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THE ROLE OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY  
IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF THE HAGUE  
CONCERNING COUNTER-RADICALIZATION

LOCAL EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN  
COUNTER-RADICALIZATION MEASURES

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## **Preface**

After graduating from the bachelor study 'Public Administration', I had the option between two masters. The first one was called 'Public administration', which was an in-depth continuation of my bachelor study. The second one was called 'Crisis and Security management'. The general topic of my bachelor thesis was 'crisis management' and back then I chose this topic for its dynamics and multidimensional character. The general topic of the bachelor thesis inspired my interest and convinced me to continue my path with the master 'Crisis and Security management'. Now, roughly one and a half years later, I can look back and say that this was probably one of the best choices I made in my study career. Every student should have a core interest in their study track in order to succeed, but in my experience it rarely occurs that one has interest in almost every course of the study. Public Administration was my third bachelor study and finally a study which suited me, although there were some topics that did not spur my interest. Crisis and Security management gave me a feeling I had never experienced during my college years. Every topic was full of excitement and connected well to contemporary issues concerning security. I passed all courses without retakes, which was not the case during my bachelor track: a clear sign of what genuine interest in a study can do for a student in combination with his or her performance. I would like to thank my parents, grandparents and little brother who have always supported me in my study efforts. I was not a perfect example of a so-called 'straight A-student', but I have grown towards a point in my life where I can tell others and myself where my true power and interest is coming from. I also want to thank Professor Edwin Bakker; in the first instance for setting up such a study, and second for being my thesis supervisor. His guidance and style of lecturing was a key factor during this track, not only for me but also for my peers. The topic of my master thesis concerns a very present-day topic, focusing on major issues in contemporary Dutch society. Radicalization and terrorism have a significant impact on the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as national security and anxiety within a society. Governments struggle to maintain social control, but approaches such as community engagement could help governmental institutions with their efforts. I hope my research can provide some clarity concerning these issues and in the long-run contribute to local community engagement approaches.

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## 1. Introduction

Counter-radicalization is a topic which gained much attention since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since then, several domestic attacks occurred by ‘homegrown terrorists’, individuals who were raised – or had some connection with – the country in which they staged an attack. These individuals have radicalized and separated themselves from society. This new form of terrorism has caused difficulties for governments because the nature of the problem is relatively new and difficult to tackle. During the years after 9/11, governments have developed several approaches concerning counter-radicalization. One of these approaches is a so-called community engagement effort, which focuses on tackling radicalization from within the community. Community engagement in counter-radicalization efforts has since then grown in literature and practice, and is seen as an important part of tackling homegrown terrorism. This research thesis will focus on the role of the Muslim community of the Transvaal neighborhood in the counter-radicalization network of the municipality of The Hague. I will research and map out the network regarding counter-radicalization in The Hague, describe the role of the Muslim community in the network, and compare this role with best-practices – which are described in the literature concerning community involvement in counter radicalization efforts – in order to decide whether the measures employed by the municipality and community of The Hague are similar to these best-practices.

My literature research has revealed various approaches on the prevention of radicalization and the relationship between police, community and radicalization. The network theory of Whelan (2012) will provide knowledge concerning the role and position of the community and their leaders in a security network. After studying the literature and the counter-radicalization programs of the municipality of The Hague, I have devised the following research question for this master thesis:

*“What is the role of Muslim communities in the Transvaal neighborhood in the network for prevention of radicalization in The Hague and in what ways does this role relate to best-practices?”*

### 1.1 Relevance of research

It is important to test the formal and informal role of the Transvaal Muslim community in the safety network of The Hague to the empirical reality. In the light of social relevance, community engagement is considered a very effective tool for prevention when it comes to combatting such a

wicked problem as radicalization (Briggs, 2010:970). This research will contribute to social dynamics and counter-radicalization policies of government actors. Providing an overview of the role of the Muslim community can give both governmental and non-governmental actors – especially the municipality of The Hague – greater insight into what is done and what should be done. At the national level, other municipalities could also apply these best-practices. The scientific relevance of this thesis lies in the testing of community engagement in counter-radicalization efforts. Community engagement constitutes many different variables and so a significant part will not be discussed in this research thesis. Nevertheless, this research thesis could still be a stepping stone for further research in the municipality of The Hague or other cities. I suggest research which pays close attention to the role of family as an underlying part of the community. Besides testing the counter-radicalization programs of the municipality of The Hague against the best practices from the literature, I will also conduct several interviews with community members and community spokespersons in order to highlight the areas in which the programs are lacking and thereby create more complete image of these programs. First I will investigate the position of the Muslim community and their representatives in the security network. It is important to reveal the position of the community in the network because it could tell us more about both what the role of the community in the network is and to what extent this role is complementary to the best-practices. Secondly, I will focus on the literature on community involvement concerning counter-radicalization which will tell us more about best-practices and to what extent they are applied by the municipality and the community in The Hague.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will draw upon several theories which will constitute a theoretical framework which will address the main concerns of this research thesis. Each concept of the main research question will be explained by a theory and eventually be connected to the empirical reality in the Transvaal neighborhood. First, the key concept of radicalization will be elaborated on as well as which type of radicalization is most applicable in the context of the main concerns of this research thesis. Second, I will use the key concepts of the network theory of Whelan (2012), which will form a sound structure for mapping out the counter-radicalization network in The Hague. The structure and policy dimensions of a network as described by Whelan (2012) should provide more clarity concerning the position of the Muslim community in the counter-radicalization network. The elements of the dimensions will be translated into questions which will then be tested to the findings. Third, I will describe the best-practices concerning counter-radicalization and what is needed to fulfill the elements of these best-practices. Due to a limited timeframe and restrictions involving size of the research, I have opted to use only the network theory of Whelan (2012).

### 2.1 Radicalization

According to Schmid (2013), the term ‘radicalization’ has become central to terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy-making, which means it is still poorly defined. There is no universally accepted definition of radicalization and local context is key in order to understand it. Sedgwick (2010) outlines these difficulties in defining radicalization. He claims that radicalization is relative and can be seen best in relation within the political context of a geographical area. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the concept ‘radical’ referred to supporting an extreme section of a party, in which society itself can be seen as the party in general (Schmid, 2013:6). Over the years two core elements concerning the term ‘radical’ can be identified which are based on attitude and action:

1. Advocating political change, based on the conviction that the status quo is undesirable while at the same time an alternative has appeared for the radical person.
2. The means to bring about changes to the status quo can be either non-violent and democratic, or violent and undemocratic.

Sinai (2012) describes six groups of factors which contribute to radicalization:

1. Personal factors
2. Political and socioeconomic factors
3. Ideological factors
4. Community factors
5. Group factors
6. Enabling factors

These factors are general descriptions of possible causes of radicalization. The diversity of factors characterizes radicalization as a ‘wicked problem’.

Since there is a major dependency on local interpretations of radicalization, the definition of the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) is currently being used to give a local definition of radicalization, as follows:

“Radicalization is the active pursuit and support of deep fundamental changes in society, which could pose a threat for the persistence of the democratic rule of law, with the use of undemocratic methods which could detract the functioning of the democratic rule of law” (AIVD, 2004:15).

Difficulties in defining radicalization have a strong connection with the nature of the issue itself. Radicalization can be seen as a wicked problem. Rittel and Webber (1973) gave a definition of a wicked problem:

1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad
4. No immediate solution or ultimate test to a wicked problem
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation’; every attempt counts significantly
6. Wicked problems have no fixed number of solutions
7. Every wicked problem is unique
8. Every wicked problem can be linked or considered to be a symptom of another problem
9. A definition of a problem can be explained by numerous causes
10. The planner has no right to be wrong



Most of these ‘wicked problem’ characteristics apply to radicalization. There is no definitive formulation of radicalization; solutions are “better” or “worse”; there is no immediate solution to radicalization; every solution has its own implications; there are no limited policy options on radicalization; radicalization is a unique problem; radicalization can be linked or considered as a symptom of another problem and radicalization has numerous causes (Rittel and Webber, 1973:161-167).

## 2.2 What type of radicalization – definition and background of the jihadi-Salafism ideology

Radicalization is manifested in many different forms, each with different origins. This research thesis will focus on the radical jihadi-Salafism stream: a form which has been practiced since the founding ages of the Islam.

The different streams within the Islam give their own interpretation and nuances of the religion. Nowadays, jihadism has its roots in Salafism, which is known for emphasizing a return to the ‘pure Islam’. This means that Salafism is rejecting all other forms of Islamic tradition which were founded later on, such as local folklore and habits (AIVD, 31:2014). Within contemporary Salafism, there are three main streams. The first one is apolitical Salafism, which emphasizes personal religious life and isolation from the non-Islamic society. The second one is political Salafism, which focuses on social involvement and has a stronger political motive. The third one is the jihadi-Salafism, which is a primary component for contemporary jihadism. All three streams have the same norms and values based on the ‘pure Islam’. The difference between jihadi-Salafism and the other two streams (which are seen as ‘dawa-Salafism streams’) is the use of violence to reach this goal. Apolitical and political Salafism emphasize that the pure Islam should be distributed in the first place by the *dawa*, which means by preaching the message of Islam (AIVD, 31-32:2014). The jihadi-Salafism is convinced that besides the *dawa*, violent jihad is necessary. Salafism in general rejects democratic norms and values and has an intolerant and polarizing attitude towards any other form of belief. At first it was believed that *dawa*-Salafism offered an alternative to jihadi-Salafism, but recent trends have shown that the *dawa*-Salafism is more prevalent than its alternatives. The growth of Salafism in general, new Salafism speakers who have more in common with jihadi-Salafism and the support for the jihad in Syria have led to this conclusion (AIVD, 33-36:2014). This research thesis will focus on the Salafism stream which creates a breeding ground for radical jihadi-Salafism and their supporters.

## 2.3 Network theory of security networks

The network theory by Chad Whelan offers a framework for the structure of the network and the position and role of actors in the network. A network can therefore be defined as a set of actors which are linked together by engaging in mutual cooperation. The actors can be individuals, groups, units within organizations, or organizations as a whole (Whelan, 2012:11).

### 2.3.1 Security networks

The governance of security is characterized by the involvement of a number of institutions which include state and non-state actors. This pluralistic form of governance is very comparable to a network-like structure in order to keep up with the changing relationships between different security agents (Whelan, 2012:18). The most common use of the concept ‘security network’ is a term which reveals the type of relationship between security actors. Dupont defines the term ‘security network’ as ‘a set of institutional, organizational, communal or individual agents or nodes that are interconnected in order to authorize and/or provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders (Whelan, 2012:19)’. As a unit of analysis, a security network is a set of actors which have formed relationships in order to fulfil security related goals. Security networks are formed to provide efficiency and effectiveness advantages in the distribution of resources, responsibility, and risk (Whelan, 2012:19).

The research will focus on the position and role of the community in the security network. I will focus on the two dimensions from Whelan (2012)’s five-point network theory which are most feasible for this master thesis. The first dimension is the ‘network structure’, which focuses on the design and development of the network. The second dimension is the ‘network policy’, which focuses on the role of policy rules and procedures and their influence on the roles of the actors in the network. These two dimensions should yield greater insights into the formal position of the Muslim community in the security network. Due to the relatively young age of the network and the limited time of this research, only these two dimensions will be taken into account.

### 2.3.2 Network structure

The structural level is the first of the two levels of analysis which will be taken into account. Whelan (2012) states that network structure has implications for patterns of relationships or ‘ties’ between actors. ‘Design’ is studied as a static condition and the development of a network as a

dynamic process (Whelan, 2012:43). Networks can be abstracted in terms of two ideal types: hub and all-channel.

The all-channel network design is a network in which each actor is connected to the other. The density of connections is at a maximum level. The network implies that maximum efficiency can be reached provided that each actor shares information with all the other actors (Whelan, 2012:44). In the context of information sharing it is important to have access to all of the information. The risk of not having some parts of the information could be counter-productive for the network because a question or problem is only partly answered (Whelan, 2012:45-46). If each actor has full access to all the information in the network, actors can decide on their own which information is relevant. The all-channel design offers a solution to the distribution of information problem in complex environments: there is no central actor controlling the information streams.. It is therefore more efficient because there is no need for two exchanges for the network to acquire all information (Whelan, 2012:47).

The all-channel network could face problems in terms of information coordination. A focus on efficiency could therefore lead to a downgrade in effectiveness.

The hub network design is used to coordinate such information diffusion in networks (Whelan, 2012-47).

The hub network is a network in which each actor is connected to a central actor. The information stream goes through the central actor, and is distributed back out again in a modified form to create a common awareness of a particular situation (Whelan, 2012:48). The central actor should have the capacity to collate information which makes the hub design more effective than the all-channel design. A key argument is that the central actor can manage outgoing information more effectively. The potential for 'information overload' is a relevant aspect for effectiveness. The goals and size of the network are factors which will be decisive for its design. Whelan (2012) argues that the smaller the network, the larger its goal consensus, and so the more likely a network is to benefit from the all-channel design. With a general goal description it is likely to adopt the all-channel design, because of the difficulty in assessing all relevant information. The more specific and profound the goals of the network are, the more likely it will adopt the hub design. The central actor is more likely to have the knowledge, capabilities and resources to deal with the information coordination task (Whelan, 2012:49).

Internal network governance concerns the manner in which activities are managed and coordinated in networks. Internal network governance is related to network design, in which the all-channel network will likely adopt the ‘shared’ governance model while the hub design will likely adopt the ‘lead’ governance model. There are some conditions which will determine the selection of a governance model. The shared model is characterized by the involvement of all members, with decision-making power being equally distributed in the network. This type of network depends on the commitment and contribution of its members in order to remain effective. The lead model is characterized by the decisions of one actor, which coordinates the decisions and activities of actors in the network. The lead organization may be formally established by mandate, or informally between the members of the network (Whelan, 2012:49-51). Leadership is thus an important aspect in all networks: even networks which maintain the all-channel design still involve some form of leadership. The organization of information and actors is important to drive the decisions and activities of the network in an efficient and effective manner. (Whelan, 2012:51).

### 2.3.3 Network policy

Policies in a network are established as a means to control network activities. Formal policies and procedures in the context of national security are one of the most important ways to keep members focused on shared goals and to address the problems of members in the network (Whelan, 2012:81). Each agency has its own unique procedures, which makes it important to establish a common set of procedures and policy. In a ‘lead’ organization network, the lead agency establishes the goals of the network and searches for potential agencies which share these goals. ‘Shared’ organization networks establish procedures by consulting each member of the network in order to create a common policy outline. A well designed policy and procedure structure can benefit the efficiency and effectiveness of the network (Whelan, 2012:83). The effects of network control can be divided into two activities. The first activity is the sharing of information. Security networks have different forms of information to process. There are security networks which have limited requirements imposed on the sharing of information. Different forms of information and legal procedures can pose an obstacle to the sharing of information between agencies (Whelan, 2012:85). A solution to this obstacle is an inter-agency agreement, which specifies the type of information that can be shared with certain agencies. The use of

policy in network control is to define the roles and responsibilities of the actors. Security networks involve different actors with different mandates and goals, which at times overlap and conflict with each other (Whelan, 2012:87).

Several tensions with policy exist in security networks. The first example of a tension is the difference between rules and guidelines. A rule is – most of the time – a strict prescription, while a guideline leaves space for interpretation (Whelan, 2012:90). A second example of a tension is the requirement of proper communication of information. These requirements place limitations on the communication of information, which could decrease the efficiency of networks. The ‘need-to-know’ principle creates dilemmas for actors that need to assess information for other actors. It is not always clear which information is relevant for actors in a network (Whelan, 2012:92).

The managing of these policy tensions is crucial. One of the key strengths of networks is the flexibility they offer, but this flexibility could be compromised through the use of bureaucratic measures, which could influence the adaptability of networks when unforeseen events occur (Whelan, 2012:93). Nevertheless, bureaucratic measures provide stability improvements which specify the operations of the network and ensure consistent network responses and management. The trade-off between policy rules and network flexibility can be difficult to manage (Whelan, 2012:94).

## 2.4 Partnerships – Community engagement in counterterrorism efforts

In this section I will elaborate on different views and recommendations on community engagement concerning counterterrorism. I will argue why communities are important in counterterrorism efforts and what is needed for an effective approach.

### 2.4.1 The importance of community involvement

Briggs (2010) describes the central role of communities for engaging in counterterrorism. The terrorist threat comes from a marginal part of the community, but they are integrated into their communities and do not solely work on their own. Therefore communities need to play a central role in tackling this issue. Briggs (2010) elaborates four ways of community engagement in a counterterrorism strategy. The first one is the use of communities as an early warning system for police and intelligence services concerning information about individuals or groups. The second one is the upstream workings of communities to prevent youngsters from becoming radicalized.

This way attempts to first identify a range of factors which contribute to radicalization and second to determine where the community should play a role with regard to these factors. Such factors are: the presence of recruiters; the spread of extremist narratives; the availability of extremist material; group or individual identity issues; personal crisis; changed situation or circumstances; underemployment; links to criminality; social exclusion; grievances; and a lack of trust in political structures and civil society. Third, communities can tackle grievances. Terrorist recruiters and promoters are trying to create a wedge between citizens and the government, thus undermining counterterrorist efforts. The government should gain and maintain the trust of Muslim communities by showing its commitment to the tackling of injustices done to Muslims both domestically and abroad. Fourth, the police needs the community's active engagement in order to effectively protect it. Communities should be more inclined to give the police the benefit of the doubt when they make mistakes or violate civil liberties in the heat of the moment. Their forgiveness ensures a long term partnership between police and community and therefore an effective response towards terrorism (Briggs, 2010:973-974).

Spalek and Lambert (2008) argue that communities are viewed as an important resource for tackling social issues such as crime, unemployment and anti-social behavior. This vision represents an approach in which state and non-state actors work together, which is comparable to processes concerned with governance. This emphasizes the involvement of local actors concerning responsibility and accountability for crime-related issues. The involvement of communities, statutory, and voluntary agencies in these issues are called partnerships (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:258). The context of a post 9/11 era has added the dimension of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization, in which the Muslim community is encouraged to actively participate in efforts to combat extremism.

#### 2.4.2 What is needed for effective community involvement?

In order to combat extremism with the involvement of the Muslim community, a framework which sets out the basic components of a critical reflective approach is needed (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:258). An important aspect of engagement work with Muslim communities is the documentation of Muslims' voices, in a sense that their stories provide understanding concerning the engagement process. Furthermore, engagement work concerning counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization goals should consider a clear definition of which norms and values should

be emphasized (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:261). Spalek and Lambert (2008) argue for a rational assessment which identifies the best groups in order to combat extremism. Government projects that encourage and discourage certain Muslim identities is a form of identity building. Government policy should focus on forms of engagement that are most effective in the battle against radicalization and terrorism, rather than creating an idealistic image of the Muslim community and a climate of acceptance for only a certain part of the community. According to current government policy, legitimate Muslims are those who cooperate with governments on terms as set out by these governments. Muslims who refuse to participate are likely to be perceived as radical and even a potential terrorist threat (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:262). With the empowerment of specific Muslim communities to help combat radicalization, individuals who are at risk of radicalizing can be more fully integrated into these empowered communities, and are less likely to participate in violence and terrorism. The Muslim youth could be embedded into these communities which carry the most legitimacy in order to prevent and counter their attraction to extremism. It is perceived that radicalized Muslims pursue their own individual goals which have little to nothing in common with the goals and values of wider Muslim communities from which they originated (in terms of family, ethnic groups, or nationality) (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:262). However, work concerning the empowerment of different Muslim communities is under constant threat of being criticized by a fearful media and political arena which sees empowerment of these communities as a source of support and nurture for fundamentalists and separatists. A more rational viewpoint argues for cooperation in a partnership form, in which minority Muslim groups actively contribute to multicultural dynamics. This type of engagement activity requires both state institutions and Muslim communities to be involved in collective interaction and dialogue. Engagement work can be seen as a pluralistic process in which communities are involved in shaping government policies and influencing practices of state actors. The communities themselves are also being reshaped and modified by these common policies, which results in a two-sided input and output synergy. Partnership work is characterized by cultures of different community groups influencing one another using hybrid solutions and innovation (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:262). Furthermore, engagement creates an environment in which resistance identities – who are viewed as actors which occupy devalued and stigmatized positions in society and developed principles opposite to institutions of society – are turned into project identities which seek to transform society with the possibility of eventually

becoming dominant in society's institutions. They will therefore be perceived as legitimate identities (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:262).

It is important to explore and document Muslim community members' experiences, perceptions and understandings of community engagement work. Creating access to the overlooked voices of these communities – such as Salafists and Islamists – is crucial for developing an understanding of their social world.

Partnerships between state actors and communities are characterized by different perspectives concerning the engagement process. Therefore, all stakeholders should be able to give their opinion concerning partnership work. The perspectives of individuals with identities placed in disempowered positions might be not heard, because their opinions might be viewed as less rational compared to the opinions of those in power. Spalek argues that an inclusion of Muslim voices in research might help to create new approaches (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:263).

Diversity in the Muslim population poses challenges for partnership work. It is important to explore which religious streams and ethnicities of the Muslim community currently should be represented in the partnership. Less organized groups which occupy less powerful positions in society are often excluded from partnership involvement and are therefore overlooked, mitigated or ignored (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:264).

In order to become involved in counter-terrorism efforts, a representative of the Muslim community should consider a less critical view on the global war on terror and have a more nuanced attitude towards government policy. However, influential commentators pose Islamists and Salafists as extremists and a threat to Europe. This creates difficulties for government actors when empowering these subgroups even though the skills of the subgroups in tackling extremism and recruitment are recognized by these government actors (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:265).

Another point of attention is the equal treatment of the different groups in the Muslim community. Some parts of the community are explicitly opponents of Islamists and Salafist groups and perceive them as extreme and dangerous. A government alliance with only those parts of the Muslim community who are perceived as their religious opponents could cause a retreat of Islamists and Salafists from community engagement and therefore provide terrorist groups with more potential recruits.



Another important area is the broader social and political factors that have an impact upon community engagement concerning counter-terrorism. The government's foreign policy could have a negative impact on Muslim community engagement. It might be a source of strong opposition and anger within Muslim communities, potentially alienating them as a result. Furthermore, domestic policy after the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 attacks and the London bombings of 2005 have raised issues concerning citizenship, individual rights, and liberal democratic values (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:266-267). Spalek highlights the notion of secularism, which is used in different contexts and impacts engagement processes. Secularism concerns the distinction between the public arena of citizenship and private arena of belief practices. Muslim minorities experience difficulties with the discourse concerning faith and identity. One interpretation of secularism denies faith identities which conflicts with people who see a religious identity as a prime identity through which the social world is experienced. Therefore, the interpretation and experiences of discrimination based on religion is a factor which should be taken seriously, especially if it concerns engagement work (Spalek & Lambert, 2008:268). Engagement work could also experience difficulties due to criminalization of a specific group. Ethnic minorities associated with Islam could be seen as problematic groups and are therefore monitored more intensively by police and other security actors. Furthermore, there are several anti-terror laws which makes it easier for the police to conduct random searches aimed at these minorities.

#### 2.4.3 Trust in the context of community involvement

Trust in police-community involvement is, according to Basia Spalek (2010), an important factor regarding the involvement of communities in the prevention of radicalization.

In the context of policing, public trust involves placing faith in a person or institution when serious issues occur. Furthermore, personalized trust can influence trust at the institutional level and even at the systemic/macro level. Therefore, trust at the micro level can improve trust at a macro level. (Spalek, 2010:798). When connecting the concept of 'trust' to policing, it is assumed that the type and quality of micro-level interactions, such as between police officers and citizens, could be decisive for trust or distrust generated towards policing at the institutional level. In this perspective, community policing offers opportunities for trust building relationships between police officers and community members and provides potential for trust building concerning policing at the institutional level (Spalek, 2010:798). Trust is important because of the

power gap between police officers and community members. It is significant to note that although the police as an institution might be in a position of formal public trust, in practice there may actually be an absence of trust between individuals and the police. This absence of genuine trust affects the manner in which policing will be carried out. For instance, the police could become more arbitrary and heavy handed towards certain community members. In the context of “new terrorism,” where “hard” measures under counter-terrorism legislation are conducted more often, the achievement of gaining trust between members of the Muslim community and the police appears to be very challenging task (Spalek, 2010:798).

Spalek examined the role of trust between police and communities in the context of counter-terrorism. The success of a partnership model is defined by the amount of trust between the actors involved (Spalek, 2010:791). A key finding is that in a low-trust context it is important for police officers to focus on building contingent trust by establishing trust-building activities which emphasize trustworthiness. Trust between police officers and Muslim community members is a feature which focuses on individuals and their commitment concerning mutual relationships. This should ensure long-term partnership work.

#### 2.4.4 A recommendation on neighborhood policing: the PREVENT program

Lamb (2012) conducted a case study of neighborhood policing from the PREVENT program and the approach of officers participating in this program. This program will be used to develop recommendations regarding neighborhood policing. The goal of this program is described in three separate objectives. The first is to have an adequate response to promoters of terrorism. The second is to prevent people who are being drawn to terrorism and to provide them with advice and support. The third concerns focused work on those sectors and institutions in which the risk of radicalization is higher. Neighborhood police officers should aim to provide residents with the following services (Lamb, 2012:91-92):

- **Access:** to local policing services through a named point of contact
- **Influence:** over policing priorities in their neighborhood
- **Intervention:** which contains joint actions with partners and the public
- **Answers:** sustainable solutions and feedback on what is being done

Neighborhood officers should apply this particular form of neighborhood policing because of their experience. Lamb (2012) called this the ‘three cups of tea approach’; three stages towards gaining the trust of a community. It consists of regular meetings with community groups and paying attention to their concerns in three discrete stages (Lamb, 2012:92).

The first stage concerns face to face contact – as well as contact through social media – and visibility. It is important to create a contact point for the neighborhood. First contact between police officers and the neighborhood should be a gradual process because it takes time for the officers to identify themselves in the community. Officers should therefore wear uniforms which enhance their visibility. They should ultimately be recognized as more informal ‘neighborhood’ officers. Once the officers have reached a certain level of familiarity, they progress to the second stage (Lamb, 2012:92-93).

The second stage concerns the achievement of trust from individuals, communities, or institutions. For example, trust can be achieved by responding quickly to red tape situations. In this way, officers will gain additional insights into related community issues which might otherwise be overlooked. Security and partnership officers should form a synergistic relationship with local police teams. The security and partnership officers focus on gaining trust by helping members of the community with small issues, while the local police deal with high priority issues. This ‘cup of tea’ focuses on offering help and support within the community to achieve acceptance as opposed to harder methods such as investigating, gathering intelligence or arresting people. Once they have reached a certain level of acceptance, they move on to the third stage (Lamb, 2012:93-94).

The third stage concerns engaging with the community on terrorism and radicalization related issues through formal or informal channels. This is most effective when there is a significant amount of trust between officers and community members. It allows officers to talk both directly and informally without angering or alienating the community. In return, the community might be more willing to share information with these officers (Lamb, 2012:94).

#### 2.4.5 Youth alienation and the importance of youth integration

The research conducted by Kosseim (2011) places emphasis on youth integration and factors which contribute to youths becoming estranged and isolated. Acculturation seems to be an

important experience that could bring about benefits for isolated and disaffected youths and the society which they feel reluctant to embrace (Kosseim, 2011:9). Counter-radicalization efforts involving community outreach have proven to be successful. Community leaders should engage in community relations and share their experiences and knowledge with other community actors at the national level. Professional diplomacy efforts should focus on promoting counter-radicalization efforts abroad to secure international cooperation. Alienated communities provide a breeding ground for radicalization and a safe haven for terrorists.

Besides identifying indicators of radicalization, it is also important to look for solutions which elaborate on policies directed towards improving societal structures and the economic situation of the community. Furthermore, Kosseim (2011) argues to pay attention to the gap between the police and the community concerning trust between the two parties. Community policing should create the perception of a common threat which society should both fear and address together.

#### 2.4.6 Conceptualization of the theoretical framework

This section concerns the operationalization of the various theories discussed with the main research question of this thesis. The first theory discussed was the security network theory of Whelan (2012), which gave insights into the position of the Muslim community within the network of preventing radicalization in The Hague in two different dimensions: structure and policy. These two dimensions will be conceptualized in order to test them in the network involved with the prevention of radicalization.

The first dimension is the network structure. Counter-radicalization efforts emphasize effectiveness, since the nature of the problem is security related (Whelan, 2012). In this light, the hub network design is the most useable, because of the information coordination advantages and the focus on effectiveness rather than efficiency. From this perspective, the position of the Muslim community in comparison with other actors will be tested.

Hub network design	All-channel design
Effectiveness	Efficiency
Single actor as coordinator of information	Multiple actors as coordinators
Preferably lead-type of organization	Preferably shared-type of organization

By mapping the network and information streams of counter-radicalization actors in The Hague according to the city's action plan, it will become clear if a hub network design or an all-channel design is a better fit.

*Question: In which type of network design is the Muslim community in the Transvaal neighborhood situated?*

The second dimension is network policy, which is a way to control network activities. This dimension concerns the following questions:

- What does the structure of policies and procedures look like in this network?
- In what way are they used and applied by the Muslim community?
- Who is responsible for the implementation of policies and procedures? What is the role of the Muslim Community in this?
- Are there requirements concerning the sharing of information between the Muslim community and other actors in the network?
- Does any tension exist concerning the communication of information between the Muslim community and other actors?

It is important to check how the policy procedures are structured in the network. This gives an overview of the policymaking relationship between the actors.

To compare the position of the Muslim community in the network involved with counter-radicalization and to determine to what extent this position is beneficial for effective community engagement, the various concepts of the network theory will be conceptualized.

The second section concerns the conceptualization of best-practices in question form, which makes it easier to compare the elements of the best-practices with the research results.

1. To what extent do communities play a central role in counterterrorism strategies?
2. To what extent are communities used as an early warning system?
3. To what extent does the community play a role in factors that could contribute to radicalization?
4. To what extent does the Muslim community tackle grievances?

5. To what extent is the community showing understanding towards the police when difficult cases or situations arise? (trust)
6. To what extent are Muslims' voices documented?
7. Is there a clear definition of which norms and values should be emphasized?
8. Is there a rational assessment which identifies the best groups for combatting extremism?
9. Government policy should focus on forms of engagement that is most effective in the battle against radicalization and terrorism
10. Government should not create a climate in which only certain parts of the Muslim community are accepted.
11. Muslim communities should be empowered in order to create safe havens for youngsters.
12. Cooperation in a partnership form with minority Muslim groups should contribute to multicultural dynamics.
13. State institutions and Muslim communities should be involved in cooperative interaction and dialogue.
14. Both actors should shape and influence policy in a two-sided synergy of input and output, which should lead to hybrid solutions and innovation.
15. Turning resistance identities into project identities, thereby ultimately becoming dominant in society's institutions and therefore transforming into legitimate identities
16. Crucial to document Muslims' voices concerning engagement work, especially from Salafists and Islamists, in order to better understand their social world.
17. All stakeholders should be able to give their opinion on partnership work.
18. Important to listen to the perspectives of identities placed in disempowered positions, as they could help create new approaches.
19. A Muslim community representative should consider a less critical view on the global war on terror and have a more nuanced attitude towards government policy.
20. What opinions are put forward by influential commentators concerning engagement work, and how do these opinions affect government actors?
21. Important to include every part of Muslim community.
22. Influence of governments' foreign policy on Muslim community engagement.
23. Influence of domestic policy involving citizenship, individual rights, and liberal democratic values and how this affects Muslim community engagement.

24. The secularistic view and faith identities – what is their influence on engagement work and in what ways are faith identities taken seriously by engagement work?
25. Effects on engagement work concerning the perception of police and other security actors on ethnic minorities.
26. How does the security network contribute to building trust between community members and the police?
27. Are there trust-building activities employed by police officers to emphasize trustworthiness?
28. Which type of police officers are assigned for community policing?
29. Is there a focus on achieving acceptance, or conducting rudimentary police work?
30. Is there an engagement with the community on topics such as terrorism and radicalization on an informal level? Does the community feel enough trust to share certain information with officers?
31. How is acculturation supported by the action program, Muslim community, and the counter-radicalization network?
32. To what extent do community leaders share their experiences and knowledge with other community actors nationwide?
33. To what extent are diplomacy efforts conducted concerning the promotion of counter-radicalization efforts abroad?
34. To what extent are solutions with a societal structure and economics nature taken into account in counter-radicalization efforts?
35. Is community policing aimed at establishing that radicalization is a common threat to all actors involved?

A total of 35 elements of best-practices were found from the literature. Each best-practice will be tested to the empirical reality and categorized in the five-level Likert scale. This type of categorization gives an overview of the degree of implementation of a best-practice.

### 3. Methodology

In this section I will explain the various methods used in this research. First, the nature of this research will be qualitative. Qualitative research generates non-numerical data and is used to gain insights concerning statements, beliefs, experiences, behavior, interactions and observations (Pathak, Jena, Kalra, 2013:192). Goal of the research is to achieve insights into the role of the Muslim community in the counter-radicalization network of The Hague. Therefore, the main sources of observation are information sources such as policy documents, written statements, news articles and interviews. The nature of the topic and the qualitative research methods gave the research question an open character, which means that an answer to the research question will be somewhat open to interpretation. During the research and writing of the thesis the research question was changed multiple times in order to better fit the extent, possibilities and findings of the research.<sup>1</sup> The research contains two major parts: the position of the Muslim community in the security network of The Hague and the implementation of best-practices proposed by the literature.

#### 3.1 Elaboration on various concepts and the position of the Muslim community in the security network

Before starting with the first of the two parts, I will elaborate on the concept of radicalization. I will give a brief definition of the general concept, the specific type of radicalization, and provide information concerning the factors that potentially cause radicalization. For this I will use scientific articles and the definition of the Dutch intelligence service. Defining the causes of radicalization gives an idea regarding the scope of the issue. In the first section I will decide what position the 'Muslim community' holds in the Transvaal neighborhood in the security network of The Hague. I will compare the structure of the security network in order to create a formal image concerning the position of the Muslim community. For this I will use policy articles from the municipality of The Hague. Furthermore, I will compare the Muslim community's position concerning policymaking and policy influence using the network theory of Whelan. The two dimensions of Whelan (2012) will be conceptualized into variables which will be tested by comparing the *Main Directives Letter*, *The Hague Action Plan*, *The Main Directives Letter on*

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<sup>1</sup> <http://wetenschap.infonu.nl/onderzoek/106079-kenmerken-kwalitatief-kwantitatief-onderzoek.html>



*Social Integration* and statements from leaders of the Muslim Community to the network theory of Whelan. This should provide greater clarity concerning the position of the Muslim community in the larger context of the security network. Efficiency and effectiveness are hard to measure, especially when a network has only recently been founded and has not yet been clearly mapped, but the network theory of Whelan (2012) describes some basic rules for a network concerning efficiency and effectiveness. The goal of this part of the research is to determine to what extent the position of the Muslim community of the Transvaal neighborhood in the security network, as described in the plan, the program, and according to the actors, could be advantageous in reaching the goals of the network, which are translated in the best-practices. The theoretical framework provides criteria which supports (or denies) certain measures and sheds light on how advantageous they could be.

### 3.2 Application of best-practices

The second part of the research is concerned with elaborating on best-practices concerning community involvement in counter-radicalization efforts.

The goal of the network is to have an effective approach towards radicalization and jihadism. I will compare several recommendations of the literature concerning community involvement to the empirical reality. The literature concerning the best-practices has been selected for its relevance to and close association with contemporary Islamic radicalization in the western world. I will operationalize their recommendations in abstract terms and test to what extent the best-practices are applied. In this section the best-practices of community engagement in counter-terrorism efforts will be conceptualized in order to test them to the empirical reality. This will concern a summary of the elements of the best-practices in question form. A significant amount of the questions concern the implementation of measures or policy to a certain extent. Therefore, an exact measurement is, due to the nature of some of the questions, not possible. Nevertheless, a general conclusion could be drawn from most measures. To categorize the measurements in a qualitative way, the Likert scale is used to provide a framework for the degree of implementation of best-practices.<sup>2</sup> The Likert scale involves a unidimensional scaling method which could be applied to most social science related topics. It is mostly used for a questionnaire, but could also

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/scallik.php>

be used for certain social test results. A five-level Likert scale is applied for the results of the best-practices, as follows:

1. Elements not applied
2. Elements slightly applied/occurs
3. Elements moderately applied/occurs
4. Elements mostly applied/occurs
5. Elements completely applied/occurs

The first level points out that a best-practice is not applied at all. The second level points out that some elements of the best-practice are applied. The third level points out that roughly half of the important elements of the best-practice are applied. The fourth level points out that most elements or parts of the best-practice are applied. The fifth level points out that all elements of the best-practice are applied. The numbers indicate which category a measure is assigned to. These two parts of the research should reveal the extent to which the role of the Muslim community in the network provides opportunities for the recommendations to develop. A general overview of The Hague Action Plan and the implementation program of The Hague can be found by conducting desk research. To test the experiences of the Muslim community and other actors involved with the plan and program, additional face-to-face interviews were conducted. Due to the vastness and diversity of the Muslim community, official spokespersons and youth workers from the community, who are also familiar with the efforts of the municipality, were the main targets for interviews. The role of the interviews is mostly additional, since some elements of best-practices are not mentioned in the programs. This is where the interviews fill in the gaps in the programs concerning the application of certain elements of best-practices. The focus will be on community leaders and their experience regarding cooperation with the municipality and community involvement. These interviews should provide insight into the implementation of policies from the plan and program and to what extent the plan and program differs from the reality and/or the best practices.

Due to a short time frame and extent of the problem, I have geographically limited the research to the Transvaal neighborhood, which gives the research a micro-level characteristic.

## 4. Case study

This chapter will elaborate on the different measures taken by the municipality of The Hague concerning counter-radicalization. Radicalization and jihadism is a serious problem for this municipality. A quarter of all jihadi travelers in the Netherlands have been residents in The Hague.<sup>3</sup> Due to the nature of the problem and the many interfaces with other social issues, several approaches have been developed by the municipality concerning the cooperation and involvement of public and private actors. Most measures concerning counter-radicalization are described in two major programs as stated by the municipality: *'the main directives letter on prevention of polarization, radicalization and jihadism'* and *'The implementation program of The Hague 2015 – Prevention, polarization, radicalization and jihadism: the Hague bullet points program'* (abbreviated as: the bullet-points program). Also, a letter concerning social dynamics has been taken into account, since it has significant interfaces with radicalization in general. First, the main directives letter on prevention of polarization, radicalization and jihadism will be explained. This letter can be seen as a first draw for the second part of the case study: *'The Hague bullet-points program'*. This program can be seen as an evolution of the main directives letter and contains key elements and the general approach of the municipality concerning counter-radicalization. Third, some policies also have a more indirect nature, such as *'the main directives letter on social integration'*, which elaborates on relevant policies with a more social character. Fourth, there will be an exploration of the different Muslim groups, Islamic streams, and ethnicities in the Transvaal neighborhood and what implications these different groups have for community involvement in counter-radicalization efforts.

### 4.1 The Main Directives Letter – Prevention of polarization, radicalization and jihadism

On November 12<sup>th</sup> 2014, the mayor of the municipality of The Hague offered the execution of the prevention, polarization, radicalization, and jihadism program 2015-2019. This program concerns in more or less abstract terms the plans of the municipality concerning the prevention of radicalization and jihadism. The program has its origin in the national 'action-program concerning the integral approach towards jihadism', and the municipality of The Hague elaborates its own variant of this general approach in the key points letter assigned to the city

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<sup>3</sup> <http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2026623-van-aartsen-over-haagse-aanpak-van-jihadisten.html?title=van-aartsen-over-haagse-aanpak-van-jihadisten>

council (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:1). The Municipality of The Hague emphasizes the possible impacts of the approach on the functioning of the city's social structure and warns about polarization of different religious and ethnical groups. Furthermore, the letter emphasizes preventive measures on two levels: general prevention and a tailor-made approach per individual case. General prevention focuses on long-term solutions concerning approaches from different angles such as education, unemployment, participation and emancipation. Triggering the right tone is essential for this approach, therefore it is crucial to acknowledge the majority of Muslims – even the more orthodox streams – as allies rather than enemies (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:1-2).

### *The IPPR*

The prevention policy has been shaped in the 'Information Point of Prevention of Polarization and Radicalization' (IPPR), which is a part of the department of public order and safety. This information point is a municipal initiative which provides greater insight into polarization and radicalization issues within society (KplusV, 2011:5-8). The IPPR was founded in 2008 by the municipality of The Hague after a policy recommendation concerning signals of radicalization and polarization in The Hague in 2007. The IPPR is manned by three part-time employees and has the following tasks:

- Facilitate youth policy, healthcare and municipal services by signaling trends, sharing information, serving as a support point and improving expertise. Furthermore, the IPPR offers training in recognizing radicalization signals and supports research in best practices.
- Processing of radicalization signals. Signals which contain criminal acts will be reported to the police or intelligence services (AIVD).
- Monitoring of the execution of advised interventions.
- Guidance and development of programs concerning prevention of radicalization and polarization.

The IPPR serves as a knowledge and information hub with the goal of supporting citizens of The Hague with proper identity development which should lead to increased resistance against radicalization. Youngsters are a prime target group for the IPPR, as it is assumed that they are more vulnerable to radicalization. Communication involving polarization and radicalization

passes through the IPPR (KplusV, 2010:4). The IPPR is responsible for setting up various projects involving the prevention of polarization and radicalization. The diversity of projects requires different actors who are involved with the execution of projects. The IPPR cooperates with the following external actors:

- The police
- Educational institutes
- Welfare employers (welfare institutes, community center, youth center)
- Youth workers
- Multicultural organizations (religious organizations or self-organizations)
- The judicial authority

The organizations provide the IPPR with information about radicalized persons or persons at risk and are involved with the execution of projects from the IPPR. Past experiences have shown that cooperation and information sharing between actors is not always self-evident. Educational institutions are cautious concerning the negative image of projects involving counter-radicalization because funding is not always sufficient for all projects. Welfare institutes are having trouble with frequent shifts in personnel which leads to a loss in experience and knowledge. Furthermore, welfare institutes are not skilled in developing methodology. Cooperation with multicultural organizations is only partially successful. The municipality and multicultural organizations share relevant information and both parties know how to find each other should instances of radicalization and polarization be signaled. Cooperation with the police is labeled successful. They support the approach in the program. Cooperation with judicial authorities is not very successful, since they have difficulties sharing information. This causes a limited view on potential risks, which makes it difficult for joint activities to be effective (KplusV, 2011:6-7).

The effort of The Hague has developed six points of attention which should support the approach:

1. Further intensification of the signal-function

#### *Signal networks in the city districts and neighborhoods*

The first bullet point is the strengthening of the signal-function. The signal-function concerns a signal-network in local communities and neighborhoods. These networks consist of first-line

professionals and members of migrant organizations. These persons have a competitive advantage regarding connections and provide the best knowledge of developments in the neighborhood. This is important in order to quickly recognize matters such as tensions between different populations providing the opportunity to make effective decisions to de-escalate the situation. Key concepts are participation and connection, and the municipality is at the center of these neighborhood networks and cooperates with professional institutions, social organizations, and individual citizens. The staff of the municipality believes in a pro-active attitude towards connections in the neighborhood with focus on using the dynamics and creativity of the network to prevent problems. It is important to take the dynamics of society into account when protecting the relationship between frame-members and communities in the signal-networks. The goal is to maintain dialogue between the relevant groups and organizations and to find solutions concerning the dangers of radicalization and exclusion (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:2)

*Improving expertise of front-line workers* Approximately 1000 front-line workers will follow a so-called orientation-program which has the goal to improve awareness concerning the seriousness and scale of the problems. They will be informed about the different backgrounds of radicalization and jihadism, will learn how to recognize signs of early stages of radicalization and what to do with these signs. Creating so-called ‘negotiation opportunities’ for these front-line workers is essential, since it gives clarity concerning their tasks and possibilities. Furthermore, providing support to schools which will be trained on the topic of radicalization should benefit their signaling skills. The orientation-meetings are also attended by other front-line workers and organizations such as the police, municipal services, and welfare organizations. The city council acknowledges the need for citizens and other voluntary organizations to participate in information sharing and negotiation opportunities (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:3).

## 2. Strengthening of social resistance

This measure concerns the early detection and intervention concerning youngsters who are (more) vulnerable to the jihadi mindset and to create an environment that spreads a counter message which opposes radical beliefs.

### *Education concerning citizenship and democratic values*

Education is crucial for strengthening the resistance of youngsters. In the coming years there will

be several intensive meetings which should decide what role education authorities should fulfil and with what means they should fulfil this role (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:3-4).

#### *Counter messages deriving from communities*

It is important to have a counter message from the communities. Key figures from the communities will be recruited and receive training, with the goal of stimulating the social discussion. The discussions should have a multifaceted character which does not only focus on jihadism, but also on more underlying issues such as tension between different groups of society. The key figures are seen as the prominent actors concerning the correct explanation of the Islam, not the government. Muslims should engage in dialogue with each other and the key figures should be seen as “connectors” which make it easier to discuss sensitive matters in communities and to report to the government on these issues. Key figures also develop a buddy-role for youngsters at risk and initiatives from the community that contain a counter-message will receive support (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:4).

#### *Religious and women organizations*

Special attention should be given concerning the position of religious organizations. Existing connections with these organizations will be amplified and cooperation will be sought when necessary. Extra attention will be given to women, since they play a crucial role in the family and with the upbringing of youngsters. Therefore, much attention will also be given to women and young girls who are both difficult to reach and are more susceptible to recruitment than others (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:4).

#### *Converts*

Those who have been radicalized require special treatment, which will be developed with some best-practices from other municipalities and countries (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:4).

### 3. Personal approach

#### *Approach through the safety house*

Since March 2014 the safety house Haaglanden offers a personal approach for potential jihadi travelers and returnees. A case meeting will be arranged with the involved actors and a tailor-made approach will be developed for each individual case. The core partners in these meetings are the municipality, the police, the national coordination center for terrorism and safety, the

crisis intervention team for youth care and child protection services. Each partner can report a case and cooperation between different municipalities should reveal links, such as relations between different jihadi travelers, which were not noticed before (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:5).

#### *Guidance for parents and partners of jihadi travelers*

The personal approach also provides guidance for parents and partners of jihadi travelers, with information concerning support and the organization of meetings for fellow-sufferers (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:5).

#### 4. Cooperation as a key for success

Combating radicalization and jihadism is an intensive effort. Therefore, a wide municipal approach is needed with the cooperation of municipal services such as social affairs, the department of education, culture and science, and managerial services (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:5).

#### 5. Development of knowledge

There is much obscurity concerning the existing knowledge of radicalization. It is not clear why individuals radicalize, how these radicalization processes develop, and what kind of intervention offers the greatest opportunities for success.

The unit 'Information Prevention Polarization and Radicalization' (IPPR) takes the role of 'knowledge broker', in order to connect issues from the field to the knowledge of scientists and consultants. IPPR will make contact with universities, research institutes, international networks, and the ministry of Security and Justice to fulfil this task effectively (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:5).

#### 6. Points of conciliation with the national government

In general, the city council agrees with the measures of the national government in the 'Action Program Integral Approach Jihadism'. However, the presented approach is not sufficient according to the municipality of The Hague, especially the funding of the program and the approach concerning returnees (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014:5).



#### 4.2 The implementation program of The Hague 2015 – Prevention, polarization, radicalization and jihadism: the Hague bullet points program

On the March 24<sup>th</sup> 2015, the municipality of The Hague presented the implementation program which should provide more clarity concerning the activities and can be seen as an extension of the Main Directives Letter. This program has a more dynamic character and additional activities may be added during the program. The program is divided into four bullet-points and these should provide a more in-depth perspective. In this section I will elaborate on the four bullet-points of the implementation program (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:2).

##### *Bullet-point one: personal approach*

This bullet-point focuses on an intensification of the existing personal approach. National expertise and knowledge will be used whenever necessary. The bullet-point is divided into five different actions. The target groups of this bullet-point are potential jihadi travelers, individuals who might already be participating in foreign fighting, returnees and recruiters and facilitators.

##### 1. Personal approach by the safety house Haaglanden

The personal approach is an existing activity which offers an approach for the target groups. Central to this approach is the prevention of further jihadi activities, such as propaganda and recruitment. Furthermore, support for families tends to play a significant role in this approach. This approach is tailor-made for each individual case (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:3).

- The primary goal is to protect society by supporting returnees in their reintegration process
- The approach towards potential travelers is aimed at detaching them from the radical network and preventing them travelling to jihadi combat areas
- The strengthening of parental authority concerning youngsters is an important goal of the approach. Another important aspect is the recovery of ties with schools. It is essential that youngsters participate in school life.

##### 2. Continuous development of a dynamic assessment frame

The dynamic assessment frame has proved to be a handy tool to assess reports and cases correctly. It contributes a sound assessment as well as an interpretation concerning signs of radicalization. It offers several options for the approach towards cases from a tailored-

made perspective. The dynamic assessment frame is easily adjustable concerning new developments in a case and is also available for other municipalities (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:4).

3. Intensifying family support

The personal approach also focuses on guidance for parents and partners of jihadi travelers by providing information concerning support possibilities such as counselling or group sessions with fellow-sufferers. Several organizations already offer these types of guidance and the national government offers a support package which will be defined by cooperation between national and local governments (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:4).

4. Development of regional image

This new activity concerns the optimization of information sharing structures and processes which should contribute to the development of a regional image. It provides opportunities for activities to become more synchronized (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:4).

5. Pilot of potential violent individuals

This new activity concerns a pilot which should provide more knowledge of a radicalized individual who is at risk of staging an attack. In order to decide this, specific knowledge and expertise is needed from national parties. Local or regional knowledge is insufficient. The pilot is an initiative of the municipality of The Hague, the public prosecutor, and the NCTV. The goal is a short-term development of a pilot which offers a framework for assessing an individual's risk of violence, and a procedure to organize resistance against this risk.

Because of safety measures it is not possible to further elaborate on the details of the pilot (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:4).

*Bullet-point two: knowledge and skills*

This bullet-point aims to provide and share knowledge, skills and tools among every person or actor involved with prevention of radicalization. The issue of radicalization is relatively new, therefore there are no validated scientific de-radicalization programs available.

Knowledge concerning this topic is developing at different places and is sometimes difficult to access. This led to the development of a national expertise unit, which should collect this information to support joint policies. The municipality of The Hague has its own local demands for practical knowledge, perspectives for action, and insights concerning the effectiveness of interventions. The target groups are professionals, front-line professionals, cultural and religious organizations, as well as individual citizens and key figures. This bullet-point consists of three actions (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:5)

1. Continuous development of a contact point which acts as a knowledge and expertise center concerning polarization and radicalization (KEC).

This new activity is a part of the IPPR. The KEC (knowledge and expertise center) collects knowledge and good practices from domestic and foreign sources and makes them accessible to front-line professionals, key figures, and other actors involved with community work. The emphasis is put on themes that are important for the local approach, such as:

- *Personal approach*
- *Deployment of key figures*
- *Cooperation with local communities*
- *Controlling tensions between population groups*
- *Guidance and support for youngsters at risk and their parents*
- *De-radicalization tracks*
- *Perspectives of action for teachers, youth workers, imams, neighborhood officers, social workers, and other professionals who are in direct contact with youngsters at risk and radicalized youngsters*
- *Keeping “lone wolves” in sight and dealing with them*

The exact contents of an assignment will be elaborated on through the meetings with the Safety house, the police, integration and education department, department of city borrows, and the NCTV. Coordination is important, since most tasks of the actors seem similar.

The first activity which has been achieved is the lodging of a European subsidy aimed at the sharing of knowledge, experience, and good practices concerning the strengthening of society. This request is formulated in cooperation with the municipalities of Rotterdam, Delft, Antwerp,

Goteborg, the University of Leiden, the Lawaetz foundation from Hamburg and the NGO ADICE from Roubaix. The Hague is fulfilling a leading role in this project, which comprises of local activities in the participating cities and feedback in international meetings. The local aspect of this project is essential and guarantees the involvement of local communities (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:6).

## 2. Expertise advancement of front-line professionals

This action is a continuation and intensification of an existing activity, with some new elements. A core activity of the IPPR is the enhancement of expertise of front-line professionals. Approximately 1600 professionals have participated in an orientation program in which they receive insights concerning issues, recognizing radicalization, perspectives of action, and what to do when they receive signals of radicalization. This program is also available for voluntary organizations. Furthermore, a training program spread over several days is available for professionals who are involved with cases.

A new element is a training for front-line professionals which will be marked by an increase in opportunities to practice their skills. A more in-depth perspective on the orientation program will focus on teachers who are seeking tips that might help them deal with sensitive matters in class and with students that support extremist thoughts. This type of training is also available to other front-line professionals. The first pilot starts in 2015 and any interested parties can request this training after the summer of 2015 (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:7).

## 3. Support of private initiatives

This is an existing activity which will be intensified. Supporting private initiatives is important when they contribute to the goals of the program and have durable characteristics. Several initiatives are already supported by the municipality, such as the cooperation of Moroccan organizations in The Netherlands. Their hotline offers answers concerning the increasing turmoil and anxiety about radicalization within society and particularly within the Dutch-Moroccan community. Parents are worried about their children, so the municipality of The Hague is supporting the promotion of this initiative. The initiative supports already existing initiatives from approachable (women) organizations (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:7).

### *Bullet-point three: networks & communication*

This bullet-point focuses on the prevention and combat against radicalization and the strengthening of ties between social groups. Communication is key in this bullet-point, therefore it is essential to cooperate with social organizations and involved citizens. The target groups are the ‘ties’ in the city, individuals who could have a significant role in combating radicalization and in improving integration and dialogue, and ‘buddies’ of radicalized persons. This bullet-point comprises of two main action points (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:7-8).

#### 1. Maintaining and developing networks in neighborhoods

This is an existing activity which focuses on the development of signal networks in neighborhoods. The goal is to achieve an overview on developments which could lead to social tensions and how to prevent or channel these tensions. The structure of these types of networks has the characteristics of a ‘web’ which does not have regular intervals, but relies on a more flexible way of intervention and concerns persons who can meet swiftly and whenever needed. The networks consists of front-line professionals and executives from volunteer organizations. The networks require maintenance on a regular basis. The city boroughs are responsible for the continued development of networks which serve as the eyes and ears for the municipality concerning relevant developments. IPPR contributes to this task by offering specific knowledge and skills.

Key figures play a significant role in this network. Today’s world provides ample opportunity to professionalize this network. New key figures who are close to youngsters should be recruited and reach these youngsters in ways the government cannot. In 2015 the first 25 new key figures will be recruited. The goal is to let these key figures participate in the social debate, either as an initiator or a participant. They can discuss wider issues such as education, employment and the tackling of discrimination and islamophobia. Furthermore, some of them will guide youngsters at risk of radicalizing or youngsters who are already radicalizing. The general idea is that key figures have some expertise on a variety of topics, but cooperation between municipalities, institutions and neighborhoods should provide easier access to professionals (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:8-9).

## 2. Intensifying communication

This activity emphasizes the importance of lucid communication which aims at increasing civilian involvement. Connecting people is key according to policy and the municipality looks for initiatives which support cooperation and dialogue. In order to combat radicalization and give returnees a chance to reintegrate, trust and cooperation is needed between all actors. This message will continuously be propagated by the city council, the partners, and the networks (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:9).

### *Bullet-point four: strengthening of social resistance*

The goal of this bullet-point is to improve the resistance of The Hague's citizens against jihadism and other forms of radicalization. This goal does not only focus on preventing radicalization, but also on the reaction of society concerning extremist incidents in The Netherlands or abroad. The target groups are students of The Hague's educational institutes, vulnerable youngsters, women organizations, key figures as well as every other citizen of The Hague. Several activities will focus on school classes or other youth groups. These are "light" activities aim to help youngsters join a debate concerning identity and to respect other people's choices. These activities are available for schools and other youth organizations and participation is voluntary (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:10).

### 1. Lessons and workshops in identity development

This is an existing activity which focuses on helping youngsters with the struggles that tend to accompany identity development. Youngsters with a multicultural background often have issues with striking a balance between different cultures. Centrum 16/22 is a The Hague institution which teaches youngsters to think carefully about identity. Schools can purchase these programs at Centrum 16/22. Furthermore, there is a budget available to introduce the program to 40 selected school classes for free (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:11).

### 2. Education concerning citizenship and democratic values

This is an existing activity which aims to strengthen the resistance of youngsters. Core values of society are taught in schools. Youngsters learn to think, argue and choose their positions independently. In the coming years there will be several meetings with schools which should provide more clearance about the role of schools and what is needed in this process. Furthermore,

the deployment of guest lecturers should provide more certainty about difficult topics involving religion. IPPR offers schools guest lecturers who can offer support and training for teachers to enhance their discussion-skills (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:11).

3. See bullet-point three (networks & communication)
4. Supporting debate and dialogue between groups and communities

This is a new activity which focuses on the interests of persons, groups, and organizations in intercultural and interreligious dialogues with the emphasis on connection and social cohesion at the neighborhood and urban level. The goal of these activities is to contribute towards social resistance. The role of the municipality is supportive in nature. Activities with a durable character have priority.

Another activity is the intensification of dialogue with mosques. The attacks in Paris have served as an inducement to intensify conversations with Islamic and Jewish organizations. There is much anxiety among the managements of mosques concerning security of mosques and their visitors. The municipality states that there are no signs yet for an imminent threat, but they keep an eye on further developments and offer protection from the government when necessary. Organizations can report incidents to the police. The municipality will investigate approaches concerning islamophobia. The meetings also concern underlying issues, and what role the Muslim community and managements of mosques can fulfill. The municipality believes that social resistance is a task best executed by citizens, in which the government acts as a facilitator. Initiatives from communities to strengthen bonds within society and to counter radicalization will be supported by the municipality. The boards of several mosques have reacted very positively regarding this measure and have expressed their wish to become involved as partners in the battle against radicalization and jihadism. Conversations with them will continue in the coming period (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:12).

5. Supporting counter-narratives, such as on social media

This new activity concerns a counter-narrative against jihadi propaganda, mostly through social media. The Muslim community should answer this propaganda by offering alternatives. The municipality supports relevant key figures such as imams and youth workers who are in direct contact with groups who are difficult to reach. The key figures should provide the groups with relevant knowledge and skills of social media and youth culture. The goal is to support these key

figures by developing a proper “counter-narrative” and by spreading this message through social media (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:12).

#### 6. Focus groups ‘messaging’

This is a new activity which focuses on strengthening the skills of the formal and informal key figures in the city in order to create strong messages within the community. The target groups are fathers, mothers, youngsters and professionals (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:13).

#### 7. Deploying women organizations

This is an intensification of an existing activity. Women are seen as a crucial part of the family and upbringing of children. Therefore, the municipal approach to radicalization emphasized the role of mothers and women, including the group of women who are difficult to reach. Several women organizations in the city will be deployed to reach these groups by organizing meetings with women, fellow-sufferers and young girls and providing guidance and support for those in need. These activities often take place in the city center, but other neighborhoods will soon also offer these activities.

The prevention policy continues to give special attention to young girls, since recent findings suggest that they are quite susceptible to recruitment (Gemeente Den Haag, 2015:13).

### 4.3 Main directives letter on integration – Social pressure and conservatism

Radicalization is a wicked problem which has multiple direct and indirect causes. Therefore, it is important to implement policies that try to tackle radicalization indirectly. The ‘*main directives letter on integration – social pressure and conservatism*’ is a policy letter written by city council member Rabin Baldewsingh. In this letter he brings up issues surrounding integration of minorities and how the municipality is planning to tackle these issues (Baldewsingh, 2014:1)

The municipality of The Hague gives special attention to integration issues linked with radicalization and social pressure. Therefore, the integration policy of the municipality aims for emancipation processes and combating prohibitive factors such as socio-economic and educational deprivation, discrimination and non-participation outside their own world. Religion and ethnicity play a significant role in the development of one’s identity. Discrimination could lead to alienation and parents are responsible for guiding their children whenever discrimination or alienation occurs. The municipality wants to organize meetings to quickly signal tensions and



stimulate dialogues between different groups. Furthermore, the municipality will organize interreligious meetings twice a year which should spark debate, seek for shared values between religions, and tackle problems within society. The city council supports initiatives from specific groups which stimulate participation in The Hague's society. When it comes to economic and employment issues, the municipality of The Hague recognizes difficulties that youths in the city experience when applying for an internship. Especially those youths with a migrant background who often experience difficulties when applying for an internship or a job. The municipality requests educational institutions to stimulate the social skills and network development of youngsters. Schools should also pay attention to companies that discriminate against youngsters. Schools should discourage their students to apply at such companies and students should report prejudice and discrimination. The majority of youngsters in The Hague have a migrant background. It is important to have capable teachers who can give special attention to culture sensitivity, which will be a part of the professionalization policy (Baldewsingh, 2014:4-9).

#### 4.4 The Muslim community in the Transvaal neighborhood – who are they?


The Muslim community in general consists of different streams within the Islam. This does not make it easy to define the community as a whole, but the importance of this distinction is underlined since counter-radicalization efforts have different implications for each stream. The radical jihadi stream considers some Islamic streams as enemies, and other streams as possible allies. In this section the various Islamic streams that occur in the Transvaal neighborhood will be explored, in order to define implications that counter-radicalization has for each stream.

The Transvaal neighborhood is known for its high amount of non-western ethnicities. The numbers of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) show that 7.8% of the residents have a Dutch background, 28.1% have a Turkish background, 13.8% a Moroccan background, 21.5% a Surinamese background, 2.1% a Dutch Antillean background, 11.5% a non-western foreign background and 14.5% have a western foreign background.<sup>4</sup> According to Spalek and Lambert (2008) it is important to explore which religious streams and ethnicities of the Muslim community are represented in the network of counter-radicalization. Due to the vastness of the Muslim community in The Hague, I will only focus on the Muslim community in the Transvaal

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<sup>4</sup> <http://denhaag.buurtmonitor.nl/>

neighborhood and their role in the safety network. The Transvaal neighborhood is known for its diversity regarding Islamic streams and ethnicities. Each mosque represents a certain stream or ethnicity within the Muslim community and therefore has different cultural influences and nuances. The three major Muslim groups in the Transvaal neighborhood are the Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese Muslims. They are represented by the major mosques in the neighborhood, while other mosques are aimed at a more diverse Muslim population. <sup>5</sup>



Source: [www.moskeewijzer.nl](http://www.moskeewijzer.nl)

This overview gives an impression of the mosques in the Transvaal neighborhood. Although this is not an exact representation of the Muslim community, the number of specific ethnic mosques gives an impression of the major ethnic Muslim groups in the neighborhood. There are three major Mosques which represent three different ethnic groups in the Transvaal neighborhood. The first one is the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque, marked in green and located in the Terletstraat. This mosque represents the Turkish-Shiite Muslim population and their spokesman/youth worker is Jihad Dedei. The second mosque is Noeroel Islam, marked in red and located in the Scheepersstraat. This mosque represents the Surinamese Sunni-Islam population and their spokesman/youth worker is Zainul Habieb. The third mosque is El Islam, marked in blue and located in the Van der Vennestraat. This mosque represents the Moroccan Sunni-Islam population and their spokesman

is Bel Hadj. The El Islam mosque is located just across the border of the Transvaal neighborhood, but according to their spokesperson the majority of visitors live in the Transvaal neighborhood.

The other two mosques, marked in purple, are not active at the moment.

The differences in ethnic and religious streams are important because it defines their affinity to the radical jihad. Most other streams are considered opponents of the Salafism stream, especially the Shiite stream. Therefore, counter-radicalization has further implications for this part of the Muslim community as their stream is considered a target, rather than acting as a breeding ground for radicalization and jihadism (AIVD, 32:2014).

## 5. Analysis


In this section I will connect the approach of The Hague concerning counter-radicalization to the recommendations of the literature. The analysis consists of two main sections. The first section will connect the network theory of Whelan (2012) to the empirical reality. This should give more clarity regarding the position of the Muslim community in the security network of The Hague. First I will test which type of structure the network uses and the formal position of the Muslim community in the network. Second, I will test the role of the Muslim community in the policy dimension. Testing these two security network dimensions should provide more clarity concerning the possible role the Muslim community could fulfill. The second section compares the best-practices concerning community engagement in counter-radicalization efforts with the programs of the municipality of The Hague and whether they fit in the current structure. Each best-practice will be tested to the empirical reality and will be categorized in the five-level scale of whether an element of a best-practice is applied or whether a certain perception occurs. The number of the best-practice will be indicated in brackets, which will make it easy to find the corresponding best-practice. The number of the best-practice will be mentioned by a number in the analysis. Special attention will be given to the role of family in the program, and how they fulfill a role in counter-radicalization efforts.

### 5.1. The formal position of the Muslim community in the counter-radicalization network – the network theory of Whelan applied to the counter-radicalization network of The Hague

#### 5.1.1 Network structure of The Hague's counter-radicalization network

The formal position of the Muslim community in the security network of the Hague will become clear by testing their role in four dimensions. The first dimension is network structure, which gives clarity concerning the structure of the counter-radicalization network and the formal positions of the actors involved with counter-radicalization efforts. According to the Bullet-points Program, the municipality of The Hague fulfills as an actor a central role in the network of prevention of polarization, radicalization and jihadism. The IPPR, which is a part of the department of public order and safety, is the main organization involved with projects, processing information, and cooperation between different parties within the network. A primary task is the

setup of programs which prevent polarization and radicalization. The role of the IPPR in the network is similar to the role of a central actor in the hub network. Whelan (2012) states that in order to be effective as a hub design network, the central actor should have the capacity to process information which ultimately makes the hub design effective. Besides implementing policy, the IPPR also has the goal to serve as an information hub. Sharing information and processing signals is a primary task of the IPPR. Managing outgoing information effectively is essential for the central actor to be successful in a security network. The type of network structure depends on the goal and size of the network. The main goal of the safety network is to prevent polarization and radicalization. Although the goal description of the network is more general in nature, the goal itself tries to tackle an important social issue, since radicalization could pose a threat for the functioning of the democratic rule of law. Choosing a hub design network fits the importance of the goal of the network. Furthermore, the size of a network is decisive for its design. The network has multiple members who are clustered in categories. Educational institutes, welfare institutes, multicultural organizations, police and judicial authorities. Each cluster has one or more institutes, which means that the network consists of many different actors. It makes the choice for a hub-design network self-evident.



The position of the Muslim community of the Transvaal neighborhood in the security network, in which the IPPR is the central actor, is supportive in nature. The IPPR cooperates with several

external actors, which are clustered in general institutes or groups. The Muslim community is not explicitly mentioned or clustered into a single actor. Members of the Transvaal neighborhood's Muslim community generally find themselves participating in welfare institutions as youth workers or in multicultural organizations. They fulfil roles such as community engagement workers, key figures, and representatives from mosques. These organizations provide the IPPR with information about radicalized persons or persons at risk and are involved with the execution of projects. The IPPR is formally established by the municipality and acts as a central 'lead' organization through which all information passes. Furthermore, the IPPR is the leading organization responsible for information distribution among other organizations and acts as the principal of the projects.

The municipality of The Hague plays a primary role in the counter-radicalization network, which can be seen in how the IPPR was established. The IPPR was formally mandated by the municipality of The Hague to coordinate efforts involving counter-radicalization. The Muslim community has a formal supportive role in the network and depends on the contents of programs and sharing capabilities of the IPPR.

#### 5.1.2 Network policymaking in the counter-radicalization network of The Hague

Policies in a network are established in order to control and manage network activities and are created by a single organization in a 'lead' organizational network, or by each member of the network in a 'shared' organizational network. The network policy in the counter-radicalization network is mainly established by the municipality of The Hague and is translated into the main directives letter and the bullet-points program. The municipality is in general responsible for the formulation of formal policies and procedures in the network. In order to realize and manage these policies and procedures, the municipality established the IPPR. This bureau is delegated by the municipality and is responsible for the setup and execution of most programs. The bureau acts as the 'lead' organization in the network. The IPPR cooperates with organizations which have different information sharing rules and requirements. This makes cooperation with some actors, such as the judicial authority, difficult. Cooperation with the Muslim community concerning policy has been partly successful. The main directives letter describes a key role for connectors within communities which emphasizes the independence of key figures and their way of operating. Guidelines are developed, but the key figures of the community are not hampered by strict rules. Instead, the municipality encourages the Muslim community to give their own correct

interpretation of the Islam and initiatives from the community aimed at supporting a counter-narrative will receive active support. The bullet-points program describes the support for private initiatives (such as the Cooperation of Moroccan organizations in The Netherlands) from the community as an additional way for the community to have a say in the prevention of radicalization policy and measures. However, the main directives letter and the bullet-points program describe these types of support more as additions to the programs, rather than influencing policy directly at the top. The programs do not state if community members or key figures are involved in policy making procedures by the IPPR. The interviews with the representatives of the mosques have somewhat confirmed this assumption. The representative of the El Islam mosque suggests that the municipality has some contacts with the mosques involving radicalization, but this has not been translated into action. Even though there are some minor conversations between mosques and municipality actors regarding the profiling of (potential) radical persons, the information stream is, according to his experience, moderate and one-sided. He believes there should be a more active discussion between mosques and municipal actors (personal interview, 23 November 2015). The representative of Noeroel Islam stated that according to his experience there is not a direct possibility for mosques to have any influence on municipal policy. He added that most of the time the neighborhood officer is the only person known to him who has a connection with the mosque (personal interview, 08 november 2015). The representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque stated that there is a platform for mosques where they could share their experiences, but according to his experience, the meetings were not very fruitful. He also stated that the neighborhood officer is the primary point of contact regarding radicalization issues besides the sporadically organized platforms. Furthermore, he thinks the municipality should invest more in involving mosques in policy making processes regarding counter-radicalization and polarization. He does not have the impression that the municipality is truly listening to the mosques regarding radicalization issues. A more personal approach should be more helpful. He suggests that the municipality should visit mosques more often in order to develop a proper policy (personal interview, 08 november 2015). According to the representatives of the mosques in the Transvaal neighborhood, the municipality is rarely involving them in policy making processes. The mosques and their representatives are mostly used as an information source, rather than a policy making actor, which confirms their supportive role in the network.

## 5.2. Community engagement in counter-terrorism efforts - comparing the various prevention of radicalization and polarization programs with the best-practices

This part of the analysis will focus on comparing the programs of the municipality of The Hague with some best-practices from the literature concerning community involvement. Each best-practice will be connected to the programs of the municipality of The Hague and will be indicated by a number between brackets, which should provide a clear overview.

### 5.2.1. The role of the Muslim community

Community involvement in counter-terrorism issues is important because of the integration of threats in their community (Briggs, 2010). Communities need to play a central role in tackling radicalization issues. The main directives letter from the municipality of The Hague underlines the importance of community involvement. The Muslim community is an ally in combating radicalization, and counter-narratives from this community are key for a successful approach, but their role seems to be more supportive rather than central in nature, since their position does not involve a key role in policymaking processes (1).<sup>6</sup> Briggs (2010) described four ways of community engagement in a counterterrorism strategy. The first way is to use communities as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services concerning information about individuals or groups. The municipality of The Hague has included a similar system in their bullet-points program. The third bullet-point called 'networks & communication' describes the development of signal-networks which should serve as extra 'eyes and ears' in the neighborhood. This system serves as a web with ties between key figures who can quickly contact each other in case of emergency signals of radicalization. The city boroughs are responsible for the maintenance of these networks. The number of key figures within the neighborhoods will increase from 25 to 200 by 2018. The key figures are also tasked to act as watchmen. The IPPR contributes to the signal-networks by offering specific knowledge and practices (2).<sup>78</sup> The second way of community engagement concerns the upstream workings of communities. Briggs argues for community involvement in various social issues. The presence of recruiters and their narratives should be countered in some manner. The fourth bullet-point underlines the need for a

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<sup>6</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofddlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag p. 1-2

<sup>7</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofddlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag p. 2-3

<sup>8</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019* p. 7-8



counter-narrative from the Muslim community and the important role that mosques and social media can fulfill. The main directives letter describes the need for social resistance and discussion. It states that Muslims rather than the government should define the correct teachings of the Islam. These key figures are not spokesmen of the municipality, but are ‘connectors’ between communities and government. The municipality is convinced that social resistance is best practiced by communities and that the government should maintain a facilitating role. The managements of the mosques have all reacted positively and expressed their role as partners in the efforts against radicalization and jihadism (3).<sup>910</sup> Factors such as social exclusion, identity issues and a lack of trust in political structures and society should also be tackled through community efforts. The fourth bullet-point describes actions which focus on identity development and citizenship. Youngsters at risk can participate in workshops of identity development offered by ‘Centrum 16/22’, which is an institution in The Hague that helps students to think carefully about their identity. Schools can purchase these programs at ‘Centrum 16/22’ and as an introduction the institution offers 40 programs to selected schools for free. Education about citizenship and democratic values is also an important part of the fourth bullet-point. The municipality will confer with schools in order to decide their role and what is needed. The IPPR offers guest lecturers who can assist teachers in their dialogue with students by offering training. Other factors such as underemployment and links to criminality are not elaborated on in the program. Briggs (2010) argues that communities should tackle grievances within society. The government should gain and maintain the trust of Muslim communities by tackling injustices done to Muslims both domestically and abroad. The municipality expressed their full support concerning the protection of Muslims, mosques and the community. Muslim organizations are invited to report incidents to the police. Furthermore, the municipality will discuss how to tackle islamophobia in society and what role the Muslim community and different mosques could play regarding grievances. The program focuses on domestic Muslims and has no explicit opinion or statement concerning Muslims abroad (4).<sup>11</sup> According to Briggs (2010), the police needs the community for effective protection and to provide law enforcement the benefit of the doubt in

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<sup>9</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p.12

<sup>10</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag

<sup>11</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p.8-9

heated incidents or certain cases. The forgiveness of the community ensures a long term partnership and an effective response to terrorism. The main directives letter and the bullet-points program do not explicitly describe how communities could assist the police in controversial cases, but the core message is cooperation between the police and the community. The interviews with the mosques in the Transvaal neighborhood also show that assistance for controversial cases is approached in a different manner. Two mosques from the Transvaal neighborhood have indicated that radicalization is not a primary topic in their community. The Elh-I-beyt mosque has declared that its religious stream, Shiite, is opposed to the beliefs of radical jihadi. Therefore, radicalization is not a primary concern in their community and, due to their religious stream, the representative of the mosque expects them to be targets of radicalized persons, rather than serving as a breeding ground for extremists (personal interview, 08 November 2015). The Noeroel Islam mosque has declared that there has not been a case in their community concerning radicalized persons or youngsters who are at risk of being radicalized. The representative of the mosque has indicated that whenever any hint of radicalization would occur they would rely on their strong ties with the neighborhood police officer, thus expecting to have a chance to solve things by themselves first (personal interview, 08 November 2015). The representative of the El Islam mosque declared that they should report difficult cases to the neighborhood officer and the police would then further investigate the case (personal interview, 23 November 2015). Representatives of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque and Noeroel Islam mosque both indicated that ties with the neighborhood police officer are close, but regarding radicalization and assistance in controversial cases there is not much clarity, apart from simply reporting a case to the neighborhood police officer (5).

### 5.2.2 Community engagement in the Transvaal neighborhood

Spalek and Lambert (2008) have set out a framework which provides the basic components for engagement work with Muslim communities. An important aspect is the documentation of Muslims' voices, which should provide greater understanding during engagement work. The main directives letter describes the development of knowledge about radicalization. The IPPR would be the main actor responsible for connecting questions from the field to knowledge from experts and consultants. The bullet-points program elaborates on this development in greater detail. The second bullet-point describes the development of the KEC, a part of the IPPR which collects knowledge and expertise from domestic and foreign sources. Although the

documentation of Muslims' voices is not explicitly stated in either the main directives letter or the bullet-points program, the collection of data by the IPPR and the KEC also concerns signals and stories from Muslims, especially from persons at risk. Furthermore, the personal approach of the safety house Haaglanden in the same way as the case-study approach does. These cases should act as a valuable data sources which contribute to the development of future approaches (6).<sup>1213</sup> Counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization efforts should have a clear goal definition of which norms and values should be emphasized without alienating certain groups within the community. Therefore, it is essential that the government avoids creating a climate of acceptance for only a certain part of the community. The main directives letter already emphasized the importance to strike the right tone and acknowledging the majority of Muslims as allies rather than enemies in the approach towards radicalization and jihadism. Orthodox Muslims should be seen as fully-fledged citizens and there should be a clear distinction made between the minor group of jihadi extremists and the major group of "mainstream Muslims". The bullet-points program further acknowledges these values by stating that the municipality of The Hague holds a special responsibility as a representative of the city of peace and security, and should therefore play a leading role in expressing and applying core values of the Dutch democratic rule of law and civil rights (7).<sup>14</sup> Concerning a rational assessment to identify the best groups for combatting extremism, the municipality has created a climate which accepts most but not all parts of the Muslim community because a small group of jihadi extremists are excluded and distanced from the "mainstream" group (8)(10). The empowerment of Muslim communities is difficult due to the constant threat of being criticized by a fearful media and political arena who believe that Muslim community empowerment will be targeted by fundamentalists to gather support. Right wing political parties such as the PVV (Freedom Party) are opposed to any form of Islamic influence.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, the spokesperson of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque claims that the media has a more profound influence on both engagement work and Muslim youngsters (personal interview, 6 November 2015). The empowerment of Muslim communities in The Hague is still in its early stages (11). The rational viewpoint argues for a cooperation in partnership form with certain

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<sup>12</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag p. 5

<sup>13</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p.7

<sup>14</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2016

<sup>15</sup> [www.pvv.nl](http://www.pvv.nl)

minority Muslim groups. Spalek (2008) argues for both state institutions and Muslim communities to be involved in mutual interaction and dialogue. Engagement work should lead to a pluralistic process through which communities have greater influence on government policies and state actors' actions. Bullet-point three emphasizes the importance of networks and communication. A key element is the maintenance of networks and the strengthening of civil involvement. Bullet-point four of the program describes the importance of initiatives from the community to combat radicalization and the strengthening of urban society. The municipality emphasizes the leading role communities should take concerning these actions. However, interviews with the representatives from the Transvaal mosques have revealed that there are almost no possibilities for the community to have influence on government policy or state actors' actions (12).<sup>16</sup> The municipality offers room for private initiatives to arise and emphasizes the leading role communities should take, but this is a rather one-sided measure which is not directly connected with increased influence on government policy or practices. A two-sided synergy of input and output which shapes and influences policy does not apply according to the programs and community representatives (13) (14). Initiatives which emphasize cohesion and dialogue, such as the counter narrative on social media, will receive municipal support when needed. Furthermore, the communities themselves are reshaped by these common policies. Bullet-point four also describes the use of focus groups and key figures who will spread counter narratives within the community. In the main directives letter and the bullet-points program it is stated that in an environment where resistant identities which have principles opposite to the institutions of society are turned into project identities seeking legitimacy. According to Spalek (2008) it is key to give these identities the opportunity to eventually become dominant in society's institutions and thereby be regarded as legitimate identities. Bullet-point two describes the support of private initiatives with a community-based characteristic, and bullet-point four describes education involving identity development for youngsters with a multicultural background in order to give them the opportunity to think carefully about identity. However, there seems to be no clear plan concerning the possibility of Muslim identities to formally involve themselves in society's institutions and policymaking processes. The position of the Muslim community is also, as tested

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<sup>16</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p.10

with the network theory of Whelan (2012), more supportive in nature, rather than being actually involved with the central actor (15).<sup>1718</sup>

An important element is the inclusion of voices from Salafists and Islamists, with the aim of better understanding their social world. The main directives letter describes a personal approach which will be set out by the ‘safety house Haaglanden’. A tailored-made approach has been developed through a collaboration effort between the municipality, the police, the national coordination center for terrorism and safety, the crisis intervention team from youth care, and child protection services. This partnership should create cases which provide a better understanding of the social world of jihadists. The *bullet points program* indicates that jihadists are also a target group of the personal approach. However, the *main directives letter* and the *bullet points program* do not explicitly describe if the voices of Salafists and Islamists are used for a better understanding of their social world (16).

All stakeholders should be able to give their opinion on partnership work. *The main directives letter* describes that each stakeholder, partner, or group is involved in a dialogue which aims to find solutions concerning radicalization. The city council acknowledges the need for citizens and other voluntary organizations to engage in information-sharing and negotiation opportunities. Furthermore, each partner from the safety house Haaglanden can report a case and an independent report has been made to test the cooperation between different partners in the security network (KplusV, 2011:6-7) (17).

It is important to hear perspectives of identities in disempowered positions, since they could help develop new approaches. *The bullet points program* describes an intensification of dialogues with mosques and seeks for approaches concerning islamophobia. The meetings should give greater clarity concerning the role of the community and managements of mosques.<sup>19</sup> The representatives of the mosques in the Transvaal neighborhood somewhat confirm this initiative, but the representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque believes that a meeting from time to time is not very

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<sup>17</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p. 5-10

<sup>18</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag

<sup>19</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019

fruitful. A more personal approach would be more effective in terms of sharing community concerns (personal interview, 6 november 2015) (18).

Spalek (2008) describes the role of a Muslim community representative and argues that he or she should have a less critical view on the global war on terror and a more nuanced attitude towards government policy. The main directives letter elaborates on the role of front-line workers and key figures who operate in the neighborhoods. By creating negotiation opportunities and providing training to key figures not only focuses on the greater threat of jihadism but also on underlying social tensions. The bullet-points program further elaborates on the share of key figures in combating radicalization with a nuanced view. According to the program, key figures receive special training in order to stimulate debates concerning radicalization, discrimination, and islamophobia-related issues. Key figures in the program are seen as ‘connectors’ and have some expertise in various topics and provide access to professionals. They should act as the connecting variable between government policy and the neighborhoods, and so a nuanced view is needed from them (19).<sup>20</sup> Spalek (2010) recognizes the difficulties government actors could experience when supporting Muslim subgroup empowerment. The main directives letter states that the majority of the Muslim community are allies rather than opponents. Even orthodox Muslims should have a partner-role in combatting radicalization and jihadism. Furthermore, the bullet-point program states that initiatives from the community will receive support and several mosques have reacted positively on this form of empowerment.<sup>22</sup>

Equal treatment of different subgroups within the Muslim community is also important. Alliances with certain parts of the Muslim community, while ignoring other groups, could lead to a retreat of those groups from community engagement. The main directives letter emphasizes the acknowledgement of almost all Muslim groups, with the exception of extreme jihadi. The main directives letter urges that a distinction be made between extremists and “mainstream Muslims”.<sup>23</sup> This could be troublesome because this small group of jihadis retreat from

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<sup>20</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag p. 2-3

<sup>21</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019* p. 7-10

<sup>22</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag

<sup>23</sup> De gemeenteraad (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019*, Gemeente Den Haag

community engagement, which could provide terrorist groups with a breeding ground as well as neglecting an opportunity to better understand their social world (21).

Differing opinions between state actors and communities concerning broader social and political factors could have an impact on community engagement. Foreign government policy could influence engagement work, since it clashes with the perspective of domestic Muslims and acts as a source of anger within the Muslim community. The Ehl-I-Beyt and Noeroel Islam mosques mainly concur with this notion. According to the representatives, domestic and foreign policy of the Dutch government creates a significant amount of confusion and anger in the community and causes Muslims to criticize Dutch domestic and foreign policy. In this regard, the representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque highlights Dutch military action in Iraq and the position of the Dutch government on the war in Syria. This causes much confusion among community members, but it does not lead to significant resistance towards the Dutch government or society (personal interview, 6 november 2015). The representatives emphasized that Dutch democratic values and rule of law are more important to community members from this mosque. Domestic policy could also hinder community engagement work. Issues involving citizenship, individual rights, and liberal democratic values in the political arena could broaden the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. According to the representatives of the Noeroel Islam and Ehl-I-Beyt mosque, this is a primary source of anger within their community. The representative of the Noeroel Islam mosque explains that policymakers do not take their opinions or troubles into account. Policymakers mostly talk about Muslim youngsters, rather than involving them in policymaking processes. This way of policymaking causes significant friction between government actors and the community, which is, according to him, noticeable in society (personal interview, 8 november 2015). The representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque gives another perspective on domestic policy. According to him, the Dutch government holds a careless attitude towards jihadi travelers and the measures taken by the government are too soft (personal interview, 6 november 2015). The representative of the El Islam mosque gives a different view on this issue, explaining that most of the time those youngsters who have no proper education, employment and/or stable family, are more likely to oppose Dutch foreign and domestic policy, and are more susceptible to radical thoughts and behavior (personal interview, 23 november 2015) (22)(23). Spalek emphasizes the notion of secularism and how this applies to Muslim minorities. Secularism is experienced differently by Muslims because religious identity is the prime identity through which their social world is

experienced. It is therefore important that interpretations and experiences of discrimination based on religion should be taken into account in community engagement work. The representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque explains that this is a norm in engagement work. Choosing religious identity as a prime identity is described as an automatic reflex. According to him, the government is indifferent concerning this issue, but the media is more active in criticizing this issue (personal interview, 6 november 2015). The representative of the Noeroel Islam explains that there are two sides to the story. On the one hand, Muslim youngsters have to find a balance between the Dutch rule of law and the Islam. On the other hand, there are some institutions which do take this issue into account, but it is unclear how they actually do this. This could cause some inconsistencies for youngsters. There are some institutions which pay attention to this issue, but most of the time the government institutions discuss these identity issues within their own circle, rather than actually involving youngsters in the debate (personal interview, 8 november 2015) (24). The association of ethnic minorities with the Islam could also lead to the criminalization of these groups, which might negatively affect community engagement efforts. Representatives of the Ehl-I-Beyt and Noeroel Islam mosques confirm that stigmas concerning appearance do cause some prejudices. Muslims dressed in traditional clothing with a beard are frequently labelled as jihadi practitioners (personal interview, 6 november 2015). Although this does not lead to serious problems, the engagement worker of Noeroel Islam emphasizes that a significant portion of Muslim youngsters have issues giving the correct explanation concerning this topic (personal interview, 8 november 2015). The representative of the El Islam mosque claims that there are always people who intentionally insult Muslims, but he did not notice an increase in these cases. He explains that there will always be persons from right wing political parties that stigmatize Muslims, and that this is something that the community is used to (personal interview, 23 november 2015) (25).

Spalek (2010) emphasizes the importance of trust in engagement work. Trust at the micro-level between community members and formal institutions such as the police defines the success of partnership models. Counter-terrorism legislation could create difficulties for such partnership models. There does exist counter-terrorism legislation at the national level. The legislation gives administrative institutions more options regarding the prevention of participating in or providing



financial support to terrorist activities.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, in 2007 the Dutch parliament passed legislation which offered police and judicial authorities more and easier options during investigations into potential cases of terrorism. The legislation makes it possible to act at an early stage in an investigation even if there is not a reasonable amount of suspicion of a criminal offence.<sup>25</sup> This type of legislation has not been used frequently by the police and an evaluation report from 2012 has rendered it obsolete. In a low-trust context, police officers should focus on building trust by establishing trust-building activities. According to the Noeroel Islam mosque and the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque local police officers frequently visit the mosques and share a cup of coffee, but these minor activities do not translate into trust-building activities (personal interviews, 6-8 november 2015). The representative of the El Islam mosque is more nuanced. He explains that there is a good relationship between the mosque and the local police and sees their frequent visits as a trust building activity (personal interview, 23 november 2015) (26)(27).

### 5.2.3 Community policing in the Transvaal neighborhood

A case study of Lamb (2012) on the PREVENT program provided insights on community policing. The program describes the importance of providing residents of neighborhoods with services such as access to local policing services through a named point of contact, influence over policing priorities in the neighborhood, interventions in the form of joint actions with partners and public, and answers and feedback on what is done. The program consists of three stages which try to tackle promoters of terrorism, provide advice and support to vulnerable persons, and to focus on areas or sections where the risk of radicalization is more eminent. The first stage focuses on reaching a certain level of familiarity and recognition within the community. In the municipality of The Hague, the neighborhood officer is the frontline person who is in direct contact with community leaders such as representatives of mosques (28). Their frequent visits is a sign of a trust-building activity. The experiences between representatives and neighborhood officers mostly corresponds with each other. The representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque tells that there are good relations with the neighborhood officer and he is always available for support regarding issues as radicalization (personal interview, 6 november 2015). The representative of the Noeroel Islam mosque gives a similar explanation. He tells that there are very strong

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<sup>24</sup> <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Actualiteiten/Nieuws/Pages/Wetsvoorstel-bestuurlijke-anti-terrorisemaatregelen-onduidelijk.aspx>

<sup>25</sup> [https://www.privacybarometer.nl/maatregel/12/Wet\\_opsporing\\_en\\_vervolging\\_terroristische\\_misdrijven](https://www.privacybarometer.nl/maatregel/12/Wet_opsporing_en_vervolging_terroristische_misdrijven)

relationships with the neighborhood officer and that they from time to time visit the mosque (personal interview, 8 november 2015). The same explanation is given by the representative of the El Islam mosque. According to him, there are strong ties with the neighborhood officer, who visits the mosque twice a week for a cup of coffee. There are always options to contact the neighborhood officer in a direct manner and he actively tries to discuss issues such as radicalization with the members of the mosque (personal interview, 23 november 2015). The second stage focuses on gaining trust of community members. Achieving acceptance is key, rather than investigation or gathering intelligence. The three major mosques in the Transvaal neighborhood all have a positive relationship with the neighborhood officer. They can share their concerns with him and the frequent visits where the officer shares a cup of coffee with the representatives can be seen as a goal to seek acceptance, rather than investigation or intelligence gathering (personal interviews, 6-8-23 november 2015) (29). The third stage focuses on engaging with community members on terrorism and radicalization related issues through formal and informal channels. Community members should share this information more easily as the officers have now gained a certain level of trust. Engagement with community members on terrorism and radicalization related topics differs according to the interviews with the representatives of the mosques. Because each mosque represents different ethnic streams, the engagement of neighborhood police officers also differs per mosque. The Ehl-I-Beyt mosque explained that due to their Shiite background, radicalization is not an issue in their community. Instead, they fear being the targets of radicalized groups. The neighborhood officer visited the mosque and told them they could share their concerns regarding radicalization (personal interview, 6 November 2015). The Noeroel Islam mosque explained that there has not been a case of radicalization within their community, which makes it difficult to comment on it. According to the representative, radicalization is not an issue within their community and the neighborhood officer has not mentioned anything related to radicalization. The representative thinks that the police do not have the impression that radicalization is an issue within their community (personal interview, 8 November 2015). The El Islam mosque explained that the neighborhood officer is in close contact with the board of the mosque regarding radicalization. The representative explained that whenever suspicious behavior occurs, they report it to the neighborhood officer. He gave an example of a recent case in which two groups tried to share radical ideas with other visitors. The neighborhood officer came by, offered help and asked for the mosque's point of view regarding

radicalization and recruitment (personal interview, 23 November 2015). Therefore, there seems to be a difference in policing priority concerning radicalization. The police seems to be aware of the different ethnic and religious streams and their susceptibility to radical groups (30).

#### 5.2.4 Youth integration and societal strengthening in the Transvaal neighborhood

Youth integration and alienation of communities is also a factor which should be taken into account regarding community engagement. Kosseim (2011) focuses on isolated and disaffected youth and the society which they feel a resistance to embrace. Acculturation could be a helpful experience to disaffected youth in order to help them embrace their new society. Bullet-point four describes activities which involve identity development. Youngsters receive help with developing their own identity, especially those with two or more cultural backgrounds. Centrum 16/22 provides youngsters tools to rethink their own state of mind and learn to cope with other identities. Furthermore, bullet-point four describes that it is vital to strengthen the resistance of youngsters and educate them about basic norms and values of Dutch society. These educational programs should benefit acculturation and help youngsters identify themselves with the society they live in.<sup>26</sup> The municipality of The Hague also pays special attention to integration issues. The integration policy of the municipality focuses on combating socio-economic issues as well as issues concerning educational deprivation, discrimination and non-participation. The municipality is aware of the links between integration, social pressure and radicalization. Therefore, the municipality wants to organize meetings between different groups in order to signalize tensions quickly. Interreligious meetings should stimulate debates and seek for similarities between (religious) groups. The city council support initiatives which stimulate participation within The Hague's society (31).<sup>27</sup> Kosseim (2011) argues for a key-role for community leaders in these activities by sharing their experiences at the national level and promote counter-radicalization efforts and international cooperation abroad. The main directives letter and the bullet-points program do not mention a platform that gives community leaders a role to promote best-practices at the national and international level. The representatives of the Mosques in the Transvaal neighborhood state that there is a platform for mosques in The Hague, but not all mosques have received an invitation or are involved. The representative from the

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<sup>26</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p. 11-12

<sup>27</sup> Baldewsingh, R (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief Integratie*, Gemeente Den Haag,

Noeroel Islam mosque declares that they have not been involved in these meetings. The representative of the Ehl-I-Beyt mosque states that there was a meeting, but that this meeting was not very fruitful. The representative of the El Islam mosque declared that there is a regional platform which consists of 21 mosques from the Zuid-Holland province (personal interviews, 6-8-23 November 2015) (32).

When it comes to diplomacy efforts conducted concerning the promotion of counter-radicalization abroad, a first accomplishment has been the successful request for a European subsidy. These activities are aimed at the sharing of knowledge, experience and good practices involving the strengthening of society. The municipalities of Rotterdam, Delft, Antwerp and Goteborg are participating, and organizations such as the University of Leiden, the Lawaetz foundation from Hamburg and the NGO ADICE from Roubaix are also involved in the project. The municipality of The Hague fulfills a leading role in this project. A key aspect is the involvement of local communities (33).<sup>28</sup>

Solutions should have characteristics of strengthening societal structures and economic situation. The measures of the municipality seem to focus mainly on strengthening societal structures in which educational actors such as schools and teachers play a dominant role. Strengthening of the economical situation is mainly addressed by providing youngsters with job or internship related options and guidance. Educational institutes should focus on improving social skills and network development, which should ultimately provide better access to the job market. Schools should report discrimination on the labor market concerning internships and discourage their students to apply for such jobs (34).<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, Kosseim (2011) argues for community policing which reinforces a common threat which affects all parts of society. It is not explicitly stated that there is a policy carried out by the police or municipality of The Hague which reinforces a common threat, but a common perception exists regarding radical jihadi Salafism. The AIVD considers this stream as a threat to democratic norms and values (AIVD, 31-32:2014) (35).

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<sup>28</sup> Gemeente Den Haag (2015), *Speerpuntenprogramma*, Uitvoeringsprogramma preventie polarisatie, radicalisering en jihadisme 2015-2019 p. 6

<sup>29</sup> Baldewsingh, R (2014), *Hoofdlijnenbrief Integratie*, Gemeente Den Haag,

### 5.3 Measuring the amount of applied counter-radicalization policies in The Hague

When applying the Likert-scale measurement method as described in the conceptualization section, the following results were found:

1. To what extent is there a central role for communities in counterterrorism strategies? (3)
2. To what extent are communities used as an early warning system? (5)
3. To what extent does the community play a role in factors that could contribute to radicalization? (4)
4. To what extent does the Muslim community tackle grievances? (4)
5. To what extent is the community showing understanding towards the police when difficult cases or situations arise? (trust) (2)
6. To what extent are Muslims' voices documented? (4)
7. Is there a clear definition of which norms and values should be emphasized? (5)
8. Is there a rational assessment which identifies the best groups for combatting extremism? (4)
9. Government policy should focus on forms of engagement that are most effective in the battle against radicalization and terrorism. (4)
10. Government should not create a climate in which only certain parts of the Muslim community are accepted. (4)
11. Muslim communities should be empowered in order to create safe havens for youngsters. (2)
12. Cooperation in a partnership form with minority Muslim groups should contribute to multicultural dynamics. (2)
13. State institutions and Muslim communities should be involved in cooperative interaction and dialogue. (2)
14. Both actors should shape and influence policy in a two-sided synergy of input and output, which should lead to hybrid solutions and innovation. (1)
15. Turning resistance identities into project identities, thereby ultimately becoming dominant in society's institutions and therefore transforming into legitimate identities. (4)
16. Crucial to document Muslims' voices concerning engagement work, especially from Salafists and Islamists, in order to better understand their social world. (5)
17. All stakeholders should be able to give their opinion about partnership work (5)

18. Important to listen to the perspectives of identities placed in disempowered positions, as they could help create new approaches. (1)
19. A Muslim community representative should consider a less critical view on the global war on terror and have a more nuanced attitude towards government policy. (4)
20. What opinions are put forward by influential commentators concerning engagement work, and how do these opinions affect government actors? (1)
21. Important to include every part of Muslim community (4)
22. Influence of governments' foreign policy on Muslim community engagement. (2)
23. Influence of domestic policy involving citizenship, individual rights, and liberal democratic values and how this affects Muslim community engagement. (3)
24. The secularistic view and faith identities – what is their influence on engagement work and in what ways are faith identities taken seriously by engagement work? (4)
25. Effects on engagement work concerning the perception of police and other security actors on ethnic minorities. (2)
26. How does the security network contribute to building trust between community members and the police? (3)
27. Are there trust-building activities deployed by police officers to emphasize trustworthiness? (4)
28. Which type of police officers are assigned for community policing? (5)
29. Is there a focus on achieving acceptance, or conducting rudimentary police work? (3)
30. Is there an engagement with the community on topics such as terrorism and radicalization on an informal level? Does the community feel enough trust to share certain information with officers? (4)
31. How is acculturation supported by the action program, Muslim community, and the counter-radicalization network? (3)
32. To what extent share community leaders their experiences and knowledge with other community actors nationwide? (2)
33. To what extent are diplomacy efforts conducted concerning the promotion of counter-radicalization efforts abroad? (3)
34. To what extent are solutions with a societal structure and economics nature taken into account in counter-radicalization efforts? (4)

35. Is community policing aimed at establishing that radicalization is a common threat to all actors involved? (2)

Elements not applied (1):	3
Elements slightly applied (2):	8
Elements moderately applied (3):	6
Elements mostly applied (4):	13
Elements completely applied (5):	5

Although most elements of best-practices are not completely or even for a small part implemented, most elements of best-practices are in some way applied in the policy of the municipality of The Hague. Of all the best-practices set out by the literature, three are not applied at all in the counter-radicalization policy of The Hague. 33 best-practices are at least implemented in a certain way and 18 best-practices occur that have implemented at least a majority of the elements of the best-practices. When we take a look at the elements of the best-practices and their application in the municipality of The Hague, one could say that the vast majority of the elements are applied. However, there are some important reservations which have to be taken into account. The first reservation is that the majority of best-practices are only partly implemented. There are only five best-practices which have all elements implemented. Second, it is at this point unclear what implications an incomplete implementation of a best-practice has for the overall working of measure itself, or the counter-radicalization policy of The Hague in general. Evaluation reports on most policies have not been conducted because the recent implementation of these policies has not yet been made available. The third reservation is the disadvantageous position of the Muslim community regarding community involvement. A significant part of the elements of the best-practices require a more central role for the Muslim community. This is especially noticeable when we take a look at best-practices in which elements are only slightly or not applied. As long as the role of the Muslim community remains supportive in nature, it is likely that these elements will not be fulfilled.

## 6. Conclusion

The goal of this research was to map the community engagement efforts of the Muslim community and to determine to what extent they fulfil a role in the counter-radicalization network of the municipality of The Hague. The following research question was raised at the beginning of this research:

*“What is the role of Muslim communities in the Transvaal neighborhood in the network for prevention of radicalization in The Hague and in what ways does this role relate to best-practices?”*

The research on the role of the Muslim community in the Transvaal neighborhood has brought to a certain extent clearance concerning the role and position of the Muslim community in the counter-radicalization network of The Hague. The formal position of the Muslim community is clearly supportive. The analysis concerning the network structure and policy have led to the conclusion that the central municipal actor, the IPPR, is the lead actor which collects and divides information. The other actors are clustered in general groups, but the quantity of actors and the network goal make it natural for the network to have a hub-design. The IPPR is responsible for the setting up and implementation of policy and there is little space for other actors such as the Muslim community to influence policy in a direct manner, which explains their supportive position. The position of the Muslim community in the counter-radicalization network also has implications for a significant number of the best practices. The best-practices served as a tool to test the amount of counter-radicalization measures involving community engagement that were taken by the municipality of The Hague, which introduced two major programs involving counter-radicalization. Due to the qualitative nature of the research and the recent founding and implementation of the programs it is still unclear whether some parts of the program are implemented in a way that they should be. The role of the Muslim community compared to the best-practices gives the impression that most of the elements regarding the best-practices do occur in The Hague. A total of 35 community involvement related measures, translated in a five-level scale, were used from the best-practices' literature as well as the measures of the municipality of The Hague. Three best-practices were not applied in The Hague. Eight best-practices were slightly applied. Six best-practices were moderately applied. Thirteen best-practices were mostly applied and five best-practices were completely applied. The results tell us



that the vast majority of elements of best-practices occur in the counter-radicalization policies of The Hague. 33 best-practices have at least some elements which occur the counter-radicalization policy of The Hague and 24 of the best-practices are at least moderately applied. However, the vast majority of the policies described in the best-practices literature are not fully applied. Most of them are missing elements and it is not fully clear what implications this has regarding the effectiveness of community engagement in The Hague. Another part of the elements of best-practices involve an active role for the community in the policymaking process, but the position of the Muslim community in the counter-radicalization network of The Hague gives little to no options regarding involvement in policymaking processes. These measures involve a strong synergy between community and government actors. The position of the community explains why these best-practices are not (fully) applied in the municipality of The Hague. The majority of best-practices only have a partial implementation of the elements of best-practices. Complete implementation of a significant part of the best-practices is only possible if there exists a more central role for the Muslim community. In this light, the position of the Muslim community is not beneficial for a significant part of the proposed best-practices. These elements will only be fulfilled if the Muslim community acquires a more central role in the network of counter-radicalization in The Hague.

In the light of social and scientific relevance, this research has provided an overview of community-related counter-radicalization efforts in The Hague and can contribute to further implementation of community engagement policies in The Hague or other municipalities. Community engagement tries to tackle the issue at the roots and could have positive side effects concerning social dynamics. Future research regarding this topic could focus on family as an underlying part of the Muslim community. The synergy between community as a whole and family in the light of counter-radicalization would make this research more complete. Although incomplete and 'filled' with caveats, a general observation still tells us that the municipality of The Hague is actively involved with counter-radicalization efforts and takes a leading role in the national and international counter-radicalization community.

## Abbreviations

AIVD: General intelligence and security service

CBS: Central Bureau of Statistics

IPPR: Information Point of Prevention of Polarization and Radicalization

KEC: knowledge and expertise center

NCTV: National Coordinator Terrorism and Security

PVV: Freedom Party (political party)

SMN: The Foundation of cooperation between Dutch-Moroccans

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## Attachment

### **Interviews with community representatives and youth workers (in Dutch)**

#### **Transcript 1**

*Naam: Jihad Dedei*

*Functie: vertegenwoordiger/jongerenwerker*

*Moskee: Ehl-I-Beyt*

*Stroming: Shiisme*

*Datum: 06-11-15*

- 1) Heeft u als vertegenwoordiger van een moslimgemeenschap direct of indirect invloed op het beleid van gemeente Den Haag inzake de aanpak van radicalisering en jihadisme. Kortom: heeft u het idee dat de gemeente en overheidsinstanties ook naar de moskeeën luisteren?*

J: Ik kan me herinneren dat de gemeente den haag een soort van comité of commissie had gemaakt waarin ze eerdere moskeeën hadden uitgenodigd om over radicalisering te praten.

G: een soort van platform?

J: ja ja, heb je daar weleens van gehoord?

G: Ik hoorde inderdaad zoiets van broeder Sahin, ik had er ook iets over gelezen, maar heel kort

J: ik ben er zelf helaas niet naar toe geweest, maar iemand van onze gemeenschap was er naartoe gegaan. Dus inhoudelijk en wat ze daar doen dat weet ik niet. Ik weet wel dat we nauw contact hebben met de wijkagent. Wij kunnen hem bellen en onze zorgen met ons delen.

G: maar heeft u het idee dat gemeenschapsleiders op een directe manier invloed hebben op beleid? Op een directe manier?

J: in ieder geval op zijn minst te weinig. De moskeeën werden 1 a 2 keer bij elkaar verzameld en meer niet. En contact met de wijkagent. Maar dat was het. Te weinig. Het kan serieuzer aangepakt worden vind ik. Kom zelf even langs. Maak een persoonlijke afspraak om het 1 of ander te bespreken. Dus ja. Ik heb niet het gevoel dat ze naar ons persoonlijk luisteren, maar meer eens in de zoveel tijd een platform organiseren.

*1) Ondervind u als vertegenwoordiger van de moslimgemeenschap moeilijkheden met het uitvoeren of verspreiden van bepaald beleid vanuit de gemeente?*

J: nee dat beleid van de gemeente ken ik niet

G: dat is ook niet bij de ander vertegenwoordigers bekend?

J: nee dat kan ik met zekerheid zeggen, het is ook niet gezegd tegen één van onze mensen dat we het moeten verspreiden. Het is ook nooit een onderwerp van gesprek geweest in de moskee in de gesprek van de imam

G: het is ook dus nooit doorgespeeld?

J: er staat ondervindt u als vertegenwoordiger moeilijkheden. Kijk, dat sowieso, de voertaal is Turks in de moskee. Meeste mensen van de gemeenschap spreken gebrekkig Nederlands. Het is lastig om het sowieso te verspreiden en weetje je hebt ook veel mankracht nodig om dit te doen. We hebben weinig hooggeschoolden in huis of vrijwilligers. Kijk voor schoonmaken hebben we genoeg, maar dit soort dingen moet je meer verwachten van hooggeschoolden en ja mensen die zich met dit soort zaken bezighouden hebben het meestal te druk

G: dus jullie hebben eigenlijk een tekort aan mensen die dit beleid effectief zouden kunnen uitvoeren?

J: ja, buiten het feit dat we te onbekend zijn met het beleid zelf.

*1) Zijn er vanuit uw perspectief goede contacten met de (wijk)agenten? Kunt u bijvoorbeeld snel terecht bij een agent als u wat signaleert?*

J: jazeker, hij komt regelmatig langs, we kunnen op ieder moment een vergadering met hem houden en hij is zelf een keer langs geweest om over radicalisering te praten, waarin we onze zorgen hebben medegedeeld en ja en ook adviezen hebben doorgegeven, dus dat zit wel goed.

*1) Is de samenwerking met de politie van een dergelijk niveau dat de gemeenschap enerzijds, en de politie anderzijds, elkaar ondersteunen om bijvoorbeeld moeilijke zaken effectief aan te pakken? (denk bijvoorbeeld aan de kansen die de gemeenschap krijgt om het vanuit eigen hoek eerst op te lossen)*

J: kijk ik moet ook zeggen, het probleem radicalisering speelt niet echt af binnen onze gemeenschap. Dus dat is de vraag of de behoefte er is voor een oplossing. Je moet het als een dagelijks probleem zien wil je er iets aan doen. Wij van de Ehl-i-Beyt moskee zijn van de sjiitische stroming. Dus in onze gemeenschap zijn er geen jongeren die kunnen radicaliseren naar groepen als ISIS en Jabaht al Nusra. Het komt ook vanuit een andere hoek, meer vanuit het Salafisme en Wahabisme. Eerder speelde bij ons de vraag of wij ook in Europa het slachtoffer kunnen worden van radicale groepen als ISIS of sympathisanten van ISIS. Dat is wel een zorg. Maar omdat dat nooit tot nu toe gelukkig tot zoiets is gekomen, bijvoorbeeld dat onze moskee beklad is of in brand gestoken, of een aanslag etc., wordt de kans niet heel groot geacht. Echter: op speciale dagen wanneer het extra druk is verzorgen we onze beveiliging zelf. De vorige vraag was of de samenwerking met de politie van een dergelijk niveau is dat de gemeenschap enerzijds en de politie anderzijds elkaar ondersteunen om bepaalde zaken effectief aan te pakken. Meer dan een melding bij de wijkagent inzake geluidsoverlast zal het niet worden. De rest lossen we zelf op. Door bijvoorbeeld iemand met een oranje hesje voor de moskee te plaatsen om sowieso de geluidsoverlast van kinderen te verminderen, maar ook om een oogje in het zeil te houden van wie komt binnen en wie niet.

G: dus in principe wat u zegt is dat er wel de kans wordt gegeven mocht er radicalisering voorkomen binnen uw gemeenschap dat u de kans krijgt om het eerst zelf op te lossen?

J: ja, maar dus niet radicalisering in onze gemeenschap, want dat komt niet voor, maar wel radicalisering van buitenaf die voor ons een gevaar kunnen zijn. In ons geval is er geen sprake van mogelijke radicalisering.

*1) Verschillende instanties in het anti-radicaliseringsnetwerk kennen een andere cultuur qua werkwijze en informatiedelen. Merkt u dat een verschil in organisatiecultuur (politie en moskee) voor obstakels zorgt bij het delen van informatie?*

J: van de politie krijgen wij geen informatie, dus je kan het ook niet vergelijken

G: het is dus eenrichtingsverkeer qua informatie?

J: het is eerder dat wij iets opmerken of horen maar niet dat wij vanuit de gemeente of de overheid of de politie informatie krijgen. Dat gebeurt niet dus dat kan ik ook niet vergelijken.

*1) Is er een platform waarbij vertegenwoordigers van de moskeeën bij elkaar komen om ervaringen en ideeën uit te wisselen inzake de bestrijding van radicalisering?*

J: door de gemeente is er wat georganiseerd, maar voordereest is er geen platform binnen de gemeenschap onderling, want we hebben wel contacten met andere moskeeën, maar dan is het onderwerp van gesprek niet radicalisering. Nee, temeer omdat wij daar geen last van hebben.

G: maar wordt u er dan niet bij betrokken of krijgt u geen uitnodigingen inzake dit onderwerp?

J: over dit onderwerp?

G: ja radicalisering

J: nee

*1) Zorgt het binnenlands als buitenlands beleid van de Nederlandse overheid ervoor dat de moslimjongeren zich juist afzetten tegen de Nederlandse overheid en samenleving?*

J: ja, kijk daar kan ik wel het een en ander over zeggen. Kijk Nederland doet mee in de strijd in Syrië op een bepaalde manier, tenminste qua politiek, maar ook militair.

G: maar waar ik ook op doel is zeg maar van het buitenlands beleid van de afgelopen 10 jaar ook in Irak en Afghanistan.

J: juist, dat mensen zeggen van: ooh ze doen mee wij zetten ons af tegen de Nederlandse overheid. Kijk wij interpreteren en zien ook iets anders dan de mainstream gedachte en dat is het volgende: wij beschouwen ISIS en andere groeperingen buiten de islam. Mensen die hoofden afhakken en mensen zonder een proces vermoorden en massamoorden plegen dat is afschuwelijk, daar staan wij lijnrecht tegenover. Maar wij zien ook dat mensen vanuit Nederland, moslims vanuit Nederland naar Syrië gaan om zich aan te sluiten daarbij. En wij vinden dat de Nederlandse overheid onvoldoende doet om deze mensen tegen te houden. En er heerst zelf de gedachte dat deze houding bewust is. Kijk, bij mij heerst de vraag: stel deze jongeren gaan naar



Palestina om te vechten tegen Israël, zouden ze even makkelijk gegaan kunnen zijn? Ik denk van niet. Want ja, die mensen gaan toch om andere moslims te vermoorden dus wat maakt het uit.

G: dus vanuit de Nederlandse overheid wordt er laks omgegaan met het tegenhouden van deze mensen, er wordt een oogje dichtgeknepen?

J: eigenlijk wel ja, en ze hebben ook naar onze mening een foute positie ingenomen om tegen Assad te zijn. Want ja in de tijd dat Assad gewoon de macht had, was er geen ISIS en terreur. Syrië heeft nooit iemand aangevallen of oorlog gehad. Deed met iedereen zaken. En hoe zwakker je Assad maakt, hoe sterker ISIS wordt. Ik zie het ook een beetje als een boete die Europa en Nederland moeten betalen dat ze nu heleboel vluchtelingen krijgen vanuit Syrië. Had jij Assad niet tegengewerkt, of had je hem gesteund in de strijd tegen terrorisme, dan was de bevolking ook niet genoodzaakt om te vertrekken.

G: Maar merkt u ook wat voor effect dat beleid heeft op de jongeren in uw gemeenschap? Wat hoort u daarvan?

J: ja de jongeren zijn daar niet zo heel bewust van, ze krijgen er wel natuurlijk wat van mee, ze zijn tegen de jongens die er heen zijn gegaan. En nu is je vraag echt op de jongeren en niet op de ouderen?

G: nouja, eigenlijk de gemeenschap zelf

J: kijk de gemeenschap ziet de tekortkomingen van de Nederlandse overheid en de bewuste lakse houding. Maar dat leidt er niet toe dat ze de Nederlandse overheid als vijand zien, eerder kritiek. Het zal bij ons niet heel snel gebeuren dat de Nederlandse overheid als vijand wordt gezien. Je bent geloof ik langsgeweest in onze theekamer?

G: ja daar ben ik langsgeweest

J: Heb je de Nederlandse vlag gezien?

G: die heb ik gezien

J: kijk wij hebben geen problemen met de Nederlandse overheid zelf. Wij hebben allemaal getekend dat we ons aan de wet houden. Dus geen afkeer, maar wel kritiek. Dat dit deels hun eigen schuld is.

- 1) Het geloof is voor (jonge) moslims een belangrijke manier om het dagelijks leven in te vullen.

*Houden de instanties van de Nederlandse overheid naar uw ervaring rekening met de leefwereld van (jonge) moslims?*

J: vanuit de overheid merkt ik er niks van, het is alleen de media. We weten ook niet echt wat de overheid van ons verwacht op dat punt. Het speelt niet echt. Alleen de media drukt een stempel.

- 1) Moslims zien het geloof als een primaire identiteit waarbij zij de sociale wereld ervaren, in hoeverre houdt u hier rekening mee bij het gemeenschapswerk?

J: Kijk het geloof is onze primair identiteit, zowel van het bestuur als van de gemeenschap. Dus het is dan ook niet iets waar je rekening mee hoeft te houden. Het is een automatisme.

- 1) Komt het voor dat u tijdens u werk moeilijkheden ervaart met etnische stigma's, zoals bijvoorbeeld een stempel op een bepaalde groep moslims als Marokkaanse jongeren?

J: njaa het maakt het niet lastiger, maar er zijn wel ethische stigma's of stigma's qua uiterlijk. Als iemand een baard heeft en een jallaba dan ontstaat er wel snel het vooroordeel dat die persoon bij ISIS hoort. In ons geval is het weer zo dat andere moslimgemeenschappen ons als ongelovigen zien. Omdat ik een sjiit ben. Dan krijg je een soort vooroordeel. En ja daar kan je soms mee moeite hebben, maar tot echte problemen leidt dat niet.

- 1) Heeft de gemeenschap ook invloed op de prioriteiten die de politie moet stellen inzake preventie van radicaliseringswerk?

J: het is mij niet bekend wat hun prioriteiten zijn. Dus dan heb ik daar ook geen invloed op. Ik heb het gevoel dat het meer in besloten kringen gebeurt. Inlichtingenwerk. We hebben ook vanuit de politie nooit het verzoek gekregen om mee te denken inzake dit onderwerp.

- 1) Worden er volgens u activiteiten vanuit de politie ondernomen die gericht zijn op het bouwen van vertrouwen richting de gemeenschap?

J: nee niet echt, enkel het bezoek van de wijkagent, meer niet

- 1) Is er een vaste agent of aanspreekpunt bij de politie die zaken van radicalisering behandelt?

J: enige aanspreekpunt is de wijkagent. Hij heeft ons aangegeven dat wij punten of zorgen bij hem kunnen melden. In die zin hebben we een aanspreekpunt.

## Transcript 2

Naam: Zainul Habieb

Moskee: Noeroel Islam

Stroming: Soennitisch

Functie: Jongerenwerker/vertegenwoordiger

Datum: 08-11-15

- 2) Heeft u als vertegenwoordiger van een moslimgemeenschap direct of indirect invloed op het beleid van gemeente Den Haag inzake de aanpak van radicalisering en jihadisme. Kortom: heeft u het idee dat de gemeente en overheidsinstanties ook naar de moskeeën luisteren?*

Z: ik vind het lastig om daar antwoord op te geven, omdat dat meer iets is tussen het bestuur en de gemeente, sowieso direct niet, indirect zou kunnen

- 1) Ondervind u als vertegenwoordiger van de moslimgemeenschap moeilijkheden met het uitvoeren of verspreiden van bepaald beleid vanuit de gemeente?*

Ik moet zeggen dat ik daar weinig van merk. We horen niet echt wat vanuit het bestuur van de moskee dat er gesprekken zijn geweest, dat er een bepaald beleid is en of dat wordt uitgevoerd en verspreid.

- 1) Zijn er vanuit uw perspectief goede contacten met de (wijk)agenten? Kunt u bijvoorbeeld snel terecht bij een agent als u wat signaleert?*

Ja we hebben vaste aanspreekpunten vanuit de moskee met de wijkagenten. Die komen hier ook af en toe langs. En ik weet dat de moskee en het bestuur daarmee in contact staat, ze weten bij wie ze terecht kunnen. De hoofdimam heeft ook goede contacten en is ook bekend bij de wijkagent, er zijn goede relaties tussen ons. Ze kunnen elkaar snel vinden.

- 1) Is de samenwerking met de politie van een dergelijk niveau dat de gemeenschap enerzijds, en de politie anderzijds, elkaar ondersteunen om bijvoorbeeld moeilijke zaken effectief*

*aan te pakken? (denk bijvoorbeeld aan de kansen die de gemeenschap krijgt om het vanuit eigen hoek eerst op te lossen)*

Ik merk er weinig van, omdat er niets zoiets is gebeurd, maar zoals ik net al aangaf, zal die ondersteuning er zeker zijn. Om het eerst zelf op te lossen is het makkelijkste en kan dat niet dan zal er hulp aangeboden worden daar ben ik van overtuigd. Alleen of ik dat merk dat niet want er is niet echt wat gebeurd.

- 1) *Verschillende instanties in het anti-radicaliseringsnetwerk kennen een andere cultuur qua werkwijze en informatiedelen. Merkt u dat een verschil in organisatiecultuur (politie en moskee) voor obstakels zorgt bij het delen van informatie?*

*Nee ik weet daar niks van dus ik kan er geen informatie over geven.*

- 2) *Is er een platform waarbij vertegenwoordigers van de moskeeën bij elkaar komen om ervaringen en ideeën uit te wisselen inzake de bestrijding van radicalisering?*

*Ik denk dat er een platform is, maar ik weet dat deze moskee in een vergadering of iets is geweest of een samenkomst waarbij radicalisering het onderwerp is geweest. We hebben er niks over gehoord, dus ik kan er ook weinig kennis over geven.*

- 1) *Zorgt het binnenlands als buitenlands beleid van de Nederlandse overheid ervoor dat de moslimjongeren zich juist afzetten tegen de Nederlandse overheid en samenleving?*

Ik denk dat je vooral bij het gros van de jongeren kan zien dat ze zich afzetten, of in ieder geval in gedachte afzetten van het beleid, maar dat komt vooral omdat er vaak over hun wordt gesproken, en niet met hun wordt gesproken. Ze voelen zich er niet bij betrokken. Ze voelen zich niet gehoord. Er wordt niet geluisterd naar hun meningen en visies. Er wordt beleid gemaakt op basis van gesprekken over hun en ik vind wel dat er te weinig direct contact is tussen beleidsmakers en moslimjongeren en dat er daardoor fricties ontstaan. Dat zie je nu vooral in de samenleving heel veel en dat is een groot probleem.

- 1) Het geloof is voor (jonge) moslims een belangrijke manier om het dagelijks leven in te vullen.

*Houden de instanties van de Nederlandse overheid naar uw ervaring rekening met de beleefwereld van (jonge) moslims?*

Het heeft natuurlijk twee kanten. De ene kant is vanuit de jongeren zelf. Ze moeten de Nederlandse wet respecteren en hun identiteit daarbinnen vinden en hoe kan ik de Nederlandse wet respecteren en de islam respecteren. Dat kan nog weleens een clash of tegenstrijdigheid weergeven. Aan de andere kant heb je de instanties die daar rekening mee houden, al is dit niet duidelijk hoe ze dat precies invullen. Maar zoals ik net al aangaf, er wordt vaak over hun gesproken en niet met hun, en dan kan je moeilijk in een beleefwereld met iemand iets gaan uitvoeren of iets gaan doen. Dus ja ik weet niet of ze daar echt rekening mee houden maar er kan wel wat meer moeite gedaan worden om begrip te kweken.

- 2) Komt het voor dat u tijdens u werk moeilijkheden ervaart met etnische stigma's, zoals bijvoorbeeld een stempel op een bepaalde groep moslims als Marokkaanse jongeren?

Op mijn werk merk ik dat wel, kijk ik draag een baard. Ik ga met gewone westerse kleding naar het werk. Ik gedraag me als een westerling. Ik heb alleen een baard qua uiterlijk verschijn en daar worden wel opmerkingen over gemaakt, grappende wijs meestal maar er wordt inderdaad wel wat gezegd. Of iets wat in de media is voorgekomen, daar worden ook vragen over gesteld. Onbegrip en soms heb je bepaalde opmerkingen waarvan je ziet dat er iets niet begrepen wordt en dat ze daar dan opmerkingen over maken of een mening over hebben. Ik hoor dat zelf ook van veel jongeren en de 1 vind het moeilijk de ander vind het niet moeilijk. En het gebeurt best veel. Het is denk ik een stuk onwetendheid bij de mensen of juist omdat laten we zeggen de moslimjongeren het zelf moeilijk vinden om het uit te leggen of om het op een juiste manier te brengen en dat heb je natuurlijk ook.

G: Voordat we naar de volgende vraag gaan, als eerst even deze vraag: in hoeverre is radicalisering een issue in deze moskee of gemeenschap?

Z: heel minimaal, ik merk er zelf vrij weinig van. Of het er is? Misschien dat iemand wat heeft opgemerkt maar er is hier iig niet wat actiefs, en wij zijn er zelf wel actief bezig om een juiste interpretatie van Islam te weergeven. We zijn meer met het innerlijke bezig en niet de zwart op wit benadering zoals de geradicaliseerde mee bezig zijn. Als we iets zouden zien dat op een bepaalde brainwashing lijkt of als mensen van een radicale stroming komen dan werken we dat gelijk tegen. We hebben in het verleden weleens gehad dat mensen van een andere stroming hier kwamen en die dan jongeren proberen weg te trekken van hier, en dat is ook een paar keer gelukt. Als we het zien proberen we dat tegen te houden. Maar het is niet dat het we er heel actief mee

bezig zijn, ook omdat je niet gelijk mensen wilt bestempelen of in een hoekje wilt zetten. Het is daarom ook op een vrij laag pitje en ik zou eigenlijk ook wat meer activiteiten zien op dit gebied eigenlijk. Er heerst momenteel een passieve houding. Ik denk dat het heel belangrijk is in deze tijd. Bijvoorbeeld op de vrijdaggebeden zou het een mooie aangelegenheid zijn, maar het gebeurt weinig. Er wordt wel gesproken hoe je moet zijn in de Islam, tegenovergesteld van een geradicaliseerd iemand, daar wordt wel op gespeeld en zo zie je dat de gemeenschap langzamerhand wel die kant op wilt gaan en de huidige normen probeert te behouden in deze lijnen.

- 1) Heeft de gemeenschap ook invloed op de prioriteiten die de politie moet stellen inzake preventie van radicaliseringswerk?

Vanuit de jongeren nu hebben we daar geen invloed op. Het wordt niet besproken en niet naar gevraagd. Vanuit het bestuur is mij dat eerlijk gezegd onduidelijk. Maar het lijkt me dat we daar geen invloed op hebben. Vanuit de jongeren hebben we geen contact met hun, we worden daar niet voor gevraagd. Als ze erom vragen zouden we dat heel graag willen doen. Het is heel belangrijk maar er wordt niet naar gevraagd. We zullen vast wel gescreend worden of dat ook nodig is, maar ik denk dat ze de impressie hebben dat het in deze moskee niet zo speelt. Maar op dit moment hebben wij geen invloed op het politiewerk.

G: hoe ervaart u de samenwerking met de politie? Ik hoorde u net zeggen dat u goede contacten heeft met de wijkagenten.

Z: bij moeilijke zaken of als we hulp nodig hebben zal deze geboden worden, maar er heeft zich nog niet iets afgespeeld waarbij dat nodig was.

- 1) Worden er volgens u activiteiten vanuit de politie ondernomen die gericht zijn op het bouwen van vertrouwen richting de gemeenschap?

Er komen wel af en toe agenten langs en dan houden we een babbeltje met ze. Dus dat gebeurt wel op kleine schaal. Soms komen ze een broodje eten, koffie drinken. Of het spontaan was of dat ze een afspraak hadden was mij niet duidelijk. Maar over het algemeen is de band er zeker.

- 1) Is er een vaste agent of aanspreekpunt bij de politie die zaken van radicalisering behandelt?

Nee dat is bij mij niet bekend.

- 1) Vinden er interventies plaats in samenwerking met partners zoals reclassering, jongerenwerkers, de gemeenschap etc.?

Op dit moment niet, we proberen wel samen te werken met andere jongerenwerkers. Vanuit de Hijaaz gemeenschap proberen we met andere moskeeën contact te leggen en activiteiten te ondernemen, maar daar speelt radicalisering niet echt een rol.



### **Transcript 3**

*Naam: Bel Hadj*

*Moskee: El Islam*

*Stroming: Soenitisch*

*Functie: Voorzitter*

*Datum: 23-11-15*

**De volgende vragen gaan over het overheids/gemeentelijk beleid in relatie met de moslimgemeenschappen en moskeeën.**

- 3) *Radicalisering is tegenwoordig een belangrijk onderwerp in de samenleving en heeft invloed op verschillende gemeenschappen. In hoeverre is radicalisering een onderwerp van gesprek of een probleem in dit deel van de moslimgemeenschap?*

B: nee, het komt en het gaat. Als je bij de gebeurtenissen kijkt en het heeft te maken met radicalisering, dan word het in de moskee besproken. De mensen van hier hebben de angsten altijd.. als er wat gebeurd hier of daar.. dat er vingers naar de moslimgemeenschap worden gewezen. Die angst hebben wij altijd. Verder ben ik verantwoordelijk voor de moskee. Wat er buiten de muren van de moskee afspeelt is moeilijk aan te pakken. Binnen de moskee gebeurt het in principe nooit en deze gedachtes accepteren we nooit. Jongeren die verdacht worden van radicale gedachten accepteren we niet. Ook hier willen wij geen groeperingen van jongeren met radicale gedachtes. Er zijn altijd wel jongeren die van moskee naar moskee gaan en aparte groepen vormen om in het geheim dit soort dingen te bespreken. Wij accepteren dat echter niet. Onze preken, onze lessen, onze adviezen gaan altijd over

- 4) *Heeft u als vertegenwoordiger van een moslimgemeenschap direct of indirect invloed op het beleid van gemeente Den Haag inzake de aanpak van radicalisering en jihadisme. Kortom: heeft u het idee dat de gemeente en overheidsinstanties ook naar de moskeeën luisteren?*

Nee, de gemeente heeft wel contact met de moskeeën over het onderwerp radicalisering, ze willen wel luisteren naar de moskeeën en hun advies serieus nemen. Maar samenwerken of luisteren, echt luisteren, dat gebeurt weinig. Kijk over radicalisten, wie is de radicalist? Die definitie weten zij ook niet. Wij moeten samen met de gemeente dat bepalen en daarover in gesprek gaan. Dat gebeurt nu te weinig.

*5) Ondervind u als vertegenwoordiger van de moslimgemeenschap moeilijkheden met het uitvoeren of verspreiden van bepaald beleid vanuit de gemeente of overheid?*

Nee dat is niet nieuw voor ons. Als ik radicalisten zie geef ik het door. Want ik ben de voorzitter en dat geef ik gelijk door aan de politie. Zaken die een gevaar kunnen vormen voor de maatschappij moeten wij doorgeven.

*6) Is er een platform waarbij vertegenwoordigers van de moskeeën bij elkaar komen om ervaringen en ideeën uit te wisselen inzake de bestrijding van radicalisering?*

Ja er is een platform voor, een islamitisch platform van de regio Zuid-Holland waarin 21 moskeeën staan. We hebben ook een communiqué naar de pers gestuurd inzake de gebeurtenissen in Frankrijk en in de moskee hebben we het er over gehad.

*7) Zorgt naar uw idee het binnenlands als buitenlands beleid van de Nederlandse overheid ervoor dat de moslimjongeren zich juist afzetten tegen de Nederlandse overheid en samenleving?*

Kijk het Midden-Oosten is altijd al een wereldprobleem geweest. Daar zit het geld en de wereldeconomie. Daar zit alles. Religieuze conflicten, moslims tegen moslims, christenen tegen christenen. Joden ook weer tegen die groepen en andersom. Daar zit het probleem. Wij begrijpen eigenlijk ook niet waarom de Marokkaanse en/of buitenlandse jongeren daar naar toe gaan om ook te vechten. Wie tegen wie? En ik begrijp niet als ik naar Syrië zou gaan, welke kant je zou kiezen? Als je het hier in Nederland goed hebt, ga je niet naar Syrië. Als jij op de universiteit zit en toekomst hebt ga niet daar naar toe. Alleen jongeren die geen opleiding hebben, geen werk, moeilijke familie, in aanraking met politie, dat zijn de jongeren die vatbaar zijn.

Het heerst niet dat jongeren hier denken dat Nederland het verkeerd doet.

- 8) Het geloof is voor moslims een belangrijke manier om het dagelijks leven in te vullen.  
*Houden de instanties van de Nederlandse overheid naar uw ervaring rekening met de leefwereld van (jonge) moslims?*

**De volgende vragen gaan over de samenwerking/relaties met de politie en wijkagenten.**

- 9) *Zijn er vanuit uw perspectief goede contacten met de (wijk)agenten? Kunt u bijvoorbeeld snel terecht bij een agent als u wat signaleert?*

B: ja ik ontvang hem, de wijkagent, bijna twee keer per week. Hij komt hier langs voor een bak koffie. Ik heb zijn contactgegevens altijd bij de hand. Als er wat gebeurd kan ik hem gelijk bellen. Kijk we zijn hier bij de grens tussen Schilderwijk en Transvaal. De moskee bevindt zich officieel wel in Schilderswijk, maar de meeste mensen komen uit Transvaal. Het is een gebied waar veel activiteiten en problemen zich hebben afgespeeld. De markt is hier, hobbemaplein. Het is er druk. En wij hebben met de wijkagent altijd goed contact. Laatst waren er twee groepen die anderen wilden laten radicaliseren. De politie komt dan naar ons toe en vraagt hoe wij het zien en vragen actief mee over dit onderwerp.

- 10) *Worden er volgens u activiteiten vanuit de politie ondernomen die gericht zijn op het bouwen van vertrouwen richting de gemeenschap?*

Dat merk ik wel, wij zitten hier nu 35 jaar en vanaf het begin hebben we contact met de gemeente en met de politie en de overheid. Een paar ministers zijn hier geweest. Voormalig koningin Beatrix is ook hier langs geweest. We hebben ook contact met veel niet-moslims, die ook langskomen. De betrouwbaarheid is er wel met de omgeving en de politie.

- 11) *Is er een vaste agent of aanspreekpunt bij de politie die zaken van radicalisering behandelt?*

Nee kijk de wijkagent is een boodschapper die het brengt naar het bureau. Daar zijn er mensen die zich bezighouden met dit onderwerp. Wij en de wijkagent signaleren. Het kan gebeuren dat wij dan iets oppikken inzake een radicaliseringsgeval. Een tijd terug was er een groep jongeren die langskwamen om te bidden, maar ze gedroegen zich nogal verdacht, ze waren altijd samen 5

of 6 jongeren, met een baard. Ze verzamelden zich ook om de hoek en bidden ook apart. Wij merkten dat op en hebben dat doorgegeven. Hun gedrag was geen gewoonte in onze moskee.

*12) Heeft de gemeenschap ook invloed op de prioriteiten die de politie moet stellen inzake preventie van radicaliseringswerk?*

*13) In het geval van interventies, vinden deze plaats in samenwerking met partners zoals reclassering, jongerenwerkers, de gemeenschap etc.?*

Er is een samenwerking tussen de moskee en jongerenwerkers, wij proberen zoveel mogelijk informatie en adviezen aan elkaar door te geven.

*14) Is de samenwerking met de politie van een dergelijk niveau dat de gemeenschap enerzijds, en de politie anderzijds, elkaar ondersteunen om bijvoorbeeld moeilijke zaken effectief aan te pakken? (denk bijvoorbeeld aan de kansen die de gemeenschap krijgt om het vanuit eigen hoek eerst op te lossen)*

Nee de politie zegt oke we houden het in de gaten. En als ze zorgen voor problemen in de moskee dan moeten we gelijk contact opnemen.

### **De volgende vraag gaat over de ervaringen en verhalen van mensen in de samenleving uit uw gemeenschap**

*15) Komt het voor dat u tijdens u werk moeilijkheden ervaart met (etnische) vooroordelen, bijvoorbeeld een stempel op een bepaalde groep moslims? Denk bijvoorbeeld aan uiterlijk vertoon als het dragen van een baard en traditionele kleding?*

Een heel klein percentage, je hoort 1x in de drie a vier weken dat een vrouw met een hoofddoek wordt bespot. Wij weten dat er zulke mensen zijn, van bijvoorbeeld de PVV die haat willen uiten tegenover moslims. Maar in de loop der jaren is dit aantal wel gelijk gebleven.

G: merkt u dat ook tegenover Marokkaanse jongeren?

B: De jongeren zijn veel agressiever, die agressiviteit is het probleem. Kijk terug naar de zomertijd, inzake het conflict met Mitch Henriquez. Wij van de moskee hebben toen de gele

jasjes gedragen en gesproken van hey jongens wat is er aan de hand. Doe een beetje rustig. Heb een beetje respect. Maar ze willen doorgaan. Ik sprak die jongeren hier voor de deur en ik zei luister: De burgemeester heeft gezegd we hebben een fout gemaakt, dus we willen bij elkaar zitten om te praten, dus jullie moeten stoppen nu, want jullie demonstreren tegen geweld, maar jullie gaan zelf door met geweld.