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**China's Vision for Global Governance:  
A Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM)**

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## Introduction

### **From the Chinese Dream to a Community of Shared Future for Mankind**

In November 2012, President and Party Secretary of China Xi Jinping introduced the concept of the Chinese Dream. Directed towards the goal of national rejuvenation, the Chinese Dream is to develop and prosper according to Chinese terms and values. Along with a domestic orientation, the slogan has been consistently referred to on international occasions. In these instances, it is invoked as a continuation of China's peaceful development,<sup>1</sup> and as representative of the dreams of other nations. It not "... only benefit [s] the Chinese people, but also the people of all countries."<sup>2</sup> At an international level, the slogan carries a dimension of inclusion, signaling how the world benefits from China's developmental achievements.

In 2012, the Chinese Dream was reported by the official State Language Commission as the "hottest" word of the year.<sup>3</sup> Amongst academics and policymakers, the slogan was similarly embraced. However, in recent years, the fervor surrounding Xi's phrase has decreased. According to the CNKI China Academic Journals database, 9,291 academic articles were published in 2013 with the words "Chinese Dream- 中国梦" in the title. Comparatively, there were 6,271 such articles in 2014, 3,949 in 2015, 2,520 in 2016, 2,278 in 2017, 1,443 in 2018 and 569 published in the first half of 2019.<sup>4</sup> This decline in quantity indicates that the concept is drawing less attention from scholars within China, a phenomena that parallels overseas academic and policy oriented commentaries which are largely constrained to the period of 2012-2017. Such a change suggests that the relevancy of the slogan has diminished within academic and policy-

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<sup>1</sup> Camilla T.N. Sørensen, "The Significance of Xi Jinping's 'Chinese Dream' for Chinese Foreign Policy: From 'Tao Guang Yang Hui' to 'Fen Fa You Wei,'" *JCIR* 3, no. 1 (2013): 53, <https://doaj.org/article/8e9bac4f0d574454b88f68739a01f705>

<sup>2</sup> Xinhua, "Xi calls for new-type intl'l relations," last modified March 24, 2013, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-03/24/content\\_16340253.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-03/24/content_16340253.htm)

<sup>3</sup> William A. Callahan, "What can the China Dream do in the PRC?" The Asan Forum, last modified December 8, 2014, <http://www.theasanforum.org/what-can-the-china-dream-do-in-the-prc/>

<sup>4</sup> China Academic Journals Database, author's search of articles, September 20, 2019.

making circles. Thus, shifting attention to other concepts may better aid understanding of the CCP's current international strategic intentions.

The CCP often references the Chinese Dream in relation to other concepts such as the Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM). Seen as an extension or component of Xi's original slogan, CSFM was first introduced in the 18th Party Congress Work Report of 2012.<sup>5</sup> The concept refers to a group of people or nations bonded together by common interests and fate.<sup>6</sup> To achieve such a community, efforts at the international level must be made in five aspects: political partnership, security, economic development, cultural exchanges and the environment.<sup>7</sup>

Since its inception, CSFM has been increasingly featured in Chinese political dialogue. In 2017, CSFM was highlighted in the 19th Party Congress Work Report of 2017 as a core goal of the CCP, and described explicitly in terms of the Chinese Dream. The interconnectivity between the two concepts is emphasized further in Xi's statement that "this great struggle, great project, great cause, and great dream are closely connected, flow seamlessly into each other, and are mutually reinforcing."<sup>8</sup> CSFM's centrality to Chinese policy can be additionally seen in the 2018 Amendment to the PRC Constitution, where it was added as a new foreign policy goal.<sup>9</sup> It starred in Xi's speeches during prominent international occasions such as the 70th Session of the United

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<sup>5</sup> Xiaochun Zhao, "In Pursuit of a Community of Shared Future: China's Global Activism in Perspective," *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 4, no. 1 (2018): 27, DOI: 10.1142/S2377740018500082;

<sup>6</sup> Denghua Zhang, "The Concept of Community of Common Destiny in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motivations and Implications," *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 5, no. 1 (2018): 197, doi: 10.1002/app5.231.

<sup>7</sup> Xi Jinping, "Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind," (speech, New York, September 28, 2015), FMPRC, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/zyjh\\_665391/t1305051.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305051.shtml)

<sup>8</sup> Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," (Report at 19th Party Congress, Beijing, October 18, 2017), Xinhua, 14, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi\\_Jinping's\\_report\\_at\\_19th\\_CPC\\_National\\_Congress.pdf](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> "Annotated Translation: 2018 Amendment to the P.R.C. Constitution (Version 2.0)," NPC Observer, last modified March 11, 2018, <https://npcobserver.com/2018/03/11/translation-2018-amendment-to-the-p-r-c-constitution/>

Nations General Assembly in 2015 and the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2018. The term gained additional international traction with the UN's incorporation of it into a resolution titled "Social Dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa's Development," which Chinese diplomats and media deemed as a universal recognition of the concept and a huge Chinese contribution to global governance.<sup>10</sup>

Given the rising prominence of CSFM internationally, this thesis aims to deconstruct the concept and situate it in terms of Chinese aspirations in the international system. This objective is underpinned by the view that concepts such as CSFM reveal the CCP's implicit and explicit beliefs about the global order. Focusing on such ideas can thereby generate valuable insight on China's strategic priorities. This effort is particularly important as Chinese conceptualizations of world affairs are unique and distinct, requiring Western scholarship to better engage with Chinese thinking on the world order.<sup>11</sup> To gain such insights, this thesis addresses the following questions: How does the current Chinese leadership construct and present a narrative of a Community of a Shared Future for Mankind to audiences abroad? What beliefs and visions underpin CSFM?

To address these questions, this thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 1 examines the extent to which CSFM has been featured in academic scholarship, with reference to how overseas and Chinese scholars engage with the concept. It defines and justifies the theories employed to understand CSFM such as global governance failure, social interpretations of power, Chinese discursive power and narratives in IR. Chapter 2 details the methodology, a three-layered approach that comprises of content, thematic and narrative analysis. With the use of CCP speeches and political documents, these layers respectively identify the components of narrative, themes/storyline of narrative and types of narrative. They build upon one another to decode

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<sup>10</sup> "Chinese landmark concept put into UN resolution for first time." Xinhua, last modified February 11, 2017, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/11/c\\_136049319.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/11/c_136049319.htm)

<sup>11</sup> Sabine Morky, "Decoding Chinese Concepts for the Global Order: How Chinese scholars rethink and reshape foreign policy ideas," MERICS, last modified October 4, 2018, 2, <https://www.merics.org/en/china-monitor/decoding-chinese-concepts-for-global-order>.

CSFM and the beliefs which underpin it. Chapter 3 quantitatively presents the findings of the thematic and content analysis, proceeding to utilize these results to qualitatively reconstruct the CSFM as an international system, identity and issue narrative. The conclusion recaps how CSFM is constructed and presented by the CCP. It discusses the shortcomings of this work and makes suggestions for additional research.

## Chapter 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

### CSFM in Existing Literature

The CCP has emphasized that CSFM is a core component and continuation of their national rejuvenation project. Along with the Chinese Dream, it is one of the visions, concepts and solutions which have been vigorously promoted by Chinese leaders.<sup>12</sup> Given the presence of CSFM in speeches directed to foreign audiences, and how it has been inscribed into the most important Chinese constitutional documents<sup>13</sup>, CSFM warrants for in-depth study. Such slogans, although easily dismissed as vague or as propaganda, play a key role in shaping Beijing's political thoughts and actions.<sup>14</sup> It is imperative to "...grasp the sources, dynamics and implications of Chinese world-making," as it uncovers motivations behind foreign policy and references how and why Beijing seeks to shape world politics.<sup>15</sup>

Yet, existing literature on CSFM is limited, with the majority of work deriving from Chinese scholars and few from overseas ones. Literature from overseas scholars mention CSFM briefly in broader discussions of the Chinese Dream, with absent or limited analysis of CSFM's meaning and implications in a global context.<sup>16</sup> Observations from abroad often take CSFM as "...simply an international expansion of domestic propaganda."<sup>17</sup> Although the concept is relatively new, a lack of focused literature from abroad is significant considering how the slogan is international orientated and how comparatively rich Chinese literature is. CSFM is applauded by Chinese scholars as a major contribution of Chinese wisdom to the world<sup>18</sup>, a new framework that transcends traditional IR thought<sup>19</sup>, and as encapsulating the dreams of China and the world.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>13</sup> See page 4.

<sup>14</sup> William Callahan, "Dreaming as a critical discourse of national belonging: China Dream, American Dream and world dream," *Nations and Nationalism* 35, no. 35 (2015): 251, DOI: 10.1111/nana.12296.

<sup>15</sup> Morky, "Decoding Chinese Concepts," 4.

<sup>16</sup> See Sørensen, "Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream," 63 and Callahan, "Dreaming as a critical discourse," 262.

<sup>17</sup> Morky, "Decoding Chinese Concepts," 4.

<sup>18</sup> Zhao, "China's Global Activism," 25; Sun, Jianguo, "A Community of Shared Future for Mankind," *Qiushi* 4 (2016): 114, <http://qiushi.sinoperi.com.009a27ma01ef.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/en201604/896890.jhtml#>

<sup>19</sup> Sun, "Community of Shared Future," 114; Zhao, "China's Global Activism," 25.

CSFM is regarded domestically as a core aspect of Chinese foreign policy. It is thus necessary to study the idea in-depth to understand CCP beliefs and aspirations in the international system.

### **Global Governance Failure**

CSFM is referred to by scholars as a global governance concept,<sup>21</sup> a tool to understand changes at the global level.<sup>22</sup> In the current era of globalization, a need emerges for governance and rule-making at the global level.<sup>23</sup> Qin Yaqing argues that this need has not been met, with the institutions of the international system failing to exercise effective global level governance, resulting in disorder.<sup>24</sup> Global governance failure is presented as an outcome of a long-standing international order characterized by political coercion, U.S-led military alliances, and Cold War mentalities.<sup>25</sup> This viewpoint is in line with that of Xi, who stresses the “new threats and challenges which we must face squarely...[by] abandon [ing] Cold War mentality in all its manifestation...”<sup>26</sup>

Although Chinese perspectives note that the system is changing, pressing challenges faced by the international community such as terrorism, financial crises, and climate change, warrant for immediate solutions. Global governance failure is cited to be largely due to ideational limitations, where current ideas underpinning global governance such as monism, rationalism and dualism, lag behind reality. To address this, it is necessary to reconstruct global governance ideas to ones of pluralism, partnership and participation.<sup>27</sup> CSFM is thus seen by Chinese academics as the ideational solution to global governance failure, which “...especially in the West, has undermined

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<sup>20</sup> Xulong Chen, “Theory of Community of Shared Future For Mankind in Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought,” *Contemporary World* 4 (2016): 32.

<sup>21</sup> Zhao, “China’s Global Activism,” 24. Chen, “Theory of Community,” 35.

<sup>22</sup> Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to Global Governance Theory* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 3.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1.

<sup>24</sup> “Global Governance Failure and Ideational Reconstruction for a Sustainable World Order,” in *China Under Xi Jinping: Its Economic Challenges and Foreign Policy Initiatives*, ed. Shao Binhong (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 98.

<sup>25</sup> Sun, “Community of Shared Future,” 114.

<sup>26</sup> Xi, “Working Together.”

<sup>27</sup> Qin, “Global Governance Failure,” 98.



the world's confidence in the Washington Consensus, making more imperative the search for an alternative model that is more just..."<sup>28</sup> With its emphasis on equal representation, peaceful development and win-win cooperation, Xi's global governance concept is regarded by Chinese scholars as a viable solution.

Non-Chinese scholars adopt more critical views of China's proposals for global governance. Contrary to beliefs which stress the existence of global governance failure and Chinese contributions to address this, Michael Pillsbury sees the notion of global governance failure as a constructed one, part of China's effort to delegitimize the West's global authority and world order in order to create a new one.<sup>29</sup> According to this notion, China must create an image of terminal decline in order to offer an appealing blueprint for a new one.<sup>30</sup> The idea of CSFM as a viable blueprint is further contested by Western scholars who see it as reflective of long-standing Chinese rejections to the Western-led international order, and an attempt to subvert Western influence.<sup>31</sup> Xi's proposal of a specifically China-ASEAN CSFM is highlighted as one such example of a Chinese vision which excludes the U.S. and positions China at the center.<sup>32</sup>

Apprehensions about CSFM are further shaped by a perceived lack of credibility. As Ingrid d'Hooghe notes, "...official messengers are never fully trusted, even less when they come from a country with an authoritarian leadership that is not considered legitimate by the public."<sup>33</sup> As a top-down initiative from an authoritarian government, CSFM could suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Developments within China such as repressive domestic crackdowns and prevailing gaps between the rich and the poor further stand at odds with Beijing's assertions that it holds the

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<sup>28</sup> Zhao, "China's Global Activism," 27.

<sup>29</sup> *The Hundred Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 192.

<sup>30</sup> Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2011): 60, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289688>

<sup>31</sup> Liza Tobin, "Xi's Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies," *Texas National Security Review* 2, no.1 (2018): 156-157, ISSN 2576-1153.

<sup>32</sup> Sørensen, "Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream," 63.

<sup>33</sup> *China's Public Diplomacy*, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2014), 40.

answers to global problems of peace and development. CSFM is thereby interpreted by Tobin as China's "...highly orchestrated, ostentatious campaign to trumpet its vision."<sup>34</sup>

### **The Power of Ideas**

Chinese proposals such as CSFM can be situated within a broader context of change at the global level. Recent trends of China's rise and globalization indicate that power is diversifying materially from West to East. Yet, change is also occurring in an ideational sense, as marked by competing notions of best practices in the global political sphere. Miskimmon et al stress that not only will there be "...future power transitions, but that future power transitions will be different..."<sup>35</sup> Here, the difference can be traced to the increasing role of social and ideational factors in international politics, rather than just material ones.<sup>36</sup> Kennedy notes that as China becomes more powerful, the question is not how it will employ its increased economic resources to directly challenge dominant powers such as the U.S. Rather, the issue at hand is how China will use its power to shape global governance ideas and norms to its liking.<sup>37</sup>

This account of power transition rests upon a social interpretation of power. As Hurrell elaborates, "we must place it [power] side by side with other quintessentially social concepts such as prestige, authority and legitimacy. A great deal of the struggle for political power is the quest for authoritative control that avoids...force and coercion."<sup>38</sup> Chinese leaders similarly recognize that this social dimension of power must be harnessed to achieve great power status.<sup>39</sup> Increasing

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<sup>34</sup> Tobin, "Xi's Vision," 166.

<sup>35</sup> Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. *Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2017), 18.

<sup>36</sup> See William A. Callahan, "Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China Dream," *POLITICS* 35, no. 3-4 (2015): 316, doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12088 and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Fujia Lu, "Thinking Hard About Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power," *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 4 (2012), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704806>, 566.

<sup>37</sup> Scott Kennedy, *Global Governance and China: The Dragon's Learning Curve*, (Routledge: London, 2017), 6.

<sup>38</sup> Andrew Hurrell, "Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality," In *Power in Global Governance*, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 49.

<sup>39</sup> See Xi Jinping, "*Jianshe shehui zhuyi wenhua qianguo zhuoli tigao guojia wenhua ruanshili*," last modified December 31, 2013, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-12/31/c\\_118788013.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-12/31/c_118788013.htm)

cultural attraction is equally as important as military, economic and political aspects of power. For the CCP, these components together form a comprehensive national power.<sup>40</sup> However, China's attractive power which rests upon culture and values, currently 'punches below its weight,' falling short of the clout expected of a great power and limiting China's international influence.<sup>41</sup>

### **China's Discursive Power**

The Chinese perspective observes that its soft power resources of culture and values do not hold as much weight internationally as its comparatively stronger hard power sources of economy and military.<sup>42</sup> Against the backdrop of globalization, Chinese efforts abroad are not aimed at enhancing land, resources or markets, but at establishing rules and norms.<sup>43</sup> The importance of these efforts is shaped by Chinese sensitivity to their global image, and their feelings of misjudgment and misunderstanding by the international community.<sup>44</sup> As such, the CCP has devoted much attention to its communication initiatives<sup>45</sup>, an effort which can be understood through the lens of discursive power (*huayu quan*) and the West's discursive hegemony (*huayu baquan*). As a popular topic within China, discourse power is interpreted in various ways. Broadly speaking, these conceptualizations include a "right to speak," a de facto "power discourse," correlated directly with national strength, involving "power of the media" requiring

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<sup>40</sup> d'Hooghe, *China's Public Diplomacy*, 2.

<sup>41</sup> Callahan, "Identity and Security," 216.

<sup>42</sup> Zheng, Yongnian, "Zhongguo zai guojishiwushang meiyou huayuyan" last modified April 18, 2013, <http://dfjws.blog.sohu.com/261284965.html>; Meng Xiangqing and Wang Xiao, "Zai canyu quanqiu zhili zhong tisheng guojihuayuyan," last modified October 15, 2015, <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/1015/c40531-27699830.html>

<sup>43</sup> Yan Xuetong in Mark Leonard, *What Does China Think?* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 94.

<sup>44</sup> d'Hooghe, *China's Public Diplomacy*, 2.

<sup>45</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson, "Russia and China Respond to Soft Power: Interpretation and Readaptation of a Western Construct," *Politics* 35, no. 3-4 (2015), 288, doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12095 and Gary D. Rawnsley, "To Know Us is to Love Us: Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting in Contemporary Russia and China," *Politics* 35, no. 3-4 (2015), 274.

its internationalization; or an aspect of soft power, involving values and culture.<sup>46</sup> Based on a review of relevant Chinese literature, this thesis conceives discursive power as a combination of these definitions, with discursive hegemony referring to the West's dominance in these aspects.

In 2013, President Xi emphasized that Chinese values should be spread by increasing China's international discourse power.<sup>47</sup> "More work should be done to refine and explain our ideas, and extend the platform for overseas publicity, so as to make our culture known through international communication..."<sup>48</sup> Initiatives such as the Chinese Dream and CSFM are part of Chinese endeavors for new discourse power, seen by Chinese academics as crucial for the development of Chinese soft power.<sup>49</sup> China has thus formulated a discursive power strategy that comprises of setting facts straight and innovating rules.<sup>50</sup>

The CCP's focus on discursive power is understood by Chinese scholars in terms of the nations' rapid economic development. In the last three decades, economic growth has expanded Chinese overseas interests.<sup>51</sup> As China participates and invest globally, its interests become intertwined with that of the world. Participation in global discussions and affairs thus serves as an important means to protect Chinese global interests.<sup>52</sup> Zheng frames the necessity of Chinese participation in terms of their absence of international discursive power. "China is now the second largest economy in the world, with an increased economic influence. Yet, the right to speak in international economic affairs has not emerged, let alone the right to speak in world politics."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Zhao, "China's Global Activism, 542-544" and Elsa Kania, "The Right to Speak: Discourse and Chinese Power," last modified November 27, 2018. <https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2018/11/27/The-Right-to-Speak-Discourse-and-Chinese-Power>

<sup>47</sup> Xi, "Jianshe shehui zhuyi wenhua."

<sup>48</sup> Xi Jinping, "Enhance China's Cultural Soft Power," (speech, Beijing, December 30, 2013) in *The Governance of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 179.

<sup>49</sup> Zhao, "China's Global Activism, 549.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 547.

<sup>51</sup> Anny Boc, "The Power of Language: Globalizing the Chinese Dream," *Fudan Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences* 8, no. 4 (2015): 545, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/2443/10.1007/s40647-015-0102-y>;

<sup>52</sup> Zhang, Jianjing, "Zhongguo waijiao jinru huayuquan yishi gaozhang shidai," *South Reviews* 6 (2008): 26.

<sup>53</sup> Zheng, "Zhongguo zai guojishiwushang."

The deficiency of discursive power thus contrasts China's economic strength. Meng and Wang similarly iterate this but offer a more optimistic view of China's prospects. Accompanying China's growing economic resources is also the decline in the West's economic strength, signifying an opportunity for China to participate in global governance and improve international discourse power through the construction of a new IR theory system.<sup>54</sup>

The call to strengthen discursive power is additionally framed according to an issue of inequality between China and the West, compounded by Chinese feelings of misunderstanding by the international community. For Meng and Wang, the discursive hegemony of the West allows it to maintain a leading position in the international system.<sup>55</sup> China thus needs to enhance their discursive power so that they can create their own political models rather than following the established Western order.<sup>56</sup> Focus on discursive power is further shaped by Chinese frustration with the lack of desired results in their initiatives to strengthen their international attractiveness.<sup>57</sup> As Xi emphasizes, China must "grasp international discourse" to effectively spread a "good voice and story of China."<sup>58</sup> Dai names "discourse, narrative and story," as the necessary tools to address this.<sup>59</sup> For the CCP, increasing discourse power allows it to gain control over how its values and ideas are communicated abroad, essential for the increase of its attraction as a dimension of China's comprehensive national power.

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<sup>54</sup> Meng and Wang, "Zai canyu quanqiuzhili zhong."

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>56</sup> Zhao, "China's Global Activism, 562.

<sup>57</sup> See Jan Melissen and Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The Chinese Dream and Successful Communication with the World," Clingendael, last modified April 3, 2014, <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/chinese-dream-and-successful-communication-world>

<sup>58</sup> State Council Information Office of the PRC, "Xi Jinping: jianghao zhongguogushi, chuanbo haozhongguoshengyin," last modified September 4, 2013, <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/10/Document/1345245/1345245.htm>

<sup>59</sup> Dai Muncai, "Cong sixiang he jiazhi guan shang dazao zhongguo huayuquan," last modified March 20, 2015, [http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2015-03/20/m\\_1114710382.htm](http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/2015-03/20/m_1114710382.htm)

## **The Narrative Turn in International Relations**

In the past two decades, IR has undergone a ‘narrative turn,’ with academics and policymakers viewing narrative as a valuable way to understand and explain political phenomena.<sup>60</sup> This turn has accompanied a growing conviction that humans have a natural tendency to think in narrative form and as such, examining how the world is conceptualized through narratives can contribute to understanding how political actors make meaning.<sup>61</sup> Narratives facilitate “meaning making,” by simplifying complex situations into an understandable chain of events to formulate and maintain world views.<sup>62</sup> This worldview is a product of a particular perspective, selected and formed with consideration of specific events, interests and goals over others. Narratives are thus constructions of how to understand the world.<sup>63</sup> Studying narratives can generate insight on an actor’s self-understanding, interests, and ideas about how the world is and should function.<sup>64</sup>

## **Strategic Narratives**

Narratives can be employed during times of change, such as the current international context which is characterized by globalization and an economic power shift from West to East. As a form of persuasive communication, strategic narrative sets off from a starting point of understanding change in the international system by asking: what are the best methods to influence international affairs?<sup>65</sup> In a changing international order with increased voices wishing to exert influence on politics, actors seek different paths to develop their power. Here, communication becomes a key tool. Employing persuasive communication tactics can enhance a nation’s international attractiveness by shaping favorable foreign opinions.

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<sup>60</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, “History, theory, and the narrative turn in IR,” *Review of International Studies* 32 (2006): 703, doi:10.1017/S0260210506007248.

<sup>61</sup> Shaul R. Shenhav, “Political Narratives and Political Reality,” *International Political Science Review* 27, no. 23 (2006): 245.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 246.

<sup>63</sup> Lutgard Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives in Chinese Official Discourse under Xi Jinping,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 23, no.3 (2018): 388, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9529-8>

<sup>64</sup> Andreas Antoniadis, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, *Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives*. Sussex: Center for Global Political Economy, 2010, 6, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/12302/>

<sup>65</sup> Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic narrative: a new means to understand soft power,” *Media, War and Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014): 75, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696>.

To understand the processes of change and influence in IR, attention must be directed to not only material power but also communication and social power.<sup>66</sup> Strategic narratives offer a way to achieve this, especially at a time of change at the international level. “Rational theories are for well-ordered worlds and for leaders set within that world. “Today, however, we have a chaotic world...narratives are even more important for ordering the chaos.”<sup>67</sup> In this context where emerging powers can threaten the status quo, narratives allow actors to articulate interests in a manner that facilitates power transitions whilst avoiding violent struggles with status quo states.<sup>68</sup> Narratives achieve this by forging cooperative behaviors and mitigating tensions, such as between the U.S. and China.<sup>69</sup> As a persuasive tactic, they also conceptually integrate values to unite diverse political perspectives.<sup>70</sup> These accounts all position narratives as a method of strategic communication, a means for states to favorably exert their voice on agendas and policies.<sup>71</sup>

For the purpose of this thesis, strategic narrative is conceptualized as this form of persuasive communication, involving the construction of a specific worldview by state actors for the achievement of political objectives. This world view encapsulates the interests and goals of states, articulating end results and how to get there.<sup>72</sup> It includes a dimension of intentionality, where events and identities are formed to “...give determined meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives.”<sup>73</sup> To achieve objectives, narratives are often formed in temporal terms, establishing “an initial situation or order, a problem that disrupts that order, and a

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<sup>66</sup> Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, *Forging the World*, 3.

<sup>67</sup> Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, “Strategic narrative,” 75.

<sup>68</sup> Antoniadou, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, *Great Power Politics*, 6.

<sup>69</sup> Kevin Rudd, “How Ancient Chinese Thought Applies Today,” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2015), 17, <https://doi.org/10.1111/npqu.11509>.

<sup>70</sup> Jack Synder, “Dueling Security Stories: Wilson and Lodge Talk Strategy,” *Security Studies* 24 (2015): 171. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2015.1003723.

<sup>71</sup> Corinne Squire, “Approaches to Narrative Research,” (London: ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, 2008), 3, <http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/419/1/MethodsReviewPaperNCRM-009.pdf>.

<sup>72</sup> Antoniadou, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, *Great Power Politics*, 6.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

resolution that re-establishes order.”<sup>74</sup> The effects of narratives is power and legitimacy, tied to whichever narrative is successful in giving shared and accepted meaning. Narratives thus involve a political struggle between states over ‘whose story wins’.<sup>75</sup>

This research defines narrative as a constructed, temporal and politically-motivated form of story building by states at the international level. Analyzing CSFM through the framework of narrative allows for a tracing of how China strategically shapes agendas, policy choices, the discursive environment, and the international system for political objectives.<sup>76</sup> It is thus a fitting framework for the objective of decoding CSFM to understand the CCP’s aspirations and beliefs in the global order.

### **Chinese Strategic Narratives**

China’s foreign policy strategies have historically featured strategic narratives. From Mao Ze Dong’s “Five Principles,” to Deng Xiao Ping’s “independent and peaceful foreign policy,” to Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious World,” to Xi’s current “Community of Shared Future,” China has employed strategic narratives as part of an effort to communicate their intentions and values to the world. Policy implementation at all levels in China is shaped with considerations to questions of “How should this be put? What happens if we put it like that? Will putting it like this put people off?”<sup>77</sup> Determining the most appropriate formulations of language is crucial to controlling what is being discussed, and by extension what is being done within Chinese politics.<sup>78</sup> Such attention to the formulation and reception of Chinese ideas can be interpreted as part of CCP’s efforts to increase their global influence through the spreading of values and discourses.

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<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>75</sup> Joseph Nye, “Today, It’s a Question of Whose Story Wins,” LA Times, last modified July 21, 2004, <http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01dca4.html>

<sup>76</sup> Boc, “The Power of Language,” 537.

<sup>77</sup> Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 3.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.,



### **Theoretical Framework**

This chapter provided a contextual overview of CSFM and introduced concepts to understand how CSFM is constructed. To decode CSFM, this thesis employs the theory of global governance failure, which articulates how the current liberal international system is inadequate in addressing issues facing the world today. Global governance failure reflects Chinese thinking about the international system at a time of change and challenges. It further alludes to how CCP leaders conceive of their role and the aspirations for CSFM in this context. Presented by the CCP as a proposal for the management of global challenges, CSFM points to how China is inserting their ideas in global discussions. In light of this, CSFM is further situated in terms of social understandings of power, such as discursive power. As a way for the CCP increase its attractiveness and better communicate Chinese values and ideas, discursive power can be enhanced by developing, popularizing, and harnessing strategic narratives.

## **Chapter 2: Methodology**

To address how the CCP constructs and presents CSFM, this thesis examines CSFM as a strategic narrative. As elaborated further in this chapter<sup>79</sup>, there is an absence of specific categories or procedures to structure narrative analysis on. As such, this thesis formulates its own three-layered approach according to the objective of deconstructing CSFM and contextualizing its underpinning ideas. To achieve this, the tools of content, thematic and narrative analysis are employed to discern CSFM's components, themes/storylines and types of narrative. The end product utilizes results from the content and thematic analysis to re-tell the CSFM narrative at the international system, issue and identity levels.

### **Text Selection and Translation**

As CSFM will be examined as part of the CCP's international strategy, English-language translated speeches are selected for this analysis. Whilst translated documents could reflect the ideas of a translator rather than the CCP, they can be taken as representative of official discourse due to the CCP's exclusive control over publishing.

Communicating narratives of China to the world relies greatly on the translation of 'China's voice.'<sup>80</sup> Thus, translation follows a set of highly regulated and largely secretive procedures. Translators are members of the CCP, or hold senior positions in political and professional institutions.<sup>81</sup> This obliges them to uphold ideologies and pursue politically correct translations.<sup>82</sup> In recent years, translation processes have increasingly accommodated the target readership of an international audience as China plays a greater part in global affairs. Audience reception is crucial, as illustrated by procedures to "cover or dress up elements" not intended for international

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<sup>79</sup> See page 19

<sup>80</sup> Jingjing Li and Saihong Li, "New trends of Chinese political translation in the age of globalisation," *Perspectives* 23 (3): 424. DOI: 10.1080/0907676X.2014.983530

<sup>81</sup> Tanina Zappone, "Translating Xi Jinping's Speeches: China's search for discursive power between political correctness and external propaganda," *Kervan* 22 (2018): 260-261, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.13135/1825-263X/2875>

<sup>82</sup> Li and Li, "Chinese political translation," 426.

readers.<sup>83</sup> Political translation is thus an institutionalized, norm-governed and ideologically-motivated practice,<sup>84</sup> underlining China's preoccupation with how its ideas come across to foreign audiences.

Chinese authorities are similarly involved in the translation process of CSFM. Whilst the original Chinese wording of CSFM [*renlei mingyun gongtong ti*] has remained the same since its inception, foreign audiences have heard the terms Community of Common Destiny, Community of Common Future, Community of Shared Destiny, Community of Shared Interests and Community of Shared Responsibilities. These were most prominently featured in 2013-2016, with leaders shifting to almost exclusively using CSFM from mid-2016 onwards.<sup>85</sup> Speeches mentioning CSFM and related terminologies are exclusively translated by CCP in-house translation services. Official media must also adhere to the latest official translations to "...ensure the uniform formulation of China's worldview through translation."<sup>86</sup> According to Foreign Minister Wang Yi, changes in CSFM terminology were also a result of the natural development of the concept. "Shared interests and shared responsibilities constituted the foundation and due path for building a community of shared future, which is an elevated integration of the community of shared interests and the community of shared responsibilities."<sup>87</sup> Thus, this research codes CSFM and related terms as variations of the same concept.

### **CSFM in Speeches**

CSFM was first introduced in the 18th Party Congress Work Report of November 2012 and was not mentioned in English-language speeches until January 2013. From January 2013-November 2019, CSFM and related concepts<sup>88</sup> were featured in 193 English-language texts in the

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<sup>83</sup> Zappone, "Translating Xi Jinping's Speeches," 266.

<sup>84</sup> Li and Li, "Chinese political translation," 427.

<sup>85</sup> See Appendix 1 for full list of speeches mentioning CSFM and related concepts.

<sup>86</sup> Zappone, "Translating Xi Jinping's Speeches," 248.

<sup>87</sup> Wang Yi, "Work Together to Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind," (speech, March 31 2016), [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/zyjh\\_665391/t1369269.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1369269.shtml)

<sup>88</sup> See Appendix 1.

‘Speeches’ sections of the website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>89</sup> and the English version of the Chinese State Council website.<sup>90</sup> Texts were selected from these outlets due to their focus on foreign policy developments. Other ministries did not have this emphasis or English-language versions of websites. All texts mention CSFM or related concepts at least once within the title or body of the speech.

The volume of CSFM mentions highlights its importance in the CCP’s international communication strategy. CSFM’s promotion at hundreds of international events with varying audiences points to its centrality in the Chinese communication strategy. However, many speeches include CSFM only once in the context of broader topics and events, making them less suitable for this research objective of providing in-depth account of CSFM’s construction. Thus, only speeches that include CSFM at least five times were considered for the final analysis. A total of twenty-three speeches met this criteria,<sup>91</sup> still a large number considering the time and word constraints of this thesis. As such, one speech each year from 2014-2019<sup>92</sup> was selected, on the basis of highest frequency of CSFM mentions. The decision to select texts based on years was to account for any developments that could impact how often and in what ways CSFM is presented.

With the goal of analyzing a total of twelve texts, six more speeches were chosen according to target audience. To have a range of speeches targeting various audiences is important, as messages could be presented differently depending on the audience. The final selected speeches were delivered at academic, region-specific, human rights, security and development forums. Others were made after Party Congresses, or at the UN Office in Geneva. All speeches were

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<sup>89</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Speeches,” accessed November 1, 2019.

[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/wjbz\\_663308/2461\\_663310/](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/)

<sup>90</sup> The State Council of the PRC, “Speeches,” accessed November 1, 2019.

<http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/>

<sup>91</sup> See highlighted items in Appendix I.

<sup>92</sup> Although CSFM was mentioned in 2013, there were no speeches that year which mentioned CSFM or related concepts five or more times.

delivered by Xi or high-ranking leaders such as Wang Yi,<sup>93</sup> Yang Jiechi,<sup>94</sup> Zheng Zeguang, Li Baodong or Liu Zhenmin.<sup>95</sup> Further details about the selected speeches can be found in Appendix 2.

### **Analyzing Narratives**

To discern how the narrative of CSFM is constructed, this research employs a narrative approach. This interprets stories which are told within the context of research, and focuses on elements such as “how the story is structured, what functions the story serves, what is the substance of the story, and how the story is performed.”<sup>96</sup> By concentrating on these aspects, a narrative approach addresses the composition of CSFM as a strategic narrative.

Unlike other qualitative frameworks, narrative research does not set definitive starting or finishing points. No self-evident categories exist on which to structure narrative analysis on.<sup>97</sup> There is an absence of overall rules about suitable materials, methods of analysis, or the best level at which to study stories. For example, narrative frameworks do not outline whether to focus on stories’ particularity or generality; or what epistemological significance to attach to narratives.<sup>98</sup>

As such, this research adopts its own approach based on the conception of narrative as a constructed, temporal and politically-motivated form of story building. The choice of methodology is further guided by “...the question being asked and the tradition the researcher feels most comfortable within... entail [ing] the use of different methods.”<sup>99</sup> For this thesis,

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<sup>93</sup> Wang Yi is the Foreign Minister and a member of the 13th State Council, the executive organ of the CCP.

<sup>94</sup> Yang Jiechi was a member of the 12th State Council, and is currently a member of the Politburo and the Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission

<sup>95</sup> Zheng Zeguang, Li Baodong and Liu Zhenmin are Vice Foreign Ministers.


<sup>96</sup> Erin Sahlstein Parcell and Benjamin Baker, “Narrative Analysis,” in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods*, (Thousand Oaks, SAGE, 2018), 1070.

<sup>97</sup> Squire, “Approaches to Narrative Research,” 4

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>99</sup> Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, *Forging the World*, 24.

CSFM is examined through three layers of analysis, each of which employs different tools of content, thematic and narrative analysis. The layers of analysis build upon each other and decode different dimensions of narrative to discern how CSFM is built and presented. Chronologically, this process begins with identifying the components of a narrative, the themes/storylines of narrative, and finally, the types of strategic narratives. Each layer's details, function and tools are outlined below and expanded upon in the subsequent sections.



### Types of Strategic Narratives

Narrative analysis involves the reconstruction of the composition of the narrative.<sup>100</sup> As this thesis seeks to address how CSFM is presented, the end goal is to identify and explain the types of strategic narrative that CSFM constitutes as. To retell the CSFM narrative with reference to the beliefs which underpin it, the meaning of CSFM will be examined at three levels: international system, identity and issue.<sup>101</sup> Narratives at these levels are inextricably linked, and can be interpreted as interconnected layers of meaning.<sup>102</sup> When employed at one level, they may affect narratives at other levels, influencing, future policy choices and behavior.<sup>103</sup> An actor who is able to align system, policy, and identity narratives also has a greater chance of influence.<sup>104</sup> It is thus essential to explore CSFM at all three levels. The table below describes the types of strategic narrative.

### Types of Strategic Narratives<sup>105</sup>

<b>International System</b>	<b>Identity</b>	<b>Issue</b>
How the world is structured, who the players are, and how the system works.  E.g. The Cold War	The story of who a political actor is, and what values/goals it has.  E.g. The U.S. as a Champion of Democracy	Sets political actions in a context, with an explanation of who the important actors are, what the conflict or issue is, and how a course of action will resolve the issue.

Interpreting CSFM in this manner takes narratives as layers of meaning and brings them into useful dialogue with each other.<sup>106</sup> This "...provides a more precise grasp of how communication, persuasion and influence operate in international affairs."<sup>107</sup> It functions as a focused lens to

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<sup>100</sup> Kimberly A. Neuendorf. *Content Analysis: Guidebook*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002), 5.

<sup>101</sup> Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, *Forging the World*, 7.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>103</sup> See Roselle, Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, "Strategic narrative," 77 for an example.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>105</sup> Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, *Forging the World*, 7.

<sup>106</sup> Squire, "Narrative Research," 5.

<sup>107</sup> Roselle, Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, "Strategic narrative," 77.

discern how China understands the international system, its role within the system, and the global issues at hand. This typology provides a structured way to situate identified themes and storylines from the middle layer of the methodology which is focused on content analysis. Thus, the types of narrative framework directs this research explicitly towards the specific visions, beliefs and motivations which underpin CSFM, allowing for a comprehensive deconstruction of the concept.

This layer of analysis is positioned last in the research process, as it incorporates and elaborates upon the descriptive layer (components of narrative), and analytical layer (themes/storylines of narrative), to achieve a final construction of CSFM. The end product is a narrative analysis which examines the structure, function, substance and delivery of the story. It will be framed around the international system, identity and issue levels and re-tells the CSFM narrative with the use of excerpts from CCP speeches.

### **Components of Narrative**

In order to reconstruct the CSFM as a narrative at the international system, identity and issue levels, this research firstly sets out to identify and describe CSFM as a narrative. As outlined by Miskimmon et al, there are five components of narrative: character or actors (agent), setting/environment/space (scene), conflict or action (act), tools/behavior (agency) and resolution/or suggested resolution/goal (purpose).<sup>108</sup> This criteria qualifies CSFM as a narrative, confirming the suitability of the narrative approach and strategic narrative as an analytical framework. Identifying components of narrative also explicitly sets out the who, when and where, what, how and why elements, which contextualize actions and motives for China's CSFM narrative.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>109</sup> Carolijn Van Noort, "Study of Strategic Narratives: The Case of BRICS," *Politics and Governance* 5, no. 3 (2017): 123, <http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.961>



To gather these components, descriptive coding was conducted on the 19th Party Congress Work Report from 2017. Convened every five years, Party Congresses reviews the work of the CCP and outline priorities for the next five years. Work reports set forth guidelines of the highest authority and are the most authoritative public recitation of CCP policy.<sup>110</sup> In the table below, excerpts about CSFM are referenced in relation to the components of a narrative.

<b>Components of Narrative as presented in the 19th Party Congress Work Report</b>	<b>Community of Shared Future for Mankind</b>
Agent (character or actors)	“The Communist Party of China.” <sup>111</sup>
Scene (setting)	“Changes in the global governance system and the international order...” <sup>112</sup> “The world... [that faces] growing uncertainties and destabilizing factors,” <sup>113</sup>
Act (conflict or action)	“As human beings we have many common challenges to face.” <sup>114</sup> “Gap between rich and poor...unconventional security threats...major infectious diseases, and climate change...” <sup>115</sup>
Agency (tools/behavior)	“The Belt and Road Initiative” <sup>116</sup>
Purpose (resolution or goal)	“Safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order” <sup>117</sup>  “Rise in China’s international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape.” <sup>118</sup>  “The Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order,” <sup>119</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Alice Miller, “How to Read Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Political Report,” accessed November 26, 2019, <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm53am.pdf>

<sup>111</sup> Xi, “*Secure a Decisive Victory*,” 50.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 51

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 52

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 21.

The purpose of this descriptive coding is to describe CSFM as a narrative and provide some contextual background. It is not meant to serve as a complete account of the components of the CSFM narrative, but rather as a summary of the agent, scene, act, agency and purpose. This thesis recognizes that certain components such as agency and agent are not fully represented due to research scope restraints. Nevertheless, the aspects outlined sets a clear, albeit brief, picture of the CSFM narrative. It functions as a starting point for a more elaborate and in-depth thematic and content analysis.

### **Narrative Themes and Storylines**

To identify how CSFM is constructed, this methodology focuses around narrative themes/storylines with the tools of thematic and content analysis. Thematic analysis identifies, analyses and reports patterns, or themes, in a minimally organized manner that describes data in rich detail.<sup>120</sup> It is “not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures, but rather on whether it captures something important in relation to the overall research question.”<sup>121</sup> It is further “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytical interest ... [and] tends to provide less a rich description of the data overall, and a more detailed analysis of some aspect of the data.”<sup>122</sup>

Considering the time, word and scope limitations of this thesis, such a methodology is best suited to understand a smaller number of texts in greater detail, rather than a larger number of texts with less detail. This is also due to how state-level communication efforts are reflective of an effort to stay “on message,” and as such, speeches are commonly a re-iteration of a focused and repeated “message.”<sup>123</sup> Repetition provides legitimacy to messages, crucial for public acceptance. Messages must be consistent with already existing ideas and narratives so that audiences have a

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<sup>120</sup> Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using thematic analysis in psychology,” *Qualitative Research In Psychology* 3, no. 2 (2006): 79, <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>123</sup> Skonieczny, “Narrative Analysis,” 9.

sense of plausibility.<sup>124</sup> As part of an overarching communication strategy of the CCP, CSFM and its themes are likely to appear across many speeches in order to construct a consistent narrative. This thesis will identify the most relevant themes in accordance with the research objective of unpacking CSFM's meaning.

Amongst the forms of narrative analysis, thematic analysis is employed due to the focus it has on motifs within narratives and the types of stories told.<sup>125</sup> Such an approach is fitting to identify the recurring ideas which underpin CSFM and reflect the CCP's strategic priorities. In light of this objective, the thematic method in this research is defined as one that "unpicks or unravels the surface of reality."<sup>126</sup> As defined earlier, narratives can be understood as a specific worldview or reality. They are constructed and maintained by discourses, which shape how communities choose to engage and understand politics in specific ways over others.<sup>127</sup> As this research is part of a constructivist research agenda to highlight the role of ideational factors in IR, a thematic approach is suitable to explore how the CCP injects their discourses into global discussions.

This layer of analysis draws inspiration from Skonieczny by organizing themes according to storylines. Themes signal larger storylines that comprise of an overall narrative strategy.<sup>128</sup> Storylines are often explicitly referenced to by political leaders and invoke specific understandings.<sup>129</sup> They create and maintain discursive order by allowing actors to draw upon discursive categories, such as themes, to give meaning to phenomena. Storylines "...suggest unity in...[the face of] a problem... play [ing] a key role in the positioning of subjects and structures. Political change may therefore well take place through the emergence of new storylines that reorder understandings. Finding the appropriate storyline becomes an important form of

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<sup>124</sup> Skonieczny, "Trading with the enemy: narrative, identity and US trade politics," *Review of International Political Economy* 25, no. 4 (2018): 445, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2018.1448879.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>126</sup> Braun and Clarke, "Using thematic analysis," 81.

<sup>127</sup> Florian Schneider, "Getting the Hang of Discourse Theory," last modified May 6, 2013.

<http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/getting-the-hang-of-discourse-theory/>

<sup>128</sup> Skonieczny, "Trading with the enemy," 447.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 446.

agency.”<sup>130</sup> Examining the CCP’s storylines can thereby generate insight on how China understands the political world and their role within it.

To identify CSFMs themes and storylines, this process followed Neuendorf’s proposal to code categories based on theory and previous studies.<sup>131</sup> Themes and storylines were identified by referencing relevant theories and previous literature from the first chapter, such as global governance failure. This step was further guided by Braun and Clarke’s definition of what constitutes as a theme, which “captures something important about the data in relation to the research question.”<sup>132</sup> With the research question in mind, themes were further drawn up if they touched upon CCP beliefs or visions about global governance, the international system, and their role within it.

This research proceeded to follow Neuendorf’s suggestion to screen examples of content for analysis.<sup>133</sup> Two speeches with CSFM mentioned at least five times were randomly selected. From the reading of these two texts, additional and enhanced thematic categories and storylines were included into the table below. This process will be repeated during the content analysis, thus constituting an evolutionary coding approach as “...categories evolve from theoretical considerations into a full-fledged operational list based on empirical data.”<sup>134</sup>

The following table outlines six storylines of the CSFM narrative, along with respective themes. Each theme signals a specific storyline, with the exception of “world must unite to face an uncertain future,” “Chinese partnerships rather than U.S.-style alliances,” and “Chinese participation in multilateral platforms,” which have necessary overlap across two storylines. The

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<sup>130</sup> Maarten Hajer, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995,) 56.

<sup>131</sup> Neuendorf, *Content Analysis*, 50.

<sup>132</sup> Braune and Clarke, “Using thematic analysis,” 82.

<sup>133</sup> Neuendorf, *Content Analysis*, 50.

<sup>134</sup> Florian Schneider, “How to Do a Discourse Analysis,” last modified May 13, 2013, <http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/>

theme of an uncertain future calls for international cooperation within a broader storyline of liberal global governance failure. It further contextualizes the storyline in which China champions for multilateralism as the appropriate course of action at a time of global governance failure. The theme of Chinese participation in multilateral platforms similarly overlaps between two storylines, signaling how China is increasingly active in the international system, and how it champions for multilateralism. Proposed as a Chinese alternative to longstanding U.S.-led alliances, the theme of partnerships also belongs to both the Chinese victimization/anti-West storyline, and the Chinese wisdoms/solutions storyline.

### Themes and Storylines of CSFM Narrative

<b>Liberal global governance is failing</b>	<b>Shared fate of the World</b>	<b>Chinese wisdom and solutions can solve global governance issues</b>	<b>Chinese Victimization/ Anti-West</b>	<b>Increasing Chinese presence and power in the international system</b>	<b>China as a champion of multilateralism</b>
World faces unprecedented challenges	Benefits and interests of all countries are shared and intertwined	China's phenomenal progress and development	Unfounded and unfair critiques of China	China is reshaping global norms and values to its favor	Criticisms of unilateralism/bilateralism
Changes at the international level	Shared dream between China and other countries	China contributes to mankind by preserving peace or development	China is a fair, just and responsible power	Increased Chinese voice in international issues	Multi-polarization is the trend of the times
World must unite to face an uncertain future	Shared struggles and interests between China and developing countries	Chinese perspectives and proposals are needed	The West should not intervene in internal affairs of other countries	Increased Chinese soft power	World must unite to face an uncertain future
Criticisms of Cold War mentalities, zero-sum thinking	Shared struggles and interests between China and Asian countries	China wants to improve, not overturn the international system	Chinese partnerships rather than U.S. alliances	China's phenomenal progress and development	The UN at the core of the international system

Global governance reform is needed or desired	Positive China-U.S. relations benefit everyone	Chinese traditions of peace and harmony		Chinese participation in multilateral platforms	Chinese participation in multilateral platforms
Reform must be inclusive	Common interests between China and Europe	CSFM is warmly received by the international community			Multilateralism promotes peace and development
		New type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation			China wants to improve, not overturn the international system
		Chinese partnerships rather than U.S. alliances			China as a defender of developing countries
		Peaceful coexistence			

With these established themes and storylines from the thematic analysis, a content analysis will be conducted on speeches with the aid of the computer software Quirkos. Formatted and designed for themes or nodes of analysis, Quirkos sorts and presents qualitative data in an organized manner. It will assist in counting how many times each theme appears across texts. Although each theme does not have to be described in speeches exactly as outlined in the table above, the emphasized idea of the sentence/phrase should include one or more elements of the corresponding theme. To discern if a sentence/phrase corresponds to a theme, the preceding and following sentences will be considered for contextual purposes.<sup>135</sup> The final results of the content analysis outlines how many times each theme is presented, signaling how present certain storylines are in the CSFM narrative.

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<sup>135</sup> For further description, justification and examples of coding, see appendix 3.

### Chapter 3: Findings and Analysis


As the content analysis was designed and implemented to only count how many times each theme and storyline appeared, the corresponding data is presented in a purely quantitative manner. It provides an overview of how often certain themes were drawn upon to indicate different storylines in the CSFM narrative. To further account for the significance of these results in terms of CSFM socialization, the forthcoming section qualitatively situates these storylines and themes according to types of strategic narratives. It synthesizes the prevalent themes and storylines from the content analysis to account for how the CCP prescribes meaning to CSFM at the international system, identity and issue levels.

#### **Presence of Storylines and Themes**

Results from the content analysis outline that all six of the storylines and their respective themes were present in all speeches about CSFM. The storylines, themes and their occurrences are outlined in the table and graphs below, accompanied by qualitative analysis in the forthcoming section.

#### **Presence of Storylines in CSFM Narrative**

Storyline	Number of Appearances	% of Total Storylines
Chinese wisdom and solutions can solve global governance issues	193	31%
Liberal global governance is failing	130	21%
China as a champion of multilateralism	98	15.5%
Shared fate of the world	98	15.5%
Chinese victimization/anti-West	63	10%
Increasing Chinese presence and power in the international system	46	7%



**Chinese Wisdom and Solutions can Solve Global Governance Issues Storyline**

Theme	No. of Appearances
China contributes to mankind by preserving peace or development	73
New type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation	21
Chinese partnerships rather than U.S. alliances	20
Chinese perspectives and proposals are needed	18
Chinese traditions of peace and harmony	17
China wants to improve, not overturn the international system	15
Peaceful Coexistence	13
CSFM is warmly received by the international community	9
China’s phenomenal progress and development	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b>



### Liberal Global Governance is Failing Storyline

Theme	No. of Appearances
World faces unprecedented challenges	35
Changes at the international level	27
Criticisms of Cold War mentalities and zero-sum thinking	26
World must unite to face an uncertain future	15
Global governance reform needs to be inclusive	15
Global governance reform is needed or desired	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>

### China as a Champion of Multilateralism Storyline

Theme	No. of Appearances
The UN at the core of the international system	20
China as a defender of developing countries	17
China wants to improve, not overturn the international system	15
The world must unite to face an uncertain future	15
Criticisms of unilateralism/bilateralism	10
Chinese participation in multilateral platforms	9
Multilateralism promotes peace/development	7
Multi-polarization is the trend of the times	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>98</b>

### Shared Fate Storyline

Theme	No. of Appearances
Benefits and interests of all countries are common and intertwined	30
Shared struggles and interests between China and Asian countries	26
Shared struggles and interests between China and developing countries	24
Shared dream between China and other countries	9
Positive China-U.S. relations benefit everyone	6
Common interests between China and Europe	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>98</b>

### China Victimization/Anti-West Storyline

Theme	No. of Appearances
China is a fair, just and responsible power	21
Chinese partnerships rather than U.S. alliances	20
The West should not intervene in internal affairs of other countries	16
Unfounded and unfair critiques of china	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>63</b>

### China's International Presence and Power Storyline

Theme	No. of Appearances
Increased Chinese voice in international issues	15
Chinese participation in multilateral platforms	13
China is reshaping global norms and values to its favor	9
China's phenomenal progress/development	7

Increased Chinese soft power	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>

### **CSFM Strategic Narratives**

In speeches, Chinese leaders employed the above storylines and themes to put forth an international system narrative of global interdependence, an issue narrative of global governance failure, and an identity narrative of China as a responsible world leader. These narratives had overlaps, with stories and themes often drawing upon each other. In the following section, each narrative will be deconstructed with the usage of quotes from speeches and a focus on the ontological attributes of narratives. This approach discerns each narrative's different layers of meaning and brings them into dialogue with each other.<sup>136</sup>

### **International System Narrative of Global Interdependence**

CSFM is presented as an international system narrative of global interdependence, where the core theme of changes at the international level is emphasized and linked to the storyline of a shared fate of the world. The CCP identifies “changes unseen in a century”<sup>137</sup> as the “shifting balance of power,”<sup>138</sup> and “multi polarization and economic globalization.”<sup>139</sup> In the face of this “changing international and regional landscape,”<sup>140</sup> the “interests of countries have never been so closely interconnected.”<sup>141</sup>

Global interdependence is framed as an inescapable outcome of monumental changes at the international level. This pattern of change is established in the opening paragraphs of almost all speeches by various CCP leaders.<sup>142</sup> As the interests of participants in the international system become intertwined, their future is one and the same. “All countries belong to one big family as

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<sup>136</sup> Squire, “Narrative Research,” 5.

<sup>137</sup> Yang 24-6-19

<sup>138</sup> Wang 10-12-17

<sup>139</sup> Xi 28-3-15

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>141</sup> Liu-21-11-14

<sup>142</sup> See Wang 6-25-19, Yang 14-7-18, Wang 10-12-17, Li 10-12-17, Wang 1-9-17, Xi 18-1-17, Xi 28-3-15.

they live on the same planet they call home, with their dreams and futures closely linked.”<sup>143</sup> To signal the shared fate storyline, officials often refer to the theme of a shared dream. This underscores that not only is the world’s fate intertwined, but that all people are united in their aspirations for the international system. By interlinking the fate and hopes of all, the CCP establishes a sense of interdependence between countries of the world.

To further emphasize a shared fate, Chinese leaders employ specific themes to target different audiences. For Asian and developing countries, China focuses on shared historical struggles and developmental interests. China and Africa have “similar sufferings and struggle in our histories and are faced with the same tasks of development.”<sup>144</sup> “Asian countries [after the Cold War] were finally able to focus on development and on exploring a path suited to their national conditions.”<sup>145</sup> To establish a shared fate with the U.S. and Europe, CCP leaders tweak their approach by referencing common and contemporary economic interests rather than shared historical struggles. The “economic relationship between China and the United States is, in essence, mutually beneficial, delivering many tangible benefits to people of both countries.”<sup>146</sup> “China and Europe have continued to make fresh headway in the development of the partnership for peace, growth, reform...”<sup>147</sup> Here, leaders employ a multi-pronged approach that considers the nature of bilateral relations and historical contexts to ensure that the narrative of global interdependence speaks to all participants in the international system.

After employing the themes of shared dreams and interests against a backdrop of global change, the CCP establishes a sense of uncertainty for the international system which equally affects all parties. “People long for a bright future but are bewildered about what will come. What has

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<sup>143</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>144</sup> Wang 25-6-19

<sup>145</sup> Liu 21-11-14

<sup>146</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>147</sup> Wang 10-12-17

happened to the world and how should we respond?”<sup>148</sup> The looming image of an unknown future creates fear and urgency to adequately address destabilizing factors in the international system.

In a system of global interdependence, which “has become more unstable, uncertain and unpredictable,”<sup>149</sup> the CCP emphasizes that Cold War mentalities and zero-sum thinking must be abandoned. Such attitudes are inefficient and in conflict with processes of integration that characterize the current order. “One must not cling to the Cold War mentality or zero-sum thinking since the times have changed. We must keep pace with the trends in the 21st century...”<sup>150</sup> The call to replace zero-sum thinking is prescribed with a high degree of urgency when officials touch upon conceptualizations of how the international system is vs how it ought to be. These notions draw upon history, juxtaposing the outdated and inefficient remnants of Cold War thinking with the present and future of global interdependence. “Old security concepts based on the Cold War mentality, zero-sum game and worship of force are being overtaken by new trends of regional economic integration.”<sup>151</sup> Here, Chinese representatives point to how diplomatic practices from the Cold War stand at odds with the progression of mankind in an era of global interdependence.

Whilst speeches do not specify which actors are guilty of operating under Cold War mentalities, Beijing alludes to the U.S. as such an actor. Chinese diplomats have previously issued warnings to their American counterparts at times of heightened bilateral tensions, explicitly criticizing them for engaging in zero-sum thinking.<sup>152</sup> Beijing’s narrative of global interdependence further imagines a system where “all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>149</sup> Yang 14-7-18

<sup>150</sup> Wang 1-9-17

<sup>151</sup> Liu 21-11-14

<sup>152</sup> Xinhua, “China urges U.S. to discard Cold-war mentality, zero-sum game mindset,” last modified September 16, 2019, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/16/c\\_138396255.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/16/c_138396255.htm) and BBC, “China condemns US Cold War mentality on national security,” last modified December 19, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42409148>

members of the international community.”<sup>153</sup> Again alluding to the U.S., often regarded as the dominant power and leader of the current liberal international system, the CCP asserts that “no country has the right to monopolize international and regional security affairs.”<sup>154</sup> Within the Chinese proposed system of global interdependence, equality, mutual trust and justice are core values which are described as achievable only through the rejection of “the outdated Cold-War mentality and zero-sum mindset.”<sup>155</sup>

Other characteristics of the Cold War period such as U.S.-style alliances are similarly criticized in the international system narrative. Alliances were U.S.-led features of the bipolar Cold War system and remain a “central pillar of the liberal international system.”<sup>156</sup> Beijing opposes such alliances, labeling them as “outdated,”<sup>157</sup> and advocating for the alternative of partnerships which “spring naturally from China’s independent foreign policy of peace...transcend the Cold War mentality of either with us or against us that created confrontation between opposing alliances, and present the world with a new modality for developing state-to-state relations.”<sup>158</sup> Partnerships, a hallmark of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, are noted to be more conducive to progress and collaboration in a globalized world.<sup>159</sup> They are more preferable for the CCP as they are not bounded by treaty obligations and allow for cooperation with partners despite differences in ideologies.<sup>160</sup> By contrasting partnerships with the inefficient alliance system, CCP officials put forth a vision of the global order in which the U.S. system of treaty alliances is absent.<sup>161</sup> The international system narrative thus excludes long-standing features associated and put forth by the West, advocating for a system which instead features Chinese proposals.

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<sup>153</sup> Yang 14-7-18

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>156</sup> CSIS, “Alliances and American Leadership Project,” accessed December 19, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/programs/alliances-and-american-leadership-project>

<sup>157</sup> Wang 31-5-16

<sup>158</sup> Wang 1-9-17

<sup>159</sup> Wang Yi, “Work Together to Build Partnerships and Pursue Peace and Development,” (speech, Beijing, March 20, 2017), FMPRC, [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/wjbz\\_663308/2461\\_663310/t1448155.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1448155.shtml)

<sup>160</sup> Tobin, “Xi’s Vision,” 157.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.,

In the context of global interdependence, the CCP highlights themes of changes, shared fates and dreams, uncertain futures and the need to abandon old Cold-War mentalities. These notions suggest the need for new global governance ideas, as a “new era calls for a new mentality.”<sup>162</sup> “Human society has once again come to a crossroads of history. Should one opt for openness or isolation, cooperation or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum game? These are the questions we are all thinking hard about. The choice made by major countries will significantly impact the future of our world and the entire mankind.”<sup>163</sup> The international system narrative thus functions to set the context in which new ideas and solutions are required during a time of global interdependence.

### **Issue Narrative of Global Governance Failure**

Drawing on the narrative of global interdependence in which the world is characterized by change and uncertainties, the CCP establishes an issue narrative of global governance failure. Whilst the international system narrative alludes to problems in the global order, the issue narrative explicitly labels the issue as the failure of liberal global governance to address changes and challenges in a system of global interdependence. There thus needs to be immediate “solutions,”<sup>164</sup> “reforms,”<sup>165</sup> and “conclusions and answers.”<sup>166</sup> The narrative of global governance failure is constructed through its own storyline, along with major themes of unprecedented challenges, the desire for international system reform and a more inclusive reform. It further employs the storyline of Chinese wisdom and solutions, drawing upon the notion that Chinese ideas such as CSFM, a new type of IR and peaceful coexistence<sup>167</sup> are needed to solve global governance failure.

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<sup>162</sup> Wang 31-5-16

<sup>163</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>164</sup> Wang 10-12-17

<sup>165</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>166</sup> Wang 1-9-17

<sup>167</sup> See Appendix 3 for details about these Chinese concepts.

The leadership devotes time in each speech to highlight the unprecedented challenges that the world faces, which attests to the inability of the current system to address these issues. Against the backdrop of globalization and a consequent shared fate, there are challenges such as “uncertainties in the economic climate...non-traditional security threats and global challenges including terrorism, cyber security, energy security, food security, climate change, and major infectious diseases.”<sup>168</sup> By highlighting the severity of these issues, the CCP establishes a sense of necessity and urgency to reform global governance in order to “safeguard world peace.”<sup>169</sup>

The narrative of global governance failure is constructed through themes of desired reform and inclusive reform. Echoing the longing of many for reform of the international system to be more inclusive, the CCP establishes that improvements must be made due to limitations of the current system. Against the backdrop of global interdependence, “countries are eagerly looking for solutions to such questions as how to uphold the post-war international order.”<sup>170</sup> These questions are framed in terms of the unprecedented challenges that have been left unresolved and equally impact members of the international community. Thus, “the goal to achieve peace and development is far from being met. We need to respond to the people’s call...”<sup>171</sup>

The demand for global governance reform is projected in terms of the fundamental inequality which exists in international relations, illustrated by the lack of “representation and say of developing countries.”<sup>172</sup> Thus, “reforms to make the global governance system more just and equitable,”<sup>173</sup> and “in a way that serves the interest of developing countries,”<sup>174</sup> are required. In this instance, China presents itself as a defender of developing countries and emerging economies. “China maintains that global affairs should be run together by countries in the world,

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<sup>168</sup> Xi 28-3-15

<sup>169</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>170</sup> Wang 31-5-16

<sup>171</sup> Xi 18-1-17

<sup>172</sup> Yang 14-7-18

<sup>173</sup> Yang 24-6-19

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.,



and that all people, irrespective of their nationality, social stratum, and walk of life, should be able to benefit from global governance.”<sup>175</sup>

A lack of equal representation in IR is presented as a symptom and outcome of the failure of global governance. Global governance failure derives from ideational limitations, where current ideas underpinning governance such as monism and dualism lag behind reality. <sup>176</sup> The reality in the Chinese perspective is one of multipolarity and global interdependence and thus, the CCP constantly advocates that “all countries have an equal voice in decision making, constituting an important force for improving global governance.”<sup>177</sup> With changes at the international level such as “the collective rise of developing countries,” the CCP establishes a dichotomy between the shared fate of the world, and the “dominance by just one or several countries” <sup>178</sup> in IR. With the absence of voices from developing countries and emerging economies, there is an imperative to reform the system that has failed to address global challenges.

Against this backdrop, Chinese leaders view that their role is to “play an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system,”<sup>179</sup> to address the “dual deficits in development and governance and the dual challenges of anemic global growth and lack of drive in global cooperation.”<sup>180</sup> Their ability to do so is framed in terms of the value of Chinese proposals and ideas. CCP leaders explicitly reference that Chinese initiatives such as CSFM, a new type of IR featuring win-win cooperation, and peaceful coexistence “have become international consensus... [and] have been translated into global actions. These propositions have further enriched the core values of China’s foreign policy and received wide recognition from the international community, particularly developing countries.”<sup>181</sup> Here, Chinese ideas are presented

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<sup>175</sup> Yang 14-7-18

<sup>176</sup> Qin, “Global Governance Failure,” 98.

<sup>177</sup> Xi 18-1-17

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>179</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>180</sup> Wang 31-5-16

<sup>181</sup> Wang 1-09-17

as needed due to their ability to address the ideational and representative limitations of the current system.

Along with the global implementation of Chinese initiatives, Beijing additionally imagines a multilateral system featuring Chinese participation as the most appropriate course of action to reform global governance. Multilateralism is conceptualized as the coordination of policies between three or more states for the purpose of certain principles and burden-sharing.<sup>182</sup> It is often characterized as a post-Cold War phenomenon, an embodiment of world multipolarization, globalization and internationalization of challenges.<sup>183</sup> Specifically, a multilateral system centered around the United Nations is identified by scholars as one way to address the lack of representation in IR, allowing for an order that is not determined by might but by a set of rules that apply to all.<sup>184</sup> Indeed, CCP iterates that “we must never allow the law of the jungle to rule the world, nor should we accept the zero-sum game that puts the weak at the mercy of the strong.”<sup>185</sup> Such repeated statements reflect perceptions that the rules of the current system have been skewed against poorer countries.<sup>186</sup> With reference to the desires for inclusive reform, China explicitly interlinks the “need to unequivocally uphold the UN Charter,” with the safeguarding of “the common interests of all developing countries and emerging economies, and, for that matter, international fairness and justice.”<sup>187</sup>

Positioning itself as a champion for inclusive growth and peace, China asserts that multilateralism is the answer to the “important question of where human society should go.”<sup>188</sup> This is especially crucial as “rising unilateralism and protectionism,”<sup>189</sup> is incompatible with the

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<sup>182</sup> Niu Zhongjun, *Multilateralism and China-UN Relations* (Singapore: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), 6.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>184</sup> Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “The Retreat of Multilateralism: What Should Africa Do?” last modified October 7, 2019, <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/retreat-multilateralism-what-should-africa-do-24092>

<sup>185</sup> Wang 6-25-19

<sup>186</sup> Sidiropoulos, “Retreat of Multilateralism.”

<sup>187</sup> Wang 6-25-19

<sup>188</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>189</sup> Wang 25-6-19

current system of global interdependence. Multilateralism is thus situated as the way to promote peace and development and further discussed in terms with another theme of multipolarization. As the current trend of the times due to a “shifting balance of power,”<sup>190</sup> multipolarity increases voices in IR, serving to check the unilateral impulses of the U.S. and generate more stability than a current order which is dominated by a single American superpower.<sup>191</sup> Alluding to this, Xi asserts that “big countries should treat smaller ones as equals instead of acting as a hegemon imposing their will on others.”<sup>192</sup> Multilateralism thus facilitates the necessary cooperation in a system of interdependence that lacks equal representation and faces challenges due to global governance failure.

Beijing presents itself as a champion for multilateralism by drawing attention to its participation in multilateral platforms such as “multilateral human rights committees,”<sup>193</sup> “the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and such multilateral financial institutions as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.”<sup>194</sup> The AIIB, with China’s 30% stake, is regarded as an alternative to Western-led multilateral financial institutions, illustrating Chinese leadership in the reform and development of the multilateral system.<sup>195</sup> Such contributions are underscored as part of Chinese efforts to “promote reforms to make the global governance system more just and equitable.”<sup>196</sup> In light of global interdependence and the rise of developing countries, Chinese contributions in this area provide developing countries with increased channels to address themes that they feel existing institutions are not tackling or that through their creation gives them an increased voice.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Wang 10-12-17

<sup>191</sup> Li, Mingjiang, *China Joins Global Governance Cooperation and Contentions* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 38.

<sup>192</sup> Xi 19-1-18

<sup>193</sup> Li 10-12-17

<sup>194</sup> Xi 28-3-15

<sup>195</sup> Nicholas Rosellini, “Multilateralism and the Chinese Dream,” last modified April 19, 2017, <https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2017/04/19/multilateralism-and-the-chinese-dream.html>

<sup>196</sup> Yang 24-6-19

<sup>197</sup> Sidiropoulos, “Retreat of Multilateralism.”

China strategically communicates a narrative of global governance failure by highlighting the serious challenges that the international community jointly faces. The themes of desired reform and inclusive reform refer to the failures of the current system to address challenges and changes at the international level. In this system, the ideational foundations of zero-sum thinking and unilateralism stand at discord with the current context of global interdependence. Along with ideational limitations, the CCP references the core issue of unequal representation in IR which reflects the inadequacies of the current system and drives desires for reform. Within this context, China notes the suitability of its ideas such as CSFM, new type of IR and peaceful coexistence in addressing the failures of liberal global governance. In a similar vein, China also champions for multilateralism to make IR more equitable and prevent the dominance of the system by one or several countries, such as the U.S.

### **Identity Narrative of China as a Responsible and Capable Leader**

After strategically communicating a system narrative and issue narrative, Chinese officials put forth a narrative which conveys who China is and what its values are. The identity narrative establishes China as a responsible and capable world leader by highlighting the nation's contributions to peace and development of mankind, contextualizing such contributions in terms of China's increasing international power and presence. The CCP further employs themes that emphasize the value of their proposals for the international system, achieved by stressing their domestic developmental success and their philosophical traditions of peace and harmony. China additionally presents itself as a fair and just actor in IR, countering anti-Chinese narratives which misrepresent China as a hegemonic power. The identity narrative thus provides an elaborate account of how the leadership conceptualizes its identity and role in a system of global interdependence and governance failure. It establishes a sense of legitimacy and credibility to the Chinese image, communicating to the world that the nation is capable to lead at a time of uncertainty and interconnectedness.

The most coded theme in the content analysis was that which detailed China's contributions to the peace and development of mankind. On 73 occasions, leaders explicitly referenced China's "significant contribution to world peace and development."<sup>198</sup> Against the backdrop of global interdependence and governance failure, Chinese contributions to mankind shape an image of China as a capable leader to meet rising challenges. In a similar vein, the CCP references the theme of China's phenomenal progress and development to further highlight their competence on the world stage. "China has blazed its own path to strength and prosperity,"<sup>199</sup> growing "from a poor and weak country to the world's second largest economy."<sup>200</sup> Here, the success of China's progress is attributed to the uniqueness of their developmental path. This addresses American or other critical conceptions that China cannot or should not "follow its own path of socialism with Chinese characteristics...suited to its own conditions."<sup>201</sup>

Chinese progress is further presented in terms of how Beijing's ideas "are inspired by the fine traditions of the 5000-year Chinese culture emphasizing the pursuit of common good."<sup>202</sup> These values are described as something special that China offers to the world. As such, ideas like CSFM "with distinct Chinese features,"<sup>203</sup> "received warm response from the wider international community."<sup>204</sup> As a Chinese proposal for the reform of the international system, CSFM is framed as credible due to its foundation in wise, time-tested Chinese tradition.

Chinese propositions are presented as not only valuable for the international community, but also indicative of the nation's increasing power and presence of the world stage. China is "moving closer to center of the world stage,"<sup>205</sup> and has "a bigger voice and greater influence in the international arena."<sup>206</sup> For the CCP, this is partly due the international circulation of Chinese

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<sup>198</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>199</sup> Wang 1-9-17

<sup>200</sup> Xi 18-1-17

<sup>201</sup> Wang 10-12-17

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>203</sup> Wang 31-5-16

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>206</sup> Wang 1-9-17

ideas such as CSFM, which are warmly received and contribute to Chinese efforts to improve their soft power. “These propositions have further enriched the core values of China’s foreign policy and received wide recognition from the international community...they have become a hallmark of the soft power of socialist China.”<sup>207</sup> In this instance, the CCP asserts that Chinese visions like CSFM function to improve China’s attraction power internationally.

The emphasis on the wisdom of Chinese ideas and their increased presence of the world stage can be understood as part of CCP efforts at enhancing discursive power. As referenced in chapter 1,<sup>208</sup> discursive power allows for the development of soft power, crucial for China’s comprehensive national power. Leaders invest in communication initiatives to shape favorable global discussions and improve understandings of China which are often negative and not grounded in reality.<sup>209</sup> The Chinese perspective thus sees a dichotomy between the image of China presented by the West and the reality of China. To address this, the CSFM narrative communicates the theme of unfounded critiques, situating them as a product of “anti-China forces,”<sup>210</sup> which are “totally groundless,” and expose a “lack of understanding about China.”<sup>211</sup> CCP officials engage in the battle for discursive power by directly addressing criticisms and telling their story of China’s motivations and actions.

Chinese conceptualizations note that the West possesses discursive hegemony and uses it to negatively describe Chinese behavior with labels such as neocolonialism and authoritative capitalism.<sup>212</sup> When referencing Sino-African relations, officials counter such notions by asserting that “outside forces have attempted to vilify and undermine China-Africa cooperation by fabricating the so-called neocolonialism and debt trap.”<sup>213</sup> Other themes such as the one that emphasizes how China is a fair and just power function similarly to counter negative narratives.

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>208</sup> See page 9-12

<sup>209</sup> d’Hooghe, *China’s Public Diplomacy*, 4.

<sup>210</sup> Li 10-12-17

<sup>211</sup> Wang 6-25-19

<sup>212</sup> Zheng, “*Zhongguo zai guojishiwushang meiyou huayuquan*.”

<sup>213</sup> Wang 6-25-19

In addressing its relationship with Africa, officials emphasize that “China upholds the principle of sincerity, real results, amity and good faith.”<sup>214</sup> In light of this, China emphasizes its opposition to Western intervention, asserting that “no interference will weaken our resolve to strengthen cooperation with Africa.”<sup>215</sup>

The identity narrative additionally serves the purpose of addressing fears about the implications of China’s rise on the global order. Chinese interpretations of discursive power highlight that negative concepts like the “China Threat” reflect the many “doubts about China.”<sup>216</sup> In speeches, leaders thus explicitly stress that Chinese participation in global governance is “not meant to overhaul the system or start a new structure, but to improve the current system.”<sup>217</sup> Such definite statements reflect Beijing’s attention to how it is regarded by the foreign public, who often express fears that China wishes to overturn the current order.<sup>218</sup> According to such conceptualizations, China’s rapid economic development during a period of intense globalization represents a shift in power from West to East. It will thus seek to alter the literal international system in order to increase its power and interests.

Various reasons are proposed for why China wishes to overturn the international order. From a historical viewpoint, the post-1945 system was established without China, and as such, the nation does not feel inclined to uphold a system that was not constructed with their interests in mind.<sup>219</sup> The influences of traditional Chinese culture and a distinctive perspective on world affairs is also

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<sup>214</sup> Yang 24-6-19

<sup>215</sup> Wang 6-25-19

<sup>216</sup> Zhao, “China’s Global Activism,” 545.

<sup>217</sup> Zheng 26-3-18

<sup>218</sup> See Robert Gilpin *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9.

<sup>219</sup> Mark Leonard, “Why Convergence Breeds Conflict: Growing More Similar Will Push China and the United States Apart.” *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 5 (2013): 125, ISSN: 00157120 and Kennedy, *Global Governance*, 6.

cited as motivations for Beijing's efforts.<sup>220</sup> Another argument focuses on China's authoritarianism, arguing that it shapes a preference for non-liberal institutions.<sup>221</sup>

CCP officials rebuke these claims by asserting that China "will firmly uphold the existing international system...[with] no intention to change or displace the United States."<sup>222</sup> The theme of China as a fair and just power is also employed for this purpose, to assure international observers that "no matter how advanced it may become, China will never seek hegemony, nor will it seek expansion or spheres of influence."<sup>223</sup> Beijing casts itself as a responsible stakeholder, working to sustain their position in the system that maintains their prosperity.<sup>224</sup> Such statements are aligned with arguments of China as a status quo rather than a revisionist power. As a status quo power, China is searching for ways to expand its influence within the current system rather than directly attacking it.<sup>225</sup> In line with this, the CCP constantly asserts that the "global governance reform that China takes part in is not about overturning the current system and starting all over again. Instead, it is about improving the system so that it can better reflect the changing realities."<sup>226</sup>

China presents itself as a responsible and capable world leader at a time of international uncertainty and change. It highlights the diverse ways in which it is working to sustain and improve the international order. Yet, it also puts forth themes that indicate desires to fundamentally change the current system. For example, speeches include notions of how Beijing

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<sup>220</sup> See Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, (London: Penguin, 2012) and David Kang, *East Asia before the West : Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

<sup>221</sup> See Stefan Hapler, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century*, (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

<sup>222</sup> Wang 10-12-17

<sup>223</sup> Yang 14-7-18

<sup>224</sup> Robert Zoellick, "Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility," (speech, New York, September 21, 2005), [https://www.ncuscr.org/sites/default/files/migration/Zoellick\\_remarks\\_notes06\\_winter\\_spring.pdf](https://www.ncuscr.org/sites/default/files/migration/Zoellick_remarks_notes06_winter_spring.pdf)

<sup>225</sup> Ikenberry, John. "Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive," *Ethics & International Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2018), 18, doi: 10.1017/S0892679418000072. See also Yongjin Zhang, "China and liberal hierarchies in global international society: power and negotiation for normative change," *International Affairs* 92, no. 4 (2016): 795-816, doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12652 and Li, *China Joins Global Governance*, 48.

<sup>226</sup> Yang 14-7-18



“takes initiatives to shape the new normal in our favor,”<sup>227</sup> situating this “rule-making in new areas,”<sup>228</sup> as a positive indicator of China’s increased international presence and power.

Observers interpret Chinese reshaping of norms as indicative of efforts to overthrow the current system rather than improve it. In human rights, China harnesses its increased influence in the UN to actively influence norms. Specifically, China works within the institution to establish state sovereignty and the right to economic development as core values rather than political and civil human rights.<sup>229</sup> CSFM is seen as a tool to achieve this, hiding “... deeper meanings in the discourse of international relations—a desire to reinforce orthodox interpretations of principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention... [and] undermine the legitimacy of international mechanisms to monitor human rights...”<sup>230</sup> Such accounts stand at odds with the image that China projects of itself “the most positive factor in the evolution of the international system.”<sup>231</sup> They also offer perspective as to why Beijing strongly advocates for the centrality of the UN. Motivations are not purely rooted in the UN's ability to include more equality and voices in IR, nor its “universally recognized contribution to maintaining global peace and sustaining development.”<sup>232</sup> Rather, the UN helps China advance its interests and achieve its goal of acting as a responsible power through participation in UN affairs.<sup>233</sup>

Chinese assertions of its contributions to mankind and the wisdom of its ideas reflect a broader shift in Beijing’s foreign policy posture. Whilst there is debate over whether China has truly adopted a more assertive foreign policy under Xi, there is agreement that the nation has become increasingly articulate in its interests.<sup>234</sup> Beijing’s campaign of the Chinese Dream and CSFM are

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<sup>227</sup> Xi 28-3-15

<sup>228</sup> Liu 21-11-14

<sup>229</sup> Maaïke Okano-Heijmans, and Frans-Paul van der Putten with contributions from Etienne Bechard, Louise van Schaik, Vishwesh Sundar. “*A United Nations with Chinese characteristics?*” (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael, 2018), 4.

<sup>230</sup> Ted Piccone, *China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations* (Washington D.C: Brookings, 2018), 7.

<sup>231</sup> Wang 10-12-17

<sup>232</sup> Xi 18-1-17

<sup>233</sup> Niu, *Multilateralism*, 5.

<sup>234</sup> Poh and Li, “A China in Transition,” 84.

examples of the growing intensity of policy moves to reshape the global order in its favor.<sup>235</sup> The framing of CSFM as a better model for global governance in five dimensions: politics, security, development, culture, and the environment suggests the many dimensions that China aims to restructure with its newfound international influence in order to achieve global leadership.<sup>236</sup> In contrast to the previous leadership where China was only participating in global governance, Xi actively calls for China to “take an active part in the reform of the global governance system.”<sup>237</sup> Xi also has a much tougher image than his predecessors, illustrating an “eagerness to sketch out a vision of foreign policy distinctly different from that of the West [which] illustrates China’s growing confidence and aspirations to play a much larger role on the world stage.”<sup>238</sup> The identity of China is thus not only one of a responsible world leader, but also one with increasing international power and presence.

By emphasizing China’s international contributions and the phenomenal pace of its domestic development, the CCP shapes an image of China as a responsible and capable world leader. This identity qualifies China to reform the international system which is interdependent and suffering from global governance failure. By linking the theme of Chinese wisdom and solutions with Chinese traditions of peace and harmony, the CCP projects Chinese proposals such as CSFM as viable solutions to the challenges of today. Ideas such as CSFM further serve as a way for the CCP to inject their values into global discussions, countering the discursive hegemony of the West and taking control of the story of China which is told. To construct the image of China as a responsible and capable leader, the identity narrative addresses critiques of China as hegemonic and revisionist with a Chinese victimization/anti-West theme. This theme and the consistent framing of Chinese proposals as valuable and necessary underscore the increasing confidence of China on the world stage. However, certain discrepancies exist between their projected identity vis-a-vis the CSFM narrative and actual practice. Here, CCP efforts to subvert certain global

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid., 85; Kennedy, *Global Governance and China*, 5.

<sup>236</sup> Tobin, “Xi’s Vision,” 156.

<sup>237</sup> Yang 14-7-18

<sup>238</sup> Poh and Li, “China in Transition,” 86.

norms within multilateral institutions calls into question the legitimacy and value of CSFM as a solution to global governance failure within a system of global interdependence.

### **Narratives in Dialogue**

China's international system narrative of global interdependence relies on the shared fate storyline to describe how the world is changing as the futures and interests of all become increasingly intertwined. Changes arising from power shifts and globalization generate uncertainties, thus calling for international cooperation and new ideas for global governance. Whilst the international system narrative emphasizes a context of change, the issue narrative provides more detail by stating that the cause behind an uncertain and unstable future is the failure of the current liberal global governance system. The storyline of global governance failure also draws upon the system narrative of global interdependence to further stress how unprecedented and unresolved challenges affect all participants in the international system. With such high stakes, immediate solutions are required to tackle the inadequacies of liberal global governance. In this instance, the storyline of Chinese wisdoms and solutions is put forth to highlight how China possesses the answers to problems of peace and development which global governance has failed to resolve. The narratives of global interdependence and governance failure thus work together to create a sense of demand for solutions, with the identity narrative functioning to present China as the source for such solutions. Storylines of Chinese victimization/anti-West, increasing Chinese power and presence, and Chinese championing for multilateralism characterize China as the most capable actor to lead in a system which is interdependent and suffering from global governance failure.

## Conclusion

This thesis provided an in-depth examination of the CSFM vision and contextualized it according to Chinese thinking on the world order and their role within it. A narrative approach decoded CSFM to identify six prominent storylines with corresponding themes, all of which were present and interacting throughout an international system narrative of global interdependence, an issue narrative of global governance failure, and an identity narrative of China as a responsible and capable leader. To communicate such narratives, the CCP incorporated and framed a range of contextual, historical, cultural, political and theoretical concepts. Together, these concepts constitute a narrative that presents China as a leader in an interconnected global order that is failing to address unprecedented challenges.

Whilst the employed narrative approach serves a useful framework to understand how Chinese leaders construct and socialize CSFM, the practice of identifying and deconstructing narratives can be problematic. Although identified storylines and themes were guided by a literature review and methodological approach, they cannot be regarded as all encompassing. Certain storylines and themes could be missing or more or less prevalent than identified in the content analysis. Thus, findings from this thesis can only be taken as a general representation of the few themes that the CCP circulates internationally as part of the effort to establish CSFM meaning at the international system, issue and identity levels.

This research focused exclusively on the formation of narratives and as such, there is an absence of information on how CSFM is received. Future studies could benefit from an in-depth examination of CSFM's reception as it touches upon the narrative's effectiveness rather than solely its construction. Examining the reception and effectiveness of narrative is important as the formulation of a narrative strategy does not guarantee by any means that is successfully received. Focusing on narrative reception in the case of China is especially necessary considering how

the CCP has struggled with successfully communicating its ideas and values at the international level.<sup>239</sup>

The limitations of this research underscore how more diversified approaches to studying narrative could increase understanding of CSFM. As this thesis relied exclusively on CCP speeches to decode CSFM and its underpinning ideas, its approach constitutes as a state-centered one. In the current international context characterized by a new media ecology, non-state actors have increasing influence in narrative formulation and reception, shaping a need to trace how narratives are presented across different outlets.<sup>240</sup> Future studies are likely to benefit from a perspective that recognizes how narratives can be collectively constructed by different actors and channels.

Despite these shortcomings, the narrative approach in this thesis decoded CSFM to offer a window into the CCP's thinking about the world order and their role within it. Examining the concepts and language behind such Chinese ideas reveals Beijing's implicit and explicit beliefs about foreign relations and the global order. Further attention to concepts such as CSFM can thereby inform international observers about the impacts of China's newfound influence on the global order, better preparing them to engage with Chinese thinking.

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<sup>239</sup> Melissen and d'Hooghe, "The Chinese Dream and Successful Communication."

<sup>240</sup> Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, *Forging the World*, 318.

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## Appendix 1: Full List of Speeches Mentioning CSFM

Date	Title	Event	Author	Link	# of mentions of CSF
1.11.2019	Working Together to Meet Our Shared Responsibility and Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind	Opening Ceremony of Beijing Forum 2019	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1712626.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1712626.shtml</a>	5
22/10/2019	China: A Source of Certainty and Stability in a Changing World.	Special Plenary Session: The 70th Anniversary of the Founding of	Le Yucheng	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1709807.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1709807.shtml</a>	3
21/10/2019	Remarks	Third Training Course for the 1540 Points of Contact in the Asia-Pacific Region	General FU Cong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1709242.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1709242.shtml</a>	1
9/10/2019	Remarks	Closing Ceremony of the Horticultural Exhibition 2019	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2019/10/10/content_31852491893c6a0bcf8c4c1449b.html">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2019/10/10/content_31852491893c6a0bcf8c4c1449b.html</a>	1
30/09/2019	Speech	Reception in Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of The Founding of the People's Republic of China	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1704400.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1704400.shtml</a>	2
27/09/2019	China Today: A Proud Member of the Global Community	At the General Debate of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly	H.E. Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1703219.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1703219.shtml</a>	2
25/09/2019	Statement	2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	H.E. Mr. Fu Cong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1702107.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1702107.shtml</a>	1
25/09/2019	Toward a Better Future Through Development Cooperation Statement	High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development Under the auspices of the General Assembly (SDG Summit)	H.E. Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1701246.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1701246.shtml</a>	1
15/09/2019	Written Interview	With Russian News Agency TASS	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1698470.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1698470.shtml</a>	2
6/08/2019	Promoting Asian Cooperation for a Shared Bright Future	Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) Of the Asian Partners of ASEM	Ma Zhaoran	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1686770.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1686770.shtml</a>	1
8/07/2019	Upholding Peace and Cooperation and Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind	Opening Ceremony of the Eighth World Peace Forum	Wang Qishan	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1679950.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1679950.shtml</a>	2
8/07/2019	China's Foreign Policy in a Fast Changing World: Mission and Responsibility. Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng At the Lunch Meeting of the Eighth World Peace Forum	Lunch Meeting of the Eighth World Peace Forum	Le Yucheng	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1679454.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1679454.shtml</a>	4
28/06/2019	Working Together to Build a High-Quality World Economy	G20	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1676619.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1676619.shtml</a>	1
25/06/2019	Keynote Speech	Opening Ceremony of the Coordinators' Meeting on The Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of The Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	H.E. Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675596.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675596.shtml</a>	8
24/06/2019	Speech	Group Meeting with the Heads of African Delegations Attending the Coordinators' Meeting on the Implementation of The Follow-up Actions of the FOCAC Beijing Summit	H.E. Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675449.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675449.shtml</a>	5
15/06/2019	Working Together for New Progress of Security and Development in Asia Remarks	Fifth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1672339.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1672339.shtml</a>	3
14/06/2019	Staying Focused and Taking Solid Actions For a Brighter Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	19th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1672362.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1672362.shtml</a>	1
5/06/2019	Written Interview	Mainstream Russian Media Organizations	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1669855.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1669855.shtml</a>	1
29/05/2019	Jointly Tackling Challenges for Common Development	Opening of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2019	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2019/03/30/content_281476586711492.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2019/03/30/content_281476586711492.htm</a>	1
15/05/2019	Deepening Exchanges and Mutual Learning Among Civilizations For an Asian Community with a Shared Future	Opening Ceremony of The Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1663857.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1663857.shtml</a>	3
28/04/2019	Remarks	Press Conference of The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1659452.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1659452.shtml</a>	1
28/04/2019	Working Together for a Green and Better Future for All	Opening Ceremony of the International Horticultural Exhibition 2019 Beijing China	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1659448.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1659448.shtml</a>	1
27/04/2019	Promoting High-Quality Development of Belt and Road Cooperation	Leaders' Roundtable of The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1659454.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1659454.shtml</a>	1
26/04/2019	Working Together to Deliver a Brighter Future For Belt and Road Cooperation	Opening Ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1658424.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1658424.shtml</a>	1
30/03/2019	The Belt and Road Initiative and Preparations	Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1650335.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1650335.shtml</a>	5
16/03/2019	Report on the Work of the Government	Second Session of the 13th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, March 2019	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2019/03/16/content_281476565765380.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2019/03/16/content_281476565765380.htm</a>	2
15/03/2019	Meeting People's Aspiration for a Better Life Through Continued Progress on Human Rights in China	On the Adoption of the UPR Outcome Report on China at the United Nations	H.E. Le Yucheng	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1646101.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1646101.shtml</a>	1
2/02/2019	Keynote Speech	Dialogue on the Implementation of China-Africa Peace and Security Initiative	Chen Xiaodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1636100.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1636100.shtml</a>	2
31/12/2019	Remarks	MFA 2019 New Year Reception	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1634534.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1634534.shtml</a>	5

11/12/2018	Speech	Opening of Symposium on The International Situation and China's Foreign Relations in 2018	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1621221.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1621221.shtml</a>	4
15/11/2018	Speech	13th East Asia Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/11/16/content_281476392673224.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/11/16/content_281476392673224.htm</a>	2
15/11/2018	Speech	21st China-ASEAN Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/11/15/content_281476391331254.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/11/15/content_281476391331254.htm</a>	1
19/10/2018	Speech	12th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Brussels	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/10/20/content_281476354520100.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/10/20/content_281476354520100.htm</a>	3
12/10/2018	Speech	17th Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of Government in Dushanbe	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/10/13/content_281476343196592.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2018/10/13/content_281476343196592.htm</a>	2
10/10/2018	Remarks	Foreign Policy Session of The 2018 Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1605572.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1605572.shtml</a>	2
28/09/2018	Multilateralism, Shared Peace and Development	General Debate of The 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1600861.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1600861.shtml</a>	2
24/09/2018	Commemorate Nelson Mandela and Join Hands for Lasting Peace	The Nelson Mandela Peace Summit	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1599720.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1599720.shtml</a>	3
28/07/2018	Full text of Chinese President Xi's signed article on UAE media	State Visit to UAE	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1578517.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1578517.shtml</a>	1
20/07/2018	Full text of Chinese President Xi's signed article on Senegalese media	State Visit to Senegal	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572944.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572944.shtml</a>	1
14/07/2018	A Joint Response to the Big Change of the World and A Joint Effort to Build a Community with a Shared Future	Luncheon of the Seventh World Peace Forum	Le Yucheng	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572429.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572429.shtml</a>	5
14/07/2018	Working Together to Build a World of Lasting Peace and Universal Security and a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind	Opening Ceremony of the Seventh World Peace Forum	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572424.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572424.shtml</a>	6
4/07/2018	Address	Opening Ceremony of the Seventh China-Africa Think Tank Forum	Chen Xiaodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572397.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1572397.shtml</a>	6
8/05/2018	Keynote Address	ASEAN Secretariat	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1557825.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1557825.shtml</a>	1
31/03/2018	Working Together to Write a New Chapter of Sub-regional Cooperation	The Sixth GMS Summit Vietnam	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1547074.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1547074.shtml</a>	3
30/03/2018	Remarks	GMS Business Summit	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1546907.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1546907.shtml</a>	1
26/03/2018	Address	9th Annual Session of the China Development Forum	Zhang Zeguang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1547881.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1547881.shtml</a>	7
21/03/2018	Premier Li Keqiang Meets the Press	Press Conference of the First Session of the 13th National People's Congress Press Conference	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1544120.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1544120.shtml</a>	2
9/03/2018	Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press	Press Conference of the First Session of the 13th National People's Congress Press Conference	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1540928.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1540928.shtml</a>	5
30/01/2018	Remarks	2018 New Year Reception	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1530225.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1530225.shtml</a>	3
25/01/2018	China made new contributions to global development last year	Printed in China Daily	Zhang Jun	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1528893.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1528893.shtml</a>	1
25/01/2018	Pursue High-quality Development, Work Together for Global Economic Prosperity and Stability	World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2018	Liu He	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1528861.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1528861.shtml</a>	2
25/01/2018	Join Hands Across the Ocean in a New Era	Opening Ceremony of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1528692.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1528692.shtml</a>	2
10/12/2017	Speech	Opening of Symposium on International Developments and China's Diplomacy in 2017	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1518130.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1518130.shtml</a>	8
10/12/2017	Writing a New Chapter of International Human Rights Exchanges and Cooperation	South-South Human Rights Forum in Beijing	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1518308.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1518308.shtml</a>	5
7/12/2017	Advance a Global Human Rights Cause and Build a Community of with a Shared Future for Mankind	the Opening Ceremony of the First South-South Human Rights Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t15201712115653523921.pdf">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t15201712115653523921.pdf</a>	3
27/11/2017	Speech	Sixth Summit of Heads of Government of China and Central and Eastern European Countries	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1514725.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1514725.shtml</a>	1
14/11/2017	Speech	12th East Asia Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1510667.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1510667.shtml</a>	1
13/11/2017	Speech	20th China-ASEAN Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1510666.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1510666.shtml</a>	3
21/09/2017	Toward Peace and Development for All	General Debate of The 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1496244.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1496244.shtml</a>	1

1/09/2017	Forge Ahead under the Guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping's Thought on Diplomacy	Statement after 18th Party Congress	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1489143.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1489143.shtml</a>	7
17/07/2017	Study and Implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's Thought on Diplomacy in a Deep-going Way and Keep Writing New Chapters of Major-Country Diplomacy with Distinctive Chinese Features	Statement after 18th Party Congress	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1478497.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1478497.shtml</a>	5
30/06/2017	Keynote Speech	15th East Asia Forum	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1474440.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1474440.shtml</a>	1
24/06/2017	Speech	Luncheon of the Sixth World Peace Forum	Zhang Yesui	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1472139.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1472139.shtml</a>	2
24/06/2017	Working Together to Address Global Security Challenges and Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind	Opening Ceremony of the Sixth World Peace Forum	Arkon Imirbaki	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1472952.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1472952.shtml</a>	5
21/06/2017	Work Together to Fight Poverty and Achieve Common Prosperity	Opening Ceremony of the China-Africa High-Level Dialogue and Think Tank Forum on Fighting Against Poverty for Common Prosperity	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1472000.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1472000.shtml</a>	3
2/05/2017	Statement	General Debate in the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference	Fu Cong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1465513.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1465513.shtml</a>	1
19/04/2017	"China's Economic Diplomacy Entered the New Era"	Published Article	Zhang Jun	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1454872.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1454872.shtml</a>	1
30/03/2017	Create More "Firsts" in China-New Zealand Friendship and Cooperation	Welcoming Gala Luncheon in New Zealand	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2017/03/30/content_281475611907276.htm">https://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2017/03/30/content_281475611907276.htm</a>	1
26/03/2017	Deepen Regional Cooperation in Asia With Renewed Confidence Speech	"Roundtable on Asian Regional Cooperation Organizations" At the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2017	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1448887.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1448887.shtml</a>	6
20/03/2017	Work Together to Build Partnerships and Pursue Peace and Development Speech	Luncheon of the China Development Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1448155.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1448155.shtml</a>	3
23/03/2017	Remarks	Opening Ceremony of 2017 First BRICS Sherpa Meeting	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1441282.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1441282.shtml</a>	1
18/01/2017	Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind	United Nations Office at Geneva	Xi Jinping	<a href="http://iq.chinausembassy.org/eng/zygo/t1432869.htm">http://iq.chinausembassy.org/eng/zygo/t1432869.htm</a>	7
17/01/2017	Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth Keynote Speech	Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t14338293.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t14338293.shtml</a>	2
10/01/2017	Forging Sound Relations through the Principle of Amity, Sincerity, Mutual Benefit and Inclusiveness, Aid New Chapters in Neighborhood Diplomacy	N.A.	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1429992.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1429992.shtml</a>	3
23/12/2016	Speech	Opening of the Symposium On International Developments and China's Diplomacy in 2016	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1421722.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1421722.shtml</a>	1
21/11/2016	Speech	Opening Ceremony of 9th Global Conference on Health Promotion	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2016/11/23/content_281475498309138.htm">https://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2016/11/23/content_281475498309138.htm</a>	1
4/11/2016	Speech	5th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/11/04/content_281475482644898.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/11/04/content_281475482644898.htm</a>	1
12/10/2016	Work together to improve regional security architecture and address common challenges	1st Plenary Session of The 7th Xiangshan Forum	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1405158.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1405158.shtml</a>	1
10/10/2016	Statement	General Debate of the First Committee of the 71st Session of the UNGA	WANG Qun	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1405391.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1405391.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
11/10/2016	Building a Stronger ACD for an Asian Community of Shared Future	the Second Summit of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue	Li Yuanchao	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1403303.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1403303.shtml</a>	10
22/09/2016	Work Together for a World of Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development Statement	General Debate of The 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1417055.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1417055.shtml</a>	1
12/09/2016	Deepen Production Capacity Cooperation, Achieve Common Development	2nd Session of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and Promoting International Production Capacity and Equipment Manufacturing Cooperation Forum	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1397448.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1397448.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)
7/09/2016	Remarks	19th China-ASEAN Summit to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/09/07/content_281475482644898.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/09/07/content_281475482644898.htm</a>	1
3/09/2016	Keynote Speech	Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit A New Starting Point for China's Development A New Blueprint for Global Growth	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1396112.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1396112.shtml</a>	2
29/07/2016	President Xi Jinping's Congratulatory Message and State Councilor Yang Jiechi's Keynote Speech	The Opening Ceremony of the Coordinators' Meeting on the Implementation of The Follow-up Actions of the Johannesburg Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	Xi Jinping and Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1386454.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1386454.shtml</a>	1
21/07/2016	Statement	Voluntary National Review of the Implementation of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1384513.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1384513.shtml</a>	1
21/07/2016	Statement	General Debate of the Ministerial Meeting of High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1384512.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1384512.shtml</a>	1
16/07/2016	Join Hands to Create a Bright Future of Peace and Prosperity Address	the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth World Peace Forum	Liu Yandong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1384919.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzh_665391/t1384919.shtml</a>	3

15/07/2016	Upgrade Cooperation and Foster a Partnership of Shared Future Between Asia and Europe	11th ASEM Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2016/07/16/content_281475394584697.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2016/07/16/content_281475394584697.htm</a>	
13/07/2016	Statement	Press Conference on the White Paper "China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea"	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1381980.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1381980.shtml</a>	2
9/07/2016	Actively Practices the Asian Security Concept and Jointly Creates a New Future of Asia Pacific Security	Opening Ceremony of the International Seminar on "Security Framework and Major-Power Relations In the Asia-Pacific Region"	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1379376.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1379376.shtml</a>	1
1/07/2016	Speech	CSIS Washington	Dai Binzuo	<a href="http://www.china-embassy.org/ene/tyw/t1377566.htm">http://www.china-embassy.org/ene/tyw/t1377566.htm</a>	1 (CCD)
20/06/2016	Build a New Type of International Relations Featuring Win-Win Cooperation. China's Answer to the Question "Where Are the International Relations of the 21st Century Heading?"	N.A.	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1376908.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1376908.shtml</a>	5
6/06/2016	Making Unremitting Efforts for a New Model of Major-Country Relationship Between China and the United States	Joint Opening Ceremony of the Eighth Round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Seventh Round of the China-US High level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1370191.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1370191.shtml</a>	1
31/05/2016	Dialogue Transcript	Meeting with editors of Asia News Network members	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1369269.shtml">http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1369269.shtml</a>	1
31/05/2016	Work Together to Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind	After 18th Party Congress	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1369269.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1369269.shtml</a>	33
9/05/2016	Remarks	Opening Ceremony of the ASEM Media Dialogue on Connectivity	Qian Hongshan	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1368925.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1368925.shtml</a>	2
28/04/2016	Jointly Create a Better Future of Peace and Prosperity for Asia Through Dialogue and Consensus	the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Meeting of The CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1359296.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1359296.shtml</a>	1
14/04/2016	China's Development and China-Europe Cooperation: Sources of Positive Energy for the World	At the French Institute of International Relations	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1355580.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1355580.shtml</a>	1
2/04/2016	Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture and Promote Global Nuclear Security Governance	Nuclear Security Summit Washington	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1353095.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1353095.shtml</a>	1
25/03/2016	Deepening Regional Cooperation for a Community of Shared Future	"Asian Regional Cooperation Roundtable" Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2016	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1350851.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1350851.shtml</a>	5
24/03/2016	A New Vision for A Dynamic Asia Through Joint Efforts/Speech	the Opening Planary of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2016	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1350851.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1350851.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
23/03/2016	Address	he First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders' Meeting	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1350422.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1350422.shtml</a>	1 (CSF) 3 (CCD)
16/01/2016	Address	Opening Ceremony of The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/P020160119533074024860.pdf">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/P020160119533074024860.pdf</a>	1
6/01/2016	Remarks	Foreign Ministry's 2016 New Year Reception Foreign Minister Wang Yi Diaoyutai State Guesthouse	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/P020160107590414767766.pdf">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/P020160107590414767766.pdf</a>	2
31/12/2015	2016 New Year Message	2016 New Year Message	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1331985.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1331985.shtml</a>	1 (CCF)
16/12/2015	Remarks	the Opening Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1327570.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1327570.shtml</a>	1
12/12/2015	2015: A Year of Flying Colors for Pursuing Major-Country Diplomacy with Distinctive Chinese Feature	Opening Ceremony of the Symposium on International Developments and China's Diplomacy in 2015	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1329609.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1329609.shtml</a>	4
4/12/2015	Working Together to Write a New Chapter In China-Africa Cooperation	China-Africa Business Forum	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1321559.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1321559.shtml</a>	1
30/11/2015	Speech	Opening Ceremony of The Third ASEAN Regional forum Workshop on Space Security	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1320528.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1320528.shtml</a>	1
30/11/2015	Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on Climate Change	Opening Ceremony of The Paris Conference on Climate Change	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1321560.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1321560.shtml</a>	1
26/11/2015	Build on Past Achievements and Open up the Future of All-round Development of China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation	15th Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1319121.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1319121.shtml</a>	1
23/11/2015	Remarks	10th East Asia Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1317927.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1317927.shtml</a>	2
22/11/2015	Remarks	18th China-ASEAN Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1317372.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1317372.shtml</a>	1
18/11/2015	The Leading Role of the Asia-Pacific In Meeting Global Economic Challenges	APEC CEO Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1316082.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1316082.shtml</a>	1
16/11/2015	Innovative Growth That Benefits All	10th G20 Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1314058.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1314058.shtml</a>	1 (CSI)
7/11/2015	Forging a Strong Partnership to Enhance Prosperity of Asia	at the National University of Singapore	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1313923.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_emu/wjdt_665385/yjyh_665391/t1313923.shtml</a>	3 (CSF), 1 (CSI)



7/11/2015	Build on Past Achievements to Create a Bright Future For China-Singapore Relations	Prior to State Visit to Singapore	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1528503.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1528503.shtml</a>	1
6/11/2015	Work Together to Write a New Chapter of China-Vietnam Friendship	At the National Assembly of Vietnam	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1529613.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1529613.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
6/11/2015	Renew the Friendship Across High Mountains and Contribute Asian Wisdom to World Peace and Development	State Visit to India	Li Yuanchao	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15312601.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15312601.shtml</a>	1
5/11/2015	Join Hands to Deliver a Bright Future for China-Vietnam Relations	Prior to State Visit to Vietnam	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1529606.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1529606.shtml</a>	1
26/10/2015	Congratulatory Message	Opening Ceremony of the 9th UNESCO Youth Forum	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1531082.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1531082.shtml</a>	1
17/10/2015	Uphold Win-Win Cooperation and Promote Peace and Stability in the Asia-Pacific	Ministry of Defence Dinner	Liu Zhemín	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15306891.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15306891.shtml</a>	4 (CCF)
30/09/2015	Remarks	Reception Marking the 66th Anniversary of The Founding of the People's Republic of China	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1530276.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1530276.shtml</a>	1
28/09/2015	Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind	General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15302051.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15302051.shtml</a>	3
22/09/2015	Emphasizing Building New Model of Major-Country Relationship Between China and US and Enhancing Peace, Stability and Development in Asia-Pacific Region and World	Interview to "The Wall Street Journal"	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15299819.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15299819.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
19/09/2015	Review the Spirit of September 19 Joint Statement and Uphold Peace and Stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia	International Seminar to Commemorate the 10th Anniversary of the September 19 Joint Statement of the Sixth Party Talks	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15293246.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15293246.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
16/09/2015	For China-US Friendly Cooperation, For Global Peace and Development	Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="http://enr.dia.ic.gov.cn/jremier/speeches/2015/09/11/content_297164.shtml">http://enr.dia.ic.gov.cn/jremier/speeches/2015/09/11/content_297164.shtml</a>	1
10/09/2015	A New Blueprint for Global Growth	Ninth Annual Meeting of the New Champions	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://enr.dia.ic.gov.cn/jremier/speeches/2015/09/11/content_281475187641778.htm">http://enr.dia.ic.gov.cn/jremier/speeches/2015/09/11/content_281475187641778.htm</a>	2 (CCD)
23/07/2015	Carry Forward the Tazara Spirit in a Joint Effort to Build a Community of Shared Destiny	Launch of the Book A Monument to China-Africa Friendship: First-hand Account of the Building of Tazara	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15284457.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15284457.shtml</a>	2 (CSD)
20/07/2015	Remarks	The 70th Anniversary of the United Nations	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15282387.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15282387.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
10/07/2015	Strengthening Shanghai Cooperation Organization Through Unity, Mutual Support and Joint Response to Challenges Statement	15th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15283794.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15283794.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)
7/07/2015	Building Partnership Together Toward a Bright Future	Seventh BRICS Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15283789.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15283789.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
27/06/2015	China's Role in the Global and Regional Order: Participant, Facilitator and Contributor	Luncheon of the Fourth World Peace Forum By H.E. Foreign Minister Wang Yi	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15276595.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15276595.shtml</a>	3 (CCD)
27/06/2015	Address	Opening Ceremony of the Fourth World Peace Forum	Li Yuanchao	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15277387.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15277387.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)
12/06/2015	Toward Win-win Cooperation Through Amity, Sincerity, Mutual Benefit and Inclusiveness	Opening Ceremony of the Third China-South Asia Expo	Li Yuanchao	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15274296.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15274296.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
5/05/2015	Jointly Safeguard the Victory of World War Two and Create a Bright Future of Win-Win Cooperation	12th Lanting Forum	Cheng Guoping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15263219.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15263219.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)
28/04/2015	Promote Industrial Cooperation for Common Development	11th Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15263304/wjdt_665391/15263308/2461_663310(1)259754.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15263304/wjdt_665391/15263308/2461_663310(1)259754.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
21/04/2015	Building a China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny to Pursue Closer Win-Win Cooperation	State visit to Pakistan	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15257158.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15257158.shtml</a>	4 (CSD)
14/04/2015	Uphold the Authority of the UN Charter and Promote Win-Win Cooperation	International Colloquium on the Charter of the United Nations And Post-War International Order	Liu Zhemín	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15255145.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15255145.shtml</a>	3 (CSD)
13/03/2015	Strengthen Asia-Africa Solidarity and Cooperation To Uphold World Peace and Justice	Opening Meeting of the 54th Annual Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15244807.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15244807.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
3/04/2015	Carry Forward the Bandung Spirit and Advance the International Rule of Law in Today's World	Special Event on Commemorating The 60th Anniversary of the Bandung Conference of The 54th Annual Session of The Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization	Zhang Yuesi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1524418.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/1524418.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
28/03/2015	Jointly Build the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road By Deepening Mutual Trust and Enhancing Connectivity	Session of "Jointly Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" And Launching of the Year of China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15249761.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15249761.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
28/03/2015	Speech	Session "ASEAN Community: A Major Milestone for Asian Integration" Of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015	Wang yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15252548.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15252548.shtml</a>	1 (CCD) 1 (CSD)
28/03/2015	Towards a Community of Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia Keynote Speech	Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15250690.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15250690.shtml</a>	11 (CCD)
23/05/2015	Toward a New Type of International Relations of Win-Win Cooperation	Luncheon of the China Development Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15248487.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15248487.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
8/03/2015	Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press	Third Session of the 12th Party Congress Press Conference	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15243662.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/15243662.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)

13/02/2015	Remarks	Inauguration of The Year of China-Pakistan Friendly Exchanges	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1244615.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1244615.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
7/02/2015	Foster a Vision of Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative And Sustainable Security to Build a Better World Of Enduring Peace and Common Development	the Opening Session of the 51st Munich Security Conference	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1235254.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1235254.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
8/01/2015	Keynote Speech	the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1229672.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1229672.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
8/01/2015	Jointly Write a New Chapter in the Partnership of Comprehensive Cooperation Between China and Latin America and the Caribbean	the Opening Ceremony of the First Ministerial Meeting of The China-CELAC Forum	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zqoc_662805/t1227730.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zqoc_662805/t1227730.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
20/12/2014	Work Together Toward New Progress of Good-Neighborhoodness, Friendship and Inclusive Development	Opening Session of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/12/23/content_281475027468672.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/12/23/content_281475027468672.htm</a>	1 (CSD)
11/12/2014	Toast	New Year Reception for 2015	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1218740.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1218740.shtml</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CCD)
21/11/2014	Laying the Foundations of Peace and Stability for An Asian Community of Shared Destiny	Xiangshan Forum	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1213622.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1213622.shtml</a>	7 (CSD)
17/11/2014	Address	State Visit to Australia	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1225915.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1225915.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
15/11/2014	Promoting Innovative Development Achieving Interconnected Growth	Session One of the Ninth G20 Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1225558.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1225558.shtml</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CSD)
13/11/2014	Maintain peace and advance economic integration in East Asia	Ninth East Asia Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/11/15/content_281475010415779.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/11/15/content_281475010415779.htm</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CSR) 1 (CSD)
13/11/2014	Take China-ASEAN relations to a new height	17th ASEA	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/11/15/content_281475010415762.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/11/15/content_281475010415762.htm</a>	2 (CSD)
29/10/2014	APEC Beijing: China is Ready	Lanting Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1205756.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1205756.shtml</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CSD)
16/10/2014	Speech	First Plenary Session of the Tenth ASEM Summit	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/10/17/content_281474998278340.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/10/17/content_281474998278340.htm</a>	1 (CSR) 1 (CSD)
12/09/2014	Working Together with Sincerity and Dedication to Take SCO to a New Level	At the 14th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1192339.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1192339.shtml</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CSD)
17/07/2014	Build a Community of Shared Destiny for Common Progress	At China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Leaders' Meeting	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1184869.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1184869.shtml</a>	2 (CSD)
28/06/2014	Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation	Meeting Marking the 60th Anniversary	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1170143.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1170143.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)
31/05/2014	Creating a better tomorrow for relations: Premier Li	Ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of China-Malaysia diplomatic relations	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474962979600.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474962979600.htm</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CSR) 1 (CSD)
10/04/2014	Keynote speech	Opening Plenary of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2014	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474983012946.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474983012946.htm</a>	1 (CSD) 1 (CSD) 1 (CSR)
7/04/2014	Congratulatory message	the Opening Ceremony of the 2014 China-ASEAN Cultural Exchange Year	Li Keqiang	<a href="http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474983012960.htm">http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474983012960.htm</a>	1 (CCD)
21/06/2014	Keynote speech	Luncheon of the Third World Peace Forum	Zhang Yesui	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1169213.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1169213.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
15/06/2014	Speech	Commemorative Summit on the 50th Anniversary of the Group of 77	Chen Zhu	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1166184.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1166184.shtml</a>	3 (CCD)
9/06/2014	Remarks	2014 ARF Senior Officials Meeting	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1165765.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1165765.shtml</a>	1 (CCD) 1 (CSD) 1 (CSR)
5/06/2014	Address	Opening Ceremony of the International Workshop on Information and Cyber Security	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1162458.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1162458.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
27/05/2014	Following the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Jointly Building a Community of Common Destiny	the International Colloquium Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1160366.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1160366.shtml</a>	4 (CCD)
14/04/2014	Opening Remarks	Beijing P5 Conference	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1146732.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1146732.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
11/04/2014	Jointly Open up New Vistas for Asia's Development	Opening Plenary of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2014	Li Keqiang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1145980.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1145980.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
28/03/2014	Speech	UNESCO Headquarters	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1142560.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1142560.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
13/01/2014	China's Development Makes for a Better World	Article for	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1118258.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1118258.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
31/12/2013	Forging Ahead with Determination, Playing the Main Melody of Asian Cooperation	Comments on Asian Situation and Neighborhood Diplomacy	Liu Zhemmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1114403.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zqyh_665391/t1114403.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)

16/12/2013	Embark on a New Journey of China's Diplomacy	Symposium "New Starting Point, New Thinking and New Practice 2013: China and the World"	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t102943.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t102943.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
11/12/2013	Toast	New Year Reception for 2014 Of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t102943.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t102943.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
10/12/2013	Building on Past Achievements to Make New Progress And Shaping the Future Through Asia-Pacific Partnership	APEC Informal Senior Officials' Meeting	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t107984.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t107984.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
3/12/2013	The Evolving Security Situation in Asia and the Role of China	9th CSCAP Conference	Liu Zhenmin	<a href="http://ml.china-embassy.org/eng/zqyw/t1105034.htm">http://ml.china-embassy.org/eng/zqyw/t1105034.htm</a>	2 (CCD)
2/11/2013	China's Diplomacy At a New Historical Starting Point	21st Century Council Beijing Conference	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t109554.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t109554.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
9/10/2013	Deepen Reform and Opening up and Work Together for a Better Asia Pacific	APEC CEO Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t108512.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t108512.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
27/09/2013	China at a New Starting Point	General Debate of the 68th Session of	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t108330.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t108330.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
20/09/2013	Toward a New Model of Major-Country Relations Between China and the United States	At Brookings Institution	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1078768.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1078768.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
7/09/2013	Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future	At Nazarbayev University	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1078088.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1078088.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
6/09/2013	Speech	Eighth G20 Leaders' Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1074372.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1074372.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
3/09/2013	Bring the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership of Long-term Friendship and Mutually Beneficial Cooperation to a New High	10th China-ASEAN Expo and China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1073609.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1073609.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
27/06/2013	Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy With Chinese Characteristics	Luncheon of the Second World Peace Forum	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1053908.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1053908.shtml</a>	2 (CCD)
7/04/2013	Working Together Toward a Better Future for Asia and the World	Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2013	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1030610.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1030610.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
3/04/2013	Build a New Type of China-Europe Partnership Featuring Mutual Respect, Mutual Learning, Comprehensive Cooperation and Common Prosperity	At IES Ambassadors' Forum of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	Song Tao	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1032302.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1032302.shtml</a>	1 (CCI)
25/03/2013	Trustworthy Friends and Sincere Partners Forever	Julius Nyerere International Convention Centre	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1027951.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1027951.shtml</a>	1 (CSD)
23/03/2013	Follow the Trend of the Times and Promote Peace and Development in the World	At Moscow State Institute of International Relations	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1032346.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1032346.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)
28/01/2013	Pursue Peaceful Development and Promote Win-Win Cooperation	21st Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum	Wu Bangguo	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1012616.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/info_eng/wjdt_665385/zjyh_665391/t1012616.shtml</a>	1 (CCD)

**Abbreviations**

CSFM	Community of Shared Future for Mankind
CCD	Community of Common Destiny
CCI	Community of Common Interests
CCF	Community of Common Future
CSI	Community of Shared Interests
CSD	Community of Shared Destiny
CSR	Community of Shared Responsibilities

## Appendix 2: Selected Speeches for Analysis

Date	Title	Event	Author	Link	CSFM Mentions	Text Code
25/06/19	Keynote speech	Opening Ceremony of the Coordinators' Meeting on The Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of The Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675596.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675596.shtml</a>	8	Wang 25-6-19
24/06/19	Speech	Group Meeting with the Heads of African Delegations Attending the Coordinators' Meeting on the Implementation of The Follow-up Actions of the FOCAC Beijing Summit	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675449.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1675449.shtml</a>	5	Yang 24-6-19
14/07/18	Working Together to Build a World of Lasting Peace and Universal Security and a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind	Opening Ceremony of the Seventh World Peace Forum	Yang Jiechi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1577242.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1577242.shtml</a>	6	Yang 14-7-18
26/03/18	Address	9th Annual Session of the China Development Forum	Zheng Zeguang	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1547881.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1547881.shtml</a>	7	Zheng 26-3-18
10/12/17	Speech	Opening of Symposium on International Developments and China's Diplomacy in 2017	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1489143.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1489143.shtml</a>	8	Wang 10-12-17
10/12/17	Working on a New Chapter of International Human Rights Exchanges and Cooperation	South-South Human Rights Forum in Beijing	Li Baodong	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1518308.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1518308.shtml</a>	5	Li 10-12-17
1/09/17	Forge Ahead under the Guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping's Thought on Diplomacy	Statement after 18 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1489143.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1489143.shtml</a>	7	Wang 1-9-17
18/01/17	Work Together to Build a community of Shared Future for Mankind	Speech at United Nations Office in Geneva	Xi Jinping	<a href="http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm">http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm</a>	7	Xi 18-1-17
11/10/16	Building a Stronger ACD for an Asian Community of Shared Future	The Second Summit of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue	Li Yuanchao	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1405303.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1405303.shtml</a>	10	Li 11-10-16
31/05/16	Work Together to Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind	Speech after the 18 <sup>th</sup> Party Congress	Wang Yi	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1369269.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1369269.shtml</a>	33	Wang 31-5-16
28/03/15	Towards a Community of Common Destiny a New Future for Asia	Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015	Xi Jinping	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1250690.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1250690.shtml</a>	11 (CCD)	Xi 28-3-15
21/11/14	Laying the Foundations of Peace and Stability for an Asian Community of Shared Destiny	Xiangshan Forum	Liu Zhenmin	<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1213622.shtml">https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1213622.shtml</a>	7 (CSD)	Liu 21-11-14

### Abbreviations:

CSFM	Community of Shared Future for Mankind
CCD	Community of Common Destiny
CSD	Community of Shared Destiny

### Appendix 3: Coding Criteria for Themes/Storylines

<b>Storyline 1: Liberal global governance is failing</b>		
<p>The current system of liberal global governance is failing to meet the various challenges and changes that have arisen at the international level. As a result, there is an uncertain future. The world must unite and cooperate to meet these challenges. To do so, reforms to global governance are needed and Cold War mentalities must be fully abandoned.</p>		
<b>Themes</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Examples</b>
World faces unprecedented challenges	Globalization has generated shared challenges such as terrorism, cyber/food/energy security, infectious diseases, climate change, natural disasters, conflicts, financial crises and poverty. These are unprecedented, pressing and growing challenges that make the world more unstable and unpredictable.	<p>“Asia still faces numerous challenges,” (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>“The cause of peace and development is as lofty as it is challenging,” (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>“In a time of sluggish economic growth and recovery as well as global turbulence and unending conflicts...” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“The international situation has become more unstable, uncertain and unpredictable,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p>
Changes at the international level	The world is experiencing significant changes at the international level: the rise of developing countries, the shifts in the international order/global landscape, multi polarization (shifts in global power), economic globalization. These constitute a new era in international affairs.	<p>“New era calls for a new mentality” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“The world is caught up in a historical process of increasingly fast evolution,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“We live in an increasingly multi-polar and globalized world,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“One of the defining changes has been the fact that a large number of developing countries, including China and African countries, have entered the historical phase of fast development,” (Wang 25-6-19)</p>
World must unite to face an uncertain future	In the face of changes and challenges, there is an uncertain future. The world is at a crossroads: do we choose cooperation or seclusion? In this context, countries of the world must unite.	<p>“All countries in this global village need to work together like passengers in the same boat, rather than sail against the current of our times,” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“Human society has once again come to a crossroads of history,” (Li-10-12-17)</p> <p>“What has happened to the world and how should we respond?” (Xi 18-1-17)</p> <p>“United we stand, divided we fall,” (Xi 18-1-17)</p>
Criticisms of Cold War mentalities and	Cold War/zero-sum/law of the jungle/clash of civilization mentalities should be abandoned. It is confrontational, outdated and inefficient.	“We must never allow the law of the jungle to rule the world, nor should we accept the zero-sum game that puts the weak at the mercy of the strong,” (Wang 25-6-19)

zero-sum thinking	Hegemony needs to be rejected.	<p>“Any rhetoric to stir up clash of civilizations or trumpet the superiority of a certain civilization runs counter to the endeavor to create a community of shared future for mankind,” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“Cold war mentality, power politics, unilateralism and protectionism still manifest themselves,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p>
Global governance reform is needed or desired	The current system of global governance requires improvement. Many countries of the world are looking for answers on how to achieve this.	<p>“Countries are eagerly looking for solutions to such questions as to how to uphold the post-war international order,” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“We should actively promote reform of global economic governance,” (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>“We should keep abreast of the changing times, think outside the box and develop new ways of cooperation so as to find new solutions to old problems and good solutions to new problems,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“Unilateralism and protectionism have jeopardized global growth, promoting concerns and opposition around the globe,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p>
Reform needs to be inclusive	Global governance reform needs to address the inequalities in the international system by representing the voices and interests of all countries.	<p>“[CSFM] reflects the shared expectation of most countries, serves the common interests of the international community.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“The vision is an inclusive one. The community of shared future for mankind is in itself an open and inclusive system that holds bright prospects.” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“...improving the system so that it can better reflect the changing realities, increase the representation and say of developing countries, and bring greater democracy in international relations.” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“...reject dominance by just one or several countries. All countries should jointly shape the future of the world, write international rules, manage global affairs and ensure that development outcomes are shared by all.” (18/1/17)</p>

**Storyline 2: Shared Fate of the World**

Globalization has intertwined the interests and fate of all countries of the world. Benefits are shared, and there are common dreams between China and other countries. China has specific and shared interests with actors such as the U.S. and European, Asian and African countries.

Themes	Description	Examples
Benefits and interests of all countries are common and intertwined	<p>The benefits, interests and fate of countries/regions are intertwined with each other due to globalization. There are shared developmental desires. China has benefited from this global interconnection and will share the benefits of its development with that of the world.</p> <p>Note: this refers to shared benefits and interests of the world in general, rather than that of specific regions/bilateral relations.</p>	<p>“Force of globalization have transformed our world into a global village. The interests of countries have never been so closely interconnected,” (Liu 21-11-14)</p> <p>“For us Chinese, China will do well only when the world does well, and vice versa,” (Xi 18-1-17)</p> <p>“Development is the top priority for all countries,” (Xi 18-1-17)</p> <p>“Interconnection and interdependence between countries become an inescapable reality. In such a world, all countries rise and fall together.” Yang (14-7-18)</p>
Shared dream between China and other countries	<p>The Chinese Dream of rejuvenation is connected and related to the dream of the world and other countries. Other countries also have a similar dream.</p>	<p>“Chinese dream is increasingly linked with the dream of the world,” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“All countries are entitled to development and progress, a right that both the Chinese and African people are exercising in our abiding pursuit of the Chinese Dream and the African Dream,” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“All countries belong to one big family as they live on the same planet they call home, with their dreams and futures closely linked,” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“Embracing the principles of mutual respect, equality and win-win cooperation, Asian countries ushered in the age of Asian rejuvenation...” (Liu 21-11-14)</p>
Shared struggles and interests between China and developing countries	<p>China has shared struggles, history and interests with developing countries (namely African ones).</p>	<p>“China and Africa have always been a community with a shared future. We share similar sufferings and struggle in our histories, and are faced with the same tasks of development,” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“We [China and Africa] fought together for national liberation and political independence. We joined hands in developing our countries and achieving independent development. We cherish the same vision for a multipolar world and greater democracy in IR,” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“Both being big developing countries, China and India have far greater shared strategic interests than concrete differences...” (Wang 10-12-17)</p>

<p>Shared struggles and interests between China and Asian countries</p>	<p>As an Asian country, China has a shared history of conflict and development with other Asian countries.</p>	<p>“The interests of Asian countries have become intertwined,” (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>“Asia is also confronted with various traditional and non-traditional security threats. Hence it remains an uphill battle for Asian countries to grow the economy, improve people’s livelihood and eliminate poverty,” (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>“As a big Asian nation with 14 neighbors on land and 8 across the sea, China knows only too well that it depends on Asia for peace and development, and that its hope and future lies in building the Asian community of shared destiny,” (Liu 21-11-14)</p> <p>“Since the end of the Cold War, Asian countries were finally able to focus on development and on exploring a path suited to their national conditions,” (Liu 21-11-14)</p>
<p>Positive China-U.S. relations benefit everyone</p>	<p>The China-US relationship is important for the interests of each nation and the rest of the world. Their interests are intertwined and impact the international community.</p>	<p>“Sustained, sound and steady growth of China-US relationship not only serves the fundamental interests of our two peoples, but also meets the common aspiration of the international community.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“The China-US relationship affects not just the wellbeing of the two countries but also that of the world.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“The ever more extensive cooperation and close exchanges at different levels have tied the two countries’ interests closely together.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p>
<p>Common interests between China and Europe</p>	<p>There are shared interests and goals between China and Europe.</p>	<p>“China and Europe share extensive common interests.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China and Europe have continued to make fresh headway in the development of the partnership for peace, growth, reform and progress of civilization.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“Our friends in Europe say that a single tree cannot block the chilly wind. And Chinese people say that when big rivers have water, the small ones are filled; and when small rivers have water, the big ones are filled. All these sayings speak to one same truth, that is, only through win-win-cooperation can we make big and sustainable achievements that are beneficial to all.” (Xi 28-3-15)</p>



**Storyline 3: Chinese wisdom and solutions can solve global governance issues**

Chinese wisdom and ideas can help address international issues and limitations in the global governance system. China is dedicated to the cause of peace and development and can use its economic growth and philosophical traditions to improve the international system. It does not desire to overturn it.

Themes	Description	Examples
China's phenomenal progress and development	China has achieved remarkable development and progress in the past few years. It has done so according to its own, peaceful path of development.	<p>"China has made historic achievements and registered historic changes in wide-ranging areas," (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>"It is peaceful development, not predatory expansion, that has enabled China, a country one mired in poverty and backwardness, to grow into the world's second largest economy," (Yang-14-7-18)</p> <p>"China has blazed its own path to strength and prosperity," (Wang 1-9-17)</p>
China contributes to mankind by preserving peace or development	China has and will make contributions to the peace and development of the world.	<p>"Making new and greater contribution for mankind is our Party abiding mission." (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>"China is emerging as the most positive factor in the evolution of the international system and the most dynamic force for improving global governance," (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>"China is not only advocating world peace and security, but also taking concrete actions toward these goals. China has long been a staunch force for global peace and prosperity." (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>"This demonstrated China's desire for peace and contributed Chinese wisdom to world peace," (Xi-18-1-17)</p>
Chinese perspectives and proposals are needed	The Chinese have answers and solutions to issues in global governance. Their approaches and past experiences can help resolve problems, making them necessary and useful. CSFM in particular is a way to answer pressing global governance questions of today.	<p>CSFM "...answers the important question of where the human society should go," (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>"Based on our experience, we have developed a Chinese approach to resolving hotspot issues..." (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>"In a time of sluggish economic growth and recovery...the judgment and leadership of global statesmen and the ability to take swift action are more sought after than gold. President Xi's visit to Davos early this year was such a trip that has boosted global confidence and charted the way forward for economic globalization," (Wang 10-12-17).</p> <p>"China is emerging as the most positive factor in the evolution of the international system and the most dynamic force of improving global governance," (Wang 10-12-17).</p>
China wants to improve,	Chinese efforts in global governance are	"China's participation in global governance reform is not meant to

<p>not overturn the international system</p>	<p>not to overturn the current liberal international system but to improve it by making it more representative of all countries in the world.</p>	<p>overhaul the system or start a new structure, but to improve the current system,” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China has no intention to change or displace the United States,” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“The global governance reform that China takes part in is not about overturning the current system and starting all over again. Instead, it is about improving the system so that it can better reflect the changing realities, increase the representation and say of developing countries, and bring greater democracy in international relations,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“What we need to do is to improve the mechanisms and means to more effectively resolve disputes...” (Xi 18-1-17)</p>
<p>Chinese traditions of peace and harmony</p>	<p>CSFM and other foreign policy principles/policies are guided by China’s historical and philosophical traditions of harmony and peace.</p>	<p>“These twin objectives [a new form of international relations and CSFM] are inspired by the fine traditions of the 5000-year Chinese culture emphasizing the pursuit of the common good,” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>CSFM “...aims to promote world peace and prosperity. It is a vision with distinct Chinese features,” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“The fundamental nature of China's diplomacy is for peace, and peace constitutes the nature and a prerequisite of the vision of a community of shared future for mankind,” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“For several millennia, peace has been in the blood of us Chinese and a part of our DNA,” (Xi 18-1-17)</p>
<p>CSFM is warmly received by the international community</p>	<p>CSFM has wide recognition and support from the international community.</p>	<p>“This vision has received warm response from the wider international community,” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“A growing number of Chinese initiatives have become international consensus; a growing number of Chinese propositions have been translated into global actions; and a growing number of opportunities generated by China have been shared by other countries around the world,” (Wang-1-9-17)</p> <p>“It reflects the shared expectation of most countries, serves the common interests of the international community, and is therefore receiving wider recognition and support,” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p>
<p>Peaceful Coexistence</p>	<p>The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been a hallmark of Chinese foreign policy since the 1950s. They include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each</p>	<p>“China remains firm in its commitment to strengthening friendship and cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Coexistence.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China, India and Myanmar initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to reflect the spirit of law in international relations.” (Liu 21-</p>

	other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It is regarded by the CCP as a time-tested, successful pillar of Chinese foreign policy and is cited as an example of Chinese wisdom/ideas and a policy they will continue to adhere to.	11-14)  “...many principles [Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence] have emerged in the evolution of international relations and become widely accepted.” (Xi 18-1-17).
New type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation	Like CSFM, a ‘new type of international relations’ is another Chinese concept heavily circulated internationally by the leadership. It is referred to as a goal in itself, as well as a way to achieve a CSFM. It features win-win cooperation. A ‘new type of international relations’ outlines relations based on dialogue and non-confrontation, and state-to-state relationships based on partnerships rather than alliances. The notion of partnerships contrasts that of U.S.-led alliances.	“Forging a new type of international relations will pave the way for building a community with a shared future for mankind.” (Zheng 26-3-18)  “China believe it is essential to advance peace, development and win-win cooperation, foster a new form of international relations and build a community with a shared future for mankind.” (Wang 10-12-17)  “China is committed to building a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind, thereby contributing even more to the development and prosperity of mankind, an aspiration shared world over.” (Yang 14-7-18).
Chinese partnerships rather than U.S. alliances	China advocates for an international system based on a partnership network rather than the U.S. alliance system, which was born during the Cold War. Whilst U.S. style alliances are generally grounded in security deterrence, the Chinese partnership system emphasizes economic cooperation.	“This vision [CSFM] champion communication, not confrontation, and partnership, not alliance.” (Zheng 26-3-18)  “...find a new path for state-to-state interactions featuring dialogue and partnership rather than confrontation and alliance.” (Wang 31-5-16)  “We have made the forging of partnerships as a golden rule in our relations with other countries.” (Yang 14-7-18)  “...embark on a new path of state-to-state relations where dialogue and partnership prevail over confrontation and alliance.” (Wang 10-12-17)

#### Storyline 4: Chinese Victimization/Anti-West storyline

There are anti-Chinese forces (often Western ones) which seek to negatively characterize China and its international efforts. They unfoundedly criticize China and exhibit a lack of understanding about China. China is a fair, just and responsible power, and will never seek hegemony in Africa or elsewhere. Western countries should not meddle and intervene in internal or regional affairs.

Themes	Description	Examples
Unfounded and unfair critiques of china	There are anti-Chinese forces that try to undermine China by putting forth negative narratives and critiques, which are groundless and unfair.	“For some time, however, some outside forces have attempted to vilify and undermine China-Africa cooperation by fabricating the so-called “neo-colonialism” and debt trap. This is totally groundless.” (Wang 25-6-19)  “[China has]...resolutely refuted the unfounded accusations made by

		<p>some countries and anti-China forces...” (Li 10-12-17)</p> <p>“[These efforts have]...offset the disturbances inflicted by the US, other Western countries and anti-China elements under the pretext of human rights.” (Li 10-12-17)</p> <p>“We have...adeptly used UN rules and procedures to make sure that we hold a high ground of morality and rules compliance in fighting anti-China forces,” (Li 10-12-17)</p>
<p>China is a fair, just and responsible power</p>	<p>Unlike descriptions of China by anti-Chinese forces, China is a responsible and fair great power. China will never seek hegemony, and will act in a sincere, fair and equal manner in its relations with developing and African countries.</p>	<p>“China never goes after selfish geo-political gains in Africa and never imposes its own will on others. China’s approach to cooperation with Africa has been entirely different from that of traditional powers.” (25-6-19)</p> <p>“No matter how advanced it may become, China will never seek hegemony, nor will it seek expansion or spheres of influence.” (Yang 14-7-18).</p> <p>“China has established its reputation as a major country committed to improving people’s well-being, honoring acceded agreements, and enhancing international cooperation.” (Li 10-12-17)</p> <p>“We will pursue common development with African countries in a spirit of sincerity,” (Xi 18-1-17)</p>
<p>The West should not intervene in internal affairs of other countries</p>	<p>China is firmly against Western intervention into its domestic affairs.</p>	<p>“No interference will weaken our resolve to strengthen cooperation with Africa.” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“All of us must oppose interference in other countries’ internal affairs and reject attempt to destabilize the [Asian] region out of selfish motives.” (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>“Based on lessons from history, we do not favor outside interference in internal affairs of Asian countries...outside intervention would only complicate matters further.” (Liu 21-11-14)</p> <p>“China has thwarted some countries’ attempts to...interfere in China’s internal affairs in the Human Rights Council,” (Li 10-12-17)</p>
<p>Chinese partnerships rather than U.S. alliances</p>	<p>Alliances are an outdated feature of the Cold War era, where IR was characterized by bipolarity and zero-sum thinking. Alliances are a U.S.-led system, and China advocates for partnerships instead of alliances.</p>	<p>“To create a community of shared future mankind calls on all countries to abandon the outdated mindset of seeking alliance...” (Wang 31-5-16)</p> <p>“...state to state relations that features dialogue rather than confrontation and partnership instead of alliance.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“..Explore partnerships that are inclusive and constructive instead of targeting at an imagined enemy or any third party.” (Wang 31-5-16)</p>

<b>Storyline 5: Increasing Chinese presence and power in the international system</b>		
<p>With China's remarkable economic progress, it is moving to the center international stage, with increased participation and voice in global affairs. It has increased soft power, and is able to reshape and influence global norms and values to its favor. China is active in multilateral platforms and contributes greatly to global peace and development.</p>		
<b>Themes</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Examples</b>
China is reshaping global norms and values to its favor	China is influencing and reshaping international norms and values. This is prominent mostly in the field of human rights, as well as cyberspace and development.	<p>"China will continue to be responsive to the new trend and take initiatives to shape the new normal in our favor." (Xi 28-3-15)</p> <p>"China has been actively engaged in rules-making in new areas such as cyberspace and outer space, to contribute to forming fair and equitable international rules." (Liu 21-11-14)</p> <p>"We need to. Shape the international order and global governance system in a way that serves the interest of developing countries," (Yang 24-6-19).</p>
Increased Chinese voice in international issues	China is becoming more present on the international stage. It has an increased voice and presence.	<p>"The new era will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contribution to mankind." (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>"We have made fresh headway in increasing our say on human rights issues." (Li 10-12-17)</p> <p>"China will fully and deeply participate in global human rights governance." (Li 10-12-17)</p>
Increased Chinese soft power	China is increasing its international soft power.	<p>"These proactive efforts have helped to enhance China's soft power and influence in international human rights arena by translating domestic governance philosophies into international consensus." (Li 10-12-17)</p> <p>"These propositions have further enriched the core values of China's foreign policy and received wide recognition from the international community, particularly developing countries. They have become a hallmark of the soft power of socialist China." (Wang 1-9-17)</p>
China's phenomenal progress and development	China has achieved remarkable development and progress in the past few years. It has done so according to its own, peaceful path of development.	<p>"China has made historic achievements and registered historic changes in wide-ranging areas," (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>"It is peaceful development, not predatory expansion, that has enabled China, a country one mired in poverty and backwardness, to grow into the world's second largest economy," (Yang-14-7-18)</p> <p>"China has blazed its own path to strength and prosperity," (Wang 1-9-17)</p>

Chinese participation in multilateral platforms	China has joined, participated and lead in numerous regional and international organizations. It will participate and advocate for multilateral cooperation, regimes and committees.	<p>“It became the most extensively attended and most highly represented multilateral diplomatic event that China had initiated and hosted.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“China will work with all parties to uphold free trade and the multilateral trading regime, which we believe serve the shared interests of all countries in the world.” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“Chinese experts currently serve on multilateral human rights committees including the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee.” (Li 10-12-17)</p> <p>“China’s support for multilateralism will increase as the country continues to develop itself.” (Xi 18-1-17).</p>
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**Storyline 6: China as a Champion of Multilateralism**

Multilateralism is a way of operating in the international system that includes active cooperation with other actors to manage burden-sharing and deliver public goods. It contrasts unilateralism or bilateralism. China is a champion of the multilateral regime and multilateral platforms/institutions, especially the United Nations. Multilateralism helps build and maintain a multipolar world, which is the current trend of the times. Multilateralism is especially important in the face of an uncertain global future. China’s dedication to multilateral system can be seen in its participation and support in multilateral institutions.

Themes	Description	Examples
Criticisms of unilateralism/bilateralism	An international system that is characterized by unilateralism or bilateralism stands in the way of development and peace. China is opposed to unilateralism and bilateralism.	<p>“For some time now, unilateralism and protectionism have jeopardized global growth.” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“Against the backdrop of rising unilateralism and protectionism ...China and Africa need to...take a clear stand against unilateralism, protectionism and bullsh in all manifestations.” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“China will not support or accept the demands of any party that are inconsistent with the resolutions or measures that go beyond the resolutions, still less unilateral actions, for they will only undermine the unity of the Security Council and the legitimate interests of other countries.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p>
Multi-polarization is the trend of the times	The current international context is characterized by the rise of developing countries and emerging economies. With increased actors, multi polarization is the trend of the times.	<p>“We [China and Africa] cherish the same vision for a multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations.” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“The international situation continues to experience profound and complex changes, with significant development in multi polarization...” (Xi 28-3-15).</p>

		<p>“We live in an increasingly multi-polar and globalized world.” (Yang 14-7-18)</p>
<p>The world must unite to face an uncertain future</p>	<p>In the face of an uncertain future, the world must unite and cooperate. Multilateralism is a way to achieve cooperation, in a manner that can incorporate many actors and parties in the multipolar international system.</p>	<p>“All countries living in this global village need to work together like passengers in the same boat, rather than sail against the current of our times.” (Wang 25-6-19)</p> <p>“In the face of difficulty, instead of making complaints or blaming others, we should come together and rise to the challenge.” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“No matter how long and difficult the journey may be, those who work together and never give up will eventually prevail,” (Xi 28-3-15)</p>
<p>The UN at the core of the international system</p>	<p>The UN is a legitimate and efficient multilateral institution. China advocates for its continued central presence in the multilateral system.</p>	<p>“We stand for multilateralism, resolutely uphold the authority and stature of the United Nations, and support the UN in playing an active role in international affairs.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China fully supports the United Nations and multilateralism.” (Wang 10-12-18)</p> <p>“China is a staunch supporter of the basic norms governing international relations underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN charter.” (Yang 14-7-18)</p>
<p>Chinese participation in multilateral platforms</p>	<p>China has and/or will continue to participate in multilateral institutions and practices.</p>	<p>“We support the multilateral trading regime,” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China has promoted the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank,” (Wang 1-9-17)</p> <p>“We will make funds available to peace and development oriented programs proposed by the UN and its agencies in Geneva on a priority basis.” (Xi 18-1-17)</p>
<p>Multilateralism promotes peace and development</p>	<p>Multilateral institutions, agendas and activities promote global peace and development.</p>	<p>“ASEAN-led multilateral security frameworks such as the ASEAN regional forum and ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus have gone a long way to deepening regional security dialogue and cooperation.” (Liu 21-11-14)</p> <p>“China supports the successful operation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other new multilateral financial institutions in order to provide more public goods to the international community.” (Xi 18-1-17).</p> <p>“Multilateralism is an effective way to preserve peace and promote development.” (Xi 18-17)</p>
<p>China as a defender of</p>	<p>A multilateral system, with its shared and</p>	<p>“We respect the choice of the people of all countries and endeavor to</p>

<p>developing countries</p>	<p>fair solutions and proposals, can increase the voice and representation of developing countries. China advocates for multilateralism and serves as a representative for developing countries on the world stage.</p>	<p>uphold fairness and justice. We believe that countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China maintains that issues in the world must be resolved through consultation by people of all countries and that the benefits of global governance must be shared by all countries and people of different social strata and groups.” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“Countries have an equal voice in decision-making, constituting an important force for improving global governance.” ( Xi 18-1-17)</p>
<p>China wants to improve, not overturn the international system</p>	<p>China wishes to sustain the current international system, which is a liberal one characterized by multilateral institutions and efforts.</p>	<p>“China's participation in global governance reform is not meant to overhaul the system or start a new structure, but to improve the current system,” (Zheng 26-3-18)</p> <p>“China has no intention to change or displace the United States,” (Wang 10-12-17)</p> <p>“The global governance reform that China takes part in is not about overturning the current system and starting all over again. Instead, it is about improving the system so that it can better reflect the changing realities, increase the representation and say of developing countries, and bring greater democracy in international relations,” (Yang 14-7-18)</p> <p>“What we need to do is to improve the mechanisms and means to more effectively resolve disputes...” (Xi 18-1-17)</p>