which is facilitated by the fact that relations between the parties develop in settings where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact. This lack of interaction enables the unhindered development of stereotypical images of the other and generates mutual suspicions and animosity. The nature of intractable conflicts is such that the parties often feel that "at best they may reach a temporary cessation of violence [but that] they cannot reach a fundamental and genuine resolution of their issues" (Bercovitch 2007, 100). In these circumstances, conflict management – the settlement and containment of violent conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 31) – is more feasible than conflict resolution, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of the conflict are addressed and transformed, and that the behaviour and attitudes of the disputants are no longer violent or hostile.

1.1.2 'SUCCESSFUL' MEDIATION

This research understands mediation to be a tool of conflict management. It therefore considers ceasefires, peace treaties or political settlements agreed to by all the disputants as indicators of a successful mediation effort (Siniver 2006). If a settlement is negotiated but not agreed to by both sides, the process is considered a failure. In reality 'success' is not such a binary concept: the signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily guarantee a fundamental change in the underlying societal structures which initially gave rise to the conflict. The Oslo Accords, for example, are perhaps the most pertinent example of an objective mediation success (a binding political agreement was reached), yet they failed to bring about an end to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which continues to this day. Furthermore, the failure of the parties to reach an agreement does not necessarily mean that a significant improvement in the relationship between the two parties was not achieved. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, success is treated as a mutually exclusive concept.

1.2 MEDIATION AS A TOOL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

1.2.1 DEFINITION

Given its nature, mediation is widely considered to be the most effective form of conflict management, particularly in an international system in which the principle of sovereignty remains preeminent. Over time, several definitions of mediation have been proposed. Different definitions purport to (a) capture the gist of what mediators do or hope to achieve; (b) distinguish between mediation and related processes of third-party intervention, such as arbitration; and (c) describe mediators' attributes (Bercovitch 2009, 341).

Mitchell (1981, 287) defines mediation as an intermediary activity which seeks to "achieve some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least end disruptive conflict behaviour". Moore (1996, 6), on the other hand, views mediation as "an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process", which involves the intervention of "an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third-party" – who has no authoritative decision-making power – to assist parties in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement. Other definitions (Folberg and Taylor 1984; Bingham 1985) consider neutrality and impartiality to be the distinguishing features of mediation.

Mediation is here defined as "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organisation, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law" (Bercovitch 1992, 8). This definition highlights mediation's most important characteristics: it is a tool of conflict management which involves the intervention of an outside party seeking to affect the conflict in some way; it is non-binding and, most importantly, voluntary. These features make mediation ideally suited to managing intractable conflicts, for while the mediator may retain some control over various aspects of the process, ultimate control over the final settlement remains with the parties who must live with and abide by any agreement.

1.3 MULTIPARTY MEDIATION

In intractable conflicts, successful mediation is likely to be the result of sustained involvement by third parties. Nevertheless, it is not always possible for one party alone to successfully manage a conflict, and thus international actors turn to multiparty mediation. What is multiparty mediation, and what are the advantages or disadvantages of such an approach for dealing with protracted conflicts?

1.3.1 DEFINITION

Multiparty mediations may be 'simultaneous', 'sequential', or 'composite'. Simultaneous efforts involve the intervention of multiple mediators, representing international or regional organisations, national governments, and NGOs, that do not necessarily coordinate their efforts (Berridge 2002, 195; Böhmelt 2012, 702). In sequential mediated interventions, single mediators may execute deliberate 'hand-offs' at various watersheds in the life cycle of the conflict when different kinds of mediator appear more suitable (Berridge 2002, 196). Composite mediations are those in which the mediation initiative is undertaken by a collective body such as a coalition of states representing more than one set of national interests. Multiparty mediation is defined here as: "simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in a conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional organisations or contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve more than one party" (Crocker et al. 1999, 10).

1.3.2 BENEFITS AND LIABILITIES OF MULTIPARTY MEDIATION

According to the practitioner literature (Crocker et al. 1999), a multiparty mediation process faces several unique challenges. To be successful, members of a mediating coalition must share largely similar goals, be willing to work together, be able to maintain a coherent strategy in order to coordinate their initiatives, and be willing to oversee the process from beginning to end (Crocker et al. 1999, 22). These criteria may be difficult to meet, thereby jeopardising the success of the process.

A lack of shared ideas about the objectives of the process creates confusion and produces mixed messages which consequently destabilise the mediation endeavour. The presence of multiple mediators enables the disputants to 'shop around' and play the intermediaries off against each other. This strategy fundamentally undermines the process by creating a fragmented international response which serves only to "reinforce fragmentation in the conflict and complicate resolution" (Ki-Moon 2009, 6), and by enabling parties that are not truly committed to achieving a peaceful settlement to procrastinate and delay conflict resolution. This can lead to a serious deterioration of the overall conflict situation and endanger the mediation effort.

While multiparty mediation adds an additional layer of complexity for all parties involved, it also often provides an opportunity for parties to move a peace process towards settlement. More mediating parties tend to equate to more leverage and credibility, raising the prospects of a stable peace agreement by isolating spoilers and limiting their ability to derail the process. If a coalition of mediators is able to work in unison, they should in principle be more likely than a single mediator to establish leverage over the antagonists (Crocker et al. 1999; Böhmelt 2012). This leverage can then create obligations and expectations that help ensure parties' compliance with the agreement, by definition increasing the chances of successful mediation. The ability of mediators to 'borrow leverage' through cooperation and coordination with other external parties is unique to multiparty mediation and demonstrates the potential for a greater number of parties to successfully mediate protracted disputes.

1.3.3 THE CONFLICT CYCLE AND MULTIPARTY MEDIATION

Given the cyclical nature of violence in intractable conflicts, multiparty efforts enable different mediators to enter the conflict at various points, bringing with them different skills, resources and relationships to move the parties towards agreement. At the low-end of the

conflict curve, before the outbreak of large-scale violence, mediated interventions by non-state actors may help to defuse tensions by enabling the parties to talk in an informal setting. In the 'middle range', where the violent conflict moves towards its peak, stereotypes and perceptions of the other side have solidified, and parties are reluctant to accept outside intervention. In this context, the conflict is still not ripe for high-level intervention, but low-key mediators, such as NGOs may help parties establish a dialogue without losing face publicly (Vuković 2013, 43). Once communication has been established mediators that possess coercive or reward power can be introduced in order to persuade conflicting parties to change their positions and move towards a mutually acceptable solution. The 'high end' of the conflict curve requires mediators with muscle in order to induce the parties to participate in talks and to move them away from conflicting deadlock (Vuković 2013, 43). The flexibility that a multiparty approach offers for dealing with the nature of violence in a protracted conflict significantly heightens the chance of successful mediation.

1.4 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF MEDIATION SUCCESS

The academic and practitioner literatures on mediation have proffered a number of explanations for mediation success. These explanations include the characteristics of the dispute, the internal characteristics of the parties, and the international context.

1.4.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPUTE

Existing research highlights three characteristics of the dispute held to affect mediation outcomes: conflict ripeness; the conflict's intensity; and the nature of the issue(s) in dispute.

1.4.1.1 CONFLICT RIPENESS

Willingness to address the conflict and accept the assistance of a mediator is often considered a necessary condition for mediation success (Rubin 1981, 5). Analysts have frequently highlighted the importance of proper timing of mediation initiatives for achieving successful outcomes. The concept of a ripe moment centres on the parties' perception of a 'mutually hurting stalemate' (MHS), a situation where "the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons" (Zartman 2000, 228). The second element necessary for a ripe moment is the perception of a 'way out'. The disputants themselves do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, but only believe that a

negotiated solution is possible and that the other party is similarly willing to search for a resolution to the conflict. Ripeness theory offers an important explanation for the overall success of a mediation effort, as will be demonstrated in the second chapter.

1.4.1.2 CONFLICT INTENSITY

Although the concept is somewhat ambiguous, the level of intensity is a second characteristic of the dispute commonly presumed to affect mediation outcomes, although analysts disagree strongly about its impact (Kleiboer 1996, 363). Some (Jackson 1952; Young 1967) suggest that the greater the conflict's intensity, the greater the likelihood that mediation will be accepted and be successful, as a way of minimising losses if nothing else. An opposite view contends that the greater the intensity and the higher the losses, the more polarised the parties' positions will become and the more determined each will be to 'win' at all costs, leading them to reject external attempts at mediation (Burton 1969; Brockner 1982).

1.4.1.3 THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE(S)

The mediation literature also abounds with notions linking mediation success to the nature of the issues in dispute. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, 14) distinguish between different types of issues: (1) incompatible claims to a specific peace of territory; (2) ideology; (3) security; and (4) self-determination and independence. They conclude that disputes involving claims to independence or conflicts over ideology are far less amenable to mediation than disputes concerning territorial or security issues. Similarly, Lall (1966), Frei (1976) and Ott (1972) argue that if a dispute affects the parties' vital security interests, no amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. In contrast, some (Fisher 1972, Rubin 1981) argue that even if an issue appears to be zero-sum, it may be possible to separate it into negotiable sub-units and attempt to trade these off against one another.

1.4.2 INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES

Existing research concerning the parties engaged in mediation primarily focuses on their motivation to mediate.

1.4.2.1 MOTIVATION TO MEDIATE

Willingness to address the conflict and accept the assistance of a mediator is often considered a necessary condition for mediation success (Rubin 1981, 5). The benefits parties expect to receive from participating in a mediation process influence their decision to accept an intermediary's offer of help to resolve their conflict. Disputants could benefit from a mediator's expertise, or they may decide that they will gain more from mediation than from maintaining the status quo. In Rwanda, after the Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) invasion in October 1990, the government accepted mediation in 1992 because of the conflict's impact on its economic and political fortunes (Maundi et al. 2006, 52). Similarly, the RPF accepted mediation because it sought international recognition, sympathy, and support, and it wanted a quick political solution because "its supporters could not afford to sustain the armed insurgency for a long time" (Maundi et al. 2006, 53). In this case, both parties expected to benefit more from accepting mediation than from continued fighting.

Domestic political cover is another expected benefit of mediation. Beardsley (2010, 395-96) suggests that combatants may seek mediation when they face high domestic audience costs for unpopular, though potentially prudent, concessions. In this instance, intermediaries can fulfil two roles: first, they can share the burden of responsibility for the concessions, and second, they can inform the domestic audiences about the merits of the concessions. These mechanisms were at work in the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-81. Christopher (1985) argues that Algeria played a face-saving role, as domestic audiences in both the US and Iran had made it prohibitively costly for the two sides to conduct direct negotiations. By relaying each side's messages, Algeria enabled negotiations to occur which, in turn, led to a mutually acceptable agreement. That the negotiations took place in relative secrecy obscured which parties were most responsible for the concessions made by both sides (Beardsley, 2010: 397). If parties expect to gain more from participating in a mediation process than they lose, they will be more committed and far more motivated to find a mutually acceptable agreement, thereby increasing the likelihood of a successful mediation outcome.

1.4.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The international context in which any conflict occurs also affects the outcomes of mediation efforts (Kleiboer 1996, 374). The impact of other events or conflicts taking place simultaneously is particularly relevant. Kriesberg (1987, 380) argues that de-escalation and successful mediation are more likely to occur when a particular conflict's salience declines as

other fights become of greater importance to one or more of the adversaries. The 1979 Algerian mediation process between the US and Iran illustrates this point. As Algeria began its initial mediation efforts, Iran became heavily involved in a war with Iraq. This acted as an obstacle to settlement in the first two months of the mediation endeavour, but as the costs of the Iran-Iraq war began to mount, it increased pressure on the Iranian clerics to find a suitable settlement, or 'way out', in order to focus on its more pressing conflict with Iraq (Sick 1985; Kleiboer 1996).

1.5 CONCLUSION

As this chapter has demonstrated, mediation is an important tool of conflict management undertaken by a wide range of actors. This chapter also studied existing explanations in the literature of the factors affecting the mediation process. It considered a conflict's ripeness, the dispute's intensity, the nature of the issues, the parties' motives to mediate, and the international context. The following chapter develops four hypotheses which, as this research will argue, influenced the outcome of the mediation efforts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

To reiterate, for the purposes of this research, a successful mediation endeavour is one in which a ceasefire, peace treaty or political settlement is agreed to by all parties. The first chapter considered various factors that academics have previously argued help explain a mediation outcome. This chapter argues that in order to better explain mediation outcome, any analysis should take into consideration three distinct types of factors: contextual, behavioural and procedural. This chapter builds on these three categories to develop four hypotheses which may plausibly explain the success of the mediation process in Northern Ireland and the failure of third-party efforts in Kosovo.

2.2 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Contextual factors refer to systemic variables which establish the mediator's degree of manoeuvrability before the process has begun. As discussed previously, in the context of an enduring conflict, the nature of the dispute and the issues to be resolved play important roles in determining the ultimate success of mediation. This thesis contends that an even more important contextual variable is the *timing* of a mediator's entry into a dispute.

Conflicts are dynamic and can develop and change at remarkable speed. Most often, conflicts pass through a life-cycle that encompasses a number of distinguishable phases. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011, 13) develop a conflict escalation and de-escalation model in which escalation phases move along a normal distribution curve from the initial *differences* that are part of all social developments, through the emergence of an original *contradiction* that may or may not remain latent, on up through the process of *polarisation* in which the conflict becomes manifest, and culminating in the outbreak of direct *violence* and *war* (emphasis in original). It is assumed that certain stages are more amenable to outside intervention than others (Young 1967). The underlying hypothesis is that to be successful, mediation needs to be initiated at such 'ripe moments'.

What constitutes a ripe moment remains in dispute. Some commentators believe that conflicts "follow the logic of 'clock time', [meaning that] the duration of the conflict in terms of days, months, or years is linked to the persistence or change of attitudes of the adversaries toward the conflict" (Kleiboer 1996, 362). The 'classical' position (Northedge and Donelan 1971; Zartman 2000) advocates late entry, and is based on the idea that mediation will be most fruitful once each side to the dispute has demonstrated their willingness to moderate its

intransigence and revise its expectations. This, they contend, is far more likely to occur later in the conflict, as the objective evidence concerning the futility of violent conflict accumulates. Others claim, however, that mediation should be initiated at an early stage of the conflict, before the adversaries cross a threshold of violence and begin to inflict heavy losses on each other (Edmead 1971). Prior to the outbreak of violence, and before the conflict has become too entrenched or the parties have become too inflexible, it is still possible to consider possibilities for peaceful settlement. In their analysis of 257 mediation attempts, Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) find that the longer a dispute lasts, the less amenable it is to mediation.

Other analysts repudiate the logic of 'clock time' and instead focus on 'social' or 'event' time (Lauer 1981). These thinkers assume a conflict is ripe for resolution if certain events that affect the perceptions and attitudes of disputants have occurred. For Zartman, a conflict is ripe for resolution when (1) a MHS exists, and (2) when the parties perceive a 'way out'. Although a ripe moment can be created by outside parties if they are able to "cultivate the perception of a painful present versus a preferable alternative" (Zartman 2000, 229), if the parties refuse to recognise that they are in an impasse, a MHS has not occurred. The greater the objective evidence, the greater the likelihood that parties will perceive a painful stalemate. Again, this evidence is more likely to be apparent at a later stage of the conflict. In contrast to Zartman's conception of a ripe moment, Stedman (1991) asserts that developments within the disputing parties are critical for the emergence of ripe moments. In his analysis, he argues that ripeness is a function of internal political changes within groups in conflict, such as the rise of new leaders or a split in a previously-unified leadership.

That propitious timing is important is undeniable; however, when this intervention should occur remains the subject of heated debate. This thesis will explore the validity of the following hypothesis:

H_1: *Multiparty mediations that occur at a later stage of an intractable conflict are more likely to be successful than those occurring at an earlier stage of the conflict*.

2.3 BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS

Mediation outcome is also influenced by the mediators themselves. In particular, three mediator attributes are considered important: (1) (im)partiality, (2) leverage, and (3)

legitimacy. These characteristics are usually held responsible for disputing parties' acceptance of a mediator, which, in turn, is seen as vital for the successful performance of his functions (Kleiboer 1996, 368).

2.3.1 IMPARTIALITY

The issue of mediator impartiality is controversial amongst international mediation scholars. Conceptually, confusion exists because there is no scholarly consensus on the meaning of impartiality. The concept may refer to the intention, consequence or appearance of the mediator (Kriesberg 1982). Or, it may relate to a mediator's attitudes toward the conflicting parties (Bjereld 1995). Other scholars contend that impartiality may refer to a mediator's stake in the substance of the issues in conflict (Princen 1992), and yet others suggest that impartiality refers to both the mediator's attitude and his stake in the issues (Kleiboer 1996). Analysts do agree however, that impartiality is essentially a matter of perception by the parties in conflict (Touval 1975; Bailey 1985).

The debate on impartiality is not over conceptual issues, but rather over the effect of impartiality on the outcome of mediation. Conventional thesis highlights a mediators' impartiality as essential for successful mediation (Young 1967; Northedge and Donelan 1971; Burton and Dukes 1990). Supporters of this argument assume a direct link between mediator impartiality and mediation outcome: impartiality is crucial for securing disputants' confidence in the mediator, which is a necessary condition for gaining his acceptability, which, in turn, is essential for mediation success to come about (Kleiboer 1996, 369).

In contrast to this traditional approach, a number of analysts contend that a mediator does not need to be impartial to be successful (Touval 1975; Smith 1985; Zartman and Touval 1985). Instead, they tend towards accentuating the merits of a biased mediator. From the perspective of the disputants, a biased mediator may be an attractive option as long as the mediator has particularly strong ties to the party with greater control over the outcome of the conflict. Whatever partiality results from these ties is balanced by the mediator's greater capacity to influence that party. The party that does not have any relations with the mediator thus expects the mediator to use his partiality to influence the adversary (Pruitt 1981). Many cases of international mediation efforts support this hypothesis: the Soviet Union's efforts in the war between India and Pakistan; Algerian mediation between Iran and the US over the American hostages held in Iran in 1980; and the US mediation attempts in the Israeli-Lebanese

negotiations in 1983. In all these cases, the mediator was accepted and considered successful despite his perceived alliance with one of the parties.

A biased mediator may also be more adept at securing a successful mediation outcome because he may possess certain resources that are valued by the disputants (Zartman and Touval 1985). Analysts who support this argument assume that a mediator engages in behaviour designed to elicit information and exercise influence in order to reframe issues and persuade the parties to move in one direction or another. These tasks are best achieved not when a mediator is unbiased, but when he possesses resources that either or both parties value. Thus, in this view, effective mediation is the result of sufficient resources, not impartiality (Bercovitch 1986, 164). Bias is here defined as the perceived prejudice of a mediator in favour of or against one group compared with another, in a way considered by the parties to be unfair.

This thesis will explore the validity of the following hypothesis:

H$_2$: *Multiparty mediations in which the mediators are biased towards one of the disputants are more likely to be successful in an intractable conflict than those where the mediators are impartial.*

2.3.2 LEVERAGE

Those who consider a biased mediator to be more capable of achieving a successful mediation outcome subordinate impartiality to the possession of leverage by a mediator. Few have sought to explicitly define leverage, but it generally seems to refer to a mediator's ability to put pressure on one or both of the conflicting parties to accept a proposed settlement. This assumes that a mediator has power and influence resources that can be brought to bear on the parties. Analysts distinguish between 'carrots' (positive inducements) and 'sticks' (negative sanctions), and between material aspects (such as the possibility to withhold or supply economic aid) and immaterial aspects (the possibility to use moral or psychological pressure) (Zartman and Touval 1985; Princen 1992).

In the absence of any systematic research on the impact of these various sources of leverage, the question of how important mediator leverage is for achieving successful mediation outcomes remains disputed. According to some authors (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Zartman and

Touval 1996; Favretto 2009) leverage is a necessary condition for mediation success and is indispensible for persuading conflicting parties to make concessions or ensuring that disputants agree to the conditions of settlement. In contrast, other analysts (Yarrow 1978; Slim 1992) claim that, in certain instances, the mediator's lack of political power may help facilitate success rather than hinder it. Yarrow (1978, 256), in particular, argues that the credibility and sincerity of a mediator may be enhanced "because of his non-political nature and inability to call down sanctions of any kind". Furthermore, the possibility of mediator acceptance may increase when the mediator is strategically weak and therefore perceived as non-threatening and legitimate.

2.3.3 LEGITIMACY

A very important type of leverage is the level of legitimacy invested in the mediator. Carnevale (2002, 28) defines 'legitimate power' as "influence driven by a belief that the mediator has the right to prescribe behaviour, and derives from a norm that has been accepted by the disputants". Legitimacy derives not only from a mediator's personal reputation, track record, and expertise, but also from organisational factors such as their institutional and positional status (Kleiboer 1996, 372). The institutional status of a mediator stems from the identity of a mediator's constituency. A mediator usually acts as a spokesman or representative of a national state or NGO. Thus, the legitimacy and, in some cases, leverage of these institutional bodies determines the status of the mediating representative (Rubin 1981). The positional status of the mediator depends on his standing within his own country or organisation. He must have a strong internal position in order to commit his government or executive to back up his words or actions (Kleiboer 1996).

Two competing propositions about the relations between mediator status and successful mediation outcome have been developed. The first asserts that the higher the mediator's status, the greater the chances of success (Low 1985). The second assumes that for mediation to be successful, the status of the mediator and the status of the disputing parties' representatives must be attuned: if the status of the mediator is lower than the representatives of the parties, mediation may not be taken seriously (Wolfers 1985). The leverage of a mediator, understood in terms of his personal legitimacy, has remained rather understudied in the mediation literature.   Thus, this research views leverage through the prism of the mediator's personal legitimacy. It will explore the validity of the following hypothesis:

H₃: *Multiparty mediations in which the mediators have personal leverage over the disputants are more likely to be successful in an intractable conflict than those which do not.*

2.4 PROCEDURAL FACTORS

A procedural explanation considers the strategies a mediator employs. In the mediation literature, strategy is defined as "a broad plan of action designed to indicate which measures may be taken to achieve desired objectives in conflicts" (Bercovitch 2007, 113). Choosing an approach commensurate with the conflict the mediator becomes involved in is one of the pre-requisites for successful mediation (Bercovitch 1991). The most common classification of mediator strategies is that developed by Zartman and Touval (1985), who distinguish between three principle types of strategy: (1) communication-facilitation, (2) formulation, and (3) manipulation. This typology is particularly useful as it "permits reasonably accurate distinctions between types of mediator behaviour and facilitates comparative empirical research on the effectiveness of different kinds of mediation strategies in international disputes" (Bercovitch and Wells 1993, 7).

The mediator as 'communicator' serves as a channel of communication as contact between the parties in dispute breaks down. Communication strategies involve making contact with the parties, identifying issues and interests, clarifying the situation, and supplying missing information. Essentially, this strategy requires the mediator to act as a go-between to carry information, proposals, or concessions back and forth between the conflicting parties. The mediator as 'formulator' plays a more active role, helping the parties to redefine issues or to find a formula for the resolution of their conflict. Formulation tactics include controlling the pace and formality of meetings and the physical environment, suggesting procedures and establishing protocols, and keeping the parties at the table focused on the issues in dispute. If these strategies prove insufficient to resolve the conflict, the mediator as 'manipulator' may have to use his leverage to manipulate the parties into agreement. Manipulation strategies involve the mediator engaging in the parties' decision-making process to change their expectations or press the parties to adopt more flexible negotiating positions. Manipulation strategies also require the mediator to take responsibility for concessions made and make the parties aware of the costs of failing to reach an agreement (Bercovitch and Wells 1993, 7-8).

Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, 16) empirically analysed the relationship between mediator strategy and mediation success and concluded that more active mediation strategies

produce more effective international mediations, and can affect and be responsive to a wider variety of dispute situations than less active strategies. In contrast, the premature use of active strategies is not without risks, and may ruin the mediator's credibility and acceptability. As Kochan (1981, 126) argues, when conditions are not ripe for settlement, a mediator should refrain from active or directive tactics. To determine which conclusion is more accurate in the context of intractable conflicts, this thesis will explore the validity of the following hypothesis:

H_4: *Multiparty mediations which involve a manipulative strategy are more likely to be successful in an intractable conflict than those where less directive strategies are used.*

2.5 METHODOLOGY

By exploring the validity of propitious timing (H_1), mediator bias (H_2), mediator leverage (H_3) and mediator strategy (H_4), this research seeks to solve the puzzle of why the mediation process which led to the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was successful, while the 2005-2007 Ahtisaari process to determine Kosovo's final status ended in failure.

The cases were selected based on two criteria. The first is that a particular conflict was managed by multiple mediators. The second criterion implies the existence of both hypothesised X and outcome Y (Beach and Pedersen 2012), which in this thesis means the existence (or not) of the aforementioned variables and (un-) successful mediation outcome. The relevance of Northern Ireland and Kosovo is two-fold: first, the conflict in Northern Ireland was, until the mid-1990s, deemed impossible to solve and commentators believed the country was doomed to suffer from perpetual conflict. Thus, the fact that a peace agreement was successfully negotiated implies that there are lessons to be drawn from Northern Ireland's mediation experience. Second, the mediation effort in Kosovo was undoubtedly a failure. It is therefore fruitful to analyse the mistakes of the past in order to guide future mediation efforts.

2.5.1 THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The basis for choosing a case study method can be found in its practicality: case studies offer a valuable way to test hypotheses and develop theories, by enabling the researcher to examine

the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail in order to provide historical explanations of cases (George and Bennett 2005, 21). Although this approach trades theoretical parsimony for explanatory richness, in international relations "only case studies provide the intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal factors and historical patterns" (Achen and Snidal 1989, 167-68).

2.5.2 PROCESS-TRACING METHOD

The only methodological approach which permits a serious analysis of causal mechanisms is process-tracing, which entails "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable, or variables, and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett 2005, 206; Beach and Pedersen 2012). Careful description is fundamental to successful process-tracing, as the method analyses trajectories of change and causation by closely studying the independent, dependent and intervening variables that provide sufficient support for what was hypothesised. It is therefore an appropriate method to employ alongside a case study approach.

2.5.3 MILL'S METHOD OF DIFFERENCE

After conducting process-tracing on the sequential processes within the cases, this research will use Mill's 'method of difference' to explain the success of Northern Ireland's mediation process and the failure of Kosovo's. This approach compares two cases with antithetical outcomes, and allows the researcher to employ "the logic of elimination to exclude as a candidate cause (independent variable) for the variance in the outcome (dependent variable) any condition that is present in both cases" (George and Bennett 2005, 156). Mill himself recognised that conditions that are not present in both cases can generally only be regarded as *possibly* causally associated with the variance in case outcomes, for these conditions may not be present in other cases with the same outcome. This thesis avoids the dilemma of a 'false positive' as its purports only to explain the outcome of two mediation processes, rather than to use the cases to make generalisations as to the causes of success or failure in mediation processes in general.

Using the previously formulated variables, this research continues with an analysis of the two case studies. Each chapter follows a systematic structure which provides an in-depth analysis of the events leading up to the final mediation outcome. To test the first hypothesis, the analysis will consider the failure of earlier mediation efforts in order to determine whether

they failed because the conflict was not yet ripe for settlement. To test the validity of the second and third hypotheses, this research will study the parties' perceptions of the mediator and their reaction to his authority. Finally, to test the fourth hypothesis, the analysis will consider the mediators' process, issues, and timing strategy.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

For more than a generation, Northern Ireland was a byword for sectarian conflict, terrorism, and civil disobedience. In November 1995, the heads of the British and Irish governments appointed former US Senator George Mitchell as head of a commission to propose a way out of the impasse which had thus far characterised their attempts to end the conflict. Mitchell faced the unenviable task of having to reconcile parties who, against the backdrop of a long and bitter conflict, had become entrenched in their positions and unwilling to compromise. He inherited a situation in which extremists dominated the dialogue, where compromise was denounced as ethnic betrayal, and where the social fabric of the country's two deeply segregated communities had been torn to shreds. Despite the gravity of the task, a political settlement was reached on 10 April 1998.

Seasoned analysts repeatedly observed throughout the early 1990s that, while real peace might be possible in the Middle East (in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords) and South Africa (after the end of apartheid), it was probably impossible in Ulster (Cox 1997). The purpose of this chapter is to determine how, given this context, the mediation process resulted in an agreement. It first offers an overview of the nature of the conflict by studying the sources of its intractability. It then considers why previous attempts at reaching a settlement failed, before contemplating the series of events which led to the creation of a ripe moment for negotiations. From this, it moves on to consider the mediation process itself, paying particular attention to Mitchell's strategy and his personal characteristics.

Ultimately, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA) responded to unique conditions in one divided society. It came about thanks to a particular conjunction of circumstances, and as such, it is not a foolproof blueprint for achieving success in other mediation efforts. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from the manner in which this historic deal was achieved.

3.1.1 SOURCES OF INTRACTABILITY

It is difficult to determine exactly where to begin an account of the process that gave rise to Northern Ireland's conflict. Some commentators (Cairns and Darby 1998; Edwards and McGrattan 2010) revert to the Plantation of Ulster, beginning in 1606, to understand the conflict's roots. The Plantation introduced to the northernmost province of Ireland a community of foreigners (mainly Scots) who spoke a different language and practiced a different religion. By the eighteenth century, the colonists occupied 95 percent of the

province, and came to form a majority in Ulster in contrast to a Catholic majority in the rest of the island. Years of oppression by the colonists and rebellion by the natives culminated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), which partitioned the island of Ireland into two regions: the six, predominantly Protestant counties of the North remained part of the UK to be governed by an Assembly based in Stormont; the twenty-six, overwhelmingly Catholic counties of the South were granted independence and became the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland). The partition did not put an end to the violence however, as the native Irish, who believed that their land had been stolen, became determined to bring about a united Ireland, free from British influence, a goal which conflicted with the chronically insecure Protestant majority's desire to remain part of Britain to avoid becoming a minority community in a unified Ireland. The broad outlines of the conflict were thus established.

It was the 'unionists' desire not to be subsumed in a united Catholic state that pushed them, through political, social and economic policies, to cement their majority at the expense of Northern Ireland's remaining Catholic 'nationalists'. The system used to elect ministers to Stormont was reformed in 1925, with the initial proportional electoral system replaced by a majoritarian, first-past-the-post arrangement. In itself, this meant that nationalists could expect to gain no more than ten or twelve of the fifty-two parliamentary seats at any election. The situation was further exacerbated by gerrymandering to ensure Unionist majorities (Edwards and McGrattan 2010, 4). The already-alienated, and increasingly disengaged, Catholic minority's situation was made worse by the bureaucratic structures of the Northern Irish state, which institutionalised ethnic bias in the distribution of housing and welfare services, and employment, for fear of Catholic infiltration (Mulholland, 2002; Darby 2003).

The emergence of socialist politics in Britain in the aftermath of the Second World War affected Northern Ireland's political culture. The main consequence of the establishment of the welfare state was that it gave Catholics an incentive to participate in the structures of the Northern Irish state for the first time (Edwards and McGrattan 2010, 9). Over time, these tangible benefits, as well as growing material prosperity, influenced Catholic calls for greater civil rights in the 1960s. The Catholic social movement was met with violence by loyalists and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which, in turn, prompted violent retaliations by nationalists and republicans. Escalating civil disobedience led the British government to deploy the army on the streets of Northern Ireland to try to quell the unrest. In 1972, frustrated at the inability of Northern Ireland's politicians to re-establish control, the British

government suspended the devolved parliament and imposed direct rule. These events marked the beginning of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland.

3.1.2 'THE TROUBLES'

In the aftermath of the British army's deployment, the nationalist campaign for more equitable treatment through reform of the Northern Irish state was subordinated to the need to remove the British presence and unify with the rest of Ireland (Darby 2003). The idea now was to 'take the war to the Brits'. Militant republicanism, in the form of the Provisional IRA, emerged from the increasingly politicised and assertive Catholic minority, which firmly believed that it had a moral right to take up arms. The rise of republicanism in turn prompted violence from Protestant loyalist militants.

The patterns of violence changed throughout the period of the Troubles. The late 1960s and early 1970s were largely characterised by inter-communal rioting, which was replaced gradually, though not completely, by a triangular low-intensity conflict in which bombings, targeted assassinations, and random sectarian killings became the main tactical approaches. Despite the fragmented and sporadic nature of the violence, very few families were left untouched by 'the Troubles'. In absolute terms, almost 4000 deaths appears relatively small; proportionally however, it translates to around 500,000 in the US – ten times the number of Americans killed in Vietnam (Edwards and McGrattan 2010, xviii). Around 40,000 other people were seriously wounded as a direct result of hostilities. The indirect effects of the Troubles are less easily quantifiable, but they include the deepening of inter-communal mistrust, fear, and hatred; the perpetuation of old grievances and the creation of new ones; high levels of unemployment; a decline in inward investment and tourism; and the emigration of young, highly educated people.

Thus, a comprehensive political, social and economic campaign of discrimination undertaken by the deeply insecure Protestant majority in Northern Ireland ultimately created an untenable situation. Over time, relationships between the two communities deteriorated to such an extent that violence replaced dialogue as the method for pursuing political change.

3.2 THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

The two broad 'nationalist' and 'unionist' communities had various internal divisions. The nationalist camp was dominated by the SDLP, which emphasised non-violent reform and

supported power-sharing within Northern Ireland as well as institutionalised links between the North and the Republic, and Sinn Fein – the political wing of the IRA – which was committed to forcing a British military withdrawal and reunifying Ireland. Unionists were divided between the UUP and the more militant DUP. Unlike the clear-cut ideological split on the nationalist side, "differences between the unionist parties tended to be expressive rather than substantive" (Coakley 2008, 101). Both parties were divided internally between partisans of devolved government for Northern Ireland and supporters of complete integration with Great Britain (Coakley 2008). These two blocs dominated electoral politics, contributing to entrenched positions and ultimately, political stalemate.

3.3 PREVIOUS SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS

The political settlement which finally brought an end to almost three decades of violence was not achieved until 1998, yet the mediation effort was not the first attempt made by the parties to reach a settlement. Between 1974 and the ceasefires of 1994 there were seven attempts to reach a political and constitutional settlement. All of the initiatives were London-led and all floundered in the face of local opposition. The two most significant agreements were the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985).

3.3.1 THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT

The introduction of direct rule in 1972 was only intended to be temporary measure to take charge of the situation. The government therefore needed to develop an alternative system of government acceptable to both communities. In 1972 and 1973 it published 'The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion" as well as constitutional proposals for the province. This white paper proposed a 78-member Assembly, to be elected by proportional representation. The British government would retain control over law, order, and finance, while a Council of Ireland – composed of members of the Republic of Ireland's executive, the Northern Ireland Executive, and the Northern Ireland Assembly – would act in a consultative role. New elections were held on 28 June 1973, and pro-agreement parties won a clear majority of the seats. Nevertheless, republicans boycotted the elections and the IRA continued its violent campaign.

Between 6 and 9 December 1973, representatives of the British and Irish governments and of the parties involved in the executive met to discuss the process for setting up the Council of Ireland. The provisions foresaw closer cooperation in security-related matters, and the

possibility of a future devolution of powers from Westminster to the Northern Ireland assembly and the Council of Ireland (Wolff 2002). Unionists feared that any influence by the Republic of Ireland over Northern affairs represented a step closer to a united Ireland. A general election in February 1974 turned into a referendum on power sharing and the Council of Ireland. Opponents of any change to the status quo united in a coalition – the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) and won 51 percent of the vote and eleven of the twelve Northern Irish seats at Westminster. When a motion against power sharing and the Council of Ireland was defeated in the Northern Ireland assembly, the newly established Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) called for a general strike. Two weeks of strikes brought Northern Ireland to a near-complete standstill. The failure of the Northern Ireland executive to end the strike led to its resignation. The assembly was suspended two days later (Wolff 2002, 5-6).

Why was it that a 1973 agreement that addressed essentially the same issues as the GFA addressed almost twenty-five years later failed? Sunningdale demanded significant compromises from all its signatories. However, despite the language of compromise, few if any of the parties were ready or willing to move as far or as speedily as the arrangement required in order for it to take root. Against a backdrop of continuing IRA violence, unionist leaders became increasingly vulnerable to pressure from the wider unionist community. For the parties, Sunningdale represented "an agreement too soon" (Farren 2007).

3.3.2 AFTER SUNNINGDALE

After the failure of Sunningdale, the British government developed and implemented a number of programmes aimed at economic development and improving community relations in Northern Ireland (Wolff 2002, 8). The government also introduced several initiatives to establish a new constitutional status for Northern Ireland. Seeking to learn from the lessons of Sunningdale, they were either strictly limited to Northern Ireland itself (such as, the 1974/75 constitutional convention), or, when they had cross border implications, they did not involve any Northern Irish political parties (for example, the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council set up in 1981). None were successful.

3.3.3 THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

The British and Irish governments both desired to stabilise the situation in the North: the Irish wished to prevent a spillover of the conflict, whilst the British realised that it could not solve the conflict without Ireland's support. Based on these considerations both governments

entered into new negotiations, resulting in the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) (hereafter, 'the Agreement'). The Agreement gave the Irish government an advisory role in Northern Ireland's government while confirming that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of voters agreed, democratically, to join the Republic.

Despite these provisions, the Agreement was roundly condemned by both sides of the conflict. Unionists rejected it because it gave the Republic a role in the governance of Northern Ireland, which to them represented the beginning of a process edging Northern Ireland into a united Ireland. Republicans likewise rejected the Agreement because it confirmed Northern Ireland's constitutional status as part of the UK and in doing so, formally recognised the partition of Ireland. The lack of popular support condemned this Agreement to failure. Again, the parties were not ready to compromise. The conflict was still not ripe for resolution.

Although the Agreement failed to break the political stalemate, it did indicate that solutions were possible to which the two governments and a significant proportion of the nationalist community could agree (Wolff 2002, 10). Furthermore, it undermined the more extreme factions on both sides: it made uncompromising, hard-line unionism appear a less-credible strategy for preserving Northern Ireland's link with the UK, and it indicated that there was overwhelming support for constitutional, non-violent politics within the nationalist community (Wolff 2002). Changes in the international environment helped the parties build upon this growing consensus and stimulated efforts to reach a settlement in the 1990s.

3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Accounts of the process leading to the IRA ceasefire of 1994, and the possibility for negotiations which this entailed, have too often failed to relate these events to other changes taking place in the wider world. By considering the two principal means by which the conflict was 'internationalised' – 'Europeanization' and the end of the Cold War – this research seeks to rectify this error.

The transformation of the border as a physical and symbolic divide has been integrally connected to the role of the EU: the European project indirectly helped to nullify the border's impact as a line of dispute between two states (Hayward 2011, 31). Through both countries' membership of the EU (at the time, the European Economic Community) Britain and Ireland

were able to identify and build common ground in many policy areas. The good working relationship that developed between British Prime Minister John Major and his Irish counterpart, Albert Reynolds, paved the way for the 'Downing Street Declaration' of 1993. This declaration affirmed for the first time the right of the people of Ireland to self-determination, and stated that Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Republic of Ireland if a majority of its population voted for such a move. It also stated that the British government had "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland". The declaration proved essential in preparing the way for the paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 and multiparty talks thereafter.

Prior to the 'Europeanization' of the Northern Ireland conflict, republicans viewed the Irish problem almost entirely in terms of Britain and the British presence. However, as cooperative relations between the two countries became more entrenched, many in Ireland – including the majority of constitutional nationalists – saw the British less as a malign force and more as a partner with whom any elected Irish government would have to work in order to resolve the situation in Northern Ireland (Cox 1997, 690).

Whilst the EU's involvement in the conflict was relatively constrained, major changes in the international environment led the US, under President Clinton, to adopt a far greater interest in the conflict. A Cold War-driven 'special relationship' with Britain meant that successive US administrations had been content to regard the conflict as an internal affair for the UK government. However, with the end of the Cold War, the international system was radically overhauled.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact fundamentally altered the global framework within which the IRA campaign had hitherto been conducted (Cox 1997). For a number of years, the IRA justified its actions by claiming that it was part of a global revolutionary struggle against the forces of imperialism (Cox 1997). However, with the defeat of a number of anti-imperialist movements, these claims no longer sounded credible. As the tide of anti-imperialism ebbed, the republican movement increasingly lacked purpose. Logistically the IRA could fight on, but the capacity to "continue killing people in Britain and Ireland in a campaign that seemed to be going nowhere" was "hardly the same as being part of a broader international movement whose goal was the liberation of humanity from the oppressive grip of imperialism" (Cox 1997, 682).

Together therefore, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the wider revolutionary project created a set of international conditions which made an IRA ceasefire feasible. To act on these conditions required the parties to perceive that the path of the bomb and the gun was leading nowhere and that their interests would be better served through negotiations.

3.5 THE PARTIES' REAPPRAISAL OF THE CONFLICT

The main dynamism for the Northern Irish peace process came from within the republican movement, whose change in strategy was facilitated by an auspicious international environment and the involvement of a somewhat sympathetic US administration. Additionally, a change in the make-up of the British and Irish governments also helped capitalise on the IRA ceasefire and push the peace process forward.

3.5.1 THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

Since the late 1980s an internal debate within the IRA had been taking place between those who favoured a continuation of the organisation's militant campaign to force a British withdrawal, and those who believed that a suspension of hostilities, followed by negotiations, would be more fruitful (MacGinty 1998). In the early stages of the conflict, militant republicans had overly optimistic assumptions about the possibilities of victory over the enemy. By the late 1980s, however, republicans recognised that the British had successfully reduced the conflict to Irish people killing each other (Adams in Hennessey 2000). Furthermore, in the early years of the 1990s, loyalist paramilitaries began 'out-killing' the IRA for the first time in the conflict's history, generating a sense that the IRA's 'armed struggle' had become "trapped in a sectarian cul-de-sac" (Bew and Frampton 2012, 295). The republican leadership thus came to the conclusion that their position was diminishing and sought to exploit the 'escape hatch' offered by the peace process.

The failure of the IRA's original scenario of a quick victory precipitated a major crisis in the organisation, one result of which was to relocate power in the movement from southern 'traditionalists' to northern 'radicals' (Cox 1997, 679). The new leadership was determined to broaden the base of the movement at home while extending its range of contacts abroad, particularly within the Irish community in North America. A number of Irish-American entrepreneurs had become significant players in corporate America, and as an aspiring presidential candidate, Clinton had forged a close alliance with the Irish-American lobby. The

lobby was increasingly aware that a unique set of conditions for an IRA ceasefire were falling into place, and pressed Clinton to make a number of commitments on Ireland both during and after his presidential campaign. The Irish-American lobby was convinced that a visit by Gerry Adams to the US would strengthen his standing, both internationally and within the IRA. In January 1994, against the advice of the State Department, the CIA and the FBI, Clinton personally sanctioned a visa for Adams to visit the US. This decision was of enormous importance for the peace process: first, it gave republicans a glimpse of the benefits which constitutional legitimacy offered; second, it endorsed Adams' leadership of Sinn Fein and helped him in his internal negotiations with extremist republicans; finally, by letting republicans know that they had 'friends in high places', whom they could easily lose if they failed to deliver peace, it put further pressure on the IRA to implement a ceasefire (Cox 1997, 687).

Although Clinton's decision to grant Adams a visa enraged the British government and provoked unionist protests that America was part of a pan-nationalist front, the administration's subsequent behaviour and the President's visit to Ireland significantly changed the feeling among most unionists that America's agenda was exclusively nationalist. The White House refused to intervene in the political process on the nationalists' behalf, and instead encouraged the joint efforts of both governments. Fundamentally, access to the White House required Adams to agree to place decommissioning on the agenda of any talks with the British, an issue which had thus far prevented serious talks from taking place.

Ultimately, the collapse of the global anti-imperialist movement, of which the IRA claimed to be a part, made it increasingly difficult for the organisation to legitimise a strategy which, by the late 1980s, had effectively reached a dead end. Furthermore, the opportunities given to the IRA by the US offered the organisation a 'way out'. For the republican movement, the two necessary conditions for a mutually hurting stalemate had been met, over twenty years after the conflict began (H_1).

3.5.2 THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS

Despite the IRA ceasefire, the British government still had good reason to adopt a cautious approach. During the course of the Troubles, Britain had lost hundreds of its soldiers, seen some of its major cities blown up, and had its international reputation tarnished. Furthermore, the IRA had, on two occasions, attempted to kill Conservative leaders. This inevitably shaped

its attitude towards 'doing a deal' with Sinn Fein and the IRA. Furthermore, including Sinn Fein in the peace process would create an enormous political headache for the Conservatives, who were increasingly dependent upon the unionist parties' votes to pass legislation in Westminster. The process thus reached an impasse. In retaliation for Major's perceived intransigence, the IRA ended its ceasefire in February 1996.

In 1997, the Labour Party under Tony Blair was elected with a large parliamentary majority. Blair prioritised the peace process and "cleared the table of the wreckage of the past negotiations and deprived the republican movement of excuses for violence" (Barnes and Kent 1999, 34). He sought to draw Sinn Fein into the process and dropped the demand for prior decommissioning. The IRA declared another ceasefire on 20 July 1997, and Sinn Fein entered peace talks on 9 September 1997. The process further benefited from the 1997 Irish elections, in which the Fianna Fáil party, led by Bertie Ahern, triumphed over the incumbent Fine Gael. Fianna Fáil was the party traditionally associated with the ideals of republicanism and was thus able to deal more decisively with the republican movement (Barnes and Kent 1999, 34).

The preceding analysis has highlighted the multiple events which together created an environment conducive to successful peace negotiations. That it took thirty years of violence before the parties were able to successfully resolve their differences intuitively lends credence to the first hypothesis that mediations occurring later in a conflict are more likely to be successful because parties have had the opportunity to exhaust all other avenues and realise that negotiations offer the only way forward. The analysis has further shown both how the IRA's perception of the conflict changed, and how it understood negotiations as offering a 'way out' of the conflict. Similarly, for the British, whose international reputation was being severely damaged by continued conflict, negotiations presented an opportunity to resolve the conflict permanently. The study now continues with an analysis of the mediation process.

3.6 THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

In the final months of the Conservative government, moves towards peace were initiated. However, given their reliance on the unionist votes, the Conservatives pushed for IRA decommissioning as a precondition for Sinn Fein's entry into the talks. This created an impasse, which was only resolved after the appointment of Senator George Mitchell

(alongside General John de Chastelain and Harri Holkeri) to chair a commission to propose a way out. In January 1996, the Mitchell Commission recommended that decommissioning occur in tandem with the peace process. Elections to a Forum were held in order to democratically determine the proportional representation of the parties to the talks. This move already contrasted with past attempts to reach a settlement amongst the elites: elections ensured a process grounded in inclusion. After the elections, Mitchell and his co-chairs were invited to preside over the peace process. Senator Mitchell's appointment not only underscored the depth of American involvement in the peace process, but also provided the body with gravitas. The Forum was able to gain the confidence of all major political actors, except the DUP.

3.6.1 THE MEDIATOR

Despite the hope generated by the IRA's ceasefire, Mitchell and his co-chairmen faced numerous hurdles. In order to succeed, they needed to find a way to bridge the chasm between the parties who steadfastly refused to talk to each other and bring the delegates together in a manner that would allow them to communicate with each other and forge an ultimate agreement. Mitchell endeavoured to create a 'winning coalition of the centre against the extremes' (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 4).

Mitchell himself was an experienced and qualified mediator, and having served six years as Majority Leader in the US Senate, was ideally suited to dealing with intractable negotiations between parties with seemingly irreconcilable differences. From his dealings in the Senate, Mitchell understood that the immediate pursuit of instant success would, most often, yield neither success nor a satisfactory outcome. His background not only made him ideally suited for the Northern Ireland situation, but it also guided his strategy and choices.

3.6.2 THE TALKS

The chairmen and the delegates faced tough issues, including the nature of the future relationship with the UK, the structure of a proposed Northern Ireland Assembly, the powers of cross-border entities, and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. Furthermore, the chairmen faced immense procedural barriers: the process for negotiations had not been defined or accepted, and no agenda or rules of order had been established (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 15). These procedures would have to be developed before the delegates could begin discussing substantive issues. The chairmen had not been granted any formal powers to

sanction or reward delegates, and they had no resources or tangible means of influence, making it difficult for them to credibly threaten to impose meaningful deadlines on the proceedings (H_3). Mitchell therefore relied on "the power of persuasion" (Germond and Witcover 1998), and the mediating coalition depended on the parties' trust and respect to achieve progress. Drawing on Curran and Sebenius (2003), I argue that Mitchell's approach to the talks had three major components: a process strategy, an issues strategy, and a timing strategy.

3.6.3 THE PROCESS STRATEGY

Mitchell's initial focus for the All-Party Talks was instrumental to their successful resolution. Instead of pressing the delegates to bridge their differences on substantive issues (such as decommissioning and political arrangements) early on in the process, Mitchell chose to steer the discussions almost exclusively through procedural issues (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 16). It took the parties three months, from June to August 1996, to establish the 'ground rules' for discussing procedures. It then took over a year of negotiations to establish procedures and an agenda, and then a further five months (from October 1997 to March 1998) to develop preliminary issue statements and outlines for agreement. Nevertheless, given the highly polarised environment, an early focus on highly toxic issues would have likely pushed the parties even further apart.

The strategy adopted by Mitchell and his co-chairs stressed inclusion, legitimacy and consent. The 'Mitchell Principles' − the preconditions to participate in the talks − emphasised the importance of these ideals, and committed parties to resolving their issues through dialogue and democratic, non-violent means. Discussion of adherence to these principles provided a set of criteria that would "later bind members of a coalition of the centre and distinguish them from their more extreme counterparts" (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 18). Ultimately, while Mitchell and his co-chairs had significant influence over participation, the two sponsoring governments formally maintained the powers of inclusion and exclusion to the talks. This was useful for Mitchell, as he could be seen as impartial (H_2).

Mitchell also embraced the rule of 'sufficient consensus' in the procedural debates, which was intended to guarantee that any measures adopted by the parties at the talks had genuinely broad support. While the rule sacrificed efficiency for consent, it ensured that the outcome of the talks could not reflect a one-sided victory for one faction or another. Despite weeks of

debate over procedures, it appeared unlikely that the delegates were going to be able to agree on a set of rules before the August 1996 recess. In an attempt to move the process forward, DUP delegates proposed that the participants vote on the proposed rules in sections and as a complete package, using the sufficient consensus formula. This strategy allowed smaller parties to save face with their constituents, by effectively enabling them to cast a negative vote on every section, but still vote in favour of the entire package of rules.

Over time, and with the consent of the participants to do so, the independent chairmen moved from their initial communication strategy to adopt a management and facilitative role (Touval and Zartman 1985). The gradual process solidified Mitchell's authority and strengthened the trust and commitment of the parties to the process (H_4). Now in a position to better control the process, the chairmen used 'variable geometry' to strengthen the mediation effort. In July 1996, at the peak of Northern Ireland's marching season, violence threatened to jeopardise the talks. However, Mitchell adapted the size and format of the meetings, and substituted plenary sessions with a series of smaller meetings where limited subsets of the parties met to discuss the agenda and rules of procedure (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 20). This approach enabled the parties to remain in the talks even in the midst of the sectarian violence which characterised the summer marching season.

At all costs, Mitchell kept the majority of parties committed to negotiations (the DUP and the UKUP left the talks after Sinn Fein's entry in September 1997). In response to unionist concerns about Sinn Fein's participation in the talks before the IRA had initiated decommissioning, an independent commission was set up by the British and Irish governments – headed by Mitchell – to verify decommissioning and establish a timeline. This ultimately reassured the moderate unionists that decommissioning remained a core concern for the mediators and the governments, yet could no longer act as an impediment to talks.

Mitchell also adeptly presented a facade of progress to the media raising expectations of success. For the parties, this increased constituency pressures and raised the costs of being a spoiler; it also isolated those who argued against the process. When the extremist parties turned to violent opposition, Mitchell successfully reframed their actions, to depict them not as evidence of the failure of negotiations, but rather as evidence of their success (Mitchell 1999, 142).

The chairmen's initial focus on procedures provided the parties with an opportunity to listen to other viewpoints and develop at least a rudimentary understanding of each others'

positions and interests. It also allowed the parties to vent their anger at the process rather than at each other, preventing them from becoming entrenched in their positions and refusing to compromise. Mitchell's decision to focus on the process of the talks also gave him time to solidify his authority and develop new options (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 17).

3.6.4 THE ISSUE STRATEGY

Alongside their focus on procedures, the mediators pursued an 'issue strategy' to respond to the parties' incompatibility on particular substantive issues. The establishment of the 'Independent Commission on Decommissioning' that kept the unionists in the talks enabled Mitchell to decouple the issue of decommissioning from the negotiations, and push the negotiations forward.

Mitchell's second strategy for dealing with the parties' incompatibility followed the approach suggested by the SDLP to divide the major issues into three 'Strands' which could be separately negotiated and later repackaged into a final deal. 'Strand 1' dealt with internal relations in Northern Ireland. 'Strand 2' dealt with 'North-South' relations, and involved the creation of joint institutions. 'Strand 3' dealt with relations between the British and Irish governments with respect to Northern Ireland.

The final agreement established an Assembly with constitutional powers (unionist provision) and 'parallel consent' power-sharing arrangements[1] (nationalist provision); created a North-South Ministerial Council (nationalists) with a 'mutual destruction' provision which stipulated that the Assembly and cross-border institutions could not function independently (mutual); and changed the Irish constitution (unionists) and British constitutional law (nationalists) to enshrine the concept of 'self-determination' for the people of Northern Ireland. The final package could be supported by a broad coalition of parties and, importantly, could be sold to the parties' constituencies as a victory.

Although the parties' positions on these issues were initially strongly opposed, Mitchell's decision to discuss each separately before refining the options created an overall package that, taken as a whole, was arguably better than a no-deal alternative (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 25).

---

[1] The 'parallel consent' formula requires at least 50 percent of the members of a Legislative Assembly to vote in favour of a motion. Of this, at least 50 percent of the motion's support must come from unionists and 50 percent from nationalists.

3.6.5 THE TIMING STRATEGY

Given the bitterness of the Troubles, for the parties to develop a working relationship and take steps to bridge the gulf that separated them required an extraordinarily patient approach. Furthermore, the mediators' inability to impose sanctions or offer tangible rewards, forced them to commit to an 'as long as it takes' strategy, rather than attempting to prematurely drive the parties to a deal – an approach unlikely to achieve any sort of accommodation between the parties. Thus, for almost two years the negotiations moved tentatively forward, but in April 1998, Mitchell set a deadline of May for negotiations to be completed and subsequently "shepherded explicit 'substantive' negotiations toward resolution in a mere two weeks" (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 16).

Over the course of the negotiations, Mitchell had painstakingly built enormous personal credibility with the parties. He had made a visible and costly commitment to the process and had repeatedly demonstrated his "scrupulous commitment to an even-handed approach and patient impartiality" (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 28). In early 1996, for example, his initial proposal on parallel decommissioning put him at odds with the unionists and Britain, but ingratiated him with the nationalists. In July 1996, his acceptance of the DUP proposal for voting based on sufficient consensus cut against the nationalists, but demonstrated his impartiality and desire to reach a mutually-acceptable conclusion (H_2). Mitchell used his personal credibility, and the sense of obligation that the parties felt towards him, to push the parties towards agreement.

3.7 THE BELFAST/GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT

The GFA has six main constitutional provisions. First, Northern Ireland's future constitutional status will be determined by a majority of its people. Second, "it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination to bring about a united Ireland". Third, while recognising that a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland wish for a united Ireland, the present wish of the majority is to maintain the Union; accordingly, Northern Ireland's constitutional position would remain within the UK. Fourth, if, in the future, the people of Ireland exercise their right to self-determination, both Governments are bound to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish. Fifth, the governments affirm that whichever sovereign government has jurisdiction in Northern Ireland, their power will be exercised with "rigorous impartiality and founded on

the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights". Finally, Northern Ireland's citizens have the right to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both.

In May 1998 a referendum was held in Northern Ireland to vote on the Agreement. With a turnout of 81 percent, 71 percent of the votes cast were in favour of the Agreement (ESRC 2001). In the Republic, the electorate voted to amend the Irish constitution in line with the Agreement. 56 percent of the electorate voted, with 94 percent of the votes in favour of amending the Constitution (ESRC 2001).

3.8 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

As this chapter has comprehensively demonstrated, the successful resolution of Northern Ireland's conflict was brought about by a unique combination of internal factors and changes in the external environment. Nevertheless lessons can still be drawn from the mediation process. The third parties' attempts to mediate the conflict are instructive: first, propitious timing is of great importance – in this case, the end of the Cold War, heightened US interest, and the diminution of the importance of borders, fundamentally altered the context of the conflict, and forced the parties to re-evaluate their strategies, interests and positions. Furthermore, the failure of previous agreements occurred because the conflict was not yet 'ripe'. There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to support the first hypothesis that mediation processes which occur later in a conflict, once the parties have been presented with indisputable objective evidence that they are in a MHS situation, are more likely to be successful. Second, Mitchell demonstrated no apparent bias towards either the unionists or the nationalists throughout the talks. The case of Northern Ireland thus disproves the hypothesis that biased mediations are more successful. Third, throughout the process, Mitchell and his colleagues had no tangible leverage over the conflicting parties, yet they were able to harness his personal legitimacy to persuade the parties to move towards the agreement. That the process resulted in an agreement lends credence to the third hypothesis that a mediator's personal leverage can lead to a successful mediation outcome. Finally, the chairmen adopted a communication-facilitation strategy which, over time, helped establish somewhat cooperative relationships both between the disputants and between the parties and the mediators. Had a more direct strategy been employed it would have likely driven the parties further apart rather than bringing them closer together. The Northern Irish experience

suggests that, in protracted conflicts, facilitative strategies are more successful than manipulative ones.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The dissolution of Yugoslavia, set in motion by the death of Tito in 1980, precipitated a number of chaotic and violent confrontations in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Although Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and eventually Bosnia, have all seen their conflicts resolved, the crisis in Kosovo, characterised by "competing claims to the right of self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Burg 2007, 183), has persisted over time and refused to yield to efforts at political settlement. In 2005, following the failure of previous attempts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict, the UN Secretary-General appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to lead another effort by the international community to determine Kosovo's final status.

Ahtisaari faced the seemingly insurmountable task of reconciling the diametrically opposed positions of two parties left deeply embittered by a legacy of inter-ethnic violence, domination, discrimination and exclusion. In its most basic form, the conflict in Kosovo was driven by mutually exclusive claims to control over territory (Burg 2007, 201). However, the Serbian state's discriminatory and oppressive policies towards its ethnic minorities, exacerbated the situation in the province, and violence soon trumped dialogue as the Kosovar Albanians' favoured method for pursuing political change.

4.1.1 SOURCES OF INTRACTABILITY

The intractable nature of the Kosovo conflict stems from the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, which was primarily brought about by the "effects of several mutually reinforcing conflicts" engendered by the growing ethno-nationalism of Yugoslavia's peoples, and motivated by unresolved historical grievances (Burg 2007, 184). Claims for the right to self-determination in the dissolving state were linked to both territory and ethnic identity: where ethnic populations transcended republic and provincial boundaries, the assertion of ethnic group claims to self-determination and sovereignty "engendered conflicts over definition of the borders of the emerging successor states, over the rights to be enshrined in their new constitutions, and even over the legitimacy of their very existence" (Burg 2007, 188). In Kosovo, the territorially compact ethnic-Albanian majority clamoured for independence from the Serbian state. Sovereign control of the territory, however, was seen by the Serbs as a zero-sum issue, and thus Serbia was unwilling to compromise or attempt to negotiate a peaceful solution with the Kosovar Albanians.

The dire state of Kosovo's socio-economic situation, and the extensive underdevelopment in the province repeatedly fuelled popular restlessness and stirred up ethnic tensions between the two communities. Throughout the period of provincial administration, the minority Serb population believed that they were being actively discriminated against, creating an increasingly bitter atmosphere in Kosovo. In March 1981, Kosovar Albanian students organised peaceful demonstrations to protest against poor living conditions and the lack of employment opportunities in the province. There were also calls for Kosovo's status within Yugoslavia to be upgraded to that of a republic. The protests rapidly escalated into violent riots and resulted in more than one thousand deaths and many more injuries (Ramet 1992, 196). The federal authorities reacted without delay, tightening their grip over the province.

In an attempt to quell the unrest caused by the riots, Yugoslav authorities prosecuted several thousand Kosovar Albanians on charges of separatism between 1981 and 1987 (Vuković 2013, 153). Most certainly, the indiscriminate prosecution of ethnic Albanians contributed to the development of deep feelings of distrust towards the Yugoslav government. Compounding the problem was the Belgrade media which, fuelled by the stories of Serbs in exile from Kosovo, began to publish articles of Albanian atrocities, and labelled the crisis in Kosovo as 'ethnic cleansing' of the Serbs. These stories contributed to the development of irrevocable stereotypes of Kosovar Albanians in the eyes of the Serbian audience which were adeptly manipulated by nationalist politicians (Vuković 2013, 153). Tit-for-tat violence throughout the 1980s served to sustain a highly charged and volatile environment.

4.1.2 THE EMPLOYMENT OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES

A more immediate basis for the Kosovo crisis began in 1987 with the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and the reinvigoration of nationalist rhetoric and policies. Nationalist politicians played on their constituents' fears that the Slavic population in Kosovo was demographically in decline, and that Kosovo would be lost imminently. Thus, Serbian nationalists sought to implement a programme designed to reduce the number of Albanians within Kosovo (Vuković 2013, 154). In 1989, Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy (which it had been granted after a change in the Yugoslav constitution in 1974) and established direct rule from Belgrade, dramatically escalating the conflict (Rees 2000).

In July 1990, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia introduced a permanent state of emergency throughout Kosovo. Under 'emergency measures' implemented by the Serbian

authorities, more than "100,000 ethnic Albanians were fired from factories, mines, schools, hospitals, judiciary, cultural institutions, media, public services, and municipal and regional authorities" and replaced by Serbs, Montenegrins, or pro-Serbian Albanians (Troebst 1998, 18). Authorities issued further orders outlawing all Albanian political and cultural organisations and associations. Furthermore, Albanian students were expelled from universities and a new curriculum – using Serbian language and Serbian histories – was imposed (Vuković 2013, 154). The use of the state's security forces to enforce compliance with these measures distinguished Kosovo as the region with one of the worst human rights records in Europe at the time (Nizich 1992).

The radicalisation of the Kosovar Albanian separatist tendencies, which arose from the failure of non-violent methods to secure progress, considerably reduced the scope for moderate solutions to the conflict. Similarly, Serbia's reaction to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) further narrowed the likelihood of accommodation. In March 1998, under the guise of anti-terrorism activities, the Republic's Special Anti-Terror Units cracked down on the KLA in Drenica, in the process killing more than eighty Albanians, among them women, children and elderly persons (Troebst 1998, 15). In addition, Serbian riot police brutally dispersed a crowd of several tens-of-thousands of Albanian demonstrators in Pristina.

Ultimately, a number of factors contributed to the conflict's intractability. However, the fact that the relationship between the parties was bitter and hostile (thanks to repeated negative interactions over the course of the conflict), and given the nature of the issue in dispute, the task of Ahtisaari and the other third parties was made far more difficult. For any negotiated process to be successful, a significant effort by the mediators to build trust and establish a cooperative working relationship between the disputants would be essential. Without this, any apparent 'gain' by the other side or perceived 'loss' by the party would entrench the parties in their respective positions, making compromise even more unlikely.

4.2 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

The two parties to the Kosovo conflict that participated in the international mediation efforts between 2005 and 2007 were the Republic of Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians. Historical events have meant that what constitutes 'Serbia' has varied over time, but for convenience, 'Serbia' is used here to refer to the group governing from Belgrade. The Serbian political elites have long been divided in their reaction to the efforts of international actors to mediate

the conflict between the regime, nationalist opposition, and democratic opposition (Troebst 1998, 29). At the time of the Ahtisaari-led mediation process, Serbia was governed by a coalition, within which there was an intense rivalry between the pro-European President Boris Tadić (Democratic Party), and the nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica (Democratic Party of Serbia). Tadić argued that the best interests of the Serbs would be served by continuing to engage with Europe and the process of European integration. By doing so, Serbia would be better able to combat Kosovo's demand for international acceptance and avoid international isolation (IISS 2008). Kostunica, however, argued that as the EU had sent an illegal mission to a 'fake state', Serbia should only continue engage with the EU if it rescinded its decision (IISS 2008).

Internal divisions also existed between the Kosovar representatives. Although all factions agreed that independence was the only acceptable solution to the conflict, they disagreed on how best to achieve this goal. The Democratic League of Kosovo Party (LDK) which had led the mass resistance movement of the 1980s insisted that only peaceful methods should be employed. It was not until the local Serb minority, backed by the power of the state in Belgrade, enforced its claim to Kosovo by means of brutal repression that the Kosovar Albanians began to recognise the futility of non-violence against the Serbian state. The de facto partition of Bosnia at Dayton further signalled to many Albanians in Kosovo that the attention of international actors could only be obtained through violent resistance. Dayton thus increased Albanians' impatience with their own lack of progress, and provided the impetus for the emergence in 1996 of the KLA which was willing to use force to achieve independence.

It is also important to note here the role of the International Contact Group (ICG), from which much of the international response to the conflict came. The Group, comprising France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US, was initially convened to respond to the Bosnian war. It had no organisational structure and was thus ultimately beholden to the interests of its member states. Whilst the Group was able to issue six statements between March 1998 and January 1999 condemning the actions of both Serb paramilitaries and the KLA, and was able to induce both parties to the negotiating table by using its considerable leverage (borrowed from the US and Russia), its failure to agree upon a common vision for the conflict's end ultimately led to the failure of previous mediation efforts.

4.3 PREVIOUS SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS

It would be wrong to suggest that the international community had made no attempt to resolve the Kosovo crisis prior to the Ahtisaari mediation process. A number of proposals for constitutional and administrative reforms were made, with the aim being to create a non-zero-sum outcome to the conflict, but "so deep [were] the divisions between the two camps, and within them as well, that no single moderate solution [enjoyed] the support of all parties" (Caplan 1998, 758).

A demand for the restoration of self-governance for Kosovo was included in the initial attempt to achieve an overall settlement to the Yugoslav crisis in October 1991. However, no substantive progress was made in relation to Kosovo, and the issue was left to "languish into a silent death with no progress having been made" (Weller 1999, 218). Hopes for a settlement for Kosovo were again raised in 1995 during the Dayton negotiations, yet Kosovo was mentioned only once in the final treaty, in connection with the preconditions for lifting the remaining sanctions against Serbia. For reasons of political expediency, the Kosovo issue was sidelined during Dayton: first, it was felt that there was simply too much to negotiate already, and second, nobody wished to alienate Milosevic whose continued cooperation was thought necessary to ensure the successful implementation of the accord.

In the aftermath of Dayton, various international and regional organisations, ranging from NATO to the OSCE, sought to resolve Kosovo's crisis. Several proposals were debated privately, yet none succeeded in bridging the gap between the parties or settling the issue. In 1999, as Serbian offensives in Kosovo increased, the ICG met and agreed to summon representatives of the two parties to Rambouillet, France, to participate in negotiations headed by international intermediaries. NATO welcomed the ICG's actions, and threatened the use of airstrikes if the parties did not participate in the peace conference. Following these credible threats, the disputants agreed to engage in negotiations.

4.3.1 THE RAMBOUILLET AGREEMENT

The Contact Group fully agreed that the conflict in Kosovo needed to be managed as promptly as possible. It therefore presented the parties at Rambouillet with a document containing 'non-negotiable principles', or basic elements for a settlement. These principles included an immediate end to violence; a peaceful solution through dialogue; a high level of self-governance for Kosovo through its own institutions; the protection of human rights; the

preservation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) territory; and the protection of the rights of the members of all national communities within Serbia (Weller 1999, 225-26). The mediators considered the parties' participation in negotiations as signalling their implicit acceptance of these principles.

The mediation was conducted by three key negotiators – Christopher Hill (US), Wolfgang Petritsch (EU), and Boris Mayorski (Russian Federation) – who were appointed by the Contact Group and expected to represent the interests of the entire coalition and not of their state of origin (Vuković 2013, 171). At the beginning of the conference, both parties received a draft version of a political settlement. The mediators also formulated a strict procedure for the process: the parties were not expected to engage in direct talks, but rather submit comments on the draft. If both sides agreed to a modification, it would be included; if there was no consensus, no alteration would take place.

The Kosovo delegation submitted written comments on the draft and claimed that, in principle, the document was acceptable. The Serbian delegation was obstructive, and focused on de-legitimising the Kosovo delegation instead of providing feedback on the draft. Nevertheless, the mediators urged the Serbian delegation to submit comments or suggestions on the first draft. The revised draft included almost all the Serbian delegation's demands and largely ignored the Kosovo delegation's suggestions. The revised draft was presented as a final version of a political settlement, which both parties refused to accept. The Kosovo delegation considered the proposal as "a direct result of talks between mediators and the Serbian delegation", which to them represented a betrayal of their trust in the process (Vuković 2013, 172).

Both delegations insisted on further changes. Realising that neither side was willing to accept the document, mediators extended the deadline for the talks to consider both sides' positions. This time, the procedure involved proximity talks: substantive suggestions from one side were channelled through a body of legal experts to the other side (Vuković 2013, 172). Using this method, the mediators were able to produce a new draft entitled the 'Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo' (1999), which prescribed that Kosovo would not be an independent state but a component part of Yugoslavia with a status somewhere between an autonomous province and a federal unit. Kosovo's status within Yugoslavia was to be safeguarded by an international supervisory institution with binding decision-making powers.

The Kosovo delegation signed the agreement on 18 March 1999, but for the Serbian delegation, the negotiations were far from being concluded. Believing that they had the support of the Russian delegation, they objected to withdrawing Serbian forces from Kosovo and allowing the presence of foreign troops on 'Serbian soil'. Throughout the process, Russian officials had acted somewhat duplicitously, thereby sending the Serbian delegation false signals. Although Russia recognised that an agreement was not feasible without an outside military presence to implement it, they did not offer any alternative to Western plans to use NATO forces. Rather, Russia's interests diverged from the rest of the coalition, contributing to the lack of coordination between the mediators. Russian intransigence meant that the mediators were unable to coordinate their leverages on both parties to the conflict: "while one group was exercising pressure and creating required incentives for the Kosovo delegation to accept the agreement, the Russians were abstaining from exercising their indispensible leverage on the Serbian delegation to do the same" (Vuković 2013, 175-76). As the Serbian delegation perceived Russia's actions as tacit support for their position, they assumed a much more unyielding position which prevented them from signing the agreement. On 22 March 1999, the negotiators and Ambassador Holbrooke went to Belgrade in an attempt to persuade the FRY to stop its offensive operations and sign the agreement. When these efforts failed, Holbrooke briefed NATO leaders, who instigated NATO military action.

The Rambouillet process failed for several reasons. Foremost among them was the divergence of Russian interests from the other ICG's members. This sent mixed signals to the Serbian delegation which, believing that Russia fully supported its position, became increasingly disengaged from the process. Furthermore, thanks to Russia's tacit support, Serbia did not yet perceive itself to be in a MHS. The conflict was not yet ripe for resolution (H_1).

4.4 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In the aftermath of the Cold War, severe abuses of human rights in Kosovo represented the main concern for American diplomats. However, "this concern was more superficial than what was needed for Americans to be more actively engaged in managing the crisis" (Vuković 2013, 159). At the same time, for the US, the situation in Kosovo represented only one (relatively small) component of the overall crisis Yugoslavia was going through. American unwillingness to become involved was facilitated by the Western Europeans' argument that Europe should be the one dealing with issues in Yugoslavia. However,

although European states were motivated to act to restore order in their backyard, they lacked a common perception of the situation in Kosovo. Whilst the UK and France insisted that Europe's primary concern should be the preservation of territorial integrity, Italy and Germany were much more inclined to promote human rights and democratic standards, which for them represented euphemisms for the principle of self-determination (Vuković 2013, 160).

Europe's failure to take decisive action was rationalised by the findings of the Badinter Commission (1991) which issued a number of important opinions concerning the legal status of Yugoslavia and its constituent units. In November 1991, the commission concluded that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution and that the republics seeking independence were not rebel entities but "new states created on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Caplan 1998, 747). This finding was important because it allowed a line to be drawn between entities whose independence would be legitimately recognised and those whose independence would not. As Kosovo was not a republic, the EU (and by extension, the international community) refused to consider its request for recognition as an independent state which it submitted in 1991.

The disproportionate use of violence by Serb forces to crackdown on KLA activities prompted more compelling third-party efforts to mediate the conflict. However, initial efforts were equivocal. In March 1998, for example, the Contact Group threatened new sanctions against Serbia unless Belgrade withdrew its special forces from Kosovo and began an unconditional dialogue with the Albanian leadership by the end of March. Neither condition had been met by the time the Contact Group reconvened in April 1998. On the contrary, Milosevic had launched fresh attacks but the group chose nonetheless to postpone the threatened freeze on Yugoslavia's assets abroad for another month, arguing that Milosevic had made progress towards meeting their demands (Caplan 1998, 754).

Until the mid-1990s, Russia held a very rigid position on the issue of Kosovo's legal status, insisting that any mention of self-governance should be on the condition that Kosovo remained within Serbia's formal jurisdiction (Levitin 2005, 136). With the outbreak of hostilities in the second half of 1998, Moscow began to contemplate the idea of a special status for Kosovo, always within the Yugoslav federation. Finally, in late 2005, Russia made it clear to Serbia that Moscow would not be drawn into a confrontation with the West over Kosovo and that they would not veto any UNSC Resolution promoting independence (ICG

2006, 11). However, in January 2006, Russia reversed its position and claimed that it would not support any settlement imposed on Serbia, arguing that the outcome should be acceptable to both sides (Vuković 2013, 188). Serbia interpreted Russia's stance as tacit support for its position, and consequently hardened its stance.

Thus, the international environment was not particularly conducive to successful negotiations between the two parties. Although the majority of the international representatives (particularly the UN Secretary-General, the OSCE, the EU, and the US) involved in Kosovo appeared to accept, as a result of the violence in the province, that Kosovo could no longer remain within Serbia, the Russians remained an important ally for Serbia. Furthermore, at Rambouillet the parties were coerced to the negotiating table by credible military, economic and political threats. Would they have agreed to talks without these threats? Was the conflict ripe for settlement? Did Serbia perceive itself to be in a MHS situation?

4.5 THE PARTIES' APPRAISAL OF THE CONFLICT

Determining the vulnerability of a party is, according to Fridl (2009, 79), achieved by determining their 'security point', defined as "the outcome a party would have without negotiating". Belgrade's security point was a rebellious Kosovo retaining its status as part of Serbia, whereas for Pristina, the security point was facing the spiralling effects of remaining 'in limbo' and potentially losing the momentum of the great powers' support in the quest for independence. For Belgrade, no negotiations meant Kosovo remained part of Serbia; Serbia therefore lacked any compelling incentive to negotiate. Although Serbia took part in the international community's efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, it is difficult to argue that, had it not been for the coercive efforts of various international actors, there would have been negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. The conflict was not yet ripe for settlement as the parties differed in their perceptions of their respective positions.

4.6 THE VIENNA PROCESS

In May 2005, the UN Secretary-General appointed Kai Eide to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Kosovo, in order to determine whether conditions in the province were suitable to permit discussion on Kosovo's final status. On 7 October 2005, Ambassador Eide concluded that while the standards implementation in Kosovo had been uneven, "an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time [had] come to commence

the process" (Eide 2005, 4). In late October 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Martti Ahtisaari to lead the international effort, representing the culmination of a process authorised by UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) which had mandated "a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status". Ahtisaari's office – the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) – was located in Vienna, Austria, and included liaison staff from NATO, the EU and the US.

The Contact Group established a framework for Ahtisaari's team comprising ten principles for a settlement. These included that Kosovo must not return to the pre-March 1999 situation, that any settlement should be fully compatible with international law and human rights, and should ensure a multi-ethnic society. The ICG also stated that any unilateral solution, or any solution involving partition, would be unacceptable. It further called for arrangements for good relations between Belgrade and Pristina to be part of any settlement.

4.6.1 THE MEDIATOR

Ahtisaari and his team faced substantial hurdles: the recent historical relationship between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs was bitter, and hostility and mistrust was high. Furthermore, the nature of the issue was zero-sum and the parties were entrenched in their positions, believing that they had the international community (Kosovo) or international law (Serbia) on their side. Thus, to be successful, Ahtisaari would first have to mend the parties' relationship before attempting to address their mutually exclusive positions on the issues. Ahtisaari was an experienced diplomat and negotiator, having successfully mediated in Namibia, Aceh and Iraq. Furthermore, coming from Finland, Ahtisaari's institutional status was perceived as less-threatening to the parties, making him initially more acceptable as a mediator.

4.6.2 THE TALKS

The parties to the process faced tough issues, including the future – and final – status of Kosovo, the protection of minorities within a multi-ethnic society, and the creation of sustainable institutions of governance that could be supported by Kosovo Serbs. Belgrade argued that Kosovo should enjoy substantial autonomy, but not independence. It argued that independence would be a violation of Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and therefore contrary to the UN Charter and international law. The Kosovo Albanian delegation asserted that Kosovo could not remain within a Serbian state and that only independence

would create regional stability. In order to determine why the Kosovo negotiations ended in failure, I consider Ahtisaari's approach from three different perspectives: his process strategy, his issues strategy, and his timing strategy.

4.6.3 THE PROCESS STRATEGY

From the beginning, Ahtisaari was given considerable 'room to manoeuvre' by the Contact Group (ICG 2006). With the Group's ten guiding principles for a peaceful settlement established, Ahtisaari was instructed that once the process had begun, it could not be blocked and must be brought to conclusion. From the beginning it was evident that the mediation process would involve a mixture of formulator and directive strategies: the Contact Group had prescribed the non-negotiable principles, while Ahtisaari was supposed to explore, formulate and offer solutions to both sides (Vuković 2013, 183-84).

Ahtisaari initially assumed a very constructive procedural-formulator strategy. Through informal talks with representatives from Belgrade and Pristina, he explored the positions of both sides for a period of three months. He concluded that for the Serbian authorities, any decision had to be in line with the UN Charter which, for them, guaranteed the inviolability of the borders of a sovereign state. In contrast, Kosovo's leaders expected the mediation process to formalise the reality of the situation on the ground where, thanks to UN involvement as mandated by UNSC Resolution 1244, Kosovo was already developing all the institutions necessary for a functioning independent state (Vuković 2013, 185).

At the beginning of the talks on 20 February 2006, Ahtisaari established a timeframe for the process and stated his expectation that negotiations would be concluded within 2006. The possibility of EU membership was perceived as the main 'carrot' for both sides in the process, as both parties had previously declared their commitment to EU membership (H_3). Ahtisaari's initial strategy made little headway towards an agreement. However, the adoption of a more active strategy such as forcing the parties to negotiate substantive issues early on, would likely have backfired, leaving the parties even further apart and entrenched in their respective positions.

4.6.4 THE ISSUE STRATEGY

In order to reduce the chasm between the two sides Ahtisaari realised that the negotiations must be structured in such a way that the far less contentious 'technical' issues were tackled

first. Technical issues included decentralisation, community rights, and the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In this way, it was hoped that both sides would offer concessions and establish a working relationship from which the question of Kosovo's final status could be addressed more constructively.

Nevertheless, five rounds of talks served only to reinforce the number of substantial differences between the two sides. As the time for negotiations began to run out, Ahtisaari recognised that it was highly unlikely that the parties would achieve a negotiated settlement regarding Kosovo's final status. Increasing signals from the international community, particularly from US President Bush, who declared in June 2007 that the US believed "Kosovo ought to be independent" (Malveaux 2007), made Kosovo's leaders less disposed to negotiate, and more impatient to formalise their new status.

These signals also made Serbia realise that the international community was somewhat united in its quest to grant Kosovo independence. Belgrade quickly lost all faith in the sincerity of the negotiations and, as a result, became passive and non-committal. The Serbian delegation believed that "any constructive attempts made would be perceived wrongly as Serbian willingness to accept the independence of Kosovo" (Fridl 2009, 80). The Serbs sensed that Ahtisaari had a particular goal in mind (Kosovo's independence) and that, rather than attempting to build trust between the two parties, he was focusing his efforts on coercing Serbia towards this pre-determined outcome. Serbia therefore began to perceive Ahtisaari as an adversarial mediator, biased in favour of the Kosovo Albanians' cause, and therefore untrustworthy.

Ultimately, Serbia perceived Ahtisaari as a biased mediator who had failed to offer Serbia a 'Way Out' through negotiations. For Serbian politicians, accepting Kosovo's independence would be tantamount to political suicide, yet Ahtisaari refused to offer or consider any proposal which deviated from his interpretation of Kosovo's final status. Thus, in this instance, a biased mediator obstructed the process and provoked a backlash from Serbia which felt victimised by the process (H_2).

4.6.5 THE TIMING STRATEGY

Serbia's uncooperative attitude led Ahtisaari to claim that the potential for negotiations had been exhausted. Fridl (2009, 84) argues that Ahtisaari's attitude towards the negotiations had a "plummeting effect on both parties' willingness to explore alternatives in finding a

mutually acceptable agreement". Both parties were discouraged from departing from their positions towards the centre. Instead of pushing for further negotiations, Ahtisaari focused on developing and presenting a comprehensive settlement package to the ICG which would, in turn, be voted on by the UNSC. While not explicitly mentioning 'independence' – in order to improve the chances of its acceptance by all members of the ICG and the disputants – Ahtisaari's plan included several provisions that were widely interpreted as implying statehood for Kosovo. Ahtisaari explained his position on Kosovo's independence as follows: "for the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the UNMIK pursuant to resolution 1244 has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. A return to Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable...Autonomy within the borders of Serbia is simply not tenable" (S/2007/168). After taking into account the negotiations with the parties, Ahtisaari concluded that the only viable option for Kosovo was independence.

For the Western countries of the Contact Group, the proposal was seen as fair and balanced. They argued in favour of its immediate acceptance, and cautioned that any delay could create instability (Vuković 2013, 190). Russia, accusing Ahtisaari of conducting "shallow and abbreviated negotiations" (ICG 2007, 6), proposed instead to retain the major provisions of Resolution 1244 with selective implementation of parts of the proposal.

4.7 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

On 17 February 2008, after the failure of multiple diplomatic efforts, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia, becoming the seventh state to emerge from the wreckage of the former Yugoslavia. The Kosovo experience offers a number of lessons for policymakers seeking to negotiate an intractable conflict: first, it highlights the importance of ripeness. Essentially, Serbia never perceived itself to be in a MHS and only participated in talks at Russia's insistence. Indeed, once Russian support for the process diminished, the Serbian government refused to accept the Ahtisaari process and subsequently began to stall and attempt to disrupt the mediation effort. The conflict was not yet ripe for settlement, and it is possible to argue that without Russia's presence, negotiations may never have taken place.

Second, Serbia's belief that Ahtisaari was a biased mediator fundamentally undermined the process. Once it became clear that Ahtisaari – and the wider international community – implicitly supported independence for Kosovo, the Serbian delegation perceived his every

move as a tactical manoeuvre aimed at securing Kosovo's independence at Serbia's expense. Although Ahtisaari was more partial towards Kosovo, he failed to move the Kosovar delegation towards a mutually acceptable compromise. Furthermore, although the carrot of EU membership was placed in front of the parties, Ahtisaari achieved few, if any, compromises from either party. Given the embittered context of the conflict, Ahtisaari's 'bias' meant that he could not use his personal leverage to push the parties towards agreement. Thus, in this instance, a biased mediator undermined, rather than facilitated, the mediation.

Finally, Ahtisaari's belief that the only viable solution for Kosovo was its independence significantly affected his strategy. Believing that Serbia's disengagement from the process had made reaching a compromise settlement impossible, Ahtisaari abandoned his initial communication-facilitation strategy and attempted to push the parties towards his pre-determined solution. This backfired, ostensibly because the Serbs perceived this as further evidence of his preference for Kosovo's position. Furthermore, the nature of the issue in dispute – independence and territorial integrity – does not lend itself to directive strategies. Thus, in this instance, a manipulative strategy did not bring about a successful outcome.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The analysis in the previous two chapters traced the sequential processes leading to the final mediation outcome in both Northern Ireland and Kosovo. This chapter uses Mill's method of difference and applies the logic of elimination to the two cases in order to determine which of the hypothesised variables may explain their respective outcomes. It then continues by offering some general conclusions about the two mediation efforts before discussing the limitations of this thesis and highlighting potential avenues for future research.

5.2 TIMING AND MEDIATION OUTCOME

The first hypothesis considered the validity of the argument that mediated interventions which occur at a later stage of a conflict are more likely to be successful than those occurring at an earlier stage. Directly linked to this – as demonstrated in chapter two – is the concept of ripeness. A conflict is ripe for settlement when the parties realise that they are in a mutually hurting stalemate and that a peaceful agreement is a preferable alternative to continued fighting. This realisation, although partly perceptual, is primarily influenced by objective evidence 'on the ground'. This evidence is far more likely to come at a later stage of the conflict, once several alternative avenues have been exhausted.

Considering the cases of Northern Ireland and Kosovo, it is possible to conclude that although both third-party interventions came at a later stage of the conflict (after two decades in both), only in Northern Ireland did the parties perceive mediation as a preferable alternative to continued stalemate. A within-case analysis further proves the validity of the first hypothesis: both the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements failed to resolve the conflict because the parties did not feel that they were in a MHS, nor were the agreements preferable to what they felt they could win from continuing to fight. The GFA, however, was reached after significant changes in the context of the conflict pushed the parties to realise the reality of their situations. In Kosovo, by contrast, Serbia did not perceive itself to be in a MHS. Rather, it believed that the international community's respect for the provisions of the UN Charter and international law would guarantee its territorial integrity. Only at Russia's insistence did Serbia agree to join negotiations at Rambouillet and Vienna. Thus, the Ahtisaari process was brought about not by any significant change in the context of the conflict, but by ICG coercion.

To conclude, if timing and ripeness are understood as directly correlated, it is possible to affirm the validity of the first hypothesis as an explanation of mediation success in Northern Ireland and mediation failure in Kosovo.

5.3 (IM)PARTIALITY AND MEDIATION OUTCOME

The second hypothesis considered the validity of the statement that biased mediators are more effective in intractable conflicts than impartial mediators. Bias was defined as the prejudice of a mediator in favour of or against one group, as perceived by the disputants. Analysing the two cases, it is possible to conclude that the biased mediator was less successful than the impartial mediator.

In Northern Ireland, although unionist parties had initial concerns about the mediating team's impartiality, several decisions taken by Mitchell served to allay their concerns and reinforce the parties' perceptions of Mitchell as an impartial mediator. In contrast, during the Vienna process, Ahtisaari was thought by the Serbian delegation to be untrustworthy and biased in favour of the Kosovar Albanians. Despite his endeavours to create a compromise between the parties, the Serbs believed that his efforts were simply a cover to achieve his real ambition of independence for Kosovo. Serbia's perception of Ahtisaari as a biased mediator led them to obstruct the process and disengage from negotiations.

To conclude, in the context of Northern Ireland's intractable conflict, where the relationship between the parties was almost non-existent, impartiality was a key mediator attribute. Given that the state of the relationship between the parties in Kosovo was very similar to Northern Ireland, the presence of a biased mediator undermined the effort and contributed to the failure of the Vienna process.

5.4 PERSONAL LEVERAGE AND MEDIATION OUTCOME

Understood in the traditional sense, leverage typically refers to the mediator's ability to pressure one or both of the parties to accept a proposed settlement through positive inducements or negative sanctions. Some argue that leverage is indispensible for persuading conflicting parties to make concessions or ensuring they stick to the conditions of settlement. Others claim that a mediator's lack of power may actually help facilitate success by increasing the possibility of a mediator being accepted by the parties. The third hypothesis therefore studied the mediator's personal leverage – legitimacy – in order to determine if it

could be associated with the mediation outcomes in Northern Ireland or Kosovo. Legitimacy was understood to derive from a mediator's personal reputation and personal leverage was thus the ability of the mediator to influence the process by building on the parties' belief that he has the right to prescribe behaviour.

In Northern Ireland, Mitchell had no tangible leverage as understood in the traditional sense. Rather, the British and Irish governments retained ultimate control over the process. In Kosovo, Ahtisaari was given considerable room to manoeuvre by the ICG, and the 'carrot' of possible EU membership was put on the table to induce the parties to negotiate. Nevertheless, in Northern Ireland, Mitchell invested considerable energy in building relationships between the mediating coalition and the negotiating parties. Gradually, the parties began to trust Mitchell and sought to cooperate with him. In the final weeks of the mediation effort, Mitchell used the considerable legitimacy he had built up throughout the process to push the parties to an agreement.

In comparison, in Kosovo, Ahtisaari's personal leverage was constricted by Serbia's belief in his partiality towards Kosovo. Once it became clear that Ahtisaari was in favour of substantial autonomy for Kosovo – which for the Serbs meant independence – Ahtisaari scuppered his chance to establish fruitful, cooperative, and trusting relationships with both parties.

To conclude, in Northern Ireland, Mitchell had personal – but no tangible – leverage over all the disputants, while in Kosovo, Ahtisaari had tangible leverage, yet failed to establish any personal leverage over Serbia whose agreement was essential for a successful settlement. In this instance, it is possible to argue that Northern Ireland's mediation process was a success because the mediator adeptly exploited his personal legitimacy to secure an agreement whereas in Kosovo, the mediator had no such legitimacy to exploit.

5.5 STRATEGY AND MEDIATION OUTCOME

The final hypothesis tested the validity of the claim that an active strategy is better able to secure a successful mediation outcome. This research used Zartman and Touval's (1985) typology of mediator strategies which ranges from the passive 'mediator as communication-facilitator' to the 'mediator as formulator', to the most directive 'mediator as manipulator'. In both cases, years of conflict, hostility and repression created an atmosphere in which the negotiating parties did not trust each other and were suspicious of cooperating and

compromising with sworn enemies. In these circumstances, and as demonstrated by the case studies, a communication-facilitation strategy (at least in the initial stages) is the most effective mediator approach as it allows the parties to gradually establish some semblance of a working relationship which, over time, should make compromise possible.

To conclude, both mediators adopted a communication-facilitation approach, and spent a considerable amount of time identifying the parties' positions and interests, supplying missing information, and ensuring that the interests of all parties were discussed. That the process in Northern Ireland was successful, yet failed in Kosovo, suggests that mediator strategy did not determine the success of Northern Ireland's peace process.

5.6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis was to determine why the mediation effort in Northern Ireland succeeded while third-party efforts to resolve the Kosovo issue failed. As the preceding analysis has shown, the timing of the third-party mediation effort, in addition to the behavioural attributes of mediator impartiality and legitimacy help explain the ultimate success of Northern Ireland's mediation process. Similarly the failure of third-party efforts in Kosovo may be attributed to inauspicious timing, Serbia's perception of the mediator as biased, and Ahtisaari's failure to build any personal leverage over Serbia, whose acquiescence was ultimately necessary for any political settlement.

As stated in the first chapter, this research considered a mediation process 'successful' if it resulted in a ceasefire, the signing of an agreement or some form of political settlement. This definition is seriously limited by its failure to account for mediation efforts in which no agreement was reached, but the parties themselves perceived that progress had been made. Furthermore, the signing of a peace agreement does not necessarily translate to a durable peace: in Angola, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, agreements were signed that failed to address the underlying causes of the conflicts. They later broke down and tensions again escalated. In Northern Ireland too, after the adoption of the GFA, the situation remained perilously unstable. As the Agreement provided no specific mechanisms for dealing with past histories, the question of how to address the conflict's legacies became the new battleground for the two communities. To date, Northern Ireland continues to experience sectarian tensions, as was evident in 2012 when riots broke out over Belfast city council's decision to fly the Union flag over City Hall on state occasions rather than every day (BBC 2012). Although it is

difficult to imagine a return to paramilitary violence, Northern Ireland's experience cautions against overly optimistic expectations of mediated agreements in the context of intractable conflicts. Rather, a peace agreement is better understood as one element of a larger process which may create some new opportunities but hardly alters all aspects of the conflict. Academic focus should turn to the post-agreement stage of a conflict in order to determine which conditions are necessary for a settlement to 'stick'.

Ultimately, intractable conflicts are often resistant to negotiated solutions, but this does not mean that they are impossible to control. In most cases, the most appropriate option is to attempt to 'manage' the conflict and reduce the levels of tension and violence. Nevertheless, conflict management, unless it is accompanied by extensive third-party efforts to foster dialogue and change attitudes, does not offer a long-term solution to a conflict. A better understanding of the dynamics of intractability may enable practitioners to shorten the duration of the conflict or even prevent a conflict from becoming intractable in the first place. As witnessed in Northern Ireland and Kosovo, but also in Cyprus, North Korea and Israel/Palestine, intractable conflicts exact a heavy toll on society. They are destructive, tearing apart a society's social fabric, limiting its economic and social development, and robbing succeeding generations of a hopeful future. Researchers should thus focus their attentions on finding ways to prevent intractability from taking root in the first place. To do so would not only make an invaluable contribution to the stability of the international system, but would irrevocably change the lives of so many who have suffered from the scourge of intractable conflicts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES

Achen, C.H. and Snidal, D. (1989) "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies". *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp.143-169.

Bailey, S.D. (1985) "Non-official mediation in disputes: Reflections on Quaker experience". *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp.205-222.

Barnes, H. and Kent, G. (1999) "Ceasefires and Elections". *Striking a balance: The Northern Ireland Peace Process*, pp.33-35.

Beardsley, K.C. (2010) "Pain, pressure and political cover: Explaining mediation incidence".

Beardsley, K.C., Quinn, D.M., Biswas, B., and Wilkenfeld, J. (2006) "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp.58-86.

Bercovitch, J. (1986b) "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes". *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp.155-168.

Bercovitch, J. (1991) "International Mediation and Dispute Settlement: Evaluating the Conditions for Successful Mediation". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.17-30.

Bercovitch, J., Anagnoson, J.T. and Willie, D.L. (1991) "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp.7-17.

Bercovitch, J. and Wells, R. (1993) "Evaluating Mediation Strategies: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis". *Peace and Change*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.3-25.

Bew, J. and Frampton, M. (2012) "Don't mention the war! Debating Notion of a 'Stalemate' in Northern Ireland (and a Response to Dr Paul Dixon)". *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp.287-301.

Bjereld, U. (1995) "Critic or mediator? Sweden in world politics, 1945-90". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp.23-35.

Böhmelt, T. (2012) "Why many cooks if they can spoil the broth? The determinants of multiparty mediation". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp.701-715.

Brockner, J. (1982) "Factors Affecting Entrapment in Escalating Conflict". *Journal of Research in Personality*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.247-266.

Cairns, E. and Darby, J. (1998) "The Conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, Consequences and Controls". *American Psychologist*, Vol. 53, No. 7, pp.754-760.

Caplan, R. (1998) "International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo". *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp.745-761.

Coakley, J. (2008) "Has the Northern Ireland Problem Been Solved?" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp.98-112.

Coleman, P.T. (2003) "Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Meta-framework-I". *Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 9. No. 1, pp.1-37.

Cox, M. (1997) "Bringing in the 'international': the IRA ceasefire and the end of the Cold War". *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp.671-693.

Curran, D.F. and Sebenius, J.K. (2003) "The Mediator as Coalition-Builder: George Mitchell in Northern Ireland". *International Negotiation*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp.1-38.

Farren, S. (2007) "Sunningdale: An Agreement Too Soon?" *IBIS Working Paper*, No. 80, pp.1-12.

Favretto, K. (2009) "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias". *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 103, No. 2, pp.248-263.

Fisher, R.J. (1972) "Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.67-94.

Frei, D. (1976) "Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness of International Mediation". *Peace Science Society (International) Papers*, No. 26, pp.67-84.

Fridl, D.D. (2009) "Kosovo Negotiations: Revisiting the Role of Mediation". *International Negotiation*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.71-93.

Germond, J.W. and Witcover, J. (1998) "The Road to Northern Ireland". *National Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 16, p.888.

Goertz, G. and Diehl, P.F. (1993) "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns". *International Interactions*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.57-78.

Hayward, K. "The EU and the transformation of the Irish border". *Paix sans frontières: building peace across borders*, pp.31-34.

International Crisis Group (ICG, 2006) "Kosovo Status: Delay is Risky". *International Crisis Group*, Europe Report No. 177, 10 November 2006, pp.1-30.

International Crisis Group (ICG, 2007) "Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan". *International Crisis Group*, Europe Report No. 182, 14 May 2007, pp.1-48.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2008) "Kosovo's Independence". *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp.1-2.

Kleiboer, M. (1996) "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp.360-389.

Kriesberg, L. (1987) "Timing and the initiation of de-escalation moves". *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.375-84.

Levitin, O. (2000) "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle". *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp.130-140.

Nizich, I. (1992) "Human rights abuses in Kosovo, 1990-1992". *Human Rights Watch*, Helsinki Watch, 1 October 1992.

Ott, M.C. (1972) "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases". *International Organisation*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.595-618.

Rees, N. (2000) "The Kosovo Crisis, the International Response and Ireland". *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp.55-70.

Siniver, A. (2006) "Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East". *Political Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp.806-826.

Smith, W.P. (1985) "Effectiveness of the biased mediator". *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp.363-372.

Touval, S. (1975) "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations". *Jerusalem Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.51-69.

Troebst, S. (1988) "Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998". *ECMI Working Paper #1*, European Centre for Minority Issues, pp.1-106.

Wall, Jr., J.A., Stark, J.B. and Standifer, R.L. (2001) "Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp.370-391.

Weller, M. (1999) "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo". *International Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp.211-251.

Wolff, S. (2002) "Conflict Management in Northern Ireland". *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.1-30.

Young, O.R. (1967) "Intermediaries and Interventionists: third parties in the Middle East Crisis". *International Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp.52-73.

Zartman, I.W. (2001) "Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments". *Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.8-18.

Zartman, I.W. and Touval, S. (1985) "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics". *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp.27-45.

BOOKS

Azar, E.E. (1990) *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited.

Beach, D. and Pedersen, R.B. (2012) *Process Tracing Method – Foundation and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Bercovitch, J. (1992) "The structure and diversity of mediation in international relations". In: J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., 1992. *Mediation in International Relations*. New York, NY: St Martin's, pp.1-29.

Bercovitch, J. (2007) "Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases". In: C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., 2007. *Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict*. Second Edition. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp.99-121.

Bercovitch, J. (2009) "Mediation and Conflict Resolution". In: J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, and I.W. Zartman, eds., 2009. *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*. London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, pp.340-357.

Berridge, G.R. (2002) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. Second Edition. New York, NY: Palgrave.

Bingham, G. (1985) *Resolving Environmental Disputes*. Washington, DC: The Conservation Foundation.

Burg, S.L. (2007) "Intractability and Third-Party Mediation in the Balkans". In: C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., 2007. *Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict*. Second Edition. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp.183-207.

Burton, J.W. (1969) *Conflict and Communication*. London, UK: Macmillan.

Burton, J. and Dukes, F. (1990) *Conflict: Practices, Settlement, and Resolution*. London, MacMillan.

Carnevale, P.J. (2002) "Mediating from Strength". In: J. Bercovitch, ed., 2002. *Studies in International Mediation*. New York, NY: Palgrave, pp.25-40.

Christopher, W. (1985) *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Coleman, P.T. (2006) "Intractable Conflict". In: M. Deutsch, P.T. Coleman and E.C. Marcus, eds., 2006. *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*. Second Edition. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp.533-559.

Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (1999) "Introduction". In: C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall, eds., 1999. *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp.3-18.

Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (1999) "Rising to the Challenge of Multiparty Mediation: Institutional Readiness, Policy Context, and Mediator Relationships". In: C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall, eds., 1999. *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp.665-699.

Deutsch, M. (2006) "Mediation and Difficult Conflicts". In: M.S. Herrman, ed., 2006. *The Blackwell Handbook of Mediation: Bridging Theory, Research, and Practice*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, pp.355-373.

Edmead, F. (1971) *Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation*. New York, NY: UNITAR Study.

Edwards, A. and McGrattan, C. (2010) *The Northern Ireland Conflict: A Beginner's Guide*. Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications.

Folberg, J. and Taylor, A. (1984) *Mediation*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hennessey, T. (2000) *The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles?* Dublin, Ireland: Gill & Macmillan.

Jackson, E. (1952) *Meeting of Minds*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Kochan, T.A. (1981) "Step-by-step in the Middle East from the perspective of the labour mediation process". In: J.Z. Rubin, ed., 1981. *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East*. New York, NY: Praeger, pp.122-135.

Kriesberg, L. (1982) *Social Conflicts*. Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Kressel, K. and Pruitt, D. (1989) *Mediation Research*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Lall, A. (1966) *Modern International Negotiation*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Lauer, R.H. (1981) *Temporal Man: The meaning and uses of social time*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Low, S. (1985) "The Zimbabwe Settlement, 1976-1979". In: S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, eds., 1985. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp.91-109.

Maundi, M.O., Zartman, I.W., Khadiagala, G. and Nuamah, K. (2006) *Getting In. Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Mill, J.S. (1843) *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Volume 1*. London: Echo Publishers.

Mitchell, C.R. (1981) *The Structure of International Conflict*. London: Macmillan.

Mitchell, G.J. (1999) *Making Peace*. London, UK: William Heinemann.

Moore, C.W. (1996) *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*. Second Edition. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Mulholland, M. (2002) *Northern Ireland: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Northedge, F. and Donelan, M. (1971) *International Disputes: The Political Aspects*. London, UK: Europa Publications.

Princen, T. (1992) *Intermediaries in International Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pruitt, D.G. (1981) *Negotiation Behaviour*. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Ramet, S.P. (1992) *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991*. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2011) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*. Third Edition. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Rubin, J.Z. (1981) "Introduction". In J.Z. Rubin, ed., 1981. *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Sick, G. (1985) "The Partial Negotiator: Algeria and the US Hostages in Iran". In S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, eds., 1985. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp.21-65.

Slim, R.M. (1992) "Small-state mediation in international relations: The Algerian mediation of the Iranian hostage crisis". In: J. Bercovitch and J.Z. Rubin, eds., 1992. *Mediation in international relations: Multiple approaches to conflict management*. New York, NY: St Martin's, pp.206-231.

Stedman, S.J. (1991) *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Touval, S. and Zartman, I.W. (1985) "Introduction: Mediation in Theory". In: S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, eds., 1985. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp.7-17.

Vuković, S. (2013) *Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes*. Doctoral Dissertation.

Wolfers, M. (1985) "The Organisation of African Unity as mediator". In: S. Touval and I.W. Zartman, eds., 1985. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview, pp.175-196.

Yarrow, C.H. (1978) *Quaker experiences in international conciliation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Young, O.R. (1967) *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, I.W. (1985) *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, I.W. (2000) "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond". In: P.C. Stern and D. Druchman, eds., 2000. *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, pp.225-250.

Zartman, I.W. and Touval, S. (1996) "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era". In: C. Crocker, F. Hampson and P. Aall, eds., 1996. *Managing Global Chaos*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp.445-461.

TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS

1921 Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland (Anglo-Irish Treaty)

1985 Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom (Anglo-Irish Agreement)

1993 Joint Declaration (Downing Street Declaration)

1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland

UN REPORTS

Eide, K. (2005) *A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo*, New York, NY. United Nations Security Council document S/2005/635. Available at: *www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf* [Accessed 25 May 2013]

Ki-Moon, B. (2009) *Report of the Secretary General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities*, New York, NY. United Nations Security Council Document S/2009/189. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=49e6f2880 [Accessed 12 May 2013]

WEBSITES

BBC News (2012) "Violence in Belfast after council votes to change Union flag policy". *BBC News* [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20587538 [Accessed 24 March 2013]

Darby, J. (2003) "Northern Ireland: The background to the Peace Process". *CAIN Web Service* [Online] Available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm [Accessed 22 May 2013]

Economic and Social Research Council, ESRC (2001) "The 1998 Referendums". [Online] Available at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm [Accessed 23 May 2013]

MacGinty, R. (1998) "The Irish Peace Process − Background Briefing". *CAIN Web Service* [Online] Available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/bac.htm [Accessed 22 May 2013]

Malveaux, S. (2007) "Bush: UN Must Act Now on Kosovo". *CNN* [Online] Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/06/10/bush.europe/ [Accessed 26 May 2013]

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (2012) "Curve of Conflict". [Online] Available at: http://www.buildingpeace.org/think-global-conflict/curve-conflict [Accessed 18 April 2013]