



# THE BEST KEPT SECRET

EXPLAINING WARTIME RAPE  
IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

JANA MATEJKOVA  
MASTER THESIS



## **Cover photograph © Álvaro Malo**

The large marble group of *The Rape of Proserpina* by Gian Lorenzo Bernini, shows Pluto, powerful god of the underworld, abducting Proserpina, daughter of Ceres. Seen from the left, the group shows Pluto taking a fast and powerful stride and grasping Proserpina.

The group was executed between 1621 and 1622. Cardinal Scipione gave it to Cardinal Ludovisi in 1622, and it remained in his villa until 1908, when it was purchased by the Italian state and returned to the Borghese Collection (excerpt from [www.galleriaborghese.it](http://www.galleriaborghese.it)).

LEIDEN UNIVERSITY  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES  
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

JANA MATEJKOVA

MASTER THESIS

---

# THE BEST KEPT SECRET

~

EXPLAINING WARTIME RAPE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

---

FIRST READER:

DR. NIELS J. G. VAN WILLIGEN

*(Leiden University)*

SECOND READER:

PROF. DR. MADELEINE O. HOSLI

*(Leiden University)*

LEIDEN, 13 JUNE 2014

## **Acknowledgements**

I am extremely grateful to Dr. Niels J. G. van Willigen; Dr. Adam W. Chalmers and Prof. Dr. Galen A. Irwin for their valuable comments, corrections and guidance. Without their advice, input and support, this thesis would not exist. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Madeleine O. Hosli for serving as the second reader for this thesis. I must also mention Dara Kay Cohen and James Fearon from Harvard and Stanford University respectively, who shared their research without hesitation. Special thanks must go to my friends and all of the people associated with the Masters in International Relations and Diplomacy, who have ensured that my time in Leiden has been an incredible experience. Finally, the greatest deal of gratitude goes to my family for their continued support and encouragement throughout my university career.

## **Abstract**

*Wartime rape has been part of the armed conflicts from time immemorial. In today's conflicts, armed groups use rape against the civilian population as a weapon, a tactic, strategy, and a means to exterminating the enemy. Wartime rape is a difficult phenomenon to explain, generalize and ultimately stop given the variance of factors and actors involved. When civil war became the primary form of warfare around the world in the 1990s, wartime rape became one the essential components of prosecuting warfare.*

*The aim of this thesis is to explain the high prevalence of wartime rape in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Drawing on contemporary theories used to explain the rationale behind wartime rape (gender inequality, ethnic hatred, genocidal rape and strategic rape), this thesis argues that the subordinate position of women, ethnic cleavage, the occurrence of genocide and forcible recruitment implying hierarchy increase the level of wartime rape. Using a mixed method, the first stage comprises a statistical analysis exposing the general trends, which are surprisingly contrary to expectation. The subsequent case studies – Rwanda and the DRC – argue that the high level of wartime rape in the Great Lakes region is the result of a spill over effect and all its related implications and complications.*

## Abbreviations

AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire ( <i>eng. Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo</i> )
AI	Amnesty International
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIRI	The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie ( <i>eng. National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy</i> )
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises ( <i>eng. Rwandan Armed Forces</i> )
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo ( <i>eng. The Armed Forces of the DRC</i> )
HHI	Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
<i>Interhamwe</i>	Literally ‘ <i>those who fight together</i> ’
<i>Inyenzi</i>	‘ <i>cockroach</i> ’ in Kinyarwanda, frequently used by Hutu in regard to Tutsi
LRA	Lord’s Resistance Army
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie ( <i>eng. Congolese Rally for Democracy, sometimes Rally for Congolese Democracy</i> )
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank

# Table of Contents

<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>PART I: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS</b>	
<b>1. CONCEPT DEFINITION.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>2. LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>3. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>4. RESEARCH DESIGN .....</b>	<b>24</b>
4.1. CASE SELECTION .....	24
4.1.1. <i>The Situation in the Region</i> .....	24
4.1.2. <i>Regional Security Complex Theory</i> .....	24
4.2. METHODOLOGY.....	25
4.2.1. <i>Statistical Analysis</i> .....	26
4.2.2. <i>Case Studies</i> .....	26
4.3. OPERATIONALIZATION .....	27
4.3.1. <i>Dependent Variable</i> .....	27
4.3.2. <i>Independent Variables</i> .....	28
4.3.3. <i>Limitations of the Data</i> .....	31
<b>PART II: ANALYSIS</b>	
<b>5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>33</b>
5.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS .....	33
5.2. ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS.....	36
<b>6. CASE STUDIES.....</b>	<b>40</b>
6.1. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS .....	40
6.1.1. <i>Rwanda</i> .....	40
6.1.2. <i>Democratic Republic of Congo</i> .....	43
6.2. LEVEL OF RAPE IN RWANDA AND THE DRC .....	48
6.2.1. <i>Wartime rape in Rwanda</i> .....	48
6.2.2. <i>Wartime rape in DRC</i> .....	57
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>APPENDIX.....</b>	<b>80</b>

## INTRODUCTION

Sexual violence in armed conflict and wartime rape has been part of the spoils of war from time immemorial. A long dismissed yet inevitable consequence of the conflict is now widely recognised as an important problem of international security. Wartime rape is intended to terrorize the population, break up families, destroy communities, or even change the ethnic make-up of the next generation. Occasionally, it is used to deliberately spread disease, such as HIV, or render women incapable of bearing children. Its ruinous effects on victims, perpetrators and local communities leave deeply traumatized populations. Furthermore, wartime rape can have devastating repercussions for international security, as it threatens prospects for peace and postconflict reconstruction.

No part of the world has been unaffected by wartime rape. Asia, Europe, and Americas: they all were affected by wartime rape. The Great Lakes region of Africa is no exception. Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (henceforth the DRC), Rwanda and Uganda have been plagued by decades of political instability, porous borders and humanitarian crises, along with internal and cross-border conflicts and widespread violence. Within these conflicts, sexual violence in armed conflict has emerged as a prominent *modus operandi*. To illustrate, in the DRC forty-eight women are raped every hour (Peterman, Palermo and Bredenkamp, 2011: 1064). Unsurprisingly, this makes the DRC the “rape capital of the world” (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2013: 5). During the Rwandan genocide, up to half a million women were raped<sup>1</sup>. Today, seventy per cent of Rwanda’s population is female, and arguably the vast majority have lived through rape (HRW, 1996). Additionally, armed militias and combatants have started using HIV as a weapon of war (Islam and Pollock, 2014: 3).

Although scholars may agree about the use of strategic and systemic rape as a weapon of war, there are many unanswered questions regarding the level of its occurrence. What affects the level of wartime rape? Have the countries of the Great Lakes region been plagued by the wartime rape because of the similarities that exist among them? More interestingly, *why is the level of wartime rape high in the Great Lakes region?*

The primary goal of this Master thesis is to explain the high level of wartime rape in the Great Lakes region. To put it another way, this thesis sets out to discover whether certain factors can be held accountable to contributing to the quintessence of wartime rape in the

---

<sup>1</sup> No precise number is available on the precise number of people who were raped and/or murdered; estimates vary widely: from 15,700 to 500,000 victims (Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, 2007: 55).

region, and if so, what factors are they. The peripheral purpose of this research is to see whether the regional security complex theory, advanced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, can not only explain the case selection, but also support and rationalize the arguments set forth in this research with regard to the high level of wartime rape in the region.

In order to address the topic, research question and aims of this Master thesis, the existing explanations for wartime rape are tested using a dataset of all armed conflicts in the period of 1948-2009 and subsequently explanatory case studies focusing on the selected region are conducted. Arguably, the cultural and spatial proximity and security interdependence of the countries in African Great Lakes region has led to the cross-border spread of violence and conflict, in which wartime rape played an exclusive role. Furthermore, the increase in wartime rape is possibly a dire consequence of the aforementioned characteristics of the countries in the region.

This thesis is structured into seven chapters as follows. Firstly, it is necessary to conceptually define the dependent variable of the study: wartime rape. Furthermore, it is appropriate to draw a distinguishing line between the terms 'wartime rape' and 'sexual violence', which may seem to be interchangeable. However, as demonstrated by the definition, wartime rape is not an assault parallel to sexual violence, but rather an integral component. The second chapter discussed what has been written so far on wartime rape in general as well as about four frequently cited approaches – gender inequality, ethnic hatred, genocidal rape and strategic rape – used in this research. The third chapter presents theories based on frequently cited approaches to explaining the level of wartime rape. Additionally, it develops the hypotheses to be tested in statistical analysis and subsequently in the two case studies. In the fourth chapter, the research design is presented with specific focus on the chosen methodology (statistical analysis and case study approach). Moreover, the chapter discusses the case selection based on regional security complex theory and the situation in the region with regard to the level of wartime rape and the operationalization of used variables. The fifth chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the descriptive statistical analysis results. It highlights the general trend in explaining the prevalence of wartime rape in regard to chosen theories. The statistical analysis demonstrates the importance of ethnic cleavage and argues that contrary to the expectations ethnic war is not the exemplary environment for the heightened level of wartime rape. In the following chapter, the two cases – Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo – are firstly put into context by presenting geographical, historical and political contextual factors. The chapter continues by considering these two cases through the lens of the four theories noted

above in order to identify those variables that could have an impact on the level of wartime rape in Rwanda and the DRC. Finally, chapter seven concludes with implications for further research.

---

## PART I: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

---

# 1. CONCEPT DEFINITION

In the last few decades, humanity has invented the most sophisticated weapons ever known: nuclear bombs, guided bombs, chemical weapons. Yet in recent years armies have increasingly turned back to the oldest forms of attack – rape (Barstow, 2000: 45).

Rape constitutes a crime under international humanitarian law as well as under domestic criminal law of many countries (UNSC, 1994: 27, Art. J, para. 102). The definition of rape itself is somewhat contested at the International Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, with some judgements using a definition of rape as “a physical invasion of sexual nature” and others defining rape in terms of penetration by specified body parts (De Brouwer, 2005: 105–129; MacKinnon, 2006; Hubbard, 2012, Sajjad, 2012). Thus, this research follows these definitions used by international war crimes tribunals<sup>2</sup>, and Wood (2006: 308–309; 2008: 322–323), and defines rape as:

*“the coerced (under physical force or threat of physical force against the victim or a third person) penetration of the anus or vagina by the penis or another object, or of the mouth by the penis<sup>3</sup>.”*

Rape falls within the broader category of sexual violence, which can be defined “as any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality” (Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, 1996, quoted in UN ECOSOC, 1998: 7, paras 20–22). Wood (2006: 308–309; 2008: 322–323) defines sexual violence as “a broader category that includes rape, coerced undressing and non-penetrating sexual assault” as well as a variety of other forms of violence. Thus, the term can even extend to describe situations in which two victims are forced to perform sexual acts on one another or to harm one another in a sexual manner, in order to inflict severe humiliation or to intimidate the larger community (ICC, 2014: 3; UN ECOSOC, 1998: 8, para. 22).

---

<sup>2</sup> Rape as defined in the 2002 *Foca* case (ICTY) is “[t]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) [of] the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. [...] The *mens rea* is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim” (IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, paras. 127–133). In the judgement of the *Akayesu* case (ICTR), rape was defined as “[t]he physical invasion of sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive” (ICTR-96-4-T, para. 688). It is not limited to the insertion of a penis into victim’s vagina or anus or the insertion of a penis in the mouth of the victim.

<sup>3</sup> Thus both men and women can be the victims.

However wartime rape is not all of a kind. According to Barstow (2000: 11), three kinds are distinguishable. First, individual rapes are the assaults some commit, whether in military or civilian life. Their purpose is almost always to assert power over another. Individual rape damages the victim and ruins their life (ibid).

In contrast with individual rape, mass rape is used to terrorize communities. Used as a strategy of war, mass rape is carefully planned by armies and paramilitaries. Often taking the form of ‘rape-and-kill’ (ibid), that is after being assaulted, the victims are murdered, this form of rape “[lead/s] to some of the deepest feelings of hatred and revenge that war can produce” (ibid). It can change the balance between ethnic, racial, or religious groups. In establishing the racial superiority of one group over another, it can even alter regional balance (Barstow, 2000: 45).

Military sexual slavery is yet another kind of wartime rape. The purpose is to satisfy the sexual desire of the army by supplying women, virtually always from a different national group. Military sexual slavery destroys both women’s lives and also leaves a scar upon their communities and upon the relations between states. Barstow argues that it is not prostitution, since women and girls were forced into military brothels and did not make the choice to become prostitute (ibid).

Although it is possible to identify at least three kinds of rape, this research will not make such distinctions, and thus will treat all the aforementioned kinds as ‘equal’ in its contribution to the level of reported wartime rape. Additionally, the dataset used in this research does not make such distinctions.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Wartime rape has been a constant feature of warfare, perpetrated by armed groups throughout history. Even though some scholars argue that prevalence, brutality and systemic organization of wartime rape increased in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Barstow, 2000:8; Brownmiller, 1975; MacKinnon, 1994b; Sajor, 1998: 3), most point to the timeless ubiquity of the phenomenon. Wartime rape can be traced back to early accounts in the Torah, in Homer, the days of Helen of Troy, in the petty wars of Ancient Greeks or indeed in the conquest of Rome. Rape is well documented in the Anglo-Saxon and Chinese chronicles, during the crusades and Viking marauding, in Alexander's conquest of Persia but also in Medieval European warfare, when the licence to rape was a major incentive to enlist in the army. Mass rape occurred during the Rape of Nanking<sup>4</sup> in 1927; numerous instances were reported during World War II. In the 1990s, wartime rape had plagued Africa, where combatants have discovered that rape is cheaper than bullets (Barstow, 2000; Bourke, 2007; Brownmiller, 1975; Gottschall, 2004; Leatherman, 2011; Pufong and Swain, 2008: 242; Schott, 2011: 6–7; Seifert, 1996: 37; Wachala, 2012: 533–535).

Card (1996) and Bartrop (2012) go even further, stating, “rape in war [...] has even arrived in the movies”. The *Death and the Maiden*<sup>5</sup> features a woman, who survived rape by a physician overseeing her political torture; *Rob Roy*<sup>6</sup> portrays strategic rape by an English nobleman, and *Immortal Beloved*<sup>7</sup>, briefly shows apparently voluntary rape. Arguably, even the *Braveheart*<sup>8</sup> depicts imperial rape in the “rite of the first night”. Nonetheless, rape often remains history's greatest silences for years or even decades (AI, 2004; Anderson, 2010: 246; Buss, 2009: 153–160). Wachala (2012) concurs by stating that it was not until World War I that reliable documentary evidence could be found.

Despite the lack of evidence, one thing has always been clear: wartime rape can have devastating repercussions for international security. Brutal perpetration of forced sexual act leads to ruinous effects on victims and communities. Apart from the immediate acts of savagery, wartime rape penalises its victims by means of its long-lasting consequences. The communities are left deeply traumatized with broken familial and social links, yet it is the victim, who is

---

<sup>4</sup> The Second Sino-Japanese War.

<sup>5</sup> A 1994 film directed by Roman Polanski and based on a play (1990) by Chilean playwright Ariel Dorfman.

<sup>6</sup> A 1995 film directed by Michael Caton-Jones. Based on the life of an 18th-century Scottish historical figure.

<sup>7</sup> A 1994 film about the life of Ludwig van Beethoven.

<sup>8</sup> A 1995 film directed by Mel Gibson. Based on the story of William Wallace, a 13th-century Scottish warrior who led the Scots in the First War of Scottish Independence against King Edward I of England.

ostracized, stigmatized, disowned or abandoned. This is of course not to mention the practical consequences, such as protection and economic support deprivation, sexually transmitted diseases and forced pregnancies that further contribute to the isolation of the victim (AI, 2004; Branche, 2012; Brownmiller, 1975; Cohen, 2013a: 461; Copelon, 1994: 206; Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 111; Farr, 2009: 2; Kohn 1994: 203; Hansen, 2001: 55; Leatherman, 2011, MacKinnon, 1994b: 75; Seifert, 1994: 62; Puechguirbal, 2012, Salzman, 2000). Moreover, wartime rape is used to keep the communities in a constant state of fear and as such, threatens the hopes for peace and post-conflict reconstruction (Anderson, 2010; Nitsán, 2012: 159; Plümper and Neumayer, 2006). Nonetheless, it is necessary to note that the literature, which takes into account the individual as well as societal repercussions, tends to be rather homogenous and as such, does not provide a sufficient range of explanation for the level of wartime rape.

Similarly, and despite the fact that wartime rape has been a distinctive feature of numerous conflicts, even the juristic scholarship fails to explain why certain levels of sexual violence occurred in particular conflicts (Branche, 2012). It was not until the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR in the early 1990s that made the international community consider wartime rape and sexual violence in general as a threat and possible impediment the restoration of international peace and security (Anderson, 2010: 245–246, UNSC, 2008). Crawford (2013: 506) states that “unprecedented coverage of these atrocities by the international media and transnational human rights networks shed light on an issue that was ignored for far too long”. Since then, wartime rape has been frequently studied from legal and human rights perspectives as the international tribunals and courts has defined wartime rape as a breach of international law, and wartime sexual violence as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and an act of genocide, and set precedents which previous tribunals had been unwilling or unable to accomplish (Branche, 2012: 6; Buss, 2009: 146; Crawford, 2013: 509; Eboe-Osuji, 2007; ICC, 2014: 9; UN, 1998b; Wachala, 2012). Thus, while the juristic scholarship is able to capture the legal nuances and distinguish rape as a crime against humanity from rape as an act of genocide, it is nevertheless not only unable to explain the prevalence but renders the variation in almost all aspects of wartime rape as a (party/un-) solved mystery.

### *Variation in Wartime Rape*

Recent scholarship suggests that wartime rape varies widely (Cohen, 2013a: 461; Leatherman, 2011; Leiby, 2009; Wood, 2006; 2008; 2009). Rape may be widespread in some conflicts but not in others. Benard (1994) argues that wartime rape occurs in all or most

conflicts. Indeed, no part of the world has been unaffected by wartime rape. Tens of thousands of women have been raped in the DRC. In Colombia widespread rape has become an integral part of the conflict and even lesser known conflicts, such as those of the Solomon Islands, have witnessed rape and sexual violence (AI, 2004; Cohen, Green and Wood, 2013: 3; Farr, 2009; HRW, 1996; HRW, 2003; UN, 2006: 181). Whereas Benard highlights the omnipresence of rape, Bourke (2007), Cohen, Green and Wood (2013: 2) and Wood (2006; 2008; 2009) oppose Benard's assertion and claim that it is limited in some and widespread in others. Wood (2009: 133) gives the example of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which rape appears to be very rare contrary to other violations of laws of war.

However, there is an enormous degree of variation across all aspects of wartime rape (Leatherman, 2011; Wood, 2006; 2008; 2009). AI (2004) refers to the variety of forms, both psychological and physical. Bloom (1999 quoted in Cohen, 2013a: 461) claims that it is most likely to occur in ethnic wars, while others generally point to the gender inequality and Galtung's structural violence as an explanation (Caprioli, 2005; Leatherman, 2011; Lee-Koo, 2002; MacKinnon, 1994b). Stigmayer's book entitled *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia* (1994) focuses on rape as a weapon of war, and thus is akin to the works of Allen (1996), Copelon (1994), Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2013), Kohn (1994), MacKinnon (1994a) or Seifert (1994). Rape can serve as an instrument of genocide (Askin, 2003; MacKinnon, 1994a; Mullins, 2009a; 2009b; Sharlach, 2000: 89), an engine of war (Copelon, 1994: 205), or as a war tactic (Barstow, 2000; Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 111; Tompkins, 1995: 859). In other words, these terms reflect a conception of rape as having a function or use (Copelon, 1994: 206; Kohn 1994: 203; MacKinnon, 1994b: 75; Seifert, 1994: 55, 62). In *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape* (1975), Brownmiller established a touchstone for later scholarship, when she formulated that rape expresses the power of domination exercised by men over women, seemingly amplified by war.

Though variation in wartime rape evokes a slightly uncoordinated attempt to use environment as a means of explaining the occurrence and prevalence of wartime rape, it is viable to identify four core arguments for the explanation of the presence and level of wartime rape: gender inequality, ethnic hatred, genocide and strategic rape. These four arguments are further developed below and furthermore served as the core arguments for this research.

### ***Gender Inequality***

The problem of wartime rape was first systematically investigated, documented and publicized by *feminist* scholars and activists. In their view, war is one of the most gendered

human activities, during which rape, like rape in peace, is not a crime of sexual passion but a crime motivated by desire to dominate women and as such constitutes a threat to women's security (Barstow, 2000; Bonilla, 2012: 81; Brownmiller, 1975; Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2013; Gottschall, 2004: 130; Jaleel, 2013; Lee-Koo, 2002; Mookherjee, 2012; Seifert, 1996; Stiglmyer, 1994). Card (1996: 7) considers "rape a cross-cultural language of male domination." With conviction, Brownmiller (1975) observed that "[m]an's discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries" (Brownmiller, 1975: 14; Buss, 2009: 148).

Along with human rights advocates, feminist scholars argue that it is possible to identify a relationship between gender inequality and wartime rape. According to their point of view, gender inequality promotes acceptance of patriarchy – ranging from control over reproduction to control over productive labour – hence, gender is used as a criterion to determine access to power and, according to AI, their bodies, sexuality and reproductive capacity used as a battleground. However, if women are perceived as second-class citizens in peacetime, their position will further deteriorate when there is unrest. What is more, gendered violence allows men to inflict psychological harm on women and their societies. (AI, 2004; Benard, 1994; Caprioli, 2005: 165; Carrillo, 1991; Cohen, 2013a: 463; Crawford, 2013: 515; Goldstein, 2001; Kaplan, 1994; Leatherman, 2011; Peterson; 1998; Rittner and Roth, 2012; Seifert, 1996; Turshen, 2001, Wood, 2006). Stiglmyer (1994: 84) even stated that "because [women] are women, men are using against them their most effective weapon: rape." In opposition to Brownmiller, Stiglmyer and other feminist scholars, Cohen, Green and Wood (2013:5) argue that neither patriarchy nor given opportunity satisfactorily explain the variation in wartime rape.

Put differently, the high prevalence of wartime rape is of a complex nature and thus requires more than one influencing factor within a conflict.

### ***Ethnic Hatred***

During the Cold War, political scientists and sociologists often desired to explain the sources of rebellion. However as Connor (1994) emphasizes, only few have argued that the real source is one of ethnic nature. One of the clearest Cold War exceptions is Horowitz's influential book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985). Horowitz argues that plural societies are more prone to conflict, and at a level of extreme violence. In his opinion, ethnic conflicts are more likely than any other conflicts, such as those underpinned by politics or ideology, to turn violent. Fearon (2006: 682) builds upon Horowitz's postulations by adding that ethnic conflicts engage emotions and the sense of existential threat.

The end of the Cold War brought about a paradigm shift, thanks to which the culturalist perspectives became dominant in explaining inter- and intranational conflict (Caprioli, 2000; 2003; 2005: 162; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 78; Tessler and Warriner, 1997). This shift meant that the role of domestic culture and the role of ethnicity in predicting conflict would come to be emphasized to the extent that ethnic hatred is frequently cited as a nurturing environment for extreme violence, including wartime rape (AI, 2004; Ayres, 2000; Branche, 2012: 8; Fox, 2001; Gurr, 1994; Henderson, 1997; Horowitz, 1985; Plümper and Neumayer, 2006). Additionally, if ethnic war is driven by an armed secessionist campaign, the probability of widespread rape may increase (Cohen, Green and Wood, 2013: 3–4). Along these lines, rape represents not only a disrespect towards the central government, but it is mainly present as a means of expressing contempt or ethnic hatred within a conflict.

### ***Genocidal Rape***

Contrary to the proponents of the ethnic hatred arguments, some scholars argue that genocidal/*political* wars are more likely to feature rape as a “technique” (Mullins, 2009b: 721), though according to Weitsman (2008), motivations vary. Nonetheless, one thing stays the same: genocide targets people on the basis of who they are, rather than on the basis of what they have done, what they might do, or even what they are capable of doing (Card, 2003: 72; Waller, 2012).

Mullins (2009b: 721) and MacKinnon (1994a) and other feminist scholars refer to “genocidal rape”. Branche (2012: 10) emphasizes the biological domination through control of the bodies and reproductive capacity, while Nikolic-Rastanovic (1996: 202) sees forced pregnancy as an extremely cruel form of torture. Diken and Laustsen (2005: 111), together with Lee-Koo (2002: 529) and Copelon (1998: 79) denote to wartime rape as an integral aspect of ethnic cleansing. AI (2004) and Anderson (2010: 253) hint at the purposeful infection with HIV as a tool of genocide. At its worst, wartime rape is used as a eugenic strategy to “impurify” progeny, or simply as a prologue to mass murder (Allen, 1996; HRW, 1996; MacKinnon, 1994a, 1994b, Schott, 2011; Stiglmeier, 1994). All these claims may be supported by Buss (2009: 150) who stated that while in Yugoslavia rape was used to procreate, in Rwanda, rape was largely carried out with lethal aims. In Card’s words (1996: 8) wartime rape decimates any cultural and social bonds. However, contrary to MacKinnon and others, Copelon (1994) disagrees with the exceptionalism of rape as genocide due to the fact that it would set high a marker that may obliterate less exceptional forms of sexual violence.

Some scholars, such as Anderson (2010: 250); Buss (2009: 149); Eboe-Osuji (2007); Jaleel (2013); MacKinnon (1994a) and Sharlach (2009: 89) and even AI (2004) nevertheless argue that rape fits the definition of genocide in the *1948 Genocide Convention*<sup>9</sup> as it manifests the same the same intent: to harm and eventually eradicate members of a group. This logic is exquisitely formulated by MacKinnon (1994a: 11–12), who states: “[...] It is specifically rape under orders. This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. [...] [*It is rape as genocide*].” Thus, unsurprisingly, rape as genocide can be considered as part of a strategy.

### ***Strategic Rape***

“Strategic rape theory is currently the most influential theory of mass wartime rape. It is widely credited by activists and scholars and largely taken for granted by international commissions and journalists” (Gottschall, 2004: 131). Nonetheless, even though rape and war have existed in symbiotic relationship since time immemorial, Anderson (2010: 247) acknowledges that this ancient atrocity has taken on a strategic twist. Indeed, Copelon (1994: 206); Kohn (1994: 203); MacKinnon (1994b: 75) and Seifert (1994: 55) recognize that rape as a weapon of war reflects a conception of rape as having a function or use in furthering various goals.

In the wake of the systemic use of rape in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, activists, scholars and policymakers started to consider wartime rape and sexual violence as a weapon. Starting with Brownmiller (1975), the scholarship agrees that wholesale rape represents just another ordinance, like bombs, bullets or propaganda, to achieve strategic objectives. This claim is further supported by Allen (1996); Cohen; Green and Wood (2013: 10); Kamal (1998) and Littlewood (1997), who describe wartime rape as a coordinated and logical means of prosecuting warfare. Buss (2009: 148–149); Crawford (2013: 510) and Niarchos (1995: 658) refer to the systematic, pervasive, or officially orchestrated aspect of wartime rape. Furthermore, Crawford (2013: 510), together with AI (2004); Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2013: 42–63); Gottschall (2004: 131) and Weitsman (2008: 563), highlight the designated use of rape as a weapon of war, that is to intimidate, degrade, humiliate and torture the enemy, both individuals and communities. Cohen; Green and Wood (2013: 10) point out the purposeful adoption of wartime rape in pursuit of group objectives, in order to distinguish strategic rape from massive/frequent wartime rape.

---

<sup>9</sup> The Convention makes no specific reference to rape.

Nonetheless, Cohen; Green and Wood (2013: 10) warn that frequent use of wartime rape does not necessarily mean strategy, tool or a weapon of war and vice versa.

### 3. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

This research wishes to contribute the existing scholarship by scrutinizing the most frequently cited arguments concerning the level of wartime rape in armed conflict. Therefore, in order to answer the research question, this thesis adopts gender inequality; ethnic hatred; genocide/politicide, and strategic rape theory as four central theories to explain the level of wartime rape in the Great Lakes region.

The chapter is thereby dedicated to the formulation of adopted theories and development of hypotheses based on these theories to aid in answering the central research question of this thesis. These will first be scrutinized in the descriptive statistical analysis. Subsequently, case studies will be carried out in order to peer back into nation's histories, and to test the proposed hypotheses.

#### *Gender Inequality*<sup>10</sup>

Violence against women in Africa takes various shapes, from unpaid labour and exploitation, battering, sexual abuse and harassment, to [*being treated as second-class citizens or non-humans*] (UN, 1995 quoted in Muchina, 2000: 104). Each day, the rights of African women are violated; they continue to lose their fundamental rights, such as rights to well-being, economic development, to education and health services, etc. (Muchina: 2000: 104). Furthermore, African women continue to be excluded from decision-making processes. In other words, they are denied the right to determine the political and/or economic systems they live in (ibid: 105).

Presuming that gender rights are not encoded in laws, women may have inadequate access to education, employment, and political power. Moreover, women may thus be perceived as subordinate to men. In other words, their position in the society is presumably weaker than the position of men within that same society. Brownmiller (1975: 20 of 733) argues that “[rape is] the ultimate test of his superior strength, the triumph of his manhood. [...] It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which *all men* keep *all women* in a state of fear.” This research argues that this view is emphasized by the presence of an armed conflict in the country, within which men may use rape as an expression of dominance over women. Thus, it is possible to identify a relationship between gender inequality and level of wartime rape (see e.g. Hansen, 2001: 60; Lee-Koo, 2002: 528).

---

<sup>10</sup> Gender biased hypothesis.

***H1: The higher the gender inequality, the higher the level of wartime rape during the conflict.***

### ***Ethnic Hatred***

Fury and hatred may be powerful factors in war and violence (Hintjens, 2001: 26). Unsurprisingly then, many frequently cite ethnic hatred as an almost perfect environment for violence, including wartime rape (e.g. AI, 2004; Horowitz, 1985; Plümper and Neumayer, 2006). Furthermore, emotions are heightened and a sense of existential threat is omnipresent (Fearon, 2006: 862). To illustrate: by the 1950s the Belgians managed to rewrite Rwandans' social identities: Tutsi came to be redefined in negative terms, while Hutu were gradually transformed into "authentic" inhabitants (Hintjens, 2001: 31–32). The outcome of such environment is more than well known.

The heterogeneity of society can either lead to a peaceful cohabitation, but also to widespread violence. This research explores the latter and argues that if society in the country is not ethnically homogenous, the cleavages (however not necessarily only ethnic) may lead to the outbreak of a conflict. Additionally, the ethnic division may and can appear also on the brink of a conflict or during the very early stages. Thus, if the conflict may be described as ambiguous, in which one of the cleavages is of ethnic origin; or "purely" ethnic, then wartime rape is used as means of expressing hatred towards members of the "other" ethnic group.

***H2: If the factor of ethnicity is present, then the level of wartime rape increases.***

### ***Genocidal Rape***

Arguably, genocidal wars are more likely to feature wartime rape than ethnic wars. The term "genocide" is intermittently used to describe the intention of extinction, or attempted extinction, of an [*ethnic*] or religious group. In the long-term, the eugenic use of wartime rape may be used to "purify" the ethnicity, which may be deemed equable to genocide. Correspondingly, the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and/or "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" constitute the crime of genocide (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: Art. II, paras. b, c). Thus, it is argued that rape falls within the

category as it may cause serious physical and/or mental injury to the survivor as well as to the whole community (Sharlach, 2000: 89).

According to Harff (2005), “[politicide] is the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized group.” Put differently, the political opposition to the regime and dominant groups are the decisive factors of socialization.

For the purposes of this research, the logic is as follows. The more tense is an ethnic/political environment of a country, the more likely is the outbreak of ambiguous/ethnic war. However, the situation may deteriorate further, such as by introduction of identity cards or hate propaganda. In such scenarios, genocide/politicide, in which the wartime rape is an integral tactic, may be perpetrated with the intention to bring about the destruction of and/or inflict harm on the whole community.

***H3: If genocide/politicide takes place during the armed conflict, the level of wartime rape will be higher than in the conflict sans genocide.***

### ***Strategic Rape***

Since the Yugoslavian and Rwandan mass rapes, the international community began to analyse wholesale rape as just another form of ordinance, like bombs, bullets, or propaganda, used to attain strategic objectives. In this sense, wartime rape is an ordered, coordinated and logical means of executing warfare by combatant groups<sup>11</sup> (Allen, 1996; Barstow, 2000).

Combatant groups may arise through voluntary as well as forcible recruitment mechanisms. Voluntary mechanisms consist of enlistment into the combatant group, generally armed forces. At the other end of the spectrum are forcible recruitment mechanisms, namely conscription and pressganging, also known as impressment, through which combatant groups are formed. For the purposes of this research, only forcible recruitment mechanisms are studied.

While considering the strategic rape theory, two forms of forcible recruitment are put under scrutiny as both imply hierarchy within the military affairs of the country. In the military history, recruitment originally meant reinforcement. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that in order to initiate any type of large-scale conflict, a [*leader*] must gather a force sufficient

---

<sup>11</sup> Covering both state and non-state groups.

to execute the plans (Haughton and Bicheno, 2004). The first form is conscription, also known as compulsory enrolment of personnel for service in the armed forces. The other form is known as pressganging (impressment). This antiquated practice, which is surprisingly common in modern wars, is described as kidnapping fighters into service without notice (Cohen, 2013a: 468). Thus, the distinguishing factor is the presence of force in the case of pressganging. However, it is important to point out that the type of recruitment mechanism is exogenously given. That said, the questions of how combatant groups choose recruitment mechanisms has not yet been answered (Cohen, 2013a: 465, note 14).

This research asserts that the presence of an armed conflict calls out for conscription and/or pressganging. The use of such practice implies hierarchy, as the decision to conscript and/or pressgang had to be made in the higher ranks. Furthermore, it also implies hierarchy within the units. The probability that those who ordered recruitment in the first place would not be of lower ranking is high, as well as the improbability of reducing their military ranking. From the superior position, they can order the fighters to use strategic rape as another ordinance of warfare.

*H4: If conscription is used, then the level of wartime rape is higher<sup>12</sup>.*

*H5: If pressganging is used, then the level of wartime rape is higher<sup>13</sup>.*

However, it is necessary to focus the attention back to voluntary recruitment mechanisms, a mechanism commonly associated with professional armies. This research argues that the presence of conscription and pressganging implies hierarchy. In other words, the causal mechanism behind the increased level of wartime rape hierarchy. Thus if, voluntary recruitment mechanism is used, the combatant enlist into an army with a chain of command that is, a, straightforward hierarchical structure.

Based on the causal mechanism, the voluntary recruitment mechanism and the existence of a professional army with a chain of command shall lead to an increased level of wartime rape. Indeed, throughout military history, it is common to find sexual crimes committed by military personnel: Rape of Nanking, Comfort Women in Japan and Taiwan, or even rape-murder cases committed by the US military personnel stationed in South Korea (1992), Japan (1995) and

---

<sup>12</sup> Alternative hypothesis: If conscription is used, the level of the occurrence of (strategic) wartime rape would be lower. This can be explained by fighters' obedience to the command.

<sup>13</sup> Alternative hypothesis: If pressganging is used, the level of the occurrence of (strategic) wartime rape would be lower. This can be explained by fighters' obedience to the command. Nonetheless, this argument is not entirely plausible as fighters may feel hate towards the kidnapped and disobey the orders. However, this is solely based on the author's thinking, which is in no way influenced by the experience of an armed conflict.

Kosovo (2000) (Barstow, 2000: 13–43; Lee, 2009: 11). Through the process of institutionalizing hegemonic masculinity<sup>14</sup> – the culture of military organizations – the recruits begin to treat bravery, [*use of violence, and tolerance of violence to achieve domination, including domination over women*] as the basic assumptions of military behaviour (Lee, 2009: 14).

Contrary to the forcible recruited combat groups in which hierarchy is exploited for the issuing of orders and rape is used to achieve strategic objectives, the descent of the professional army into sexual assault seems to be driven more by the military life itself than by strategic objectives. Even though such a bold claim requires further investigation, due to the scope of this research and the limitations presented by the dataset, namely the lack of voluntary recruitment mechanism variables, this hypothesis will not be considered.

Furthermore, as in the cases of conscription and pressganging, it is possible to formulate strong alternative hypothesis which considers the opposite relationship, that is, if voluntary recruitment is used, then the level of wartime rape will decrease.

---

<sup>14</sup> First, military training causes separation from family, friends, girlfriends and wives. This separation disorients individuals and creates a new world with gendered structure. Second, during military training, individual recruits are forced to learn skills, to speak certain vocabularies and to rebuild their bodies. Furthermore, as part of the transformation into ‘killing machines’, recruits are taught marching chants that denigrate women and children, making them feel as part of a special, heroic man’s world. Through the training, masculine identity is constructed and reinforced. After the training, the rite of incorporation begins. The awards and specific units create the mood and environment by which the recruits are motivated to become more deeply immersed in both training and militarization. Furthermore, the recruits are tightly controlled by rules and regulations. Continuous military socialization deepens hegemonic masculinity and makes the norms and values – the hegemonic masculinity – the basic assumption of behaviour in the military organization (Barstow, 2000: 165; Lee, 2009: 13–14).

## 4. RESEARCH DESIGN

### 4.1. CASE SELECTION

The reason for focusing on the region of African Great Lakes and selecting particular cases is twofold and will be elaborated on further below.

#### 4.1.1. The Situation in the Region

No region of the African continent, and possibly the world, has known as much political bickering, loss of life, and social dislocation during the last forty years as the Great Lakes Region. The region, whose name is derived from the system of lakes and tributaries draining the central section of the Great Rift Valley of Africa, comprises nine countries: the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. However, the label is conventionally restricted to the core of the region, namely the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania. With Lakes Victoria and Albert being the source of the White Nile, the countries of the core have a major stake in the larger political economy and geopolitics of the Nile River Basin (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004b).

Africa's Great Lakes region has been plagued by decades of political instability, armed conflicts, porous borders and humanitarian crisis, along with tensions over natural resources and other potentially destabilizing factors. Political and social cleavages have caused a lot of turmoil since 1959 (ibid). Since the early 1990s the region has witnessed genocide, civil wars, inter-state conflicts and flawed democratic transitions. Many millions of lives across the region have been lost or marred as a result of violence and displacement (Lunn, 2006).

#### 4.1.2. Regional Security Complex Theory

Since the end of the Cold War, the character of the global security order remains an issue of contestation. Buzan and Wæver for instance explore the idea that, since decolonisation, the regional level of security has become more autonomous and prominent (Peter Katzenstein, 2000 quoted in Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 3). Their main argument is formulated into *regional security complex theory* (henceforth RSCT), which enables one to understand the new structure of security. The theory distinguishes between the system level interplay of global powers, and the subsystem level interplay of regional powers whose main security environment is their own region. Therefore, the central idea of RSCT is that security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: *security complexes* (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 3–4).

Security interdependence requires substantial interaction among the units concerned. Weakness of African states (both as states and powers) means that interstate security dynamic in Africa are often simply spill overs of domestic dynamics, especially refugee flows, and civil wars. It is possible to argue that the security interaction in Africa is generated more by weakness than strength, as when imploding states inflict spill over onto their neighbours (ibid: 229–232).

Until the early 1990s, the region remained fairly unstructured. Within a few years, by mid-1990s, the post-Mobutu<sup>15</sup> upheavals in the DRC caused many events to link together much more tightly around the core. Subsequently, the Congolese war of 1996<sup>16</sup> reflected the interlocking domestic insecurities of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi on the one side, and the DRC on the other, with the former three countries plagued by insurgencies based in the DRC (ibid: 245). To illustrate: the long-term stability of the Great Lakes Region cannot be sustained without a stable government in the DRC. On the other hand, there can be no stability in the DRC, as long as the Hutu-Tutsi conflict continues to rage in Burundi, and is not resolved in Rwanda (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 21–22). To conclude, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, particularly its north-eastern part, arguably form a regional security complex, resulting from security interdependence in the region.

## 4.2. METHODOLOGY

For the purposes of this research, it both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed. First, descriptive statistical analysis is performed using SPSS Statistics Version 20. Using the ordinal logistic regression, it is possible to assess the impact of various factors upon a categorical dependent variable. In non-statistical terms, this procedure allows this research to explore the general trends with regards to the level of wartime rape and the explanations for its prevalence. Subsequently, and based on the results obtained, the findings are highlighted in case studies. Contrary to the statistical analysis, the case studies focus on particular cases: in this research

---

<sup>15</sup> Joseph-Desiré Mobutu, who later changed his forename to Sese Seko, was a former sergeant in the colonial army and chief of staff of the Congolese National Army appointed by his mentor and prime minister Patrice Lumumba. Mobutu took over as head of state in a military coup d'état in 1965. He soon became the Congo's new king, the successor of Leopold II, King of the Belgians and the owner of the country and its resources. The sense of ownership was so strong that Mobutu saw fit to change the country's name, unilaterally, from *Congo* to *Zaire* in 1971. He put an end to democracy and established personal rule backed up by military force and a party-state system internally and by the U.S., France and Belgium externally. These three external powers intervened militarily when necessary. In 1996–7, when the support did not materialise, Mobutu could no longer hang on to power and was forced to leave the country. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004a: 7–8) argues, that his demise is directly related to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which was partly a result of the violent backlash of authoritarian regimes against the democracy movements.

<sup>16</sup> The DRC was invaded by the Rwandan forces in order to destabilize the Mobutu regime and to destroy the bases of ex-FAR and the *Interhamwe*. Mobutu's fall and Laurent-Désiré Kabila's rise to power were direct consequences of the RPF invasion (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 8, 13).

Rwanda and the DRC. The evidence obtained in the case studies is then compared with the statistical results. In doing so, it is expected that comparison will either further support or reject the proposed hypotheses, thus determining whether Rwanda and the DRC follow the general trend or are an exception to the rule.

#### **4.2.1. Statistical Analysis**

In the first stage of the research, a statistical analysis will be performed using Cohen's original conflict-level dataset of rape during civil war over the past six decades (1948–2009). The dataset contains 86 cases (n=86), and all of these cases will be used in the analysis. The original dataset includes all major civil wars between 1948–2009, as defined by Fearon and Laitin (2013), an update of Fearon and Laitin (2003). For the complete list of conflicts included, see Appendix II.

#### **4.2.2. Case Studies**

The genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda has profoundly destabilized Congo with the result that the region has been plunged into endless cycles of violence (Weiss, 2000: 2). Even though Rwanda has made significant progress towards recovering from the genocide of 1994 by adopting a strategy of de-legitimising the overt political expression of ethnicity, critics claim that the government is increasingly authoritarian with some going even as far as to assert that Hutu hegemony has been merely replaced by Tutsi overlordship<sup>17</sup> (Lunn, 2006).

In the DRC, armed groups continue to operate. Tens of thousands of ex-combatant await demobilization and reintegration and much remains to be done in terms of security sector reform. Corruption and the misuse of natural resources are still rife. In particular, Eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring cycles of mixed conflict and persistent violence at the hands of armed groups from the whole region (ibid).

For the purposes of this research, Rwanda and the DRC will be studied. As the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted at the Memorial Conference on the Rwanda Genocide, “the international community failed Rwanda, and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret and abiding sorrow” (UN, 2004). Thus, the focus on Rwanda is based on the occurrence of one of the blatant examples of genocide since the Holocaust, in which widespread rape was reported and constituted undoubtedly integral part. The DRC has been selected based on its security interdependence with Rwanda, which is supported by the claim that the Rwandan genocide of 1994 has profoundly destabilized Congo (Weiss, 2000:2). Even

---

<sup>17</sup> Presidential elections in 2003 brought Paul Kagame to power – the first Tutsi ever to hold the office.

though the DRC has been plagued by years of instability and violence, the international community still has the chance to respond adequately and address the problem of violence, including sexual violence and wartime rape. In this sense, this research shall treat Rwanda as an example to which the policymakers may consider when drafting their recommendations regarding the DRC.

Because Tanzania can plausibly be viewed as the region's greatest "success story" as it is the sole country in the region that has successfully removed ethnicity as a major source of tension in the politics (Lunn, 2006), it is excluded from the selection. Burundi's post-conflict transition ended in 2005 when former armed group, the CNDD-FDD, won in the decisive elections. Despite high hopes that the current power arrangements will end conflict between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority, Burundi's peace remains fragile (ibid). In Uganda, president Yoweri Museveni has gradually brought a series of insurgencies in the North, East and West of Uganda to an end since seizing power in 1986, the internal affairs remain of concern for the international community (Lunn, 2006: 48–56). Though fragility of peace is a continuous concern, Uganda and Burundi are not studied, owing to the fact that both countries' civil wars erupted/occurred prior to the Rwandan genocide<sup>18</sup>, a matter which this research considers crucial in understanding the persistence of destabilization in the region.

### 4.3. OPERATIONALIZATION

#### 4.3.1. Dependent Variable

In order to carry out the statistical analysis, dependent and independent variables were identified. More specifically, the dependent variable in the analysis is defined as the level of wartime rape in civil war (*conflict\_sv*). For the purposes of coding both state and non-state perpetrators, Cohen uses the U.S. State Department Human Rights Country reports<sup>19</sup>. This research in turn uses Cohen's coding, and therefore the dependent variable is categorical and takes on values from 0 to 3, based on the number of reported rapes (see Table 1). Because the dataset uses U.S. State Department Reports, a coding of zero does *not* mean that no rape occurred in a particular conflict, it merely means that the State Department received no reports of its occurrence. Unsurprisingly, accurate accounts of acts of rape are only rarely available and are difficult, if not impossible, to gather (Cohen, 2013a: 466).

---

<sup>18</sup> Burundi 1988–88, 1993–2006; Uganda 1981–88, 1989–ongoing.

<sup>19</sup> See U.S. State Department. *Human Rights Reports 1999–2013* (available at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/>).

The coding procedures are similar to those in Butler, Gluch and Mitchell's (2007)<sup>20</sup> study of state-directed sexual violence, whose coding scheme is in turn based on the widely used Political Terror Scale (PTS), a five-point measure of the level and degree of physical integrity rights violations (Mark Gibney, Londa Cornett, and Reed Wood, 2011<sup>21</sup> quoted in Cohen, 2013a: 466). The Butler et al. measure is extended by coding reports of rape by both rebel groups and state actors, instead of only state security forces, and by coding all years from 1948 to 2009 (ibid).

**Table 1. Summary of Coding Rules: Levels of Wartime Rape**

Levels of Rape	Coding Rules
3	Rape likely related to the civil conflict, and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. described as systematic or massive</li> <li>ii. was used as means of intimidation an instrument of control and punishment, a weapon, a tactic to terrorize the populace, a terror tactic, a tool of war, on a massive scale</li> </ul>
2	Rape likely related to the civil conflict, but did not meet the requirements for a 3 coding and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. was described as widespread, common, commonplace, extensive, frequent, often, innumerable, persistent, recurring, a pattern, a common pattern, or a spree</li> <li>ii. occurred commonly, frequently, in large numbers, periodically, regularly, routinely, widely, or on a number of occasions</li> <li>iii. there were many or numerous instances</li> </ul>
1	Rape, likely related to civil conflict, but did not meet requirements for a 2 or 3 coding, and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. there were isolated reports, some reports, report, or there continued to be reports</li> </ul>
0	No mention of rape or other sexual violence related to the civil conflict

Taken from Cohen, Dara Kay (2013c). Supplemental Materials for 'Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009). *American Political Science Review* 107 (3)', p. 10.

### 4.3.2. Independent Variables<sup>22</sup>

#### *Fertility Rate*

To determine gender inequality, the analysis uses the proxy variable *fertility*<sup>23</sup>. Initially, Cohen used three separate measures of gender inequality from the CIRI<sup>24</sup> dataset – Political

<sup>20</sup> See 'BUTLER, Christopher; GLUCH Tali and MITCHELL, Neil (2007). Security Forces and Sexual Violence: A Cross-National Analysis of Principal-agent Argument. *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (6), pp. 669–686.'

<sup>21</sup> See 'GIBNEY, Mark; CORNETT, Linda and WOOD, Reed (2011). *Political Terror Scale 1976–2006* (available at <http://politicalterrorsscale.org>, accessed 14 May, 2014).'

<sup>22</sup> In order to adapt the dataset to SPSS, recoding was necessary in some instances.

<sup>23</sup> This figure refers to the average number of children that would be born per women if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to given fertility rate at each age. A rate of two children per women is considered the replacement rate for population. Rates above two children indicate populations growing in size and whose median age is declining. Higher rates may also indicate difficulties, such as feeding children or for women entering the labour force. On the other hand, rates below two children indicate populations declining in size and growing older (CIA, 2014b; WB, 2014a).

<sup>24</sup> "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 202 countries, collected annually from 1981-2011. It is designed

Rights, Social Rights and Economic Rights. Nevertheless, Caprioli et al. (2009: 841) criticise the gender variables, as “the gender-sensitive indicators in [...] the dataset [are] designed to capture the stance taken by the government, *not the actual situation in the country.*” In other words, CIRI’s focus is on state law, not women’s equality (ibid) Hence, Cohen uses the *fertility rate* interval variable (see Appendix III) from the World Bank as the main measure of gender inequality<sup>25</sup>, as it captures both de jure and de facto aspects of women’s inequality (Caprioli et al., 2009: 849; Cohen, 2013a: 468).

### ***Ethnic War***

Whether or not the civil war is classified as ethnic<sup>26</sup> is expressed by the variable *ethwar*. The three-level variable (0 not ethnic; 1 ambiguous/mixed conflict; 2 ethnic war) is determined using Fearon’s and Laitin’s list of civil wars (updated and revised version from 2011), covering civil wars between 1945–2009 (Cohen, 2013a: 468; Cohen, 2013c: 7). For the purposes of this research, this variable has been recoded into a different variable *ethwar\_r*, whose values are in reversed order (0 ethnic war, 1 ambiguous/mixed conflict, 2, not ethnic).

### ***Genocide***

In the dataset, Cohen coded *genocide* as a dummy variable based on the PITF’s<sup>27</sup> 2006 update of Harff’s (2003) data on genocide and politicide. For this research, the 2013 version of PITF’s list is consulted<sup>28</sup>. The variable is coded based on the brief narrative of each event (see

---

for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention. See ‘CINGRANELLI, David L.; RICHARDS, David L. and Clay, K. Chad (2014). The CIRI Human Rights Dataset (available at <http://www.humanrightsdata.com>, accessed 14 May, 2014). ‘

<sup>25</sup> See World Bank (2014b). *World Bank Development Indicators* (available at <http://wdi.worldbank.org/tables>, accessed 20 May, 2014).

<sup>26</sup> It is problematic to say what an “ethnic” civil war is, and Fearon and Laitin (2003) suspect that under any plausible statement of the concept there will be numerous mixed or ambiguous cases (p. 79).

<sup>27</sup> “The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) is a panel of scholars and methodologists formed in 1994 at the request of senior policymakers in the United States Government. Its original, assigned task was to assess and explain the vulnerability of states around the world to political instability and state failure. Over the eleven-year course of its work, the Task Force has broadened its attention from the kind of extreme state failure to include onsets of general political instability defined by outbreaks of revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide. More recently, the Task Force has explored matters of governance raised by our earlier research through projects that measure state capacity and model democratic transitions. In the wake of September 11, we also turned our attention to relationships between states and international terrorist groups. Using open-source data, the Task Force seeks to develop statistical models that can accurately assess countries’ prospects for major political change and can identify key risk factors of interest to US policymakers” (Center for Global Policy [2012] *Political Instability Task Force* [available at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/>, accessed 20 May, 2014]).

<sup>28</sup> See updated version PITF (2013). *Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set Version 2013* (available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITF%20Consolidated%20Case%20List%202013.pdf>, accessed 14 May, 2014).

Appendix IV). Therefore, all conflicts that coincide with genocide or politicide take the value of 1; all other conflicts are coded as 0 (Cohen, 2013a: 468; Cohen, 2013c: 7). For the purposes of this research, this variable has been recoded into a different variable *genocide\_r*, whose values are in reversed order (0 conflicts coincide with genocide; 1 all other conflicts).

### ***Conscription***

The dichotomous *conscription* variable (Jeffrey Pickering, 2010 quoted in Cohen, 2013a: 468) indicated whether the state used conscription (1), in which (usually male) citizens are legally required to serve for a specific term (see Appendix V) or not (0). While Cohen was inspired by Pickering, Pickering in turn used Horemans' and Stolwijk's volumes as well as Prasad's and Smythe's volumes, which are considered to be the two most comprehensive resources for information on military manpower systems after 1945 (Pickering, 2010: 126). For the purposes of this research, this variable has been recoded into a different variable *conscription\_r*, whose values are in reversed order (0 conscription used, 1 conscription not used).

### ***Pressganging***

The practice of pressganging, in which fighters are kidnapped into service without notice, is coded as a dummy variable *pressgang* based on the State Department Reports for each conflict (see Appendix V). The variable takes on values of 0 and 1, meaning no reported pressganging and reported pressganging respectively (Cohen, 2013a: 468, Cohen 2013c: 16). For the purposes of this research, this variable has been recoded into a different variable *pressganging\_r*, whose values are in reversed order (0 pressganging used, 1 pressganging not used).

**Table 1:** Arguments, Hypotheses, Independent Variables, and Data Sources

Argument	Hypotheses	Independent Variable	Data Source
Gender Inequality	H1: higher gender inequality → higher level	gender inequality (proxy variable fertility rate)	Women's rights (CIRI) Fertility rate (WB)
Ethnic Hatred	H2: the element of ethnicity present → higher level	ethnic war (0, 1, 2)	Fearon and Laitin (2003, 2013)
Genocidal Rape	H3: the occurrence of genocide/politicide → higher level	genocide/politicide (0, 1)	PITF (2010, 2013)
Strategic Rape	H4: conscription used → higher level	conscription (0, 1); pressganging (0, 1)	Cohen's original data
	H5: pressganging used → higher level		
	AH4: conscription used → lower level AH5: pressganging used → lower level		

### 4.3.3. Limitations of the Data

Although Cohen's original "dataset represents the first systematic effort to create a cross-national measure of rape across civil conflicts [...] [,] [t]heir limitations should be noted" (Cohen, 2013a: 466).

First, the interest of the international community should be taken into account. Cohen collected data from the same source over a period of time, and therefore consistency in collecting methods may be presumed. Nevertheless, the international community tends to pay close attention to the most pressing issues of the time, and thus inconsistency may appear in the interest in rape over time. For example, rapes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda received significant attention, which in turn lead to increased focus of human rights organizations. Ergo, it can be argued that the increased magnitude may merely indicate increased interest in the issue (*ibid.*).

Second, there are no precise measures of the number of victims. Potential bias can result from misinterpretation of terms, but also from under- and over-reporting. No access to the conflict zone, traumatized victims not willing to speak about their experience, but also sensing an advantage in emphasizing and/or exaggerating may all be sources of potential bias (*ibid.*: 466–467).

Last but not least, the third potential source of bias is the production of reports. The officers may vary in quality; the political climate may affect what is and what is not recorded. To illustrate: since the RPF came to power in July 1994, keeping or getting outside observers out of the country has been a constant concern. By the end of 1995, 38 international NGOs had been expelled and the activities of another 18 suspended, their assets frozen, and their equipment confiscated. Furthermore, the government, through a large-scale diplomatic offensive, succeeded in terminating the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur, making the reports redundant (Reyntjens, 2011: 3).

"Finally, there are numerous potential sources of error introduced in the process of coding qualitative reports into quantitative dataset; to minimize the source of bias, [Cohen] checked [her] coding against all other available sources [...] and assessed intercoder reliability" (Cohen, 2013a: 467). For a list of all other available sources that examined conflicts with high levels of sexual violence, see Appendix VI.

---

## PART II: ANALYSIS

---

## 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

### 5.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

The conflict-level dataset used for analysis in this research consists of 86 cases. Every case entails the description of the conflict: the country, the name of the warring parties, the region, war years, etc. To illustrate: in the period 1993–2006, Burundi witnessed a conflict between Hutu groups on one side and the government on the other.

The time period covered in this dataset spans from 1948 up until 2009, which is the latest year for ended conflicts. Nonetheless, the dataset also includes ongoing conflicts. See Table 1 for the number of ended and ongoing conflicts and their respective percentages.

**Table 1:** The ratio of ended and ongoing conflicts as listed in the dataset

	Number of observations	Ratio
All conflicts	86	100.0%
Ended conflicts	62	72.1%
Ongoing conflicts	24	27.9%

The remainder of the dataset consists of variables that are expected to be related to the level of wartime rape within particular conflicts. See Tables 2–7 for the frequencies of valid and missing cases for both the dependent (level of wartime rape) and independent (ethnic war, pressganging, genocide, conscription, and fertility rate) variables used in the analysis. Other variables in the dataset were not considered in the analysis of this research.

Table 2 shows that reporting of rape varies. While widespread rape, isolated reports of rape and no reports of rape scored more or less similarly, numerous reports of rape scored almost/exactly double. Nevertheless, the possible sources of bias, such as under-reporting or over-reporting and probability of miscoding have to be taken into account. To clarify, it is possible to argue that the protruding frequency of numerous reports of rape is not appropriately representative. The same applies to no reports of rape. In this case, no reports does not necessarily mean no rape at all, it merely means that the State Department does not have data on rape in the particular conflict. Hence, the score may also not adequately correspond to the realities of the conflicts.

**Table 2:** Frequencies for the dependent variable (level of wartime rape) for each category

	Level of wartime rape	Frequency	Percent
Valid	Widespread rape (0)	19	22.1
	Numerous reports of rape (1)	35	40.7
	Isolated reports of rape (2)	17	19.8
	No reports (3)	15	17.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Out of 86 conflicts, 52 were classified as ethnic and 19 as ambiguous. Taken together, 71 conflicts (82.6%) encompass the ethnic cleavage, either independently or conjointly with other cleavages, and thereby is it possible to confirm that ethnic hatred is indeed the “ideal” environment for the outbreak of civil war, in which wartime rape become a prominent *modus operandi*.

**Table 3:** Frequencies of the independent variable (ethnic war) for each category

	Ethnic war	Frequency	Percent
Valid	Ethnic war (0)	52	60.5
	Ambiguous/mixed war (1)	19	22.1
	Not ethnic (2)	15	17.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>100.0</b>

In the case of genocide, the results are quite positive to some degree. From 1948, genocide occurred “only” seventeen times. If, and hypothetically, every ethnic war resulted in genocide, the incidence would have been threefold. Thus, it is possible to conclude that only 1 in 3 “purely” ethnic wars ends in genocide. Nonetheless, if ambiguous conflicts are also taken into account, then the incidence would have to increase almost four times, if every conflict in which ethnic cleavage is of major concern resulted in genocide.

**Table 4:** Frequencies of the independent variable (genocide) for each category

	Genocide	Frequency	Percent
Valid	Genocide occurred (0)	17	19.8
	Genocide did not occur (1)	68	79.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>98.8</b>
Missing	User missing data (-9)	1*	1.2
<b>Total</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>100.0</b>

\* Pakistan (Taliban).

The frequency results for the pressganging variable are surprising. Contrary to expectations based on the claims that pressganging is common practice in modern warfare, the results proved quite the opposite. Put differently, it may be concluded that pressganging remains an antiquated practice and in the majority of cases, pressganging was not used. Nonetheless, the dataset also contains cases prior to the 1990s, so this research can only speculate on whether the results would be fundamentally different and the ratio reversed if only post-1990s conflicts were considered.

**Table 5:** Frequencies of the independent variable (pressganging) for each category

	Pressganging	Frequency	Percent
Valid	Pressganging used (0)	27	31.4
	Pressganging was not used (1)	59	68.6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Conscription, on the other hand, proved to be a quite popular practice, as it was used in more than half of all conflicts. However, in 22 cases (consult Appendix V) fighters were not only recruited via conscription but also through pressganging. Therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that conscription may not have been a sufficient recruitment method and states resorted to pressganging in order to build sufficient force. In any case, the motivation behind pressganging is not further explored in this analysis. Additionally, the frequency of ‘pressganging used’ coincides with ‘conscription was not used’. It is necessary to note that the likeness of results is purely coincidental and has no explanatory value whatsoever.

**Table 6:** Frequencies of the independent variable (conscription) for each category

	Conscription	Frequency	Percent
Valid	Conscription used (0)	50	58.1
	Conscription was not used (1)	27	31.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>89.5</b>
Missing	User missing data (-9)	9*	10.5
<b>Total</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>100.0</b>

\*Afghanistan (v. Taliban II), Iran (PJAK), Iraq (Sunni and Shia rebels), Cote d'Ivoire (anti-Gbagbo), Pakistan (Baluchistan), Pakistan (Taliban), Sudan (Darfur [SLA, JEM, etc.]), Thailand (Pattani), Yemen (al-Houthi rebels).

The interval variable *fertility rate* ranges from 1.170 (Russia [Chechnya II]) to 8.537 (People’s Republic Yemen, [Faction of Socialist Party]). In the terms of fertility, this means that one woman in Russia usually has one child, while Yemeni women at the end of the 1980s had

between 8 and 9 children. The rather high difference of 7.367 children per women may point to the various levels of gender inequality in those two countries. While women in Russia presumably enjoy their cultural, political and social rights, the situation of Yemeni women was (and potentially still is) disturbing. In other words, Yemeni women were/are stripped of their rights and are deemed to be the carers of the family and community. In spite of such results, further research of Yemeni structure would be necessary to confirm the oppressive nature of the country.

Although it is virtually impossible to state what is the ideal number of children per woman due to structural and cultural differences, it is possible to suggest that further research is necessary. As indicated by the standard deviation (1.780370), the data tends to be closely dispersed to the mean. This means that most of the cases in the dataset have fertility rate value close to or above the mean (5.515938). Furthermore, the median (5.26750) shows that more than 40 cases lie in the higher range. To sum up, gender (in)equality is worth researching in at least 40 countries as indicated by the fertility rate.

**Table 7:** Frequencies of the interval independent variable (fertility rate)

<b>Valid</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>Missing</b>	<b>2*</b>
Mean	5.515938
Median	5.26750
Standard Deviation	1.780370
Range	7.367
Minimum	1.170
Maximum	8.537

\* Yugoslavia (Croatia/Krajina), Yugoslavia (UCK).

## 5.2. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis

For the further analysis, ordinal logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of a number of factors on the level of wartime rape (categorical dependent variable). There are four possible levels of wartime rape: widespread rape (0), numerous reports of rape (1), isolated reports of rape (2), or no reports of rape (3). The model contained five independent variables: ethnic war, pressganging, genocide, conscription and fertility rate. As fertility rate is an interval variable, it was treated as covariate in the analysis, and thus is not listed in the case-processing summary.

In the analysis, 11 cases were dropped list-wise, as they have missing values in at least one of the specified variables. In other words, the analysis was only run on cases with a complete set

of data (n=75). For ratios, see Table 8. For the number of observations (both valid and missing) and its marginal percentage listed by variables' categories, see Table 9.

**Table 8:** The ratio of valid and missing cases as used in the analysis

	Number of observations	Percentage
All cases	86	100.0%
Valid cases	75	87.2%
Missing Cases	11	12.8%

**Table 9:** Ordinal Logistic Regression: Case-processing summary

*The number of valid and user missing cases (N) and its marginal percentage listed by variable.*

			Number of observations	Marginal percentage
Dependent Variable	Wartime Rape	Widespread rape (0)	17	22.7%
		Numerous reports of rape (1)	31	41.3%
		Isolated reports of rape (2)	13	17.3%
		No reports (3)	14	18.7%
Independent Variables	Ethnic War	Ethnic war	44	58.7%
		Ambiguous/mixed conflict	16	21.3%
		Not ethnic	15	20.0%
	Pressganging	Pressganging used (0)	23	30.7%
		Pressganging not used (1)	52	69.3%
	Genocide	Genocide occurred (0)	16	21.3%
		Genocide did not occur	59	78.7%
	Conscription	Conscription used	48	64.0%
		Conscription not used	27	36.0%
		<b>Valid</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	Missing	11		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>86</b>		

To assess the strength of the model, it is necessary to look at the Pseudo R-Square values. Table 10 shows two different measure of Pseudo R-Square: Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke. These values provide an indication of the amount of variation explained by the model: value of 0 indicated that the model does not predict data at all, whereas a value of 1 indicates a perfectly fitting model. The values of .146 and .158 indicate that the goodness-of-fit of the model is rather moderate.

**Table 10:** Pseudo R-Square, assessing the goodness-of-fit

Cox and Snell	.146
Nagelkerke	.158

As shown in Table 12, only two independent variables made a statistically significant<sup>29</sup> contribution to the model: ambiguous/mixed conflict (.046) and pressganging used (.033), and therefore influence the level of wartime rape.

Because pressganging occurs with no prior notice, and can be physically violent, it is conceivable that it may have effect on the kidnapped. That is, the kidnapper would inflict e.g. fear on the “hostage”, who would in turn become obedient. Subsequently, the kidnapper may give orders, such as to use rape as a weapon, and the fighter would obey. Nonetheless, this is more of a question for military psychologists.

With regards to ethnic war, the results are quite notable considering the common ethnic hatred explanation for widespread wartime rape. According to the results and *if*  $p < .05$ , then ethnic war has no impact whatsoever on the level of wartime rape. If the level of significance is nonetheless increased to  $p < .10$ , then the presence of ‘purely’ ethnic war proves to be statistically significant (.096). Therefore, it would not be possible to reject  $H2$ . Nonetheless, for the purposes of this research,  $p < .05$  is used and if ethnic war was only dichotomous, then  $H2$  would be rejected. Nonetheless, in the case of ethnic war, it is clear, that war of ambiguous or mixed nature influences the level of wartime rape. Therefore, it is not possible to completely reject  $H2$ .

Strikingly, gender inequality, the occurrence of genocide and conscription do not have any significant influence on the level of wartime rape. Thus, at this point, it is possible to reject  $H1$ ,  $H3$  and  $H4$ .

To conclude, the general trend shows that when pressganging is used, the level of wartime rape increases. This is rather notable considering the fact that both conscription and pressganging are forced recruitment methods and both imply hierarchy. Arguably, it is the element of violence present in pressganging that may make the difference. Furthermore, in the case of ambiguous or mixed war, when fighters are also mobilized along other lines than ethnicity, the level of wartime rape is high. Nonetheless, in the case of ethnic war, the statistical

---

<sup>29</sup>  $p < 0.05$ .

significance of the value increases. In other words, the probability of wrongly concluding that ethnic war has an impact on the level of wartime rape increases to 9.6%.

In the case of conscription, the risk of wrong conclusions amounts to 13.6%. When concluded that the occurrence of genocide increases the level of wartime rape, the risk of fault is a surprising 22.1%. Nonetheless, the most striking is the probability of wrong conclusions in the case of gender inequality (expressed by fertility rate), which reaches 82.1%.

**Table 11:** Rape during civil war: ordinal logistic regression results

*The influence of factors (fertility rate, ethnic war, pressganging, genocide, conscription) on the level of wartime rape (dependent variable) during civil war.*

Independent Variable		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.
Fertility	Fertility	.030	.131	.051	1	.821
	Ethnic war (0)	-.942	.567	2.763	1	.096**
Ethnic War ( <i>ethwar_r</i> )	Ambiguous/mixed conflict (1)	-1.378	.689	3.994	1	<b>.046*</b>
	Not ethnic (2)	0 <sup>a</sup>	n/a	n/a	0	n/a
Pressganging ( <i>pressgang_r</i> )	Pressganging used (0)	-1.098	.515	4.551	1	<b>.033*</b>
	Pressganging not used (1)	0 <sup>a</sup>	n/a	n/a	0	n/a
Genocide ( <i>genocide_r</i> )	Genocide occurred (0)	-.685	.560	1.497	1	.221
	Genocide did not occur (1)	0 <sup>a</sup>	n/a	n/a	0	n/a
Conscription ( <i>conscription_r</i> )	Conscription used (0)	.702	.470	2.227	1	.136
	Conscription not used (1)	0 <sup>a</sup>	n/a	n/a	0	n/a

<sup>a</sup> Parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .10$

## 6. CASE STUDIES

### 6.1. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

#### 6.1.1. Rwanda

##### *Geography*

*“A land of almost ideal beauty’; ‘The Switzerland of Africa’ – these were the words used by early European travellers to describe the mountain kingdoms that have since become the [republic] of Rwanda [...]” (Lemarchand, 1970: 13).*

Rwanda, the ‘land of a thousand hills’<sup>30</sup>, is a small, land-locked, coffee-and-tea exporting, ex-Belgian country whose physical landscape remained essentially the same despite all the turmoil and political convulsions that have attracted more attention than expected given the size and geostrategic importance of the country (Lemarchand, 1970: 13; Straus, 2014: 1). Yet its geographical outline, which together with Burundi resembles a human heart, is a constant reminder of its central location on the map of Africa and within the Great Lakes Region.

With 26 thousand square kilometres, Rwanda ranks 149<sup>th</sup> globally in terms of size (CIA, 2014c). Bounded to the west by the DRC and Lake Kivu, and to the north by Uganda; separated from Burundi by the Akanyaru River to the south<sup>31</sup> and in the extreme east by the Kagera River valley and Tanzania, Rwanda may indeed be considered to be the heart of the region (Lemarchand, 1970: 13). Eucalyptus trees and banana groves alter with patches of fertile pasture and in the east with savannah zones. Rwanda, a land of great fertility, where arable land and permanent crops amount to almost 56%, is thickly populated, with its population living predominantly in rural areas (CIA, 2014c; Lemarchand, 1970: 14).

Despite the impression of lushness and prosperity, Rwanda is among the poorest countries in the whole of Africa as well as in whole world. Its purchasing power parity places Rwanda at 142<sup>nd</sup> place in the world comparisons, and despite having a fertile ecosystem, leaves nearly half of its population living below the poverty line. Though the 1994 genocide decimated an already fragile economic base, nonetheless Rwanda has since then made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy. However, still about 90% of its population is dependent on agriculture as well as some mineral and agro-processing. As mentioned above,

---

<sup>30</sup> *Le Pays de Mille Collines* (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013).

<sup>31</sup> Unsurprisingly, the border is not entirely clear as Burundi and Rwanda dispute two square kilometres of Sabanerwa, a farmed area in the Rukurazi Valley, where the Akanyaru river shifted its course southward after heavy rains in 1965 (CIA, 2014c).

coffee, tea and tourism represent the sources of foreign investments (CIA, 2014c; Lemarchand, 1970: 14–16).

### *History*

Between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries, the area that is now known as Rwanda became the home of the first settlers – Twa<sup>32</sup>, who were closely followed by Hutu. In the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, Tutsi – the ‘alien’ minority – began to migrate (more or less invade) from the north. Lemarchand (1970: 18) points out that though their origins are not firmly established, their physical features suggest ethnic affinities with the Galla tribes of southern Ethiopia. By the 16<sup>th</sup> century, a small nuclear kingdom emerged through the process of amalgamation in the central region under the rule of the Tutsi minority, however with few Hutu chiefs in power. While some say that the secret of Tutsi domination lies in their “innate superiority” (Hans Meyer, 1916 quoted in Lemarchand, 1970: 19), the more widely accepted explanation is their ability to use leverage (cattle) to subdue the indigenous tribes. Nonetheless, the situation was presumably more complex, and remains a [‘mystery’] (ibid).

Up until the arrival of the Europeans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, pre-colonial Rwanda was organised around the institution of Kingship (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013; Lemarchand, 1970: 18–19; Lunn, 2006: 36). Interestingly, Rwanda developed its present territorial base through conquest and peaceful assimilation under the leadership of a royal clan, and thus differs from most countries in sub-Saharan Africa in that its general boundaries were not drawn by European powers (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013).

Shortly after Count van Goetzen’s expedition through Rwanda, the country became part of German East Africa up until 1916, when Rwanda was taken over by Belgium following Germany’s defeat in World War I. Rwanda and Burundi formed a single administrative entity under the authority of Belgium in accordance with the mandates system of the League of Nations (and later the UN) until its independence in 1962 when it became a separate republic (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013; Lemarchand, 1970: 47–48, 56–64; Lunn, 2006: 36). Both Germany and Belgium were convinced of the ‘superiority’ of Tutsi, and therefore sought to consolidate their rule through alliances with the ruling aristocracy – the Tutsi. More importantly, neither Germans nor Belgians hesitated to replace disobedient and overly independent Hutu chiefs, which laid the foundations for discrimination against the Hutu (René Lemarchand, 1996 quoted in Lunn, 2006: 36).

---

<sup>32</sup> A group of pygmoid forest dwellers, who constitute about 1% of the present population (CIA, 2014c; Lemarchand, 1970: 19).

## *Politics*

As prospects for independence drew nearer in the late 1950s, the traditional system of stratification caused that the Tutsi hegemony to become more and more burdensome. An attack on a Hutu political activist, who was believed to have died from resulting injuries, triggered a violent, soon to be full-scale 'Hutu Peasant Revolution' (Lunn, 2006: 36; UN). In January 1961, the Hutus, with substantial support from the trusteeship authorities<sup>33</sup>, shattered the Tutsi hegemony and launched a coup d'état. The putsch led to the proclamation of a republic a year and a half prior to the accession to independence and furthermore to the installation of the new provisional government and assembly, both under Hutu control (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013; Lemarchand, 1970: 85; Lunn, 2006: 37). The 1961 elections merely confirmed the pre-existing political situation and the ethnic tensions were further sharpened (Lemarchand, 1970: 85, UN).

The first Hutu president Gregoire Kayibanda built a highly socially conservative, tightly controlled political system based on ethnic quotas. Thousands of Tutsis began to leave Rwanda to neighbouring countries in order to escape the Hutu's rise. Besides the refugee flows, the early years of independence were also characterized by regular outbreaks of ethnic violence. Tutsi refugee groups, frequently referred to as *Inyenzi* by Hutus, began to attack from Uganda, which triggered a major offensive campaign in 1963. All Tutsi politicians not in exile were murdered, thousands of Tutsis died and hundreds of thousands fled into exile to Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and then Zaire. Indeed, it would take almost twenty years before Tutsis abroad began to mobilise to return home (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013; Lunn, 2006: 37, UN). As such, Tutsi elements were completely eliminated from Rwanda's political arena.

Kayibanda was overthrown in 1973 in a *bloodless* coup and a group of military officers installed Juvénal Habyarimana as the new Rwandan president. During his term, the Rwandan political system became distinctly regionalized and highly authoritarian. All Rwandans were obliged to belong to the Revolutionary National Movement for Development. Other political activities were forbidden as the emphasis was placed primarily on development. Additionally and notwithstanding the fact that Tutsis were non-citizens, the level of ethnic violence did reduce (ibid).

Even though Habyarimana suddenly declared the conversion to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, the economic crisis was slowly undermining the relative peace within the

---

<sup>33</sup> The Belgian government took a stance that the revolutionaries represented the only legitimate provisional government of Rwanda even despite the protests of the international community (Lemarchand, 1970: 85).

Hutu elite. Despite close alignment with Uganda's Museveni's National Resistance Army, many remembered the hostility of the Obote regime in Uganda in the early 1980s and could no longer stay in Uganda. Thus, at the same time, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (henceforth RPF) began to invade Rwanda in order to return to the country, even by means of force. Despite a negotiated cease-fire (1991) and further negotiations between RPF and the government resulting in the Arusha Accords (1993) and a updated constitution allowing multiparty participation, the Hutu extremists were strongly opposed to the plan, mainly because it called for a broad-based transitional government in which the RPF would participate (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013; Lunn, 2006: 37–38, UN).

Following Habyarimana and Burundi President Ntaryamira assassination on 6 April 1994 when a plane was shot down over Kigali<sup>34</sup> and Rwanda's Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana next day<sup>35</sup>, a brief political vacuum allowed Hutu extremists to seize political power and create an interim government. Within hours, Hutu extremists had launched the Rwandan genocide in which *Interahamwe* played a crucial role. In spite of the horrific events that took place in the following months, the RPF reciprocated and successfully secured the country by early July. Subsequently, a transnational government was established with a Hutu president and a Tutsi vice president (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013; Lunn, 2006: 38, UN). The Rwandan road to recovery had begun<sup>36</sup>.

### **6.1.2. Democratic Republic of Congo**

#### ***Geography***

The Democratic Republic of Congo, also known as simply the DRC or Congo (Kinshasa), with the capital added parenthetically to distinguish it from the other Congo republic, and previously as Zaire, is an almost landlocked country in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is bounded to the north by the Central African Republic and South Sudan, to the east by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania, to the southeast by Zambia, and to the southwest by Angola. The otherwise landlocked country is interrupted by a mere 40 kilometres of coastline in the west, along with the Angolan exclave of Cabinda and Congo (Brazzaville). Unlike Rwanda, the DRC

---

<sup>34</sup> The identity of the assassin(s) has never been conclusively determined. However, it was first believed that Hutu extremists were responsible. Later, it was claimed that RPF leaders were responsible (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013).

<sup>35</sup> A moderate Hutu (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013).

<sup>36</sup> The ICTR began trying its first cases in 1995. In 2001, the Rwandan government proposed trying through the traditional communal *gacaca* legal system in order to speed up the process of prosecution. Surprisingly though, the government also began granting mass amnesty to prisoners accused of lesser crimes. Last, but not least, the new constitution was promulgated in 2003, and aimed at preventing further ethnic tension/violence. The external aid was then represented by debt relief granted by the WB and IMF and by accession to the East African Community (regional and development bloc) in 2007 (Clay and Lemarchand, 2013).

has only around 3.5% of arable land, yet almost 45% of Congolese GDP is of agricultural origin (CIA, 2014).

With almost two and a half million square kilometres, it is the second largest country on the continent; only Algeria is bigger (CIA, 2014a; Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014). In comparison with Rwanda, which is about the size of state of Maryland, the DRC territory amounts to slightly less than one-fourth of the size of the United States as a whole (CIA, 2014a).

Despite being richly endowed with natural resources, such as diamond, gold, copper, etc., which produce almost nine-tenths of total exports, the Congolese economy is slowly recovering from years of decline. The DRC is slightly better off than Rwanda, and ranks 115<sup>th</sup> on the world list according to purchasing power parity. Nevertheless, systemic corruption since the 1960s, instability and conflict and grey economy have dramatically reduced national output and government revenue, and have increased external debt which reached 6.8 billion American dollars at the end of 2013 (CIA, 2014a; Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 9).

### *History*

In opposition to the existence of three ethnic groups in Rwanda, the DRC is a home to more than 200 African ethnic groups, out of which Bantu people constitute a large majority. By the time of the first European explorations, the Bantu people, who arrived to Congo between the 10<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century from the west and east, established flourishing kingdoms. Although Bantu inhabited most of the country, they were not the first inhabitants. The Pygmies arrived possibly during the Upper Palaeolithic Period and settled primarily in the Congo basin and the adjacent regions. Nonetheless, the DRC is also a home to other small non-Bantu African populations, which are spread throughout the entire country. Moreover, the eastern lake region happened to be settled by Tutsi from Rwanda (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, events in the turbulent Congolese history left an imprint. What started as a king's private domain, ended up being a fiefdom for more than thirty years before becoming a republic (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014).

Complex historical patterns are traceable even to the pre-colonial past, when Congolese society has already experienced major disruptions. Despite these various upheavals, the *Kongo* kingdom emerged as an important state with elaborate political institutions supported by the kingship and military force and with major focus on agriculture and long-distance trade. Together with competition for the kingship and the destabilizing rise of the slave trade, the

Portuguese ultimately defeated and dissolved the state in the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 9).

When Britain and Belgium began to compete over the Congo in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Congress of Berlin<sup>37</sup> held in 1885 led to the declaration of the Congo Free State under the reign of King Leopold of Belgium<sup>38</sup>. Under the false pretence of ending slavery, and bringing missionary work and benefits of modern life to the Congolese, Leopold paradoxically created a coercive colonial hegemony, which was characterized by violence, economic exploitation and episodes of resistance by the Congolese who were dealt with by Leopold private's army, the *Force Publique* – a band of African soldiers under European command who burned villages and mutilated and slaughtered families (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 9; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 7).

Heavy international criticism called for action, which resulted in the annexation of the Congo Free State by the Belgian government in 1908. Technically, the area was purchased from King Leopold and thus placed under Belgian rule with more a conventional form of colonialism. However, the Congo Free State left an immense impact on society. The widespread social disruptions complicated both the establishment of a viable system of administration, but also nurtured the an anti-Western sentiment among the Congolese (ibid).

After twenty years (1925–1945) of the single administrative entity known as Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi<sup>39</sup>, the anti-colonial sentiments and call for independence grew, despite the Belgian initiative to introduce the politics of 'assimilation' under which the educated African minority could obtain the status of honorary European. The anti-colonial sentiment further led to the establishment of the Congolese National Movement under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba in order to immediately end colonial rule (ibid).

In May 1960, Lumumba became the Prime Minister. The anti-European rioting that erupted in January 1960 in Léopoldville/Kinshasa not only led to the deaths of scores of Africans, but also to the realization that the Belgian government should grant independence in as peaceful manner as possible. Six months later, and with Lumumba as the Prime Minister, the

---

<sup>37</sup> Berlin West Africa Conference which set rules for colonial conquest.

<sup>38</sup> King Leopold II of Belgium wanted to conquer the huge domain in order to turn it into his personal fiefdom. Leopold formed the Committee for Studies of the Upper Congo (*Comité d'Études du Haut Congo*, later renamed *Association Internationale du Congo*) to open up Africa to European trade along the Congo River. By 1884, the Association has signed treaties with 450 independent African entities, which allowed the Association, and thus the King, to govern all the territory concerned as an independent state. Leopold was later sanctioned for his control of the Congo River basin area at the Berlin West African Conference (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014).

<sup>39</sup> Colonial names for Rwanda and Burundi.

Congo acceded to independence and descended into chaos (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 9–10).

### *Politics*

A mutiny within the army (*Force Publique*) triggered Belgian military intervention, which ultimately led to the establishment of a secessionist government in Katanga province under Tshombe. Lumumba requested help from the international community to protect the country, however he was dismissed as a Prime Minister and placed under house arrest by President Kasavubu. The action was not recognised by the parliament, and thus prompted a coup orchestrated by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. At this point, Mobutu did not take power. Subsequently, the secessionist government, who in turn was defeated by UN forces by early 1963, executed Lumumba. Following the departure of UN troops, armed insurgencies were defeated with the help of US and Belgian militaries, and after national elections, Tshombe returned to power. Within six months, Mobutu staged a second coup<sup>40</sup> and this time seized power and was to rule until 1997 (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 10, Nzongolo-Ntalaja, 2004a: 7).

History repeats. Mobutu turned the Congo into fiefdom and the nationalisation of the natural resources turned the country into his personal treasury. The semblance of political stability was represented by the violent suppression of political opposition and subsequent one-party rule, the 1971 renaming the country Zaire to emphasize the country's cultural identity and by the deprivation Tutsis of their citizenship in the 1981 (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 10, Nzongolo-Ntalaja, 2004a: 7–8; Reyntjens, 2009: 15). Furthermore, Mobutu changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko (CIA, 2014a).

Mobutu retained his position through sham elections, as well as through brute force (CIA, 2014a). However, the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the circumstances all over the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa. The pressure for democratic reforms forced Mobutu to end one-party rule and convene the Sovereign National Conference to decide the future of the country. The future was meant to be embodied in the High Council of the Republic (HCR)<sup>41</sup> and in the election of as the Zaire's new Prime Minister. By undermining the unity of the HCR, a provisional body overseeing the transfer to multi-party democracy and winning the support of military units who were given the permission to plunder, Tshusekedi was removed from power

---

<sup>40</sup> The circumstances were strikingly similar: both coups occurred alongside a power struggle between the incumbent President Kasavubu and the Prime Minister Tshombe (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014).

<sup>41</sup> *Haut Conseil de la République*.

and Mobutu resuscitated the regime. Consequently, Mobutu began negotiating and reached an agreement with the opposition, installing Kengo wa Dondo as Prime Minister in 1994. However, the formulation of reforms in the Transnational Constitutional Act of 1994 and the spill over effects of the Rwandan genocide ultimately rendered the agreement irrelevant (Cordell, Lemarchand, 2014; Lunn, 2006: 10; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 8).

Surprisingly though, the genocide afforded Mobutu an opportunity to mend his relationship with Western powers by providing logistical and military support to intervening French and Belgian troops. His help however did not stop the influx of Hutu refugees, including former members of Rwandan army and *Interahamwe* and his encouragement for attacks against Zairians of Rwandan Tutsi origin. Furthermore, Mobutu was accused of displaying pro-Hutu sympathies by Uganda. Simultaneously with the formation of Laurent-Désiré Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) supported by Rwanda and Uganda, the encouragement for the attacks sowed the seeds of his downfall. Additionally, Kabila gained support from Angola. His strong position was ultimately confirmed when the AFDL advanced rapidly across Zaire and seized Kinshasa in May 1997. Mobutu tried to stabilize the situation but failed and fled. Kabila declared himself President and changed the country's name to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 10–11, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 5, 13; Reyntjens, 2009: 102–143).

Even though Kabila managed to relieve the decimated economy by attracting foreign aid and initiated the drafting of a new constitution, he lost the support of Rwanda and Uganda. The loss was mainly due to his reluctance to tolerate criticism, opposition or to share power. Though during Mobutu, political parties were banned, now even public demonstrations were forbidden and the administration was accused of human rights abuses. Kabila had to be removed (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 10–11, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 15, Reyntjens, 2009: 8).

Kabila's former allies initiated new rebellions<sup>42</sup>, which turned out to be a full-scale civil war drawing in several countries<sup>43</sup>, devastating the whole region. In July 1999, the Lusaka Agreement, signed by all state parties to the conflict, called out for a cease-fire and the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. The Agreement was not fully implemented, and the

---

<sup>42</sup> Rwanda, Uganda and Congolese allies. Rwanda and Uganda were also implicitly supported by Burundi (Cordell, Lemarchand, 2014; Lunn, 2006: 11).

<sup>43</sup> Kabila's government received support from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe (CIA, 2014a; Cordell, Lemarchand, 2014; Lunn, 2006: 11; Reyntjens, 2009: 65).

fighting continued. Although Kabila began to implement democratic reforms, albeit in a tight controlled manner, it is alleged that he was assassinated under order from Uganda, Rwanda and its Congolese allies in 2001. His son Joseph Kabila, who immediately declared his commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the war, succeeded him. Still, the Lusaka Agreement was not fully actualized. Since Joseph Kabila entered the scene better positioned for negotiation, it was possible to conclude another agreement within a year. The Pretoria Accord (2002) provided for the establishment of a power-sharing transitional government an end to war. Notwithstanding the ratification (2003) and technically terminated war, the country was left devastated and is still recovering from its turbulent past (CIA, 2014a; Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014; Lunn, 2006: 12, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 18–19; Reyntjens, 2009: 208).

## 6.2. LEVEL OF RAPE IN RWANDA AND THE DRC

### 6.2.1. Wartime rape in Rwanda<sup>44</sup>

#### *Gender Inequality*

“[*Patriarchy*] and poverty are not [women’s] only cross to carry. An African women lives in a world of violence: colonialism, imperialism, conflict and war, domestic violence, globalization, and HIV/AIDS pandemic” (Muchina, 2000: 101–102). Thus, violence against African women takes various forms: from unpaid labour and exploitation, to being treated as a second-class citizen (ibid: 104).

Although guaranteed full equality under the Rwandan constitution, Rwandan women are facing problems due to their second-class status (HRW, 1996). Moreover, they have been traditionally regarded as dependents of their male relatives: fathers, husbands and male children<sup>45</sup>. In other words, her role in Rwandan society is that of wife and mother, and as such is one of extreme submission. While the strength of the family lies in the numbers of its male members, women’s strengths come from her fertility, toughness in work and the art of silence. Disobedience is punished with violence<sup>46</sup>. Her ability to seek opportunities beyond the home has been tremendously limited, as that would violate the idealized image of women as child-

---

<sup>44</sup> The following subchapter is based on the data available in the dataset.

<sup>45</sup> The dependency is clearly visible in the fact that Rwandan women were not allowed to vote, open an account, buy a land, act as a witness, and many more actions without husband’s consent. However, if women managed to open an account, her husband was allowed to withdraw money without her permission (Jefremovas, 1991: 382).

<sup>46</sup> According to the government’s 2005 Demographic Health Survey, 31% of Rwandan women have experienced domestic violence since age 15 (Daley, Dore-Weeks and Umuhzoza, 2010: 133). HRW report of 1996 even mentions a Rwandan proverb: “A women who is not yet battered is not a real women” (HRW, 1996).

bearers and home carers<sup>47</sup> (ibid). Indeed, the fertility rate as listed in the dataset indicates, and thereby supports such claims that women were largely bound to the domestic sphere in the early 1990s, that the average number of children per woman was nearly 7 (6.8).

Prior to the 1994 genocide, women were significantly underrepresented in education and politics. This only supports the idealized image of a woman, as most women remained in the home from puberty onwards. To put this in quantifiable, the inadequate access to education meant that by secondary level education, boys outnumbered girls 9 to 1 and by university level, women were outnumbered by an astonishing 15 to 1. Furthermore, financial difficulties almost always meant the discontinuation of women's studies, which in turn increased the levels of illiteracy among women (HRW, 1996).

Regarding politics, women were vastly under-represented. Nevertheless, few women did participate in political life and were even among the elite responsible for the genocide<sup>48</sup> (HRW, 1996; Sharlach, 1999: 387). In general though, women were stripped of their basic political rights, such as the right to free election<sup>49</sup>, despite the Constitution guaranteeing the right of all citizens to participate without distinction based on sex (Jefremovas, 1991: 382; HRW, 1996).

However, one of the biggest obstacles to gender equality was due to the discriminatory laws. Although women constituted over half of the economically active population<sup>50</sup> prior to the genocide, women in most communities neither owned nor inherited land and had only limited rights to control and dispose of property (Jefremovas, 1991: 382; HRW, 1996; Rose, 2004: 209). To illustrate, women did not inherit land from her father, however she was given land from her husband primarily in order to provide for his needs and the needs of their children and finally her own. Upon the husband's death, women were only allowed to retain minimal rights to land and to remain in the matrimonial house in order to secure the patrimonial lineage of inheritance. Surprisingly enough, widowed women could also be allowed to stay on her husband's land but only under the condition of being on good terms with the relatives of the deceased. Another option to remain in the matrimonial house was to marry the brother of the deceased<sup>51</sup>. Furthermore, the law forbid women from applying for credit and/or

---

<sup>47</sup> According to the national census of 2002, women made up around 52% of the populations and headed some 35% of all Rwanda households (Daley, Dore-Weeks and Umuhoza, 2010: 133).

<sup>48</sup> Nonetheless, there were no women appointees until 1990 within the executive branch (HRW, 1996).

<sup>49</sup> To be more precise, Rwandan women were allowed to vote only with the consent of her spouse (Jefremovas, 1991: 382).

<sup>50</sup> An estimated 65-70 percent of agricultural work was done by women. But even though women could and did earned cash, they were only allowed to control small amounts of income they generated (Jefremovas, 1991: 382; HRW, 1996).

<sup>51</sup> Levirate marriage. A custom by which a man may be obliged to marry his brother's widow (Rose, 2004: 210).

loans. To summarize, women were completely dependent upon their husbands and the goodwill of their in-laws (Jefremovas, 1991: 382–383; Rose, 2004: 209–210).

The second, and presumably more influential obstacle was gender hate propaganda, both in print media as well as on the radio, which was the most important and influential medium through which the Rwandan population received information (Green, 2002: 741–742). Thus, it is possible to argue that gender propaganda played a critical role in incitement of the ethnic war and subsequent genocide. The leitmotiv of the propagandists was the superiority of Tutsi women, who ultimately infiltrated international organizations, including the UN, and NGOs focusing on human rights. According to Green (2002: 734), Tutsi women were “evil seductresses.” Des Forges (1999: 75) mentions that “the [*inkotanyi*] will not hesitate to transform their sisters, wives and mothers into pistols” to conquer Rwanda. Tutsi women were thought to be more beautiful and educated than Hutu women, and their manipulative behaviour was meant to dominate and humiliate the Hutu in general (Des Forges, 1999: 75; Green, 2002: 734, HRW, 1996; Jones, 2002: 78).

### ***Ethnic Hatred***

*“By 1994, Tutsi in Rwanda, much like Jews in Nazi Germany, were ‘socially dead’ people, whose murder was acceptable as it became common” (Peter Uvin, 1997 quoted in Hintjens, 1999: 241).*

Rwandans take history seriously. The individual motivation of each perpetrator may remain a mystery, though it is clear that beneath these lay a common fear rooted in firmly held but mistaken ideas (Des Forges, 1999: 31).

Rwanda has three commonly recognized ethnic groups – Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas. Although some debate the exact proportion of each, one fact is clear, the Hutus were the first inhabitants of the area nowadays known as Rwanda. Each ethnic category was organized based on lineage or loyalty to the leader and each contributed to the creation of the state of Rwanda. Conjointly, they developed and speak the same language – *Kinyarwanda* – and share a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs as well as creative culture rich in dance and poetry. Many intermarried (Des Forges, 1999: 31; Straus, 2006: 28 of 287).

The Rwandan pre-colonial ethnic identities were thus already forming before contact with European ideals (Hintjens, 2001: 27). The strengthening of statehood brought about the clearer definition of governing elite and its members began to think of themselves as superior. The ‘Tutsi’ status of an individual, which meant rich in cattle, became the descriptive term for the

whole elite group. Hutu, a term originally denoting those who were subordinate or followers of a more powerful person, became a reference for the mass of ordinary people. Rwanda itself created the hierarchical, orderly and sophisticated system of rule based on social stratification (ibid), which did much to surprise the early European explorers. However ever since the beginning of the colonial intervention, the meaning and matter of the ethnic categories changed rapidly (Des Forges, 1999: 32; Straus, 2006: 29 of 287).

After the initial surprise, the European colonizers became more and more impressed with the system. Both Germans and Belgians sought to rule with the least cost and the most profit. Despite the relative impressiveness of the Rwanda state, the colonizing nations were not satisfied with the multiple hierarchies, which in turn allowed the local leaders to maximize control while evading surveillance by the colonialists, and thus began to alter the Rwandan state in the name of administrative efficiency. Put differently, what the Belgians wanted was to have resources at their own disposal and to cover their own expenses linked with colonialism (Des Forges, 34).

The administrative shift also meant the reiteration of ethnic categories and “started to twist the knife of a new form of identity politics into the Rwandan society” (Hintjens, 2001: 31), which in the long-term perspective sowed the seed of ethnic hatred in Rwanda. Furthermore, “with every schoolchild reared in the doctrine of social superiority and inferiority, the idea of a collective national entity was steadily laid to waste” (Philip Gourevitch, 1998 quoted in Hintjens, 2001: 31). Indeed, the Tutsis were perceived as the [*superior race of natural-born rulers*] who came to dominate the more lowly Hutus, a group the Europeans considered as the [*inferior race of Bantu negroids*]. Nonetheless, the image of Hutu would gradually be transformed into one where they would come to be seen as the ‘authentic’ inhabitants of Rwanda (Hintjens, 2001: 31; Straus, 2006: 29 of 287). Furthermore, the anthropological ideas of the day described Hutus as short, dark-skinned and wide-nosed, while Tutsis were the opposite: tall, elegant, light-skinned and thin-nosed (Straus, 2006: 29 of 287). This class stratification was formalized in 1930s when the Belgian administration introduced identity cards that labelled Rwandans according to their ethnicity<sup>52</sup>. As Straus notes, “under the colonial rule, [‘]race[‘] became the

---

<sup>52</sup> The distorted version of the past presented Tutsis as the winners and creators of the Rwandan state, while the Hutu were pictured as the losers in every great contest in the Rwandan history. The emergence of the new generation of scholarship in 1960s began to question the faulty presentation of Rwanda’s history and called out for a new version that demonstrated a more balanced participation of Hutu and Tutsi in the creation of the state. The Belgians who decided to limit administrative posts and higher education to Tutsi further supported this, however they were facing the challenge of deciding exactly who the Tutsi were. Physical characteristics identified only some, while genealogy could be timely and inaccurate. Thus, the Belgians decided that the most effective procedure would be the registration at birth, noting the affiliation in writing once and for all (Des Forges, 1999: 37).

central determinant of power[.] [A]s a consequence [‘]race[‘] became a symbol of oppression (Straus, 2006: 30 of 287). Additionally, the ‘anthropologically’ supported visual evidence aided the perpetrators in the genocide which was yet to come<sup>53</sup> (Newbury, 1998: 11; Strauss, 2008: 29 of 287).

As the prospect of independence from Belgium loomed on the horizon, the Hutus as well as external pressures from the international community called for an end to the political monopoly and for an increase in Hutu political representation. During the Belgian-supported [*Hutu Revolution*], the ruling Tutsi elite were overthrown and a new Hutu-dominated government, purging all Tutsis from their posts, was installed. Finally, the meaning of ethnic identities now came full circle and gave rise to ethnic nationalism. The new Rwandan state emerged in the name of the previously oppressed Hutu majority (Des Forges, 1999: 38–40; Hintjens, 2001: 31–32; Straus, 2006: 30 of 287).

At this point, it is also necessary to reiterate the importance of propaganda. Apart from the gender hate propaganda, which establishes clear link between propaganda and wartime rape and/or sexual violence, it is necessary to point out that propagandists equated the Hutu-Tutsi difference with the fundamental difference between male and female (Jean-Pierre Chrétien et al., 1995 quoted in Des Forges, 1999: 72). In other words, the gender hate propaganda worked alongside the ethnicity propaganda. The idea of a united Rwandans was rejected, a move which was subsequently explicitly formulated in a newspaper article according to which “A cockroach cannot give birth to butterfly” (Des Forges, 1999: 73). According to the Hutu radicals, a Tutsi was a cockroach – *Inyenzi* – that would always stay exactly the same: exploiting and looting the inferior (ibid), while Hutu in contrast were portrayed as the innocent victim (Des Forges, 1999: 81). On top of that, some even believed that the Tutsi were planning genocide against the Hutu (Des Forges, 1999: 79). Despite the ethnic reconciliation offered by the Arusha Accords of 1993, which would entail a weakening of the ruling Hutu parties, the Hutu Leaders began drawing up plans for genocide (Alain Destexhe, 1995 quoted in Sharlach, 1999: 391). Indeed, in the years to come, the genocidal mandate was to equate ‘enemy’ with ‘Tutsi’ and to declare that the ‘enemy’ must be eliminated. It was the ethnic categorization in process (Straus, 2006: 18 of 287).

### ***Genocidal Rape***

---

<sup>53</sup> The synthesis of the identity cards and visual characterisation is visible in Gil Courtemanche’s novel *A Sunday as the Pool in Kigali*, when Colonel Athanase, a member of the High Command gives instructions: “And don’t trust identity papers, use your heads [.] If they’re tall, if they’re thin, if they’re pale, they’re Tutsis, cockroaches we must wipe off the face of the earth” (Courtemanche, 2009: 214 of 274).

In early April 1994, the anxiety was palpable. Both Hutu and the RFP understood the likelihood of violence. On April 6, Rwanda's fate changed. A plane carrying the moderate Hutu President Habyarimana was shot down over Kigali, igniting weeks of intense and systemic massacres. Within less than an hour, the hardliners took control of the Rwandan state and the Hutu militiamen, with the help of *gendarmerie* (paramilitary police), began to set up roadblocks in order to identify Tutsis. Apart from eliminating political opposition, the hardliners managed to drag the RFP into combat and attack international peacekeepers that were in the country overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The following day, the hardliners unleashed widespread genocidal violence throughout Rwanda against the *Inyenzi* (Des Forges, 1999: 180–185; Mullins, 2009b: 722–723; Reyntjens, 1996: 240; Straus, 2006: 51 of 287, UN). “One hundred days later, Rwandans had murdered at least half a million of other Rwandans [...]. It was the twentieth century's fastest genocide” (Straus, 2006: 51 of 287).

Despite the fact, that the international community (and feminist scholars) began substantial inquiry in the aftermath of war in Bosnia, the rapes of Rwandan Tutsi women were on a vastly greater scale than in the former Yugoslavia (Jones, 2002: 81). Rape was widespread. Wood (2006) predicts that while some were opportunistic or were instances of sexual slavery, nonetheless most comprised a form of genocide (Mullins, 2009a: 23; Wood, 2006: 307–308). In Rwanda, women<sup>54</sup> were often individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks and gun barrels, held in sexual slavery or were sexually mutilated before they were murdered (Des Forges, 1999: 10, 215; HRW, 1996). In other words, Rwandan women had to endure all forms of sexual violence, including wartime rape. It is however important to note, that sexual mutilation did not only affect women, but also men, whose penises were commonly removed (Mullins, 2009b: 723).

The events depicted in the post-genocide trials clearly show that rape represented an organized aspect of the Hutu attempt to annihilate the Tutsi enemy<sup>55</sup> (Mullins, 2009b: 728). Some of them were incited by propaganda about Tutsi women prior to the genocide, other were attacking women for their alleged arrogance while they were being raped. Women were raped with the consent of the burgomasters, or as a reward for good performance in killing Tutsi. Some women were raped repeatedly (Des Forges, 1999: 215). Albeit the non-existence

---

<sup>54</sup> The youngest victim was two years old (Des Forges, 1999: 215).

<sup>55</sup> Nonetheless, a number of Hutu women were raped as well. The main reason was their marriage to Tutsi men (HRW, 1996).

of accurate numbers, the UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda estimated<sup>56</sup> that over the course of one hundred days, between 250.000 to 500.000 rapes occurred (Sharlach, 1999: 393, Sharlach, 2000: 98). Many women came close to death several times and begged to be killed, only to be spared and raped again. The perpetrators – *Interahamwe* – preferred to inflict a protracted death upon Tutsi, rather than to kill them swiftly (Sharlach, 2000:99). Pregnant women or those shortly after giving birth were also raped, usually leading to haemorrhaging, other medical complications and ending in death. There are reports that even corpses or the bodies of women who had just been were raped (HRW, 1996). Undoubtedly, these repercussions for Rwandan society caused the heightened interest in wartime rape, which ultimately lead to the creation of the term *genocidal rape* (Jones, 2002: 81).

In the Rwandan context, the genocidal rape did not mean only ‘immediate’ death, but also the means of bringing it about. Jones presents evidence: “It appears that at least some 35% of Rwandese soldiers were HIV-positive before the genocide of 1994” (Elenor Richter-Lyonette, 1997 quoted in Jones, 2002: 82). While it is not possible to ascertain how many women or men were infected prior to the genocide or how many are actually infected post-genocide, e.g. because of the fear of discovering that they carry the AIDS virus, it is possible to reach firm conclusions about the certainty of HIV/AIDS transmission, which was considerably aggravated during those few months of 1994 (HRW, 1996; Sharlach, 2000: 99–100). The Hutu militiamen and marauders carrying the virus described their intentions to the victims: to rape and infect them as an ultimate punishment that would guarantee long-suffering and tormented deaths (Donovan, 2002: 17). “But with the help of HIV [...] Rwanda’s marauding rapists have been granting something close to the most gruesome of their hate-filled, genocidal wishes. Until the very last of their rape victim dies of AIDS – [and her offspring] and all sex partners subsequently infected by them have died – in effect, [*the genocide continues*]” (Donovan, 2002: 18)

### ***Strategic Rape***

The Rwandan Armed Forces consisted of some 7.000 troops, about 1.2000 of whom were part of the National Police (Gendarmerie). Furthermore, 1.500 to 2.000 elite troops – the Presidential Guard plus soldiers of the paracommando and reconnaissance unit – supported by some 2.000 militiamen were all the men responsible for the killings of civilians in the early 1994 (Des Forges, 1999: 21, 43).

---

<sup>56</sup> The estimate was done by multiplying the 2.000–5.000 pregnancies caused by rape based on the probability that an act of rape would result in conception one time in every hundred (Sharlach, 1999: 393).

Prior to the genocide, the *Interahamwe* had already demonstrated their effectiveness in attacking Tutsis and moderate Hutus. At that point, Habyarimana and his supporters already sensed the palpable anxiety and tension in the air, and thus stepped up the recruitment and training of the militia. Nevertheless, the need for secrecy nevertheless significantly hindered the recruitment procedure, and therefore the government program of civilian-defence<sup>57</sup> offered a simpler, cheaper and presumably equally effective mobilization for the prospective action against the enemy. The recruits were immediately deployed after the RPF invasion in order to block the roads and carry out patrols (Des Forges, 1999: 101–102).

In the following months (late 1993–early 1994), the hardliners further increased the recruitment and training of the militia. In attempt to counter the spreading rumours, the Minister of Defence admitted the training, but denied the purpose by stating that the men were being trained to become guards in national parks and forests or private security companies (Des Forges, 1999: 128–129).

Contrary to expectations, genocide was not a killing machine, but rather a campaign to which participants were recruited over time by the use to threat and incentives. While the early organizers were among military and administrative officials, who had secured the capturing of the state, during the later stages, literally all Hutu men were recruited to join the patrols and subsequent attacks (Des Forges, 1999: 6–7; Straus, 2006: 160 of 287). Finally, the largest group of attackers was created out of male civilians, recruited by the rural elite and aggressive young men (Straus, 2006: 105 of 287). It is important to highlight that the recruitment would not be possible without gender and ethnic propaganda and/or tangible incentives to participate or even rewards for participant. Nevertheless, unlike regions where authorities needed only little effort to give signals to start attacking Tutsis, in some regions, the authorities deliberately drew hesitant Hutu into increasingly violent behaviour under the threat of punishment (Des Forges, 1999: 10–11).

With regard to strategy, the authorities initially incited attacks on the most obvious targets, especially those with evident links to the RPF, and only afterwards did they insist on the slaughter of women, children, the elderly and other apolitical persona (ibid: 11). By exploiting the existing structure of the military, administrative and political systems, the [*leaders*] were able to exterminate the enemy with speed and thoroughness. What the military and

---

<sup>57</sup> The civilian-defence program worked on the basis of hierarchy. The president called on the ministers to organize local self-defence committees. The ministers then met with prefects, sub-prefects and burgomasters, who in turn mobilized civilian-self defence committee at the local level (Straus, 2006: 203 of 287).

gendarmerie started with only few in number and with tactical knowledge and ‘sophisticated’ guns was finished by civilian assailants armed with machete, hammers, and clubs (ibid:8). Additionally, the program of civilian self-defence relied on the recruitment of participants by administrators and on the command of retired officers-cum-politicians, who stood at the top of the program’s hierarchy (ibid: 9). Through these hierarchies and defence programs, the organizers managed to carry out a killing campaign.

During the first stage of the campaign, assailants went systematically from house to house, killing both Tutsi and Hutu opposed to Habyarimana – the moderate Hutu. Then a different strategy was implemented: drive Tutsi out of their homes to public sites, where they would be massacred in large-scale operations. When criticism appeared, the assailants adopted a campaign of ‘pacification’, which contrary to its implied use meant only control over killings rather than their immediate halt. The ending of the genocidal campaign is characterised as the final phase, during which the last surviving Tutsis were tracked down and annihilated (ibid: 10–11).

Indeed, none of this would be possible without thorough preparation. From late 1992, the burgomasters were compiling lists of people with complete identification, which was urgently demanded by the prefects<sup>58</sup>. In fact, what the burgomasters were creating were the lists of Tutsis which would allow the militiamen to exterminate Tutsi civilians and members and accomplices of the RPF. By February 1994, these ‘death lists’ as the public now knows them, consisted of some 1.500 names (Des Forges, 1999: 99–101, Straus, 2006: 35 of 287). What these lists confirm however is that the political changes of early 1990s radicalized the Hutu hardliners by early 1994 and that the genocide was carried out in a carefully planned, coordinated and systematic manner. Sadly, these will also always be the constant reminder of the international community’s missed opportunity to stop genocide in the making<sup>59</sup>.

---

<sup>58</sup> Posts in communal administrative hierarchy.

<sup>59</sup> The UN peacekeeping force was informed about the existence of such lists in January 1994. The informer, an officer of the government’s elite Presidential Guard and a former trainee of *Interahamwe*, briefed Gen. Dallaire, the commander of the UN forces. Alarmed, Dallaire cabled to the UN headquarters in New York, however the ‘genocide fax’ backfired (Straus, 2006: 35 of 287).

## 6.2.2. Wartime rape in DRC<sup>60</sup>

### *Gender Inequality*

*“The worst place on earth to be a woman” (HRW, 2009: 15).*

Similarly to the case in Rwanda, women and girls were second-class citizens well before the conflict broke out (HRW, 2002: 20; Jefferson, 2004). Thus, their subordinate position and unequal status in peacetime renders women exceptionally susceptible to rape and other forms of sexual violence in the times of war (Banwell, 2014: 51–52; Jefferson, 2004).

Within the DRC, gender inequality is deeply rooted in communities due to patriarchy and disparate power relations (Oxfam, 2012: 3). The result is the obvious gender imbalance in all domains of social, political, cultural and economic development (Banwell, 2014: 52; Mbanbi and Faray-Kele, 2010). Surprisingly, in the mid-2000s, women constituted 53% of the population, which rendered their contribution to food security and the Congolese society undeniable (ibid).

As in Rwanda, women in the DRC are deprived of almost all their rights. Despite the constitutionally recognized right to employment, the work opportunities for women have generally been limited. Furthermore, any contract signed by a woman without her husband’s consent is rendered illegal, as women cannot enter legally binding arrangement independently. Consent is also required for work, opening a bank account, starting business, travelling, etc. The possibility of inheritance is completely out of question (ibid). On the political level, the legislature used to guarantee the protection of women’s political rights and the right to equitable representation at any level. However, the contradictory provision of 2006 deemed equitable representation obsolete because political parties are no longer obliged to ensure the representation of women (Freedman, 2011: 172; Mbanbi and Faray-Kele, 2010). Moreover, the inadequate access to education, has resulted in higher rates of illiteracy among women (Jefferson, 2004). To conclude, the position of women in the DRC is thus strikingly similar to the position of women in Rwanda: they are caregivers, child-bearers, nurturers and community workers. “They are [...] the core of the community” (Banwell, 2014: 52).

---

<sup>60</sup> The following subchapter is based on the data available in the dataset.

No matter how noble their position within the community might be, women are still excessively restricted by the DRC [*Family Code*], which organizes marital life on a highly discriminatory basis. The law expressly subordinates women by the requirement of obedience to men<sup>61</sup> who are by the same law recognized as the head of household. In turn, it is the man who determines the woman's status, and thus many young Congolese women<sup>62</sup>, some as young as 13 years old, enter into marriage with men, as old as 65 years (HRW, 2002; Jefferson, 2004; Mbanbi and Faray-Kele, 2010).

Perhaps the most peculiar aspect of the Family Code is the husband's role in protecting his wife. Although rape is seen as an effective weapon against men's masculinity, the perpetrators are more than often benefit from impunity. The avoidance of prosecution<sup>63</sup> is the results of settling the violent crimes, including rape of daughters, sisters, and wives, by accepting money from the perpetrator's family or even by arranging the perpetrator to marry the victim. In the case of death by murder or negligence, the family of the victim may agree to accept the equivalent of the women's bride price as compensation and in exchange for not pursuing the case further (Banwell, 2014: 52; HRW, 2002: 20; Jefferson, 2004; Mbanbi and Faray-Kele, 2010). Though, rape and death clearly expose a husband's failure to protect his wife, the solution underscores the notion of ownership and the subordinate position of women within Congolese society.

### ***Ethnic Hatred: Ambiguous War***

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 set things into motion. Apart from the devastating and horrific consequences for Rwanda, the Rwandan government, dominant parts of FAR, and members of *Interahamwe* militia fled into exile to Congo, back then Zaire, where civilian and military refugees established themselves in camps along the border (HRW, 2002: 11; Weiss, 2000: 2). The influx of refugees turned a "relatively peaceful society [...] into an arena of conflict and war" (Weiss, 2000: 2). Furthermore, the refugees began to rearm and prepare new

---

<sup>61</sup> Even though women have to show absolute obedience to their husbands, women are not even allowed, for instance, to protect themselves by requiring their husbands to use condoms. Furthermore, extramarital sex for husbands, but not wives, is tolerated (HRW, 2002: 20).

<sup>62</sup> The estimates refer to 74% of married women between 15 and 19 years are married. Surprisingly, the legal minimum age for marriage is 15 for women while it is 18 for men (Mbanbi and Faray-Kele, 2010).

<sup>63</sup> The Congolese law criminalises rape and also addresses other forms of sexual violence. According to the law, rape is punishable by a prison sentence of 5 to 20 years, and indecent assault is punishable by prison terms between 6 months and 20 years, depending on the age of the victim and whether violence, ruse or threat was used (HRW, 2009: 18–19; Mbanbi and Faray-Kele, 2010).

attacks on Rwanda. In 1996, the Rwandan government sent troops to the border protect Rwanda. Joined by the combatants of the AFDL, the forces attacked the camps and killed thousands of Rwandans. Many refugees returned or were deported back to Rwanda, while others who survived were massacred in the following months. Additionally, the AFDL received support from ex-FAR and Ugandan forces, which enabled the allies to overthrow Mobutu in 1997 (HHI, 2009: 6; HRW, 2002: 12; Lunn, 2006: 11, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a; Reyntjens, 1999: 242; Weiss, 2000: 3).

The main reasons neighbouring countries intervened in then Zaire, was closely related to their own security concerns. First, the influx of refugees destabilized Congo, but more importantly substantially altered the inter-ethnic relations in the Kivu regions. When the Tutsi-dominated RPF defeated the Hutu government in mid-1994, more than a million Hutu fled into exile, where they began to rearm. However, the Rwandan Army was not only sent to Congo to protect the state of Rwanda from any possible attack, but also to protect the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group, who had in turn fled to Congo during the Hutu revolution of late 1950s. Because the Hutu became the dominant force within North and South Kivus and proceeded to attack and isolate Congolese Tutsis with Mobutu's support, the Congolese Tutsis undertook a pre-emptive strike against the Hutu refugee camps and the National Zairian Army. With the commencement of the attacks against the camps, the Rwandan forces entered the war against Mobutu (*ibid*). The instrumentalization of the bipolar ethnic set-up infected the whole Great Lakes region with lethal consequences and led to the First Congo War (Reyntjens, 1999: 244; Weiss, 2004: 2).

Second, "the fall of the Mobutu regime resulted from a combination of internal weaknesses and the exploitation of these weaknesses by neighbouring countries to get rid of a dictator that most Africans came to despise" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 13). Just over thirty years of Mobutu's despotic rule had undermined the normal capacities of the state, revenue collection and service delivery. The state institutions were collapsing, officers were more concerned about their own wealth acquisition and the army was disintegrating. Despite a negotiated agreement on democratic reforms, the Rwandan genocide halted implementation, and thereby allowed Mobutu to stay in power (*ibid*). The collapse of the state allowed the neighbouring nations to invade Zaire with the knowledge, that Mobutu did not have the capacity to launch a counteroffensive. By creating a coalition of Eastern and Southern African states, Rwanda and Uganda rendered themselves capable of action with the objective of getting rid of Mobutu altogether (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004a: 13; Weiss, 2004: 2, 9–10).

With the central aim of overthrowing Mobutu, Laurent-Désiré Kabila formed the AFDL. Along with the support of foreign forces, Kabila seized Kinshasa in 1997, overthrew Mobutu, declared himself President and restored the country's name back to the DRC. The victory of Kabila and the AFDL was a watershed event for the region. Within the year, the support began to weaken and in the end the regime was ultimately overthrown. What began as a step towards democracy, ended up being a system somewhat similar to the previous one, within which the President held the bulk of power (Cordell, Lemarchand et al., 2014). And yet again, the ignition of the Second Congo War owed to a complexity of reasons rather than one alone.

Kabila was primarily able to attract foreign aid and provide relief to the decimated economy. However, he began to rely heavily on the international support and to demonstrate lack of gratitude to the alliance that had put him in power (Kevin C. Dunn, 2002 quoted in Meger, 2010: 125). The attempt to remove Rwandans from high-ranking positions resulted in the very near success of a coup orchestrated by Rwanda and Uganda. What saved Kabila was the support of Zimbabwe and Angola, both of which had interest in accessing Congolese natural resources to boost their failing economies (Meger, 2010: 125). "The opportunity to conquer Congo's exception natural resource riches appears to have been a primary determinant of conflict [...]" (Ola Olsson and Heather C. Fors, 2004 quoted in Meger, 2011: 118).

However, it is worth mentioning, that the invasion of foreign forces in 1998 was initiated to simply supporting Congolese political factions in a war against a dictatorial regime. Despite no fighting prior to the invasion, the leading figures of Kabila's regime were part of a plot which had been hatching since mid-1998. When Kabila sent all foreign military personnel back home, Rwanda and Uganda were prompted to simultaneous invasion supported by the united military units whose commanders were the parts of the plot. The initial plan was to seize power and install a more manageable regime. In the case of failure, a buffer zone of economic and political security would be carved out in eastern Congo. Because Angola and Zimbabwe backed Kabila, the invaders 'only' occupied and plundered the region (Meger, 2010: 125; Nzongolo-Ntalaja, 2004a: 15–16, Weiss, 2002: 13–14). Even though, these may have been considered legitimate security interests, the subsequent war is best depicted "as an inter-African war for the natural resources of the Congo" (Nzongolo-Ntalaja, 2004a: 16).

Last but not least, a fight between the Congolese Tutsi and the new Congolese army began. As a consequence, a pogrom, encouraged by the Kabila regime, was carried out against all Tutsis in Kinshasa and other cities (Weiss, 2002: 14). Yet again, it was the ethnicity that legitimized rape and abuse (Farr, 2010: 94).

## *Strategic Rape*

The rapes are being perpetrated in the DRC in the context of a protracted civil conflict that dates back to 1996 and 1998. While sexual violence has gone hand in hand with almost every armed conflict in history, the scale and extent of rape in the eastern DRC has no precedent<sup>64</sup>. Nevertheless, the exact numbers are extremely hard, if not impossible, to gather due to the stigmatization associated with the violence, the inability to seek medical care and the general insecurity in the region (Bartels et al., 2010: 2). Since 2003, the *International Rescue Committee* has assisted over 40.000 rape survivors, *Médicins Sans Frontières* treat on average 60 rape survivors per month, while the UN reported 27.000 sexual assaults in South Kivu alone in 2006 (Wairagala Wakabi, 2008 quoted in Bartels et al., 2010: 2). Peterman, Palermo and Bredenkamp's research however showed that approximately "[1150 women [are] raped every day, 48 women [are] raped every hour, and 4 women are raped every 5 minutes]" (Peterman, Palermo and Bredenkamp, 2011: 1064–1065).

Almost every armed group involved in this conflict has resorted to the use of rape as a weapon. The RCD, the Rwandan forces, Mai Mai<sup>65</sup>, armed groups of Rwandan Hutu and Burundian rebels, have all raped women (HRW, 2002: 23). The highly violent use suggests that rape is being used as a weapon to advance the strategic aims of armed groups in the area (HHI, 2009: 8). According to Meger (2010), "the intensity of violence constitutes more than a simple assault, and rather is a systematic means of terrorising the civilian population" (Meger, 2010: 126). Seventy percent of rapes were planned in advance with the intention to "terrorize, loot, rape and then leave" (Marie Claire O. Ohambe et al., 2004 quoted in Meger, 2011: 117). Additionally, soldiers and other combatants rape in order to win and maintain control over the territory and communities, which are represented by women (HRW, 2002: 23). In many cases, rape was not the end as many victims have been subjects to horrific mutilations that go beyond the scope of rape: fistulas<sup>66</sup>, after gang-raping<sup>67</sup> women's labia are pierced and then padlocked, hot plastic as well as sticks and bayonets are being inserted into the women, soldiers are even shooting women in the vagina (Meger, 2010: 126).

---

<sup>64</sup> Even six months old girls are being raped to death.

<sup>65</sup> Originally numerous locally based groups of combatants committed to the defence of their communities against outsiders (Rwandans, Ugandan, or Burundian government forces, Congolese of other ethnic group, particularly those who speak *Kinyarwanda* or are of Tutsi origin). During the course of the war, they became opportunistic predators in the name of defending their own communities (HRW, 2002: 16).

<sup>66</sup> A condition caused by traumatization of genitals by the destructive insertion of guns and sticks into women's vaginas that tear the walls of the vagina and rectum and leave many permanently incontinent (Lisa F. Jackson, 2007 quoted in Meger, 2010: 126).

<sup>67</sup> Gang rape is the predominant form of rape (59.3%) with an average of 4.5 attackers per victim (Bartels et al., 2010: 7, Meger, 2010: 127).

Although the patterns and strategies may be strikingly similar, unlike Rwanda the state did not use conscription to recruit soldiers. Put differently, in the context of the Congolese conflict, pressganging was the predominant form of recruitment. The Congolese national army, FARDC, was formed by forcibly merging all the main rebel groups as well as former government army into a new force. Additionally, the transitional government pursued the policy of *brassage* (mixing up), in which the new brigades were formed and subsequently trained (HRW, 2009: 20). Even though the new brigades were initially internationally acclaimed, the FARDC, especially the 14<sup>th</sup> Brigade, turned out to be one of the main perpetrators of rape and sexual violence in general (ibid: 21–31).

This is mainly due to the lack of vertical cohesion. During the huge logistical exercise under the *brassage*, the newly created forces came under the control of a sole commander. The constant reorganization and reshuffling of the military leaders may undermine the cohesion, and implicit obedience, as much as the creation of new units from the former adversaries of the integration under sole commander who may have less experience than the soldiers below his rank (Eriksson-Baaz and Stern, 2008; 2013: 75). To illustrate: the soldiers of the 14<sup>th</sup> Brigade were able to commit abuses without consequences because the brigade lacked a clear chain of command both within the field and as senior levels of military hierarchy, and instead accepted orders from operational command (HRW, 2009: 32). In conclusion, the lack of military command brings about the lack of control and enforcement of rules, which in turn increases the use of rape that is used for achieving strategic objectives of a certain armed group even without order from above.

## CONCLUSION

Modern warfare has seen a substantial increase in the use of not-so-new phenomena – wartime rape. Wartime has become a prominent *modus operandi* in conflicts, leaving direct, profound and life-changing consequences on the lives victims and their communities. Some women and girls will never recover from the physical, psychological and social effects; other women did not even have the opportunity to try as the assault ended their life. Significant numbers of children were born whose mothers were not able or willing to take care of them, as they are a constant reminder of what had happened. Many victims are ostracized by the wider community. To conclude, the repercussions affect not only the victim, but also the whole community, both short-term and long-term.

A shockingly high prevalence of rape in the Great Lakes region inspired this research, the main aim of which was to put the widespread use of rape under scrutiny. In this sense, the research used four theories – gender inequality, ethnic hatred, genocidal rape and strategic rape – that have been frequently cited as the main explanatory forces behind wartime rape. Additionally, the minor goal of the research was to test the regional security complex theory. To this extent, this research succeeded by demonstrating the spillover effect of conflict in the region.

For the purposes of this research a mixed method was used. In other words, the research drew upon both quantitative and qualitative research methods, an approach which led to rather interesting results. Firstly, statistical analysis was performed using Cohen’s original dataset (2013) with 86 cases of extraordinary temporal and spatial details. Despite the fact, that cases with missing data were dropped, and thereby analysis was carried out with only 75 cases, plausible general conclusions were drawn. The general trend showed that only the use of pressganging, seemingly because of the use of force, and the ambiguous nature of the conflict directly impact the level of wartime rape. To put it another way, the results supported the proposed hypotheses, and stated that the use of pressganging does indeed increase the prevalence of wartime rape. Though, ethnic war is frequently cited as an environment susceptible to wartime rape, the results proved that it is in fact a conflict of mixed nature in which more factors than ethnic cleavages alone effect the level of wartime rape. Though the chances of faulty conclusions rose to almost ten per cent in the case of ethnic war, this research is willing to take the risk and conclude that ethnic war also renders populations more prone to wartime rape. Contrary to expectations, gender inequality, the occurrence of genocide and

conscripted, presumably due to the lack of use of force, do not have any impact whatsoever on the level of wartime rape.

Strikingly, the evidence of the case studies showed contradicting results. In the case of Rwanda, it is not possible to dogmatically conclude that gender inequality and ethnic hatred resulted in the higher prevalence of wartime rape. Arguably, however the evolution of ethnic identities and the second-class status of women paved the way for hate propaganda and subsequent annihilation. In other words, these were not the end, but the means. During the killing campaign of 1994, the recruits were given lists and were instructed to go and rape. Rape has become a tactic in the wider strategy of cleansing. Rape has become the order of genocide. Ultimately, the case study of Rwanda supported the results of the statistical analysis regarding pressganging and ethnic war. More importantly, the study also demonstrated that in the case of Rwanda, gender inequality, genocide and conscription played its role. Because the results do tend to go against the general trend, it is possible to consider Rwanda as an outlying case.

Turning attention to the DRC, a country that has been suffering ever since the genocide in neighbouring countries, also presented notable data, including direct support for the regional security complex theory. In the DRC, gender inequality, the mixed nature of the conflict and pressganging played a role in increasing the prevalence of wartime rape. However, it is fundamentally important to acknowledge that in the case of pressganging, the evidence illustrated a peculiar fact. Contrary to the prerequisite of pressganging implying hierarchy, in the case of the DRC, pressganging did not lead to a hierarchical command, though the level of wartime rape remained high. This is mainly due to the fact that the combatants still systematically exploited rape in order to achieve objectives, even without clear orders from higher ranks. Nevertheless, this may still support the hypothesis stating that pressganging increases the prevalence of wartime rape. All in all, the DRC proves to be somewhat of an exceptional case as it goes against the general trend.

Notwithstanding the ambitions of this research, it is not possible to provide definite conclusions. Even though the general trend showed that certain factors are or are not influencing the level of wartime rape, it is more than advisable to conduct case additional studies, such as studies considering Burundi and/or Uganda that may support or reject the quantitative results. Furthermore, while it is possible to conclude that some interdependent regions are more prone to the cross-border occurrence of various threats, it remains a question whether the same results will be obtained in a different regional complex. In other words, it is feasible to question the similarities of one complex vis-à-vis the similarities of others? On a

more specific note, the particulars of ethnic hatred in Rwanda may be completely different from the ethnic hatred in, for example, Iraq, etc. Whereas it may be plausible to conclude that ethnic hatred possibly plays a role in the prevalence, more thorough research based on the case study approach is highly advisable. As mentioned earlier, due to the limitations posed both by the scope of this research and the dataset used, the probability of heightened wartime rape when voluntary recruitment mechanisms commonly associated with professional armies is used was not researched. Because evidence proved that wartime rape occurs even when highly hierarchical armies are part of the conflict, the question of sexual assaults perpetrated by professional armies definitely deserves a generous allowance of research attention in its own right.

Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of this research and its limited scope considering the topic at hand, several important conclusions and implications may be drawn. First and foremost, wartime rape still represents a means of executing warfare that is not only inexpensive but also highly effective. Second, due to the stigmatization, ostracism and trauma, the attacks remain underreported, which in turn may lead to inadequate response from the international community that is willing and capable of providing medical, physical, legal and psychological support for victims. Furthermore, underreporting may lead to the increase in impunity, which has to be ended in order to achieve justice and potential for reconciliation. Last but not least, without clear comparative understanding, it is difficult to disclose why wartime rape occurs and why its prevalence is high. Accordingly, it also becomes very problematic to define the term of appropriate intervention or even to take measures preventing the use of wartime rape by combatant groups. Ultimately, this research should therefore serve as a source of evidence and the cases as a source of enlightenment, which proves to be a cause for hope in an otherwise dark field.

---

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

- ALLEN, Beverly (1996). *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press).
- Amnesty International (2004). *Lives Blown Apart: Crimes against Women in Times of Conflict* (London: Amnesty International Publications).
- ANDERSON, Letitia (2010). Politics by Other Means: When does Sexual Violence Threaten International Peace and Security?. *International Peacekeeping* 17 (2), pp. 244–260.
- ASKIN, Kelly Dawn (2003). Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles. *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21 (2), pp. 288–349.
- BANWELL, Stacy (2014). Rape and Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case Study of Gender-Based Violence. *Journal of Gender Studies* 23 (1), pp. 45–58.
- BARSTOW, Anne Llewellyn, ed. (2000). *War's Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution, and Other Crimes Against Women* (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press).
- BARTELS, Susan et al. (2010). Patterns of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: report from survivors presenting to Panzi Hospital in 2006. *Conflict and Health* 4 (9), pp. 1–10.
- BARTROP, Paul R. (2012). Genocide, Rape and the Movies. In: Rittner, Carol and Roth, John K., eds. *Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House), pp. 227–245 of 296 [e-book].
- BASTICK, Megan; GRIMM, Karin and KUNZ Rahel (2007). *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces).
- BENARD, Cheryl (1994). Rape as Terror: The Case of Bosnia. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6 (1), pp. 29–43.
- BONILLA, Natalia Suarez (2012). Rape, Blaming the Victim and Social Control in Paramilitary Enclaves: An Approach to the Case of Colombia. In: Branche, Raphaëlle and Virgili, Fabrice, eds. *Rape in Wartime* (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 79–89.
- BOURKE, Joanna (2007). *Rape: A History from 1869 to the Present Day* (London, Virago).
- BRANCHE, Raphaëlle et al. (2012). Writing the History of Rape in Wartime. In: Branche, Raphaëlle and Virgili, Fabrice, eds. *Rape in Wartime* (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1–16.

- BROUWER, Anne-Marie de (2005). *Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR* (Antwerp – Oxford: Intersentia).
- BROWNMILLER, Susan (1975). *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape* (New York: Open Road Media) [e-book].
- BUSS, Doris E. (2009). Rethinking ‘Rape as a Weapon of War’. *Feminist Legal Studies* 17 (2), pp. 145–163.
- BUTLER, Christopher; GLUCH Tali and MITCHELL, Neil (2007). Security Forces and Sexual Violence: A Cross-National Analysis of Principal-agent Argument. *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (6), pp. 669–686.
- BUZAN, Barry and WÆVER, Ole (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge University Press).
- CAPRIOLI, Mary (2000). Gendered Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (1), pp. 51–68.
- CAPRIOLI, Mary (2003). Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality of State First Use of Force. *International Interactions* 29 (3), pp. 195–214.
- CAPRIOLI, Mary (2005). Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2), pp. 161–178.
- CAPRIOLI, Mary et al. (2009). The WomanStats Project Database: Advancing an Empirical Research Agenda. *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (6), pp. 839–851.
- CARD, Claudia (1996). Rape as a Weapon of War. *Hypatia* 11 (4), pp. 5–18.
- CARD, Claudia (2003). Genocide and Social Death. *Hypatia* 18 (1), pp. 63–79.
- CARRILLO, Roxanna (1991). *Violence Against Women: An Obstacle to Development* (New Brunswick: Center for Women’s Leadership).
- Center for Global Policy [2012] *Political Instability Task Force* (available at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/>, accessed 20 May, 2014).
- CIA, (2014a). *Congo, Democratic Republic of* (available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html>, accessed 15 May, 2014).

- CIA, (2014b). *Country Comparison: Fertility Rate* (available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html>, accessed 15 May, 2014).
- CIA, (2014c). *Rwanda* (available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html>, accessed 15 May, 2014).
- CINGRANELLI, David L.; RICHARDS, David L. and Clay, K. Chad (2014). The CIRI Human Rights Dataset (available at <http://www.humanrightsdata.com>, accessed 14 May, 2014).
- CLAY, Daniel and LEMARCHAND, René (2013). *Rwanda*. Encyclopædia Britannica (available at <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514402/Rwanda>, accessed 15 May, 2014).
- COHEN, Dara Kay (2013). *Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009) Dataset* (received by request from the author).
- COHEN, Dara Kay (2013a). Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009). *American Political Science Review* 107 (3), pp. 461–477.
- COHEN, Dara Kay (2013b). Supplemental Materials for ‘Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)’. *American Political Science Review* 107 (3), p. 1–23.
- COHEN, Dara Kay; GREEN, Amelia Hoover and WOOD, Elisabeth Jean (2013). Wartime Sexual Violence: Misconceptions, Implications, and Ways Forward. *United States Institute of Peace: Special Report* 323, pp. 1–16.
- CONNOR, Walker (1994). *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951.
- COPELON, Rhonda (1994). Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in Time of War. In. Stiglmayer, Alexandra, ed. *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), pp. 197–218.
- COPELON, Rhonda (1998). Surfacing Gender, Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in Time of War. In. Lorentzen, Lois and Turpin, Jennifer, eds. *The Women and War Reader* (New York: New York University Press), pp. 63–79.

- CORDELL, Dennis D.; LEMARCHAND, René et al. (2014). *Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*. Encyclopædia Britannica (available at <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132363/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo-DRC>, accessed 20 May, 2014).
- COURTEMANCHE, Gil (2009). *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali* (Canongate) [e-book].
- CRAWFORD, Kerry F. (2013). From Spoils to Weapons: Framing Wartime Sexual Violence. *Gender & Development* 21 (3), pp. 505–517.
- DALEY, Elizabeth; DORE-WEEKS, Rachel and UMUHOZA, Claudine (2010). Ahead of the Game: Land Tenure Reform in Rwanda and the Process of Securing Women’s Land Rights. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4 (1), pp. 131–152.
- DES FORGES, Alison (1999). “Leave None to Tell the Story”: *Genocide in Rwanda* (Human Rights Watch).
- DIKEN, Bülent and LAUSTSEN, Carsten Bagge (2005). Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War. *Body & Society* 11 (1), pp. 111–128.
- DONOVAN, Paula (2002). Rape and HIV/AIDS in Rwanda. *The Lancet* 360, pp. 17–18.
- EBOE-OSUJI, Chile (2007). Rape as Genocide: Some Questions Arising. *Journal of Genocide Research* 9 (2), pp. 251–273.
- ERIKSSON-BAAZ and STERN, Maria (2008). Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC). *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 46 (1), pp. 57–86.
- ERIKSSON-BAAZ, Maria and STERN, Maria (2013). *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, prescriptions, problems in the Congo and beyond* (London and New York: Zed Books).
- FARR, Kathryn (2009). Extreme War Rape in Today’s Civil-War-Torn States: A contextual and Comparative Analysis. *Gender Issues* 26, pp. 1–41.
- FARR, Kathryn (2010). No Escape: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Central and Eastern African Armed Conflicts. *DEP* (13-14), pp. 85–112.
- FEARON, James D. (2006). Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence. In. Weingast, Barry and Wittman, Donald, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (Oxford University Press), pp. 852–868.

- FEARON, James D. and LAITIN David D. (2013). A List of Civil Wars, 1945–2012. Revised and Updated Version of the List used for Fearon and Laitin 2003 (Stanford University) (received by request form by author).
- FEARON, James D. and LAITIN, David D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), pp. 75–90.
- FOX, Jonathan (2001). Religious Causes of International Intervention. *International Politics* 38 (4), pp. 515–532.
- FREEDMAN, Jane (2011). Explaining Sexual Violence and Gender Inequalities in the DRC. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 23 (2), pp. 170–175.
- GIBNEY, Mark; CORNETT, Linda and WOOD, Reed (2011). *Political Terror Scale 1976–2006* (available at <http://politicalterroryscale.org>, accessed 14 May, 2014).
- GOLDSTEIN, Joshua S. (2001). *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa* (Cambridge University Press).
- GOTTSCHALL, Jonathan (2004). Explaining Wartime Rape. *The Journal of Sex Research* 41 (2), pp. 129–136.
- GREEN, Llezlie L. (2002). Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide: An Argument for Intersectionality in International Law. *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 33 (3), pp. 733–776.
- GURR, Ted Robert (1994). Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address. *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3), pp. 347–377.
- HANSEN, Lene (2001). Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 3 (1), pp. 55–75.
- HARFF, Barbara (2005). Assessing Risks of Genocide and Politicide. In: Marshall, Monty G. and Gurr, Ted Robert, eds. *Peace and Conflict: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (College Park, MD: The Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland).
- Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2009). *Characterizing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Profiles of Violence, Community Responses, and Implications for the Protection of Women* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Open Society Institute).

- HAUGHTON, Andrew and BICHENO, Hugh (2004). Recruitment. In. Holmes, Richard; Singleton, Charles and Jones, Spencer, eds. *The Oxford Companion to Military History* (Oxford University Press) [online version].
- HENDERSON, Errol A. (1997). Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States, and the Onset of War 1820–1989. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (5), pp. 649–668.
- HINTJENS, Helem M. (2001). When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda. *Ethnicities* 1 (1), pp. 25–55.
- HINTJENS, Helen M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37 (2), pp. 241–286.
- HOROWITZ, Donald (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- HUBBARD, Jessica (2012). Justice for Women? : Rape as Genocide and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In. Rittner, Carol and Roth, John K., eds. *Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House), pp. 149–165 of 296 [e-book].
- Human Rights Watch (1996). *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath* (Human Rights Watch).
- Human Rights Watch (2002). *The War within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo* (available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602.pdf>, accessed 25 May, 2014).
- Human Rights Watch (2003). “*We’ll Kill You If You Cry*” (available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/01/15/well-kill-you-if-you-cry>, accessed 25 May, 2014).
- Human Rights Watch (2009). *Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (available at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0709webwcover.pdf>, accessed 25 May, 2014).
- International Criminal Court (2014). *Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender Based Crimes* (available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf>, accessed 7 June, 2014).

- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998). *Prosecutor versus Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T* (available at <http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf>, accessed 7 May, 2014).
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2001). *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1* (available at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf>, accessed 7 May, 2014).
- ISLAM, Shada and POLLOCK, John (2014). Sexual Violence in Conflict: Fact Sheet. *Friends of Europe*.
- JALEEL, Rana (2012). Weapons of Sex, Weapons of War. *Cultural Studies* 27 (1), pp. 115–135.
- JEFFERSON, LaShawn R. (2004). In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status. In: Human Rights Watch. *Human Rights and Armed Conflict: World Report 2004* (Human Rights Watch).
- JEFREMOVAS, Villia (1991). Loose Women, Virtuous Wives, and Timid Virgins: Gender and the Control of Resources in Rwanda. *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 25 (3), pp. 378-395.
- JONES, Adam (2002). Gender and Genocide in Rwanda. *Journal of Genocide Research* 4 (1), pp. 65-94.
- KAMAL, Sultana (1998). The 1971 Genocide in Bangladesh and Crimes Committed Against Women. In: Sajor, Indai Loudres. *Common Grounds: Violence Against Women in War and Armed Conflict Situations* (Quezon City, Philippines: Ascent), pp. 268–281.
- KAPLAN, Laura Duhan (1994). Woman as Caretaker: An Archetype That Supports Patriarchal Militarism. *Hypatia* 9 (2), pp. 123–134.
- KOHN, Elizabeth (1994). Rape as a weapon of war: Women’s human rights during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. *Golden Gate University Law Review* 24 (1), pp. 199–223.
- LEATHERMAN, Janie L. (2011). *Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict* (Polity) [e-book].
- LEE-KOO, Katrina (2002). Confronting a Disciplinary Blindness: Women, War and Rape in International Politics of Security. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 37 (3), pp. 525–536.

- LEE, Chang-Hun (2009). Institutionalized Hegemonic Masculinity and Rape by United States Army Personnel in South Korea: A Perspective on Military Subculture. *Asian Criminology* 5 (1), pp. 11–25.
- LEIBY, Michele (2009). Wartime Sexual Violence in Guatemala and Peru. *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2), pp. 445–468.
- LEMARCHAND, René (1970). *Rwanda and Burundi* (London: Pall Mall Press).
- LITTLEWOOD, Roland (1997). Military Rape. *Anthropology Today* 13 (2), pp. 7–17.
- LUNN, Jon (2006). The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?. *House of Commons Library Research Paper* 06/51.
- MACKINNON, Catherine (1994a). Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights. *Harvard Women's Law Journal* 17(5), pp. 5–16.
- MACKINNON, Catherine (1994b). Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide. In: Stiglmyer, Alexandra, ed. *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), pp. 73–81.
- MACKINNON, Catherine (2006). Defining Rape Internationally: A comment of Akayesu. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 44 (3), pp. 940–958.
- MBANBI, Annie Matundu and FARAY-KELE, Marie-Claire (2010). Gender Inequality and Social Institutions in D.R.Congo. *PeaceWomen* (available at [http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/hrinst\\_genderinequalityinthedrc\\_wilpf\\_december2010english.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/hrinst_genderinequalityinthedrc_wilpf_december2010english.pdf), accessed 18 May, 2014).
- MEGER, Sara (2010). Rape of the Congo: Understanding Sexual Violence in the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28 (2), pp. 119–135.
- MEGER, Sara (2011). Rape in Contemporary Warfare: The Role of Globalization in Wartime Sexual Violence. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 1 (1), pp. 100–132.
- MOOKHERJEE, Nayanika (2012). Mass Rape and the Inscription of Gendered and Racial Domination during the Bangladesh War of 1971. In: Branche, Raphaëlle and Virgili, Fabrice, eds. *Rape in Wartime* (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 67–78.
- MUCHINA, Paulina (2000). What Are you Doing to Stop Violence Against Women and Girls in Africa?. In: BARSTOW, Anne Llewellyn, ed. (2000). *War's Dirty Secret: Rape,*

- Prostitution, and Other Crimes Against Women* (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press), pp. 101–123.
- MULLINS, Christopher (2009a). ‘He Would Kill Me With His Penis’: Genocidal Rape in Rwanda as a State Crime. *Critical Criminology* 17 (1), pp. 15–33.
- MULLINS, Christopher W. (2009b). We Are Going to Rape You and Taste Tutsi Women: Rape During the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. *British Journal of Criminology* 49 (6), pp. 719–735.
- NEWBURY, Catharine (1998). Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda. *Africa Today* 45 (1), pp. 7–24.
- NIARCHOS, Catherine N. (1995). Women, war, and rape: Challenges facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. *Human Rights Quarterly* 17 (4), pp. 649–690.
- NIKOLIC-RASTANOVIC, Vesna (1996). War and Violence against Women. In. Lorentzen, Lois Ann and Turpin, Jennifer, eds. *The Gendered New World Order: Militarism, Development, and the Environment* (London: Routledge), pp. 195–210.
- NITSÁN, Tal (2012). The Body That Writes: Reflections on the Process of Writing about Wartime Rape Avoidance in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. In. Branche, Raphaëlle and Virgili, Fabrice, eds. *Rape in Wartime* (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 153–168.
- NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, Georges (2004a). *From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet).
- NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, Georges (2004b). Great Lakes Region. In. Krieger, Joel, ed. *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* [online version].
- Oxfam (2012). *Gender Equalities in Emergencies: Protecting Communities in the DRC* (available at <http://www.oxfamblogs.org/estafrica/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/cs-protecting-communities-drc-081012-en.pdf>, accessed 30 May, 2014).
- PETERMAN, Amber; PALERMO, Tia and BREDENKAMP, Caryn (2011). Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *American Journal of Public Health* 101 (6), pp. 1060–1067.
- PETERSON, (1998). Gendered Nationalism: Reproducing ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’. In. In. Lorentzen, Lois and Turpin, Jennifer, eds. *The Women and War Reader* (New York: New York University Press), pp. 41–49.

- PICKERING, Jeffrey (2010). Dangerous Drafts? A Time-series, Cross-national Analysis of Conscription and the Use of Military Force, 1946–2001. *Armed Forces and Society* 36 (2), pp. 1–22.
- Political Instability Task Force (2013). *Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set Version 2013* (available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITF%20Consolidated%20Case%20List%202013.pdf>, accessed 14 May, 2014).
- PLÜMPER, Thomas and NEUMAYER, Eric (2006). The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy. *International Organization* 60 (3), pp. 723–754.
- PORTER, Jack Nusan (1982). Introduction: What is Genocide?: Notes Toward a Definition. In: Porter, Jack Nusan, ed. *Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology* (University Press of America), pp. 2–32.
- PUECHGUIRBAL, Nadine (2012). Breaking the Silence: New Approaches to the Consequences of Rape in Some African Conflicts, 1994–2008. In: Branche, Raphaëlle and Virgili, Fabrice, eds. *Rape in Wartime* (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 140–152.
- PUFONG, Marc G. and SWAIN, Randall D. (2008). Rape in Militarised Conflicts: Variation in International Outrage and Responsiveness. *International Journal of Law in Context* 4 (3), pp. 237–275.
- REYNTJENS, Filip (2009). *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006* (Cambridge University Press).
- REYNTJENS, Filip (2011). Constructing The Truth, Dealing With Dissent, Domesticating The World: Governance In Post- Genocide Rwanda. *African Affairs* 110 (438), pp. 1–34.
- RITTNER, Carol and Roth, John K. (2012). *Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House) [e-book].
- ROSE, Laurel L. (2004). Women’s land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the Gap between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation. *Texas Journal of Women and the Law* 13 (2), pp. 197–250.
- SAJJAD, Tarzeena (2012). Rape on Trial: Promises of International Jurisprudence, Perils of Retributive Justice, and the Realities of Impunity. Rittner, Carol and Roth, John K.,

- eds. *Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House), pp. 109–130 of 296 [e-book].
- SAJOR, Indai Loudres (1998). Our Common Grounds. In. Sajor, Indai Loudres. *Common Grounds: Violence Against Women in War and Armed Conflict Situations* (Quezon City, Philippines: Ascent), pp. 1–18.
- SALZMAN, Todd (2000). “Rape Camps.” forced impregnation, and ethnic cleansing: Religious, cultural and ethical responses to rape victims in the former Yugoslavia. In. BARSTOW, Anne Llewellyn, ed. (2000). *War’s Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution, and Other Crimes Against Women* (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press), pp. 63–92.
- SCHOTT, Robin, May (2011). War Rape, Natality and Genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research* 13 (1/2), pp. 5–21.
- SEIFERT, Ruth (1994). War and rape: A preliminary analysis. In Stiglmayer, Alexandra, ed. *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), pp. 54–72.
- SEIFERT, Ruth (1996). The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars. *Women’s Studies International Forum* 19 (1/2), pp. 35–43.
- SHARLACH, Lisa (1999). Gender and Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Agents and Objects of Genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research* 1 (3), pp. 387–399.
- SHARLACH, Lisa (2000). Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. *New Political Science* 22 (1), pp. 89–102.
- STIGLMAYER, Alexandra, ed. (1994). *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press).
- STRAUS, Scott (2006). *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press) [e-book].
- STRAUS, Scott (2014). Introduction: Rwanda Twenty Years After the Genocide. *African Affairs*, pp. 1–3.
- Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law of the Committee on the Judiciary (2008). [Hearing: *Rape as a Weapon of War: Accountability for Sexual Violence in Conflict*] 1 April, 2008 (United States Senate), serial no. J-110-82.

- TOMPkins, Tamara (1995). Prosecuting rape as a war crime: Speaking the unspeakable. *Notre Dame Law Review* 70, pp. 845–890.
- TURSHEN, Meredith (2001). Engendering Relations of State to Society in the Aftermath. In: Meintjes, Sheila; Pillay, Anu and Tursher, Meredith, eds. *The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation* (London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.), pp. 78–96.
- U.S. State Department. *Human Rights Reports 1999–2013* (available at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/>).
- United Nations (1998). *Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response* (available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.pdf>, accessed 28 May, 2014).
- United Nations (2004a). *Great Lakes Region 1* (available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/blr.pdf>, accessed 21 May, 2014).
- United Nations (2004b). *Rwanda Genocide ‘Must Leave Us Always With A Sense Of Bitter Regret And Abiding Sorrow’, Says Secretary-General To New York Memorial Conference* (available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9223.doc.htm>, accessed 29 May, 2014).
- United Nations (2006). *Broken Bodies, Broken Dream: Violence Against Women Exposed* (United Nations).
- United Nations Economic and Social Council. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998.
- United Nations Security Council (2008). S/RES/1820, 19 June 2008.
- United Nations Security Council. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994.
- United Nations. *Background Information on Sexual Violence Used as a Tool of War* (available at <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml>, accessed 31 May, 2014).
- WACHALA, Kas (2012). The Tools to Combat the War on Women’s Bodies: Rape and Sexual Violence Against Women in Armed Conflict. *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16 (3), 533–553.
- WALLER, James E. (2012). Rape as a Tool of “Othering” in Genocide. In: Rittner, Carol and Roth, John K., eds. *Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House), pp. 131–149 of 296 [e-book].

- WEISS, Herbert (2000). *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet).
- WEITSMAN, Patricia A. (2008). The politics of identity and sexual violence: a review of Bosnia and Rwanda. *Human Rights Quarterly* 30(3), pp. 561–578
- WOOD, Elisabeth Jean (2006). Variation in Sexual Violence during War. *Politics and Society* 34 (3), pp. 307–342.
- WOOD, Elisabeth Jean (2008). Sexual Violence During War: Toward an Understanding in Variation. In. Kalyvas, Stathis N.; Shapiro, Ian and Masoud, Tarek, eds. *Order, Conflict, and Violence* (Cambridge University Press), pp. 321–351.
- WOOD, Elisabeth Jean (2009). Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare?. *Politics and Society* 37 (1), pp. 131–162.
- World Bank (2014a). *Fertility rate, total (births per women)* (available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN>, accessed 20 May, 2014).
- World Bank (2014b). *World Bank Development Indicators* (available at <http://wdi.worldbank.org/tables>, accessed 20 May, 2014).

---

## APPENDIX

---

## APPENDIX I: The map of the Great Lakes Region



UN (2004a). *Great Lakes Region I* (available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/blr.pdf>, accessed 21 May, 2014).

## APPENDIX II: The list of civil wars as listed in the dataset, updated according to Fearon and Laitin (2013) - excerpt

Conflict	War years
AFGHANISTAN (Mujahideen)*	1978-92
AFGHANISTAN (v. Taliban)	1992-2001
AFGHANISTAN (v. Taliban II)	2003-ongoing
ALGERIA (FIS, GIA, GSPC)	1992-ongoing
ANGOLA (FLEC (Cabinda))	1992-2004
ANGOLA (UNITA)	1975-2002
AZERBAIJAN (Nagorno-Karabagh)	1992-94
BANGLADESH (Chittagong Hills/Shanti Bahini)	1976-97
BOSNIA (Rep. Srpska/Croats)	1992-95
BURMA (CPB, Karens, etc.)	1948-ongoing
BURUNDI (Hutu groups v. govt)	1993-2006
BURUNDI (Org. massacres on both sides)	1988-88
CAMBODIA (Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, etc)	1978-98
CHAD (FROLINAT, various)	1965-ongoing
CHAD (FARF, other rebels in South)	1992-98
CHINA (Xinjiang)	1990-98
COLOMBIA (FARC, ELN, etc)	1963-ongoing
CONGO/BRAZZAVILLE (Republic of the Congo) (Factional fighting)	1997-99
CROATIA (Krajina)	1992-95
DEM. REP. CONGO/ZAIRE (AFDL (Kabila))	1996-97
DEM. REP. CONGO/ZAIRE (RCD, etc v. govt)	1998-ongoing
DJIBOUTI (FRUD)	1991-94
EL SALVADOR (FMLN)	1979-92
ETHIOPIA (Eritrea, Tigray, etc.)*	1962-92
ETHIOPIA (Oromo Lib. Front)	1992-ongoing
GEORGIA (Abkhazia)	1992-94
GUATEMALA (URNG, various)	1968-96
GUINEA BISSAU (Mil. Faction)	1998-99
HAITI (Mil. Coup)	1991-95
INDIA (Kashmir)	1989-ongoing
INDIA (N.East rebels)*	1956-1968
INDIA (Naxalites)*	1990-ongoing
INDIA (Sikhs)	1982-93
INDONESIA (E. Timor)	1975-99
INDONESIA (GAM I (Aceh))	1989-91
INDONESIA (GAM II (Aceh))	1999-2005
INDONESIA (OPM (West Papua))	1965-85
IRAN (KDPI (Kurds))	1979-93
IRAN (PJAK)	2004-ongoing
IRAQ (KDP, PUK (Kurds))	1974-93
IRAQ (Shia uprising)	1991-91
IRAQ (Sunni and Shia rebels)	2004-ongoing

ISRAEL (Palestinian insurgents)	1949-ongoing
IVORY COAST (anti-Gbagbo)	2002-07
LEBANON (various militias)	1975-90
LIBERIA (NPFL (Taylor), INPFL (Johnson))	1989-96
LIBERIA (LURD)	2000-03
MALI (Tuaregs)	1989-94
MOROCCO (Polisario)	1975-88
MOZAMBIQUE (RENAMO)	1976-92
NEPAL (CPN-M/UPF (Maoists))	1997-2006
NICARAGUA (Contras)	1981-88
PAKISTAN (MQM: Sindhis v. Mohajirs)*	1992-99
PAKISTAN (Baluchistan)	2004-ongoing
PAKISTAN (Taliban)*	2004-ongoing
PAPUA N.G. (BRA (Bougainville))	1988-98
PERU (Sendero Luminoso)	1981-95
PHILIPPINES (MNLF, MILF)*	1970-ongoing
PHILIPPINES (NPA)	1969-ongoing
RUSSIA (Chechnya II)	1999-ongoing
RUSSIA (Chechnya)	1994-96
RWANDA (RPF, genocide)	1990-2002
SENEGAL (MFDC (Casamance))	1989-ongoing
SIERRA LEONE (RUF, AFRC, etc.)	1991-2000
SOMALIA (post-Barre war)	1991-ongoing
SOMALIA (SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs))	1981-91
SOUTH AFRICA (ANC, PAC, Azapo)	1983-94
SRI LANKA (JVP II)	1987-89
SRI LANKA (LTTE, etc.)	1983-2009
SUDAN (SPLA, etc.)	1983-2005
SUDAN (Darfur (SLA, JEM, etc))	2003-ongoing
SYRIA (Muslim Brothers)	1979-1982
TAJKISTAN (UTO)	1992-97
THAILAND (Hill Tribes, CPT)	1966-81
THAILAND (Pattani)	2004-ongoing
TURKEY (Militia-ized party politics)	1977-80
TURKEY (PKK)	1984-ongoing
UGANDA (LRA, West Nile, etc.)*	1987-ongoing
UGANDA (NRA, etc.)*	1981-89
UK (IRA)	1969-98
YEMEN (South Yemen)	1994-94
YEMEN (al-Houthi rebels)	2004-ongoing
YEMEN PEOP. REP. (Faction of Socialist Party)	1986-87
YUGOSLAVIA (Croatia/Krajina)	1991-91
YUGOSLAVIA (UCK) (From Serbia-Montenegro Report)	1998-99
ZIMBABWE (Ndebele guer's)	1983-87

Adapted from COHEN, Dara Kay (2013). *Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)* Dataset (received by request from the author).

APPENDIX III: Fertility rates as listed in the dataset (The Great Lakes Region) -  
excerpt

Country	Duration	Rate
Burundi	1993–2006	6.442
Burundi	1988–1988	6.754
DRC	1996–1997	7.102
DRC	1998–ongoing	7.026
Rwanda	1990–2002	6.842
Uganda	1987–ongoing	7.097
Uganda	1981–1988	7.101

Adapted from COHEN, Dara Kay (2013). *Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)* Dataset (received by request from the author).

**APPENDIX IV: Genocide/Politicide PITS notes as used in the dataset, updated according to PITF 2013 (The Great Lakes Region) - excerpt**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Burundi	<b>1993–2006</b>	In 1993, Hutu opposition forces win first multi-party presidential and legislative elections, provoking disaffected Tutsi military forces to revolt and assassinate the Hutu president (ARC 10/93-7/96). Subsequent armed clashes and massacres occur in three waves: Tutsi soldiers against Hutu civilians, Hutus against Tutsis, and Tutsi against Hutus (GEN 10/93-12/93). Arusha peace accords are signed by all parties except the FNL in July 2001 and establish an interim government. Most fighting has ended by May 2005 and elections are held that set up a power-sharing government.
Burundi	<b>1988–1988</b>	Attempted democratic reforms prompt violence between historically dominant Tutsis and Hutu challengers (ETH 8/88- 5/05). As result of rural violence against local Tutsi officials, Tutsi-dominated army conducts unpremeditated massacres of Hutus (GEN 8/88).
Rwanda	<b>1990–2002</b>	Tutsi exiles of RPF launch successive attacks from Uganda prompting escalating violence between Hutu and Tutsi fighters (ETH 10/90-12/98). Hutu-dominated military government promises return to democratic rule, and transitional government is established. When President Habyarimana's aircraft is shot down in April 1994, Hutu government deploys military and armed gangs to systematically slaughter Tutsis and Hutu moderates (GEN 4/94-7/94). Ethnic-Tutsi RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) invades and seizes control of government by July 1994 (ARC 4/94-7/94). Hutu militias (Inter-a-hamwe) are driven into neighboring regions, namely the DRC and Uganda, and fighting within Rwanda largely subsides by end of 1998. Hutu fighters launch a major attack in northwestern Rwanda from bases in the DRC in May 2001 but the attack is quickly crushed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (ETH 5/01-7/01).
Uganda	<b>1981–1988</b>	After Amin is overthrown by Tanzanian intervention, Obote again takes power. Following ouster of Amin, his tribal supporters begin campaign of banditry and rebellion. Langi and Acholi peoples continue rebellion with support from Sudan; December 1999 agreement between Sudan and Uganda (Nairobi Accords) ends support and rebel activity lessens for a time but reignites when Ugandan troops enter Sudan in April 2002 to attack Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel bases. Peace talks resume and an effective cease-fire is implemented in May 2006 while talks continue (ETH 10/80-5/06). Obote's other political and tribal rivals are slaughtered on massive scale (GEN 12/80- 1/86). Widespread corruption, repression, and ethnic conflict lead to overthrow of Obote's military-backed civilian regime by General Musaveni's National Resistance Army (REV 1/83-12/85; ARC 7/85-1/86).

Adapted from:

COHEN, Dara Kay (2013). *Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009) Dataset* (received by request from the author).

PITF (2013). *Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Consolidated Problem Set Version 2013* (available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITF%20Consolidated%20Case%20List%202013.pdf>, accessed 14 May, 2014).

**APPENDIX V: Reports of pressganging and conscription by state forces as used in the dataset**

<b>Were there ever reports of pressganging by the state?</b>	<b>Did the state ever recruit through conscription?</b>
<b>Yes, in 27 conflicts (31%)</b>	<b>Yes, in 50 conflicts (64%)</b>
<i>Afghanistan (Mujahedeen)</i>	<i>Afghanistan (Mujahedeen, Taliban)</i>
<i>Angola (FLEC, UNITA)</i>	Algeria
<i>Burma</i>	<i>Angola (FLEC, UNITA)</i>
<i>Cambodia</i>	Azerbaijan
<i>Chad (FROLINAT, FARF)</i>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>DRC (RCD)</b>	<i>Burma</i>
<i>El Salvador</i>	<b>Burundi (Hutu groups)</b>
<i>Ethiopia (Eritrea)</i>	<i>Cambodia</i>
<i>Guatemala</i>	<i>Chad (FROLINAT)</i>
<i>Iraq (KDP, Shia uprising)</i>	China
Ivory Coast	Colombia
Liberia (NPFL, LURD)	Croatia
<i>Nicaragua</i>	Djibouti
Peru	<i>El Salvador</i>
<i>Russia (Chechnya II)</i>	<i>Ethiopia (Eritrea)</i>
<b>Rwanda</b>	Georgia
<i>Somalia (SSDF)</i>	Guatemala
Sri Lanka (LTTE)	Guinea Bissau
<i>Sudan (SPLA, Darfur)</i>	Indonesia (East Timor, GAM I, GAM II, OPM)
<i>Tajikistan</i>	Iran (KDPI)
<i>Yugoslavia (Croatia, Krajina, UCK)</i>	<i>Iraq (KDP, Shia uprising)</i>
	Israel
	Mali
	Morocco
	Mozambique
	<i>Nicaragua</i>
	Peru
	<i>Russia (Chechnya, Chechnya II)</i>
	<b>Rwanda</b>
	<i>Somalia (post-Barre war, SSDF)</i>
	South Africa
	<i>Sudan (SPLA)</i>
	Syria
	<i>Tajikistan</i>
	Thailand (Hill Tribes)
	Turkey (militia-ized party politics, PKK)
	<b>Uganda (LRA)</b>
	Yemen (South Yemen)
	Yemen's People's Republic (Faction of Socialist Party)
	<i>Yugoslavia (Croatia/Krajina, UCK)</i>

\*Cases in bold are countries of the Great Lakes Region.

\*\*Cases in italics are conflict in which both conscription and pressganging were used.

Adapted from COHEN, Dara Kay (2013b). Supplemental Materials for 'Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009). *American Political Science Review* 107 (3)', p. 1–23.

## APPENDIX VI: Previous Data Collection Efforts: Rape During Recent Conflicts

“Collective Rape” (1980–2003) Green (2006)	Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (1987–2007) Bastick et al. (2007)	Violence against Women in Conflict (1997–2000) UN Report (2001) <sup>68</sup>	“Extreme War Rape” in Recent Civil Wars Farr (2009)
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Algeria	Algeria	<b>Burundi</b>	Algeria
Angola	Angola	Colombia	Angola
Argentina	Azerbaijan	<b>DRC</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Azerbaijan	Bosnia and Herzegovina	East Timor	<b>Burundi</b>
Bangladesh	Burma/Myanmar	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Cambodia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	<b>Burundi</b>	India	Chad
<b>Burundi</b>	Cambodia	Indonesia/West Timor	Chechnya
Chile	Central African Republic	Myanmar/Burma	Colombia
Congo	Chad	Russian Federation	Congo
<b>DRC</b>	Colombia	(Chechnya)	Cote d’Ivoire
El Salvador	Cote d’Ivoire	Sierra Leone	East Timor
Guatemala	Croatia	Sri Lanka	Guatemala
Haiti	<b>DRC</b>		Haiti
India	East Timor		Iraq
Indonesia	El Salvador		Kosovo
Kenya	Eritrea		Liberia
Kuwait	Ethiopia		Myanmar/Burma
Liberia	Georgia		Nepal
Mozambique	Guatemala		Peru
Myanmar/Burma	Guinea-Bissau		<b>Rwanda</b>
Nicaragua	Haiti		Sierra Leone
Nigeria	India		Somalia
Peru	Indonesia		Sri Lanka
Philippines	Iraq		Sudan
Russian Federation	Israel/Palestinian Territories		Tajikistan
<b>Rwanda</b>	Kuwait		<b>Uganda</b>
Serbia	Lebanon		
Sierra Leone	Liberia		
Solomon Islands	Mozambique		
Somalia	Nepal		
Sri Lanka	Nicaragua		
Sudan	Papua New Guinea		
Turkey	Peru		
<b>Uganda</b>	Philippines		
Uruguay	Republic of Congo		
Zimbabwe	Russia		
	<b>Rwanda</b>		
	Serbia (Kosovo)		
	Sierra Leone		
	Solomon Islands		
	Somalia		
	South Africa		
	Sri Lanka		
	Sudan		
	Tajikistan		
	Turkey		
	<b>Uganda</b>		
	United States		
	Yemen		
	Zimbabwe		

Adapted from COHEN, Dara Kay (2013b). Supplemental Materials for ‘Explaining Rape During Civil War:

Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009). *American Political Science Review* 107 (3), p. 1–23.

<sup>68</sup> “These countries are based on the case studies provided in the report, which the authors note are neither exhaustive nor representative” (Cohen, 2013b: 11).

## APPENDIX VII: SPSS Output

### VII.1. Frequencies

#### Statistics

		conflict_svr	ethwar_r	pressgang_r	genocide_r	conscription_r	fertility
N	Valid	86	86	86	85	77	86
	Missing	0	0	0	1	9	0

#### conflict\_svr

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	19	22.1	22.1	22.1
	1	35	40.7	40.7	62.8
	2	17	19.8	19.8	82.6
	3	15	17.4	17.4	100.0
	Total	86	100.0	100.0	

#### ethwar\_r

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	52	60.5	60.5	60.5
	1	19	22.1	22.1	82.6
	2	15	17.4	17.4	100.0
	Total	86	100.0	100.0	

#### pressgang\_r

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	27	31.4	31.4	31.4
	1	59	68.6	68.6	100.0
	Total	86	100.0	100.0	

#### genocide\_r

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	17	19.8	20.0	20.0
	1	68	79.1	80.0	100.0
	Total	85	98.8	100.0	
Missing	-9	1	1.2		
	Total	86	100.0		

#### conscription\_r

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	50	58.1	64.9	64.9
	1	27	31.4	35.1	100.0
	Total	77	89.5	100.0	
Missing	-9	9	10.5		
	Total	86	100.0		

#### Statistics

##### fertility

N	Valid	84
	Missing	2
Mean		5.15938
Median		5.26750
Std. Deviation		1.780370
Range		7.367
Minimum		1.170
Maximum		8.537

## VII.2. Ordinal Regression

Case Processing Summary

	N	Marginal Percentage	
conflict_svr	0	18	23.4%
	1	31	40.3%
	2	13	16.9%
	3	15	19.5%
ethwar_r	0	46	59.7%
	1	16	20.8%
	2	15	19.5%
pressgang_r	0	25	32.5%
	1	52	67.5%
genocide_r	0	16	20.8%
	1	61	79.2%
conscription_r	0	50	64.9%
	1	27	35.1%
Valid		77	100.0%
Missing		9	
Total		86	

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	202.669			
Final	191.381	11.288	6	.080

Link function: Logit.

Goodness-of-Fit

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	222.649	219	.419
Deviance	189.995	219	.922

Link function: Logit.

Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.136
Nagelkerke	.147
McFadden	.055

Link function: Logit.

Parameter Estimates

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Threshold	[conflict_svr = 0]	-2.207	.793	7.741	1	.005	-3.762	-.652
	[conflict_svr = 1]	-.274	.751	.133	1	.715	-1.745	1.198
	[conflict_svr = 2]	.664	.758	.768	1	.381	-.822	2.150
Location	fertility	-.006	.079	.007	1	.935	-.161	.148
	[ethwar_r=0]	-.917	.565	2.636	1	.104	-2.023	.190
	[ethwar_r=1]	-1.307	.682	3.680	1	.055	-2.643	.028
	[ethwar_r=2]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[pressgang_r=0]	-1.020	.485	4.419	1	.036	-1.970	-.069
	[pressgang_r=1]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[genocide_r=0]	-.640	.556	1.327	1	.249	-1.730	.449
	[genocide_r=1]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.	.	.
	[conscription_r=0]	.663	.468	2.009	1	.156	-.254	1.579
	[conscription_r=1]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

**APPENDIX VIII: The data in the dataset used for the subchapter selection in the case studies - excerpt**

	Fertility Rate	Ethnic Hatred	Genocide	Pressganging	Conscription
DRC (1996–1997)	7.102	Mixed war	No	No	No
DRC (1998–ongoing)	7.026	Mixed war	No	Yes	No
Rwanda (1990–2002)	6.842	Ethnic war	Yes	Yes	Yes

Adapted from COHEN, Dara Kay (2013). *Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009) Dataset* (received by request from the author).

