

Master Graduate Thesis

Maoism in Turkey: The Journal of *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, 1969-1971



Universiteit Leiden

Jiayi Zhu s2123428

j.zhu.5@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Supervisor: Dr. A.A.Yenen

Master program of Middle Eastern Studies-Turkish Studies

2018-2019

Leiden University

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
1. Globalizing Maoism: From Tiananmen Square to Beyazıt Square	8
Setting off from China’s Tiananmen Square: Maoism as Political Task in the 1960s	8
Flying to the World: How Maoism Became a Global Trend in the 1960s.....	14
Landing in Turkey: Maoism Meets Radical Leftism in the 1960s	18
2. Localizing Maoism: <i>Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık</i>	23
The Rise of Maoism among the Turkish Left.....	24
<i>PDA</i> Group of TIP and <i>PDA</i> as a Maoist Journal.....	27
<i>PDA</i> as a Maoist Journal	31
3. Debating Maoism in <i>PDA</i> Journal	35
Maoism and the Proletarian Internationalism.....	38
Maoism as Anti-Revisionism	44
Maoism as a Peasant-based Mass Revolution	57
Conclusion	71
Table of Abbreviations	74
Bibliography	75

Introduction

On May 15, 2019, the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations opened in Beijing, China, with 1,352 delegates from all 47 countries in Asia in attendance. Together with the Second One Belt and One Road International Cooperation Summit, held in Beijing on April 25, 2019, and attended by 38 national leaders and two heads of international organizations, it clearly showed how China is today engaging more frequently and forwardly as a state actor with global ambitions. This increasing engagement has been widely debated by international scholars ever since the extravagant and splendid opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 and framed as China's soft-power strategy.¹

The term soft power refers to a state's ability to attract or change others' preferences through non-coercive ways such as culture, political values, foreign policies, and even lobbying, in contraposition to military force (Hard Power).² It was only in the past decade that China's soft power efforts started to make international headlines once again, with Chinese President Xi Jinping's decision to "increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's messages to the world."³ However, for the generations coming of age between the 1950s and the 1970s, the projection of China's soft power towards the world assumed a different shape and manifested in the global interest for and adoption of Maoism.⁴ Even though Western interest in Maoism has been seen mostly as a "home-grown phenomenon – as

¹ Many scholarly efforts, especially after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, are devoted to studying the soft-power of the Chinese government, the most cited being: David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Other useful sources include: David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (2015): 99-107; James F. Paradise, "China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (2009): 647-669; Alan Hunter, "Soft Power: China on the Global Stage," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 3 (2009): 373-398.

² Joseph S. Niye Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 76-88.

³ David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-Power Push," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 94 (August 2015): 99-107.

⁴ Julia Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-Building in the People's Republic, 1949-1976," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (2015): 136, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080440115000067>.

an eccentric youthful experiment in alternative politics, an intellectual and cultural outburst divorced from China itself,”⁵ the reasons and ways in which each country adopted and localized Maoism are widely divergent and worth studying.

One of the most detailed studies on this global localization is to be found in *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*, a volume edited by Alexander C. Cook,⁶ which paints a complex picture of Maoism in different countries. The contributions to this book deal with the success of Maoism as an ideology in countries such as Italy, Tanzania, India, Peru, the USSR, Albanian, Yugoslavia, East and West Germany, and France. However vast in scope and well-researched, the volume lacks a discussion of Turkey's case. In the 1960s, Turkey was a country in turmoil, where youth movements inspired by Maoism played a significant role in society. This thesis will try to make a contribution to the subject, enriching the picture by exploring the localization of Maoism in Turkey, through the study of leftist journals such as *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment, *PDA*) and *Aydınlik Sosyalist Dergi* (Enlightenment Socialist Journal, *ASD*) in the period spanning from the late 1960s to 1971.

As its title suggest, this thesis will try to understand to what extent Maoist ideas were localized by Turkey's left. This primary research question is built around three sub-questions: When and why did Maoism start to reach Turkey? Who introduced Maoism in Turkey? How was Maoism interpreted and framed in Turkish leftist journals, especially in *PDA* journal? This thesis will argue that the adoption of Maoism in Turkey was not a case of blindly following a trend, but had much to do with the country's particular political situation. Moreover, by examining Turkey's context and tackling *PDA*'s ideas about a Turkish revolution alongside Maoist ideas, this thesis will also show that *PDA* group tried to apply Maoism to the Turkish situation to a large extent.

Together with the development of revolutionary movements in Third-World

⁵ Lovell, “The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China,” 137.

⁶ Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

countries, and especially after China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a sociopolitical movement launched by Mao to restore bourgeois elements inside the government and society, was announced in 1966, the appearance of Mao and his China started to become evident in the 1960s. While *Quotations from Chairman Mao*, also known as Mao's *Little Red Book*, which contains 267 aphorisms from the Communist Chinese leader Mao Ze-Dong, was translated into a vast number of languages and therefore spread globally, some scholars also started to analyze the political, military, cultural, and educational thoughts of Mao, known under the name of Maoism. In 1963, U.S. historian Stuart R. Schram interpreted and categorized Mao's ideas into English with the help of famous PRC-based American journalist Edgar Snow.⁷ Another American historian, John Bryan Starr, has been making contributions to the field with various books and in several journals ever since the 1970s.⁸

With the global turn in Cold War history and the hardworking of journals such as *Cold War History* and books like *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*,⁹ in recent decades a renewed interest in the study of Cold-War China emerged. Scholars who do or did study Maoism and Mao-era China's influence on other countries in the Cold War period are numerous. Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad re-evaluated Cold War history and emphasized the role of the conflict on a global scale.¹⁰ Edited by Zheng Yangwen, Liu Hong, and Michael Szonyi, *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* argued for the importance of Mao's China to Cold War culture and diplomacy.¹¹ Using Chinese primary sources, Chinese historians Chen Jian (*Mao's*

⁷ Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).

⁸ John Bryan Starr, "Conceptual Foundations of Mao Tse-Tung's Theory of Continuous Revolution," *Asian Survey* 11, no. 6 (1971): 610-628; *Ideology and Culture: an Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics* (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1973); *Understanding China: A Guide to China's Culture, Economy, and Political Structure* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010); *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds. *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹⁰ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹¹ Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi, *The Cold War in Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004175372.i-270>.

China and the Cold War) and Qiang Zhai (*China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975*) introduced the role of China during the Cold War from a non-Eurocentric angle.¹² The already mentioned book edited by Alexander C. Cook, *The Little Red Book: A Global History*,¹³ described the world-wide localization of Maoism through a selection of national case studies. Anne Marie Brady focused on China’s foreign affairs in the 1960s in her books *The Friend of China: The Myth of Rewi Alley* and *Making the Foreign Serve China*.¹⁴ By discussing black American writers traveling to China in the 1950s and 1960s, Matthew D. Johnson disclosed China’s attempt to seize a leading role in the global revolutionary movement.¹⁵

While the study of Mao’s ideas and their relevance in the world is vast, Maoist influence on Turkey, a crucial part of the chaotic world of the 1960s, is still understudied. Pioneering in this field are the studies penned by Çağdaş Üngör, an associate professor at Marmara University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations. Her master thesis, submitted in 2004, discussed the formation and main concepts of Maoism and how it was interpreted in Turkey by *PDA* group in the decade following the launch of the Cultural Revolution. Her doctoral dissertation, as much as several articles, concentrate on China’s ‘external propaganda’ (*duiwai xuanchuan*) and analyze how Mao-era China attempted to gain international influence through a network of foreign-language broadcast and print media, such as Radio Beijing and the periodical *Peking Review*.¹⁶ Her article “China and Turkish Public Opinion

¹² Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9780807898901_chen; Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975*, *The New Cold War History* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

¹³ Cook, *Mao’s Little Red Book*.

¹⁴ Anne-Marie Brady, *Friend of China - The Myth of Rewi Alley* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), <http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=171805>; Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic, Asia/Pacific/Perspectives* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

¹⁵ Matthew D. Johnson, “From Peace to the Panthers: PRC Engagement with African-American Transnational Networks, 1949–1979,” *Past & Present* 218, no.8 (April 17, 2013): 233–57, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gts042>.

¹⁶ Çağdaş Üngör, “Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976)” (PhD Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2009), <http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3366023>; Also see: Çağdaş Üngör, “China Reaches Turkey? Radio Peking’s Turkish Language Broadcasts During the Cold War,” *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 1, no. 2 (February 10, 2016): 19–19, <https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.167301>.

during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–69)” studies both positive and negative reception of the Chinese cultural revolution by Turkish public opinion.¹⁷

Üngör mostly delved into the role China’s public media played in promoting Maoism in the 1960s and 1970s. Her master thesis, titled “Impact of Mao Zedong Thought in Turkey: 1966-1977”, introduced Maoism through the Sino-Soviet split and China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the first part, and the Maoist narrative of the Turkish Revolutionary Party of Workers and Peasants (*Türkiye İhtilâlcî İşçi Köylü Partisi*, TİİKP) by *PDA* group in the second part. Üngör’s thesis gives readers a general idea of Maoism and the work of TİİKP based on Mao’s ideas from 1966 to 1977, but the context is incomplete in regards to China, Turkey, and the world. Inspired by her work, this thesis will try to assimilate the essence and reject the dross of all the previous works on global Maoism. By taking into consideration more primary sources both in Chinese and in Turkish, and engaging more deeply with *PDA* journal, the following sections will explore the localization of Maoism, approaching the topic through contextualization and global intellectual history, to understand how Maoism as an ideology became prosperous in the 1960s with the international situation, and how it was framed by the Turkish left.

Since this thesis is focused on how Maoism was adopted by the Turkish *PDA* group, the issues of the journal *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* represent its main Turkish primary sources. Other leftists’ journals, such as *Aydinlik Sosyalist Dergi*, *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left), *Devrim* (Revolution) and *İşçi-Köylü* (Worker-Peasant) have been consulted as useful references for the debates on Maoism among Turkish leftists. Thanks to the Feridun Gürgöz Periodicals Archive (*Feridun Gürgöz Süreli Yayınlar Arşivi*) of the Social History Research Foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, TÜSTAV*),¹⁸ I had access to almost all the copies of the journals and newspapers online.

¹⁷ Çağdaş Üngör, “China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–69),” in *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture*, ed. Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 47–66, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137326690_3.

¹⁸ TÜSTAV (<http://www.tustav.org/>) was founded in 1992 by decision of the General Board of Directors of the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP), which is constituted by the Workers Party of Turkey and the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP).

Even though only 12 issues out of 15 of *PDA* are accessible through *TÜSTAV*, they are more than sufficient to explore the ideas discussed by *PDA* group on Maoism. I will also use Chinese primary sources from Chinese governmental periodicals or books published by state-owned publishers to supply official definitions or explanations on Maoism to the discussion.

Due to the research question and the data I have obtained, the approach is based on contextualism within the recent turn to global intellectual history. Contextualism emphasizes the importance of the context of inquiry in a particular question and locates the event in its historical milieu.¹⁹ This approach will be used to link the ideas of Turkish leftist writers and factions with their contexts, such as their educational background, Turkish political process, and social phenomena. In the first part, I will briefly introduce the international conjuncture with an emphasis on China and Turkey, aiming at offering a general context for the development of Maoism both on an international and national level. In the second part, I will analyze the similarities and differences among Turkish leftist groups with more specific context related to the history of Turkey in the late 1960s and the biographies of these leftists. These two contextual approaches would lay a complex ground for the understanding of the ideas of Turkish leftists on Maoism in the third part.

I consider my work to be a contribution to global intellectual history, which emphasizes the explanation of tendencies on a global scale, or comparative analyses of how tendencies developed in different parts of the world.²⁰ Maoism thought China's anti-imperialist route to be suitable for almost all the countries in the Third-World, fittingly with the cosmopolitanism approaches of global intellectual history.²¹ By exploring the political and social background, and actual situation of adoption of

¹⁹ Mark Bevir, "The Contextual Approach," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, ed. George Klosko (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11–24, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238804.003.0001>.

²⁰ Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, "Approaches to Global Intellectual History," in *Global Intellectual History*, ed. Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 3–30, <https://doi.org/10.7312/moyn16048-001>.

²¹ Moyn and Sartori, "Approaches to Global Intellectual History," 16–17.

Maoism from its headstream China to the world in the 1960s, this thesis will introduce Maoism with an international and global perspective. In Part Two, based on more than a hundred articles published on the 12 issues of *PDA*, this thesis will take Turkey as a case study to explore how the global trend of Maoism was localized in the world

After some necessary information about the background and research significance of this thesis in the introduction, the main body of the project is divided into three main parts, exploring the research questions. The first part, “Globalizing Maoism: From Tiananmen Square to Beyazıt Square,” will assess how Maoism sprawled from China and reached the rest of the world, included Turkey. It will do so by taking into consideration the Chinese government’s effort in promoting Maoism, the international conjuncture before and after the 1960s, and Turkey’s particular political condition after the 1960 coup d’état. The second part, “Localizing Maoism: *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*,” will assess why Turkish leftist group adopt Maoism and the establishment of the Maoist Journal of *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*. The third part, “Debating Maoism in *PDA* Journal”, will deal with how Maoism was interpreted by Turkish leftists from 1969 to 1971, through an analysis of the *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* journal and other related leftist journals.

1. Globalizing Maoism: From Tiananmen Square to Beyazıt Square

In the period ranging from the 1960s to 1970s, Maoism spread considerably outside of China. In this mid-Cold War era, while the bipolar competition between the US and the USSR-led blocks became stronger than before, the de-colonization struggles increased in the Third World. At the same time, the People's Republic of China (PRC) split from its former bloc, led by the USSR, to find its way on the international stage with the spread of Mao Zedong's thought, also known as Maoism. Maoism in the 1960s was like a red rocket, taking off from China's *Tiananmen* square the world,²² and landed on the places which were more "suitable" for it. Among these "suitable" places, which more openly embraced Maoism in the turbulent 1960s, was Turkey's Beyazıt Square.²³ However, while many articles and books focus on the global influences of Maoism, research about how Maoism was adopted in Turkey is few. This part of the thesis tries to delineate how Maoism was popularized domestically in China and internationally, with the specific concern of understanding its adoption in 1960s Turkey. Owing to the Chinese archives recently made available, this part will draw a more complex map on the spread of Maoism through the discourses of China's official bodies, the suitable environment offered by the international conjuncture, and Turkey's political and social situation in the 1960s. This exploration of the reasons behind the adoption of Maoism should be seen as a background for part two, where "how" Maoism was localized in Turkey by Turkish leftist journal *PDA (Proleter Devrim Aydınlik)* will be discussed.

Setting off from China's Tiananmen Square: Maoism as Political Task in the 1960s

Maoism, as a local Chinese brand of communism, lifted off from China to reach the

²² Tian-an-men means "Gate of Heavenly Peace." The square itself is located at the center of Beijing, and is the place where Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People's Republic of China, as well as the place of the cultural revolution parade, thus being seen as the embodiment of the highest political power of China.

²³ Beyazıt Square has traditionally been the site of political protests in Turkey's history. It is the place where student demonstrations happened on 28 April 1960, and also the place where the Bloody Sunday, and a terrorist attack in 1978, known as the Beyazıt Massacre, took place.

world together with the internal impetus of the 1960s, that is, with the public enthusiasm for Maoism and through the governmental promotion of Maoism abroad. The essential frames to understand these singular driving forces were the Sino-Soviet split and the Great Proletarian Revolution.

The Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War was one of the most significant events to not only affect China and the Soviet Union, but also the Eastern bloc and global geopolitics. It is necessary to point out that ideological differences between the PRC and the USSR on the socialist-revolutionary route had started to appear ever since the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the 1920s, but the situation had significantly improved after the CPC established its regime in 1949. Later, when Khrushchev came to power in 1953, after the death of Stalin, his de-Stalinization discontented Mao, since China in Mao's era was following Stalin's style of country leading and construction.

In the late 1950s, Mao led the Great Leap Forward (*Dà Yuèjìn*) as a Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism adapted to Chinese conditions, aiming to rapidly transform China from an agricultural economic society to a socialist society, by using rapid industrialization (national steelmaking movement) and cooperative production (people's commune movement). The Soviet Union's criticism of the Great Leap Forward and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis resulted in a clash of national interests and ideology between China and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union withdrew a large number of suppliers and technical experts from China.²⁴

Due to its distance from Chinese objective reality, the Great Leap Forward dealt a fatal blow to the young PRC's development; Mao was therefore marginalized within the party.²⁵ However, similarly to his idea of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao soon returned to power with the backing of Lin Biao, Mao's right hand,

²⁴ Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 103–4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7pfr5>.

²⁵ Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership," in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, vol. 14, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 291–359, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521243360.008>.

and the man who controlled the military at that time. In June 1963, under the instruction of Chairman Mao,²⁶ the PRC published *The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement*,²⁷ to which the USSR responded with the *Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*; this ideological polemic perpetuated the Sino-Soviet split.²⁸

In the first half of the 1960s, China was under enormous pressure: inside the country, the Great Leap Forward movement and the famine which had lasted from 1959 to 1961 had brought considerable damage to China's political stability, economic development, and social harmony. In foreign politics, China was suffering from the threats of the Cold War. The Cold War period was marked by nuclear competition. China was not only rejected by the nuclear-armed US and its capitalist camp but also threatened by the equally nuclear-armed Soviet Union.²⁹

Faced with domestic strife and foreign aggression, Mao's trusted lieutenants and his acquiescent successor, Lin Biao, crystallized Mao's ideas into Maoism and promoted it as a "spiritual weapon" for the Chinese people. Lin ordered the compilation of *Quotations of Chairman Mao* (also known as the *Little Red Book*) to be printed in 1964. It was to be distributed to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) since it was not initially intended for a broader public. Together with the social environment of "learning from the PLA" in China, the *Little Red Book* also became a "prized trophy"

²⁶ Allen S. Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split," in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, vol. 14, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521243360.012>.

²⁷ Marxists.org, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," marxists.org. <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm>

²⁸ Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split," 528.

²⁹ From 1954 to the end of 1956, China's policy toward the United States was mainly to seek detente and practice peaceful coexistence. The five principles of peaceful coexistence which put forward at the end of 1953 marked a new leap in the diplomatic theory and practice of new China. The five principles advocated that all countries should transcend differences of social systems and ideologies. Although there was the first Taiwan strait crisis from the second half of 1954 to the beginning of 1955, China immediately sent a signal of seeking detente after the crisis, which led to the beginning of the ambassadorial talks between China and the United States in August 1955. But soon later China's willingness of detente failed. See: Tao Wenzhao, "Review of 'From confrontation to detente: a re-discussion of Sino-US relations during the Cold War'", *American Studies* 15, no. 1 (2001): 132-137.

among Chinese youngsters.³⁰

While claiming that nuclear weapons were “paper tigers,” China successfully conducted a nuclear test in 1964. Once becoming a nuclear-armed power, China began the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution against the Soviet bureaucratic model in 1966. In late 1966, Mao himself approvingly reviewed a one million energetic parade of young people coming from all over the country, waving the *Little Red Book* in Tiananmen Square.³¹ Soon the book was made available to the public with the aim, as Lin Biao stated, “to arm the minds of the people throughout the country” with Maoism. Thus, the *Little Red Book* and Maoism became a new popular trend, and the Red Guards, increasing in number, promoted Maoism to a higher degree by claiming it as the legitimation of their political violence.

Under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, the personality cult of Mao continued to grow, and with it people’s interest in learning his sayings.³² At the same time, Mao was trying to increase the world’s recognition of China through his ideas of three world theory: anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and the principle of peaceful coexistence with other countries. Moreover, Chinese State Council sent out a notice in 1967, lifting previous restrictions on sending copies of the *Little Red Book* as gifts to foreigners,³³ and required all the organizations dealing with foreign affairs to start promoting Mao’s works as their most important political task. On September 18, 1968, the *People’s Daily* stated in its editorial that the most crucial mission of China’s ambassadors and experts was to “propagandize Chairman Mao’s thought.”³⁴

Besides these formal steps, the Chinese government also used non-diplomatic

³⁰ Alexander C. Cook, “Introduction,” in *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Alexander C. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7.

³¹ Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao, “Declaring War on the Old World,” in *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution*, ed. and trans. D. W. Y. Kwok (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 65–84, <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/7950>.

³² Daniel Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 87–89, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511984754>.

³³ In March, April, and June 1966 the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Department sent out three notices related to issues of foreigners’ requests for *Quotations from Chairman Mao*. In the beginning, access to the *Little Red Book* by foreigners was prohibited, but later the restrictions were gradually loosened.

³⁴ People’s Daily, “People’s Daily Editorial,” People’s Daily Online Database: September 18, 1968, <http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19680918/2>

channels to expand the influence of China and Maoism on the outside world. Among them, China's so-called 'foreign affairs' system (*waishi xitong*), China's multilingual media, including the Foreign Languages Press and the International Bookstores, and Beijing Radio were the most influential.³⁵

In the early years of the People's Republic of China, very few countries recognized it as a legitimate government. Thus, in order to create a better international image, the Chinese government invited foreigners to visit China, providing them with free, well-planned tours, the highest-level accommodation, and even the chance to meet Chairman Mao.³⁶ In fact, this action was a classic case of "killing two birds with one stone": on the one hand, since the degree of openness in the early years of the PRC was very limited, being able to enter China and meet the head of state was a unique possibility for foreign people, reason why they would want to join. On the other hand, the foreigners, leaving with a good, deep impression of the country, would introduce or promote voluntarily how "successful" China had become under the guidance of Mao when back home. China was so devoted to this activity that even though it was suffering from famine from 1959 to 1961, Beijing still invited more than 2000 foreign guests to attend the tenth National Day celebration.³⁷ Moreover, the influence of this strategy is evident in American journalist Edgar Snow's global bestseller *Red Star over China*, in which he described Mao as a disarmingly laidback, affable patriot;³⁸ and in Swedish novelist Jan Myrdal's book *Report from a Chinese Village*,³⁹ which became an international bestseller and inspired radical leftists and hot-blooded youngsters in 1960s Sweden.⁴⁰ Books and articles written by these foreign guests boosted Maoism's popularity in the world, especially in Europe and in the United States.

The Foreign Languages Press was established in 1949 with the main tasks of

³⁵ Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China" 138.

³⁶ Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China" 141.

³⁷ Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China" 148.

³⁸ Edgar, Snow, *Red Star Over China*. (London: Gollancz, 1968). See also: John Maxwell Hamilton, *Edgar Snow: A Biography* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2003); Robert M. Farnsworth, *From Vagabond to Journalist: Edgar Snow in Asia, 1928-1941* (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1996).

³⁹ Jan Myrdal, *Rapport Från Kinesisk By* (Stockholm: Norstedts förlag, 1963).

⁴⁰ Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China" 138.

publishing journals in foreign languages and translating documents from China's government, and the works of critical Chinese politicians, among which Mao's works accounted for the majority. In 1961, Mao's works made up 70 percent of exported books. Correspondingly, with the high revolutionary passion, one report of the China Cultural Council in 1962 stated that "the export of foreign language books should be done in cooperation with the development of international revolutionary movements. The priority of the categories exported overseas should be those in foreign languages, especially Mao's works."⁴¹

Similarly to the agency above, the International Bookstore was established in 1949 and, as a self-defined trade organization,⁴² was mainly responsible for "cultural exchanges between the new China and other countries."⁴³ However, at the beginning of 1960s, with a structural reorganization, the mission of the International Bookstore was changed to be "cooperation with foreign affairs,"⁴⁴ then in 1962 it was specified that "distribution should coordinate international revolutionary movements," and during the Cultural Revolution its principle was transformed into "distribution should accelerate world revolution."⁴⁵

Under the "Surge Out" (*Chong Chu Qu*) slogan,⁴⁶ the Foreign Languages Press was asked to translate the *Little Red Book*. The International Bookstore was asked to offer help with the overseas distribution network. In October 1966, the Foreign Languages Press was asked to arrange for the translations of Mao's works into thirteen foreign languages within two years.⁴⁷ Through establishing branches of the

⁴¹ Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji* (Beijing: China International Publishing Group, 1989), 44.

⁴² Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji*, 36

⁴³ Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji*, 37.

⁴⁴ Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji*, 47.

⁴⁵ Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji*, 59.

⁴⁶ Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji*, 19.

⁴⁷ Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong, eds., "Zhongguo Waiwenju Wushinian: Da Shi Ji," in *Zhongguo Waiwenju Wushinian* (Beijing: Xinxing Press, 1999), 223.

International Bookstore overseas, taking advantage of connections with capitalist book dealers with contracts, and donating foreign-language books from China as gifts through NGO organizations, Mao's books spread to the world. According to the Chinese newspaper *People's Daily*,⁴⁸ more than 800,000 copies of the *Little Red Book* in 14 languages were distributed to 117 world countries from October 1966 to May 1967.

Another critical organ was Radio Beijing, now known as China Radio International (CRI). Radio Beijing was established in 1942, with the original task to "announce newly conquered areas and broadcast a Chinese political and cultural perspective to the world at large."⁴⁹ Ever since the beginning of the 1950s, Radio Beijing started to transmit multi-language broadcast programs, and a Turkish channel was established in 1957.⁵⁰ In 1967, the program "Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong" started broadcasting in various language sections at a slow speed in order to make it easier for the audience to write down what they heard.⁵¹ Compared with the written material, the medium of sound, to a certain degree, could more easily reach the masses, by transcending "geographical boundaries and ideological differences." Radio Beijing was; therefore, another powerful Chinese propaganda means to spread Chairman Mao's ideas into the world.

Flying to the World: How Maoism Became a Global Trend in the 1960s

Apart from the Chinese government's various efforts, the spread of Maoism around the world cannot be understood without looking at the world conjuncture in the 1960s. The Cold War period was named "cold" since there was no direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, during this period, conflicts, either "cold" or "hot", had never stopped in the world. Parallel with the competition between

⁴⁸ Xinhuashe, "Guojigongchanzhuyi Yundongshi Shang De Dashijian, Wuchanjieji Wenhudageming De Xinsheng," *People's Daily*, (July 2, 1967).

⁴⁹ Won Ho Chang, *Mass Media in China: The History and the Future* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 151–52.

⁵⁰ Üngör, "China Reaches Turkey?," 30.

⁵¹ Li, Dan, Yingmin Cong, Yaoting Hu, Yongchang Cui, Guoxing Zhao, and Jiachao Liu. ed. *Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai Zhi* (Beijing: Zhongyang guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001), 5.

the United States and the Soviet Union for global hegemony, the tense and dense competition among them brought oppression and dissatisfaction to many other countries. Therefore, countries in the second and Third World began to look for alternative routes and tried to build a new international order⁵², where Maoism was welcomed. Cooperation inside the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc was disintegrating, on the one hand; the independence movement of colonial countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America raised a new upsurge against imperialism and colonialism, on the other. In such a situation, Mao and Maoist China were gradually recognized by other countries, which contributed to the globalization of Maoism. Moreover, relying on Mao's language features, full of motivation, and through translated books, radio, television, and other sources, Maoist thought quickly reached the world's population and gained unprecedented popularity just less than Bible and Qur'an⁵³, especially with the global protest movements in 1968.⁵⁴

The turmoil and instability in the Eastern and Western Bloc, together with the Sino-Soviet split, made Mao's ideas a feasible alternative for world counterbalance. The Eastern camp was unstable ever since the beginning of the cold-war period. The Soviet Union experienced a split with Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948, just one year after the Communist intelligence service was created to strengthen the Communist International movement.⁵⁵ After Stalin's death, Khrushchev came to power in 1953, whose de-Stalinization policies swayed the loyalty of members in the Eastern Bloc.⁵⁶

⁵² Jussi M. Hanhimaki, "Détente in Europe, 1962–1975" in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1.* eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 198-218; Ennio Di Nolfo, "The Cold War and the Transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960–1975", in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1.* eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 238-257; Michael E. Latham, "The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975" in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1.* eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 258-280

⁵³ N. L. Griese, "The Bible vs. Mao: A 'best guess' of the top 25 bestselling books of all time," *Publishing Perspectives* (7 September, 2010). <https://publishingperspectives.com/2010/09/top-25-best-selling-books-of-all-time/>

⁵⁴ Anthony Kemp Welch, "Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity" in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1.* eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 228-230

⁵⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 191.

⁵⁶ Zachary Karabell, *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 916.

Moreover, in 1956, the Khrushchev's USSR violently suppressed the October incident in Hungary, which led to internal conflicts among communist parties around the world, especially in western European countries, where a large number of communist members withdrew from the parties.⁵⁷ At the same time, the appearance of Sino-Soviet split since the late 1950s opened a significant hole on the USSR's alliance⁵⁸. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962-63 was described as "the closest thing the world has come to a nuclear war,"⁵⁹ which made Khrushchev's nuclear threats unpopular. The fall of Khrushchev in 1965 reduced the obstruction on China's presence on the world stage. The Soviet Union's occupation of the Czech Republic in 1968 sparked protests in the socialist camp in Yugoslavia, Romania, China and elsewhere.⁶⁰ In the context of the Soviet Union's increasing control over the socialist countries, Maoism provided a reasonable explanation for these socialist countries' resistance.⁶¹

In the Western Bloc, while decades of the Vietnam war badly affected America's international prestige and domestic social and economic situation, western European countries and Japan kept a low profile and developed rapidly. Economic development resulted in political confidence; the process of the European Union made world bipolarization trend start to change, the UK and other European countries started to establish diplomatic ties with China in succession. French President Charles De Gaulle, because of his discontent for the role Britain and the United States played in NATO, withdrew from NATO in 1966.⁶² France then showed a friendly attitude and tried to carry out diplomatic relations with the Third World countries, including China. Non-official communication between China and other countries with whom it did have established diplomatic ties - including the establishment of diplomatic ties between

⁵⁷ Paul Lendvai, *One Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁵⁸ Whiting, Allen S. "The Sino-Soviet Split.", 484-486.

⁵⁹ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 84.

⁶⁰ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 154.

⁶¹ Cook, "Introduction," 18.

⁶² Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, "NATO Strategies and the Gaulle's France 1958-1966" in *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969*, eds. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), 99-102.

China and Turkey - were conducted through their respective embassies in France.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to compete for influence in many Third World countries in the process of decolonization,⁶³ each selling or supplying weapons to groups they supported.⁶⁴ However, while many countries were under the control of these two superpowers, many other Asian, African, and Latin American countries refused to take sides in the conflict between East and West.⁶⁵ In the Bandung Conference in 1955, dozens of Third World countries reached an agreement, which became the basis of the non-aligned movement, later formed in Belgrade in 1961.⁶⁶ Independence movements in the Third World transformed post-war Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, creating a more pluralistic international order. For many people after the Second World War, Maoism offered a new perspective to conduct a revolution against oppression and colonization.⁶⁷

The chaotic international situation during the Cold War and the dissatisfaction of the younger generation with bureaucracy and oppression led to a global storm of democracy movements, which peaked in 1968. This mass movements led by young students began with the United States marching against the Vietnam war and spread to Britain, France, Italy, Mexico, the Soviet Union, the Scandinavian countries, Pakistan, Poland, and Turkey.⁶⁸ The May 1968 revolution in France was the most representative among these.⁶⁹ As the influential representatives of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the socialist camp, Mao and his *Little Red Book*, because of their pursuit of equality, the courage to fight against power, and the passionate language adopted, were most in line with their appeals and quickly became the treasures of leftist youth

⁶³ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 121–24.

⁶⁴ Philip Towle, “Cold War” in *The Oxford History of Modern War*, ed. Charles Townshend (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 260.

⁶⁵ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 126.

⁶⁶ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 10th ed (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008).

⁶⁷ Cook, “Introduction,” 17.

⁶⁸ Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005); The History Guide, “1968: The Year of the Barricades”, <http://www.historyguide.org/europe/lecture15.html>; Jesús Vargas Valdez, “Student Movement of 1968,” in *Encyclopedia of Mexico*, (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn 1997), 1379-1382.

⁶⁹ Steven Erlanger, “May 1968 - a Watershed in French Life,” *The New York Times*, April 29, 2008, sec. Europe, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/world/europe/29iht-france.4.12440504.html>.

all over the world. A historian of China, Alexander C. Cook, wrote about the popularity of Maoism:

What is certain is that the Little Red Book, as a flexible and dynamic script for revolution, traveled easily from its contingent and specific origins in China to a great many different kinds of places.⁷⁰

In Italy, Maoism and his sayings were made into popular songs. In Germany, the books of Maoism became mixture of “brand” books, which means the books that express meaning through their outer form as much as through their content and acted as identifiers of belonging in a particular political group, and “badge” books, which commodities that were consumed within the space of the market and contained ideas debated within a depoliticized “marketplace of ideas.”⁷¹

Landing in Turkey: Maoism Meets Radical Leftism in the 1960s

Due to the Chinese government’s cumulative efforts and the international conjecture in the 1960s, Maoism disseminated into different areas of the world, including Turkey. Turkish intelligentsia was indeed influenced by the international popular trend of Maoism to some extent, and the Cultural Revolution became an inspiration for Turkish leftist groups.⁷² However, the sympathy for China and Maoism in Turkish society were also related to Turkey’s peculiar political and social situation at that time, namely the more democratic political atmosphere after the 1960 coup d’état, and the rising anti-American sentiment in the same decade.

Turkish socialists, or more accurately the Turkish left, has a history dating back way prior to the TİP. Early in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, leftist ideas inspired by Marx and Engels began to appear within the empire’s boundaries. Less than

⁷⁰ Cook, “Introduction,” 19.

⁷¹ Quinn Slobodian, “Badge Books and Brand Books: The Mao Bible in East and West Germany” in *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Alexander C. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 208.

⁷² Çağdaş Üngör, “Türkiye Solunda Çin Etkisi: Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik Hareketi Üzerine Bir İnceleme,” in *Türkiye’de Çin’i Düşünmek: Ekonomik, Siyasi ve Kültürel İlişkilere Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, ed. Selçuk Esenbel, İsenbike Togan, and Altay Atlı (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2013), 174.

70 years after the Communist Manifesto was published (1848), in 1912 Baha Tevfik started to publish a journal named *Felsefe Mecmuası* (The Philosophy Journal), where he dedicated many articles to Marxist materialism.⁷³ After the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, the Bolshevik trend also reached Turkey, mediated by the Muslim or Turkic people of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Tatarstan.⁷⁴ Also, the Turkish Communist Party (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*, TKP) emerged out of this Bolshevik trend. The TKP was established in Baku, in September 1920, and played an essential role in spreading leftist ideas in Turkey, often in articles written for periodicals such as *Aydınlık*, *Aydınlık Fevhalade Nüshaları*, and *Orak-Çekiç*.⁷⁵ However, TKP and other leftist groups were banned in 1923 by the newly established government. After the ban, the Turkish left was seen as illegal until the 1960 coup. Turkey's 1950s experienced the economic problem, government-army tensions, and students' riots.⁷⁶ The suppression of the military officers and student's movement in the late 1950s and the decision of closing down most of the newspapers and journals to control public opinion by Democratic Party government led to considerable discontent among students, intellectuals, and the army.⁷⁷ After years of planning, the military launched a coup on May 27, 1960. The coup d'état on 27 May 1960 was one of the most momentous issues in Turkey's political history, which, together with the followed 1961 constitution, helped Turkish democracy to reach to a new level. The 1961 constitution, while much inspired by that of 1924, adopted several concepts and ideas from Western constitutions,⁷⁸ among which the guarantee of Turkish people's liberty and the idea that political parties were necessary for democracy,⁷⁹ therefore enabling various parties'

⁷³ Cemal Güzel, "Türkiye'de Madencilik ve Madencilik Karşıtı Görüşler," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Sol* vol. 8, ed. Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007), 50.

⁷⁴ Emel Akal, "Rusya'da 1917 Şubat ve Ekim Devrimlerinin Türkiye'ye Etkileri/Yansımaları," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Sol* vol. 8, ed. Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007), 117–22.

⁷⁵ Aydın Engin, "Politika Gazetesi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Sol* vol. 8, ed. Murat Gültekingil, İstanbul: İletişim, 2007), 322.

⁷⁶ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 4th ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 223-243.

⁷⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 223-243

⁷⁸ Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 8.

⁷⁹ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 10.

presence. Many leftist ideological or political currents,⁸⁰ which used to be forbidden, were admitted into political life.

Meanwhile, a press freed from censorship in 1963 championed the revival of suppressed journals and newspapers, which contributed to Turkish people's familiarity with diverse political theories, or at least with different political ideas. During the 1960s there was a steady increase in the publication of books related to the social science,⁸¹ and some socialist writers, such as Hilmi Özgen,⁸² Çetin Özek,⁸³ Cemil Barlas,⁸⁴ and Ali Faik Cihan,⁸⁵ also introduced socialist theory to Turkish society with their bestsellers. More and more works of Marxism were translated from French or English,⁸⁶ leading to Turkish society's sympathy towards socialism and the "opening to the left" trend.⁸⁷ Among those works, the most famous ones were related to Leninism and Maoism. While the USSR was a longtime Turkish enemy, Maoism, came from China, was seen as more "friendly."⁸⁸ The split with the USSR and geographical distance between Turkey and China enabled Chinese's official ideology, Maoism, to be adopted and localized by Turkish radical leftists.

Turkey's youth movement in the 1960s also helped Maoism to land on Turkey. As stated above, when speaking about the international situation, there was a global youth movement in the 1960s. Influenced by its pro-western stand and education system, Turkish youth at that time also became part of the huge radical wave. Many leftist organizations sprouted, such as the Federation of Idea Clubs (*Fikir Kulüpleri*

⁸⁰ Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980*, (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 1.

⁸¹ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 21.

⁸² Hilmi Özgen, *Türk Sosyalizmi Üzerine Denemeler* (Ankara: Ege Matbaası, 1963); *Kalkınma ve Sosyalizm* (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1966); *Ekonomik Sorunlarımız* (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1969).

⁸³ Çetin Özek, *Türkiyede Lâiklik: Gelişim ve Koruyucu Ceza Hükümleri* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962); *100 soruda Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar*. Vol. 3. (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968); *Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İyüzü.* (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1964).

⁸⁴ Cemil Sait Barlas, *Sosyalistlik yolları ve Türkiye gerçekleri* (İstanbul: San Organizasyon, 1962).

⁸⁵ Ali Faik Cihan, *Sosyalist Türkiye*. Vol. 2. (İstanbul: Devrimci Yayınlar Kooperatifi, 1969); Ali Faik Cihan, *Treatise in Socialist Turkey*. (Virginia: US Department of Commerce, Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Info., Joint Publ. research Service, 1967).

⁸⁶ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 25.

⁸⁷ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 27.

⁸⁸ Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi, *Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi Davası: Savunma* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1992), 85.

Federasyonu), which later evolved to the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (*Türkiye Devrim Gençlik Federasyonu, Dev-Genç*).

Accompanied by the “common frustration and fragmentation” of Turkish politics,⁸⁹ in the mid-1960 countless young men and women were discussing Turkey’s political destiny with leftist students.⁹⁰ Even though their views on nature and the way Turkey was to follow to develop were different, they were all looking for an alternative to the country’s pro-western orientation. Mao’s radical and revolutionary anti-imperialist discourses appealed to the youth’s because, at that time, many of the youth group were more radical than the image in people’s mind, which was pure “characteristically revolutionary.”⁹¹

The popularity of anti-American sentiment in the 1960s not only made the Turkish government change its foreign policy towards the East but also accelerated the localization of Maoism. American engagement in Turkey started with its westernization project in Turkey from the 1940s, and with the acceptance of Turkey as a NATO member. However, a series of military skirmishes in the 1960s, such as the U-2 aircraft incident,⁹² made the Turkish government begin to court US’s involvement in sovereignty issues.⁹³ However, anti-Americanism broke out after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the crisis over Cyprus. In 1963, the United States agreed to remove the Jupiter missiles based on Turkish territory as a compromise with the Soviet Union on the Cuban Missile Crisis, something that made Turkish people feel betrayed, since “the Turks saw Jupiter as symbols of the alliance’s determination to use atomic weapons against a Soviet attack on Turkey.”⁹⁴

Later on, during the 1963–64 Cyprus crisis, the so-called ‘Johnson letter,’ in reply

⁸⁹ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 36.

⁹⁰ Üngör, “China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War,” 47–66.

⁹¹ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 36.

⁹² Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 473, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3092168>.

⁹³ Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 473–75.

⁹⁴ Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West since World War II,” in *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising National Power*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and Craig Nation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 53.

to Turkish president's ask for help, not only refrained Turkey from attempting an invasion of the island but also humiliated the Turkish government. When the letter was leaked to the press, it generated a surging wave of anti-Americanism in the whole country. Turkish people realized that the United States could not keep the promise of guaranteeing the security of Turkey within the framework of NATO;⁹⁵ some argued that "the present rigid Turkish-American relationship should be transformed into a 'flexible alliance' based on shared values and principles."⁹⁶ It soon became a prevalently fashionable attitude to be Anti-American and blame America for everything.⁹⁷ As a result, when the U.S. Sixth Fleet visited Turkey in 1968, university students protested and threw some American sailors into the Bosphorus Strait.⁹⁸ During the chaos, a student was shot dead by Turkish security forces, sparking a broader revolt toward the US.⁹⁹

The radical social environment and nation-wide anti-Americanism, along with a freer democratic political environment emerged after the 1960 coup d'état, provided a suitable breeding ground for Maoism and other ideologies landing on Turkey. The liberal social environment "produced" vast ideological debates and the appearance of means to conduct them – newspapers and journals. Maoism, as one of the popular ideologies at that time, drew quite a lot of attention from its followers and opponents by appearing on both right and left-wing publications. *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Light), as a notorious and controversial leftist magazine, was at the center of the debate on how to localize Maoism in Turkey.

⁹⁵ George S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950–1974*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 60.

⁹⁶ Ferenc Albert Váli, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 158.

⁹⁷ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 27.

⁹⁸ A. A. Holmes, *Social unrest and American military bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 68-74.

⁹⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, "Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War," in *Terrorism and Politics*, ed. Barry Rubin (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991): 128, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12743-6>.

2. Localizing Maoism: *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*

Turkey entered the 1960s as a different country from the one that it had been in previous decades, and much of it was due to the 1961 constitution. The text, prepared by a group of university professors, held forth the promise of a democratic regime. The new constitution opened for Turkish people, especially workers, the possibility to organize political struggles and to debate on political issues, and guaranteed freedom for universities and mass media, which translated into the establishment of many journals publicly commenting or criticizing state policies. However, the concepts borrowed from western constitutions did not fit the political situation of Turkey.¹⁰⁰ Restrictions due to one-party monopoly and the flourishing of both leftist and rightist parties led to many unstable coalition governments which ruled the country during the 1960s, while political journals applied more pressure to the government and to political parties increasingly.¹⁰¹

In this climate of democratic opening, the ideas and ideologies of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh came to occupy a prominent space in leftist articles, journals, and books. Different leftist factions adopted and interpreted these ideas in various ways, aiming to show that their understanding of leftist thought was the most suitable for Turkey, and intellectually superior to the others. Maoism as a global trend was a hotly debated issue among the leftists, especially in the journal *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Light, *PDA*), where Maoism acted as the dominant ideology. *PDA*'s framing of Maoism caused a debate between leftists such as Mihri Belli, a prominent leader of the socialist movement in Turkey; Mahir Çayan, a Turkish communist revolutionary and the leader of the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C); and a number of other leftist politicians and writers.

¹⁰⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977), 186.

¹⁰¹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 247–50.

The Rise of Maoism among the Turkish Left

Maoism as a global trend was introduced in Turkey by both Chinese official propaganda tools, such as the Turkish version of Beijing Radio, and unofficial means like articles, newspapers, journals, and books written or translated by political groups. Considering that interactions at a state level started to increase only after diplomatic ties between China and Turkey were established in 1971, unofficial channels, as tools of propaganda for parties and political factions, were the primary way through which Turkish leftists got to know China and Maoism.

Translation of books on Maoism, which saw a growing trend during and after the Cultural Revolution, played a fundamental part. Left-wing publishers in major cities like Ankara and Istanbul played an essential role in this process by translating books on Maoism from English or French to Turkish.¹⁰² Some of the main books on Maoism translated by left-wing publishers during the 1966-1971 period are shown in the table below.

City	Publisher	Year	Title
Ankara	Aydınlık Yayınları	1970	<i>Halkın Demokratik Diktatörlüğü Üzerine</i> (On the People's Democratic Dictatorship)
	Bilim ve Sosyalizm Yayınları	1970	<i>Lin Biao (1970) Yaşasın Halk Savaşının Zaferi</i> (Long Live the Victory of the People's War)
	Ekim Yayınları	1969	<i>Başkan Mao Tsetung'un Sözleri</i> (Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong)
		1970	<i>Sağ ve Sol Sapma</i> (Left and Right Deviation)
		1970	<i>Milli Burjuvazi ve Eşref Sorunu Üstüne</i> (On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry)

¹⁰² Çağdaş Üngör, "China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–69)," in *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture*, ed. Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 47–66, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137326690_3.

	ÖDTÜ SEK Yayınları	1970	<i>Çin Devrimi</i> (Chinese Revolution)
	Ser Yayınları	1969	<i>Halk Savaşında Temel Taktikler</i> (Basic Tactics in People's War)
		1970	<i>Seçme Eserler</i> (Selected Works)
	Sol Yayınları	1967	<i>Emperyalizmle Mücadele</i> (Struggle against Imperialism)
		1967	<i>E. Snow. Mao Çe-tung: Bir Devrimcinin Otobiyografisi</i> (Mao Zedong: Autobiography of a Revolutionary), trans. M. Ardos
		1971	<i>Askeri Yazılar</i> (Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong)
		1966	<i>Teori ve Pratik</i> (Theory and Practice)
Istanbul	Ataç Kitabevi	1966	<i>Kültür, Sanat, Edebiyat</i> (Culture, Art, Literature)
	Gün Yayınları	1967	<i>İhtilalin Özu</i> (Little Red Book)
	Payel Yayınlar	1967	<i>Gerilla Harbi</i> (On Guerilla Warfare)
	Sosyal Yayınları	1966	<i>Mao Tsetung (1966) Çin İnkılabının Teorik Meseleleri</i> (Strategic Problems of China 's Revolutionary War)
		1967	<i>Yeni Demokrasi</i> (On New Democracy)

Table 1: Books on Maoism translated in Turkey, 1966-1971. See: Üngör, "China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War," footnote 11,12.

Some critical books written by non-leftist authors also contributed to make Maoism more well-known in Turkey through a less ideological lens. The book *Mao 'ya Tapanlar* (Mao worshippers), written by Turkish journalist Yılmaz Çetiner, provided a detailed account based on the author's interviews in and personal observations on China.¹⁰³ Another example was *Mao Çe-Tung: Bir Devrimcinin Otobiyografisi* (Mao Zedong:

¹⁰³ Yılmaz Çetiner, *Mao 'ya Tapanlar* (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1969).

Autobiography of a Revolutionary), written by American journalist Edgar Snow, a best-seller book about China and Mao at that time. Yılmaz Altuğ, a professor at Istanbul University, published his lecture notes on China under the title *Çin Sorunu: “Günün Siyasi ve İktisadi Meseleleri” Ders Notları* (China’s Problem: Daily Political and Economic Problems).

Besides these books, articles in widely-published leftist journals attracted the people’s attention, by quoting Maoist works or debating the ideas of Maoism. The most relevant of these journals included *Yön* (Direction), which was published from December 1961 to June 1967, and whose idea of neo-Etatism took economic development as the only way to solve social problems and support masses-backed elites to obtain power by peaceful parliamentary way;¹⁰⁴ *Ant* (Oath), published from January 1967 to May 1971, which championed a more radical activism, cared more deeply about social and political reforms when compared to *Yön*, and supported the radical faction of the Workers’ Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP);¹⁰⁵ *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left), published from November 1967 to April 1970, a radically extremist journal which identified revolutionary socialism with nationalism;¹⁰⁶ *Devrim* (Revolution), published from October 1969 to April 1970, which adopted Leninist non-capitalist method and preferred the idea of an intervention of military force in revolution.¹⁰⁷

I will devote a larger part of the discussion below to *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* (Enlightenment Socialist Magazine, *ASD*) and *PDA*. The creators or contributors of these journals were prominent leftist personalities such as Şahin Alpay, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mahir Çayan, Mihri Belli, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Sadun Aren, Behice Boran, and Çetin Altan. These people, no matter if they supported or opposed Maoism, all mentioned or talked about the journal *PDA* in their works. This was partly due to the fact that these people all initially shared the membership in the only legitimate leftist party in Turkish

¹⁰⁴ Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East 14 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 50–58.

¹⁰⁵ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 69–70.

¹⁰⁶ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 70–71.

¹⁰⁷ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 72–73.

parliament, the TİP. The party later suffered a split, which resulted also in the appearance of a Maoist group – *PDA* group.

***PDA* Group of TİP and *PDA* as a Maoist Journal**

PDA, as a political group, initially belonged to the *milieu* of the Turkish Labor Party, a socialist party founded in 1961 by a group of trade union members, which became stronger after Marxist lawyer Mehmet Ali Aybar joined the party and succeeded in making their program more appealing to the Turkish people in the chaotic early 1960s. In the 1965 general election the TİP managed to secure 3% of the total votes and won 14 seats in the parliament, a first in Turkey's history. However, ideological differences among factions inside the party set up for its failure from the beginning.

There were three main factions inside TİP at first: the Aybar faction, the Sadun Aren-Behice Boran (Aren-Boran) faction, and Mihri Belli's faction. Aybar was a Law graduate and had studied in France. He held the idea that a speedy industrialization was what Turkey needed in order to get rid of an old property system based on the landlords, the so-called *ağa*, and of an American-style bureaucracy. This could only be achieved following a constitutional path, namely by increasing TİP's vote count, in order for the party to obtain the power to revise the constitution. Sadun Aren was an economist, and Behice Boran a sociologist. Their faction maintained that Turkey was intellectually and socio-economically an undeveloped country, which could progress only through a more socio-economical solution. While Aybar's idea was "a socialist orientation suited to Turkey,"¹⁰⁸ Boran promoted her own socialist solution, as one meant to create a more progressive social order, replace capitalism, and take control of the mode of production. Mihri Belli studied economy in the United States, and was mostly known for his two-stage idea of a National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*, NDR). Since Turkey's conditions were not ripe for a socialist revolution, he argued, Turkey

¹⁰⁸ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 156.

had to accomplish its NDR under the leadership of young military officers at first, then proceed to a socialist revolution in a second time.

Mihri Belli's NDR idea was influential among the leftists in the 1960s, therefore a basic introduction of this idea and the factions advocating it is necessary for a better understanding of how Maoism was adopted and localized by *PDA* group. The NDR movement was promoted by Mihri Belli in the journal *Yön* in 1966.¹⁰⁹ Belli thought that the struggle Turkey had to fight was not the struggle between proletarians and the bourgeoisie, but rather a struggle between patriotism and imperialism.¹¹⁰ the NDR idea maintained that only when Turkey would have gone through the first stage of the national democratic revolution would it be possible for the country to head towards a socialist revolution. Thus, Mihri Belli's interpretation of the path set for Turkey implied the necessity to conduct a struggle with a united national front, namely by uniting the forces of urban and rural laboring classes, the petty-bourgeoisie and the military-civilian intelligentsia against imperialism and its compradors.¹¹¹ As for the leadership, Mihri Belli first stated that, due to the two-stage process envisaged, the working class might stay away from the leadership for a certain period at first, but would finally have the leadership in the second stage, the socialist revolution stage. This part, however, would change in 1967 when Mihri Belli argued that "whoever fought better would be the vanguard."¹¹² After the proposal of adopting NDR as the TİP official program was rejected in the 1966 Malatya Congress, NDR adherents were expelled from the party, while the supporters of the Socialist Revolution (SD), led by Behice Boran, gained a majority within the party.¹¹³

Two years later, the journal *Aydınlık* was established to promote the NDR ideas by Mihri Belli's group and Doğu Perinçek. Doğu Perinçek, who completed his

¹⁰⁹ Mihri Belli used the pen name E.Tüfekçi to publish his article proposing the NDR movement idea. The "E." in the name stands for "Eski" (*Old*), making *E.Tüfekçi* literally mean "Old-guard". See: E.Tüfekçi, "Demokratik Devrim: kiminle beraber, Kime Karşı?", *Yön* 5, no. 175 (1966): 10–11.

¹¹⁰ Eski.Tüfekçi, "Demokratik Devrim: kiminle beraber, Kime Karşı?", *Yön* 5, no. 175, (1966), 10–11.

¹¹¹ Özgür Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism*, Library of Modern Middle East Studies (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 94.

¹¹² Mihri Belli, "Ortanın Solu Nedir, Ne Değildir?", *Türk Solu*, no. 5, 1967.

¹¹³ Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 100

doctorate in law in Germany, was a member of TİP and a supporter of NDR. In 1968, Perinçek and his group were expelled from the TİP due to their support of Dev-Genç, the radical student organization.¹¹⁴ Belli's group and Perinçek's group started to publish the theoretical socialist journal *Aydınlık*, whose name was the same as the former journal of the Turkish Communist Party.¹¹⁵ Inside the NDR supporters, there were three main groups: the Mihri Belli group; the group of Mahir Çayan, leader of Ankara University's youth movement, and the group led by Doğu Perinçek. However, a quarrel soon broke out between Çayan and Perinçek: while Perinçek asked for the elimination of the leftist anarchistic trend, Çayan criticized Perinçek's line as a rightist deviation, labelling him as an opportunist.¹¹⁶

At the same time, ahead of the 12 October 1969 national general election, there was yet another split in the TİP, this time between unionists and representatives of the Eastern provinces inside Aybar's faction. Thus, TİP reached the eve of the 1969 election split in four groups: 1. Aybar-Ekinci 2. Aren-Boran 3. Labor unionists 4. Supporters of the NDR theory.¹¹⁷ In the 1969 national general election, even though it secured once again 3% of the votes, TİP was only able to win two seats in the parliament. The ruling Justice Party had adopted a majority-proportional system to replace the proportional representation system, in order to hamper TİP's chances. Aybar was made a scapegoat for the situation and left the TİP together with the union members, therefore leaving the NDR and Aren-Boran factions as the leading forces in the party.¹¹⁸

Inside the NDR supporters, Perinçek's group (later *PDA* group) championed almost the same route as Mihri Belli's group (the *Aydınlık* group), namely regarding the military-civilian intelligentsia as an actor which had to play an important role in the struggle. However, *PDA* group came up with a new term, "National democratic

¹¹⁴ Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 112.

¹¹⁵ *Aydınlık* first appeared as a socialist journal published by the Turkish Communist Party in the Ottoman Empire in 1921 and was banned in 1925.

¹¹⁶ Mahir Çayan, "Sağ Sapma, Devrimci Pratik ve Teori", *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* 15, (January 1970), 188-221. Also in Mahir Çayan, *Toplu Yazılar*. (SU Yayinlari, 2008), 75-122.

¹¹⁷ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980*, 75-79.

¹¹⁸ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980*, 75-79.

movement” (*Milli Demokratik Hareket*, NDM),¹¹⁹ instead of NDR and had divergences with Belli on two points: the vanguard of the struggle and the attitude to adopt towards Kemalism. Towards the end of 1969, Perinçek’s group was barred from publishing articles on *ASD*, so they left the NDR group and started to publish the *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment, *PDA*) journal after the 15th issue of *Aydinlik* in January 1970, with support from mostly academics of upper-middle-class origin at the University of Ankara’s Faculty of Political Science.¹²⁰ On April 1970, at a TİP branch meeting in Istanbul, the NDR supporters were politically divided in two camps: the group led by Perinçek, called as its journal, the “group of *PDA*”, and the group led by Mihri Belli and Mahir Çayan.

PDA journal was first published in January 1970 and was closed by the Erim government after the 1971 coup. Since *PDA* adopted the same issue number of *Aydinlik*, the first *PDA* issue was the 15th, thus two “*Aydinlik*” were published at the same time with the same issue number. While the full title of the former *Aydinlik*, with a red-colored cover, was *Aydinlik Sosyalist Dergisi*, the full title of new “*Aydinlik*” identified it as *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* and used a white-colored cover, same as the *Beijing Review* had. *PDA*’s extreme revolutionary tone attracted attention and resulted in a massive debate on *PDA*’s adoption and interpretation of Maoism, and on the application of its Maoist revolutionary ideas to Turkey.

¹¹⁹ Halil Bertay, “Bilimsel Sosyalist Devrim Anlayışı,” *Aydinlik Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 14 (December 1969): 147; Şahin Alpay, “Türkiye’nin Düzeni Üzerine,” *Aydinlik Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 12 (October 1969): 464.

¹²⁰ Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism*, 114.



Image 1,2,3: the covers of *PDA*¹²¹, *ASD*¹²² and *Beijing Review*¹²³

***PDA* as a Maoist Journal**

While Mihri Belli maintained his belief in the NDR theory and his preference for Ho Chi-Minh,¹²⁴ and Mahir Çayan remained a convinced Leninist,¹²⁵ Doğu Perinçek employed Maoism as the its special interpretation of socialism. The importance *PDA* attached to Maoism could firstly be seen in the Turkish translation of the name “Mao Ze-Dong” which they adopted. While the translations in other leftist journals were either “Mao Tse-tung”¹²⁶ or “Mao Çe-tung,”¹²⁷ *PDA* translated it as “Mao Ze Dung” and gave a detailed explanation of the linguistic principle applied in the footnote of the first article of its first issue.¹²⁸ Another evidence of the relevance of Maoism for *PDA*

¹²¹ The cover of Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık 8 (August 1970), this cover was downloaded from: <https://www.nadirkitap.com/proleter-devrimci-aydinlik-aylik-dergi-sayi-8-22-dergi6434434.html>

¹²² The cover of Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi 4 (February 1969), this cover was downloaded from: <https://e-kitaplar.net/kitap/aydinlik-sosyalist-dergi-sayi-04-subat-1969.html>

¹²³ The cover of Beijing Review 34 (August 1972), this cover was downloaded from: <http://www.massline.org/PekingReview/>

¹²⁴ Mihri Belli said that “Ho Chi-Minh gave us the rightist action example in this topic” (“Bu meselede en doğru davranış örneğini bize *Ho Chi Minh* vermektedir.”) See: Mihri Belli, “Aydınlıkta Dünya ve Türkiye,” *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 17 (March 1970): 403.

¹²⁵ Çayan said that he was “against anyone who opposes Leninism” since he was “a defender of Leninism”. See: Mahir Çayan, *Toplu Yazılar* (Istanbul: SU Yayınları, 2008), 187.

¹²⁶ This transliteration of the name mostly appeared in Turkish leftist journal *Ant* (Oath). See: *Ant*, issue 4, August 1970, p 52

¹²⁷ This transliteration mostly appeared in Turkish leftist journal *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*. See *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 21 (July 1970): 241.

¹²⁸ “Halk İçin Çalış,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 1 (January 15, 1970): 173.

was in its unique content. Even though *PDA* did not give a clear definition of Maoism (something that was hardly possible, since the Chinese government itself defined Maoism only in 1981),¹²⁹ the articles and words it quoted or translated came not only from Mao Zedong but also from Lin Biao, Mao's right hand man, and from Chinese official magazines. This approach is consistent with China's definition of Maoism, according to which Maoism is not only the thought of Mao Zedong, but also the crystallization of his thoughts on the revolution and socialist construction among the first generation of leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC)'s central committee.

Moreover, *PDA* also published articles originating from China, including five editorials from the official journal of the Chinese Communist Party, *Red Flag* (*Hóngqí*), one communique of the CPC, two articles penned by Mao Zedong, and one by Lin Biao. CPC's *Red Flag*¹³⁰ is a political theory journal established in 1958 under Chairman Mao's order to establish a magazine to guide the theoretical study and propagation of Chinese communism, and was one of three CPC's mouthpieces during the 1960s and 1970s.¹³¹ *PDA* reprinted a series of pieces from *Red Flag* which dealt with the political principles of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,¹³² and two articles by Mao Zedong.¹³³ *PDA* closely followed political articles published in China: the journal featured in October 1970 a CPC communique issued in September 1970, and a speech by Lin Biao was published in *PDA* just one month after it was pronounced.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Zhongguo guangchandang zhangchen, xinhua she 中国共产党章程, 新华社, 2002年11月18日. (*Constitution of the Communist Party of China*, XinHua News Agency. 18 November 2002)

¹³⁰ Chinese: 红旗; Chinese Pinyin: *Hong Qi*; Turkish: *Kızıl Bayrak*

¹³¹ Cynthia B. Leung and YiPing Wang, "Influences of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese Literacy Instruction," in *Perspectives on Teaching and Learning Chinese Literacy in China*, ed. Cynthia B. Leung and Jiening Ruan (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012), 52, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4822-4_4.

¹³² The re-published articles are the following: Hong Qi (Red Flag), "İnsanla Silah Arasındaki İlişkide Önde Gelen İnsandır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 16, (February 1970); Hong Qi (Red Flag), "Politik Çalışma BÜTÜN Çalışmanın Can Damarıdır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 17 (March 1970); Hong Qi (Red Flag), "İdeolojik Çalışmaya Öncelik Vermeliyiz," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (May 1970); Hong Qi (Red Flag), "İdeolojik Çalışma Gerçeğe Dayanmalıdır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 21, (July 1970); CPC, "Komünistler Proletaryanın İleri Unsurları Olmalıdır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970).

¹³³ Mao Ze-Dong, "Halk için Çalış," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 15 (January 1970); Mao Ze-Dong, "Dünya Halkları Birleşin, Amerikan Saldırganlarını ve tüm Uşaklarını Alt Edin!," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 20 (June 1970).

¹³⁴ *PDA*, "Çin Komünist Partisi 9. Merkez Komitesi 2. Genel Toplantısının Bildirisi," *Proleter Devrimci*

Besides these translation works, *PDA* also defended Maoism openly in its pages, and anyone who did not accept Maoism was criticized by *PDA* as a revisionist, with Mihri Belli being frequently accused. Belli seemed to regard supporting Maoism as a “mistake” (*hataymış gibi*), and accused *PDA* members, using the term “Maoist” derogatively in an article he wrote.¹³⁵ Doğu Perinçek attacked Mihri Belli in an article, stating that the NDR group was reactionary and backward since they did not accept Marxism-Leninism through Maoism. Doğu Perinçek said that Marxism-Leninism and Maoism were the riches of all humanity, and the proletariat, as the most advanced class, was the inheritor of all human thoughts. Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, as the cumulative result of continuous development of human thought, promoted the liberation of the people and the development of socialism throughout the world. As the one who correctly appraised the experience of Chinese and the world people’s revolution and successfully led the proletarian cultural revolution – he maintained – Mao had elevated Marxist-Leninist thought to a new level.¹³⁶

Perinçek said that, while Maoism was spreading in the world, Turkish “revisionists” like Mihri Belli and his journal *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* were trying to stop the spread of this idea in Turkey by writing articles which criticized China and Maoism, and trying to portray Mao as merely a Chinese revolutionary leader. Doğu Perinçek argued that Mihri Belli and his NDR group had also tried to allege that Mao was an “infidel invention” (*gâvur icadı*), to reject proletarian internationalism. Modern revisionism, as Perinçek put forward, was attacking Maoism just as the revisionism of the Second International once attacked Lenin’s Communist Internationalism. Perinçek stated that Mao had succeeded because he did not talk in the “Moscow dialect” (*Moskova ağzı*) to express his ideas, countering NDR’s criticism of *PDA* as a group speaking “Beijing’s dialect” (*Pekin ağzı*).¹³⁷ As a result, Perinçek concluded, Maoism

Aydınlık, no. 24 (October 1970): 435-439

¹³⁵ Mihri Belli, “Her Devrim Milli Bir Yol İzler,” *Türk Solu*, no. 15 (February 27, 1968): 3–5.

¹³⁶ Doğu Perinçek, “Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 24 (October 1970): 479–96.

¹³⁷ Perinçek, 480, footnote 3. The NDR group had said in their meeting that revolutionaries should not talk with the “dialect of Beijing.”

was not only relevant for China or Japan, but for as an advanced ideology of all mankind.

PDA stated that the socialist struggle in Turkey had a history going back more than 50 years, and it had further developed with the victory of Maoism in the contemporary revolution. *PDA* group expressed its determination to continue the revolutionary struggle by combining Marxism-Leninism and Maoism with Turkey's national conditions.¹³⁸ Moreover, on one of its editorials, *PDA* showed its confidence in the popularity of Maoism, stating that with the strengthening of the proletarian revolutionary movement, Maoism as a contemporary expression of Marxism-Leninism was gaining more and more recognition among young people.¹³⁹ However, at the same time, Mihri Belli and the *ASD* journal were trying to attack Maoism by framing Maoism as “partly right and partly wrong” (*bir kısmını doğru, bir kısmını yanlış*).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Program Çalışma Komitesi, “Vatan Partisi Tüzük ve Programının Eleştirisi,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 24 (October 1970): 451–62.

¹³⁹ *PDA*, “Devrim Gençlik Hareketlerinin Tecrübeleri ve Dev-Genç Kurultayı,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 25 (November 1970): 11–18.

¹⁴⁰ *PDA*, 16.

3. Debating Maoism in *PDA* Journal

PDA as a political group was referred to and attacked by other leftist groups during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and *PDA* as a political journal was the forum where Maoism was fiercely debated, owing to the general principle of Criticism and Self-Criticism put forward by Maoism. Criticism and Self-Criticism, also framed as “solidarity-criticism-solidarity” in some in some articles published by Chinese official outlets,¹⁴¹ is a philosophical and political concept related to Marxism–Leninism, which is said to have developed within the Stalinist period of USSR.¹⁴² Mao Zedong attached great importance to this concept of self-criticism, which, together with “combining theory and practice” and “closely uniting with the masses”, were summarized as the three main characteristics of the CPC in April 1945.¹⁴³ By dedicating a whole chapter of the *Little Red Book* to the issue,¹⁴⁴ Mao defined a “conscientious practice” of self-criticism as a unique quality of the Communist Party of China. As Mao said, “dust will accumulate if a room has not been cleaned regularly, our faces will get dirty if they have been not washed regularly. Our comrades’ minds and our Party’s work may also collect dust, and also need sweeping and washing”.¹⁴⁵

PDA group took advantage of this principle to legitimize criticism of other political groups’ ideas. *PDA* member İbrahim Kaypakkaya,¹⁴⁶ who had great admiration for Maoism, talked about this Maoist principle in an article he published on the journal. He argued that wrong trends in the revolutionary struggle were inevitable, so in order to dissipate these wrong ideas and trends, proletarians had to learn from the past and pay more attention to the future, with the principle of ‘symptomatic treatment’,

¹⁴¹ “Solidarity-Criticism-Solidarity,” *People’s Daily*, June 21, 1967.

¹⁴² David Priestland, “Introduction,” *The Red Flag: A History of Communism* (New York: Grove Press, 2009), 3-10.

¹⁴³ Wang Xiaorong, “The source of CPC’s style of criticism and self-criticism” (PhD Dissertation, Shanxi Normal University, 2014).

¹⁴⁴ Mao Zedong, “Criticism and Self-Criticism,” in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1966), 258–67.

¹⁴⁵ Mao Zedong, “Criticism and Self-Criticism,” 258–67.

¹⁴⁶ İbrahim Kaypakkaya later left the *PDA* group to create the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) and the armed group Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army (*Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu*, TIKKO).

in other words, following the principle of Maoism's solidarity-criticism-solidarity. Only by fighting with the correct principles could the proletarians gain strength and win the final victory.¹⁴⁷

In its last editorial of 1970, *PDA* criticized the TİP and *ASD* group by looking back on its revolutionary struggle in the previous two years. *PDA* admitted that it had been wrong to support parliamentarism and reformism in the first year, because it was not in line with Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology. In the second year, *PDA* stated that it recognized its mistake and had therefore left TİP and the *ASD* group, in order to actively promote Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. While entering its third year, *PDA* said it would use Marxism-Leninism and Maoism to become more courageous, organize the people to conduct the revolution, and achieve victory.¹⁴⁸

PDA employed this principle not only in criticizing other groups but also in its practice of trying to conduct self-criticism, for which *PDA* set up a new "Debate" (*Tartışma*) section in the journal ever since its ninth issue, offering a place for all the criticism to be heard. By saying that "criticism is our revolutionary weapon and we should use it to defeat mistakes as a part of criticism and self-criticism," *PDA* believed that, while making magazines, it was good to accept criticism and always learn Marxism-Leninism and Maoism.¹⁴⁹ *PDA* stated its aims of setting up this debate section saying that:

AYDINLIK, from the first issue, and especially in the 10th issue invited all the revolutionaries to criticize and debate the articles it published. In this article, we repeat this call. We must criticize our magazine for the proletarian revolutionary enlightenment to establish more vivid and stronger ties with the proletarian revolutionary cadres and the masses of people. Criticism and Self-Criticism are a powerful weapon of our revolutionary struggle. We defeat our mistakes and any

¹⁴⁷ İbrahim Kaypakkaya, "İşçi-Köylü Hareketleri Ve Proleter Devrimci Politika," in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (May 1970): 17-52.

¹⁴⁸ *PDA*, "Üçüncü Yıla Girerken," in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 1.

¹⁴⁹ *PDA*, "İşçi -Köylü Çalışma Komitesi Kuralım!," in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 337-342

individualistic attitude with this weapon. The criticism to draw revolutionary conclusions and the friendly criticism makes us able to comprehend the truth and move forward on the path of revolution. Truths are grasped through fighting wrongs.¹⁵⁰

“With the revolutionary friends in our environment, we set up the Workers-Peasants Working Committee, let’s read the articles published in AYDINLIK and İŞÇİ-KÖYLÜ collectively, criticize and send our thoughts as writing to AYDINLIK.”¹⁵¹

Moreover, *PDA* defined the principle of criticism and self-criticism as the task of Turkey’s proletarians, by saying that a proletarian party must be constructed on the solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Only then would there be a party that leads mass people to victory, and only by applying the principle of criticism and self-criticism could the people’s revolution lead the people’s army.¹⁵² In another article whose title overlapped with the China’s framing of criticism and self-criticism, “Goal: solidarity-criticism-solidarity”, *PDA* said that its intention, in publishing people’s criticism and suggestions in the journal, was to achieve a hundred schools of thought to push forward the revolution.¹⁵³

While *PDA* was trying to put Maoist theoretical ideas into practice, its actions were also criticized by other leftists. Those articles in the “debate” section, in Mahir

¹⁵⁰ *PDA*, “İşçi -Köylü Çalışma Komitesi Kuralım!,” in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 337-342. “AYDINLIK, ilk sayısından itibaren ve özellikle 10. sayısında bütün devrimcileri yayınlanan yazıları eleştirmeye ve tartışmaya çağırmişti. Bu yazımızda bu çağırışı tekrarlıyoruz. Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik’ın proleter devrimci kadrolarla ve halk yığınlarıyla daha canlı ve daha güçlü bağlar kurması için der gimizi eleştirmeliyiz. Eleştiri ve Özeleştiri devrimci mücadelemizin güçlü bir silahıdır. Hatalarımızı, her türlü bireyci tutumu bu silahla yeneriz. Devrimci sonuçlar çıkarmak için ve arkadaşça yapılan eleştiri, doğruları kavramamızı ve devrim yolunda ilerlememizi sağlar. Doğrular, yanlışlarla mücadele ederek kavranır.”

¹⁵¹ *PDA*, “İşçi -Köylü Çalışma Komitesi Kuralım!,” in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 337-342. “Bulduğumuz çevrede devrimci arkadaşlarla «İŞÇİ -KÖYLÜ ÇALIŞMA KOMİTESİ» kuralım, AYDINLIK ve İŞÇİ-KÖYLÜ’de yayınlanan yazıları toplu olarak okuyalım, eleştirelim ve düşüncelerimizi bir yazı haline getirerek Aydınlik’a yollayalım.”

¹⁵² *PDA*, “Bilimsel Sosyalizmin Yıkılmaz Temeli Üzerinde Proletarya Partisi,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 377-383.

¹⁵³ *PDA*, “Amaç: Birlik-Eleştiri-Birlik,” in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 74-77.

Çayan's view, falsified the Maoist theory of the people's war and propagated negative revisionist ideas in a positively "Maoist" fashion. As a result, *PDA* was "the most obnoxious, disgusting and dishonest faction of pacifism" (*pasifizmin en namusuz, en iğrenç ve en sahtekar bir fraksiyondur*).¹⁵⁴ However no matter how good or bad, *PDA* was making use of or practicing the principle of criticism and self-criticism, *PDA* was the first Turkish group showing the willingness to implement the principles of Maoism openly, which, at the same time, enriched debates between the leftists on the adaptability of Maoism in Turkey.

Maoism and the Proletarian Internationalism

The adaptability of Maoism in Turkey was huge debating issue among leftists. While Mihri Belli and the TİP leaders thought that Turkey should adopt its own way of revolution, *PDA* supported Maoist proletarian internationalism, saying that China's revolutionary experience and route could be learned and adopted in Turkey. By using other countries employing Maoism in revolution as examples, *PDA* tried to show that Maoism was applicable in Turkey as well, and those who opposed it were just revisionists.

Mihri Belli and his group expressed disagreement on the universality of Maoism by saying:

We are obliged to synthesize that science (Marxism) towards the needs of our society. We do not leave this to the Peking Review editorial board. Such unity of principle cannot reach us. Mao Zedong is the leader of the Chinese people who have achieved a great revolution. We have great respect for him. We study the Chinese revolution. We read Mao Zedong's writings. We will take advantage of them. However, no one is above criticism, Mao included. Because Peking does so, we cannot put the Soviet Union and imperialist America in the same basket.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Mahir Çayan, *Toplu Yazılar* (Istanbul: SU Yayınları, 2008), 203.

¹⁵⁵ Mihri Belli, "Aydınlıkta Dünya ve Türkiye", *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 17 (March 1970): 403. "Biz,

Besides, Mihri Belli also had said that all revolutions in the world were following a “national path” (*milli yol*), and China had pursued its unique path of revolution, which was required by its particular circumstances, so Turkey had to follow its own revolutionary path.¹⁵⁶ Mihri Belli rejected all other countries’ ways by saying: “Our answer to the imputations (*yakıştırmalar*) of Maoist (*Pekinci*), Castroist (*Havanacı*), and Moscow’ist (*Moskovacı*) is: we are not This’ist (*ne buyuz*) or That’ist (*ne de o*), we are Turkist (*biz Türkiyeciyiz*), we are guards of Turkish workers’ claims.” Especially to *PDA*’s habit of employing Mao’s ideas from Chinese medias, Mihri Belli answered that all Turkish revolutionaries had to abandon the articles and ideas of *Beijing Review*, since it was “a magazine on the other side of the Asian continent.”¹⁵⁷

To Mihri Belli, as *PDA* said, Mao Zedong was “the representative of the proletarian revolution under Chinese conditions” and merely the leader of the Chinese revolution. Countering to this attack of the role of Mao, *PDA* argued that Mao Zedong was not just a leader but a great thinker and a living Lenin, who succeeded in the mission of struggling against revisionism from Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and developed Marxism-Leninism to a new level. Regarding Mao as nothing but just a Chinese revolutionary leader was the same as to say that Lenin was only the representative of the revolution under Russian conditions, and only the Russian revolution was led by bourgeois nationalism. *PDA* thought that Mihri Belli ignored Mao’s achievements and contributions in developing Marxism-Leninism, just as Khrushchev did in regarding Stalin as merely a revolutionary leader.¹⁵⁸ *PDA* said that, by doing this, Mihri Belli wanted to destroy the world revolutionary movement by relying on backwardness, to

o bilimi (Marksizmi) toplumumuzun gereklerine doğru sentezlere varmakla yükümlüyüz. Bu işi Peking Review yazı kuruluna bırakmayız. Böyle ilke birliği bize varamaz. Mao Zedong büyük bir devrim başarmış Çin halkının lideridir. Kendisine büyük saygımız vardır. Çin devrimini inceleriz. Mao Zedong’un yazılarını okuruz. Yararlanırız da. Ama Mao dahil. Hiç kimse eleştirinin üstünde değildir. Pekin öyle yapıyor diye biz Sovyetler Birliği ile emperyalist Amerika’yı aynı sepete koyamayız.”

¹⁵⁶ Mihri Belli, “Aydınlıkta Dünya ve Türkiye,” *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 17 (March 1970): 403. “Çin, kendi özel şartlarının gerektirdiği, kendine özgü devrim yolunu izlemiştir”; “Türkiye’ye özgü devrimci çizgiyi saptamaldır.” in

¹⁵⁷ Mihri Belli, “Aydınlıkta Dünya ve Türkiye,” *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 17 (March 1970): 403-404. “Aysa kıtasının öbür ucunda yayınlanan bir derginin yazı kuruluna terk etmek.”

¹⁵⁸ Yıldırım Dağyeli, “Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 23 (September 1970): 394-402.

freeze the Turkish revolution at the same time.

Mihri Belli said that it was meaningless and not worth it to learn from the *Beijing Review*, to which *PDA* argued that *Beijing Review*, as the official, multilingual voice of China's foreign propaganda ideology, was the stalwart and pioneer of anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism, anti-backtracking, anti-capitalism, and anti-colonialism. It was also concerned with the promotion of what they considered the most essential part of contemporary proletarian revolutionary thought, Maoism. As a result, *PDA* invited all Turkish proletarians to consider *Beijing Review* as an important ideological weapon to be armed with, and to benefit from revolutionary practice against imperialist revisionism.¹⁵⁹

Mihri Belli's narrative of its being the guard of the worker's claims was stealthily criticizing *PDA*'s farming on Maoism, to which *PDA* retorted that the struggle of the working people was not in contradiction to the revolution of the proletariat, but closely related. The real contradiction was the contradiction between proletarian revolutionaries and modern revisionists like Mihri Belli's group. *PDA* claimed that every proletarian revolutionary undertakes many tasks, the most important of which was proletarian internationalism, since each proletarian revolution could not exist independently from the rest of the world. Proletarian revolutionaries needed to follow the experience of the master (*usta*), namely Mao. The Chinese proletarian revolution under the guide of Maoism had set up an anti-imperialist model for the world, which was worth learning for Turkish revolutionaries.¹⁶⁰

Doğu Perinçek fought back the "Geography Theory" put forward by Mihri Belli. Mihri Belli suggested that Turkey was geographically far away from China, so the experience of the two countries were not comparable. Doğu Perinçek thought that this was somewhat of a bourgeois thought, because Marxism-Leninism and Maoism were applicable all over the world. The geographical location of a country was important, but

¹⁵⁹ *PDA*, "Proleter Enternasyonlizmi ve Burjuva Miliyetçiliği," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 22 (August 1970): 261-272.

¹⁶⁰ Yıldırım Dağyeli, "Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 397-398.

not a decisive factor, while the decisive factors were the relations of production and class composition.¹⁶¹ For example, Doğu Perinçek wrote an example about a single Turkish farmer who listened to the Turkish language channel of China's Beijing Radio, Moscow Radio, and Voice of America's at the same time, and thought that "Moscow is not revolutionary, and if you want to hear the voice of a real revolutionary, you should listen to Mao's voice."¹⁶² Turkish proletarian revolutionaries, as *PDA* call on, had to follow the Maoist path and not to reject it just because it had come from the other side of the Asian continent, just as people following Lenin's thought did not abandon Europe as a source of inspiration.¹⁶³

In order to persuade the reader that Maoism was globally adaptable, *PDA* also picked examples from other countries in revolution, like India and Palestine, to show that Maoism could succeed outside of China. Indian communists had achieved huge victories in their revolution during 1968-1969, so *PDA* firstly showed how other successful revolutionary leaders had followed and referred to Maoism, by quoting CPI leader's saying that "China's chairman of is also our chairman."¹⁶⁴ *PDA* reprinted articles published by the CPI in its "documents" (*belgeler*) section. In those articles the CPI praised China's cultural revolution, saying that it was also part of a revolution that ensured socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and had made China the cultural center of the world.¹⁶⁵

PDA then praised the revolutionary situation in India, and also affirmed that India, Laos, Vietnam, and other countries had won the revolutionary struggle under the guidance of China's revolutionary practical experience. *PDA* said that the Turkish revolution had also to follow on their footsteps and learn from the experience of Maoists

¹⁶¹ Doğu Perinçek, "Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 24 (October 1970): 479-496.

¹⁶² Perinçek, "Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır," 489. "Moskova Devrimci değil. Devrimci bir ses istiyorsanız Mao Zedung'un sesini dinleyin."

¹⁶³ *PDA*, "Proleter Enternasyonlizmi ve Burjuva Miliyetçiliği", *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 22 (August 1970): 261-272.

¹⁶⁴ *PDA*, "Proleter Enternasyonlizmi ve Burjuva Miliyetçiliği", 268.

¹⁶⁵ *PDA*, "Hindistan Komünist Partisi (Marksist-Leninist) Programı ve Kongre Belgeler," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 25 (November 1970): 42-49.

against American imperialism.¹⁶⁶ Besides its long narrative of India Communist Party's parsing of Maoism, *PDA* also gave a detailed introduction to the armed revolution of Palestine and used it as an example of how Maoism could be adopted and localized in a different revolutionary context. *PDA* said that the Arab people, led by the Palestinians, were quickly arming themselves with Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. As Marxism-Leninism and Maoism spread among the people day by day, and submissiveness and conciliation disappeared as a consequence, the revolution intensified.¹⁶⁷

However, *PDA* also agreed on Mihri Belli's idea of national way of revolution to some extent. *PDA* said in one of its articles that the proletarian movement in every country had to be structured on its nation's features. If one did not pay attention to the class struggle and national characteristics of each country in the proletarian vanguard scientific socialist struggle, the revolution would not succeed. This idea seemingly redeemed Mihri Belli's NDR idea, but *PDA* emphasized that national characteristics could not be the universal truth on which the proletarian revolutionary struggle had to depend. Only the rules of class struggle were universal, and the principles proved by the struggling proletariat applied to every country. The problems of one nation's proletarian struggles were the problems of all nations' struggles, and this was the unchanging principle of proletarianism. *PDA* thought Mihri Belli's idea that since the conditions of class struggle in each country were different, the revolution in each country had to be based entirely on its own national line and a nation's proletarian movement was in a higher position than the world's proletarian movement was wrong.¹⁶⁸

PDA agreed that since Turkey's proletarian revolutionary movement had its disadvantage, Turkish revolution needed to be analyzed under specific Turkish conditions. In order to develop the proletarian revolution in Turkey, the Turkish

¹⁶⁶ *PDA*, "Filistin İkinci Dünya Kongresi," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 24 (October 1970): 417-435.

¹⁶⁷ *PDA*, "Filistin İkinci Dünya Kongresi," 423-425.

¹⁶⁸ *PDA*, "Proleter Enternasyonluzmi ve Burjuva Miliyetçiliği," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 22 (August 1970): 261-272.

proletariats needed to analyze the contradictions and conflicts in different regions of Turkey and find out ways in which it was possible to mediate between the people's masses and the revolutionaries. Only by combining proletarian socialism with Turkey's concrete situation could the proletarian revolutionaries realize the actual assimilation (*özümlemesi*) of Maoism. The struggle against modern revisionism and opportunism could only be realized under the guidance of Maoist people's revolutionary war. As a result, *PDA* members had to ensure that Maoism was adopted as the only revolutionary view able to shed light on the path of world revolution and the masses of workers and peasants today (*bugün dünya devrim yoluna, işçi ve köylü yığınlarına ışık tutan tek devrimci görüş olarak benimsenmesini sağlamak*).¹⁶⁹

PDA said that its members had always been influenced by Mihri Belli's and others' revisionist ideology, so there was no denying that this right-deviation still existed. *PDA* said that, while proletariat was carrying out revolution consciously and spontaneously on the principle of scientific socialism of the proletarian movement globally, what Turkish proletarian revolutionaries had to remember was that the proletarian revolutionary struggle in Turkey was part of the proletarian revolutionary movements and struggles worldwide. So, the principles (*ilkeler*) and ideas (*fikirler*) that illuminated the course (*ışık tutan*) of the proletarian revolutionary movements and struggles in the world also illuminated the course of the proletarian revolutionary movement in Turkey. The same was true of the struggle against revisionism and opportunism: *PDA* called on proletarian revolutionaries to stay away from any revisionist or opportunist, whether they wore masks or not, and to reach out to the masses and find a revolutionary line through Maoism.¹⁷⁰

PDA stated that Turkey was on the way to revisionism after Turkey's foreign minister returned from a visit to the USSR with a pro-soviet revisionist stance, portraying Turkey as a bourgeois society in the manner of the USSR.¹⁷¹ While political parties and

¹⁶⁹ Hüseyin Erzurumlu, "Devrim Yolunu Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Gösteriyor," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no.23 (September 1970): 410-411Z

¹⁷⁰ Erzurumlu, "Devrim Yolunu Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Gösteriyor"..

¹⁷¹ Doğu Perinçek, "Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır," *Proleter*

organizations, which were armed with Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, were fighting modern revisionism in the USSR, *PDA* called for the struggle against revisionism and opportunism in Turkey to be based on Maoism if it wanted to succeed.¹⁷²

Maoism as Anti-Revisionism

Revisionism, a term normally referring to various ideas, principles, and theories which present a significant alteration of fundamental Marxist premises, is a concept that was often used by leftists to condemn each other's position,¹⁷³ utilized as a derogatory word ever since it was first applied in the early 20th century, even if its definition has changed in time. One of the most notorious representatives of revisionist tendencies is social-democrat Eduard Bernstein, who promoted a non-violent way to achieve socialism in the Second International.¹⁷⁴ Another one is Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who showed tolerance towards capitalism and the bourgeoisie, and was blamed as a revisionist in socialist camp.¹⁷⁵

However, Mao himself also had the same attitude towards bourgeoisie before. As Mao Ze-Dong thought, China's revolution before the Chinese first national democratic revolution, Xinhai Revolution, in 1911 was old bourgeois democratic revolution, and the revolution after Xinhai Revolution was new democratic bourgeois revolution which became a part of the world's proletarian socialist revolution from the perspective of the revolutionary front.¹⁷⁶ During China's anti-Japanese war and civil-war from 1939 to 1949, Mao and the Communist Party of China under his leading welcomed the class of national bourgeois and petty-bourgeois in order to win these wars.¹⁷⁷ However, Mao then

Devrimci Aydınlik, no. 24 (October 1970): 489.

¹⁷² Hüseyin Erzurumlu, "Devrim yolunu Mao Zedung Düşüncesi gösteriyor," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 410-411.

¹⁷³ Frederic Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1974), xiv-xv.

¹⁷⁴ Edwin A. Roberts, "The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 1 (1998): 211-13, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2585952>.

¹⁷⁵ Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv75d52q>.

¹⁷⁶ Mao Zedong. *On new democracy*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1954),5-10

¹⁷⁷ Also see: Timothy, Cheek, "On New Democracy January 15, 1940." In *Mao Zedong and China's revolutions: a brief history with documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002),76-112.

later adopted the route of violent class-struggle only with the united force of peasants and workers for China and the Third-World countries since early 1950s.¹⁷⁸ In the early 1960s, as a consequence of the split between China and the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong revived the term ‘revisionism’ to criticize Khrushchev’s non-capitalist idea, which showed tolerant attitude towards capitalism and preferred evolution rather than socialist revolution,¹⁷⁹ As for the Turkish situation in the late 1960s, while Mihri Belli adopted Mao’s earlier idea of new democracy on revolution, *PDA* used Mao’s later idea on the revolution as legitimacy. As a result, *PDA* labeled the TİP and Mihri Belli’s acceptance of the petty-bourgeoisie in Turkish revolution, and their preferences for either parliamentary or evolution way to seize power in the revolution as examples of revisionism.

Blaming others as revisionists was a common matter, yet a harsh accusation among Turkish leftists during the 1960s. Though both *PDA* and Mihri Belli’s group used the idea of a national democratic revolution as the solution of Turkish revolutionary way, they had different interpretations of the concept and context of the national democratic revolution. *PDA* and TİP both agreed that national democratic revolution and socialist revolution are inseparable while Mihri Belli did not. Both Belli and TİP were influenced by Khrushchev’s non-capitalist way in Third World countries to some degree, which led them to consider that the petty bourgeoisie had to be included in Turkish national democratic revolution and socialist revolution. As a result, the Maoist journal *PDA* reacted strongly to the detachability of national democratic revolution a socialist revolution, and the acceptance of the petty-bourgeoisie in the revolution under a non-capitalist guidance, similarly to Mao’s portrayal of Khrushchev as a revisionist.

In order to show that the idea of the USSR’s socialist revolution at that time was generally a revisionist idea, *PDA* published an article by M. Ukraintsev, a Soviet

¹⁷⁸ Wang Yeyang, “Historically consider Mao Zedong’s New Democracy Theory and Its Change,” *Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies* 3 (2001).

¹⁷⁹ Which is also known as policy of a peaceful coexistence, which was meant to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United State and had major implications for the preceding events of the Cold War. See: Khrushchev, Nikita. “On peaceful coexistence.” *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 1 (1959): 1-18.

diplomat, on the liberation movement of India and Southeast Asia. By displaying fierce criticism of Maoism, Ukraintsev framed that China was rebuilding its former empire by supporting the revolution in Southeast Asian countries. *PDA* blamed Ukraintsev's article as the most apparent manifestation of Soviet revisionism on the liberation struggle of the people all over the world. Besides 'badmouthing' Maoist China, *PDA* accused Ukraintsev of belittling Asian people's agency in the process towards freedom. Ukraintsev's portrayal of Southeast Asian countries as proxies of China was defined by *PDA* as a revisionist campaign to undermine revolutionary forces opposing American imperialism. Contrary to Ukraintsev, who claimed that Maoism brought disaster to the whole world, *PDA* considered Maoism as providing the revolutionary people of the world with a path towards victory. Moreover, *PDA* continued, the "revisionist" Soviet Union did not support workers' revolutionary wars in the Middle East, but instead the petty-bourgeoisie. Though the Soviets tried to show that their path was more progressive, they were obstructing people's war as much as surrendering to American imperialism.¹⁸⁰ *PDA* thought that revisionists at the same time were opposing the leadership of proletarian political parties in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism, as well as preventing the alliance of workers and peasants in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Therefore, as *PDA* urged, Maoism had to be widely disseminated among workers and peasants.¹⁸¹

Among Turkish leftists, Mihri Belli and his group did not reject the non-capitalist path at all, but just regarded it as suitable for Turkey, due to the level of economy by saying:

In an independent country with deep traces of primitive tribal society, without the industry to be mentioned, and therefore without the working class, or with no power to influence historical development, for example in Ghana, Somalia, of

¹⁸⁰ *PDA*, "Modern revizyonistler dünya halklarının kurtuluş mücadelelerini nasıl baltıyorlar," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 21 (July 1970): 177-185.

¹⁸¹ Dağyeli, Yıldırım, "Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 394-402.

course the socialist organization could not be mentioned. The only right way of economic development that patriots of countries could take would be the ‘non-capitalist path’ that would lead to socialism. But in the underdeveloped countries, where the working class represents an industrial power, the revolutionary slogan may and must be the slogan of a socialist establishment. For example, in Algeria, which has 200 thousand employment powers of its industry, the non-capitalist path could not be the slogan of socialist organization in this country. In this regard, in a country like Turkey which was advanced from Algeria and thus the development of capitalism was a fantasy, the non-capitalist path should not be talked at all. ¹⁸²

Standing on the center of the debate on national democratic revolution versus Maoism in the left wing of Turkey, Şahin Alpay, who was a famous political scientist and journalist, and was considered the first Turkish Maoist, wrote a 40 pages-long theoretical treaty to discuss the non-capitalist path with other leftists.¹⁸³ Answering to Belli, Şahin Alpay framed the non-capitalist path proposed by the US socialist revolution in the Third World countries as a modern form of revisionism, which deviated from the original socialist ideas. As Maoism demonstrated with significant examples, and Alpay put forward, whoever wanted to rely on some sort of capitalism as a backbone of the revolution was a representative of modern revisionism. Turkey, as Alpay argued, needed not only political independence, but also economic independence. Following the capitalist road of the USSR’s socialist revolution, Turkey would end up again under the control of a superpower and become another colony, unable to obtain

¹⁸² Mihri Belli, “Meselesi,” *Türk Solu*, no. 5 (December 15, 1967): 5. “İlkel kabile toplumunun derin izlerini taşıyan, sözü edilecek sanayii bulunmayan ve dolayısıyla işçi sınıfı da olmayan, ya da işçi sınıfı tarihi gelişmeyi etkileyecek güce erişmemiş bulunan bağımsız bir ülkede, örneğin Ghana’da, Somalya’da, elbetteki sosyalist kuruluştan söz edilemezdi...Bu durumda bu ülkelerin yurtseverlerinin tutabilecekleri tek doğru iktisadi kalkınma yolu sosyalizme götürecektir olan ‘kapitalist olmayan yol’ olabilir. Ama sanayii olan, işçi sınıfının toplumsal bir gücü temsil ettiği geri kalmış ülkelerde devrimci şiar elbette ki, sosyalist kuruluş şiarı olabilir ve olmalıdır. Örneğin kurtuluşunda, sanayiinin 200 bin istihdam gücü olan Cezayir’de ‘kapitalist olmayan yol’ dan söz edilemezdi ve nitekim de edilmedi, bu ülkede sosyalist kuruluş şiarı ileri sürüldü. Bu bakımdan, Cezayir’den ileri olan Türkiye gibi bir ülkede, kapitalist gelişmede bir hayli yol kat etmiş olan Türkiye gibi bir ülkede ‘kapitalist olmayan yol’ un sözü hiç edilemez.”

¹⁸³ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980*, 115.

full independence.¹⁸⁴

PDA group framed Mihri Belli's thought of forming a national front as the "unprincipled unity front" (*ilkesiz birlik cephesi*),¹⁸⁵ which dismissed any deep connections between the national-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.¹⁸⁶ *PDA* thought that this was a revisionist trend, since both Lenin and Mao explicitly insisted on the reciprocity between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.¹⁸⁷ Thus, *PDA* stated that this modern revisionist's understanding of the national-democratic revolution was to coexist with American imperialism peacefully.¹⁸⁸ Mihri Belli's idea was considered by *PDA* as a mix of individual heroism and opportunism, originating from the French petty-bourgeois tradition of a social consciousness, without the formation of a system based on the national characteristics of Turkey.¹⁸⁹

At the same time, even though both *PDA* and the Turkish Labor Party agreed on the inseparability between national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, *PDA* criticized the TİP's non-capitalist path and its acceptance of the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie as revolutionary classes. In its article "Critique of The Turkish Labor Party's Statutes and Program," *PDA* rejected TİP's parliamentarism and policy considerations, by saying that they had turned "opportunists" after 1965.¹⁹⁰ According to *PDA*, the TİP's "non-capitalist" development path relied on the petty bourgeoisie and on reformism, completely ignoring the proletarian classes and the proletarian revolution. What is worse, as *PDA* cautioned, the TİP also tried to spread rumors that both Marxism-Leninism and Maoism were based on a "petty-bourgeois front".¹⁹¹ *PDA*,

¹⁸⁴ Şahin Alpay, "İşçi Sınıfı ve Milli Demokratik Devrim," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 18 (March 1970): 353–92.

¹⁸⁵ Dağyeli, Yıldırım, "Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım."

¹⁸⁶ *PDA*, "Proleter Devrimci Birlik İçin İlkesiz Birlik Cephesini Açığa Çıkartalım," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 16 (February 1970): 241–53.

¹⁸⁷ *PDA*, "Proleter Devrimci Birlik İçin İlkesiz Birlik Cephesini Açığa Çıkartalım," 245.

¹⁸⁸ Dağyeli, Yıldırım, "Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım."

¹⁸⁹ *PDA*, "Proleter Devrimci Birlik İçin İlkesiz Birlik Cephesini Açığa Çıkartalım."

¹⁹⁰ *PDA*, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tüzük ve Programının Eleştirisi," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 25 (November 1970): 19–30.

¹⁹¹ *PDA*, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tüzük ve Programının Eleştirisi," 30.

therefore, called on Turkey's proletarian revolutionaries to fight TİP's contemporary revisionism, by using the correct ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as an ideological "weapon" (*silah*).

Mahir Çayan also criticized the TİP as "opportunist" in his article "The Intention of Aren's Opportunism".¹⁹² By quoting Mao's words, Çayan said that what Aren ignored was that national democratic revolution was a revolution which considers the proletariat as the vanguard to lead other classes to victory. national democratic revolution, as he said, was a necessary stage for semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, and the resolution of the Third International, and was clearly defined in Mao's thesis. Turkey had not yet achieved independence and democracy, so it still needed a national democratic revolution.

The disagreement on Turkish social nature also led to another big debate among Turkish leftists that whether the petty-bourgeoisie could be considered a revolutionary class. As mentioned above, Mao's idea on this issue went through a change because he thought the social nature of China and other Third-World countries had changed. Turkish leftist had different ideas on this topic, thus they accused others as revisionists by adopting Mao's idea in different period to Turkey's situation. Seeing Turkey as a country based on petty-bourgeoisie, Mihri Belli and his group tried to include as many classes as possible in the revolutionary struggle and, moreover, regarded the petty-bourgeoisie as essential in the national democratic revolution policy. Belli also expressed his advocacy of petty-bourgeois nationalism by stating that "the truth of our time is the truth of the nation" (*çağımızın en büyük gerçeği, millet gerçeği*),¹⁹³ a position which was attacked as revisionist by *PDA*.¹⁹⁴

PDA criticized these ideas of Mihri Belli as expressions of bourgeois nationalism, and a proof that revisionists like Mihri Belli tried to infuse petty-bourgeois nationalism

¹⁹² Mahir Çayan, "Aren'in oportünizmin niyeti," *TÜRK SOLU* (22 July, 1969):88. Also in Mahir Çayan, *Toplu Yazılar* (Istanbul: SU Yayinlari, 2008).

¹⁹³ Mihri Belli, "Millet Gerçeği," *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 7 (May 1969): 24

¹⁹⁴ This could be frequently seen in the *PDA* journal, for example "Let's be vigilant against modern revisionism" (*modern revizyonizme karşı uyanık olalım*), *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 394.

into the class struggle of the people in Turkey. *PDA* argued that this so-called “nationalism” of Mihri Belli was serving the means of imperialism and that revisionists were distorting the public’s understanding of patriotism, by representing it in identical terms with bourgeois nationalism. Quoting Mao’s words, *PDA* reminded that the only answer to the question, “Can proletarian internationalists also be patriots?” was: “We think they not only can be, but must be”.¹⁹⁵

Alpay said that the idea that the petty bourgeoisie could also lead the revolution was a rejection of scientific socialism and of Mao’s theory of a constant and continuous revolution. In addition, the non-capitalist path completely ignored the vanguard role of a working class leading the revolution, and did not consider it necessary to establish a workers’ party. Şahin Alpay evaluated that Castro’s line was also a left-leaning line, and it was impossible to rely on the strength of socialists without relying on the working class.

However, before joining *PDA*, Alpay used to support the idea that “Turkish proletarian today has no total objective and subjective conditions to lead the proletarian revolution” in *ASD*,¹⁹⁶ a position which was also labelled as revisionist. Şahin Alpay later changed idea and tried to explain that what he meant was that Turkey indeed had objective and subjective conditions to foster a proletarian revolutionary, but that the working class at the time did not have the level of consciousness and organization necessary to lead the revolution. This was different from the revisionist stance of Mihri Belli, who argued for a two-stage revolution, in which national democratic revolution and socialist revolution had to be separated from each other.¹⁹⁷ In his argument, Alpay made references to both Mao’s article “Class Analysis of Chinese Society,”¹⁹⁸ and Lenin’s “Two Tactics,”¹⁹⁹ saying that a revolution needs to satisfy the objective

¹⁹⁵ *PDA*, “Proleter Enternasyonalizmi ve Burjuva Milliyetçiliği”, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, n. 22 (August 1970): 270.

¹⁹⁶ “Türkiye’de proletarya, bugün, devrime öncülük edecek objektif ve sübjektif şartların tam olarak sahip değildir”, in Şahin Alpay, “Türkiye’nin Düzeni Üzere,” *Aydinlik Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 12 (October 1969): 448-478.

¹⁹⁷ Mihri Belli, “Savunmam,” *Aydinlik Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 9 (July 1969): 207.

¹⁹⁸ Mao Ze-Dong, *Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieji De Fenxi* Vol. 1. (Beijing: Renmin Publishing, 1975).

¹⁹⁹ Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (London:

conditions before the subjective requirements. He said one of the crucial reasons of Chinese proletariat's victory in revolution was showing the power of the revolutionary class. Therefore, the proletariat in Turkey had to unite with the peasant class and organize to demonstrate revolutionary consciousness and prove the strength of the masses. At the end of this article, Alpay quoted Mao's words, calling for a struggle against the liberalism of the American bourgeoisie under the motto "freedom, equality and fraternity," and to fight against capitalism to the very end.

Turkish Maoist İbrahim Kaypakkaya also rejected the inclusion of the petty-bourgeoisie, saying that the idea of petty-bourgeois socialism sponsored by TİP and Mihri Belli mixed the aims and conditions of the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. The petty-bourgeois class saw words such as "laborers" (*emekçiler*), "exploited" (*sömürülenler*), "working class" (*işçi sınıfı*), "working masses" (*emekçi yığınları*), "exploited class" (*sömürülenler sınıfı*), "exploited classes" (*sömürülenler sınıfı*) as the same thing, without any distinction whatsoever. Kaypakkaya saw the same populist and opportunist tendencies in the Aybar-Aren group. Kaypakkaya thought that the inclusion of the petty bourgeoisie had become a source of contradiction for almost all countries in the world; he used their failure to express the opinion that the idea of Sun Yat-Sen, leader of the Chinese bourgeois revolution and president of the Republic of China, was a populist utopia. Sun's petty-bourgeois program was advanced for national-democratic revolutionary countries and was part of the people's democratic revolutionary movement, but hindered the awakening of self-consciousness and was not conducive to socialist revolution.²⁰⁰

Doğu Perinçek criticized Mihri Belli's formula in *ASD*, saying that "the real nationalists of our age are the proletarian revolutionaries,"²⁰¹ and repeated the same formula, adding that "the struggle against modern revisionism is the struggle of the

Lawrence & Wishart, 1963).

²⁰⁰ İbrahim Kaypakkaya, "İşçi-Köylü Hareketleri ve Proleter Devrimci Politika," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 19 (May 1970): 17–52.

²⁰¹ "Çağımızın gerçek millicileri, proleter devrimcileridir," in Mihri Belli, "Devrim Milliyetçilik İle Proleter Enternasyonalizmi Birbirini Tamamlar," 359.

proletariat against the bourgeoisie” in a follow-up article.²⁰² He said that, while the US socialist revolution was turning to capitalism, Turkish revisionists led by Mihri Belli denied such claims as “it is impossible to resurrect capitalism in a country which succeeded in socialist revolution fifty years ago.”²⁰³ Perinçek warned against the lurking dangers of the bourgeoisie tendencies of the Soviet experience. Only Maoist China, as Perinçek assured, had gained comprehensive experience from the revolutionary struggles of both the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, by paraphrasing Mao, Perinçek pointed out that the socialist world failed to address the question of who would defeat whom in the class struggle so that the fighting against the bourgeoisie will continue ruthlessly in the socialist stage.²⁰⁴ However, there was a contradiction between nationalists and the patriotic proletariat, but Perinçek resolved it by quoting Mao: “We are both internationalists and patriots.”²⁰⁵

In conclusion, according to *PDA*, Mihri Belli and the Aybar-Aren groups were nothing but representatives of a counter-revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and the defenders of Soviet revisionism, while Maoism was framed as the solution to fight against revisionist ideas globally and domestically in Turkey. Contrary to Mihri Belli, who suggested that ideological differences had caused the Sino-Soviet split, *PDA* even regarded the Sino-Soviet struggle as a class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie.²⁰⁶ *PDA* said that Turkey’s Revolutionary Youth Federation (*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu, TDGF*), a radical youth organization which was active in Turkish politics in the 1960s, was an organization operating under Mihri Belli’s opportunist petty-bourgeois ideology, which prevented people from learning the highest level of contemporary scientific socialism, identified with Maoism. Therefore, in the face of the struggle against revisionists and its followers, Turkish proletarian

²⁰² “Modern revizyonizme karşı mücadele, proletaryanın burjuvaziye karşı mücadelesidir.” İn Doğu Perinçek, “Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır,”: 482–83.

²⁰³ Mihri Belli, “Devrim Milliyetçilik ile Proleter Enternasyonalizmi Birbirini Tamamlar,” *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 23 (September 1970): 363.

²⁰⁴ Perinçek, “Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır,” 482–83.

²⁰⁵ Perinçek, “Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır,” 494.

²⁰⁶ *PDA*, “Modern Revizyonistler Dünya Halklarının Kurtuluş Mücadelelerini Nasıl Baltıyorlar,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 22 (August 1970): 261–72.

revolutionaries needed to arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and fight against opportunism and revisionism.²⁰⁷

Besides the class of revolution, Turkish leftists had disagreement with other on the way of seizing power: TİP, Mihri Belli and his *ASD* group, and other personalities close to the journal *Yön* preferred a top-down evolution approach influenced by Khrushchev, be it parliamentarism or a military-led path to seize power. But *PDA* and Mahir Çayan supported the Maoist idea that “power came from the barrel of a gun”, meaning that the Turkish proletariat could only seize power through a violent bottom-up class struggle under the lead of a proletarian party in revolution. The *ASD* had used the example of the Philippines to show that the proletariat was not necessarily the leader of the revolution and insisted on parliamentary elections for the revolution:

Socialism can only be established by mobilizing all the working masses of the party of the working people, and democracy is essential for it to lead to the socialist stage to establish such a party.²⁰⁸

We want to say that the struggle for democracy is the struggle for the creation of opportunities for the establishment of a real socialist organization.²⁰⁹

According to the system of Philippine democracy, it must become louder and clearer that it is impossible for none of the national powers, neither the proletariat nor the petty bourgeoisie, to be involved in the field of politics with their own political organizations.²¹⁰

Turkey’s proletariat and poor peasants will affect our historical development by

²⁰⁷ *PDA*, “TDGF’yi yıkıcılarından kurtaralım!,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 24 (October 1970): 428-429.

²⁰⁸ “Başyazı,” *Türk Solu* (December 28, 1968): 3. “Sosyalizmi ancak emekçilerin partisi tüm emekçi yığınları seferber ederek kurabilir ve böyle bir parti kurabilmek için sosyalist aşamaya yol açması bakımından demokrasi şarttır.”

²⁰⁹ Mihri Belli, *Türk Solu*, no. 64 (February 4, 1969): 19. “Demokrasi uğruna mücadele, gerçek sosyalist örgütün kurulması olanaklarının yaratılması uğruna mücadeledir demek istiyoruz.”

²¹⁰ Mihri Belli, “İlkelerde Birlik Şarttır”, *Aydınlik Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 15 (January 1970): 163. “Filipin demokrasiciliği düzeninde ulusal güçlerin hiçbirinin ne proletaryanın ne küçük burjuvazinin kendi öz siyasi örgütleriyle politika alanında yer almasının imkânsız olduğunun gittikçe daha açık seçik anlaşılması...”

their own political organization, [which will result in] the creation of a truly democratic environment.²¹¹

Under the conditions of Philippine democracy... the working class did not have the opportunity to dominate the field of politics with its own political organization.²¹²

Philippines democratic conditions which constitute the vast majority of cities and villages laborers of Turkey's population, can be excluded from parliamentary politics, a proletarian revolutionary party in our country, there is even a dandelion petty bourgeois party.²¹³

However, *PDA* believed that the parliament was controlled by the ruling class, which would prevent the proletariat from leading and organizing the people. Therefore, the proletarian revolution and the organization of the people could not follow the steps of the ruling class, but only the way of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Revolutionary organizations had to, under all conditions and at all times, establish ties with the people and dismiss the parliamentarism of the petty bourgeoisie. By quoting Mao's words, saying that "if there is no revolutionary party that follows the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and Marxist-Leninist way of revolution, it cannot lead the working class and the masses to victory in the face of imperialism and its lackey," *PDA* defended the idea that the proletarian revolution depended on a proletarian party leading the revolution against imperialism and traitors. Social revolution, therefore, could not be based on the theory of a government that is unconditionally collaborating with the enemy.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Mihri Belli, "İlkelerde Birlik Şarttır" 164. "*Türkiye proletaryasının ve yoksul köylüsünün kendi öz siyasi örgütüyle tarihi gelişmemizi etkileyeceği, gerçekten demokratik ortamın yaratılması.*"

²¹² Mihri Belli, "İlkelerde Birlik Şarttır" 178. "*Filipin demokrasıcılığı şartlarında... işçi sınıfı, kendi öz siyasi örgütüyle politika alanında ağırlığını koyma olanağına da sahip değildi.*"

²¹³ *ASD*, "Yol Kavşağında Vardık," *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 20 (June 1970): 121. "*Filipin demokrasıcılığı şartlarında Türkiye nüfusunun muazzam çoğunluğunu teşkil eden şehir ve köy emekçileri, parlamenter politika dışında tutulabildiğinden, ülkemizde bir proleter devrimci parti, hatta bir radika küçük burjuva partisi yoktur.*"

²¹⁴ *PDA*, "Bilimsel Sosyalizmin Yıkılmaz Temeli Üzerinde Proletarya Partisi," *Proleter Devrimci*

According to *PDA*, what *Devrim*, *Emek*, and *ASD* journals had in common was that they thought government was above class, and their peaceful revolutionary route was the means of repression implemented by the ruling class. Revisionist put forward their thought of “revolution” without dismantling the existing mechanism of government repression. Any idea that did not acknowledge the revolutionary power of the masses placed the government in a more critical position, widespread among modern revisionists around the world.²¹⁵ Referencing Lenin and Mao Zedong, İbrahim Kaypakkaya defined the proletarian revolution as the struggle to create a world without class differences and colonialism. Kaypakkaya criticized Aybar-Aren and *Ant*'s claim that the spontaneous movement of workers was equal to “anti-capitalism” and sufficient for “socialism”. The Aybar-Aren group within the TİP advocated revolution through economic reforms, something which was criticized by Kaypakkaya as “opportunism”, since economic reform had only limited promises for the proletarian class struggle.²¹⁶

PDA called for the Turkish proletariats to overturn exploiters one by one since imperialist violence could only be eliminated by the organized force of the people, namely only by people's violence. Marxism-Leninism and Maoism both pointed out a revolutionary line for the people. This line was the line of people's war, that is, the dismantling through violence of the repressive mechanisms practiced by imperialism and all backward elements in the world. Throughout the world, as *PDA* argued, revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were struggling against revisionism in that same way. Turkish modern revisionists denied Lenin's theory of government and the dictatorship of the proletariat that depended on it, and believed that socialism could be achieved by a non-capitalist path led by a civil-military elite. By contrast, *PDA* said that the only reliable power in the revolution was the organized power of the masses under the lead of a proletarian party.²¹⁷

Aydınlık, no. 23 (September 1970): 383.

²¹⁵ *PDA*, “Burjuva devlet teorilerini yıkalım,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 23 (September 1970): 350-362.

²¹⁶ Kaypakkaya, “İşçi-Köylü Hareketleri ve Proleter Devrimci Politika,” 17-52.

²¹⁷ *PDA*, “Burjuva devlet teorilerini yıkalım,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 23 (September 1970): 350-362.

Mahir Çayan also criticized TİP's parliamentarism by attacking Kenan Somer, a member of the party who had translated many Marxist books into Turkish. Çayan perceived that Kenan Somer was trying to legitimize his 'opportunist ideas' through Lenin and Mao's works.²¹⁸ Çayan stated that parliamentarism was the most backward feature of Marxism.²¹⁹ Relying on Mao, he added that bourgeois parliamentarism did not constitute a proper condition to reach a proletarian revolution by peaceful means, as Somer had suggested. Quoting Mao and Lin Biao, Çayan argued that Somer's ideas contradicted the essence of Marxism. Moreover, he illustrated how the TİP had distorted Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, by using Lenin's theory of a two-phase revolution and Mao's new democracy theory.²²⁰ Somer had discussed Mao's "power grows from the barrel of the gun" in his "*Devrim Teorisi ve Yeni Demokrasi*" as the only form of revolution possible in the context of China's particular society. Somer said Mao's way was not suitable for the rest of the world, since China was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, lacking a complete industrial revolution and not equipped for a peaceful struggle. If China had the means to revolutionize by parliament or law, it would have done so, he argued.²²¹

PDA insisted on establishing a revolutionary party based on the "indestructible foundation of scientific socialism," namely on Maoism.²²² *PDA* said that Mao Zedong's lesson to the people of the world was that without a people's army, the people will not have anything. Maoism taught the people of the world that the struggle for liberation was not about joining hands with backward governments, but about continuing the class struggle until the end. In the Indonesian revolution, *PDA* stated, the anti-revolutionary fascist forces were able to win because the Indonesian people did not have their army.²²³

²¹⁸ Mahir Çayan, "Revizyonizmin Keskin Kokusu I," first published in *TÜRK SOLU* (12 August, 1969):91, *Toplu yazılar*. SU Yayınları, 2008, 36.

²¹⁹ Mahir Çayan, "Revizyonizmin Keskin Kokusu I," 44.

²²⁰ Mahir Çayan, "Revizyonizmin Keskin Kokusu II," first published in *TÜRK SOLU* (12 August, 1969):92, *Toplu yazılar*. SU Yayınları, 2008, 67-73.

²²¹ Kenan Somer, "Devrim Teorisi ve Yeni Demokrasi," *Emek* 6.

²²² *PDA*, "Bilimsel Sosyalizmin Yıkılmaz Temeli Üzerinde Proletarya Partisi," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 377-383.

²²³ *PDA*, "Modern Revizyonistler Dünya Halklarının Kurtuluş Mücadelelerini Nasıl Baltıyorlar," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no.21 (July 1970): 177-180.

Thus, by framing other ways of seizing power as a mere fantasy (*boş hayaller*) *PDA* called all Turkish proletarian revolutionaries to fight together against revisionist ideas, through the liberation of people with people's war (*halk savaşı*), which relied not only on the working class, but also on the peasants.

Maoism as a Peasant-based Mass Revolution

The idea of a 'mass line' is one of the most crucial aspects of Maoism, absent from other interpretations of Marxism and Leninism. While Leninists adopted the Bolshevik vanguard model, the Maoist idea of a mass line holds that a party must have strong ties with the people as a mass movement, both in politics and in the revolutionary struggle. Moreover, contrarily to Lenin's emphasis on the main role of the urban proletariat in revolution, Mao regarded peasants as the primary revolutionary power and, thus, the countryside as the main field of revolution. Especially in the face of the nuclear threat, Maoism stressed the power of mass line over the power of nuclear by stating that "all the reactionaries are paper tigers" (*bütün gerici kağıttan kaplandır*), an idea which was also inherited by *PDA*. In the Turkish case, while almost all leftists agreed on uniting the people in revolution, they indeed were busy in a massive debate on the priority of the mass line theory, and how to achieve it in practice. *PDA* and Mahir Cayan supported the Maoist idea, contending that the peasants had to be the primary revolutionary power and the workers were to occupy a pioneering role, since Turkey's situation was similar to China. Mihri Belli's and the Aybar-Aren groups of TİP did not agree with Mao's mass line, because they thought that Turkey's and China's social structures were different.

How to treat nuclear weapons was also an important topic of debate among Turkish leftists in the late 1960s. *PDA* and other supporters of Maoism, adhering to the mass line idea, insisted that the power of the masses was greater than the power of the weapons, and thus that all other factions, following the USSR's socialist revolution's weapons priority theory, were merely revisionists. In order to show the universal validity of the peasant-based revolution Maoist principle, *PDA* referred to words and

ideas of the Communist Party of India (CPI), which achieved victories in their own revolution during 1969-1970.

PDA relied on the discussion of the situation of revolutionary struggles around the world, for example saying that in the Philippines the revolutionary consciousness of the people had aroused through the newly formed people's army, and that the development of the revolutionary struggle of the Thai people also confirmed the correctness of Mao's saying that "all the reactionaries are paper tigers". *PDA* argued that the American imperialists and the Thai reactionaries claimed that they would destroy the revolutionary forces in the shortest time, by relying on their numerous helicopters and on US supplied weapons, but the failure of the reactionaries showed that these weapons were not enough, and the power of the people had struck the reactionaries a heavy blow. In Mao's words, the threat of a world war was still present, but "the essential trend of the world today is a revolution" (*bügün dünya esas akımın Devrim olduğu*).²²⁴ In the turbulent revolutionary tide of the people of the world, it was an excellent retrogression for imperialism to be obsessed with nuclear power plants. *PDA* contended that only by destroying imperialism could nuclear power plants be destroyed and the threat of war and imperialist revolution be eliminated.²²⁵

PDA published an article by Charu Majumdar, leader of the Communist Party of India. Majumdar said that the Indian revolutionary masses had achieved many victories in 1969 by listening to *Beijing Radio* every day to learn the ideological platform of Maoism and China's revolutionary struggle experience. Majumdar described China as the axis turbine (*mihveri*) of revolutions around the world, while depicting the US socialist revolution, as Mao Zedong had put it, as a doomed social-imperialism (*tam çökü doğru giden emperyalizmin*).²²⁶ Mao had called on the world to unite against nuclear war, and the Indian people were to also respond to Mao's call, by getting prepared ideologically and materially.

²²⁴ *PDA*, "Hindiçini Halklarının Kurtuluş Savaşları Zafere Doğru İlerliyor", *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* 23 (September 1970), 364.

²²⁵ *PDA*, "Hindiçini Halklarının Kurtuluş Savaşları Zafere Doğru İlerliyor", 364.

²²⁶ *PDA*, "Hindiçini Halklarının Kurtuluş Savaşları Zafere Doğru İlerliyor", 334.

Majumdar explained that ‘ideological preparations’ meant to study Maoism in consciousness, through books such as the “Selected Works of Mao Zedong,” and at the same time to actively promote it. He also wrote that the nuclear weapons seemed scary, but that the power of weapons was limited, and the masses would not be afraid of weapons after they realize their shortcomings. Material preparation did not refer to weapons, but to “people,” because people were once again considered more important than weapons. Therefore, the Communist Party of India had to arm itself with Maoism and lead the poor peasants to launch a red revolution, by taking women and children as a reserve force countrywide, to defeat imperialism. Also, the organization structure had to obey to the idea of Maoism, to form a hierarchical structure by establishing the organization cadre.²²⁷

PDA quoted extensively Charu Majumdar’s words on the mass line and how it was practiced in the context of the Indian revolution. Majumdar said that India did not learn from China’s experience in struggle at the beginning, but later changed its position and obtained victories. By saying that “China’s chairman is our chairman,” and “China’s line is our line,” the Communist Party of India had become the vanguard in organizing workers, peasants and the masses to guide the revolution. The CPI line was to adhere to Maoism, on such topics as the armed revolutionary struggle, surrounding the city from the countryside, sticking on the idea that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” CPI had also been trying to spread Maoism and arm itself with it. By asking, “Where does the guerrilla begin?”²²⁸ and “What is the task of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals in guerrilla warfare?”, Majumdar said that instead of starting in the mountains or the forests, guerrilla war begins where there are peasants, because the guerrilla warfare relies on landless poor peasants. The guerrilla warfare would give birth to a brave new man, the man of the Mao’s era. Their task was to spread Mao Zedong’s thought among the peasant masses by physically going to the fields. Only in

²²⁷ Çaru Mazumdar, “1970’leri Kurtuluş Yılları Yapalım”, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 19 (August 1970): 333-336.

²²⁸ *PDA*, “Yaşasın Hint Devrimi!”, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 25 (November 1970): 32-41.

this way could they establish ties with the masses and organize peasants to carry out the war of annihilation of the class enemy.²²⁹

This attitude was clearly reflected in the article “We Will Face the Modern Revisionism”, penned by Yıldırım Dağyeli.²³⁰ Dağyeli asked, “What do we need to solve the world's problems, a proletarian revolution or experts of nuclear weapons?”²³¹. Dağyeli said that the “apostate Khrushchev” (*dönek Kruşçev*²³²) had put nuclear weapons experts first since 1959, and that the idea was still widespread among modern revisionists, such as Turkey’s ‘unprincipled unity front’ (the *Aydınlık* group). In its editorial “The Line of Our Proletarian Revolutionary Movement is Clear” (*Proleter Devrimci Hareketimizin Çizgisi Açıktır*),²³³ the ASD group had said:

“The Beijing-Moscow conflict is, of course, an issue of interest to us, and we need to follow developments as far as our possibilities allow. However, while we try to adopt a stance on this issue, it is important to note that we have limited opportunities, that we are not nuclear strategists and that no one has appointed us to distribute justice between the two sides.”²³⁴

Dağyeli thought that this framing was an adulation of modern revisionism, and *ASD*’s opening the topic (*söz açmak*) of nuclear weapons was a modern revisionism and its language about the proletarian revolutionaries on the topic was laughable (*gülüş gülüş olduğu*).

However, from *PDA*’s point of view, this was unbridled because the greatest

²²⁹ *PDA*, “Yaşasın Hint Devrimi!”, 40. “Gerilla savaşında küçük burjuva aydın kadroların görevi nedir? Onların görevi kırık alanlara giderek köylü kitleleri arasında Mao Zedung Düşüncesini yaymaktır. Ancak bu yolla kitlelerle bağlar kurabilir, sınıf düşmanını imha savaşını yürütmek üzere köylüleri örgütleyebilirler.”

²³⁰ Dağyeli, “Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım,” 394-402.

²³¹ Dağyeli, “Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım,” 394-402. “Dünyadaki sorunları çözmek için proleter devrimci mi, yoksa nükleer silah uzmanı mı olmak gerekir?” in

²³² Dağyeli, “Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım,” PAGE NUMBER.

²³³ *ASD*, “Proleter Devrimci Hareketimizin Çizgisi Açıktır”, *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 15 (January 1970): 168-187.

²³⁴ *ASD*, “Proleter Devrimci Hareketimizin Çizgisi Açıktır,” 174. “Pekin-Moskova çatışmaları el betteki bizi de ilgilendiren bir konudur ve bu konudaki gelişmeleri imkanlarımızın izin verdiği ölçüde izlememiz gerekir. Ama bu konuda bir tutum benimsemeye kalkarken bu imkanlarımızın sınırlı olduğunu, nükleer strateji uzmanları olmadığımızı ve hele kimsenin bizi iki taraf arasında adaleti tevzi etmekle görevlendirmedini aklımızdan çıkarını yalım.”

Marxist-Leninist of that time, Mao Zedong, had said that the atomic bomb was a paper tiger used by American reactionaries to intimidate the people. Moreover, nuclear weapons “look scary, but they are not in fact. Naturally, the atomic bomb is a weapon for destroying heaps, but the struggle of the people determines the outcome of a war, not a few new types of weapons.” (*Korkunç gözüktür, fakat gerçekte değildir. Tabiatıyla atom bombası, yığınları yok etmeye yarayan bir silahtır, fakat bir savaşın sonucunu halkın mücadelesi belirler, birkaç yeni çeşit silah değil.*)²³⁵

Dağyeli said that the modern revisionists had their purpose on emphasizing the nuclear weapons strategy. One was to make the proletariat inside the capitalist-imperialist society to abandon the class struggle, and turn in favor of the bourgeois parliamentary system. Also, the idea of modern revisionism spreading in oppressed countries was not the national democratic revolution led by the proletariat or the people’s armed struggle against imperialism, but the “non-capitalist path” of imperialism. In the revisionist view, the people of oppressed countries could peacefully achieve socialism in a “non-capitalist” way by relying not on the leadership of the proletariat but on the leadership of the revolutionary democratic elite.

Dağyeli retorted that the modern revisionist understanding of the national democratic revolution was apparent (*açık seçik göstermektedir*).²³⁶ They wanted to coexist peacefully with American imperialism and oppose the leadership of the proletarian party and the alliance of workers and peasants in colonial and semi-colonial countries, and the struggle of the people against imperialism, capitalism, and feudalism. The so-called “national democratic revolution” could be achieved through peaceful means led by a civilian-military elite, without the need for a people’s war. Dağyeli thought the leader of proletariat would not have supported both Maoism, as the contemporary Marxism-Leninism, and backward revisionism of the US socialist revolution at the same time. Dağyeli said that the revolution could not succeed without a struggle against modern revisionism and for the disappearance of its ideas. If Turkish

²³⁵ Dağyeli, “Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım”, 400.

²³⁶ Dağyeli, “Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım”, 401.

proletariat did not intend to have people's war in a firm and resolute way, it would be the same revisionist action as what "unprincipled unity front" was doing.

Şahin Alpay looked at the problems of Turkey's revolution and proposed his solution. Turkey's proletarian revolution, he stated, had entered a new phase, and in the context of the limited democracy provided by the 1961 constitution, leftists party needed not only to promote of intellectual and youth movements, but also to organize workers and peasants, in order to connect more closely with the masses.²³⁷ However, before joining *PDA* group, Şahin Alpay's attitude of the revolution was different. He had said in the journal of *ASD*, in 1969, that the objective condition for the proletarians to lead the revolution was not ripe, so the first task of the proletariat was to struggle for this, and "all ties with the peasantry, especially property, must be severed" (*Köylülükle, özellikle mülkiyetle bütün bağları tam olarak kopmalıdır*).²³⁸

This idea received fierce criticism from Mahir Çayan and was one of the reasons why Çayan defined him a "new opportunist". Mahir Çayan wrote an extensive Maoist criticism of Şahin Alpay's idea. By quoting Mao's words in defining the new democratic revolution and Lin Biao's slogan "Long live the victory of the people's war," he argued that the democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism was, in fact, a peasant revolution. Just as Mao Zedong evaluated Chen Duxiu, who was one of the leaders of the Chinese democratic revolution, as the bourgeois faction of the proletariat, who did not understand the actual situation and launched the bourgeois democratic revolution outside of Lenin's theory of continuing revolution, Mahir Çayan said that Alpay's suggestion of cutting off the peasants, in order to make the objective conditions of the working class mature, was utterly ignorant of the performance of national democratic revolution, and was like swimming in the same swamp with Chen Duxiu. Then, Çayan referred to the principles of "uniting Russia",²³⁹ "uniting the Communist party", and "assisting peasants and workers" promoted by Mao in the first cooperation

²³⁷ Şahin Alpay, "İşçi Sınıfı ve Milli Demokratik Devrim," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 18 (March 1970): 353-392.

²³⁸ Şahin Alpay, "'Türkiye'nin düzeni' üzere," in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* no. 12 (October 1969): 464.

²³⁹ Mahir Çayan, *Toplu Yazılar* (Istanbul: SU Yayınları, 2008), 94-95.

period between the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) and the CPC in 1924-1927, and Mao's description of the connection between the bourgeois revolution and peasants, saying that, even in the highest stage of national democratic revolution, Chinese proletariat also expressed the connection with peasants, therefore Alpay's statement was wrong.²⁴⁰

It seems that Şahin Alpay changed his ideas, switching from the urban proletariat to peasants just two months after Mahir's criticism was published. This time, according to Alpay, one of the misconceptions regarding revolution in Turkey at that time was that some leftist neither attached importance to the relations with workers and peasants nor to the popularization of political thought, which would enlighten the workers and peasants, and lacked contact with the workers and peasants. Here, Alpay used Maoist ideas to express the necessity to get in contact not only with the working class, but also with the peasant class. Paraphrasing the words of Lin Biao, Alpay argued: "The path offered by the proletarian revolutionaries to the areas colonized by imperialism and to all the countries in the remnants of imperialism and feudalism is the national democratic revolutionary path."²⁴¹ Alpay promoted the Maoist theory of a new democratic revolution. Some people were saying that the ideas of Maoism were repeated in Marxism-Leninism except for the new-democratic revolution theory. Alpay refuted that Mao's insistence on the political and economic revolution, uniting closely with workers and peasants, was of high significant, and considered those idea which stressed the need to go back to capitalism as examples of modern revisionism. Alpay stated that, as Mao's revolution theory, Turkey's national democratic revolution needed to be based on peasants, led by the working class, fought together with all other revolutionary forces, and through the establishment of a popular front.²⁴²

İbrahim Kaypakkaya also talked about the mass line in considerable length in his

²⁴⁰ Mahir Çayan, "Sağ sapma ve devrimci pratik ve teori," in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 15 (January 1970): 188-221.

²⁴¹ "Proleter devrimci çizginin, emperyalizmin sömürü alanı olan, emperyalizme bağımlı ve feodal kalıntılar barındıran bütün ülkeler için önerdiği yol, milli demokratik devrim yoludur." in Şahin Alpay, "İşçi Sınıfı ve Milli Demokratik Devrim," 357.

²⁴² Şahin Alpay, "İşçi Sınıfı ve Milli Demokratik Devrim," 357.

article. He first analyzed the Turkish workers' movement of 1968-70 and the Turkish peasant movement of 1967-1969, widely referring to *ASD* and *Türk Solu* journals.²⁴³ From 1967 to 1969, the peasant movement entered an outbreak stage, with farmers holding slogans such as "There is an agrarian struggle in this village" (*bu köyde toprak mücadelesi vardır*)²⁴⁴ and "Farmers and youth hand in hand" (*köylü gençlik elele*), held a rally for "land reform and autonomy" (*Toprak reform ve bağımsızlık mitingi*). Thousands of peasants participated in organizations and rallies held in different locations. Kaypakkaya thought that the peasant movement's breadth and depth was increasing day by day, and that the farmers in their daily fight also continued to gain revolutionary experience and had become more enlightened. Kaypakkaya said that the belief that the proletarian revolution could only win through organized enlightened people had been localizing in rural areas unceasingly, and that the petty bourgeoisie which did not believe in the masses' power had also been defeated by the reality on the ground.

Besides, Kaypakkaya also used Maoism to divide the peasants into five categories: the agricultural proletariat (*tarım proleteriyası*), the poor peasants (*yoksul köylüler*), the middle peasants (*orta köylüler*), the rich peasants (*zengin köylüler*), and the big landlords (*büyük toprak sahipleri*). Then he clarified the different roles these people were to play in the people's democratic revolution, the socialist revolution, and the socialist development.²⁴⁵ Quoting Mao's words to support his ideas,²⁴⁶ Kaypakkaya argued that the proletariat is the leading power, and that especially the industrial proletariat should be in the first place, with the peasants as the primary forces: the poor and middle peasants. The rich peasants were to him the same as the national bourgeoisie. Big landlords, and other feudal actors, were enemies of the national democratic

²⁴³ İbrahim Kaypakkaya attached reference to each movement he mentioned in this section, which is really impressive. See the footnotes of İbrahim Kaypakkaya's article, "işçi-köylü hareketleri ve proleter devrimci politika" in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (May 1970): 17-25.

²⁴⁴ *ASD*, "Aydınlık'ta Dünya ve Türkiye", in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergisi* 5, 341-344

²⁴⁵ İbrahim Kaypakkaya, "İşçi-Köylü Hareketleri ve Proleter Devrimci Politika," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (May 1970): 42-45.

²⁴⁶ Mao Ze-Dong, *Yeni demokrasi* (İstanbul: Sosyal yayınlar, 1967),95.

revolution. In the stage of socialist revolution, the rural proletariat was next to the industrial proletariat, and the poor peasants were still the reserve forces for the proletariat, but the role of the middle peasants was uncertain. He said that the leading force in the national democratic revolution were and had to be the proletariat and the industrial proletariat; in revolution, the poor and the inferior peasants were the most potent revolutionary group, and the rich peasants were the people's bourgeoisie. He believed that the proletarian revolution should support the peasant movement and carry out the revolution together with the organization of the industrial proletariat.

Similar to Kaypakkaya's study on Turkey's rural conditions, *PDA* group also made an effort to classify the peasants and analyzed the problems in rural areas, coming up with a solution which was faithful to Maoist guidelines. *PDA* discussed Trakya's rural revolutionary work since it "has always given us much experience, and we also learn a lot from the rural people." *PDA* said that revolutionary proletariat should wholeheartedly believe in two things: Maoism as the most potent revolutionary weapon (*en büyük devrimci silahı*) of the Turkish people and that only by putting Maoism into practice among the masses they could learn it better, which was also the best way to spread the collective in rural areas around the world.²⁴⁷ *PDA* then classified the peasants in Trakya according to Maoism and by income level, similarly to the category used by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya. *PDA* said that Turkey was a semi-colonial country with 70% of the population working in agriculture, and that millions of people living on agricultural land were living under the oppression of feudal forces, loan sharks and landlords. Similarly, this land was the area where labor was ruthlessly exploited, conflicts were the most severe, and class struggle the most intense. The oppression and exploitation of the countryside were so severe that some peasants distrusted any party and even view the 'righteous' revolutionary forces as the enemy.²⁴⁸

PDA attached much importance on peasants' power since the rural land was the

²⁴⁷ *PDA*, "Köy Çalışmalarından Çıkan Sonuçlar," in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* 27 (January 1971): 212-223.

²⁴⁸ *PDA*, "Köy Çalışmalarından Çıkan Sonuçlar," 212-215.

largest and most authentic area of labor struggle due to exploitation, conflict, and class struggle. As a result, *PDA* promoted the idea that Turkey's proletarians should not spare any effort to unite the peasants because "the oppression and exploitation are so severe here that the people do not trust any party and even look at the power of justice through the eyes of the enemy" (*baskı ve sömürü o kadar çekilmez olmuştur ki, halk artık hiçbir siyasi partiye güvenmiyor, hakim güçlere düşmanca bakıyor.*)²⁴⁹

However, as Maoism contended, people expressed their dissatisfaction as their own demands. For Turkey's farmers, the most important demands were land and independence. Therefore, the most critical task of the Turkish proletarian revolutionaries was to go out among the masses, to listen to their voices, to bring their wishes into the struggle as principles, and to promote the democratic people's revolution as an agrarian revolution.

PDA said that many people were unable to understand the importance of land revolution (*toprak devrimi gerçeğini iyice kavrayamadık*), believing that the revolutionary path of encircling the cities by the countryside was undesirable and that the cities were the location of the proletarian struggle. *PDA* retorted that the rural struggle was as important as the urban struggle, and that simply regarding the city as the center of the struggle would only encourage parliamentary dictators while forgetting that the revolution was focused on agrarian revolution. This was a trend of deviation towards the right, which Turkish proletarian revolutionaries should not follow. It must not be forgotten that the rural areas were the fires that could ignite the revolutionary struggle to destroy fascism and imperialism. If a solid alliance of workers and peasants could not be guaranteed, the actions of the Turkish proletarian revolutionaries could not preempt imperialism.²⁵⁰

PDA said that imperialism was gradually disintegrating, while the struggle was becoming more intense. "We had powerful weapons such as Marxism-Leninism and Maoism in our hands, and our task was to work among the colonized masses and raise

²⁴⁹ *PDA*, "Köy Çalışmalarından Çıkan Sonuçlar," 216

²⁵⁰ *PDA*, "Köy Çalışmalarından Çıkan Sonuçlar," 217.

the struggle against imperialism.” *PDA* stated that many rural people in one of Turkey’s village, Aydın, were previously very revolutionary, but had seen a reversal in their beliefs. Although these people did have advanced consciousness, they could not see the path of organization and revolution clearly. At such times it was vital to publicize Maoism to the peasants, as the people’s war led by the proletariat (*proletarya önderliğinde halk savaşı yolu*), the agrarian revolution (*toprak devrimi*), and the idea of seizing power part by part (*iktidarın parça parça ele geçirilmesi yolu*). The workers and peasants’ alliance led by the proletariat had to make the people more confident in their own strength by increasing the propaganda of the people’s war. *PDA* said that the revolutions in China, Vietnam, and India had had a positive effect on revolutionaries all over the world, even people in rural Turkey were saying that “the whole world is following in Mao’s footsteps” (*bütün dünya Mao’nun izinden gidiyor*) and *PDA* indicated its standing that “Mao’s line should draw our line” (*yolumuz Mao Zedung yolu olmalıdır*).²⁵¹

In the war of words between the leftists over revolutionary lines, Mahir Çayan attacked the views of Doğu Perinçek, the founder of *PDA* magazine and a central figure in *PDA* group. Doğu Perinçek’s articles published on the ASD before the factional split took the urban area as a field of struggle and regarded industrial proletariat as the main revolutionary force. By comparing these views with original Maoism, Mahir Çayan attacked these views as counter to Maoist orthodoxy, opportunist, and accused *PDA* group of being academic "Maoists", rather than truly Maoists.

PDA revised some of the views previously expressed by its members on the ASD. *PDA* admitted that in the past “our friend” Doğu Perinçek’s idea was to organize a revolution in the city rather than in the countryside, which was a wrong idea. The Turkish leftists had been blinded by some wrong ideas; one was that peasants were the backup force in the revolution and workers were the foundation; another that the majority of the members of a working-class party must belong to the working class.

²⁵¹ *PDA*, “Köy Çalışmalarından Çıkan Sonuçlar,” 219.

PDA said that the concept of “People’s War” of Maoism and Turkey’s revolutionary practice had shown that these ideas were wrong, so Turkish proletarians should try their best to correct these wrong ideas. The basis of the revolution was the peasantry, and the revolution had to spread from the countryside to the cities, not the other way around. Besides, the members of the working-class party did not have to come mostly from the working class, but the working class had to lead the revolution.

PDA said that the realization of people’s war through the encirclement of cities by the countryside during the revolution was the guiding ideology taught by Maoism to semi-feudal societies ruled by imperialism like Turkey, and also the experience gained from the revolutionary practice in Turkey. In rural revolutions, the poor peasants are the basic force, the vanguard of the proletarian revolution, without which the revolution cannot succeed. The result of Turkey’s practice is that the people’s army, which guides the people’s war, relies on the poor peasants on a broad basis.

PDA said that workers and peasants’ committees were growing in strength and influence across Turkey, but the left was divided into different parties and groups by a struggle of ideology. *PDA* held that Marxism-Leninism was not a party-distinguishing doctrine, but the basis of all revolutionary activities and that only in practice could all these ideologies gain the best practical experience. *PDA* said that all Turkey’s people should fully devote to the revolution, the route of which had been pointed out by Mao Zedong 45 years before: the advanced class should walk deep inside the enemy rear, transmit the revolutionary ideas to the masses to unite workers and peasants class boosted revolutionary struggle, the people’s war. *PDA* called on the proletarian revolutionaries to firmly remember Mao’s revolutionary experience, combining Maoism and Turkish practice to conduct the struggle. ²⁵²

Çayan criticized the mission *PDA* defined for the mass line in his article “The Military Side Should Be Separated from the Ideological and Political Side.”²⁵³ He

²⁵² *PDA*, “İşçi-Köylü Çalışma Komitelerinde Teori ile Pratiği Kaynaştırılm,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 25 (November 1970): 74-76.

²⁵³ Mahir Çayan, “Askeri Yan, İdeolojik ve Politik Yandan Ayrı Olarak Alınmaz,” *Toplu Yazılar* (Istanbul: SU Yayınları, 2008), 206-207.

thought that *PDA* implied that the revolutionary war was the war of the peasants, which had nothing to do with *PDA* as the petty bourgeoisie, and they would therefore finish the task once the war broke out. Çayan said that the reason why *PDA* published magazines in other languages was that they could continue their work in another country after the mission in one had been completed. *PDA* criticized Che Guevara and Castro since they came from the petty bourgeoisie class, but Çayan thought that, although both Che Guevara and Castro came from the petty bourgeoisie, they were not the petty bourgeoisie elite, but rather mature revolutionaries. What mattered was not the class they hailed from, but whether or not they were brave enough to start a revolution, and how to conduct a revolution.

Same as in China, the “mass-line” principle of Maoism in Turkey also identified the task and mission of art. In the article “Of the Task of Art”,²⁵⁴ Ali Eralp said that Turkish art was still serving imperialism and traitors, that Turkish art was still in a state of self-writing and self-understanding. The author quoted extensively from Mao Zedong’s article “Revolutionary Art and Literature”,²⁵⁵ saying that culture and art had to be beneficial to the people, that is, culture and art should also join the proletarian revolutionary struggle. Combined with the actual situation in Turkey, the author said that in an atmosphere of fabricated democracy (*uydurma demokrasi ortamında*), it was more urgent for art to arouse public awareness. As Mao said, it was impossible for culture and art to be classless; they both had class and position. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct cultural revolution and struggle through art.

By quoting Mao’s sentence stating that “only by going deep into the masses and acquiring primitive materials could literary and artistic workers create excellent works of art that will last forever”,²⁵⁶ the author stated his belief in the fact that the creation of culture and art could not be done behind closed doors, but had to take part in all the activities of the workers and peasants, in order to better understand their common

²⁵⁴ Ali Eralp, Sanatın Görevi, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 25 (November 1970): 65-68.

²⁵⁵ Mao Zedong, “Devrimci Sanat ve Edebiyat,” *ODTÜ Dergisi* 66 (November 1967)

²⁵⁶ Mao Ze-Dong, “Devrimci Sanat ve Edebiyat,”

reactionary enemies and to form the weapons of the masses. The idea echoed a political campaign the Chinese government had launched between the 1950s and the 1970s, to organize urban intellectual youth to settle and work in the countryside.

Conclusion

The Cold-War world witnessed its two most eventful decades in the period from the 1960s to 1980s. The Sino-Soviet split, the Sino-US détente, and the non-alliance movement among Third-World countries radically altered a scenario of bipolar competition between the US and the USSR. Mao's China played an essential role in reshaping the international status quo; at the same time China's leading political ideology, Maoism, grew in popularity in the international revolutionary arena, especially appealing among radical leftist.

Thanks to the Chinese government's propaganda and a chaotic international conjunction, people in different regions in the world adopted and re-appropriated Maoism. Despite Turkish state's history of a long-lasting hostility towards leftist opposition, Turkish society had an extensive discussion on Maoism in the 1960s. A new political setting emerged after the 1960 coup which determined the course of Maoism in Turkey.

Maoism first became a popular trend inside China, after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and reached other countries via non-political ways, with the Chinese government aiming to obtain a more considerable influence among international revolutionary countries. At the same time, the world in the 1960s saw an uprising trend in radicalism, which was best reflected in the global 1968 student movement, where Maoism was welcomed by many leftist groups. Due to the larger degree of democracy and liberty brought by the 1961 constitution, Turkey saw the flourishing of leftist political journals and the establishment of the first legal leftist party, Turkish Labor Party, where also the ideas of Maoism found a forum for discussion.

However, the leading members of TİP had different ideas on which leftist ideology and which revolutionary path was more appropriate for Turkey. As a result of ideological disagreements, the TİP experienced more than one split in the 1960s. The groups led by Mihri Belli and by Doğu Perinçek were expelled in the late 1960s, and proceeded to create the *Aydınlık* journal, to promote their ideas of a National

Democratic Revolution for Turkey. A later split led the Doğu Perinçek group to leave *Aydınlık*, and create its own political journal, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, which espoused a yet more radical ideology, Maoism.

The *PDA* group adopted Maoist ideas to pave the path for the Turkish revolution. *PDA*'s discussion of Maoism took place throughout the whole lifespan of the journal and the group's framing of the ideology was also often debated or criticized by opposing leftist groups. The principle of criticism and self-criticism of Maoism was referenced and practiced during the debate of Turkish leftists. One of the main debating topics among the leftists was whether Maoist internationalism, namely China's revolutionary route, was suitable for Turkey. Another core discussion topic was revisionism, the way of non-violent evolution instead of class-struggle revolution. Leftists were accusing each other as revisionists, and while *PDA* insisted on a violent class struggle, and on a united front of working class members and peasants by quoting Mao's words of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mihri Belli and the TİP preferred the perspective of an evolution or a non-violent revolution open to the petty-bourgeois class. In practice, the *PDA* stressed Maoism's idea that peasants were the fundamental strength of a revolution, and thus that the path to follow had to be to 'surround the cities from the countryside', in contrast to other leftist ideas, emphasizing the importance of the urban working-class or of the petty-bourgeoisie.

The *PDA*'s localization of Maoism within the Turkish political setting was a mixed product of China's efforts, underlying global trends, and Turkey's specific socio-political situation, which allowed Maoism to be introduced to Turkish people and influence many young students in multiple ways. Though the aftermath of the 1971 coup led to the closure of the TİP, and the ban of many leftist journals, *PDA* included, the awareness aroused by these political debates led 1970s Turkey to a situation of even greater turmoil.

This thesis tried to delineate how Maoism was localized in Turkey in the late 1960s, by relying on the debates among leftist groups in the pages of *Proleter Devrimci*

Aydınlık. Yet, several topics would require a further investigation, such as the debate among Turkish leftists on Leninism vs Stalinism, leftist perceptions of other countries' revolutions, the reflection of Turkish radicalism in specific literary works. Besides, Mao-era China's international soft power policies from Chinese perspective would be a promising project as more Chinese archival documents have been released. With more studies based on primary sources in Turkish and Chinese, we could thus explore and understand the Cold-War interactions between China, Turkey, and the world in greater depth and variety.

Table of Abbreviations

ASD	<i>Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi</i> (The Socialist Journal of Enlightenment)
CCP	Communist Party of China
CPI	Communist Party of India
NDM	National Democratic Movement (<i>Milli Demokratik Hareket</i>)
NDR	National Democratic Revolution (<i>Milli Demokratik Devrim</i>)
PDA	<i>Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık</i> (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment)
TİP	<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i> (Workers' Party of Turkey)
TDGF	<i>Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu</i> (Turkey's Revolutionary Youth Federation)
TİİKP	<i>Türkiye İhtilâlcı İşçi Köylü Partisi</i> (Turkish Revolutionary Party of Workers and Peasants)
TİKKO	<i>Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu</i> (Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US	United States (of America)

Bibliography

- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977.
- Akal Emel. "Rusya'da 1917 Şubat ve Ekim Devrimlerinin Türkiye'ye Etkileri/Yansımaları." *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*. Edited by Murat Gültekinil, vol. 8. İstanbul: İletişim, 2007. 117-122.
- Alpay Şahin. "Türkiye'nin Düzeni Üzerine." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 12 (October 1969): 448-477
- Alpay, Şahin. "İşçi Sınıfı ve Milli Demokratik Devrim." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 18 (March 1970): 353-92.
- ASD. "Aydınlık'ta Dünya ve Türkiye." in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergisi* 5, 341-344
- ASD. "Proleter Devrimci Hareketimizin Çizgisi Açıktır." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 15 (January 1970): 168-187.
- Aydınoğlu, Ergun. *Türkiye Solu, 1960-1980: "Bir Amneziğin Anıları."* Vol. 30. İstanbul: Versus Kitap, 2007.
- Banac, Ivo. *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Barlas, Cemil Sait. *Sosyalistlik Yolları ve Türkiye Gerçekleri*. İstanbul:San Organizasyon, 1962.
- Berktaş, Halil. "Bilimsel Sosyalist Devrim Anlayışı." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 14 (December 1969): 134-153
- Bevir, Mark. "The Contextual Approach." *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*. Edited by George Klosko. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 11-24, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238804.003.0001>.
- Brady, Anne-Marie. *Friend of China-The Myth of Rewi Alley*. Routledge, 2003.
- Brady, Anne-Marie. *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
- Byrne, Jeffrey James, Carolyn Davidson, Ja Alexander Cmes Ellison, Joaquín Fernandois, Carine Germond, Gadi Heimann, Mark Kramer, Piers Ludlow, Guia Migani, and Marie-Pierre Rey. *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969*. Maryland:Lexington Books, 2010.
- Çaru Mazumdar, "1970'leri Kurtuluş Yılları Yapalım." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 19 (August 1970): 333-336.
- Çayan Mahir. "Sağ Sapma, Devrimci Pratik ve Teori." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* 15, (January 1970),188-221.
- Çayan, Mahir. *Toplu Yazılar*. İstanbul: SU Yayınları, 2008.
- Çetin Özek. *Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İçyüzü*. İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1964.
- Çetin Özek. *Türkiyede Lâiklik: Gelişim ve Koruyucu Ceza Hükümleri*. Vol. 200. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962.
- Çetiner, Yılmaz. *Mao'ya Tapanlar*. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1969.

- Chang, Won Ho. *Mass Media in China: The History and the Future*. Iowa: Iowa State University Press Ames, 1989.
- Cheek, Timothy. "On New Democracy January 15, 1940." *Mao Zedong and China's revolutions: a brief history with documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002.76-112
- Chen, Jian. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. North Carolina: Univ of North Carolina Press, 2010.
- Cihan, Ali Faik. *Sosyalist Türkiye*. Vol. 2. Istanbul: Devrimci Yayınlar Kooperatifi, 1969.
- Cihan, Ali Faik. *Treatise in Socialist Turkey*. Virginia: US Department of Commerce, Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Info., Joint Publ. research Service, 1967.
- Cook Alexander C., ed. *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- CPC. "Komünistler Proletaryanın İleri Unsurları Olmalıdır." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970):365-368
- Criss, Nur Bilge. "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 473,
- Criss, Nur Bilge. "Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War," in *Terrorism and Politics*, ed. Barry Rubin (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991): 123–150
- Dağyeli, Yıldırım. "Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 394–402.
- Dai Yannian, Chen Rinong, eds., "Zhongguo Waiwenju Wushinian: Da Shi Ji." in *Zhongguo Waiwenju Wushinian* (Beijing: Xinxing Press, 1999), 223.
- Doğu Perinçek. "Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır." *Proletarya Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 24 (October 1970): 479-496.
- Engin, Aydın. "Politika Gazetesi." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, ed. Murat Gültekingil, vol. 8, 332-337. İstanbul: İletişim, 2007.
- Ennio, Di Nolfo. "The Cold War and the Transformation of the Mediterranean,1960–1975." In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1*. eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 238-257. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010,.
- Eralp, Ali. "Görevi Sanatın." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 65-68
- Erlanger, Steven. "May 1968 - a Watershed in French Life." New York: *The New York Times*, April 29, 2008, sec. Europe, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/world/europe/29iht-france.4.12440504.html>.
- Erzurumlu, Hüseyin. "Devrim Yolunu Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Gösteriyor." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no.23 (September 1970): 410-411.
- Fairbank, John K., and Denis C. Twitchett. *The Cambridge History of China: Volume 14, The People's Republic, Part 1, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965, Part 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

- Farnsworth, Robert M. *From Vagabond to Journalist: Edgar Snow in Asia, 1928-1941*. Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1996.
- Gaddis, Lewis John. *The Cold War: A New History*. London: Penguin Books, 2007.
- Griese, Noel L. "The Bible vs. Mao: A 'best guess' of the top 25 bestselling books of all time," *Publishing Perspectives* (7 September, 2010).
<https://publishingperspectives.com/2010/09/top-25-bestselling-books-of-all-time/>
- Güzel, Cemal. "Türkiye'de Madencilik ve Madencilik Karşıtı Görüşler." *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*, ed. Murat Gültekin. vol. 8 Istanbul: İletişim, 2007, 50
- Hamilton, John Maxwell, Edgar Snow. *A Biography*. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2003;
- Hanhimaki, M. Jussi. "Détente in Europe, 1962–1975." *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1*. eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 198-218
- Harris, S. George. "Turkey and the United States," In *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950–1974*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat Leiden: Brill, 1975, 60.
- Hilmi, Özgen. *Kalkınma ve Sosyalizm*. Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1966.
- Holmes, A. A. *Social unrest and American military bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Hunter, Alan. "Soft Power: China on the Global Stage." Beijing: *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 3 (2009): 373–398.
- Hüseyin Erzurumlu. "Devrim yolunu Mao Zedung Düşüncesi gösteriyor." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 410-411.
- İbrahim Kaypakkaya, "İşçi-Köylü Hareketleri ve Proleter Devrimci Politika," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (May 1970): 17–52.
- İletişim Yayınları. "Mehmet Ali Aybar." Accessed June 25, 2019.
<https://www.iletisim.com.tr/kisi/mehmet-ali-aybar/5601#.XRJ1R5MzY2x>.
- Jameson, Frederic. *Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* Princeton, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, xiv–xv.
- Johnson, Matthew D. "From Peace to the Panthers: PRC Engagement with African-American Transnational Networks, 1949–1979." Oxford: *Past & Present* 218, no. 8 (August 2013): 233–257.
- Karabell, Zachary. *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962*. Louisiana: LSU Press, 1999.
- Kızıl Bayrak. "İdeolojik Çalışma Gerçeğe Dayanmalıdır." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 21, (July 1970);
- Kızıl Bayrak. "İdeolojik Çalışmaya Öncelik Vermeliyiz." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (May 1970),
- Kızıl Bayrak. "İnsanla Silah Arasındaki İlişkide Önde Gelen İnsandır." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 16, (February 1970)
- Kızıl Bayrak. "Politik Çalışma BÜTÜN Çalışmanın Can Damarıdır." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 17 (March 1970);

- Kuniholm Bruce. "Turkey and the West since World War II." In *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising National Power*. Edited by Vojtech Mastny and Craig Nation. Boulder: Westview
- Kurlansky, Mark. *1968: The Year That Rocked the World*. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005.
- LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008.
- Landau, Jacob M. *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Vol. 14. Leiden: BRILL, 1974.
- Leese, Daniel. *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 87–89, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511984754>.
- Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad. *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Lendvai, Paul. *One Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy*. Translated by Ann Major. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Lendvai, Paul. *One Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich. *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. Dagenham: Lawrence & Wishart, 1963.
- Leung, Cynthia, and Jiening Ruan. *Perspectives on Teaching and Learning Chinese Literacy in China*. Vol. 2. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
- Li, Dan, Cong Yingmin, Hu Yaoting, Cui Yongchang, Zhao Guoxing, and Liu Jiachao. ed. *Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Diantai Zhi* (Beijing: Zhongyang guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2001)
- Lieberthal, Kenneth. "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership" In *The Cambridge History of China*, edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, vol. 14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 291–359, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521243360.008>.
- Lipovsky, Igor P. *The Socialist Movement in Turkey: 1960-1980*. Vol. 45. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
- Lovell Julia. "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-Building in the People's Republic, 1949–1976." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (2015): 136, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080440115000067>.
- Lüthi, Lorenz M. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Vol. 124. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Mahir Çayan. "Askeri Yan, İdeolojik ve Politik Yandan Ayırılarak Alınmaz." *Toplu Yazılar* (Istanbul: SU Yayınları, 2008), 206-207.
- Mahir Çayan. "Sağ sapma ve devrimci pratik ve teori." in *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* no. 15 (January 1970): 188-221.

- Manzenreiter, Wolfram. "The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power." *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34, no. 1 (2010): 29–48.
- Mao Ze-Dong. "Dünya Halkları Birleşin, Amerikan Saldırganlarını ve tüm Uşaklarını Alt Edin!" *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 20 (June 1970) :153-154
- Mao Ze-Dong. "Halk İçin Çalış." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*15, no. 1 (January,1970): 173.
- Mao Ze-Dong. *Yeni demokrasi*. İstanbul: Sosyal yayınlar, 1967.
- Mao Ze-Dong. *Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieji De Fenxi* Vol. 1. Beijing: Renmin Publishing,1975.
- Mao, Zedong, "Devrimci Sanat ve Edebiyat," *ODTÜ Dergisi* 66, (November 1967)
- Mao, Ze-Dong. *Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieji De Fenxi*, Vol. 1. Beijign: Renmin Press,1975. (毛泽东. 中国社会各阶级的分析. Vol. 1. 北京: 人民出版社, 1975)
- Mao, Zedong. *On new democracy*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1954.
- Marxist Org. "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement." Accessed July 12, 2019.
<https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm>.
- Mazumdar, Çaru. "1970'leri Kurtuluş Yılları Yapalım." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 19 (August 1970): 333-336.
- Michael, E. Latham. "The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975." In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1*. eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 258-280
- Mihri Belli. "Devrim Milliyetçilik ile Proleter Enternasyonalizmi Birbirini Tamamlar." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 23 (September 1970): 357-371.
- Mihri Belli. "Her Devrim Milli Bir Yol İzler." *Türk Solu*, no. 15 (February 27, 1968): 3–5.
- Mihri Belli. "İlkelerde Birlik Şarttır." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 15 (January 1970): 163-167.
- Mihri Belli. "Meselesi." *Türk Solu*, no. 5 (December 15, 1967): 5
- Mihri Belli. "Millet Gerçeği." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 7 (May 1969): 1-10
- Mihri Belli. "Savunmam." *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 9 (July 1969): 193-208.
- Moyn, Samuel and Sartori Andrew. "Approaches to Global Intellectual History" In *Global Intellectual History*. Edited by Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, 3–30. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
<https://doi.org/10.7312/moyn16048-001>.
- Msrxists Org "Quotations from Mao Tse Tung — Chapter 27." Accessed July 4, 2019.
<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch27.htm>.
- Msrxists Org. "1964: On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World." Accessed June 27, 2019.
<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1964/phnycom.htm>.

- Myrdal Jan. *Rapport Från Kinesisk By*. Stockholm: Norstedts förlag, 1963.
- Niye Jr Joseph S.. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 76–88.
- Nuenlist, Christian and Locher Anna. "NATO Strategies and the Gaulle's France 1958-1966" *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969*. Edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher Garret Martin, Lanham, 99–102. Maryland State: Lexington Books, 2011.
- Özek, Çetin. *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar* Vol. 3. Istanbul:Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968.
- Özgen, Hilmi. *Ekonomik Sorunlarımız*. Istanbul: Mars Matbaası, 1969.
- Paradise, James F. "China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power." *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (2009): 647–669.
- Perinçek Doğu. "Marksizim-Leninizm-Mao Zedung Düşüncesi Bütün İnsanlığın Malıdır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 24 (October 1970): 479–496.
- Priestland David. *The Red Flag: A History of Communism*. New York: Grove Press, 2009.
- Program Çalışma Komitesi, "Vatan Partisi Tüzük ve Programının Eleştirisi." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 24 (October 1970): 451–62.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Köy Çalışmalarından Çıkan Sonuçlar." in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* 27 (January 1971): 212-223.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Proleter Devrimci Birlik İçin İlkemiz Birlik Cephesini Açığa Çıkartalım." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 16 (February 1970): 241–53.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Modern Revizyonistler Dünya Halklarının Kurtuluş Mücadelelerini Nasıl Baltıyorlar." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no.21 (July 1970): 177-185.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Proleter Enternasyonlizmi ve Burjuva Miliyetçiliği." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 22 (August 1970): 261-272.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "İşçi -Köylü Çalışma Komitesi Kuralım!" *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 337-342.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Burjuva devlet teorilerini yıkalım." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 350-362.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Hindiçini Halklarımızın Kurtuluş Savaşları Zafere Doğru İlerliyor." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* 23 (September 1970):363-367.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Bilimsel Sosyalizmin Yıkılmaz Temeli Üzerinde Proletarya Partisi." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 23 (September 1970): 377-383.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "TDGF'yi yıkıcılardan kurtaralım!," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 24 (October 1970): 428-429.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Çin Komünist Partisi 9. Merkez Komitesi 2. Genel Toplantısının Bildirisi." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 24 (October 1970): 435-439

- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Üçüncü Yıla Girenken," in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 1.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Devrim Gençlik Hareketlerinin Tecrübeleri ve Dev-Genç Kurultayı." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 11-18.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Yaşasın Hint Devrimi!", *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 32-41.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Hindistan Komünist Partisi (Marksist-Leninist) Programı ve Kongre Belgeler." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 42-49.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Amaç: Birlik-Eleştiri-Birlik." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 75-76.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "İşçi-Köylü Çalışma Komitelerinde Teori ile Pratiği Kaynaştırılm." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 74-75.
- Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik. "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tüzük ve Programının Eleştirisi," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 25 (November 1970): 19-30.
- Renmin Ribao. "Renmin Shuju-Renmin Ribao Tuwen Shujuku(1946-2019)" Accessed July 10, 2019. <http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19680918/2>.
- Roberts, A. Edwin. "The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy." Washington DC: *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 1 (1998): 211-13, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2585952>
- Şahin Alpay, "'Türkiye'nin düzeni' üzere," in *Aydınlik Sosyalist Dergi* no. 12 (October 1969): 464.
- Şahin Alpay, "İşçi Sınıfı ve Milli Demokratik Devrim," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, no. 18 (March 1970): 353-92.
- Şahin Alpay, "Türkiye'nin Düzeni Üzere," *Aydınlik Sosyalist Dergi*, no. 12 (October 1969): 448-478.
- Schram, Stuart R. *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969. John Bryan Starr
- Shambaugh, David L. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. Vol. 111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Shambaugh, David. "China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect." *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (2015): 99-107.
- Slobodian, Quinn. "Badge Books and Brand Books: The Mao Bible in East and West Germany" in *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Alexander C. Cook Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Snow, Edgar. *Red Star Over China*. London: Gollancz, 1968.
- Somer, Kenan. "Devrim Teorisi ve Yeni Demokrasi," *Emek* 6.
- Steger, Manfred B. *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Tao, Wenzhao. "Review of 'From confrontation to detente: a re-discussion of Sino-US relations during the Cold War' ." *American Studies* 15, no. 1 (2001): 132-137.

- Towle, Philip. "Cold War" in *The Oxford History of Modern War*, ed. Charles Townshend, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 260.
- Townshend, Charles ed. *The Oxford History of Modern War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Tüfekçi, Eski. "Demokratik Devrim: kiminle beraber, Kime Karşı?" *Yön* 5, no. 175 (1966):10–11.
- Türk Solu*, no. 64 (February 4, 1969): 19.
- Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi. *Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi Davası: Savunma*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1992, 85
- Twitchett, Denis Crispin, John King Fairbank, Albert Feuerwerker, Willard J. Peterson, Kwang-Ching Liuv, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds. *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521243360>.
- Ulus, Özgür Mutlu. *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism*. Vol. 97. London: IB Tauris, 2010.
- Üngör, Çağdaş. "China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–69)." in *Turkey in the Cold War*, 47–66. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013.
- Üngör, Çağdaş. "China and Turkish Public Opinion during the Cold War: The Case of Cultural Revolution (1966–69)." In *Turkey in the Cold War*, 47–66. Berlin: Springer, 2013.
- Üngör, Çağdaş. "China Reaches Turkey? Radio Peking's Turkish Language Broadcasts During the Cold War." *All Azimuth* 1, no. 2 (2012): 19.
- Üngör, Çağdaş. *Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda abroad (1949–1976)*. New York: State University of New York at Binghamton, 2009.
- Valdez, Jesús Vargas. "Student Movement of 1968," In *Encyclopedia of Mexico*. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn 1997, 1379-1382.
- Váli, Albert Ferenc. *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971.
- Vladimir, Il'ich Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1963).
- Wang, Xiaorong. "The source of CPC's style of "criticism and self-criticism" (PhD Dissertation, Shaanxi Normal University, 2014).
- Wang, Yeyang, "Historically consider Mao Zedong's New Democracy Theory and Its Change," *Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies* 3 (2001).
- Welch, Kemp Anthony. "Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity" in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* Vol. 1, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad, 228-230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010
- Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- Whiting, S. Allen. "The Sino-Soviet Split," in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank. vol. 14, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521243360.012>.
- Xinhuashe, Zhongguo Guangchandang Zhangchen, Beijing: XinHua News Agency. 18 November 2002. (中国共产党章程, 新华社, 2002 年 11 月 18 日)
- Xinhuashe. "Guojigongchanzhuyi Yundongshi Shang De Dashijian, Wuchanjieji Wenhudageming De Xinsheng." *People's Daily*, (July 2, 1967).
- Yan, Jiaqi and Gao Gao. "Declaring War on the Old World," in *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution*, ed. and trans. D. W. Y. Kwok, 65–84. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996. <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/7950>.
- Yıldırım Dağyeli, "Modern Revizyonizme Karşı Uyanık Olalım," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, no. 23 (September 1970): 397-398.
- Zheng, Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi. *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds*. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
- Zhongguo Tushu Maoyi Zonggongsi Bianxiezu, *Zhongguo guoji tushu maoyi zonggongsi sishizhounian: shilunji* (Beijing: China International Publishing Group, 1989),
- Zürcher, Jan Erik. *Turkey: A Modern History*, 4th ed. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017.