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INSTITUTION OR STATE-LED  
DEVELOPMENT?  
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI

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Bachelor project 5: Development and Underdevelopment: Testing Historical-institutionalist  
Explanation



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## 2 INTRODUCTION

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Rwanda and Burundi, two countries in the African Great Lakes region, share many similarities. The resemblances are in terms of culture, geographic location, ethnic demography and history. During the civil war in Burundi in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, both countries economic and social structure was devastated. In 1995 both countries were among the poorest in the world (World Bank, 2018). Despite their similarities, Rwanda and Burundi followed different developmental paths since the periods of violence in the 1990's. In the last two decades, Rwanda has experienced a higher developmental progress than Burundi.

Many development theories have tried to answer questions why certain countries are able experience a positive developmental transformation. Because of the similarities of our cases, theories that attribute geographical differences, culture, climate and natural resources to development do not seem to give gratification. In this paper, I will evaluate Acemoglu and Robinson influential historical-institutionalist explanation of development and compare this with Adrian Leftwich's theory of the developmental state. Acemoglu and Robinson explain the difference in economic growth by the quality of its political and economic institutions. Countries with inclusive political institutions will shape inclusive economic institutions, which will provide economic growth. Leftwich focuses on politics and the role of the state. States need to have certain characteristics to succeed, which are embodied by the term: 'the developmental state'. These two theories make an interesting comparison because on certain issues they disagree on how institutions should be manifested. Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize the role of democracy and pluralism, while Leftwich questions the influence of democracy and argues for a weak civil society. The goal of this paper is to relate to the theoretical discussion between the two theories and try to find empirical support for one or the other. The research question is:

*Which theory best explains the differences in the developmental progress between Rwanda and Burundi?*

The reason I want to answer this question is that the similarities between Rwanda and Burundi are numerous. I find it interesting that despite the similarities, both countries have taken significantly different paths in the last two decades. Besides this, there has been little research on answering the question why economic progress has been much higher in Rwanda.

## **2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN**


My research will be theory testing, I will start with the evaluation of the relevant theories. I will do this by laying down the theoretical debate and the main differences of Acemoglu & Robinson and Leftwich; this will be used as a guide for my methods of analysis in chapter 4. The main sources of both theories will come from Acemoglu and Robinson's book 'Why Nations Fail' and from Leftwich's book 'States of Development'. Chapter 4 will elaborate which observations and propositions I should. If the observations in chapter 5 align with my propositions, I will know which theory is supported.

To measure the political and economic inclusion of Rwanda and Burundi I will evaluate the political system, electoral system, press freedom, freedom of assembly and association, access to employment and economic freedom. To test if Rwanda or Burundi have characteristics of a developmental state I will examine if a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, powerful effective bureaucracy, and a weak civil society are present.

### **2.1.1 Case Selection**

Rwanda and Burundi are exceptional empirical cases in conducting a comparative case study. Rwanda and Burundi share their colonial history, culture, demographics and ethnic groups. From 1899 until the end of World War I they were under German rule as German East Africa. After World War I Rwanda and Burundi got passed on to Belgium as a mandated territory of the League of Nations. Both countries consist of 84% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa (Vandeginste , 2014, pp. 264-265). Since Rwanda and Burundi gained their independence from Belgium in 1962, power struggles took place between Hutu and Tutsi that led to numerous conflicts. In the 1990's these conflicts reached their boiling point leading to more than 800.000 thousand deaths in Rwanda and 300.000 of deaths in Burundi. Due to the conflicts, the countries were among the poorest in the world in the mid-1990's (Vandeginste, 2015, pp. 265-266). Besides the thousands of deaths, the social and economic structure of Rwanda and Burundi was destroyed.

Based on income per capita in 1994, Rwanda was ranked 165th and Burundi 166th out of 171 countries (World Bank, 2018). Since 1994, Rwanda's GDP had an average growth of 7,4% each year. Making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. In 2000, the current president Paul Kagame took control of the country. Rwanda began to modernize its economy. Poverty rates dropped and health improved (World Bank, 2018c). Rwanda's economy has experienced an economic boom and the population increased their living standards. In the same period, Burundi's has shown very little developmental progress. GDP in Burundi has grown an average of only 1,2% per year (World Bank, 2018b). This makes them special cases to perform a comparative case study to find answer why these differences exist.



### 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

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#### 3.1.1 Core concepts

Before laying down the theoretical debate a few core concepts need to be clarified. The concepts inclusive and extractive political or economic institutions are of big importance in Acemoglu & Robinson's theory in determining economic success.

Institutions are a set of formal or informal normative rules and conventions that structure social interactions. North defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions"(1991, p. 97). Constraints are defined as formal rules or informal constrictions. They are either self-regulated or regulated from an external authority (Wiggins & Davis, 2006, pp. 1). Political institutions decide who is in power and how power is used. Economic institutions consist of norms, regulations and laws that form or modify human economic behavior and can be identified by: property rights, facilitating transactions and permitting economic cooperation and organization (Wiggins & Davis, 2006, p. 2).

The main differences between inclusive and extractive institutions are the political system, the incentives structure and sustainable economic growth through technological improvement (Carter, 2014, pp. 6-7). Inclusive political systems will favor input of the people the rulers of the society govern. In an extractive political institution, the political system will undermine its people and exclude those that are not within the small circle of elites. These institutions will only have an incentive structure that would best serve the elite instead of the public.

Development theories try to answer the question how to achieve positive economic and social change. In this chapter the debate on development will be clarified. In order to answer the research question I first need to identify the main theories on development and determine the relevancy in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. The focus in this paper will be on the debate between institutional and state-led development. My main sources for these theories will come from Acemoglu and Robinson's book "Why Nations Fail" (2012) and The developmental state theory based on Adrian Leftwich's book "States of Development" (2000).

### **3.2 DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT**

We can characterize the different theories under a few main explanations that try to answer what factors drive economic growth: policy-hypotheses, geography-hypotheses, state-led hypotheses and the institutional-hypotheses (Lorenz, 2005, p.4; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 45 – 69).

In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century the geography-hypothesis gained recognition, the French philosopher Montesquieu linked geographic location to prosperity and poverty (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 49). The geography hypothesis assumes that geographical characteristics determine economic growth. The characteristics that determine if certain geographical areas experience economic success can be climate, diseases, strategic location or natural resources (Lorenz et al, 2005, pp. 4 - 8). Most of the poor countries lie between the tropic of Cancer and Capricorn, which gives appeal to the geography hypothesis. This made the geography hypothesis highly valued for many years (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 48). However, the geography hypothesis is not able to answer differences of economic prosperity within the same regions with the same climate, culture and resources (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 48-56).

The policy-hypothesis focuses on the role of policy decisions and leadership in explaining economic development. It differs from geography-hypothesis in that it offers concrete solutions to achieve economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, p. 67). Policy methods that promote a stable macroeconomic framework are seen as key factors for economic growth. Liberal trade regimes are central and international trade is valued (Frankel & Romer, 1999). In the 1980's more support grew for neo-liberal economic policies models for economic development. These policies became known as the Washington Consensus (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 2). Countries that received foreign aid would have to rely on the market as a mechanism for distributing resources and stimulating economic growth. These countries were expected to reduce government's size and reach (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 2). For countries that were not able to deliver basic social services, maintenance and modernization of the civil service and the financing of the state, these structural adjustment policies were not successful. In these countries, the private sector was not able to provide services without the help of the state to coordinate and regulate (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 3).

In contrast to the market-led policy-hypothesis, the role of the state in development became more popular in the 1990's. This was mainly influenced by state-led development in East-Asian countries that



were termed Asian Tigers (Leftwich, 1995; Johnson, 1999; Wade, 2018). In a short period, countries like Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea were able to radically transform their societies and experience massive economic growth. The term “the developmental state” originated from the type of state that were able to radically transform their economies (Johnson, 1999, p. 33). This type of state also started to take form in other regions of the world, for example Botswana and Chile (Leftwich, 1994, p. 159). An ideal-type developmental state is one that demonstrates a ‘determination and ability to stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with the domestic private sector and arrange or supervise mutually acceptable deals with foreign interests’ (Leftwich, 2000, 167-8). A developmental state is broadly understood as one that displays a clear commitment to a national development agenda, that has solid capacity and reach, that seeks to provide growth as well as poverty reduction and the provision of public services. In the book ‘States of Development’ (2000) Leftwich gives a profound explanation to what the developmental state is and why it has been so successful.

### **3.3 LEFTWICH**

Leftwich sees the presence of a particular type state “the developmental state” as the most important factor in acquiring a sustainable developmental growth (Leftwich, 1995, p. 401). The developmental state is a type of state that is greatly influenced by the success of Asian Tigers. The human and civil rights records of these states were not good. Nevertheless due to excessive economic growth human and social indicators such as life expectancy, literacy and child health have increased significantly (Leftwich, 2000, p. 3). Both democratic and non-democratic were able to achieve success from a development point of view. In the book ‘States of Development’ (2000), Leftwich tries to find answers to why these societies were able to perform so well.

Leftwich focuses us on the primacy of politics in development (Leftwich, 2000, p. 4). Development is a political process and needs to be tackled with politics. Politics are the central and dominant variable in determining the success or failure of development. Leftwich defines politics as “all the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, whether at local, national or international levels, or whether in the private or public domains” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 5). Development must be understood as a political process involving new ways in which resources are mobilized, directed and deployed to promote growth and welfare. The resources can be land, capital or human beings

Because of the primacy of politics, the role of the state is crucial. It is the only agency capable in undertaking the complex process to manage and coordinate the use, production and distribution of resources on a national basis. That is, if it has the structure and capacity to do this. The type of state that is able to do this is described as the developmental state. Developmental states are “states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at the center to shape, pursue and encourage achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and

promoting the conditions of economic growth, by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of both.” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 155).

Leftwich shows criticism to the Washington consensus and international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, that focus on democratization and improvement of human rights. In order to receive support political conditions are attached by World Bank to persuade countries in developing democracies, and improve human rights this is called good governance (Leftwich, 2000, pp. 120-121). Leftwich is skeptical whether such conditions have an impact on the political culture and political process. States that have not concentrated enough power, probity, autonomy and competence at the center to shape, pursue and encourage determined developmental objectives will fail in impacting political culture, for example corruption culture in politics (Leftwich, 2000, p. 126). He argues that underdeveloped countries do not have the necessary conditions for democracies to emerge and even more special conditions to consolidate and remain stable (Leftwich, 2000, p. 10). If development occurs in these countries under backings of the developmental state, it will help to establish the conditions from which democracies emerge. He contends that the developmental state is a transitional form. States that were successful in their developmental transition will eventually improve the aspects it initially ignored, like democracy or human rights.

Leftwich also questions the thinking that democracy is a necessary feature for development. Democratic politics are seldom the required politics of radical change (Leftwich, 2000, p.150). The form of democracy is a critical factor in determining the pace and extent of developmental achievements. The developmental momentum is greater in a dominant party democracy than in a coalition democracy and even much greater than in democracies where political parties alter in power (Leftwich, 2000, p. 11). A determined elite with relative autonomy will be more likely to guide fast and sustainable economic growth; these elites would not be hindered by the civil society. Democracies are less likely to deal with rapid changes (Leftwich, 2000, p. 189, p. 150). This is also observed with the Asian Tigers, during the period of rapid growth, most of the countries were authoritarian, in time most of them have developed democratic regimes.

In his developmental state model, he defines the characteristics of countries that experienced rapid development. Developmental states have a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, powerful and competent bureaucracy and weak civil society. A determined developmental elite control developmental states. Their goal is not self-enrichment but have a determined commitment to economic growth and transformation (Leftwich, 2000, p160). The elites have relative autonomy over the state institutions they control. The state has the possibility to act independently without being pressured by different interest groups, regions or groups (Leftwich, 2000, p161). Furthermore, the characteristics include an ability to define and implement developmental objectives. Elites that have relative autonomy can focus on the national interest.

In developmental states, the elite can make use of a powerful competent bureaucracy able to manage economic and social development (Leftwich, 2000, p162). It gives the state the ability to supervise the developmental process and implement new policies effectively.

Civil society has been weak in the developmental states. In addition, there appears to be a condition of the rise and strengthening of developmental states. It is a result of the relative autonomy of the state (Leftwich, 2000, 163-164). Developmental states score badly on human rights records. Attitudes against the opposition are often not considered tolerable (Leftwich, 2000, 165). Especially in non-democratic states developmental states. Organizations or individuals that seem to challenge the state and its developmental purposes are neutralized, penetrated or incorporated by the ruling party (Leftwich, 2000, 165). Despite poor human rights records, there still exists a widespread support and legitimacy for the state. Developmental states have lost their constitutional or political legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000, 166). Legitimacy is gained in the manner in which these states have been able to distribute the benefits of rapid growth in terms of school's roads healthcare, public housing and other facilities (Leftwich, 2000, 166).

In order for market-based economies to function, a stable and functioning state was needed, as was seen with the Asian Tigers. This also led to the recognitions of the role of institutions in economics and politics. Douglass North argued that the quality of institutions was essential in determining economic growth. The institutional explanations view the quality of institutions as the main driver of economic growth. Countries with better institutions will invest more in physical and human capital (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p 1369). North, et al. (2000) account the degree of political order to economic growth.

Acemoglu et al. (2001) explain the differences of development between different geographical locations by the institutions that took shape during the colonial era. They find a relation between the different strategies of colonialization and developmental success. Certain colonies became settler colonies like North America and Australia, while other colonies mainly in Africa and South America were used for recourse extraction. In the settler colonies, intuitions were shaped to build a successful society for settlers. In colonies that were used for their resources, extractive states were set up to rapidly transfer goods to the colonial powers (Acemoglu et al., 2001, pp. 1395). The extractive institutions were shaped to let a small elite group benefit from the extraction of recourses. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that geographical factors influenced the strategy of colonialization. Regions that had high disease mortality were less likely to become a settler colony. A relation was found between the institutions that were shaped during the colonial era with the nature of regimes in these countries today (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 1395). In the book, 'Why Nations Fail' (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) explanation is given to what kind of institutions are desirable.

### **3.4 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON**

In their book “Why Nations Fail”, Acemoglu and Robinson, name political and economic institution as the main reasons for success or failure of states. Institutions influence behavior and incentives of citizens, individual talents are able to achieve their potential through the right institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 43). For example, people like Bill Gates, Steve Job or Larry Page were able to complement their talents by acquiring a unique set of skills through the United States schooling system. They were easily able to start companies because of the economic institutions in the United States. Political Institutions provided stability and continuity for them to successfully continue their businesses. Because the political power in the USA is distributed broadly, it was not necessary to fear a disastrous new economic direction by the government (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 43). Economic institutions are crucial in determining the prosperity of a country and politics and political institutions determine what economic institutions take shape in a country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 43). In order for the society as a whole to profit from economic growth, the economic institutions need to be inclusive and pluralistic. Institutions that are not inclusive will only enriching those in power. In order to have inclusive economic institutions, a country needs political inclusive institutions. There should be a certain degree of pluralism, in which power is constrained and evenly divided among society. In inclusive institutions, power is not narrowed down to an individual or a small elite group (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 80). There is also a certain degree of centralization and monopoly of legitimate violence. Without centralization and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, law and order cannot be enforced and society will eventually descend into chaos (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 81).

Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that extractive political institutions will try to maintain itself. When a new group overthrows the ruling elite. These newcomers will have incentives to preserve the current extractive political and economic institutions, because of the few constraints that exist on power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 82). When power is unconstrained and concentrated in a narrow elite group, the political institutions are absolutist. The economic institutions are then shaped by the elites to extract recourses from society. The ruling elite will use these recourses to defend their political power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 82). These factors make it difficult for countries to radically change their institutions. Economic institutions that create incentives for economic progress may redistribute income and power in a way that does not positively affect the ruling elite (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 84). Economic growth causes winners and losers, new industries arise and old industries fade away. This is called Creative destruction. It causes rivalry to increase and threatens the elites, as they may be replaced (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 150). The ruling elite will try to prevent this from happening by limiting economic progress and innovation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 344). Therefore, countries that have extractive institutions are likely to stay in a vicious circle with an elite only interested in preserving power. It is possible for countries to replace extractive institutions for inclusive ones. When a convergence of different factors takes place in which a broad coalition of those that desire

reforms exists (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 427). An example for this is the industrial revolution in England, which set in motion path breaking technological changes like steam power and transportation. This led to increases in income and the foundation of modern industrial society. The emergence of a middle class challenged the political monopoly (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 85).

It is also possible to argue in reverse that inclusive institutions are hard to change. Inclusive institutions have created several control mechanisms against the abuse of power. First, incentives are created for a pluralistic society that make the illegal seizure of power by a dictator, party within government or president, more difficult (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 333). Second, inclusive political institutions support and are supported by inclusive economic institutions. In inclusive economic institutions monopolies are reduced and dynamic economy is created which reduces the benefits for a seizure of power. Finally, Inclusive institutions will allow a free media to establish. A free media will provide information about threats against inclusive institutions, which mobilizes opposition (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 333). Inclusive economic institutions will make it impossible for extractive political institutions to take shape. Since either, the inclusive economic institution will be transformed to benefit the elite or it will destabilize the extractive political institution and replace it for an inclusive one (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 82-83).

### **3.5 COMPARISON**

Adrian Leftwich's theory and Acemoglu & Robinson theory, both try to answer the question why certain countries are able to make a positive developmental transformation while others cannot. On certain issues, there exists some disagreement between Acemoglu & Robinson and Leftwich. The main differences are the importance of institutions and degree of pluralism in politics.

Both theories see the importance of institutions. The historic context in which institutions take shape is crucial with Acemoglu & Robinson, but Leftwich believes that we should not overestimate the role of institutions in development. Institutions cannot be seen as separate from the raw processes and practices of politics, which create and shape them. Leftwich sees the proof that institutions should not be overestimated in the many post-colonial states that overthrew, abandoned or transformed institutional arrangements that were passed on from colonial regimes, within a few years of independence, (Leftwich, 2000, pp. 8-9). Leftwich believes that no institutional development can be promoted or sustained independent from politics, because no institutions are stronger than the politics that sustain it.

Another difference is the role of democracy and pluralism in both theories. Acemoglu & Robinson emphasize the role of pluralist society in which power is divided in broad coalition. In these societies there is freedom of assembly, so citizens can come together to voice their concerns. Leftwich is in favor of determined elite with relative autonomy that can lead the country through periods of rapid

changes. The civil society should be weak, so elites do not have to take in to account the wishes of the population when pursuing development.

According to Acemoglu and Robinson democratic societies encourage inclusive economic institutions to emerge, which are essential for economic growth. Leftwich believes democracy is not necessary for economic growth, but can follow from economic growth. Economic growth can create the necessary conditions for democracies to emerge.

When taking in to account Acemoglu & Robinson's theory on development and the developmental progress of Rwanda and Burundi, the following hypothesis will be derived:

*Hypothesis 1: Rwanda has more political & economical inclusive institutions than Burundi.*

When taking in to account Leftwich's developmental state theory, the following hypothesis will be derived:

*Hypothesis 2: Rwanda has more characteristics of the developmental state than Burundi*

In the next chapter, I will elaborate how I will measure the variables of hypothesis 1 and 2.

## **4 METHODOLOGY**

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To test the hypotheses a qualitative analysis of documents and reports will be done. In this section, I will explain the chosen measures and how they will be evaluated. To construct the core variables from hypothesis 1 and 2 : political institutions, economic institutions and the characteristics of developmental state (determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, bureaucratic power, weak civil society, repression and legitimacy) I will derive indicators. For political institutions the degree of plurality is important I will use the following indicators: political system, electoral system, press freedom. My indicator for economic institutions will be economic freedom, which consists of property rights, and division of wealth.

To evaluate the political system, I will first compare regime types. Democratic regimes will be considered inclusive, authoritarian regimes will be considered extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 446). Second, the degree of representation of different groups. An inclusive political system should entail a system with a broad proportional representation of different groups in the government (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.419). I will specifically compare the representation of different ethnic groups, as it has been relevant in the history of Rwanda and Burundi. When a country has extractive institutions, citizens are not able to participate in the countries politics and economy. The large problem of extractive institutions is that elites want to keep their positions in power and wealth; extractive institutions are meant to keep these advantages over the rest of the population, so change is less likely (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 408-410). In inclusive political institutions, citizens have a say in

politics, which can be expressed in the electoral system . To test if the electoral system is inclusive, the elections of the countries will be evaluated by determining the fairness, the presence of an opposition and the changing of guard. Press freedom will be used as an indicator to measure incisiveness of the political institutions. An independent media emerges from pluralism; groups that have an interest in the continuation of inclusive institutions can become aware and organize against threats to these institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 309). An independent media is an important control mechanism that prevents abuse of power. If rulers want to impose extractive policies, the media will report on this and an opposition can be mobilized (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 333). I will evaluate the rights to assembly and association. Pluralism is encouraged when there is freedom of assembly and association (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 455 - 457). The population should be able to come together, express their views and concerns over government policy when inclusive institutions are present.

Economic institutions can be identified by three set: property rights, facilitating transactions and permitting economic cooperation and organization (Wiggins & Davis, 2006, p. 2). Inclusive economic institutions give the population the chance to participate and benefit from economic growth and promote innovation. There should be a certain degree of economic freedom. Economic freedom will be measured by the ease of doing business, and the quality of property rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 337-340).

Developmental states are led by a small determined elite their goal developmental progress. To test this I will evaluate the economic policies and corruption will be evaluated as a measure. Their goal is not self-enrichment so corruption should be low. Civil society is weak in developmental states, society does not have influence on politics. Developmental states are also not concerned with human rights; this will be measured by inspecting freedom of civil society organizations and the compliance of human rights. The elite has relative autonomy in a developmental state it is able to operate freely without the concern of different interests. To test this power relations will be investigated. The bureaucracy is powerful, effective in the developmental state. It is capable of managing the economic development; this will be determined by evaluating the government's effectiveness. Government effectiveness aims to measure in relative terms the ability of state bureaucracies and institutions to create and enforce government policies.

In the next section I will compare Rwanda and Burundi based on these indicators for the inclusiveness of institutions and the characteristics of the developmental state.

## 5 ANALYSIS

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### 5.1 INSTITUTIONS

#### 5.1.1 Political Systems

Burundi's political system is a Presidential, multiparty system. The president is both head of state and head of government. The parliament consists of a senate and a national assembly where members are elected for a term of five years by proportional representation. And a senate elected term of five years by communal colleges. Rwanda is also a presidential republic with a multi-party system. President Paul Kagame is head of state and head of government. Parliament consists of senate and chamber of deputies. The chamber of deputies has 80 chosen representatives and there are 26 senate members. In the parliament certain spots are reserved for certain groups, for example in the chamber of deputies, 26 chairs are reserved for women, 53 are directly chosen, 2 seats come from youth councils and 1 seat representing people with disabilities. Although both countries appear to be democratic, In the Economist's democracy index of 2017 both Rwanda and Burundi were considered authoritarian. Burundi is ranked 153th out of 167 countries, Rwanda scores slightly better and is ranked 133th.

Both countries score high in representation of women in parliament. Rwanda scores extremely well and has the highest proportion with 61% women in parliament. Burundi also scores well with 36% women in parliament, it is ranked 25<sup>th</sup> in the world (World Bank, 2018e). The Burundi parliament has quotas on ethnicity and gender. Political parties must present candidate lists with a minimum degree of ethnic and gender balance. The top four candidates require at least one woman and of the top three candidates, only two can be of the same ethnicity (Vandeginste, 2014, p. 268). The national assembly require a 60% Hutu and 40 % Tutsi composition. The Senate consist of 18 Hutu and 18 Tutsi. For the Twa minority, three seats are guaranteed in both the National Assembly and the senate (Vandeginste, 2014, p. 268). Rwanda implemented a very different policy on ethnicity it has tried to abolish ethnic division with policies based on ethnic amnesia. The level of representation of ethnic identities is unclear in Rwanda, parties based on ethnicity or religion are banned. Addressing the question of ethnic representation is considered taboo and might be considered as a criminal offence (Vandeginste, 2018, p. 269). A WikiLeaks cable from the US embassy in 2008 showed that in the Rwanda government, Tutsis hold a greater percentage of senior positions. Hutus in senior positions frequently held position with little power (US Embassy, 2018).

In Burundi, the government heavily influences the judicial organs, by the use of political pressure. The minister of justice together with the president make judicial appointments, The Rwandan judiciary is influenced the executive power. The government has been alleged for pressuring lawyers to accomplish its goals (Freedom House, 2018a).



### 5.1.2 Electoral System

Since 2005 Burundi has an average voters-turnout of 79%. The first elections after the war were considered to be fair, but since 2010 the fairness of the elections have been questioned. The ruling party CNDD-FDD have abused the states recourses and facilities during elections, CNDD received greatly more coverage in the media. Opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2010 because of the unfair playing field during elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). The current president Pierre Nkurunziza is democratically chosen by members of parliament and has been in office since 2005. Currently Nkurunziza is on his third term of office, while according to the constitution only two terms are possible. In the last presidential elections of 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza won with a percentage of 69% according to the IFES election guide (2018). These elections were controversial because it is claimed that Nkurunziza unlawfully participated in the elections (Rufyikiri, 2017, pp. 238). The highest court in Burundi accepted this third term. It was claimed that the government threatened the court (“Burundi court backs President,” 2015). Following the decision of the national court, violent protests occurred in the capital and plunged the country in an international crisis. Because of the protests the opposition boycotted the election. The names of the eight opposition candidates that initially wanted to participate were still placed on the ballot. This was done to keep the appearance of open elections (Vandeginste, 2015, p. 625). In May 2018, a referendum was passed changing the constitution, in order for Nkurunziza to remain president until 2034 (Vandeginste, 2017, pp. 7). But in June of 2018 Nkurunziza vowed to step down in 2020, critics have contested this promise (Nimubona, 2018).

Rwanda’s president Kagame is currently also in his third term as president, he is in office since 2000. According to IFES Election (2018) guide Rwanda has an average voter’s turnout of 96% since 2003. In the last presidential elections of 2017, Kagame won with a large percentage of 98,79%. These high percentages are largely explainable due to the lack of a strong opposition and a tight control of voters by local government bodies (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Only two other candidates participated in the elections. The National Electoral Commission of Rwanda disqualified other candidates due to technical reasons, which was condemned by the United States and the European Union (Amnesty International, 2018). Amnesty international (2018) has criticized Rwanda by claiming that political opponents are suppressed before and after the elections. Unsolved cases of disappearances of political opponents were observed. There was no freedom of association, no freedom of expression and unsolved killings of critics took place. The Human Right Watch (2017) claims intimidation and irregularities happened in the days before and during the voting of the 2017’s presidential elections. The US state department (2017) similarly observed irregularities during the elections and condemn the media for not reporting on the harassments of opposition candidates and the lack of transparency in determining why certain political candidates were not eligible. The 2010 presidential elections faced similar difficulties as in 2017 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Intimidations and non-transparent technical issues caused a lack of opposition. Kagame won these elections for his second term with 93% of the vote. In 2015, a referendum was passed that gave Kagame the opportunity to be elected until 2034. The Rwandan

constitution permits political parties to exist, but these parties face serious restrictions. The government uses the protection of the national unity as an argument to limit political pluralism. The recognized parties are closely tied to the dominant RPF. In the 2010 elections, leaders of opposition parties were arrested (Freedom House 2018a). In the Democracy index, both countries score very low on electoral process and pluralism, Burundi 0,00 and Rwanda 0.83 (highest score is 10) (The Economist, 2018).

### **5.1.3 Press Freedom**

Burundi is ranked 159<sup>th</sup> in the world press freedom index (RSF, 2018). The harassment of the media has intensified in the last months because of the recent referendum. Organizations like the BBC and the Voice of Africa have been banned. The media suffers from government censorship. In 2013 a law was implemented forbidding media to report on issues that can damage national security, which has led to many concerns (RSF, 2018). Since the 2015 elections more restrictions have been placed on the media and freedom of expression. Many criticisms are directly countered by claiming that the criticism is a threat to the national security (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Public expression is legally restricted. There exist many cases of intimidations, arrests and killings of journalists. After a failed coup in May 2015, many independent journalists went in exile and civil society groups were banned.

Rwanda is ranked 156<sup>th</sup> in the world press freedom index by RSF (2018a). It is considered not free. According to its constitution there is freedom of press if it does not deny the national unity. In practice every criticism on the president and government officials is in violation of national unity. Many journalists have been arrested, intimidated and have fled the country. Both countries are considered unfree in the media freedom index by The Economist. They both score a 1 out of 10 and are both ranked 145<sup>th</sup>.

### **5.1.4 Freedom of Assembly and Association**

The constitution of Burundi grants freedom of association and assembly, yet there exist certain regulations that place limitations. Government representatives need to be part of public assemblies, assemblies can be shut down to protect public order, group sports in public is banned in the capital and demonstrations can at most take up to one day. In the 2015 demonstrations, demonstrators were killed, injured and arrested without trial. Association rights have been limited. It has been difficult to register civil society groups, critical groups are banned (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). In 2013 a law was imposed that restricted public gatherings (Freedom House, 2018).

Association and assembly groups are tolerated in Rwanda if they do not separate from the state's national unity. In reality collective bargaining and strikes are rare because of arbitrary rules (Freedom House, 2018a). Demonstrations are only allowed if they are no risk for public safety. Independent organizations have been intimidated and threatened when showing criticism towards the government. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016).

### **5.1.5 Economic Freedom**

In the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index of 2018 Burundi scores 50.9 out of 100 points, making it the 157<sup>th</sup> freest economy. Rwanda scores significantly better with 69.1 out of 100 points the 39<sup>th</sup> freest country higher than the world average 61.1. In the World Bank's (2018a) rating of economies ease of doing business, Rwanda is ranked 41<sup>st</sup> of 190 in the world and second of 47 in Sub-Saharan Africa over 2017. In the same ranking Burundi is placed 164<sup>th</sup> in the world and 34<sup>th</sup> in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2017). In the same ranking Rwanda scores higher on property rights, it scores 69 out of 100 while Burundi scores 17 out of 100.

### **5.1.6 Conclusion**

Hypothesis 1 stated that Rwanda has more political & economical inclusive institutions than Burundi. I have tried to answer test this by evaluating the political system, electoral system, press freedom, freedom of assembly and association and economic freedom. The political systems of both countries did not differ a lot in regime type or the separation of powers. Rwanda and Burundi's regimes have the appearance of democracy but in reality seem to be authoritarian. The differences in representation of ethnicity seem to be more distinct. Burundi has policies actively pursuing an ethnic proportionate representation. These policies have been successful and considered the most successful use of power sharing in Africa (Lemarchand, 2006). In Rwanda it seems that Tutsis are favored in the appointment of important positions. I consider neither political systems to be inclusive. Based on representation of ethnic groups, Burundi is slightly more inclusive than Rwanda. Separation of powers is limited both countries, the judiciary is pressured by the government. In both countries do not seem to have an inclusive electoral system. The leaders of both countries have been powerful and in office for a long time, this does not seem to be changing in the short term. There is one dominant party and opposition is thwarted and suppressed. Press freedom is also not inclusive, the Rwanda and Burundi governments are actively repressing journalists lacking media freedom. Economic freedom seems more inclusive in Rwanda. Freedom of association and assembly is not inclusive in Rwanda and Burundi, there exist many restrictions.

Rwanda only has more inclusive economic institutions, for the rest of the indicators the institutions are not significantly more inclusive than in Burundi, hypothesis 1 can be rejected. Therefore, Acemoglu & Robinson theory that inclusive institutions provide for economic growth, is not supported in our cases.

## **5.2 DEVELOPMENTAL STATE**

### **5.2.1 Determined developmental elite**

Rwanda's President Kagame launched a program called vision 2020 in the year 2000, to transform Rwanda in a knowledge based middle income country by the year 2020. These goals align with the success achieved in the last decades in reducing poverty, a high economic growth and reduced inequality (World Bank, 2018c). The government is actively working on developing the economy by improving the business climate (USAID, 2018). Which is reflected in high scores in the annual World Bank Doing Business Report (see section 5.1.5). In Rwanda, the fight against corruption is mainly done by strict enforcement. Rwanda is ranked 48<sup>th</sup> in the world in Transparency International corruption perception index of 2017. Burundi is ranked 157<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries. Rwanda is the 3<sup>th</sup> least corrupt government of Sub-Saharan Africa (Transparency International, 2018a). There exist a special commission that has the goal to fight clientelism and nepotism: The Public Sector Commission. Which uses naming and shaming with a corruption convict database (Office of Ombudsman, 2018).

Burundi has its own developmental program called Vision Burundi 2025, with policies and strategies to accomplish sustainable development. The goals set by the government are not embodied by Burundi's economic performance, as it has faced years of recession (AFDB, 2018). Burundi's corruption is perceived as high it is ranked 157<sup>th</sup> out of 175 countries according to the corruption index. According to Transparency international (2018) Burundi is the most corrupt country in East-Africa. 16 to 30 percent of respondents have admitted to have paid bribes.

### **5.2.2 Weak civil society**

Civil society organizations in Rwanda cannot operate freely. They are forced to work together with the government and concede with developmental and political goals (Greedy, 2010, p641). Human rights organizations have pointed to the concern of the politicization of human rights work in Rwanda (ICNL, 2018). There is concern that those working in human rights are topic to intensified scrutiny. Civil society organizations in Rwanda face barriers of entry, activity and barriers to free speech. They have excessive documentation requirements to obtain legal status (ICNL, 2018). Ministry approval is mandatory; they must integrate governmental priorities into their operations. All decisions involving their statutes must be approved by the ministry (ICNL, 2018). Only civil society organizations that do not focus on democracy and human rights are able to operate freely. There have been accusations that the government uses infiltration tactics similar to the ones used against political opposition (Freedom House, 2017). Interest groups that show criticism on the government are restricted.

Burundi's civil society has been shut down since the 2015 elections. Right after the elections during the protest, the government shut down local civil society organizations. Many civil society leaders have been forced to flee the country and the government have shut down all local independent radio stations (Freedom House, 2017). There have been costly requirements that prevent NGO's from receiving official recognition.


**5.2.3 Relative Autonomy**

. In 2006 Lemarchand compared the power sharing between Rwanda and Burundi in which he concluded that power sharing in Burundi is better than in Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2006). Executive power in Burundi is shared among the different ethnic groups (see section 5.1.1). The parliament is not independent in Rwanda simply endorses all presidential initiatives (Freedom House, 2018).

Although Lemarchand, sees Burundi as a promising case to have more power sharing. Which he defines as “power relations thorough a more inclusive participation in policy making, accompanied by corresponding spheres of autonomy for the groups concerned” (Lemarchand, 2006, p2). In more recent times, as we have seen in section 5.1.2, in both countries, the political power lies with one party and its leaders. In Burundi relative autonomy for the elite increased since the 2015 elections. There is a lack of political opposition and civil society is weak (section 5.2.2). Society is incapable in influencing the state’s policies. The elites in both countries do not have to concern itself with civil society or opposition.. Because of the weak civil society in both countries, the governments do not have to concern itself with the society. The governments do not face any restrictions on their power and can do as they please.

**5.2.4 Powerful, Effective Bureaucracy**

In the worldwide governance, different indicators are measured that show the quality and the ability of the state’s bureaucracy indicators (World Bank, 2018d). Scores can vary between -0,25 and +0,25. Zero is the average world score. Rwanda scores high on government effectiveness. The graphs show that Rwanda scores higher than Burundi in the period of 1998 to 2016; indicating that Rwanda has a more



effective government since 1996 relative to Burundi. In 2016 Rwanda scored positive for the first time

on this index, indicating that from 2016 government has been more effective compared to the average in rest of the world.

### **5.2.5 Conclusion**

Hypothesis 2 stated that Rwanda has more characteristics of the developmental state than Burundi. I have tried to test this by evaluating if the characteristics of a developmental state were present in Rwanda or Burundi. Burundi does not seem to have a determined developmental elite. Both governments have shown the developmental ambition but Burundi has achieved little result. Rwanda on the other hand, is actively developing its economy and achieving the necessary results. Corruption in Rwanda is far less than in Burundi, which is to be expected when a determined developmental elite is present. Government effectiveness in Rwanda is significantly higher than in Burundi.

When taken in account the characteristics of the developmental state, I can conclude that all characteristics of the developmental state are present in Rwanda. In Burundi, on the other hand we have only encountered a weak civil society and relative autonomy of the state. Therefore, I have failed to reject hypothesis 2. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi Leftwich's theory of developmental state is supported.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS

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In the introduction, I stated the following question: “Which theory best explains the differences in the developmental progress between Rwanda and Burundi?” By exploring the theoretical debate on development, I have tried to identify the different theories that were relevant in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. This led me to making a comparison between the state-led theory on development by Leftwich and an institutional explanation by Acemoglu and Robinson. Leftwich describes a particular type of state as essential, which he calls the ‘developmental state’. Developmental states have the following characteristic: a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, weak civil society and a powerful effective bureaucracy. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of a state’s institutions are essential. States with inclusive institutions will be able to succeed and reach sustainable developmental progress. While states with extractive institutions will likely fail. The origins of these institutions can be tracked down to the colonial era. Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize pluralism and the role of democracy. Based on the literature two hypothesis were constructed to test which theory is best supported in the case of Rwanda and Burundi.

*Hypothesis 1 : Rwanda has more political & economical inclusive institutions than Burundi.*

*Hypothesis 2: Rwanda has more characteristics of the developmental state than Burundi*

Hypothesis 1 was constructed to test Acemoglu and Robinsons theory and Hypothesis 2 to test Leftwich’s theory. To measure if inclusive were present in Rwanda certain indicators were determined based on the literature. The chosen indicators were political system, electoral system, freedom of press and freedom of assembly and association. According to Acemoglu and Robinson we would expect Rwanda to have more inclusive institutions than Burundi. As expected Burundi does not seem to have inclusive institutions. Rwanda does not perform much better; on certain areas, it even has less inclusive institutions than Burundi. The representation of ethnic groups is better in Burundi while Rwanda has better inclusive economic institutions. On other indicators, not many differences were found. I have not found empirical evidence support for hypothesis 1. Acemoglu & Robinson theory has not been able to explain the differences in economic development. Therefore, their theory that inclusive institutions provide for economic growth, is not supported in our cases.

To measure if Rwanda or Burundi qualify as developmental state, certain indicators were determined based on the characteristics of developmental state: a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, weak civil society and a powerful effective bureaucracy. Hypothesis 2 was constructed to test Leftwich’s model of the developmental state. Burundi did not meet the requirements to be characterized as a developmental state. A determined developmental elite is absent and there is no powerful effective government. Rwanda on the other hand, does have the features of a developmental state, all characteristics are present. We have failed to reject hypothesis 2, Leftwich’s theory has been

able to explain the differences in developmental progress. Hence Leftwich's theory of the developmental state has found support in our cases.

To answer the question: "Which theory best explains the differences in the developmental progress between Rwanda and Burundi?" I have come to the conclusion that Acemoglu and Robinson's theory has not been able to explain the differences in development. Leftwich on the other hand has been able to answer this question. In Rwanda all characteristics of the developmental state were present. In Burundi only two characteristics were present.

I would suggest further research to focus on the role of democracy in democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that without democracy developmental progress is not sustainable. In Rwanda's, the progress that has booked will not be sustainable. Leftwich disagrees and claims that economic progress can shape the conditions for democracy to arise. In this paper, I have not been able to answer this question and believe it is an interesting question.



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