



## **Intelligence leadership**

A research on the influence of Intelligence Leadership in the Netherlands: The Heads of the BVD and AIVD



Universiteit  
Leiden

**Author:** Marijn Adams

**Student number:** 1760653

**Date:** 29-01-2018

**Supervisors:** prof. dr. P.H.A.M. Abels & drs. W.J.M. Aerdt

Crisis and Security Management

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Leiden University



## **Foreword**

This thesis in front of you is the result of four months of hard work. It represents the final work of my study Crisis and Security Management and the end of my time as a student. I studied for over six and a half years, of which I enjoyed every single minute. In these years I was able to develop and enrich myself by making make new friends, be part of several projects, commissions, internships and jobs. After the bachelor public administration in Rotterdam I followed my true interest and started the master Crisis and Security Management in The Hague. I finished the master Public Management in between, and know now that I want to work in the public security domain. I am very happy I choose the intelligence topic for my master thesis, this was a unique chance to research this world that intrigued me for over many years. I was able to speak to interesting people that were involved in this field, the interviews have been a pleasure to do. Several persons have been important throughout my time as a student and in the graduation period, I want to thank them for their help and support.

First I want to thank prof. dr. Paul Abels and drs. Willemijn Aerdts for their supervision during the thesis process from the Leiden University. Paul and Willemijn introduced me into the intriguing world of intelligence organizations. I was given the room to conduct my own research and was able to speak to several interesting people involved due to their help. It created the ideal circumstances to finish this thesis within four months.

I also want to thank my parents, Camiel, lisanne and Chantal. Thank you for the unconditional support during my study. You believed in me and where there for me, you gave me the extra push whenever I needed it, I appreciate that.

I hope that you enjoy reading this thesis!

Marijn Adams



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## Abstract

The leadership role of the Head of the intelligence organization is a unique one. The Heads are responsible for ensuring national security, faced with a complexity of threats, and have to operate in a political environment of stakeholders. The Head of the intelligence organization is the only public ‘face’ and ‘voice’ of their organization. It makes their job one of the most important within their nation, but also one of the least understood, due to the secrecy around it. Leading this type of organization in a democracy seems to require special qualities – it does not have a pre-written manual.

The general intelligence organizations in the Netherlands, that are part of this research, started as the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) under the lead of Louis Einthoven in 1949, the BVD changed their name into de Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst in 2002 and is currently under the lead of Rob Bertholee. The BVD and AIVD exist for over sixty-five years. The BVD was established in times when the Communist threat was a substantial threat, the AIVD is active in times when the threats are more fragmented and complex. The authorities, focus, execution of tasks and enemies changed, but the main goal of the organization remained the same; ensuring national security in the Netherlands.

Different Heads of the BVD and AIVD have used their skills and capacities to lead their organization and to make it develop in the best possible way. An important question arises how the Heads of the BVD and AIVD have governed their organization; what is their influence on the BVD and AIVD? Therefore, this study aims to provide an answer on the following question: *“What is the influence of the Heads of the general intelligence services in the Netherlands – BVD and AIVD - on the development of these organizations?”*.

To give an answer on this research question a qualitative research is conducted. I used the methods of desk research and interviews to generate empiric material about this topic. With this I created a rich analysis, using the theory of Robarge (2010), of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. The results generated valuable insights in different patterns, missions, time frames and skills of the Heads of the BVD and AIVD. It gained knowledge in their strategies of leading their organization, in how they managed the internal and external organization. The results show that the Heads have influenced ‘their’ organization in different ways over the years. Their influence can be divided in two parts. The first part was before the fall of the Berlin wall: the different Heads made the BVD grow gradually and develop without major changes needed for the organization, the orientation was internal. Also, the first steps were made in generating more openness and rethinking the threat perception of the organization. In the second part the BVD and AIVD were reorganized to make it move with the times and be prepared for new threats; globalization and technology had created bigger challenges than before and were asking for more authorities. The Heads had to deal with openness and transparency due to involvement of the outside world. The analysis of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD also derived the influence of the time frame the organizations are subjected to. The Head of the organization is subject of the time frame in which developments take place that influence the work of the BVD and AIVD. Due to this time frame certain variables are more important than others, some variables disappear and new appear. This also means that some of the Heads that have delivered a ‘good’ organization to their successor, might not have fitted well in other time frames. Important variables that are appointed for leading the AIVD in the upcoming years are independency, diplomatic manager, the international aspect and a well-considered choice in openness and transparency for an effective organization.



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 In lead of the Dutch intelligence organization – a special job

*“The new headquarter of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD). The fear of every terrorist or political activist. Today the new 007-headquarter of the Netherlands is opened by Minister Dales (Ministry of Interior) and yesterday the Dutch press was given the opportunity to look behind the scenes of the Dutch secret service. (...) You do not need to know the royal decree to know that this piece of Leidschendam is a forbidden area to enter for the outside world. (...) Once the journalists are inside they get a lot to see, but not really a lot. ‘What is secret, has to remain secret’ tells the Head of the BVD Arthur Docters van Leeuwen. (...) For the first time in the history of the BVD the door had opened for the press. (...) The tour brings us around different sections, also the workroom of Docters van Leeuwen, who was finishing the writing of his speech for today. A 007-headquarter located behind a moat in Leidschendam.” (De Telegraaf, 1993).*

The example in the Dutch newspaper ‘De Telegraaf’ (1993) is a rare example of the Dutch intelligence organization generate this amount of openness about their organization. Intelligence organizations do their work in secrecy, outside the spotlights, to protect their sources and employees. Secrecy makes it for the outside world hard to get a clear picture of these organizations. Employees of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) and the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) are seldom seen in public, for security reasons they cover their work from the outside world (Abels, *to appear*). The only exception on this rule are the Heads of the intelligence organization, they are the public ‘face’ and ‘voice’ of the organization. The Heads of the intelligence organizations have a special position, they have the authority to take decisions that can have different outcomes in different time frames and situations.

The role of the Head in managing the intelligence organization could be compared with that of a CEO of a big company. Despite this similarity their leadership position is unique due to several reasons: the important task of ensuring national security, the complexity of threats they are faced with, balancing with secrets on the edge of openness and the relation with the political arena (Abels, *to appear*). The Head of the BVD and AIVD walks on the knife’s edge between politics and politicization, are the scapegoat for intelligence missteps that are often committed years before and have to deal with the overarching reality that this might be one of the least understood and most misrepresented confessions there is, not only by the public, but by many policymakers (Dulles, 1963; in Robarge, 2010). Leading an organization as the BVD or AIVD - that is in a democratic context seen as a unique and sometimes even anachronistic organization – requires special qualities (Abels, *to appear*).

Intelligence organizations work in secrecy, how they work and what their activities are remains secret for outsiders. Intelligence organizations are governmental devices with the main task of gathering intelligence, that is being analyzed and forwarded to public organizations (Lowenthal, 2009; in Hijzen, 2016). The information consists of political, economic, military, social and cultural nature that helps policy makers, politicians and other authorities to shape their policy and decisions on the field of security (Hijzen, 2016). Intelligence organizations are active outside the borders. The BVD and AIVD are civil intelligence organizations, focused on non-military, often political, economical or other information (Van Reijn 2010; in Hijzen, 2016).

The history of the Dutch intelligence organizations goes back many decades, way before the BVD and AIVD were established. The working methods and activities changed throughout the years. The different Heads of the BVD and AIVD have led the organization through different time frames, starting in the Cold War with the Communist threat and currently with more fragmented and globalized threats that are related to terrorism, radicalization and cyber-attacks. The role of (social) media, politicians and the involvement of society has changed throughout the years. The Heads had to use their qualities to anticipate on the changing environment and had to (re)organize the internal organization to make it move with the times. This put the leadership role of every single Head of the organization more in the spotlight than before.

The newspaper article in the start of this introduction is an example of how a Head of the Dutch intelligence organization deliberately choose to give more openness. Each of the Heads made different choices when a certain time frame or critical moment arrived or a mission or order was given. This raises question how they execute their job and what patterns occur. Intelligence leaders all around the world have a unique job description, that differs in every nation, and that can be executed in different ways. This research zooms in on the intelligence organizations in the Netherlands: ‘de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst’ and ‘de Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst’ and investigates the unique position of the Heads of the BVD and AIVD.

## **1.2 Problem outline**

### **Goal of this research**

The general intelligence organizations have been organizations with a closed culture from the beginning. People working in the field of intelligence tend to avoid publicity and have to keep their affiliation with the services secret for reasons of security and vulnerability. The Heads of these organization are the only exemption on this rule, they are the public ‘face’ and ‘voice’ of their organizations. The Heads have a public function and a big influence on the internal and external development of their organizations, their role is comparable to that of a CEO in international business. Due to the secrecy that surrounds these organizations it is nevertheless very difficult to get a clear picture of their leadership performance. To get more knowledge about the influence of leadership within general intelligence organizations this research focuses on the Heads of the Dutch BVD and the AIVD. The goal of this research is formulated:

*“Gather knowledge about the role and influence of the Heads of the Dutch general intelligence organizations -BVD and AIVD- on the development of these organizations”.*

### **Central research question**

To accomplish the goal of this research the following research question is formulated:

*“What is the influence of the heads of the general intelligence organizations in the Netherlands – BVD and AIVD- on the development of these organizations?”.*

## **1.3 Sub questions**

The following sub questions contribute on answering the central research question:

1. *How have the Dutch general intelligence organizations -AIVD and BVD- developed?*

This sub question is a context question that gives understanding in the creation, set-up and work of the BVD and the AIVD. This question is answered by analyzing empirical material.

2. *What are the leadership profiles of the Heads of the Dutch general intelligence organizations –BVD and AIVD-?*

This empirical question gives understanding in the profiles of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. This question will be answered by analyzing policy- and scientific documents, media sources and conducting interviews.

- 2.1 *What are the leadership characterizations of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD?*

- 2.2 *What are the key variables that can be derived from the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD?*

## **1.4 Relevance**

### **1.4.1 Societal relevance**

The general intelligence organizations have become increasingly relevant over the past decades. Terrorist threats in New York or Paris and the rising fear from countries as Russia and North Korea have given extra attention to our intelligence services. The AIVD is expected to prevent the Netherlands from these threats. But critical notes from the media and the public opinion on themes as integrity and privacy generate pressure on this organization. The Head of the AIVD is the only actor, apart from the responsible minister, who can step outside his organization and react. They are the public 'face' of their organization and are important to defend them in times of discussion, reforms and developments. This is a unique role that cannot be compared with any other leadership role. They need to lead these organizations successfully to ensure a safe and stable society. In times when the threat level is rising, the influence of (social) media is growing and new authorities are needed, the leadership role becomes even more important. The research of the performance of the different Heads is interesting to discover the personal attribution to and the influence on the development of the organization they are leading. The societal relevance of this research is that it can provide valuable insights in important elements of leadership in the Dutch intelligence organization.

### **1.4.2 Academic relevance**

The central research question in this research is aimed at obtaining more understanding about the influence of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD on their organization. In scientific literature, there is a lot of attention for leadership (see for example: Yukl, 1981; Smith & Peterson, 1988; Bryman, 1992; Vecchio, 2007), and more specific for public leadership (see for example: Rainey, 1997; Cleveland, 2002; Kellerman & Webster, 2002; Van Wart, 2003; Vogel & Masal, 2016). However, the current body of literature on 'intelligence leadership' is scarce. The role and influence of leadership on the development of the general intelligence organizations in the Netherlands and other nations is limited. Aspects that are related or important for intelligence leaders vary in the scientific literature. Robarge (2010) has developed a straightforward approach to analyze different Heads of the intelligence organization. Yet, this analysis has only been conducted in the United States. An in-depth analysis in the Dutch intelligence organizations could give extensive and valuable insight in intelligence leadership. Scientific insights regarding the influence of intelligence leadership can, in a context of changing threats and rapidly developing technology, be complemented and enriched. The Dutch case of the BVD and AIVD, where ten Heads have led the organization, is in a scientific light very interesting to research.

## **1.5 Reading guide**

This thesis is built up as follows. In the first chapter an introduction is given and the research question and sub-questions were introduced. The main goal of this research is to understand more about the influence of the Heads of the BVD and AIVD. To do this the second chapter will first present the theoretical framework. It is defining the concept of intelligence and what intelligence organizations do. Also, it seeks to presents different typologies of intelligence leaders, characterizations and key variables. In the third chapter the methodology will be described, this includes the operationalization, research strategy and methods. Thereafter, the fourth chapter will provide the context of this research: a brief history of the BVD and AIVD. Then, the fifth chapter will outline the empirical analysis of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. After, Chapter 6, will analyze the empirical findings. Chapter 7 will build the conclusion, and contains the answer to the central research question. Chapter 8 and 9 contain a critical discussion of limitations to this study, and gives recommendations for further avenues for academic research.

## 2. Theoretical framework

-“*Intelligence is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of the professions*”- (Dulles, 1963).

### 2.1 General intelligence services

To define the topic of this research, it is important to elaborate on this from a scientific perspective. By defining the concept ‘intelligence’ and the activities of the general intelligence organizations the content of this research is created and of use for incorporation in the conceptual model.

#### 2.1.1 Defining intelligence - *What is intelligence?*

Into defining the concept of ‘intelligence’ has gone much effort since the early years of the twenty-first century. Even though there is a long history of intelligence, there is still no general accepted definition of intelligence (Gill & Phytian, 2006). This has led to practical problems for the definition of ‘intelligence’. The first problem is that ‘intelligence’ is redefined by different authors. When these new definitions are developed the authors rarely refer to another or they do not build on what has been written before. The second problem is that without a clear definition of intelligence it is hard to develop a theory that can explain how intelligence works (Gill & Phytian, 2006).

Warner (2002) pointed out that there are many competing definitions of the concept of intelligence. The US Department of Defense stated in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for joint Usage the definition of intelligence as; “*The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning*” (US Department of Defense, 1979; in Davies 2004).

The definition of intelligence that arrived at the Brown-Aspin Commission in 1996 showed that governmental thinking about the definition had not evolved despite fifty years of developments (Gill & Phytian, 2006); “*The commission believes it is preferable to define intelligence simply and broadly as information about things foreign – peoples, places, things and events – needed for Government for the conduct of its functions*” (Brown-Aspin Commission, 1996; in Gill & Phytian, 2006).

Gill and Phytian (2006) describe the definition of intelligence that is offered by Loch Johnson (Johnson, 1988; in Gill & Phytian) as an advancement; “*the knowledge – and ideally foreknowledge – sought by nations in response to external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the well-being of their own people*”. This definition of intelligence brings the security element to the center-stage and introduces the vital ingredient of prior-knowledge. Criticism on this definition is that it does not distinguish between the collection of targeted information and the subsequent analysis that frames it, thereby providing policy options for decision-makers (Gill & Phytian, 2006).

Warner (2002) highlighted the ‘poverty’ and diversity of intelligence definitions. Gill and Phytian (2006) summarized the discussion about the definition of intelligence; intelligence needs more than merely information collection, covers a range of linked activities, is security-based, aims at providing a warning in advance, encompasses the potential for intelligence agencies or other entities to engage covert action as a possible response, and that secrecy is essential to the comparative advantage being aimed for. The definition of intelligence that is created from this collection is used in this research (Gill & Phytian, 2006):

-“*Intelligence is the umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination – conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that follow for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including, where deemed desirable, covert activities*”-

### **2.1.2 Activities of the general intelligence service - *What do they do?***

The concept of ‘intelligence’ has been defined in the previous chapter. The next step is to define what general intelligence organizations do. Intelligence organizations around the globe differ in tasks, expertise and authorities. The main activities of general intelligence organizations will be explained and elaborated on.

Intelligence organizations operate largely in secret, they conduct activities to secure the safety of a nation. The ‘business’ of intelligence organizations is identifying threats, the collection and interpretation of information is one of the most important tasks (Gill & Pythian, 2006). Without sufficiently serious threats, their need becomes less clear, which will influence their budget. But this explanation of the activities of general intelligence organizations is narrowly defined. General intelligence organizations do more, Johnson (2003) has created a comprehensive description of the activities of the general intelligence organizations based on the United States; “*Intelligence may be thought of as three kinds of activities carried out by secretive agencies: first, the gathering, interpreting, and distribution of information (collection and analysis, for short); second, clandestine attempts to manipulate events abroad (covert action); and, third, the guarding against the hostile operations of foreign intelligence agencies (counterintelligence)*” (Johnson, 1996; in Johnson, 2003).

#### *Collection and analysis*

One of the basic tasks of the intelligence organizations is the collection and interpretation of information. Intelligence organizations will seek access to a wide array of information resources, both public and secret, which will offer warnings to protect a nation (Johnson, 2003). A model that describes the flow of activities that is necessary for the collection and interpretation of information of intelligence organizations is the Intelligence Cycle. This Cycle is based on how intelligence professionals conceptually think of their work (Johnson, 2003; Gill & Pythian, 2006). The cycle consists of five phases that can be considered as a process of discrete steps, moving from early deliberations over questions of intelligence targeting tot the final distribution of information to policy makers (Johnson, 2003). The first phase is the ‘*planning and giving direction*’ to the gathering of data; decide what data should be gathered from around the world. Choices that have to be made are about the scope of collection, and the distortions that arise as a result of flawed communications between intelligence employees and policy makers about the information that should be gathered (Johnson, 2003). The second phase consists the ‘*collection*’ of data, which means that the tasks requirements need to be translated into specific targets; nations, organizations, NGO’s, individuals or other topics of interest. The third phase exists of ‘*processing*’ the information that is collected by the intelligence organizations. The collected data is in most cases unreadable for policy makers to use; satellite photos need to be specified, telephone interceptions need to be translated. The fourth phase consists of the ‘*analysis*’ of intelligence information; the interpretation of people that understand the topic, country or group regarding the question (Johnson, 2003). Raw and unevaluated data is placed into the right context. The fifth and last phase is the dissemination of the information gathered by the intelligence organizations. The information must make its way into the hands of the people that make decisions. This step is often the most difficult in the

intelligence cycle because the information must have certain key attributes before it will be appreciated and used by policy officials (Johnson, 2003).

#### *Covert action*

The more 'aggressive' the mission of intelligence organizations is, the more covert the activity of action, that is focused on events abroad to advance a nation's interest (Johnson, 2010). Covert action has primary forms such as propaganda, political and economic action, and paramilitary operations (Johnson, 2003). These activities can include the spread of fake news in foreign media, bribing politicians, and providing weapons to a militia in a civil war. Covert action is a 'quiet' option for nation states in comparison with sending in soldiers, and 'quicker' than the glacial pace of diplomacy (Johnson, 2003).

Covert action is appealing for nation states that are engaged in an ideological or military struggle against an (aggressive) global entity. Nations states who find themselves more free of major provocations or confrontations overseas are less eager to use covert action. Covert action is more obvious when there is no consensus in a nation for open military interventions against an enemy or supposed threat (Ransom 1987; in Johnson, 2003).

The downside of covert action is that it can be very expensive, especially the long-term operations. Military actions can inflict damage on the short term, without much financial costs. The more prolonged covert actions, are expensive to maintain and continue (Johnson, 2003).

#### *Counterintelligence*

The last important mission of intelligence organizations is to protect their nation against hostile intelligence organizations and other enemies of the state, this is called counter-intelligence (Johnson, 2003). Counterintelligence has two sides: defensive and offensive. The defensive side of counterintelligence ranges from wired fences around agency building, polygraph tests, to encoded communications. The offensive side of counterintelligence ranges from the penetration of a mole of one's own in the opposition, to discovering what sort of operations an enemy nation state has running against the homeland to foil his attacks. Money does also play an important role in conducting counterintelligence (Johnson, 2003)

#### *Distribution of energy into different activities*

The amount of energy put into different activities of the intelligence organizations depends on several key dimensions of intelligence organizations (Johnson, 2003). These dimensions are related to the foreign policy goals and threat perception, the targets, missions and infrastructures, the consumers of intelligence, and the marketing of intelligence of a nation state. These dimensions depend on the scope of a nation's foreign policy objectives, its sense of danger in their own nation and abroad, and its affluence (Johnson, 2003). Leaders of a nation differ in the degree of risk tolerance, as well as to the extent on which they value and use information of the intelligence organizations. Just as important is how well the intelligence organizations respond to these information needs from policymakers, by providing relevant, timely and unbiased reports (Johnson, 2003). This shows that the amount of energy put into intelligence activities by intelligence organizations differs depending on their interests.

## 2.2 Leadership in intelligence organizations

To define intelligence leadership, it is important to elaborate on the scientific literature. By defining the concept 'intelligence leadership' the research topic of this thesis is explained and of use for incorporation in the conceptual model.

### *Leadership – public leadership*

The definition of leadership is described by Cleveland (2002) as: “bringing people together to make something different happen”, this is a simple definition. *“To most people, the importance of leadership is self-evident no matter what the setting. In organizations, effective leadership provides higher-quality and more efficient goods and services; it provides a sense of cohesiveness, personal development, and higher levels of satisfaction among those conducting the work; and it provides an overarching sense of direction and vision, an alignment with the environment, a healthy mechanism for innovation and creativity, and a resource for invigorating the organizational culture”* (Van Wart, 2003). The previous citation is a description of the influence of mainstream leadership by Van Wart (2003). The literature on the field of general leadership, that is dominated by business administration and psychology, is extensive. Literature on leadership in the public sector -or administrative- leadership has also grown extensively in the last decade (Vogel & Masal, 2016).

Leadership in the public sector is different than leadership in the private sector. This brings the discussion on the definition of public leadership. The word public - as in “public” leadership - refers to the sector generally regarded as political, to the domain of individuals and institutions dedicated to governance and public policy (Kellerman & Webster, 2002). The element –public- is different as some of the elements of the context in the public sector are different compared to the private sector, such as the jurisdiction-wide rules for personnel, control by legislatures, the influence of the press, the short tenure of many top executives and the absence of clear and accepted performance measures for their organizations and the activities within them (Rainey, 1997). There is a difference between the position (headship) and the behavior (leadership) of public leaders (Blondel, 1987 & Kellerman, 1984). These two things are connected to each other and influence each other. Characteristics of individual leaders will not be expressed in the same way in every public leadership role. Leaders constitute the institutional function which has also influence on the functioning of the leader itself.

### *Intelligence leadership*

The distinction has been made between general leadership and public leadership, but there is another distinction to be made if we look at the intelligence context. Leadership in intelligence organizations is different compared with private companies or other public organizations (Abels, *to appear*). Employees of the intelligence organizations are rarely seen in public, they need to work in secrecy for security reasons. The only exemption on this rule is the Head of the organization (Abels, *to appear*). The Head of the intelligence organization is the ‘face’ of the organization to the outside world, they therefore need a public profile. Their influence on the internal organization and the image of their organization to the outside world can be compared with the role of CEO of a big company (Abels, *to appear*). The secrecy around their work and organization makes it hard to get a clear picture of their leadership qualities and style. These leaders fulfill an important function, given the great interest they must defend; our national security (Abels, *to appear*). The complexity and multiplicity of threats the intelligence organizations face, the influence and relationships with the political field, and the balancing between secrecy and openness makes their position even more important (Abels, *to appear*). Leading intelligence organizations seemed to be asking for special qualities. The Head of the

intelligence organization must keep an eye on the political, juridical, and organizational contexts; “were faced with foreign penetrations of their intelligence service, and wrestled with matters of transparency, accountability to democratically elected overseers, and adherence to the rule of law” (Moran, 2018). The task of the Head of the intelligence organization is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of the professions according to Dulles (1963). Their task is not only misunderstood by much of the public, but by many of the policymakers and politicians (Robarge, 2010). The Head of the organization is the personal advisor of his president or Minister of Interior, he has the institutional capacity to present him with unbiased, non-departmental intelligence, but also face legal and political constraints (Robarge, 2010).

### *Analyzing Intelligence leadership – the straightforward approach*

There are many models applied to political and corporate leaders that could be used to analyze directors of the intelligence agencies (Note: In this part the ‘Heads’ of the intelligence organization are called ‘directors’, as is usual in the scientific literature that is based on American cases). But directors of intelligence agencies do not fit into prefixed categories such as ‘prudent professionals’ and ‘bold easterners’, they lack the sociological homogeneity needed to be thought of, or think of as themselves, a network of old ‘boys’ (In Robarge, 2010; Alsop, 1968; Hersh, 1992; Jeffreys-Jones, 1985; Spears, 1991; Colby and Forbath 1978).

According to Robarge (2010) the heterogeneity does not mean that the directors cannot be analyzed collectively. Some aspects of different models that are used to analyze public leaders can be used for the analysis of the directors of the intelligence agencies, although empiricism or utility may suffer. Robarge (2010) created the ‘*straightforward approach*’ that takes into account institutional and political limitations on their authority, objectives that were set by their president/minister when they were appointed, and the personality traits they exhibited and managerial methods they used during their term. This straightforward approach can be used answering the following basic questions (Table 1):

<b>Questions (Robarge, 2010)</b>	
1. What were the directors told to do	- <i>their mission?</i>
2. How did they go about doing it	- <i>their style?</i>
3. How well did the directors do what they were expected to do, given their authorities, resources and access	- <i>their record?</i>
4. What types of directors, if any, have been most successful	- <i>patterns?</i>

*Table 1* Basic question straightforward approach (Robarge, 2010)

### **Types of directors**

In the research of Robarge (2010) in the United States of America, in which he used this perspective, five varieties of directors became evident.

#### *1. Administrator-custodian or administrator-technocrat*

The first director that became evident was the administrator-custodian, who was charged with implementing, fine-tuning, reorienting intelligence activities under close direction of the government. These directors are usually appointed at a time of uncertainty about the intelligence community’s role and capabilities. These directors tried to maintain stability in the relationship of the intelligence organization with other organizations, the parliament and the

public. Their main goal is to do better with what they already had, and avoid distractions and scandals that would add to the uncertainty they were trying to manage. The difference between custodians and technocrats is the “energy level”. Custodians had a very low-key style, almost to the point of acting like placeholders and time-servers. The technocrats were different, they pursued administrative changes designed to make the organization more responsive to policymakers and better adapted to a new political environment (Robarge, 2010).

## 2. *Intelligence operator*

The intelligence operators were current or former intelligence professionals, they served the organization for years and had now become the Head of the organization. Intelligence operators are tasked with devising, undertaking, and overseeing an extensive area of espionage, covert action, and counter intelligence programs in aggressive support of the national security policy. This type of directors were internally oriented, having experience with the operational side of policy. These directors knew more than others about what the intelligence organization capabilities were, but were less likely to sound judge of what it should not be doing (Robarge, 2010).

## 3. *Manager reformers*

Directors that were often charged with ‘cleaning up the mess’ and preventing problems such as failures, indiscretions, and other such controversies from happening again. There have been two kind of manager reformers. The first manager reformer is the *insider*: a career intelligence officer who used his experience at the intelligence organization to undertake low-profile, slow and steady changes inside the organization. He redirected activities during or after a time of political controversy and lack of certitude about its direction. The second manager is the *Outsider*: This director is chosen because of his experience in the military, business, government, politics, or academe to complement a major reorganization of the intelligence organization or community, or to regroup and redirect the organization, especially after major operational setbacks or public conflicts over secret activities. The directors in this category are more concerned about achieving their objectives quickly than about angering bureaucratic rivals or about the fostering of ill will among his subordinates. Some of these directors may have been the most disliked or hardest to get along with as they were there to accomplish so much and did not worry about who they antagonized along the way (Robarge, 2010).

## 4. *Restorers*

These directors became directors after the agency went through difficult times, but most often they were not charged with making significant changes in the way the organization did business. They used their people skills and public reputations to raise moral, repair political damage and burnish the organizations reputation. Restorers are known for their personnel shuffling (Robarge, 2010).

### **Type of director (Robarge, 2010)**

1. Administrator- *custodian* or *technocrat*

2. Intelligence operator

3. Manager-reformer- *insider* or *outsider*

4. Restorer

Table 2 Leadership typology intelligence organizations

## **Key variables to success**

Directors of the intelligence organizations perform their duties in an environment of legal authorities, institutional relationships and personal ties with policymakers and politicians (Robarge, 2010). Their 'success' may depend on the capacities they have to lead this organization, by building relations, overcoming legal restraints and generating legitimacy.

### ***I. Legal limitations***

Legislation gives the director authorities to conduct actions, for instance to collect and analyze intelligence. Legislation can give the director clear authority over their own intelligence organization to perform, protect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate. But legislation can also mitigate the authority of the directors causing restrictions to only advise and recommend (Robarge, 2010).

### ***II. The first customer***

The relationship of the director with the president or his responsible minister is important. A good relationship can give the director the ability to overcome legal limitations. The Director has a special position, as he is ensuring the national security of the nation, one of the most important jobs. But the responsible Minister and the President can have their own appreciations of intelligence and their own way of dealing with the intelligence organization and the director. The relationship between them can be very close or distant. The Minister of Interior can have experience with intelligence: seem to be more confident in their judgements about the organization, are more willing to pick types of directors who best fit specific situations, and much more inclined to entrust intelligence practitioners with national security responsibilities and with implementing changes at the intelligence organization. Or they can be less experienced: have a limited understanding of the organization, of what it does and can do and are cautious about using it aggressively. The organization could be a current or potential problem that needs close management or significant change (Robarge, 2010).

### ***III. Bureaucratic skills***

Directors of the intelligence organization need to have certain 'bureaucratic' skills to run their organization. An important mission could be to reorganize or change the culture of the organization, which could generate internal disputes that need to be solved. The directors are not only responsible for the internal organization, but also for the image towards the outside world; the society, politicians and other departments. The relationship with the government and parliament and the attitude towards other stakeholders is important to generate more legal authorities and legitimacy. Directors can deliberately choose to strengthen or release the ties. The director can decide to be a true leader or manager of the organization, or place himself more on the background (Robarge, 2010).

### ***IV. Oversight and accountability***

A defining characteristic of the directors of intelligence organizations is that they are the most unsecret employee of a secret organization. They live in the zone between secrecy and democracy, clandestinity and openness. The directors are public figures, held account for what the intelligence agency, and to some extent the community, did and did not do. The directors can decide to make the intelligence organization more open towards the outside world for instance by briefing the departments and politicians on a regular basis, spreading annual reports, but also by creating several organs of accountability. The directors can also decide to make the organization more closed to the outside world, not explaining everything and without many external control, which would generate more questions about authorities and legitimacy (Robarge, 2010).

Key variables to success (Robarge, 2010)	Explanation
1. Legal limitations	<i>Authorities</i>
2. The first customer	<i>Relations</i>
3. Bureaucratic skills	<i>Management style</i>
4. Oversight and accountability	<i>Openness</i>

Table 3 Key variables to success for Directors of the intelligence organizations

### 2.3 Conceptual model Draft version:

Based on the conceptualization of the dependent and independent variables, a conceptual model is established in which the relationship between the dependent and independent variable is presented (see: image 1). The model shows the Head of the intelligence organization (independent variable) influences the intelligence organization (dependent variable). The model indicates that the influence of the Heads on their intelligence organization is based on the leadership characterization and the key variables of each of the Heads.




Image 1 Conceptual model

### 3. Methodology

In this chapter, the choices made in this research are explained. The operationalization of the different variables from the conceptual model are described. This includes several steps that have to be followed to make a general analysis of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. The aim of the analysis is to answer the research questions. Furthermore, the research strategy, methods, techniques and limitations of this research are being discussed.

#### 3.1 Operationalization

This paragraph addresses the conceptualization of the key concepts and variables. Moreover, based on the theoretical framework and the conceptual model in the previous chapter, indicators will be set to create profiles of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. The operationalization consists of two steps (see image 2). The first step is an extensive analysis of the leadership characterization of the different Heads of the BVD using the theory of Robarge (2010). The second step is deriving the key variables (Robarge, 2010) based on the analysis made in the first step.




Image 2 Operationalization

#### First step:

The first step is the analysis of the directors using the ‘straightforward approach’ (Robarge, 2010). By answering the questions about the *mission, time frame, style, record* and *patterns and leadership* the analysis is made of the directors of the Dutch general intelligence services. The category ‘time frame’ is added to the theory, in several interviews and literature the time frame is appointed as an important factor that influences the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD (Respondent 1, 3 &7). The Heads of the intelligence agencies worked in different time frames and is therefore important to get more understanding of these time frames. The ‘leadership profiles’ are added to the category ‘patterns’. As it is not the main goal to label the Heads with different leadership styles for a final conclusion, the leadership styles are added to the patterns category. The questions create a good overview of each of the directors and make it possible to compare them with each other. In table 4 (below) is described of what this first step consists and how the leadership characterization is described and the categories are indicated. First an individual analysis is made of each of the Heads of the BVD and AIVD, after that a general analysis is made based on the characterization. The first step will give answer on sub-question 2.2.

<b>Leadership Characterization</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Description - indicators</b>
Mission	<i>What?</i>	What were the directors told to do? Mission from the Minister of Interior at the beginning of his term
Time frame	<i>Wat was going on?</i>	The context in the Netherlands and abroad
Style	<i>How?</i>	How did the directors go about doing it? Choices they made in relation with the politics, public, media, own organization
Record	<i>How well?</i>	How well did the directors do what they were expected to do, given their authorities, resources and access? Choices; stimulating, impeding, open/closed
Patterns and leadership profile	<i>Overall</i>	Patterns in budget cuts, reorganizations, legitimacy, what type of director? Administrator, intelligence operator, reformer or restorer

*Table 4 Leadership characterizations - modified (Robarge, 2010)*

*Second step:*

The second step is to derive the ‘key variables’ (table 5) based on the profiles that are created with the questions of Robarge (2010) in the first step. The key variables can be derived to define important variables of each Head. These variables can point at important attributes that were useful in certain timeframes or terms.

<b>Key variables</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Description - indicators</b>
Legal limitations	Legal limitations can enable or limit the director	- Independent/dependency
First customer	The relationship with the Minister of Interior and other stakeholders	- Relationship with the Minister of Interior; - How to cooperate with government; - Type of relationship with the president; Close/ cordial/ businesslike/ tense/ no to speak of
Bureaucratic skills	Skills to run public organizations	- External/internal/international orientation
Oversight and accountability	Running an open or closed organization	- Open/closed/balance/transparent

*Table 5 Key variables (Robarge, 2010)*

The profiles are described in general terms to oversee certain patterns, time frames and behavior. These profiles are not evaluated and put labels on that will assess whether a certain Head is performing ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The comparative in-depth analysis of the ten Heads of the BVD and AIVD will give an extensive overview. Influential variables are derived that are of use for future Heads of the organization. The outcomes of the research will add value to the theories of intelligence leadership and for future Heads of the AIVD.

### 3.2 Research strategy and methods

In this paragraph, the choices that have been made in this research will be explained. Research in social sciences implies continuously making choices to get grip on the complexity of reality. The complexity in this research consists of different Heads of the intelligence organization that has been part of different time frames. The choices that are made need to be accounted to make the research trustworthy. This paragraph will present the research strategy and methods for the collection and processing of empirical data.

#### 3.2.1 Research strategy

Different qualitative research strategies are used to answer the central research question. The qualitative research strategies enable the research to derive certain patterns that can be generalized. The use of different research strategies realizes a triangulation of sources (Van Thiel, 2007). The triangulation will make the research more reliable in giving a qualitative overview of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. The precise elaboration and choices that are made in terms of methods and resources will be highlighted in this chapter.

#### 3.2.2 Research method: a qualitative research

##### Theory

The relevant core concepts of this research are derived from the central research question. The core concepts form the basis of the theoretical part of this research and the starting point of the 'desk research'. Desk research is a type of research in which material of thirds is used (Verschuuren & Doorewaard, 2007). A detailed literature research is conducted in which different books and scientific articles are analyzed. The concepts of 'leadership', 'public leadership' and 'intelligence leadership' are used as the main search terms. Most of the literature has its origin in public administration, human resource management and the history domain. The literature research represents the basis for the key concepts in the theoretical framework. The relation between the key concepts is described and schematically illustrated in the conceptual model. The conceptual model and the operationalization represent the basis of the research, which makes the research deductive.

##### Case selection

For the case selection of this research it is important that the unit of analysis is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined (Yin, 1989). The BVD and AIVD were appointed as the 'general intelligence organization' in this research. The units of analysis in this research are therefore ten Heads of the BVD and AIVD (table 6).

Name	Organization
Louis Einthoven	BVD
Koos Sinninghe Damsté	BVD
Andries Kuipers	BVD
Pieter de Haan	BVD
Aart blom	BVD
Arthur Docters van Leeuwen	BVD
Nico Buis	BVD
Sybrand van Hulst	BVD/AIVD
Gerard Bouman	AIVD
Rob Bertholee	AIVD

Table 6 Names different Heads of the BVD and AIVD

## **Empiric material**

This research is set up using the grounded theory (Verschuuren & Doorewaard, 2007). *“The grounded theory can be characterized as a way of creating new theoretical insights, by refraining of prior knowledge and by linking phenomenon’s.* In the grounded theory method, the researcher is acting as an ‘discoverer or explorer’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The main concepts of the grounded theory approach are: a questing attitude of the researcher, an ongoing comparison of empirical data and theoretical concepts, a careful and consequent application of procedures and techniques (Verschuuren & Doorewaard, 2007). In this research, the theory of Robarge (2010) is used as the analyzing method to generate a grounded theory of the Heads of the BVD and AIVD.

To establish trustworthiness and to make the research believable the concepts of validity and reliability are important. The concept of validity refers to the question whether the findings of a research are about what they appear to be about. Reliability concerns the question if the research is repeated will the same results be obtained (Robson, 2002). The external validity of this research is rather low, since the case of the Heads of the Dutch intelligence organization is a unique one, and therefore generalization is difficult, or even impossible. With regard to the internal validity of this research, some remarks are also essential. This qualitative research, in which empirical data that is collected is of qualitative nature, requires a great part of interpretation by the researcher. Robson mentions Mason who describes what a researcher should demonstrate to show the validity of the interpretation; *“In my view, validity of interpretation in any form of qualitative research is contingent upon the ‘end product’ including a demonstration of how that interpretation was reached”* (Robson, 2002). In this research, this is realized by describing and explaining what conclusion are based on which data, every step and choice in this research will be explained and justified in order to generate the internal validity.

## **Data sources**

The selection of relevant data is based on what kind of information is sought. To gather relevant data different sources are used in this research. A method of data source triangulation is applied across the analysis to increase the validity and reliability of the research. The data used in this research is a combination of primary and secondary data.

## Content analysis

The empirical data will be collected with the use of a content analysis: *“a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from their data to their context”* (Robson, 2002). By conducting a content analysis, the manifest and latent content of existing material is analyzed. The manifest content concerns the factual content, the latent content concerns the interpretation of the researcher. The content analysis is an indirect method of data-collection (Robson, 2002). In this research, the manifest and latent content of written documents, books, government documents, reports, articles and newspapers will be analyzed. These are the reports of the BVD, AIVD and the parliament, but also consist newspaper articles from different Dutch newspapers. The empirical material need to be classified, analyzed and summarized to make them use for this research.

## Interviews

The second method for the collection of empirical data are interviews. The interview is a method in which a big diversity of information can be generated in a relative short amount of time (Verschuuren & Doorewaard, 2007). In this research the semi-structured method is used for conducting the interviews. A standard interview manual is used in this research. Former

Heads (2) and employees (4) of the BVD and AIVD have been interviewed to gather first line empirical data. Besides respondents from the intelligence organization also scientists (2) were interviewed to get a more complete picture.

### **Limitations**

As in the case in many social science research, limitations and pitfalls do exist in this research. These limitations have to be acknowledged and a clear demarcation of this research must be made to avoid false statements. The analysis in this research states to create profiles and derive patterns of different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. The first limitation is that creating profiles of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD is a subjective process that is done by the researcher himself, the researcher should therefore be cautious in their statements. The second limitation is that the empirical data in the intelligence field is scarce. Both the scientific and the empirical material in this field of research are limited, this has also consequences for the outcomes. The last limitation of this research is the limited time during the process of writing this thesis. It was impossible to make an analysis that would be so extensive to cover the different Heads in every detail, however lines need to be drawn in every research, as also in this thesis is done.



## 4 Context of the research

### 4.1 A Brief history of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) and the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)

**Sub question 1.1** – “How have the Dutch general intelligence organizations -AIVD and BVD- developed?”-

#### *The establishment of the BVD*

The BVD was established in August 1949 as the successor of the Centrale Veiligheidsdienst (CDV) and was placed under the lead of the Ministry of Interior (Braat, 2012). Under the lead and according to the ideas of the first Head of the BVD Louis Einthoven, the organization structure was shaped and developed (Engelen, P. 23, 2007). The organization structure was based on the British model, the culture and threat perceptions were under strong influence of Einthoven (Hijzen, P. 141. 2016). This threat perception was based on the Communism. The events in Prague with the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Communists were a confirmation of the perceived threat. It raised an important question if this would be a threat for the Netherlands too (Engelen, P.38, 2007).

Einthoven was responsible for the motto and crest of the BVD. In his opinion was that civilians in a democracy as the Netherlands should not have a passive role, but be pro-active. This created the motto; ‘Per undas adversas’ – ‘Living fish swim against the tide, only the death ones will float with the stream’. This saying symbolized the spirit of the organization: active, against the tide when needed, keeping an eye on the threats for national security (AIVD, 2012).

The main tasks of the BVD in 1949 (Nationaal Archief, 2015):

I. The gathering of domestic intelligence regarding persons that have a relation in espionage against the Netherlands or allies (section C).

II. The gathering of data about extremist streams (section B)

III. Fostering security in vital and vulnerable companies and organizations, both in the private and public sector (Department D).

The description of the tasks of the BVD (1949) are in line with the definition of general intelligence organization by Gill and Phytian (2006), and the activities of ‘*collecting and analyzing*’, ‘*covert action*’ and ‘*counterintelligence*’ described by Johnson (2003). A brief outline of the internal organization of the BVD in the beginning period is described in appendix (3).

#### *Cold war*

After World War II the main goal of the BVD was to secure the Netherlands from the Communist threat. Einthoven was a big stimulator of this threat perception in the first decade of the BVD. The BVD seemed to be established to keep an eye on the communist threat and cooperated with allies such as the United Kingdom (MI6) and the United States (CIA) to secure the Netherlands (Nationaal Archief, 2015). The Communist threat would remain influence on the perception of the organization and the Dutch society for a couple of decades, but it would also decrease as other more visible threats occurred such as the Molluccan kidnappings (Hijzen, 2016). Different Heads of the BVD coped with the changing perception and questions about legitimacy of the organization. Communism remained the main topic for the BVD until 1989;

On November 9<sup>th</sup> something very unexpected happened, the Berlin Wall had fallen. Arthur Docters van Leeuwen had just started his term as Head of the BVD when the Communism had suddenly fallen. The interest of the BVD changed to new fields such as corruption and organized crime.

### *The establishment of the AIVD*

Van Hulst was given the job to convince the parliament that the BVD needed more tasks and authorities of which the most important was the possibility to gather foreign intelligence. New legislation on the intelligence- and security organizations (WIV, 2002) was accepted by the parliament in 2002. The new legislation led to a transformation of the name of the BVD into Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). The intelligence task was new for the organization, it had to be combined with the traditional security task. In the term of Bouman the AIVD had become more pro-active, the organization had to focus more on foreign intelligence. This led to intensified cooperation with foreign countries in the term of Bertholee, which had already started in the term of Van Hulst, who established several liaisons. The new focus was a logical step in times of more interconnected and globalized threats.

The main tasks of the AIVD described in the legislation on the intelligence and security organizations (WIV, 2002):

I.	Research to organizations and individuals (A-task)
II.	Conduct Security investigations (B-task)
III.	Fostering security measures (C-task)
IV.	The gathering of foreign intelligence (D-task)
V.	Threat- and risk analysis (E-task)

The description of the tasks of the AIVD (2002) is in line with the definition of general intelligence organization by Gill and Phytian (2006), and the activities of ‘collecting and analyzing’, ‘covert action’ and ‘counterintelligence’ described by Johnson (2003). The current (internal) structure of the AIVD is presented in image 3.




Image 3 The internal structure of the AIVD (AIVD, 2018).

### *Fragmented threats*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall threats changed in the 90's into more fragmented and diverse topics (BVD, 1997). Terrorism and radicalization became important threats after 9/11, terrorist attack in the United Kingdom and Spain, but also the assassination of Fortuyn and Van Gogh (AIVD, 2006). Technological developments changed possibilities and urged the AIVD to move with the time. Risks had their origin in global, geo-political and economic developments according to the annual report of 2010 (AIVD, 2011). The focus of the AIVD changed to foreign intelligence. Cyber-attacks were of a different nature, size and shape and therefore unpredictable (AIVD, 2013). The situations in Syria, Turkey and Ukraine urged the AIVD to grow in personnel and resources in the last years (AIVD, 2017). Changes in legislation for the intelligence and security organizations were needed for the use of special authorities and to satisfy the sound of more independent supervision on the AIVD. The times and the perception about the AIVD in the political field and society had changed rapidly in less than two decades.

## 5 Empirical findings

The first Head of the BVD started his term in August 1949, establishing an intelligence organization that would last for over sixty-five years and is now known as the AIVD. The Heads of the organization had different backgrounds, ages, styles and ideas. The time frame had influence on the mission and development of the Heads and their organization. The empirical findings about the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD will be outlined in this chapter (5). The outline will give an extensive overview of the different Heads that is used for the analysis in chapter 6.

### 5.1 Different heads of the general intelligence services (BVD and AIVD) – profiles of the Heads

- 10 Heads in a period of 69 years
- Average age when starting as Head of the organization; 52,5 years old
- Youngest Head; 44 – Arthur Docters van Leeuwen
- Oldest Head; 59 – Koos Sinninghe Damsté
- 10 male, 0 female
- Former employers; Army, Police, Marine, Court of Justice, several Ministries

Image 4 Statistics Different Heads of the BVD and AIVD

Above (image 4) are just some of the statistics about the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. Not only in terms of figures, but also in terms of time frames the Heads are different and have similarities. The BVD was established under the lead and ideas of Louis Einthoven securing the Netherlands from the Communist threat and now, nine terms later under the lead of Rob Bertholee tracing cyber-attack, terrorism and radicalized individuals.

#### 1. Louis Einthoven

##### General information

**Former employers:** Court of Justice, Police, BNV (Bureau Nationale Veiligheid)

**Head of BVD in the period:** 08-08-1949 / 31-03-1961

**Length:** 11 years and 7 months

**Age when started as Head of the BVD:** 53 years old

**Ministers of Interior:** Frans Teulings, Johannes Henricus van Maarseveen, Louis beel, Julius Christiaan van Oven, Ko Suurhoff, Antoon Arnold Marie Strucken, Edzo Toxopeus.

-“When Mr. Louis Einthoven left the BVD in 1961, he delivered an organization to his successor on which he had indisputably left his mark” (Engelen, p.23, 2007). Einthoven governed the BVD and its predecessors from 1945, and directed the organizations to its own insights. His priorities were clearly set at the ‘international issue of the communism’- (Engelen, p. 23, 2007).

### *Establishing the BVD*

In his former function as judicial officer in Dutch-Indonesia Einthoven experienced the Communist threat in real life. This experience made Einthoven to put more effort on the rising national socialism during his period as chief of the Rotterdam police. After the surrender of the German army, Einthoven was set in charge of the predecessor of the BVD; the BNV. The main goal was to create a 'stay-behind organization' that would lead and stimulate the Dutch resistance in case of a new occupation. The Communists were taking Czechoslovakia in 1948, which made a big impression on the Dutch society. In the weeks after the events in Czechoslovakia, Einthoven sounded the alarm about small budgets and incapable personnel that causes danger for the Dutch national security. Prime Minister Beel, who had good contact and a strong relationship with Einthoven, was at the end of his term and could not mean much for Einthoven anymore. The Dutch government took concrete measures against the (organized) communist threat in the Netherlands by themselves, the government even doubted the role of Einthoven as the director of the intelligence organization. The role and input of director Einthoven were not heard in the decision making of the Dutch government, the BVD was only involved in the execution of anti-communist measures (Engelen, P.39, 2007).

A new political wave in 1948 meant the start of a government that was ruled by social-democrats and catholic party's. This government felt the urge of an intelligence organization but would not give the organization extra resources as Einthoven expected to receive (Hijzen, 2016). Remarkably Prime Minister Drees gave Einthoven a year later a bigger budget for the BVD, which was caused due to the membership of the NATO. Where Einthoven had a strong relationship with minister Beel, Minister President Drees was less impressed and more cautious in respect to Einthoven. Drees had less confidence that Einthoven, who was seen as an authoritarian conservative right wing, had enough political power of discernment to lead this important intelligence organization. Besides these political concerns about Einthoven, Drees also had personal concerns. The relationship between Drees and Einthoven was on a very low profile. The two were quite different; Drees was as business men that was not interested in the intelligence operations, where Einthoven was more of a go-getter not concerning the political opinions. This eventually led to a ban of visits from Einthoven at Prime Ministers Drees room (Hijzen, 2016).

### *A clear enemy*

The BVD was established in 1949 as a successor of the BNV. In the first years, the BVD developed rapidly, due to the space that was given to Einthoven in structuring this new organization. Einthoven also had to counter critics that were publicly addressed to the organization. These critics were in most cases unfounded, but caused damage to the BVD and its personnel, so had to be repaired by Einthoven. *"In these years, I had to swim as a fish against the tide to protect my department and its people, not infrequently a mud stream"* (Einthoven, P. 208, 1974). This led to a new corporation with minister Frans Teulings, who parried the criticisms on the BVD around 1949. Einthoven described this;

*Relationship Louis Einthoven- minister Frans Teulings*

*“Over and over again unjustified criticism on the BVD turned up. For the unforgettable minister Frans Teulings, who was so important for the BVD, this was the reason to inform the ‘Vaste kamercommissie’ regularly about the activities of the BVD. On this way we could overcome the bridge between the BVD and the Parliament. I was very skeptical about the idea, because it could cause danger for national security. At least we had to talk about secrets with people whose job was to talk. I requested minister Teulings to only invite the Chairs of the political parties and not the deputies. The minister accepted this, but at the first meeting it already one of the Chairs wanted to replace himself by a deputy. Minister Teulings kept his promise, not accepting this replacement. This created a good relationship between me and Minister Teulings throughout the years.*

Source: (Einthoven, P. 226, 1974)

The developments of a communist threat urged the BVD to grow and Einthoven felt himself as the person to communicate this loud and clear. Einthoven tried to minimize the political, administrative and public opinions that caused tensions for the BVD. Different politicians and civil servants tried to control the BVD, but Einthoven was capable to parry them (Hijzen, 2016). After the establishment of the ‘Vaste Commissie voor de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst’ Einthoven could focus on the organization itself, as the BVD had the freedom to develop (Hijzen, 2016).

Einthoven saw the BVD as the organization that had to stop the rising communism, and he felt himself the person to narrate that story to everyone. *“Einthoven had a firm believe that ‘The Hague’, and especially ‘his’ minister of Interior, would wake up every morning having a first thought of mind what interesting cases the BVD would have for them”* (Engelen, P. 40-41, 2007). The common enemy made the political and civil service agree on his mission to fight communism and lower criticism on the BVD. Einthoven was known for his persuasiveness, which was also seen as the reason for the agreement of the secretary general of the department of Interior to increase the personnel of the BVD. Einthoven knew how to persuade the minister to get permission.

*-“Einthoven lacked political sensitiveness, pushing his opinion through criticism, on his mission to make the BVD an important institute. When he was meeting with the minister he took place in his seat and just started talking. He always putted his enormous bag filled with papers on the table, never opening it, to show everyone what important work he was doing and making the minister nervous. Einthoven was a personification of the BVD, creating his own organization, without much interest in others”-* (Respondent 1).

In the years that followed under the lead of Einthoven, the BVD tried to reorganize without much success, internal pressures made the organization exist in the same form. For Einthoven the BVD was as his child, he had to take care and defend it as much as he possibly could. He tried to counter potential distrust from political actors and party’s such as the Labor Party, by cooperating and creating an open discussion, sometimes on the edge of what was possible, Einthoven cooperated on relevant themes. In practice this led to a stable relationship between Einthoven and the director of the Labor Party. The only interference made during the mid 50’s was made by Prime Minister Drees, who was afraid of extreme right coalitions such as fascists and nationalists. Einthoven was aware of this threat, but from this moment, he reported more

frequently about developments on this field of threat (Hijzen, 2016). His only true interest besides own organization was the CIA. Einthoven had a good relationship with the American Head of the organization Dulles. There was mutual trust between the Americans and the Netherlands, both fighting the Communist threat (Respondent 1).

#### *Leaving 'his child'*

The last period of Einthoven as the Head of the BVD faced more tensions. Political and public criticism pointed at the legitimacy of the BVD, the organization had to cut on its budgets and employees, which caused Einthoven to defend his organization without success. The retirement of director Einthoven in 1961 meant the end of a period of the BVD that was dictated by Einthoven as a person, reflecting his ambitions, his strong and his weak points (Engelen, P. 51, 2007). Einthoven left an organization behind that developed itself into a sovereign department that could go its own direction without political or public criticism. Chief editors of the newspapers were summoned if a sensitive article was ready to be published. The former minister of Home Affairs Toxopeus described Einthoven as a 'stayer' with a huge drive. The BVD was an important institute for him, he did not care what outsiders were thinking about this (Respondent 1). These characteristics created friction and tension between the BVD and other departments such as the police and judicial authorities. But maybe the BVD needed this type of leader to establish and institutionalize a stable organization (Respondent 1). His successor, Sinninghe Damsté, was given the main task to restore the relations of the BVD with directors and generals of other departments.

## 2. *Koos Sinninghe Damsté*

### General information

**Former employers:** Lawyer, Army, Public Prosecution

**Head of the BVD in the period:** 01-04-1961 / 15-09-1967

**Length:** 6 years and 5 months

**Age when started as Head of the BVD:** 59 years

**Ministers of Interior:** Edzo Toxopeus, Koos Verdam, Jan Smallenbroek, Ivo Samkalden, Hendrik Beernink

### *Renewing the ties and reshaping the organization*

In April 1961 Louis Einthoven left the BVD after a period of more than 11 years as a director. His successor Sinninghe Damsté had the same mission and threat perception as his predecessor; securing the Netherlands from the communist threat. But Sinninghe Damsté also differed from Einthoven, he wanted to renew the ties with politicians and Secretary Generals and Director Generals of other departments. Furthermore, Sinninghe Damsté wanted to reshape the internal organization structure to make the organization more effective.

Einthoven was not known for having good relations with politicians and members of other departments. His thought was that his ‘institute’ was the most important, and that others would have to deal with this. The communist threat was the only threat perception and Einthoven knew that he had permission to build and establish the BVD in the way he wanted it to become. Sinninghe Damsté clearly had a different opinion. He was given the mission to restore the relations with other departments and politicians;

*-“Damsté had told me later that he saw it as his mission to restore the ties with the higher officials of other departments. Einthoven had ignored them, Damsté wanted to restore them on that level, and he did well in my opinion”- (Respondent 5).*

One of the external relations which Sinninghe Damsté clearly wanted to preserve was the relation with the police. During his new year speech in 1965 Sinninghe Damsté spoke about the relation between the police and the BVD; *“everyone who is doing business with the police should appreciate this and show this appreciation”* (Braat, 2012). Even though Sinninghe Damsté was clearly strengthening ties with politicians and higher officials, he was still clear about the position of the BVD. In 1965 Jan Smallenbroek was Minister of Interior for a short period of time in the left-wing cabinet Cals. Edzo Toxopeus was his successor and Sinninghe Damsté reacted on this change of position in his New Year speech;

*-“And again there is a change in political color for the Minister of Interior, but also this time this does not change the road the BVD follows. The BVD is not an political instrument”- (Braat, 2012).*

Sinninghe Damsté also wanted to reorganize the BVD. A new section E was created, which had to take over some of the tasks of other sections (AIVD, 2015). The reorganization had to make

the BVD cooperate better and be better organized (Engelen, p. 57, 2007). The second change that was made under the regime of Damsté was a new way of recruiting. In 1949, the first generation employees started, they came from the police, were former Indonesian officials, or came from the resistance. The BVD had a lot of choice in picking new recruits during these first years, but the times were changed. Most of the first-generation employees were retiring, but the BVD had to grow. Damsté decided to recruit new employees in the open market for the first time in the history of the BVD. Advertisements were made in newspapers resulting in several reactions. But these new employees, that were of younger age also took new ideas about threat perceptions with them. Times had changed during the 60s, the communist threat was not feared as before anymore, younger generations had different ideas and threat perceptions. The communist should not be fought at any cost as before. New questions arose for Damsté such as the possibility for younger employees to become a member of a political party.

### *A changing reputation*

The BVD did not have to worry about their reputation until the beginning of the 60s. In the 50s the BVD was still new, the communist threat was realistic and the BVD could grow. But in the beginning of the 60s the perception about the legitimacy and existence changed, the media became more critical. This started with the speech of the Minister of Interior Toxopeus in 1960. He called the BVD a ‘necessary evil’ (Braat, 2012). It changed the perception about the BVD from being an institute that was there for to protect the Netherlands from anti-democratic acts.

Eindhoven was known for his motto that ‘no publicity is good publicity’ for the BVD. Sinninghe Damsté shared this opinion by telling that ‘the BVD keeps secrets, but have nothing to hide’ (Braat, 2012). But in his period as Head of the BVD Sinninghe Damsté could not hide as Eindhoven did for the outside world. Sinninghe Damsté repeated his motto ‘dogs will bark, but the organization will move on’. In his New Year speech in 1966 he explained this;

*“Unfortunately only bad news about the BVD is news for the press and not the good news. In their appreciation for our organization the press came not further than the well-known ‘necessary evil’. So, we have to accept that the BVD will never be loved and that criticism will remain, also in 1966. But the organization will move on!” (Braat, 2012).*

Sinninghe Damsté kept his distance with media, not reacting on them, because they will always be critical. In the period of Damsté as director, the BVD was an introvert organization, with a self-conscious director on the lead (Engelen, P. 66, 2007). But in his last years as Head of the BVD this was hard to maintain. This resistance arose from society, the communist threat was perceived as less dangerous, which mend a more critical opinion against the BVD (Engelen, p.66, 2007). The Cuba crisis created a power equilibrium between the United States and Russia. This made the thoughts about the organization change; a threat for the democratic state, and a lack of legitimacy. Discussion about the legitimacy of the BVD were not only held within the political arena, but also on the street in protests, and newspapers (Hijzen, p. 222, 2016). Sinninghe Damsté reacted on these new developments, in 1966 the working group ‘image’ was created. This working group had to think about the image of the BVD and possible consequences. Sinninghe Damsté’s interpretation was that most of the criticism on the BVD was based on a misunderstanding of their work.

*-“TPC is worried that if we don’t manage to improve the image of the BVD that is set in the outside world, it is possible that this will have influence in the political field and could harm the BVD. This could cause cuts on budget and resources. We have the task to determine the*

*image of the BVD in the outside world as soon as possible, to discuss this with the management of the BVD”- (BVD, 1966).*

*The organization will move on*

Inside the BVD the image of the organization remained an important issue. In 1967, the working group image came with a report. It stated that criticism on the BVD was created in the public sphere of clandestinely. More important was that the society did not have enough knowledge about the BVD. But more important, a better reputation of the BVD was in their own hands. One of the things to reach this better reputation was by giving systematic information about the BVD. The silence and motto of Sinninghe Damsté ‘the organization will move on’, which is now part of the strategy, is not an option anymore (Baat, 2012). To defend the BVD from more criticism minister Smallegenbroek spoke in public about the BVD and its value for the Dutch society (Hijzen, p. 222, 2016). Sinninghe Damsté remained clear in his opinion until the end of his period as a director; in essence communism was still the same (threat) and the BVD was the organization that had the legal mandates to do this. The public debate about the legitimacy of the BVD kept alive until the very end of Damsté’s term and was handed over to his successor. Sinninghe Damsté kept his motto, because the BVD would exist no matter what would happen.

### 3. Andries Kuipers

#### General information

**Former employers:** -

**Head of the organization (BVD) in the period:** 16-09-1967 / 01-02-1977

**Length:** 9 years and 4 months

**Age when started as Head of the BVD:** 50 years

**Ministers of Interior:** Hendrik Beernink, Molly Geertsema, Wilhelm Friedrich de Gaay Fortman

*“When Kuipers became director of the BVD in 1967 he gave the world a closer look on the work of the BVD. Kuipers did not expect the criticism from the outside world to stop, he found it important for the BVD to keep their public relations on level in difficult periods” (Hijzen, 2016).*

#### *More open*

In 1967, when Kuipers became the head of the BVD, the work group ‘image’ presented their findings. Most of the employees of the BVD were convinced of the idea that the BVD needed a better image. The debate about the image of the BVD did not interest Kuipers much. Kuipers was not amused of the term ‘image’ in the first place, for him this concept meant; ‘representing something, which you are not really’ (Baat, 2012). That was going into the wrong direction for him, the BVD should relativize criticism.

The year 1968 was marked as one of the key moments in the history of the BVD, from this moment politicians obtained more influence, because of the ongoing public criticism on the organization (Hijzen, p. 228, 2016). The BVD was willing to listen to the reactions from society, and was going to act more responsive on signals from the outside world. This meant a more vulnerable BVD. One of these perceived threats within society was the upcoming student activism. The influence from politics and the public meant a change in threat perceptions and more work for the BVD. Kuipers wanted the BVD to become more open to explain the role of the BVD, he saw public relations as an important instrument to overcome criticism. Kuipers gave his first interview on the national television in 1968;

*-“I have been thinking about it a lot in the last couple of years, about an organization that has been established to defend our freedom, but that also brings the potential danger of taking our freedom away. You will feel the problems more than the benefits in this contradiction, you can imagine?” (Baat, 2012).*

The BVD employees were satisfied with the TV performance of Kuipers; 70% had the opinion that the BVD was given the image of an acceptable and necessary organization, 51% thought that this form of transparency would not miss its positive outcome. A big part of the BVD organization saw the benefits of more openness and publicity of the BVD organization (Baat,2012). Kuipers was the first Head of the BVD that put the organization in the media and plead for more openness.

### *New threats*

Kuipers was driven by new threat perceptions that became urgent. The Communist threat was still there, the perception of its danger had only changed (Braat, 2012). Kuipers also had to listen to the signals that came from politicians and the society, as the BVD relied on the support of especially politicians to receive enough budget for the organization. Therefore, the BVD changed their scope in this period also to more incidental threats. Director Kuipers found this difficult to accept, but could rule his organization in such a way that the focus was still on the communist threat. The student activism that started in 1968 first in Paris, but soon also came to the Netherlands. This was seen as an extra task for the BVD which had to be delivered to the ministers' cabinet. Director Kuipers used public relations and education to avoid misunderstandings and other problems for the BVD. Kuipers gave extensive interviews to explain the role and the working methods of the BVD to the outside world (Hijzen, p. 277, 2016). The BVD directed towards a more flexible and cooperative organization, with the main focus still on communism.

#### A flexible organization

*“Kuipers initiated a meeting with ministers Beernink and Veringa from the ministries of Education and Sciences. The meetings caused tension between the director of the BVD and the ministers. The ministers did not share his opinion of downplaying the role of the CPN within this process, arguing that Kuipers was way too careful and reluctant.*

*A year later, the ‘Maagdenhuis’, the administrative centre of the University of Amsterdam was occupied by students. Kuipers had a meeting with minister Beernink about the situation, they spoke about possible influence of the CPN, and Kuipers promised to provide all the intelligence and support needed. The situation became critical with protests all over the city, but ended in a peaceful evacuation of the Maagdenhuis. The case describes the role of director Kuipers, the BVD saw themselves not as an extension of the government, but as an organization that were standing above party politics with an own mission”.*

Source: (Engelen, p. 69, 2007)

### *Disappointment*

That Kuipers was aware of the influence of the media from the beginning of his period as a Head of the BVD is clear in the case of the Hercules-affair. In this case, in which a Dutch agent from the East-German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS) was acquitted for espionage due to little evidence, the BVD was brought into a bad daylight (Engelen, p. 69, 2007). This worried Kuipers, who was afraid that a bad image of the BVD would influence politics and the public opinion, which would cause protest and cuts in peoples and resources. This concerned Kuipers so much that he decided to create a work group that would focus on this problem. A year after the establishment of this workgroup Kuipers arranged a meeting with the chief editors of the Dutch paper ‘De Telegraaf’. This meeting initiated the idea to direct contact with the editors of the most important papers. In 1967 Kuipers held the first meeting with a group of chief editors to discuss the working methods of the BVD openly (Engelen, p. 69, 2007). An extensive interview with Kuipers was also published in the Dutch newspaper ‘De Haagse Post’.

But in the end Kuipers became disappointed in his expectations to build a good relationship with the media. Kuipers had some good meetings with the Dutch newspapers ‘De Telegraaf’ and ‘De Volkskrant’. After these meetings ‘De Telegraaf’ posted an article about a Russian that was expelled from the Netherlands, with criticism on the role of the BVD. Kuipers’ trust in the

media was damaged, his ideas was to give more openness about the BVD, but this was over after the article in 'De Telegraaf' (Respondent 5).

### *Different relationships*

The attempts of politicians, the media and the student activism influenced the BVD and resulted in new threat perceptions in the 70s. The Minister asked the BVD to intensify its attention on Greek and Moroccan unrests in 1974, even though the BVD was not interested in monitoring these groups intensively. During the 70s the international terrorism and violent national activism changed. Terrorism took more extreme forms of violence with the Moluccan tensions as one of the most appealing examples. During this period of tensions in the Netherlands, Moluccan groups kidnapped citizens in trains and schools, Kuipers role as Head of the BVD was part of discussion. As Head of the BVD he had to defend his organization from criticism. The BVD took every possible measure and risk to trace the kidnappers, but despite these efforts several accidents occurred during the year. To get more grip on the situation Kuipers tried to strengthen the relationship with the police and justice.

His relationship with Minister De Gaay Fortman was very good, the Minister supported Kuipers in every possible way (Respondent 5). During the Moluccan tensions De Gaay Fortman and Kuipers kept a close relationship. After the second action of the Mollucan group there was a meeting between Kuipers en de Gaay Fortman; *"is it not possible to do something different?"* Kuipers reacted; *"off course we can, we can put an informant on every corner of the street, place microphones everywhere. But do we want to become a police state?"* De Gaay Fortman agreed on this. It was a hard decision to make, but a way for Kuipers to show where his boundaries were (Respondent 5). In the months that followed Kuipers and De Gaay Fortman kept a close relationship informing each other about developments. The Minister defended the organization in the public and kept this role until the end of the period of Kuiper in 1977 (Engelen, P.171-186, 2007).

The disclosure of the 'Koninklijk Besluit' meant new difficulties for the legitimacy of the BVD in 1970. Kuipers had to defend his organization from political interferences, he knew that the right to exist had to be legitimated and cultivated (Braat, 2012). De BVD had to interfere in the political field to show the benefits of having an intelligence organization (Braat, 2012). Not only politicians, but also the 'Vaste Kamercommissie' had a different attitude towards the BVD. The working methods and judicial grounds on of the BVD were part of discussion. Kuipers had to take a strong position in the meetings with members of the 'Vaste Kamercommissie' (Hijzen, p. 241, 2016). This commission, under the lead of Van Mierlo and den Uyl, wanted the working methods of the BVD be working directly under the law. In practice this meant that the BVD could only analyze criminal offences, operations and behavior. To arrange this the BVD had to become part of the police. In the cabinet period that followed, he knew minister of Home Affairs Geertsema decided to make a 'Koninklijk Besluit' which was very general in the description of the activities of the BVD. The successor of minister Geertsema, Wilhelm Friedrich de Gaay Fortman, gave Kuipers more space in building relationships with other politicians and political parties. De Gaay Fortman was not a protester of the BVD, as the parliament in the Netherlands was more.

Within the BVD organization itself were also some changes visible. Some of the employees described more informal relationships between them and the management of the organization. There was more room for discussion. But there were also employees that described that in the 70s the management of the organization was not as much on the work floor anymore as before. BVD employees described that there was a clear distance between them and the management.

It was normal to speak to the Head of the organization in a formal manner. There was an appropriate distance between the Head of the organization, the management and the rest of the organization. The distance was physically visible; Kuipers was based in a different building (Braat, 2012).

### *Conclusion*

Andries Kuipers, was the first Head of the BVD that became more open about the work of the BVD. He was the first Head of the organization that went into publicity (Vos et al., 2005). Director Kuipers gave an open interview on national television, he wanted the BVD to become more open to explain the role of the BVD, he saw public relations as an important instrument to overcome criticism. But his trust in the media was damaged after a critical article was published about the BVD.

Until the end of his term Kuipers kept the same threat perception; communism was the enemy, the other new developments were extra tasks and generated budget for the BVD. The Communist threat was still important for Kuipers, but other tensions caused due student activism and Mollucan groups also needed attention. Politicians and the society became more involved in this process than before. Kuipers made the BVD become a flexible organization and had a good relationship with his Ministers. In his last years as Head of the organization Kuipers was already busy looking for a new candidate.

#### 4. Pieter de Haan

##### General information

**Former employers:** Tax Authority, National Education Institute

**Head of the organization (BVD) in the period:** 01-02-1977 / 31-01-1986

**Length:** 8 years and 11 months

**Age when started as head of the BVD:** 43 years old

**Ministers of Interior:** Wilhelm Friedrich de Gaay Fortman, Hans Wiegel, Ed van Thijn, Max Rood, Koos Rietkerk

##### *The first external Head of the BVD*

When Pieter de Haan started as director of the BVD he had no experience on the field of intelligence or security organizations. De Haan was still very young when he became the Head of the BVD, he also was the first Head of the BVD that came from outside the organization, he was a former tax inspector and director of an educational institute. This gave De Haan a backlog in his first year as director. He needed to get to know the organization and its working methods first. There was no clear vision or mission of the organization in his first years as Head of the BVD (Respondent 4 & 5). De Haan carried on the legacy of his successors Sinninghe Damsté and Kuipers for a long time, trying to create a legitimate and stable organization. He was described as a vain man both in his clothes and in his status, diplomatic in his relations with the media and other departments (Respondent 4). De Haan placed himself more on the background than Kuipers, who was in the publicity from the beginning (Engelen, p. 232, 2007).

##### *Different threat perceptions*

In the period of Pieter de Haan the threat of the Communism became more on the background than ever before. New threats were more urgent; student activism and radical anti-nuclear terrorism became important. De Haan had to deal with internal and political discussions about the role of the BVD and their working methods during his term. An important question was; “*did the BVD still look in a good way to the outside world and its own role within this*” (Hijzen, p. 272, 2016). The Communism was still the overarching threat that was important for the BVD, but new threats also needed attention of the BVD. These new tasks were spread within the organization in different sections. De Haan asked at the beginning of his term; “*Where do counter-terrorism and political violence need to be placed?*” (Respondent 1). He did not change anything in the first years, but when the political pressures on the organization grew Kuipers needed to act. The BVD was not eager to analyze student activism, it was not perceived as something that was anti-democratic and could harm the state. But when political activism became violent the BVD needed to change their scope. One of the politicians that put pressure on the BVD was Ed van Thijn (Labor Party). Van Thijn, who was the Chair of the Labour party and ‘de Vaste Kamercommissie’, became the Minister of Interior. Van Thijn discussed the role of the BVD;

-“*The BVD had to stop their activities against the CPN according to Van Thijn, who had become Minister of Interior. De Haan told me that they had intense discussions about this. De Haan was saved by the bell when Van Thijn had to resign*”- (Respondent 5).

The political pressures made the BVD recognize that Communism was not the only threat anymore. What it also tells is that to legitimize their work, the BVD needed to focus and react on these threats. Communism kept the basis of the work of the BVD, but politicians were also divided about the threat perceptions. This discussion came in practice in the case of the appointment of a new mayor in the city of Beerta in 1982. The candidate, misses Jagersma, was member of the CPN and was therefore seen as a potential threat that had to be restrained according to De Haan. Minister Van Thijn did not agree with De Haan and appointed Jagersma. As a reaction on this appointment De Haan decided to talk in public a couple of months later. In a television show De Haan discussed the communist threat, to tell the Dutch citizens that the BVD was still in need of tracing the threat (Engelen, 2007; p.230-231). The BVD was satisfied with the performance of De Haan on the national television, politicians were more divided about his performance. The case of the peace movement infiltration made the BVD become in bad daylight again in 1984. The BVD was suspected of infiltrating in this organization, the infiltrate was uncovered due to his riotous behavior.

The discussion about the role of the communist threat played an important role in the years that followed. De Haan had to cooperate with different ministers that had different opinions towards the Communist threat; Van Thijn wanted to downgrade the capacity of the BVD on analyzing the communist threat, Rood was more neutral, and Rietkerk agreed on the opinion of the De Haan.

### *Public Relations*

In his first years as Head of the BVD De Haan was more focused on the internal organization than the relationship with the media. His appearances in the newspapers and television were limited. It is when the threat perceptions changes that De Haan choosed to invest in the public relations. As a guest in the television show of Sonja Barend De Haan told more about the work of the BVD; De Haan elaborated about the coupe in Spain, this was the reason why there is an intelligence organization in the Netherlands (Respondent 1). In 1984, De Haan also decided to give an extensive interview about the work of the BVD in the Dutch newspaper 'Het NRC' \*Hijzen, p.295, 2016).

*- "For the first time in his term as Head of the BVD Mr. De Haan agreed on the request from a newspaper to give an interview. De Haan has a reason for this; When I became fifty years old I had the feeling that I started a new phase in my live. I was thinking; maybe this is the right moment to agree for an interview. I am now Head of the BVD for seven years, I hope I can stay here until I am sixty years old. So I have ten more years to go, if I keep saying 'no' these requests, this will raise questions about the things we do in this organization"- (NRC, 1984).*

De Haan clearly mentioned in the NRC-interview that the BVD had to work on the edges of democracy to protect the Dutch society. Also mentioned was the changing threat perception with which the BVD had to deal. The minister was satisfied with the interview De Haan gave, other politicians also complemented him for his work.

### *A stable and legitimate organization*

The BVD had been developed into a stable organization in the term of De Haan, the internal structures of the BVD did not change a lot. De Haan was not a supporter of big changes, such as the introduction of part-time work. There were some important questions about the legitimacy of the organization. De Haan suggested to organize an internal conference about 'important questions of general nature' to rethink the functioning of the BVD (Engelen, 2007). The re-orientation sessions, better known as the WolfHeze sessions, were initiated to answer

the question why the BVD should still exist (Hijzen, 2016). De Haan mentioned in one of his public appearances that the BVD had to accept criticism from the outside world, because the BVD margins of the organization are so small in Dutch democracy, and the only thing the public will mention are their mistakes. De Haan worked most of the time behind the scenes, investing in the relationships with the Secretary Generals and Director Generals of other departments, this gave him the description of being a diplomate. De Haan delivered an organization at the end of his term that was stable and legitimate (Respondent 5).

### *Conclusion*

De Haan was the first Head of the BVD that came from outside the organization. It made De Haan act more on the background in first years. The changing threat perceptions make the tensions on the BVD grow. Student activism and other related political activism are seen as urgent threats that need to be analyzed. For De Haan Communism was still the most urgent threat with other threats also related to Communism. The importance of new threats urged De Haan to invest in the public relations of the BVD; he appears in several newspapers and on the television. Despite several Ministers of Interior with different ideas about the threat perception, De Haan managed to make the BVD more stable and legitimate.

## 5. Aart Blom

### General information

**Former employers:** -

**Head of the organization (BVD) in the period:** 01-02-1986 / 31-01-1989

**Length:** 2 years and 11 months

**Age when started as head of the BVD:** 57 years old

**Ministers of Interior:** Koos Rietkerk, Frits Korthals Altes, Rudolf de Korte, Kees van Dijk, Jan de Koning

### *An intelligence man*

Aart Blom became the new Head of the BVD in 1986. Blom was not a new person in the organization, as his successors were. The new director worked for over than 25 years at the BVD. Blom had fulfilled the position of Chef Cabinet and deputy Head of the BVD before he became Head of the organization. Aart Blom was seen as prudent and intellectual (Hijzen, 2016), known for his relativistic view of the CPN, which was in his opinion a finished project for the BVD that did not need any extra attention (Engelen, 2007). The BVD was in a period of uncertainty about their mission, Blom was pushed forward to fulfill the task of Head of the BVD (Respondent 1, 4 & 5). Blom was seen as an ‘interim-pope’, a Head of the organization without a clear mission, his motto was; ‘wait and see’ (Respondent 3).

### *Internal orientation*

The relationship between Blom and his Minister Van Dijk was a stable one that started in July 1986 when Van Dijk was appointed. Van Dijk had worked for a couple of years within the intelligence organization and that had helped for the relationship between the two. When the first questions arose from the parliament about the role of the BVD in infiltrating and analyzing the CPN, Blom tried to handle this case as careful as possible. The BVD still had a rich information position within the CPN, even though the interests were not so high anymore. Blom tried to avoid a big discussion in the media. In his statement, which was carefully discussed with minister Van Dijk and the ‘Vaste Kamercommissie’, director Blom declared that; “*The CPN deserved some critical attention and vigilance as a result of their history and relations with Moscow*” (Hijzen, 2016; p. 299). Director Blom tried to avoid big media attention and rumors in the parliament about this topic by deciding that research on the CPN could also be done on the basis of open sources (Hijzen, 2016). In the background Blom cooperated with minister Van Dijk to withdraw informants and agents that were placed within the CPN throughout the years (Engelen, 2007). This happened out of the attention of the public. Van Dijk and Blom did this on purpose, to avoid negative attention, because they were building on a project to put the BVD in a bright daylight. This case described the strategy of Aart Blom as Head of the BVD. He choose not to use the media, his only appearances in the newspaper were at the beginning and the end of his term. Blom wanted to arrange the things internal (Respondent 4). This role also gave him criticism on his functioning; Blom was an intelligence man, a very good analyst at the BVD, but not a manager that would take the lead (Respondent 3 & 4, 5). He was missing the contact with the outside world, with other departments, and especially with ‘The Hague’ even though his relationship with Van Dijk was good.

### *Insurmountable*

After the introduction of new legislation for the intelligence organizations, Blom tried to focus on the future of the BVD, but he did not manage to create a new vision for the organization itself. The discussion about the legitimacy of the organization had risen in the 60s and 70s, criticism grew on the BVD and its role within society. It was expected that in times that things became even more calm there would be more discussion about the role and legitimacy of the BVD; the Communist threat became even less urgent in the end of the 80s, the only tensions came from the RaRA. What Blom could not have known was that a couple of months after his resignation the Berlin Wall would fall. Despite the decrease of threats from the East, a revision of the threat perception, organization and legitimacy of the BVD was not made by Blom (Hijzen, 2016).

During his term the Dutch Cabinet initiated budget cuts in the public sector, the BVD was one of the many organizations that had to deal with these retrenchments. Within the BVD there was a strong sense of discomfort about these budget cuts. Blom discussed the budget cuts with his Minister and Secretary General, he stated that the BVD had reached the boundaries of their capabilities (Hijzen, 2016). Meanwhile a negative work environment developed itself within the BVD; unsatisfied and less involved employees. Even the working council that represented the employees revoked their trust in Blom at the end of his term.

The negative atmosphere that was created around Blom and his organization urged the question in his own organization but also in the political field if he was the right man to steer this important organization in these turbulent times. He seemed not to be the ideal manager or leader of this organization (Respondent 1, 3 & 5). In the end, the problem resolved itself, Blom had reached the legal retirement age of 60 years (Hijzen, 2016).

### *Conclusion*

Blom was an intelligence man that was put forward to fulfill the job as Head of the BVD. The times had changed in the 80s with the Communist threat disappearing. These developments raised even more questions about the legitimate right of existence of the BVD. Blom seemed not to be the typical leader of an intelligence organization that had a clear vision, managerial capacities or public relations skills. Some of his ideas were perceived as good, but he did not have the managerial capacities to implement them (Respondent 1). His motto was to 'wait and see' which give him the nickname 'interim-pope'. When he left the organization most of the trust of his employees and politicians had faded away.

## 6. Arthur Docters van Leeuwen

### General information

**Former employers:** Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance

**Head of the organization (BVD) in the period:** 01-12-1989 / 31-12-1995

**Length:** 6 years

**Age when started as head of the BVD:** 44 years old

**Ministers of Interior:** Kees van Dijk, Ien Dales, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Ed van Thijn, Dieuwke de Graaff Nauta, Hans Dijkstal

- *“Keeping a good restaurant good is harder than making a bad restaurant good. But for the first thing I am not suitable, for the second I am. If I have to mind the shop I will not do it.”*- (Hijzen, 2016).

### *The start*

The new director of the BVD, Arthur Docters van Leeuwen, was appointed by minister De Koning in 1989. By that time Docters van Leeuwen was deputy director-general public order and security. In the job interview with van Dijk, the two noticed that they had many areas of overlap. Out of the blue Van Dijk told Docters van Leeuwen that he saw him as the appropriate candidate for the new Head of the BVD. Docters van Leeuwen told van Dijk that if his hands would be tied as Head he would not do it; because keeping a good restaurant good is harder than making a bad restaurant good. The first thing did not suit him, the second did. Eventually the question was raised a couple of months later; if Docters van Leeuwen was willing to defend the BVD in public? He was willing to do this and a couple of weeks later Van Dijk told him; I will recommend you, I believe you can do this, and I guess you agree.

Docters van Leeuwen first had a period of half a year in which he was introduced in the organization; he was present but had no executive power. Not everyone in the BVD organization was welcoming the new director in the same positive way. Docters van Leeuwen had a reputation as being unbearable, hot-headed and complicated (Hijzen, 2016). In the press, he was described as a flamboyant man, intellectual, an unorthodox negotiator, dominant, but capable of breaching structures (Respondent 5; Elsevier, 1989; NRC, 1990). But the bias would disappear soon and make place for a positive note.

### *Mission*

Minister Van Dijk had given Docters van Leeuwen a clear mission when he appointed him; give the BVD a visible place in the system. Questions about the legitimate right of existence of the organization were also raised in the terms of his successors, but even his own Minister Dales asked Docters van Leeuwen in his first years if the organization had to continue (Respondent 4). His answer was; *“this organization is not doing well now, but eventually you will need it, you cannot place all these tasks in the hands of the police. The police is an organization that is intertwined with publicity, that is something different than an organization that has its windows closed, you cannot change this culture”* (Hijzen, 2016).

The mission that was given to Docters van Leeuwen mend that he had to reorganize the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst. In preparation of this mission, during the period Docters van Leeuwen was present but did not have the executive powers yet, he spoke with all of the employees from the BVD, with Secretary Generals and politicians, to get a clear view of the current state of affairs of the BVD (Hijzen, 2016). The conversations with the employees gave Docters van Leeuwen a lot of information about the organization, but were also a way to get to know the employees, to dispel the prejudice about him.

In his first week as Head of the BVD Docters van Leeuwen shared his experiences with the rest of the BVD direction. Docters van Leeuwen had sensed a feeling that the BVD had managed to earn credits and that politicians were convinced of the benefits the organization. But Docters van Leeuwen also felt that something was missing in this organization; a need for useful information in the public debate (Hijzen, 2016). Docters van Leeuwen called this problem the ‘intelligence problem’ and solving this would be essential for the future of the organization. The observations that he made of the internal organization concluded that the BVD was still a bureaucratic organization, working with the same routines, thinking ‘we all know everything’ and the rest does not. The BVD had been an organization that had always acted independently from the outside world, in the ‘60s and ‘70s the organization had to listen to some influential politicians and other key influencers from society, but could still develop and decide about their own perceptions. Positive points from that were highlighted about the BVD were the high level of involvement of the employees and the will to make something out of the organization. The employees seemed to be intelligent and capable of performing their jobs (Hijzen, 2016).

Docters van Leeuwen concluded that the BVD was characterized by imbalances; the organization had a weak relationship with the outside world, work distribution within the organization was imbalanced, a dysfunctional social framework. There was a need for a reorganization to make the BVD future proof.

### **Threat perception**

In the time Docters van Leeuwen started as the new Head of the BVD there were a lot of rumors in the Dutch society; about cruise missiles, over 600.000 people were protesting, violent confrontations with squatters that had occupied a big part of Amsterdam with a lot of media attention around them. Rumors came from the anarchistic side. Soon after the appointment of Docters van Leeuwen the Berlin Wall had fallen. This mend new discussions about the legitimacy of the BVD, should an organization that was once created to keep an eye on the communist threat still exist. Docters van Leeuwen was in favor of new tasks, the BVD could play an important role in tracing corruption in public institutions.

### *Reorganization*

Docters van Leeuwen wanted to reorganize the BVD to overcome the imbalances within his organization, he wanted to change the organization into a more professional organization that would have a social framework and that would also deal with the interest of the outside world. Docters van Leeuwen spoke with minister van Dijk about his plans to reorganize the BVD, which led to an agreement about a plan that had to be worked out in detail. Docters van Leeuwen asked Peter Felix, an acquaintance of him, to write the plan for the BVD. The reorganization was meant to replace the old strategic principles of the organization.

There was a lot that had to be done, the organization needed new blood, but also had to cut on their budget, so some of the employees had to leave the organization. Docters van Leeuwen thought he was able to manage this when in 1989 Ien Dales became the new minister of Interior. In their first meetings, the two discussed the role of the BVD, Dales asked the question if the BVD should still exist. Minister Dales gave Docters van Leeuwen the trust to execute his reorganization plans; *“Docters van Leeuwen wanted to deal with the BVD as if it this was already a reorganized organization”* (Respondent 6). Not only minister Dales, but also Secretary General van Aartsen understood Docters van Leeuwen and gave him the space to execute and implement his plans.

### **The unexpected happened**

The fall of the Berlin in early November 1989 was an unexpected event. The fall mend the start of a new threat perception for the BVD. The BVD was once created to prevent the Netherlands from the communist threat, but now it had been disappeared. The unexpected event supported the work of Docters van Leeuwen in changing the threat perceptions, organizational structure and legitimacy of the organization on the short term.

When Felix delivered his first draft version of the reorganization plan of the BVD, his central message was that the BVD had become isolated. Docters van Leeuwen tried to discuss the outcomes with members of the BVD to distillate the strong and weak points of the organization. Threat perceptions had to change from being based solely on threats to interests from the politics, society and economical (Hijzen, 2016). The BVD had to find new threat perceptions to ensure their legitimate right of existence, at least in the eyes of the outside world - members of parliament and journalists did fully accept the conceptual reformulation of the security service; they discussed the legitimacy of the security service also in terms of threats. Docters van Leeuwen was aware of that. He shaped the process of creating a new story for the BVD, by talking with the employees, but also by involving the working council in the process (Respondent 5). He mentioned the urge to serve the interests of important stakeholders, that would also shape the new organization structure. This change in structure mend that the different departments within the BVD that were all separated had to work together in the future; doors had to be opened between them.

### **Internal changes**

The managerial part of the BVD had been ignored in the years before Docters van Leeuwen. A new start was necessary, but the strategy of Docters van Leeuwen was not to dismiss his employees (Respondent 6). His employees were intellectual, capable of doing good intelligence work. Budget cuts from the government urged the BVD to dismiss more than 400 men. Docters van Leeuwen managed to do this with success by using a good ‘social plan’; for instance, the voluntary repositioning of people to other departments, which also mend that employees returned without hard feelings after some time when the BVD was able to grow again. This was important as the ‘social plan’ created space to reorganize without employees feeling that they had to compete with colleagues. This was positive for the motivation of the BVD employees and made the internal reorganization accelerate.

Docters van Leeuwen gave his employees also the space to develop themselves. They were able to do their PhD to develop on other fields of interest. The doors between the different sections of the organization were opened. The bureaucratic thinking that caused limitations to their work had to be broken. *“there was an employee, might have been one of the best intelligence*

*professionals of the BVD, that was dealing with a very important operation. Docters van Leeuwen received his proposal, which was in his opinion way to weak, so he was told he had to use more intelligence and people for this. He was flabbergasted, he was never told to use more force, the employees were very conservative, but this new direction appealed him and his colleagues” (Respondent 6).*

### **External changes**

While the BVD internally tried to orientate on new interests, perceptions and working methods, Docters van Leeuwen also invested in the external relations of the BVD. Docters van Leeuwen knew that the press always reported in the same way about the BVD; mistakes were reported extensively, which sometimes led to questions from the political committee. Criticism would always remain. Docters van Leeuwen changed the external communication of the BVD. *“Docters van Leeuwen tried to reflect himself in the way Duisenberg performed in the media; he came twice a year on the television to complain, but also once for something charitable, no more than that, sometimes he gave an interview, but that was it” (Respondent 6).* Docters van Leeuwen gave several interviews on the national television to spread the message about the BVD, using film material from the organization itself. The interviews created a recognizable face for the organization, telling the story why the organization should exist. But the media kept critical; the public relations methods of Docters van Leeuwen were described as ‘the-BVD-comes-to-you-show’ (NRC, 1990). Docters van Leeuwen received the task to make the BVD more visible. Therefore, Docters van Leeuwen tried to speak more and more in public, using the motto; “to be open where possible, secret where it has to be”. Docters van Leeuwen refuted the arguments in the news about the quest for new interests for the BVD to legitimate their existence. He described the changing time perspective with different and diffuse threat perceptions, that legitimate the need for a good working intelligence organization (de Volkskrant, 1990).

Docters van Leeuwen also ensured that other employees that were capable to represent the BVD were telling their story in universities and other institutions. The skepticism never disappeared, but the public relations offensive made a change on the long term, the media were becoming more positive about the BVD. Docters van Leeuwen saw this change of perception as the result of the intensified public relations (Hijzen, 2016). One of the changes of the BVD made in creating more openness towards the outside world was described by Docters van Leeuwen:

*“We are always telling the truth”*

*“Sometimes the BVD made mistakes, and the media would make it difficult for us. But Minister Dales came up with a good idea; by the time there was a lot of Palestinian terrorism, so there were also sleeping cells, the BVD were wiretapping a potentially dangerous person, which later turned out to be wrong. Docters van Leeuwen reported this personally to minister Dales, who he met once in two weeks, and she reacted as follows; we have to disclose this. Docters van Leeuwen thoughts were yes, this a good idea, we need to disclose this. It generated enormous publicity, the story had to be told over 100 times; we also make mistakes, because we are always telling the truth. It worked out, and helped a lot in the years that followed.”*

Source: Respondent 6.

When the BVD moved into a new building in 1993, the outside world was also involved in this transformation process. The Media were given a tour around the new building. *“Head of the*

*BVD Arthur Docters van Leeuwen used the principal; visitors are welcome and not more than that; they will not know any more than before. The tour was seen as a success; the main goal was to show the BVD 'living room' and not to look in the kitchen. 'U were inside once, but never again' "* (Trouw, 1993).

Docters van Leeuwen also intensified the relations of the BVD with other departments and politicians. He created several 'trusted relationships' with different persons. His relationship with his ministers were fruitful, especially with minister Dales. The roles between them were clearly defined; Docters van Leeuwen was given the space to reorganize the BVD (Respondent 5), Dales took care of the political field. The communication of Docters van Leeuwen varied internally from externally – more brief and concise communication to the Minister so she could take it over more easily, to his own organization fuller explanations (Respondent 3). As the BVD had no executive authorities the organization always had to convince other organizations to take action. Docters van Leeuwen invested in the 'trusted relationships' with the police, ministries, army and other important organizations. These relations became strong under the lead of Docters van Leeuwen and were based on trust and keeping promises.

Docters van Leeuwen also travelled to other countries to invest in the relationships and gather knowledge about the work of these intelligence organization. In his trip to Australia Docters van Leeuwen had noticed the open annual reports of the intelligence organization. This was a good idea which he took with him, and initiated his idea back in the Netherlands. The reactions were not positive, but the Minister agreed on this idea, and the BVD created the first report of the threat perceptions in the Netherlands. The investments in the relationship with Great Britain (MI6) also led to good ties. MI6 were carefully monitoring the progress of the reorganization of the BVD and interested reform their organization in the same way in case of a successful operation.

### *New Authorities*

Docters van Leeuwen was a strategist that had created a long-term vision for the BVD. The BVD had limitations in its range of tasks, these were still very traditional and focused on threats of other nation states. The BVD had to move with the times, Docters van Leeuwen wanted the BVD to think about new tasks. The BVD could play a role in the fight against the organized crime, but he was obstructed in this;

*- "There were a lot of attacks from the IRA by that time, so Docters van Leeuwen had to show up again in the cabinet and received a lot of criticism due to a new attack in which British soldiers died. But Docters van Leeuwen did not have any power to do anything, the BVD could not use intelligence when they were behind our nations boundaries, the BVD did not have the legal authorities to observe the threat in the place where the problem occurred. "* - (Respondent 6).

Docters van Leeuwen initiated the 'policy café' in 1989; a meeting for civil servants of the Ministry of Interior. In this meeting Docters van Leeuwen initiated the idea that the BVD could have a task in researching the integrity of policy officials. The thirty or forty cases of corruption that were found in the recent years could be a tip of the iceberg. Newspapers in the Netherlands reacted on these new ideas describing them as the 'quest of the BVD' for new tasks; 'the BVD was looking for new reasons for existence' (Parool, 1990). In Eastern Europe, intelligence organizations were removed and not replaced, so why should the Dutch intelligence organization still exist? The BVD was created to keep an eye on the Cold War threat. Several other newspapers described the same search for existence, identity and threat perceptions of the BVD.

The ideas of new fields of interest for the BVD were not directly implemented, they were a prelude for the upcoming Heads of the BVD. The Inlichtingen Dienst Buitenland (IDB) was removed in 1994, which raised the discussion about the foreign tasks of the BVD, but did not led to a merge of the organizations. The discussion would grow even bigger in the following years.

### *Concluding: A new BVD*

Docters van Leeuwen was given a clear mission when he accepted the job as Head of the BVD. He was known as a person that was capable of breaching structures. The main goal was to reorganize this organization to prevent it from 'extinction', he was given the space to execute his ideas.

The BVD changed internally and externally into a new organization in the term of Docters van Leeuwen. The reorganization had led to a new BVD that had made a 'product' of their work to serve the 'customer'. New strategic concepts were implemented and gave direction. The public, political and bureaucratic field were made enthusiastic about the new organization in which the working methods, threat perceptions, internal organization and legitimacy were recreated. Docters van Leeuwen kept investing in the public relations of the BVD. The relationships between him and his minister were well aligned between them, especially with minister Ien Dales, who gave him space to enroll his plans.

Docters van Leeuwen also spread the word about the new BVD organization to the outside world, he became the 'face' of the BVD to the outside world. The BVD had always faced criticism in the media. This had changed during the term of Docters van Leeuwen; several media described the performances in a positive way in 1993; 'Director of the BVD is doing very good in front of the camera' (NRC, 1993). The credo of 'openness', could only be supported by outsiders. The contrast with the Heads of the BVD in the 70s and 80s were big, when the media appearances were scarce and less professional. Docters van Leeuwen was a strategist that had created a long-term vision for the BVD. He also faced the limitations of the BVD in its range of tasks, these were still very traditional and focused on threats of other nation states. At the end of his term as Head of the BVD, Docters van Leeuwen had given the BVD a public face, a new organization with legitimate reasons to exist.

## **Nico Buijs**

### **General information**

**Former employers:** Marine

**Head of the organization (BVD) in the period:** 01-11-1995 / 01-04-1997

**Length:** 1 year 5 months

**Age when started as head of the BVD:** 57 years old

**Ministers of Interior:** Hans Dijkstal

- *“Docters van Leeuwen had created a new profile for the Head of the BVD in his period as Head of the organization. The question was raised whether his successor would also become a ‘media-star’, that would invest in public relations”*- (de Volkskrant, 1995).

### *From the marine*

In 1995 Nico Buijs became the successor of Arthur Docters van Leeuwen. Nico Buijs was a man that came from the marine, for over 25 years he had worked for them. In his last years at the marine Buijs was sent to The Hague to become the Director of Personnel; *“He fought as a lion for ‘his’ armed forces of the marine. Those were the years they needed him, the marine had to cut their budgets”* (Volkskrant, 1995) Buijs had reached the legal retirement age of 55 years at the marine, but chose to become the director of the BVD. Nothing pointed towards a new ‘media-star’, but his successor Docters van Leeuwen was not either at his beginning. Buijs was known as a hard worker who had good relations with his employees. He was described as a true military man in his way of acting, very kind, but very direct in his contact with others. Buijs was installed in an organization that was reorganized by his successor Docters van Leeuwen, and had to recover from this ‘whirlwind’ (Baat, 2012).

In the 90s the Communist threat had disappeared, the threat perceptions that took over were smaller, more fragmented but also international connected and influenced by the developments of the telecommunications (BVD, 1996). The international dimension was seen as an even more important aspect of the work of the BVD; tensions in Bosnia, Croatia and the Middle East that also influenced people in the Netherlands. The involvement of Dutch companies with the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons. The international organized crime is also mentioned, it means that the BVD had cooperate more and more with the Police and Justice (BVD, 1996).

The organization was up to date and ready to be led by a new Head that could use his experience to make connections with other organizations and departments. Buijs was described as a man that was very direct and in good contact with his employees, something he had learned in his time at the marine (de Volkskrant, 1995; Respondent 5). Some of his colleagues at the marine were surprised of the appointment of Buijs; *“Buijs is known for his honesty, straightforward and busy. A prototype of a seaman. The mysterious twilight zone of the BVD contradicted his character”* (Volkskrant, 1995).

### *Different expectations*

*“I will enjoy this job very much”*, this is what Buijs told a reporter on the beginning of his term as a director of the BVD (Volkskrant, 1995). But the work disappointed Buijs so much that after 1,5 years he decided to quit his job and start a new job at a new company. His disappointments were based on the bureaucratic culture within the organization. He did not feel that he was in the right place in the right organization. The difference between the organizations felt as something that he could not change;

- *“It was a Friday in the afternoon in the BVD building. He was walking through the hallways and what he saw surprised him. He said; I had more men on my ships than there are people here on Friday afternoon. But he was not able to change this”*- (Respondent 4).

The organization was organized in a bureaucratic system. Buijs faced the limitations of the capabilities of the organization; Buijs was in favor of the BVD helping to trace the organized crime, which was still the task of the police. His ideas and vision what direction the organization had to go were progressive, but he could not get the organization on this direction (Respondent 5). In an interview after his resignation he told the press; *“In the world there is no intelligence organization that does not focus on organized crime”* (Trouw, 1997; De Stem, 1997). Also in the corporation with political field Buijs faced the bureaucratic limitations. His relations with his Minister were stable, during his term not many policy changes have been made. Buijs faced the limitations of the bureaucratic system;

- *“For phone tapping Buijs went to the Minister of Justice. But the Minister said no, you first have to ask permission to your own Minister of Interior. For Buijs this was ridiculous”*- (Respondent 4).

What did change in the term of Nico Buijs was the name of the organization. The name changed due to the decision of the organization to conduct besides the security task also the intelligence task, this was the outcome of an ongoing process (BVD, 1997; Respondent 3).

*“I will enjoy this job very much”* is what Buijs told the press and his organization in the beginning of his term. Docters van Leeuwen had left him an organization that improved the internal relations and the outside world; good relations with politicians and senior officials in ‘The Hague’ and good relations between him and the members of the management. But when Van Hulst started as the new Head of the BVD in 1997, he remarked poor relations between members of the management, political disinterest. Van Hulst was told that the organization was confused and not working good anymore. Minister Dijkstal even told Van Hulst that the BVD was at the point of collapsing (Engelen, 2007). Buijs resigned in 1997 after less than 1,5 years.

### *Conclusion – bureaucratic boundaries*

The culture of the organization disappointed Buijs in such a way that he decided to resign as Head of the BVD after less than 1,5 years. Minister Dijkstal of Interior respected the choice of Buijs, even though his opinion was that the project of Buijs was still unfinished. In this short period of time Buijs faced the limitations the intelligence organization gave him. *“It turned out that I was not a landlubber. My work was more bureaucratic than in my time at the marine. It made me grumpy”* (De Stem, 1997).

## 7. *Sybrand van Hulst*

### General information

**Former employers:** Police

**Head of the organization (BVD/AIVD) in the period:** 01-09-1997 / 28-11-2007

**Length:** 10 years and 2 months

**Age when started as head of the AIVD:** 50

**Ministers of Interior:** Hans Dijkstal, Bram Peper, Roger van Boxtel, Klaas de Vries, Johan Remkes, Guusje ter Horst

### *Police man*

Sybrand van Hulst was the son of a father that had worked for the ‘Inlichtingen Dienst Buitenland’ (IDB), his father was one of the directors of this intelligence organization that was similar to the American CIA. Van Hulst started his career at the police academy, from the beginning Van Hulst knew he wanted to become a police man. After finishing the police academy Van Hulst went to the national police. The national police were known for its hierarchy and military traditions, which fitted Van Hulst. His ambitions became visible, Van Hulst had good relations with his colleagues. Even journalists were very positive about him; *“a good guy, approachable, reliable, always willing to have a chat (NRC, 2001).* In his term at the national police Van Hulst already had to reorganize to make the organization more efficient and less bureaucratic.

Van Hulst had good relationships with other governors, he knew how to make use of the network within the organization and in ‘The Hague’ in order to strengthen his position. The relation with his civil servants deteriorated when he declined their intended strikes, he registered them and refused to pay them. *“Van Hulst was rock-solid sometimes, he enjoyed it to be the boss” (NRC, 2001).* But Van Hulst was also willing to sacrifice himself for his organization. After the ‘IRT-affaire’ the chief directors of the police had to change positions and van Hulst was willing to sacrifice his spot. This loyalty was not rewarded in first place, he tried to become the director of the Rotterdam police, but was not invited for this spot by the mayor of Rotterdam, who wanted a non-police man for this spot.

### *Head of the BVD – An unpleasant discovery*

In 1997, the spot of director of the BVD became vacant, his successor Nico Buijs left his job after less than 1,5 years. *“after having someone who was used to command everyone, it was a relief to have Van Hulst who brought serenity, empathy and intellect” (NRC, 2001).* Van Hulst was embraced with open arms by the BVD organization. Only two years after the reorganizations of Docters van Leeuwen, Van Hulst found an organization seemed to be back at that same point; bad relationships between members of the management, politicians who were not interested when they were told that this organization was confused again, not functioning anymore (Braat, 2012). *“There was need for a repositioning of the BVD, to show that this organization is needed for society and politicians” (Respondent 8).* Minister Dijkstal told Van Hulst that he was thinking that the BVD was at point of collapsing; *“If the BVD is not in good order in two years, with a good perspective, than is has to be removed” (Engelen, 2007).* Van Hulst had an important but difficult mission to achieve, he wanted to regain the

position of the BVD in the Dutch government and political system; regaining their authority. This was linked to the ‘meaning’ of the work of his organization, people had to be convinced of the meaning of their work. Van Hulst experienced an organization that was looking for this meaning, about the role they had to play. The BVD was sealed from the outside world, it had to realize that it served politics, but also remained independent in their judgements (Respondent 8).

### [Towards a new intelligence organization](#)

In 2002 Van Hulst was given the job to convince the parliament that the BVD needed more tasks and authorities of which the most important was gaining foreign intelligence. The new legislation had to pass the Dutch parliament and would lead to a transformation of the name of the BVD into Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). The intelligence task was new for the organization, it had to be combined with the traditional security task. For some people this new offensive task was impossible to combine with the traditional defensive task of the organization (Braat, 2012). The Dutch intelligence organizations never accepted the offensive strategies that were used by foreign intelligence organizations in The Netherlands. One of these offensive strategies was the use of espionage. Some of the BVD employees in the middle management were against this strategy for their organization. This surprised Van Hulst, according to him the new legislation fitted in these times of openness and control (NRC, 2001). The legislation had to be discussed several times in parliament, Klaas de Vries (Minister of Interior) was in favor of the legislation having to pass the parliament with a vast majority. It led to concessions in the proposed legislation, which were in a later stadium reversed. The Parliament had to agree with the legislation according to De Vries and Van Hulst, as this was essential for legitimation of the organization (Respondent 8). The colleagues on the Ministry of Interior described Van Hulst as ‘a person that has a strong sense for political subtleties’. *“I think he managed the transformation very well, he was a very diplomatic person, that had good relationships with the ministers that were important”* (Respondent 5). The Minister of Interior Bram Peper agreed on this, he described Van Hulst in an interview as the perfect assistant (De Volkskrant, 2002).

### [Openness](#)

When Van Hulst started his term as Head of the BVD his mission was to make the organization more ‘calm’ and regaining the ‘meaning’ of the organization. Van Hulst was known for his good relationships with directors in his time at the police. Also at his new employer Van Hulst was seen as a networker; *“a born director, not a typical intelligence professional, but I do not know if that is important”* (Respondent 4). The BVD maybe even needed a born director to lead the organization, someone who could tell the story of the organization to other directors and the politicians in The Hague. Van Hulst had to continue the development of more openness, that started in the period of Kuipers, was accelerated under the lead of Docters van Leeuwen, and now had be sailed into calmer waters. *“We did not live in a small corner in a closed building anymore, we became visible”* (Braat, 2012). *“In order to be effective towards the society the organization had to be open”* (Respondent 8). The BVD took over the external communication from the Ministry of Interior in the end of the 90s. The requests on personal information and questions from the Parliament increased, contact with the press became more regular and better organized. This was in line with the BVD motto; *“open if possible, closed where needed”* (Braat, 2012).

### *'Manage' his organization*

When Sybrand van Hulst started his term, he noted the hierarchal relationships within the organization that were not present (Braat, 2012). Van Hulst reversed this process a little bit, sometimes hierarchy and command structures where needed, for instance when important missions were executed (Respondent 8). But important was that all of his employees would get the most out of themselves, by giving them space to develop, contradict, and make steps forward (Braat, 2012). Van Hulst was not a proponent of top down leadership, his employees needed to have free space to brainstorm and develop their talents. Contradiction had to become part of the culture of the organization. The room for discussion that was created was perceived as positive by his employees (Braat, 2012). Van Hulst tried to stimulate his employees to recreate the thinking process, to think about the meaning of their work, but also by debating about topics.

The BVD was growing in the end of the 90s which also caused a downside on the method of 'managing' and not 'controlling'. *"They might have seen me as a loose Head of the organization in the period the organization grew"* (Braat, 2012). He trusted his employees and gave him the room to develop. *"Van Hulst was a cautious man, but he knew wat was going on inside his organization. He could feel when tensions were rising. A kind man, pleasant to cooperate with. He trusted his employees, was probably even more in The Hague than in Leidschendam"* (Respondent 4).

What van Hulst also noticed in the beginning of his term was the habit of his employees to not prevail the requests of the Minister. Van Hulst wanted to change this; *"you have to serve the Minister, there is a responsibility for this. But my employees also have a responsibility for the state. There should be a balance between these"* (Braat, 2012). This balance orientated towards a value steered organization. The request of the Minister was important for the employees in his organization, but professional responsibility too. This was reflected in the external research about the position of the employees and the Minister, the BVD employees argued they were (primarily) working for the society, in other parts of the department this turned out be the other way around; for the Minister (Braat, 2012).

### *Intellectual culture*

In the end of the 90s there was more room for new employees. The recruitment was focused on higher educated people. The responds rate were very high. But the question remained; were academia the best choice for the BVD that was also active on the operational level. Van Hulst was in favor of combining the intellectual knowledge of his employees and the operational environment. An intellectual environment was essential for his organization. *"One person can be streetwise and intellectual at the same time, we just have to find these kind of peoples"* (Braat, 2012). His thoughts were that his organization was not looking at normal criminals, this needed an intellectual culture within his organization. Van Hulst made the comparison of the BVD with the campus of a university:

*- "If you come inside our organization, than you have to, certainly in particular buildings, have the feeling that you are walking on a campus of a university: with young and creative people, that have ideas, that contradict, even when they are not asked to do"- (SSA AIVD, 2010).*

### *Harder times*

The times became harder for the AIVD when they became part of public and political discussion about the functioning of the organization. Criticism arose in the case of the royal family, the AIVD was accused of having started a research without any request to the new members of the family, this led to questions in the parliament. The request from the parliament were rising

during this period due to different causes, which generated pressure on the organization (Respondent 8). Tumult came in 2004 when there was the case of an alleged interpreter who had leaked crucial information to a terrorist cell in the Netherlands. Also, the murder of Theo van Gogh, who was committed by Mohammed B. from whom the AIVD knew who he was, generated criticism. This made Van Hulst react on the accusations in public in 2005. Van Hulst: *“It is normal that people are worried when a terrorist attack takes place, it leads to the public pointing at the intelligence organizations”* (Het Parool, 2005). Van Hulst tried to defend his organization in the media; *“we knew who Mohammed B. was, but there were no indications that he would kill Van Gogh. The reconstruction made by the media points the finger out us, but we cannot be blamed (...) We are used to the fact that we cannot react on every request for openness. We live in a time in which the AIVD is more open than ever before, the leak with the interpreter was a small disaster, but measures are taken”* (Het Parool, 2005). He tried to make the public aware of the capacities and limitations of the working methods of the organization. The threat perceptions had changed from one urgent threat to a variety of topics. In 1997, the BVD urged in their annual report for new authorities for the BVD and MID, such as new systems for intercepting new technologies (BVD, 1997). The threat perceptions were focused on radical organizations and streams, espionage, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and the vulnerability of organizations’ integrity (BVD, 1997;1999). The terroristic attacks in the United States of America, London and Madrid urged the Netherlands to take measures. The most important threat perceptions in 2005 were radicalization, left- and right wing extremism, contra-interference and the distribution of mass destruction weapons (AIVD, 2006).

Also in his last year as the director of the AIVD Van Hulst tried to defend the work of his organization in the media. *“the secret services are the dogs that are barking on the yard, who is collecting intelligence about possible dangers”* (...) *“we always get all the shit over us”* (NRC, 2006). The terror attacks make the existence of the AIVD not a part of discussion, only their authorities are part of it. Van Hulst emphasizes that; *“our authorities are major, but it’s not about using them to prevent the society of shoplifting, it’s about the security of the state”* (NRC, 2006). The outside world wants a good working secret service, expecting them to prevent them from all sorts of danger, but hesitate when they get to know what the intelligence organizations need for that. Van Hulst: *“The outside world will never love us”* (NRC, 2006). Van Hulst had the capabilities to tell the story of the BVD in the press. With the difficulties that arose around the royal family and Mohammed B. Van Hulst had to tell the story of his organization; *“It was not hard telling a story, it was hard to tell a good story representing your organization, Van Hulst had that skill”* (Respondent 1).

### *The end of his term*

The successor of Sybrand van Hulst was already found in 2006; Gerard Bouman. Van Hulst remained Head of the AIVD until the end of 2007, with Bouman working on his side. The AIVD had grown from 500 employees in 1997 to 1500 employees in 2007 (De Volkskrant, 2007). Van Hulst directed the AIVD for a long period of time, also compared with other intelligence agencies around the world. He tried to defend and represent the AIVD in public and made it open towards society whenever possible. Radicalization and terrorism were the most important threats due to the attacks in London, furthermore also classic topics such as counter-intelligence, the spread of mass-destruction weapons and political activism were important (AIVD Jaarverslagen 2002-2006; Volkskrant, 2006).

## 8. Gerard Bouman

### General information

**Former employers:** Public Prosecution, Police

**Head of the organization (AIVD) in the period:** 01-12-2007 / 16-05-2011

**Length:** 3 years and 5 months

**Age when started as the Head of the AIVD:** 55

**Ministers of Interior:** Guusje Ter Horst, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Piet Hein Donner

-“Everywhere he works, Bouman stands out for his drive and work ethic. In the morning Bouman arrives as the first one and in the evening he leaves as the last one. He wants to know everything (...) the recipe for change is to know everything, be aware of everything and to know everyone”- (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011).

### *Another man from the police*

Gerard Bouman was officially appointed as the head of the AIVD in December 2007. Even though this was the official date of his appointment, Bouman already started a couple of months earlier in an informal way next to Van Hulst, who remained Head of the AIVD until the end of November 2007. Bouman also worked for the police, he started working there when he was 17 years old. Bouman reached the position of chief of the Police in Haaglanden. At his time Bouman was still eager to go out with his ‘men’ on the street. The newspapers described Bouman as straightforward having a strong opinion (Tubantia, 2006; Vrij Nederland, 2011). After a couple of years, he left the police to gain experience working as the Chief Public Prosecutor. After a period of 15 years Bouman returned to the police. Bouman continued his bottom up mentality at the police, going on routine visits to nearby police offices, and still driving around on the motorcycle when possible (De Telegraaf, 2011).

A couple of years before Bouman became head of the AIVD, there was an incident between him and the AIVD. Bouman was still the chief of the Police in Haaglanden by that time. A coordinated invasion of a special forces team of the police had to capture two suspected terrorists in The Hague. The two suspected members were observed in the months before the invasion. According to Bouman the members of the special forces did not know more than ‘members that had something to do with terrorism’. When the team entered the house one of the house one of the suspected terrorists threw a grenade, severely injuring members of the police. It could have been worse, according to Bouman the AIVD lacked in providing the right information about these two persons. It made Bouman react critical on the work of the intelligence organization (De Volkskrant, 2004; Vrij Nederland, 2011).

### *An unexpected switch*

Although his confrontation with the AIVD made Bouman critical in his thinking about the organization, he became candidate to succeed Sybrand van Hulst in 2007. The Dutch cabinet decided that the new director of the AIVD had to have a long introduction period to get to know the organization and their relationships. “Bouman could not wait to start his job, he was there way earlier than he had to be, a real police man, but different than Van Hulst who was more

*diplomatic*” (Respondent 4). Bouman already started in January 2007, after more than half a year of introduction he would become the official Head of the AIVD.

Mayor Deetman of The Hague described in an interview in 2011 (Vrij Nederland, 2011) that he was surprised that Bouman choosed to leave his spot at the Police in The Hague for this position at the AIVD. Bouman had promised Deetman that he would stay in The Hague for a longer period of time to generate stability in his city. Minister of Interior Johan Remkes described that he knew that Deetman was not delighted with the decision to let him go to the AIVD. But Bouman was the ideal candidate for Minister Remkes; a man with a firm background at the Public Prosecution and the police. Remkes wanted the AIVD to have a new approach; become more pro-active in gathering intelligence and ensuring security in the Netherlands (Vrij Nederland, 2011). Bouman was the ideal person to do this job for him.

### *Reorganization*

Bouman’s task was to make the AIVD more pro-active, not only in ensuring security for the Netherlands, but also in gathering intelligence abroad. This mission was reflected in his plans to reorganize the organization. In the annual report of the AIVD (AIVD, 2011) Bouman announced that his organization would focus more on foreign intelligence in the future. Bouman wanted to cooperate with foreign countries, Van Hulst had already appointed some liaisons and he intended to develop this line (Respondent 4). This was a logical step in times of bigger transnational threats. In 2002, the legislation on intelligence and security organizations was already renewed, which provided the AIVD with the foreign intelligence task. This task never seemed to be as important for the organization, but as his new mission was to invest in the foreign intelligence task, Bouman tried to change this. The foreign intelligence task would become the focus of the AIVD, according to Bouman (NRC, 2010). This focus would change the working methods of the organization, which would make the AIVD work more effective and efficient. This would also prepare the organization for upcoming challenges in the nearby future (AIVD, 2011). The reorganization and change in focus is described in the annual report of the AIVD in 2010:

Report reorganization AIVD started in 2009

*“The AIVD changed their focus and attention in 2010 from endogenous to exogenous risks and threats. The organization has worked on strengthening the information position and operational strength regarding foreign nations by strengthening the technological competencies and the IT-systems. The new focus has consequences for the spread of information to our partners: more focused on partners that can have a role in preventing or reducing the exogenous threats.*

*The Year 2010 is defined as a transition year. The implementation of the reorganization that started in 2009 is completed in 2010. The focus is changed, different working methods have been implemented. This all to be well prepared for the upcoming challenges in the next years.”*

Source: Annual report AIVD 2010

### *Threat perception*

When Bouman started his job in the beginning of 2008 the threat perception of the AIVD was mainly focused on the Netherlands itself (internal). The work of the AIVD led to the arrest and conviction of terrorism suspects and persons that were posing a threat for the national security of the Netherlands. The AIVD pointed companies at the risks of animal rights extremists and gathered intelligence that would shape and strengthen the foreign policy of the Netherlands. Important was the attention for the riskful relation between national security, openness and transparency. *“This annual report is not only an obligation, the annual report is an instrument that is of vital importance to increase the awareness of security in the Dutch society: not to fear anyone, but to make the Netherlands more resilient to these threats (AIVD, 2009).*

At the end of his term, in the year 2010, the threat perception had changed to an external orientation. The threats that posed a danger for the national security came from outside the Netherlands. *“These risks and threats have their origin in global, geo-political and economic developments, in strategical intentions of foreign powers and activities of jihadist and terrorist networks” (AIVD, 2011).* This is why the AIVD changed their focus under the lead of Bouman to the strengthening of foreign intelligence; strengthening technological competences, IT-systems, and cooperation with partners. 2010 was described as a transition year in which the reorganization had been finished, the focus had changed and new working methods had been introduced (AIVD, 2011).

### *Management style*

That Bouman had a different character and style than Van Hulst was known beforehand. The image of ‘the stereotype police man’ that was appointed to change some parts of the organization led to suspicion. Bouman focused from the start of his term on the reorganization and developed the external focus of the AIVD. Bouman took some of his men from the police with him (Respondent 3 & 4). A couple of his former employees gave an extensive interview in the newspaper ‘Vrij Nederland’ (2011), they described the management style of Bouman as not being the perfect match with the organization by that time; *“if you look him in the eyes, you see a look that is telling: I want to go that way, and if you don’t go with me in that direction, you can leave”.* His direct way operating and conversations gave difficulties for some of his employees, but for some of his employees also praised him for this (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011). Capturing individual threats was made the core business of the AIVD in the time of Bouman, with the use of special, technical and human intelligence resources, to collect as much information as possible about a select number of radicalizing or radicalized individuals (Respondent 3; NRC, 2013). The task of the AIVD in supporting the policy of ministries; providing expertise in the field of national security, was put more in the background. Officials from the ministries in The Hague who ‘knocked on the door’ of the AIVD were given less response. As a result, it raised questions about the purpose and necessity of the AIVD (NRC, 2013).

### *The outside world*

#### *Politicians*

Bouman described his relationship with ‘The Hague’ in an interview as good and stable; *“I succeeded in explaining politicians why the AIVD should be there. You must sit at the table in The Hague as a head of the intelligence organization but also as the chief of the police. I now know how that works” (Vrij Nederland, 2011).* Bouman was aware of the importance of the contact of an intelligence organization with politicians and his minister he argued. His straightforward style of operating resembled the style of his Minister; if a decision is made, than it will be implemented (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011).

But there were also critics about his relationships with The Hague. Two years after his resignation signals came up in several newspapers that the relationships with politicians might not have been as good as Bouman described. When the new government of Prime Minister Rutte presented their coalition agreements in October 2012 it became clear that the AIVD had to cut their budgets for the upcoming years. Bertholee was the new Head of the AIVD in this year, and was surprised by this decision. The budget cuts made clear that in the past, when Bouman was on the lead, the AIVD was more or less detached from the political and administrative in The Hague (Respondent 3). At least the Head of the AIVD was not informed enough in The Hague about the possible budget cuts (NRC, 2013).

#### *press*

About the openness of the AIVD under the lead of Bouman opinions differ. Bob de Graaff (professor international relations University Utrecht) argued in 2011 (Binnenlands Bestuur) that it is uncertain if the AIVD has really become more open in the past years. *“Bouman is not as much on the tv as his successor Van Hulst was”* (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011). The open publications of the AIVD had raised since the start of Bouman in 2007. But these open publications include administrative reports, that indicate new measures against individuals that pose a threat for national security, not of more openness (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011).

#### *Conclusion*

Gerard Bouman was a police man that started as the Head of the AIVD in 2007. It was an unexpected switch from the police to the AIVD after the incident in 2004 and his recent appointment as chief of the police in Haaglanden. His mission was to make the organization more proactive, changing the focus of the organization on foreign intelligence. The threat perceptions had to change from internal to an external orientation. The management style of Bouman was described as very direct, not always the perfect match with the organization. The reorganization had to change the working methods, making the AIVD work more effective and efficient and were implemented successfully in 2010.

## 9. Rob Bertholee

### General information

**Former employers:** Army

**Head of the organization (AIVD) in the period:** 01-12-2011 / Now

**Length:** 6 years and 1 month – *until now*

**Age when starting as Head of the AIVD:** 56 years old

**Ministers of Interior:** Liesbeth Spies, Ronald Plasterk, Stef Blok, Kajsa Ollongren

### *From the army – experience with budget cuts*

Rob Bertholee started his career at the Dutch army and worked there for over 35 years. One of his friends described Bertholee in an interview in the Dutch newspaper ‘het NRC’ (2011) as intelligent, disciplined, driven, analytical and balanced. Bertholee became commander of the Dutch army, where he had to take important decisions about budget cuts. *“It was Bertholee who said: just take the tanks away. It was a business decision; for him his employees were more important than the weapons. And if he did not take control, ‘The Hague’ would perhaps cut more budget”* (NRC, 2011). His successor Dick Berlijn described the political feeling that Bertholee had developed during his period as commander of the Dutch army (NRC, 2011). *“People who know him, call him very open to the outside world, to his own organization and to his staff”*. Pieter Cobelens, who worked with him as head of the military intelligence service MIVD elaborated in a newspaper: *“The men love him.”* (NRC, 2011). Bertholee was given the mission to improve the reputation of the army after scandals of sexual abuse and fights between soldiers who were under the influence of alcohol. How Bertholee managed this situation was assessed as positive, changing the reputation of the army in a positive way.

### *AIVD*

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2011 Rob Bertholee was appointed as the new Head of the AIVD. In one of the first interviews Bertholee urged the need for his organization to become more open to the Dutch society.

*“The Dutch society is not enough informed about the work of the AIVD. The AIVD has to become more transparent. There are checks and balances by the Parliament Control Commission and the Netherlands Court of Audit, but the society is not enough informed about our work. I want to improve this, because the question remains whether the society realizes that we are necessary”*- (NRC, 2012).

Bertholee was afraid that the legitimacy of the existence of the intelligence organization would be under pressure due to a long term low threat level in the Netherlands (ANP, 2012; NRC, 2012). The AIVD had to become more transparent, not only by maintaining the current checks and balances, but also by telling the Dutch society more about the work of the AIVD. This would mean that not only the success stories of the AIVD would be presented, Bertholee wanted to give the Dutch society the feeling that this and other (security)organizations are truly concerned about their safety. One of the first visible signals of providing more openness of the

AIVD was the creation of a new twitter account shortly after Bertholee started his term, it had to inform people about news concerning the AIVD (NRC, 2012; De Volkskrant, 2012; AIVD, 2011).

### *Hard times*

The times became harder for Bertholee in 2012, the government decided that the AIVD had to cut on their budgets. The budget cuts were described in the annual report of the AIVD in April 2013 by Minister Plasterk (Interior) and Bertholee.

*-"The AIVD has been confronted with major budget cuts in the coalition agreement of 2012. The budget cuts are ascending with a percentage of more than 38% off the budget after 2018. The effects of these cuts are now being researched, but for sure these will have serious consequences on the effectiveness of the AIVD (...) A dilemma is visible. The economic situation is asking for budget cuts, but the developments in the threat perceptions are asking for more investments in the AIVD to strengthen its capacity to act."-* (AIVD, 2013).

The budget cuts for the AIVD were major; the AIVD had to lower their budget from 195 million to 125 million Euros (ANP, 2013; AIVD, 2013). The budget cuts were not foreseen and drastic; 35 percent budget costs and a loss of 400 jobs on a total of 1500. Media described the relation between Bertholee and Plasterk on a very low profile due to the unforeseen budget cuts (ANP, 2013). In a reaction on this the AIVD reversed this news; *"There is a task and mission for the AIVD and this is a serious and painful one, but there is no dispute between Plasterk and Bertholee"* (ANP, 2013). Minister Plasterk described the budget cuts in the media as painful, they had to be reasonable to make sure that security organizations are able to provide security. Plasterk was not able to avoid the budget cuts for the AIVD, as this was part of bigger budget cuts in the public sector. The cuts were touching the 'security of the state' according to Plasterk (Algemeen Dagblad, 2013). The importance of the existence of the AIVD was undermined, it seemed that politicians did not understand the necessity of an intelligence organization were some of the reactions from experts (Hijzen in Algemeen Dagblad, 2013).

More than ten years after 9/11 and the dead of Theo van Gogh, in times when the government was in panic and the intelligence services were given extra budget, the opposite had happened. Budget cuts were hurting the capabilities of the BVD even though the annual report of 2012 described the growing interconnectedness of threats from outside and inside the Netherlands, the technological developments that were an important variable for more diffuse threats (AIVD, 2013).

The successor of Bertholee described the budget cuts as *"alarming"* and former Dutch EU-terrorism-coordinator Gijs De Vries called it *"disproportional"* (NRC, 2013). The role of Bertholee in the more on the background, loyal with minister Plasterk who was taking the lead in the public debate (Respondent 4). Bertholee was working hard behind the scenes in implementing the budget cuts in the best possible way (NRC, 2013).

### *Volatility*

In May 2015, the Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA) published their report about the budget cuts that influenced the AIVD. The report of the NCA gave a critical note about the budget cuts and the role of the government;

*-"The government had implemented drastic cuts on the budget of the AIVD in 2012. Immediately after this decision the government increased the budget of the service again. The*

government has not met their principles of reasonable spending and reforming. Furthermore, the government has not paid sufficient attention to the special dynamics that are inextricably linked to the AIVD. (...) these developments will have consequences for the organization in the upcoming years.”- (Netherlands Court of Audit, 2015).

The Netherlands Court of Audit were critical about the role of the Dutch government. The threat level in The Netherlands had risen when the war in Syria and Iraq escalated, the tensions between Ukraine and Russia and the terrorist attacks in France and Belgium (The Netherlands Court of Audit, 2015). The unclear vision about the budget and role of the AIVD in the Netherlands is shown in image 5:




Image 5 Development of the budget of the AIVD (The Netherlands Court of Audit, 2015)

Rob Bertholee appeared in the Dutch television show ‘Buitenhof’ in May 2015 and reacted on the report of The Netherlands Court of Audit. On the proposition of the presenter that Bertholee could have put more pressure on the politics, he answered; “*That is speculation. I think it was a good choice of the minister that he asked permission to give meaning to the way in which the budget cuts were implemented. This created space for the future, how we could deal with the budget cuts*” (Buitenhof, 2015). The budget cuts forced the AIVD to limit their scope for the future, the AIVD tried to deal with the situation in the best possible way, accepting whatever the government decided. But in 2015 the government already increased the budget after the rise of threats in The Netherlands.

### *Growing threat perceptions*

Despite the budget cuts that were initiated by the Dutch government the threat perception had grown and become more fragmented between 2012 and 2016. Bertholee described in the annual report of 2012 that the domain of the AIVD was still growing. Cyber and foreign threats became more important; the nature, size and shape of the threats change very fast and are unpredictable (AIVD, 2013). In 2016 Bertholee pointed at the rising threat for ‘the West’ and therefore also the Netherlands. “*Developments such as the crisis in Syria, international involvements from Russia and the attempted coup in Turkey are the background of the work of the AIVD*” (AIVD, 2017). The threats of cyber-attacks became even more important; different nations tried to steal data from governmental organizations and top-sector private companies to influence political

decisions. Bertholee invested in the foreign task of the organization, developing the work of Van Hulst.

Bertholee pointed that the AIVD had grown in personnel and resources to prevent the Netherlands from threats in the past year. In 2016 over 240 new employees were hired. In the future, the AIVD would also grow, but more legal instruments were needed for this. Therefore, the AIVD had initiated new legislation for the intelligence and security organizations. In 2017 Bertholee even reported that there are limits on the growth of the organization (NRC, 2017).

### *Openness*

Bertholee had appointed in one of his first speeches that he wanted the AIVD to become more open to society, also to legitimate the existence of the organization (ANP, 2012; NRC, 2012). In the years after this speech the times changed drastic with budget cuts but foremost a growing threat perception. The discussion whether the AIVD had to cut on their budgets was not an issue anymore, growing threats where asking for more legal authorities. The AIVD was more needed than ever before, but more authorities where part of discussion. Bertholee explained in several newspapers and on television that the AIVD is one of the best controlled intelligence services in Europa (NRC, 2017; College Tour 2018). The need for new authorities was urged in the Dutch television program College Tour in which he elaborated that in past years several attempts of terrorist attacks had been foiled. It was a clear message to the outside world that the AIVD had a role that should not be underestimated, but also that there were grounded reasons for more authorities. Furthermore, Bertholee had appointed that the Dutch society has trust in their intelligence organizations, and that the AIVD sees this as their duty to respect this trust (Nederlands Dagblad, 2017). The mission of more openness in these times of rising threats was reflected in his visits to universities and other events, but also the publications about ISIS woman. Bertholee is trying to discuss the role of the AIVD within our society, he is the trusted Head of this organization.

### *Conclusion*

Bertholee had to deal with an organization that was subjected to budget cuts in a time of rising threats. Minister Plasterk defended the AIVD in the political field, Bertholee had a role that was more focused on the organization itself. He invested in the organization itself, made it grow in size and foreign intelligence tasks . The AIVD tried to become more 'open' as was also pledged in one of the first speeches of Bertholee. Bertholee deliberately choose when to appear in the media as for instance the recent appearance in College Tour. Bertholee tried to combine the internal and external leadership of the organization, taking an independent role, sometimes against the tide, serving the Dutch Society.

## 6. Analysis

The empirical findings about the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD have been described in the previous chapter. The empirical findings are analyzed in this chapter using the theory of Robarge (2010) to oversee differences and similarities in missions, time frames, styles, effectivity and patterns answering – sub question 2: “*What are the leadership profiles of the Heads of the general intelligence organizations - BVD and AIVD*”. This sub question is divided in two questions: The first part of the analysis is the individual analysis of each of the Heads of the BVD and AIVD - sub question 2.1. In the second part a general analysis is described to oversee patterns and variables on the long term – sub question 2.2.

### 6.1 Individual Analysis

**Sub question 2.1** - “*What are the leadership characterizations of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD*”?

#### 1. Louis Einthoven

##### *Mission*

When Einthoven started working at the BNV (Bureau Nationale Veiligheid) and the CVD (Centrale Veiligheidsdienst) after WWII he was set in charge of these organizations to create a stable organization that was able to foresee a new occupation of the Netherlands. In 1949, the BVD was established with Einthoven as the first Head of the organization. Einthoven made the mission to protect the Netherlands from the Communist threat as his personal mission. He had to build a new organization that was created to prevent the Netherlands from this threat and his idea was that he was the chosen one to execute this. From the government, the official task was given to create an organization that had to: gather information about anti-democratic persons and extremist streams, encouraging security measures, everything that was needed to make the BVD a good working organization, maintaining good relations with foreign intelligence organizations (Hijzen, p. 114, 2016).

##### *Time frame*

The BVD was established a couple of years after WWII ended. The German enemy was beaten, but the Communists in the east were occupying several countries with Czechoslovakia as one the examples. Einthoven sounded the alarm about this threat and the capacities of his organization, the government took measures to be prepared for the Communist threat. The reality of the Communist threat during Einthoven’s eleven-year period as Head of the organization gave him the mandate to shape the organization.

##### *Style*

Einthoven saw ‘his’ BVD as the most important public organization. He thought that Ministers, Secretary-Generals and Director-Generals of other departments were thinking the same. Einthoven did not pay attention to other departments or politicians (Respondent 1). He had his own mission, which he could establish without help from others. It made the organization exclude itself from other departments and politics. His only partner was the CIA, who had the same idea about the Communist threat, which was therefore easy to co-operate with. As far as the media was relevant for Einthoven, he summoned the Chief editors of the newspapers if a sensitive article was ready to be published. In his Christmas speech Einthoven spoke; “*No publicity is good publicity*” (Braat, 2012).

### *Effectivity*

The way in which the organization was established under the lead of Einthoven, without caring much about other organizations or politics faced criticism. But Einthoven managed to establish an organization with a strong vision and threat perception. He did not need good relations with the media or politicians, his task was clear, and he was willing to do everything to accomplish this. He might have been the only right person to build such an organization in this amount of time (Respondent 1). He could persuade politicians and even his own Minister in order to get permission (Respondent 5). The Americans trusted Einthoven as one of the few in the Dutch intelligence organization, finally building a good relationship between the two organizations. Einthoven made this organization his own institute

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

In the last period of Einthoven as the Head of the BVD he faced more tensions. Political and public criticism pointed at the legitimacy of the BVD, the organization had to cut on its budgets and employees, which caused Einthoven to defend his organization without success. In the years that followed under the lead of Einthoven, the BVD tried to reorganize without much success, internal pressures made the organization exist in the same form.

If we analyze Louis Einthoven according to the theory of Robarge (2010), Einthoven could be described as an intelligence operator. With his strong personality and ideas about the BVD and their mission it made the organization exclude itself from other institutions. Politicians neither the minister could limit Einthoven in his vision and ideas about the development of the BVD. Nevertheless, Einthoven used his bureaucratic skills during his eleven-year term as a Head of the BVD to establish a stable organization.

## 2. Sinninghe Damsté

### *Mission*

The mission of Sinninghe Damsté can be defined in two ways. First, he wanted to renew the political and administrative ties; having a good relationship with politicians. Even more important was renewing the relations with higher officials of other departments. His Successor Einthoven had not invested in these relationships. The second part of the mission of Sinninghe Damsté was to organize the BVD better by creating a new section E and rearranging some of the parts of the other sections.

### *Time frame*

In the period of Sinninghe Damsté the communist threat was still very realistic. But almost twenty years after the end of WWII the society and politicians came up with the first criticism on the BVD. In 1962 Minister of Interior Toxopeus called the BVD a ‘necessary evil’. The Cuba crisis created a power equilibrium in 1962. Their legitimacy was not as unspoken as before anymore. This even made the Head of the BVD react on the criticism outside the organization by creating the working group ‘image’. But until the very end of his term the communist threat kept important and legitimating their existence.

### *Style*

The motto of Sinninghe Damsté was; ‘dogs will bark, but the convoy (BVD) will move on’. What he meant was that the press will only tell what the BVD is doing wrong. His strategy was not to react on them, this worked out well in his first years, but caused the creation of the work group ‘image’ in his last year. Sinninghe Damsté renewed the ties with the political field in his own organization. The distance between the Head of the organization and the employees was still there in the 60s, even though Sinninghe Damsté did a first attempt to lower this barrier by making an appeal in the BVD-newspaper ‘Het Spionnetje’ and on his New Year speech in 1965 to come up with ideas for the management on to not leave all the work to the management. Regardless of the effects of this appeal, it showed the relative distance between the management and the employees (Braat, 2012).

### *Effectivity*

The strategy of Sinninghe Damsté to continue the organization as it was under the lead of Einthoven with some minor changes made the organization stable during his first years. The minor changes such as renewing relations and the creation of a new section seemed to work out in a positive way for the BVD. Only in the end of his term, when the first critics came on the legitimacy of the BVD, the strategy of ignoring the press was not working out anymore. Sinninghe Damsté had to react on this as also inside the BVD questions were raised.

### *Patterns and Leadership profile*

Sinninghe Damsté choose to rule the organization in a way that was equal to Einthoven. The changes in public relations and reorganizations seemed not to have changed the BVD. For Sinninghe Damsté it was important to keep focused on the Communist threat, to continue the work of Einthoven, regardless of the criticism in the politics or society. The legitimacy of the BVD was not an issue for him, only for the press, so this had to be ignored.

According to the theory of Robarge (2010) Sinninghe Damsté could be seen as an administrator-custodian. Although Sinninghe Damsté renewed relationships and reorganized a part of the BVD, these changes were minor and the most important task for Sinninghe Damsté was to continue the work of Einthoven. The threat perception was the same Communist threat and the organization was still closed to the outside world.

### 3. Andries Kuipers

#### *Mission*

Kuipers took over an organization that acted independent from criticism from the political field and society. Kuipers knew that this strategy was no longer the right one. The mission of Andries Kuipers was to give the outside world a closer look on the work of the BVD, he was the first head of the BVD that invested in the public relations (Hijzen, 2016). The work group 'image' already started under the lead of Sinninghe Damsté, but developed in a different way under the lead of Andries Kuipers. His main goal of investing in the public relations of the BVD was to relativize the mission of the BVD and show what they do and why we do it to the outside world.

#### *Time frame*

More than twenty years after WWII In the 60s the Communist threat became less urgent, it was less visible than it had before. The perception of the danger of the Communism had changed. Kuipers was still aware of the danger from the Communists, it was only the perception that had changed, we still needed to be careful were his thoughts. The student protests that broke out in 1968 were more urgent for the society, people could feel the tensions in Paris, eventually causing the occupation of the Maagdenhuis (Engelen, p. 80, 2007). The BVD had to invest their time in these new threats that became even more urgent with the Mollucans violence. Politicians were mingling themselves into the discussion. It was for the first time that the BVD had to listen to the outside world, Communism had always been the most urgent threat, but this had changed in the 60s.

#### *Style*

The idea of Kuipers was to invest in the public relations of the BVD. He wanted to build good relationships with the ministers to guarantee its legitimacy to prevent possible budget cuts. Especially the cooperation with De Gaay Fortman became a fruitful one. Kuipers also invested in his relations with the media. Kuipers was the first Head of the BVD that came on the television in 1968. He spoke about the working methods of the BVD to give the outside world a positive sight of their work. Kuipers also held meetings with the chief editors of several newspapers, but his trust was damaged after the publication of a critical article about the BVD in 'De Telegraaf'. After this event, he was less eager to go in the media and more on the background (Respondent 5).

#### *Effectivity*

His choices to make the organization more open were perceived as positive (Braat, 2012). Kuipers used public relations as an instrument to avoid misunderstandings about the work of the BVD. Misunderstandings could cause the BVD budget cuts or other restrictions in the future. Therefore, it was vital to tell politicians and the society to more about the BVD. The BVD also listened more to tensions that were addressed by politicians and society. It made the BVD a more flexible organization, more legitimate, as it could intervene on relevant tensions. In his last years as Head of the BVD Kuipers reconsidered his thoughts about the effects of the use of public relations; *"the journalists leave, and with this the picture that is created, so how effective is the public relations"* (Respondent 1).

#### *Patterns and leadership profile*

In his period as the Head of the BVD organization Kuipers had to deal with the changing perception of the threat of the Communism. He knew this threat was still very urgent, but less visible for the outside world. He had to deal with questions that arose about legitimacy of the organization. New threats became more urgent and were asking for attention. Andries Kuipers

was a former intelligence professional that tried to invest in public relations. He can therefore be presented as the combination of an intelligence operator and manager-reformer-outsider.

#### 4. Pieter de Haan

##### *Mission*

When Pieter de Haan started his term as Head of the BVD he first had to get to know the organization. One of the questions he raised during this period was; “*Where in this club is contra-terrorism located, and where is political violence located, and should we not bring this together in one section?*” (Respondent 1). During his term as Head of the BVD De Haan was in search for the legitimate reason of existence of the organization. In the first part of his term nothing really changes, but in the second part some internal changes took place and the threat perception is complemented with ideas such as student activism.

##### *Time frame*

New threats became important at the end of the 60s and the 70s in the Netherlands. The violence of Moluccan groups could not be prevented, Kuipers already told his minister that he did not want the BVD use its intelligence capacities to act as in a police-state. Communism was still an important threat but for civilians placed in the background, student activism and political activism were more violent and visible and therefore urgent. Politicians pressured the BVD to use intelligence to analyze these new threats. The new threats caused a lot of uncertainties for De Haan, he had choose the direction to follow for his organization.

##### *Style*

During the term of De Haan there is a development in style visible. In the first part of his term De Haan is acting behind the scenes, his media appearances were rare, he was focused on the internal organization. De Haan was aware of the influences of the outside world; he briefed Ministers on a regular basis to show them the work of his organization. In the second part of his term De Haan was more in the publicity. This development is in line with the developments in the Netherlands that were asking for an organization that had to keep an eye on new threats. As a result of these new threats politicians were more involved the activities of the BVD. De Haan had to represent his organization increasingly in the political, administrative field, but also for the Dutch society. Communism was still perceived as the biggest threat, but attention also need to be paid to new threats. De Haan also payed attention to the questions that were raised inside his own organization, he wanted to create a stable and legitimate BVD that is aware of its own role. It was a diplomatic style that characterized De Haan (Respondent 4 & 5).

##### *Effectivity*

De Haan was a young and ambitious Head of the BVD when he started (Respondent 3). He was not a supporter of big changes inside his organization. He anticipated on external developments and pressures by representing the BVD in the media and the political field, this made the organization more open. Also, internally De Haan anticipated on questions that were raised about the future of the organization, despite this he was seen as a distant man. This diplomatic role made the BVD a stable and legitimate organization in times of new threats in the Netherlands.

##### *Patterns and leadership profile*

Pieter de Haan managed to leave a stable organization to his successor. De Haan was not a reformer, the organization did not change substantially during his term. The BVD was reoriented in its activities in a time of uncertainty about their intelligence role. De Haan ruled his organization in a diplomatic manner, representing his organization in different fields. The role of administrator-technocrat is the most applicable for Pieter de Haan.

## 5. Aart Blom

### *Mission*

Aart Blom, who was intelligence man in his heart and sole, almost reached his retirement age when he was appointed as the Head of the BVD. Blom was pushed forward from the people in his own organization to fulfill the task of Head of the BVD. His mission has never been clear for his own organization but also not for the outside world. It gave Blom the nickname 'interim-pope, he was known for the motto; 'wait and see' (Respondent 3). Blom was not seen as the ideal leader of the BVD that had a clear mission and defended and represented his organization enough. His term lasted for three years.

### *Time frame*

During his term the time frame had been very calm for Aart Blom. What he could not have known is that the Berlin Wall would fall a couple of months after his resignation. In his term the Communist threat had already decreased. These developments in decreasing tensions from the East mend discussion about the role of the BVD. For over 40 years Communism had been the reason to exist and the main target to follow and analyze. Discussions rose outside the walls of the BVD, the only group that was causing troubles was the RaRa. The BVD had to find new threat perceptions to ensure their legitimate right of existence (Respondent 1).

### *Style*

Blom tried to focus on the internal organization, he avoided media attention during his term as Head of the BVD. His only appearances in the newspaper were the announcements of the start and the end of his term. Blom was an intelligence professional, his style was internally orientated, missing the link with the outside world. This created criticism from people inside his own organization. His ideas for the organization were perceived as good, but he was not a manager who could implement ideas, he was not a leader in a discussion (Respondent 5). These conclusions were also made in the political field; politicians that were involved raised the question if Blom was the right man for the job, because something that should not go into the wrong direction seemed to go that way (Respondent 1).

### *Effectivity*

In his term Blom faced the consequences of budget cuts for his organization. The BVD was not the only organization that was suffering from budgets cuts, this was part of a bigger efficiency operation in the public domain, but his employees felt as if he was not representing and defending his organization enough for them in the political arena. Blom typified as a good intelligence operator and analyst, but not as a manager or leader of the BVD (Respondent 1,3 & 5). He had good ideas, but was not capable of getting these ideas implemented, especially not on the operational level (Respondent 5). The question rose inside his own organization during his term if Blom was really the right man to lead this intelligence organization.

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

Blom could be typified as the combination between an intelligence operator and administrator technocrat in his term as Head of the BVD. He took the experience and working methods of an intelligence professional with him which indicates the intelligence operator profile. During his term Blom did not manage to create a new vision for the organization in times when the organization was vulnerable in terms of legitimacy, this indicates the administrator technocrat profile. Blom was seen as an 'interim-pope' that was waiting on new things to respond on, not as pro-active profile as the organization seem to be needed.

## **6. Arthur Docters van Leeuwen**

### *Mission*

Arthur Docters van Leeuwen was given a clear mission when he started his term as Head of the BVD: the organization had to be reorganized and given a visible place in the system. The organization had not moved with the time in the past years. The communism was on the edge of disappearing which urged the BVD to change its working methods and focus. His Minister even asked directly the question if the BVD had to be lifted, Docters van Leeuwen was given the space to prove the opposite. The organization was characterized by imbalances and had to be made future proof.

### *Time frame*

A couple of months after the appointment of Docters van Leeuwen the Berlin Wall had fallen, which took away the communist threat that had existed for over 40 years. The communist threat had once been the sole interest of the BVD, but in the past decades the BVD already had to deal with a reduced threat perception from the East and a more fragmented perception. The fall of the Berlin Wall mend a change from serving its own interests to serving interests from the politics, society and economical. The BVD was in a quest for a new threat perception to recreate the legitimate right of existence.

### *Style*

The first things Docters van Leeuwen did when started his job for the BVD was getting to know all his employees. He wanted to get to know their story to receive information what was needed to reorganize the BVD and make it proof for the future, but he also wanted to take away their prejudices about himself. The internal and external organization had to be reorganized. Budget cuts urged Docters van Leeuwen to create a social plan that made it possible to reposition employees. Doors were opened between different sections within the organization, and the bureaucratic limitations had to be removed from the system. Docters van Leeuwen had a clear task in creating more openness to the outside world, he initiated open annual reports, even an Open Day was held for the press when the new BVD building in Leidschendam was opened. He spread the message of the BVD on television and in the newspapers a couple of times every year. The relationships with departments, important politicians and other intelligence organizations were strengthened. Docters van Leeuwen urged the need for a new range of tasks for the BVD. The intelligence capacities could be used to trace corruption or organized crime, it would strengthen the legitimacy of the organization.

### *Effectivity*

The mission that was given to the new Head was to transform the BVD into an organization that would move with the time. Docters van Leeuwen was given the space to reorganize the BVD from his Minister. Budget cuts urged the BVD to dismiss employees. The social plan Docters van Leeuwen initiated turned out to be a success; it was able for employees to be repositioned in other organizations. The organization had also become more open to the outside world; relationships with departments, politicians and foreign intelligence organizations were strengthened. The media had also changed its perception about the BVD; the media had always been critical on the work of the BVD, but became positive about the organization and the media performances of Docters van Leeuwen.

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

Docters van Leeuwen was appointed to breach through the traditional structures in the BVD organization. He opened doors between different parts of the organization and changed the internal strategy. Externally the organization had received a public face in the person of Docters

van Leeuwen himself. The combination of changes that were made and successfully finished made Docters van Leeuwen the combination of a manager-reformer- insider and outsider.

## 7. Nico Buijs

### *Mission*

Nico Buijs was the successor of Docters van Leeuwen who reorganized the BVD in his term. The BVD had to 'recover' from the whirlwind that had passed (Braat, 2012). Buijs came from the marine where he had been active in The Hague in his last years to prevent the marine from major budget cuts. Buijs was known as an experienced marine man that could use his experience for the BVD to create and maintain relations with other departments and organizations that were active in the same domain. The new threats and tensions that occurred (see *time frame*) were asking for cooperation between the Police and Justice, but also with international organizations (BVD, 1996). Buijs was given the task to implement the new 'Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten' that would change the name of the BVD into AIVD, which was more in line with the range of tasks of the organization (BVD, 1997).

### *Time frame*

The times had changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Communist threat had disappeared. But the BVD kept an eye on interference from Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia in the Netherlands. The BVD analyzed the influence of extreme-right organizations and terrorist organizations such as the PKK and the IRA. Also on the list was the international organized crime and corruption in the public institutions. The BVD recognized the interconnectedness of tensions around the world and the development of telecommunication (BVD, 1996). The developments around the world and their influences in the Netherlands meant a wide area of interest for the BVD.

### *Style*

What the employees of the BVD appreciated about Buijs was his personal contact (Respondent 4 & 5). Even though he was hierarchal, he took time for personal conversations. The bureaucratic culture in the BVD disappointed Buijs; the mentality was different. The disconnection between him and the organization culture was reflected in the relationship with politicians; he had to ask permission for phone taps at his own Minister. His way of thinking was different - "*If I get a job from politicians I will make sure it gets done*" - the political antennae was missing sometimes (Respondent 5). It seemed to be a clash between the style of leadership that was based on a history in the marine and the intelligence culture.

### *Effectivity*

What Nico Buijs discovered when he started his job as Head of the BVD where the bureaucratic limitations the organization had. The decisions he wanted to take had to be discussed and accepted by his Minister, a bureaucratic process that frustrated him. Docters van Leeuwen had left Buijs an organization that improved its relationships with the outside world and reorganized the organization successfully. But when Van Hulst started his term as the new Head of the BVD in 1997, he remarked poor relations between members of the management and political disinterest from 'The Hague'. Minister Dijkstal even told Van Hulst that the BVD was at the point of collapsing (Engelen, 2007). The vision of Buijs was perceived as good, he had ideas about new tasks and topics that were interesting for the BVD, but frustration about the limitations of the organization made him resign after less than 1,5 years.

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

After the Whirlwind of Docters van Leeuwen in which the BVD had made a positive change towards a new type of organization, Buijs did not manage to lead this organization in the way he wanted to do. Buijs clashed with the bureaucratic culture of the organization, he could not

lead the organization according to his own preferences. It made Buijs a typical administrator-custodian Head of the organization that was fastest Head of the BVD to resign.

## 8. Sybrand van Hulst

### *Mission*

When Van Hulst started his term as Head of the BVD the mission that was given to him was to 'sail the organization into calmer waters'. After the short term of Nico Buijs, who did not fit the organization, van Hulst had to rediscover the line that was going up and given direction under the lead of Docters van Leeuwen. Van Hulst had to recover the relationships with the management, politicians and other departments (Braat, 2012). The BVD had to regain their 'meaning', legitimacy and authority, and reposition themselves in the system. There was political pressure of lifting the BVD (Respondent 8; Engelen, 2007).

### *Time frame*

The threat perceptions had changed in the 90s into more fragmented and diverse topics. In 1997, the main threat perceptions were radical organizations and streams, proliferation of mass destruction weapons and the vulnerability of organizations integrity (BVD, 1997). In the end of the term of Van Hulst this had changed into terrorism and radicalization (AIVD, 2006). Threats became more urgent with the terrorist attacks in New York (9/11) as the most striking example. The assassination of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn had raised questions in the Dutch society about safety and freedom of speech. Terrorist networks and radical organizations became more connected than before, the developments of technology had changed possibilities in less than ten years.

### *Style*

Van Hulst trusted on the quality of his employees, their skills and solutions, his task was to facilitate this and make them develop themselves. He wanted to lead the organization on 'headlines', by generating space for development, contradiction and debate. But hierarchy and commanding structures were also needed in important operations. Van Hulst was known for his good relationships with politicians and directors of other departments and organizations. He was not seen as a typical intelligence professional, but as a born director to lead this organization, competent in telling the story of his organization. Van Hulst tried to develop the work of his successors by generating more openness about his organization; "*open if possible, closed where needed*" became the motto (Braat, 2012). To be an effective organization the BVD and AIVD had to be open towards the society. The openness was reflected in more open report reports about the work of the BVD and AIVD, but also by more, regular and better organized contact with the press.

### *Effectivity*

Van Hulst was able to 'manage' his organization for over ten years. He started his term with the knowledge that there was political pressure to lift the organization. Van Hulst invested successfully in the relationships with important stakeholders of his organization. He gave his employees the space to develop, learnt them the 'meaning' of their work, and took the lead in times the organization needed this (Respondent 8). The BVD gained more legal authorities and eventually changed their name into the AIVD. The organization developed the line of openness by taking this in their own hands. Van Hulst represented and defended his organization in times of tensions. "*It might not have been hard telling a story, it was hard to tell a good story representing the BVD or AIVD, Van Hulst had that a skill*" (Respondent 1). The AIVD had grown in terms of personnel, authorities and tasks. Despite this transformation, the mission of sailing the organization into more calm waters seemed to be accomplished at the end of his term.

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

Van Hulst managed to develop the organization into the right direction. He build relationships with important stakeholders to generate support for his organization. He knew how much openness was needed to create a legitimate and effective organization. Van Hulst had a diplomatic way of acting, with a sense of feeling how this organization fitted well in the Dutch society, public and political field. His attention was mainly focused on the external and not on the internal organization, Van Hulst can therefore be seen as a manager-reformer-outsider.

## 9. Gerard Bouman

### *Mission*

Minister Remkes of Interior had a clear mission for the new Head of the AIVD: he wanted the AIVD to have a new approach, the culture of the organization had to become more pro-active. Bouman was the ideal person to execute this job according to Minister Remkes. Furthermore, the AIVD had to focus more on foreign intelligence; intensification of the cooperation with partners and investing in foreign intelligence. Bouman had to reorganize the AIVD to implement the new focus that would change the working methods of the organization to make it more effective, efficient and therefore prepared for the future (AIVD, 2011).

### *Time frame*

When Bouman started as the Head of the AIVD in 2007, the threat perception of the organization was focused on the threats of groups and individuals in the Netherlands itself. Radicalized individuals, right and left wing extremists were important threats that were analyzed. The external orientation was not the focus of the AIVD. This had changed at the end of his term; the threats that posed a danger for the national security came from outside the Netherlands. The focus had changed in 2010 to an external orientation with foreign intelligence as the most important task. Risks had their origin in global, geo-political and economic developments according to the annual report of 2010 (AIVD, 2011).

### *Style*

Bouman was known for his pro-active style of managing his organization. He was direct in his conversations, which was difficult for some of his employees, but was also praised by others. From the beginning, Bouman used his pro-active hands-on-style to lead the AIVD through the reorganization. He had to give the organization a new focus and working methods. The relationships with the outside world seemed to be more on the background. The openness the BVD and AIVD had pursued for years towards politicians and the Dutch society became on a lower profile (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011; Hijzen, 2016).

### *Effectivity*

The implementation of the reorganization was accomplished after a couple of years. The AIVD implemented new working methods, but the new focus was not implemented as a whole. The relationship with 'The Hague' was assessed as positive by Bouman himself; "*I succeeded in making politicians realize why the AIVD has to exist*" (Vrij Nederland, 2011). Others pointed at the budget cuts in 2012 that came as a surprise and indicated a diluted relationship. The openness towards the Dutch society seemed to be on a lower profile, with less attention for the media (Binnenlands Bestuur, 2011). Docters van Leeuwen initiated the thinking of an intelligence organization as a company that had to adjust their 'product' towards their 'customers' preferences, this changed towards an own mission focused on individuals (Respondent 3; NRC, 2013), without the specific 'product' thinking.

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

Minister Remkes had a clear mission for the new Head of the AIVD. Bouman possessed the characteristics that were needed to accomplish the mission of the reorganization on the short term. The strategy on the long term was partially recreated; the focus on foreign intelligence. There seemed to be less invested in the relationships with the outside world. Bouman had accomplished his mission but after less than 4 years, he seemed to have been the ideal person for a short-term reorganization job. Bouman can therefore be appointed as a manager-reformer-insider.

## 10. Rob Bertholee

### *Mission*

Bertholee announced his mission in one of his first interviews he gave as the new Head of the AIVD; “*The society has to know more about the work of the AIVD*” (NRC, 2012). The threats had risen, became more unpredictable and (international) interconnected than ever before. His mission was to make the AIVD more transparent, the Dutch society had to get the feeling that the AIVD is truly concerned for about their safety. But part of this mission or strategy was also the strengthening of the legitimacy of authorities and existence of the AIVD. “*The society does not know enough about our work. I want to improve this. It is the question whether the society realizes that we are necessary*” (NRC, 2012).

### *Time frame*

Right after the appointment of Bertholee the government decided in the coalition agreement of 2012 that the AIVD –*as one of many public organizations*- had to cut their budgets. These budget cuts were initiated in times when threat perceptions were rising, became more complicated and unpredictable. Soon the budget cuts made place for investments as threat perceptions grow; cyber and foreign threats became urgent. The situations in Syria, Turkey and Ukraine urged the AIVD to grow in personnel and resources. Changes in the legislation for the intelligence and security organizations were needed for the use of special authorities and to satisfy the sound of more independent supervision on the AIVD. The times and the perception about the AIVD in the political arena and society had changed rapidly in less than five years.

### *Style*

Bertholee was known for his ‘diplomatic’ style in leading his organization: having good relationships with important stakeholders of the organization, focused on the organization itself, but also trying to create a balance in being open towards the outside world. He tried to explain the work and the necessity of his organization in the media. The developments around the ‘sleepwet’ had put Bertholee more in the spotlight. His organization needed more authorities to guarantee a secure society in the Netherlands. His message in College Tour of several terrorist attempts that had been foiled in the past years underlined the importance of these authorities and necessity of the AIVD, and gave a strong signal to the outside world (College Tour, 2018).

### *Effectivity*

Bertholee managed to lead the AIVD through difficult times of budget cuts. His role was more on the background and not much in the spotlights, loyal to the Minister of Interior. After this period, the urge of growing and more fragmented threats had risen and led to more investments in his organization. The organization was able to grow in size and develop the foreign intelligence tasks. His mission of pursuing more openness and transparency by discussing the role of the AIVD within our society where hard to achieve in times of growing interconnectedness and the influence of the social media.

### *Patterns and leadership profile*

The AIVD tried to pursue more openness and transparency as Bertholee stated in one of his first interviews. Bertholee was more in the background in times of budget cuts, with the Minister taking the lead in the debate. In the period that followed investments had to be made to follow the technological developments and growing international threats. Change of legislation was initiated to give the AIVD more legal authorities and independent supervision. Bertholee became more in the spotlight. The patterns in the profile of Bertholee define him as an administrator-technocrat. Even though Bertholee is described as an administrator-technocrat patterns from a manager-reformer-outsider can be derived. His emphasis on transparency and

openness of the AIVD made him try to change the perception of the outside world about his organization.

## 6.2 General Analysis

In this part of the analysis the individual analysis of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD is combined to create a general analysis. The general analysis can overcome short term knowledge and oversee and describe long term patterns and important variables.

### *Mission*

In the mission of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD are two general lines derived throughout the years: the strengthening of external relationships and the quest for legitimacy, which was pursued by generating more openness and transparency. The strengthening of relationships had once started with investing in relationships with other departments, intelligence organizations and politicians, but eventually also with the outside world. The main reason for strengthening the relationships was the changing threat perception that had once been the Communism, but eventually fragmented in complicated threats from different nature, size and shape. As some of the Heads invested less in relationships than others, the strengthening of relationships returned as an important mission several times. This was the result of questions about legitimacy of authorities and the existence of the organization. The decreasing threat from the 'East' made politicians and the society look more critical to the BVD. In the last decade, the AIVD tried to anticipate on the new threats by becoming more pro-active and international orientated. Fragmented, interconnected and international threats were asking for a different strategy with more authorities for the AIVD.

### *Time frame*

When the BVD was established in 1949 the Communism was the most important threat. The occupation of several nations and the establishment of the Berlin Wall made the threat even more realistic. In the decades that followed, the threat remained urgent, but became less visible in the daily lives of citizens in the Netherlands. New generations were born and did not grow up with the same threat perception their parents had. Threats as the Mollucan Kidnappings and the RaRA were visible and had a bigger impact on the society. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 mend the end of the Communism. Threats for the Dutch democracy became more fragmented, interconnected and globalized after this. Terrorism and radicalization interfered in western societies with 9/11 as the most striking example. Geo-political tensions in different parts of the world influenced the Dutch society. Technology developed in a very short amount of time causing cyber-attacks as new types of threats, making the challenges in the current time frame grow.

### *Style*

Under the lead of Einthoven the BVD became an introvert organization that was enclosed from the outside world. The relations within the organization were hierarchal. In the decades that followed the introvert and closed style of the Heads of the BVD remained. Some of the Heads strengthened their ties with other Departments (Sinninghe Damsté) and invested in Public Relations (Kuipers). The openness and cooperation was needed for the organization as new threats and questions about legitimacy had to be answered. A transformation from an introvert and closed organization into a more open and externally orientated organization began to be visible in the term of Docters van Leeuwen. Threats became more global and fragmented in the 90s, therefore the external focus was needed. The relationship with the Minister of Interior and the Management Team was very important. Van Hulst had to deal with threats that had a major impact on the Dutch society; 9/11, Van Gogh and Fortuyn, but also the incident with the grenade in 'Het Laakkwartier' which generated a louder voice for more openness and transparency of the AIVD. Bouman's task was to invest in the foreign tasks of the AIVD, he had to change the

focus of the organization. Bertholee pledged in his term for more openness and transparency about his organization, showing up in the media to elaborate the story of the AIVD.

*Effectivity*

When Einthoven started his term as Head of the BVD he was given the space to structure the organization to his own preferences. His successors were able to continue this structure adding minor changes in the internal organization structure and external relations. This kept the organization ‘closed’ from the outside world, but stable. When politicians and society became more involved in the work of the BVD, due to student protests and Mollucan kidnappings, the organization and its Head had to anticipate and become more open and flexible. Criticism rose about legitimacy until the end of the term of Blom. Docters van Leeuwen implemented a successful reorganization and became the ‘public face’ of the BVD, with the media reacting positive on his performances. Buis was appointed to intensify the relationships with stakeholders, but found himself not the right man for the organization. Under the lead of Van Hulst the organization was able to grow in size and added a new range of tasks to the AIVD. He followed the road of Docters van Leeuwen of investing in Public Relations. Bouman was less open to the outside world, and was given the job to change the focus of the organization to foreign threats in times of rising cyber threats and global interconnectedness. Bertholee developed the foreign focus and tasks. He led the AIVD through budget cuts and generated transparency about the work of the AIVD. In times of rising influence of (social) media and geo-political conflicts Bertholee was able to generate more openness as he pledged to do when he started his term.

*Patterns and leadership profile*

If the patterns of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD are analyzed and the leadership profiles are allocated the following table is created:

Head of the organization	Leadership profile
Einthoven	Intelligence operator
Sinninghe Damsté	Administrator-custodian
Kuipers	Intelligence operator + Manager-reformer-outsider
De Haan	Administrator-technocrat
Blom	Administrator-custodian
Docters van Leeuwen	Manager-reformer-insider + Manager-reformer-outsider
Buijs	Administrator-custodian
Van Hulst	Manager-reformer-outsider
Bouman	Manager-reformer-insider
Bertholee	Administrator-technocrat

Table 7 Leadership profiles Heads of the BVD and AIVD

The table shows a general pattern; in the period before Docters van Leeuwen the leadership profiles were in general intelligence operators and administrator-custodians/technocrats. The BVD developed itself gradually in this period; no major changes were needed for the organization. The term of Docters van Leeuwen mend the starting point of different leadership types in the BVD, manager reformer insiders and outsiders tried to move the BVD and AIVD with the time as new threats, globalization and technology created different challenges than before.

### **6.3 Important variables –for future intelligence leaders**

The primary task of the Head of the AIVD has not changed throughout the years; guaranteeing national security and standing for their organization. The thing that has changed is the way this has been executed and the skills that are required. In current times of globalization in which threats are more interconnected and fragmented, there seems to be a need for leadership that is pro-active and has clear a vision. The variables below are assessed as important for future Heads of the AIVD and in line with the key variables defined in the theory of Robarge (2010); *legal limitations, first customer, bureaucratic skills and oversight and accountability.*

**Sub question 2.2** - *“What are the key variables that can be derived from the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD”-?*

#### **Independency**

An intelligence Head should be able to tell an unpleasant message, a message citizens are not always eager to hear, in line with the motto of the organization; ‘swim against the tide when needed’. The BVD has to remain their independent position, there is no desirable (political) behavior. An important task of the Head is to collect signals from the minister and other organizations, but the AIVD is independent and is not able to be involved in politics. The checks and balances are the basis for democracy, the Head has to ensure that his organization acts according to the rules that are set, independent from external influences. The checks and balances are the ‘insurance’ for the organization to exist and execute their tasks.

#### **Diplomatic manager – internal and external connector**

Diplomatic skills are assessed as an important characteristic for the Head. The AIVD is subject to many ‘employers’ on different levels (national, regional, municipal), but also to politicians, private and foreign organizations. The Head must be a skilled governor to manage the external relations that have become even more important in recent years. Besides the external stakeholders, the internal organization also needs management. The AIVD has to move with the time and have clear vision for the future. The combination of management of the external environment and the internal organization has grown in importance throughout the years and require skills to do so.

#### **The international aspect**

The importance of the international aspect of intelligence has grown from the 90s. The foreign intelligence task has become the focus of the AIVD nowadays. Before, the BVD and Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (IDB) where separate organizations, they are now integrated. The international aspect and the development of technology are calling for extra attention. The BVD had been a pioneer in the international cooperation, it made the AIVD a more diverse organization. It therefore requires a Head that has the skills an wants to invest in maintaining these relationships with other Heads of intelligence organizations in a globalized world.

#### **Transparency and openness**

Two topics that returned throughout the years where ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’. The concepts are linked to each other. Openness and transparency lead to a more effective AIVD. The current times are asking for more openness and transparency about the AIVD and its working methods. This had once started by publishing open annual reports and now extended to open reports about ‘ISIS Women’ and lectures. The AIVD needs more authorities to keep up with developments in the outside world and is therefore more open to the outside world to legitimate these requests. But the AIVD remains an organization that has to work in secrecy to meet their number one rule: protecting their sources. The motto that has developed; ‘open where

it is possible, secret where it has to be' represents the nature of the AIVD. The Head of the AIVD is subject to (social) media that makes it harder present themselves nowadays. Choices about how and when to use the media are therefore important.



## 7. Conclusion

### *7.1 Be the appropriate Head for the time frame?*

The analysis of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD made it clear that the time frame has an important influence on the Heads and their organization. The Head of the organization is subjected to the time frame where developments take place that influence the work of the BVD and AIVD. Due to this time frame certain variables return more often than others, some variables disappear and new appear. This also means that some of the Heads that have delivered a ‘good’ organization to their successor, might not have fitted well in different time frames. Einthoven was a decisive Head that fitted in the time frame when the BVD was created. Kuipers noted the urge to begin investing in the external relations. At the end of the 80s the BVD needed an organization-changer, which fitted the profile of Docters van Leeuwen perfect. Van Hulst had the capabilities to tell the story of the BVD to the outside world when the organization needed this, he possessed the skill to explain things well in times of critical moments, and invested in foreign intelligence. After the term of Van Hulst the AIVD wanted to become more pro-active, Bouman was a police man that was known for his pro-active profile. In recent years, in which Bertholee is on the lead, the AIVD needed a diplomatic Head that could lead the organization in times of more complicated and fragmented threats, developing the international orientation in a globalized world, and generate more openness and transparency; a profile with a wider range of key variables than ever before. The analysis is implemented in the adjusted conceptual model (image 6):




Image 6 Adjusted conceptual model

## **7.2 Answering the central research question**

*“Wat is the influence of the heads of the Dutch general intelligence organizations BVD and AIVD on the development of these organizations?”*

Ten Heads have served the BVD and AIVD over sixty-five years, starting under the lead of Louis Einthoven and currently under the lead of Rob Bertholee. The results show that the Heads have influenced ‘their’ organization in different ways, which can be divided into two parts. The first part was before the fall of the Berlin wall: the different Heads made the BVD grow and develop gradually without major changes needed for the organization, the orientation was internal. First steps were made in generating more openness and rethinking the threat perception of the organization. Their leadership profiles were administrator-custodian/technocrat or intelligence operator. In the second part the BVD and AIVD were reorganized to make it move with the times and be prepared for new threats; globalization and technology had created bigger challenges than before and were asking for more authorities. The Heads had to deal with openness and transparency due to involvement of the outside world. Their leadership profiles were manager-reformer-insiders/outsideers. Important to note is the time frame the Heads of the organization are subjected to, this influences their leadership of the organization. Variables that are assessed as important in leading the AIVD in the future are independency, diplomatic manager, the international aspect, and a well-considered choice in transparency and openness for an effective organization.

## 8. Discussion

### *Method*

In this research has been chosen to gather empirical material based on one in-depth case. The availability of empirical material in the field of intelligence, and more specific about the Heads of the BVD and AIVD is scarce. A relevant question is; “*whether there is enough relevant data gathered about the different Heads?*” Based on the results it can be concluded that the analysis has provided the necessary methodological framework that allow to reveal the influence of the different Heads of the BVD and AIVD. Interviews were conducted with a range of persons that have been involved in different ways, this his gave an extensive insight from various points of view. However, data sources are limited, the intelligence field is still an unexplored field, despite this the gathered data made it possible to get a deep insight in the characterizations, variables and time frame of the Heads in the Netherlands. The analysis of the data provided a firm basis for drawing conclusions.

### *Outcomes*

The outcomes of the research in the case of the BVD and AIVD resulted in the analysis that before the fall of the Berlin Wall the general pattern developed in which the Heads of the BVD made the organization grow gradually, as no major changes were needed for the organization. The term of Docters van Leeuwen meant the starting point of different leadership types in the BVD, after the fall of the Berlin Wall the Heads tried to move the BVD and AIVD with the time as new threats, globalization and technology created bigger challenges. The time frame played an important role in the influence of the Heads on their organization. The question remains whether this pattern is also seen in different intelligence organizations in the Netherlands and other nations, or that this is case-specific. The AIVD is an intelligence organization that is different than any other intelligence organization in a unique context, further research on this topic will have to support the research outcomes. The outcomes of this research are valuable for future Heads of the AIVD. In this context, however, the caveat should be entered that this research has remained on the surface regarding the success or failure of the Heads. Furthermore, it remains uncertain what the future will bring for the AIVD, this could bring more globalized and fragmented threats, reorganizations and changes in society that could influence the leadership.

### *Personal reflection*

The process of conducting this research and writing my master thesis has been a pleasant process. Exploring the intelligence world was a leap in the dark for me, but gave an extensive insight is an intriguing but complicated world to study. I learned more about the organization, intelligence, the history, leadership, influence of the outside world and of the time frame. It fascinated how the AIVD had and still have to do their work in an extensive field of stakeholders that influence the organization. The required qualities the Head of the AIVD needs to govern their organization are special and extensive. Their role is unique and cannot be compared with any other job, having the main responsibility of ensuring safety of the Netherlands. Due to a limited time frame, practicalities like a lack of knowledge about the intelligence world, and actual space in the thesis, it was impossible to cover all aspects in the field of intelligence leadership in the Netherlands. To be able do more and extensive research on this topic would have been a pleasure. Investigating this case sometimes was a hard job, writing down the results in a proper way even harder. Writing a master thesis is a process that needs a critical mind in order to get to a good result. I hope I can remain this critical mind in the future on my own work and on that of others, but foremost that I am not afraid to take the leap in the dark.

## 9. Recommendations

### *Recommendations for further scientific research*

In the discussion, a first step is set in conducting further research on this topic. This research has focused on the BVD and AIVD, who are only one of several intelligence organizations in the Netherlands and the rest of the world. Therefore, two recommendations are given to for further research.

The first recommendation is *to conduct an extensive analysis of intelligence leadership in different intelligence organizations* in the Netherlands, for example the MIVD. This could give insight in the results of intelligence leadership in other intelligence organizations in the Netherlands. By using the same methodology and structuring the research with several case studies in different intelligence organizations a comparison can be made. The results can prove valuable insights for the Dutch intelligence leadership literature.

The second recommendation is *to conduct the research in intelligence organizations around the world*. Intelligence organizations around the world are organized and active in different ways. Some of the intelligence organizations were established a long time before the BVD and have therefore a more extensive field for research. The intelligence leaders of these organizations face different challenges that can provide interesting and valuable insights. The results of the comparative cases can enrich the scarce scientific literature in the field of intelligence leadership.

### *Recommendations for in practice*

The AIVD has become more in the spotlight in recent years, with rising threats and growing influences from outsiders on the organization. The role of the Head of the AIVD is therefore important in managing these influences and generating more authorities for the AIVD.

The first recommendation that is given is to the Head of the AIVD is to *keep in mind the time frame* the Heads are part of. Sudden changes due to budget cuts or increasing threats have influence on the AIVD and therefore the influence of the Heads on their organization. The leadership profiles have to fit with the time frame to remain the capacity to lead the organization. But this also means that the Head has to have a clear mission and vision when times are changing.

The second recommendation for the Head of the AIVD is that they have to have the skills to coop with growing interconnectedness and globalization in the world, by performing an independent and diplomatic role. The Head of the AIVD has to be able to connect the internal and external organization: not only the fit with the own organization is important, but also with the outside world to have keep influence on the development of the organization. The Head needs to stay independent in the field of tensions and influences, defending the organization in public when needed, building in the background on a stable development of the organization. In this way, the Head can achieve the main goal of the AIVD: ensuring national security in the Netherlands.

## 10. Appendix

### 1. Interview format

Semi-structured format – open interview with questions on the topics of the operationalization scheme.

### 2. Interview list of names

Available on request

### 3. Internal structure of the BVD

#### ***Internal structure of the BVD in the beginning period (Engelen, P28-38, 2007)***

##### *Internal oriented departments:*

Department Central Documentation – this department concerned the registration, documentation and archiving of the entire BVD organization.

Department B – The main task of the B department was to collect intelligence about extremist streams. These streams concerned anti-democratic party's and organizations that were positioned on the far right or left of the political spectrum.

Department C – The C department was focused on individuals that were suspected to already be or potentially become spies.

##### *External oriented departments:*

Department KO – This department was concerned with the strengthening of relations by providing courses, mainly focused on explaining the ideology and current practice of communism within society.

Department D – Improving security (measures) in all vital and vulnerable public and private companies and organizations.

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