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# Terrorism: understanding Terra Lliure using the Structural-Cognitive Model.

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Crisis and Security Management

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## Introduction

The chances of encountering terrorism-related news increases with the amount of time one spends watching or reading the news. Terrorism is a subject that appears almost every day on the media, yet we still do not know what it is exactly (Hoffman, 2006, p. 1): what are the reasons, why do *they* do it, how can we prevent it, but moreover, how can we *eliminate* it? Terrorism has been studied for decades, but has seen a rise since the 9/11 events. Still a major knowledge gap is the understanding of terrorism, which this thesis hopes to at least partially fulfil applying Karl-Dieter Opp's Structural-Cognitive model, developed as a synthesis of several Social Movement theories.

Years have passed since the last successful terror attack in Spain. As a matter of fact, *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), the Basque nationalist terror<sup>1</sup> organization, and main active terrorist organization in Spain, has been inactive since 2011, when unilaterally decided to cease all armed activity. The last successful Islamist terror attack took place in 2004 (Madrid train bombings, claimed by Al-Qaeda), which is also the biggest terror attack in Spain, killing 192 and injuring more than two thousand (RTVE.es, 2017). In March 2017 ETA organization announced a final disarmament that will take place in 8<sup>th</sup> April 2017 (La Vanguardia, 2017), and for weeks the issue has been on all media, proving that terrorism is not something from the past in Spain's politics, but a current issue.

But Al-Qaeda and ETA have not been the only terror organizations operating in Spain. Spain has seen plenty of terrorism and terrorist organizations, from Islamist to separatists, and from state-sponsored terrorism to far-right terrorism. One of the less studied organizations is the Catalan *Terra Lliure*, an organization that was active for more than a decade, and which perpetrated over 140 successful attacks.

With a deep and thorough analysis of *Terra Lliure* and the events surrounding and prompting the emergence of this organization, this thesis hopes to provide a new study on a hardly studied organization, providing probably the only such research in English, and more importantly, to test the viability of a new model in order to understand terrorism. Using Opp's Structural-Cognitive model, terrorism is not understood as a particular phenomenon, but a violent extreme of social movements. Terrorism is understood as part of what Tilly designates 'contentious politics' (1997, p. 56). Studying Terrorism as

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<sup>1</sup> ETA is referred here as a 'terror organization' since it has been considered as such by the Spanish Government. The term 'terrorism' and its derivatives are controversial and will be addressed further below.

a social movement allows for a major understanding of the perceived causes of violence. Doing so is the first step towards better and improved approaches to counter terrorism in its many forms.

### **Thesis outline**

The structure of this thesis is as follows: following this brief introduction, the goals of the thesis are presented, and the research defended for both its scientific and societal relevance. A theoretical framework is elaborated based on the academic fields of terrorism, nationalism studies, and more importantly, social movement theory. After the theoretical framework, the context is presented, focusing specially on the Spanish Transition era (1975-1980), as well as the first steps and *modus operandi* of *Terra Lliure*. Following the context section the reader will find the Analysis section, in which several sources of information are analyzed in order to extract the insights and perceptions of *Terra Lliure* militants and leaders. A brief recap follows the Analysis section, in which all the findings are summarized in a table. The last section of this thesis is the Conclusions section, which also contains recommendations.

### **Research objective**

Although recently shocked by lone-wolf type of terror attacks, such as the Nice massacre of 14<sup>th</sup> July in 2016 (Ellis & Almasry, 2016), Europe has been mostly struck by terrorist organizations demanding independence or higher degrees of self-government, at least during the period 2006-2013 (Luedi, 2016). Be it the Irish Republican Army (IRA), ETA, or some less known organizations like the Catalan *Terra Lliure* (Free land) there have been plenty of secessionist organizations native to Europe (Rothenberger & Müller, 2015).

There are plenty of things we still do not fully understand about terrorism, and one of these things is how do terrorist groups behave. Several theories and approaches have been applied (Oberschall, 2004; Crenshaw, 1981; Boylan, 2014) , but still there is no clear understanding. The goal of this thesis is two-fold: first, to understand how terrorist organizations behave, and second, as a necessary consequence of the main goal, to provide an analysis of the organization known as *Terra Lliure*. To do so, and considering terrorism as mainly politically-motivated and falling within Tilly's contentious politics, I will apply a synthesis of theories and approaches applied to understand social move-

ments to understand *Terra Lliure*, which emerged in the late 1970s-early 1980s, and dissolved in the early 1990s.

### Research question

Since the goal of this research is to understand how terrorist organizations behave, the research question has to address this issue. Moreover, this research will be testing Karl-Dieter Opp's Structural-Cognitive model (Opp, 2009), applied to social movements to understand the terrorist organizations' behavior. Thus, the research question is as follows:

- How does Social Movement Theory explain the behavior of the ethnic-nationalist terrorist organization *Terra Lliure*?

The propositions that will drive this research are derived from Social Movement Theory as well as Opp's approach:

- The organization emerged due to a combination of resources available (including time) and the perception that the transition period and early democratic period allowed for mobilization and realistic chances of success.
- The organization resorted to violence due to the perception that armed struggle could help rally people to 'the cause', while at the same time be of leverage against the central government.
- The organization had a limited scope of action due to the lack of human resources.
- *Terra Lliure's* human resources (recruiting pool) were dependent on frame-alignment within Catalan nationalists.

### Scientific relevance

Terrorism is a tricky concept. As Bruce Hoffman puts it, terrorism is a 'grossly over-used term' of which 'most people have a vague idea or impression of what it is, but lack a precise, concrete, and truly explanatory definition of the word' (Hoffman, 2006, p. 1). The term terrorism appears during the French Revolution (1789) and since then the meaning of the term has changed quite a lot. Often, terrorism is used as a label, hence the cliché: 'one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter' (Ganor, 2002).

It has not been until recently<sup>2</sup> that scholars have started to use Social Movement Theory to explain terrorism. Terrorism falls into the category of ‘contentious politics’ to the extent that it entails one or more groups which ‘make collective, public, visible claims on other people, claims which if realized would affect the objects’ interests’ and in which ‘at least one party to the claims, including third parties, is a government’ (Tilly, 1997, p. 56). According to Clausewitz’s famous statement, ‘war is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means’ (Clausewitz, 2007). This implies that war is political. Following Clausewitz’s logic, terrorism is contentious politics by other means. This may equal terrorism with war, but it does with politics too.

Up until recently, little attention was paid to why terrorist groups end. One of the first studies to do so is a RAND Corporation study, authored by Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, in which they analyzed terrorist organizations which operated during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and found out that most terrorist groups end for two major reasons: they either decide to join the political process, or are defeated by the law-enforcement agencies (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Audrey Kurth Cronin also studied how terrorism ends, and identifies six endings: decapitation, negotiation, success (of the terrorist organization), failure (of the terrorist organization), repression, and reorientation (2009). Understanding how terrorist organizations behave will provide new insights on how to end them. So far no study has applied Opp’s model of Social Movement Theory to explain a terrorist group’s behavior, although some insights of social movement theory have been applied to study terrorism<sup>3</sup>. Thus, this research provides new insights from Social Movement Theory to understand terrorist organizations and how to better manage and act to end them.

Moreover, this thesis will be one of the few scientific researches on the organization *Terra Lliure*, and probably the first one in a language different from Catalan. As will be shown further ahead in the thesis, *Terra Lliure*, as a terrorist organization, has the peculiarity of having killed only one person in over fifteen years of action and more than 140

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<sup>2</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges considers the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq, and more broadly, salafi-jihadism, a social movement, and analyses it accordingly in his book *ISIS: A history* (2016). Although he does not use Opp’s model explicitly, parts of Opp’s Structural-Cognitive model can be implicitly found.

<sup>3</sup> Besides Gerges’ analysis of ISIS, Colin J. Beck discusses possible applications of Social Movement Theory to terrorism (2008), Sarah V. Marsden uses Social Movement Theory to develop a typology of militant organizations (2016), and Jordi Comas, Paul Shrivastava, and Eric C. Martin consider terrorism to be polymorphic, resembling formal organizations, networks and social movements, with different intensities, at the same time (2015).

attacks, a statistic that might strike common citizens as something unusual for a terrorist organization.

### **Societal relevance**

It appears that nationalism is resurging on Western countries: Trump won the election for the presidency of the United States of America (2016), the ‘Brexit’ won the referendum in Great-Britain on leaving the European Union (2016), nationalist leaders obtained good results, although none formed government, in the Netherlands (2017), and in France (2017), and at least two regions of European Union member States are seeking independence (Scotland and Catalonia). In some cases, this resurgence has been linked with increased aggressions towards migrants or people from different backgrounds, like in the United States after the Trump victory, and in the United Kingdom after the ‘Brexit’ vote (Al-Jazeera, 2016; Singh, 2016). Terrorist violence and nationalism are two growing concerns of today’s European citizens, and as such, this research is justified, although no secessionist terrorist organization seems to be rising today.

### **Choice of methodology and analysis**

Since this research analyzes the behavior of a single terrorist organization, the best way to do it is with a qualitative single case study. Case studies are useful when the goal of the study is to answer ‘how’, when the researcher cannot affect the behavior of the subjects being studied, or when one considers contextual conditions due to their relevance to the subject of the thesis (Baxter & Jack, 2008), all of which apply to the current research.

This research is deductive in nature, since the goal is not to produce a new theory, but to apply an existent theory of a different field to terrorism studies. Since the theory applied, the Structural-Cognitive model synthesized by Opp, takes into account subjective observations and parameters that determine if there will be collective protests, this research will need to take into account subjective observations and parameters. Interviews would be the logical way to obtain this kind of subjective information (What did the participants feel at the time? What were their motivations?), but as will be explained in the next paragraphs, this will not be the case in this research.

For several reasons, including the fact that the organization is no longer active, that the researcher has no possible access to former members, and that former members have participated in at least one documentary and written a book, this research will mainly



use documents both for the objective parts as well as the subjective in nature. These documents also include reports on socio-economic parameters, as well as the press, and the aforementioned book and documentary.

The unit of analysis of this research is the terrorist organization *Terra Lliure*. The units of observation are derived from the Structural-Cognitive model, and thus will be the macro-variables that constitute the political opportunity structures as well as the availability of resources, elements that influence the cognitive framing processes, the generat-ed incentives, as well as the action taken by the organization.

Terrorism as a field of study has plenty of research articles, although results are often contradictory, existing both qualitative and quantitative studies on several issues. Although some models and theories have been applied to study terrorist organizations, no one has tested Opp's synthesized model to explain terrorist organizations' behavior, which offers a comprehensive approach that can be applied to terrorist organizations. Testing the model with a single organization (single case study) allows for a more comprehensive analysis, which takes into account both structural and subjective variables that can potentially affect terrorism. This comprehensive approach can help understanding organizations and thus, to draw new strategies in order to counter them.

### **Advantages and limitations of this research**

The advantages of using documents instead of other means to extract information, such as direct observation or interviews, are the following: a relatively low cost for the amount of information obtained; no reactivity caused by the subjects being investigated, who could contaminate the data; exclusivity (the information obtained may differ from that obtained with direct observation or interviews); and historicity, since the material is recorded and will endure through time, giving it a historical dimension to the analysis (Valles, 1997).

But the use of this means to extract information also has disadvantages. Valles lists the following: selectivity, by which the information contained in the documents might have been previously selected, excluding parts of it; the secondary nature of the material, which may produce limitations to the investigation; and the multiple and changing interpretability of the documents (1997, pp. 129-130).

The election of *Terra Lliure* is not random. Most terrorism today is not ethnic/nationalistic in nature, although violence on these lines has re-emerged in several western countries, as well as nationalism. Since *Terra Lliure* existed mainly during the 1980s, it is affordable to analyze the whole period in which they existed. Of course, adding more organizations to the research would provide better external validity to the findings, but due to the lack of resources (including time and space) analyzing *Terra Lliure* alone should suffice. Moreover, not being particularly bloody may help the reader to better understand the political nature of terrorism, as well as to why terrorism fits into Tilly's contentious politics<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, there has not been much research on this organization, while other organizations have been extensively studied.

As stated above, the results of this research can only benefit from other research using the same model, applied to ever more diverse organizations.

## Theoretical Framework

### Terrorism

Terrorism studies, as a field of research, is relatively young. During the sixties, according to Martha Crenshaw, one of the leading academics on terrorism, there was only a chapter in an edited book, and David C. Rapoport, arguably the founder of terrorism studies, published his book *Assassination and Terrorism* in 1971 (Gilsinan, 2015). Since then terrorism has been studied from a wide array of perspectives and disciplines: political science, international relations, psychology, sociology, etc. Terrorism studies as a field of study gained popularity after the events of 9/11 in the United States. At the same time, since the 9/11 attacks, most research on terrorism has focused on Islamic or religious terrorism, paying little attention to other types of terrorism that, for decades, were common in many countries, such as revolutionary socialism terrorism and nationalist terrorism.

### What is terrorism?

No research can begin without defining what is to be researched, and the same applies to terrorism. Yet, no research on terrorism would be complete without stating that there are plenty of definitions of what constitutes terrorism, and more oft than not, they are

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<sup>4</sup> This is not to say, by any means, that *Terra Lliure* was not a terrorist organization, or that terrorism is not a deadly concern.

somewhat contradictory. Richard Jackson identifies more than 200 definitions used by scholars and law enforcement agencies (2010). This research will not deepen on the questions regarding the definition of terrorism, nor if it is worth studying it as a matter of violence or as a label used by governments and media to delegitimize political causes.

### *Academic definitions*

This research will take into account Bruce Hoffman's definition. Although long, it is also very thorough and complete:

[Terrorism is] the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider "target audience" that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale (2006, pp. 40-41).

According to Walter Laqueur, terrorism is characterized by 'the use of covert violence by a group for political ends' (1987, p. 72). Building on Laqueur's definition, Anthony Oberschall highlights four key attributes of terrorism: 'it is collective action, not individual; it is political, not criminal; it is covert, not conventional warfare; and it is of course violent' (2004, p. 26). Although Hoffman does not mention whether if terrorism has to be perpetrated by a group or if it can be individual, the four key attributes that Oberschall identifies in Laqueur's definition, can also be identified in Hoffman's.

A different and useful definition of terrorism that will not be used since it narrows terrorism too much as to exclude damage to property or infrastructure (which, as will be seen below, is considered to be terrorism according to the Spanish legislation) is that of Richard Jackson's. In his article *In defense of 'terrorism': finding a way through a forest of misconceptions*, Richard Jackson defines terrorism as 'violence or its threat in-

tended as a symbolically communicative act in which the direct victims of the action are instrumentalized as a means to creating a psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a political objective' (2010, p. 8). It is useful because it highlights the importance of violence as a 'symbolically communicative act' (ibid) that goes beyond the immediate damage caused to victims.

### *Legal definitions*

But academic definitions of terrorism do not always fit law enforcement agencies' definitions of terrorism. In fact, different agencies in the same state may have different definitions of what constitutes terrorism (see Hoffman, 2006: 31-34). In this regard, it is interesting to look what constitutes terrorism according to Spain's legislation.

This research will not consider the historical definitions of terrorism according to Spain's legislation prior to the time when *Terra Lliure* was active. For this reason, it is not necessary to take into account what constituted terrorism during the Francisco Franco dictatorial regime (although terrorism legislation is based on the Francoist legislation), other than to consider that, during that time, terrorism was punishable for being *political*, not for the violence it involved (Rueda & Boldova, 2015, p. 299). This changed with the constitution of 1978, after Franco's death in 1976.

There is no clear and explicit definition of what constitutes terrorism according to the Spanish legislation, but Maria Ángeles Rueda & Miguel Ángel Boldova have extracted one based on articles 571 and 572 of the Criminal Code. Terrorism in the Spanish legislation, according to Rueda & Boldova has the following characteristics: it can be perpetrated either by members belonging to a terrorist organization or groups, or by individuals not belonging to any of them; it includes violent means of intimidation; and it is put in practice with specific purposes (2015, pp. 301-302).

As Rueda & Boldova note, Organic Law 9/1984 of 26 December amended the Criminal Code of 1944, which applies, among others, to 'people integrated into armed bands or related to terrorists' (2015, p. 299), by which the following actions were punishable:

- a) Crimes against life and integrity of individuals.
- b) Assaults on the authority, its agents, civil servants and their families.
- c) Unlawful detentions, kidnapping in order to obtain a ransom or under any other condition or with simulation of public functions.

- d) Attacks against military establishments and of the state police forces, the autonomous communities policies and of the local authorities, facilities and communication centres, trains, ships, aircrafts, cars, public buildings, bank offices, tax collection buildings, commercial establishments or others in which flows are preserved as well as munitions dumps, gunsmiths and health centers.
- e) Coercions, threats or extortions.
- f) Fire and other damages.
- g) Crimes against the head of state and his successor, against high institutions of the nation, against the form of government and crimes against the external security of the state.
- h) Rebellion.
- i) Holding or storage of arms, ammunition or explosives, as well as purchasing manufacturing, handling, transportation or supply thereof.
- j) The establishment of institutions, organizations, bands or groups formed for the development of terrorist or rebel activities, belonging to them and the acts of cooperation or collaboration with their activities.
- k) Any other crimes committed by persons included in number 1, when the commission thereof contributes to rebel or terrorist activities, and related crimes and those committed in cooperation with these activities or individuals. (Rueda & Boldova, 2015, pp. 299-300)

As such, an action involving the destruction of a telecommunication tower by an individual with the intention of exercising leverage in the promotion of a certain cause – be it the independence of a region, or a change in the welfare system – would be considered as terrorism in the Spanish legislation.

All the above being said, this research will always keep in mind Tilly's advice: 'social scientists who attempt to explain sudden attacks on civilian targets should doubt the existence of a distinct, coherent class of actors (terrorists) who specialize in a unitary form of political action (terror) and thus should establish a separate variety of politics (terrorism)' (2004, p. 5). That is, individuals labelled as terrorist do not form a specific distinct demographic (terrorists) that engage only in terrorist activities, but instead is usually someone politically motivated on the attainment of certain political goals that, for some reason, has resorted to different tactics, among them, actions that falls into the category of terrorism. There is no such thing as *Homo Terroristis*.

## Understanding terrorism

As early as 1981, terrorism has been understood as being rational, in the sense that it 'is seen collectively as a logical means to advance desired ends' (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 385). Terrorism is a tool that some organizations use to advance their ends. It is instrumental, which according to Hanna Arendt, is one of the key elements of violence itself (Arendt, 2011).

A recurrent topic in terrorism studies has been the origin of terrorism or its causes. One of the first articles on the causes of terrorism is Crenshaw's *The causes of terrorism*, in which she concludes that the origin of terrorism is usually a disaffection of part of the elite, that decide to act on the behalf of the vast majority due to perceived grievances or dissent that this part of the elite blames on the government (1981). More recently, with more data available, the topic has resurged.

Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks have reviewed the evidence on the determinants of transnational terrorism, grouping published articles on the causes of terrorism in seven global hypotheses: economic deprivation, modernization strain, institutional order, political transformation, identity conflict, global order, and contagion. For most of the hypotheses the results of previous academic enquiries have been contradictory, and as such, the authors themselves recognize that their 'review has not produced truly conclusive results' (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p. 23). However, what is significant about their review is that we still don't know what causes terrorism. We still lack an understanding of the matter being studied. Among the difficulties to answer these issues is the fact that there is no clear and agreed definition of what terrorism is, as mentioned above.

Terrorism, being rational, can be analyzed from the collective action perspective (Oberschall, 2004). Oberschall identifies four dimensions of terrorism related with Collective Action Theory. These are: '(1) discontent; (2) ideology-feeding grievances; (3) capacity to organize; and (4) political opportunity' (2004, p. 27). As the very same author notes, 'For terrorists, one has to explain why a small group chooses to break from or to differentiate from a larger political movement that pursues similar political goals with less violent ..., overt, more conventional means (2004, p. 28). What is important to note about Oberschall is that theories explaining phenomena different from terrorism can be applied to understand terrorism. Since terrorism involves a political motivation,

it seems logical to apply theories that have been applied to other political motivated phenomena in order to understand it.

### **Ethnic/nationalist terrorism**

Although many authors favor the development of a typology of terrorism, even producing new ones (Marsden, 2016; Vasilenko, 2004), the truth is that they do not make things easier for those studying terrorism. Terrorism is a complex enough concept. As seen above, there are different and often contradictory definitions of terrorism. As Jackson notes, ‘there are over 200 definitions of terrorism currently in use by scholars, governments and international organizations’ (2010, p. 2), and derived from this plethora of definitions is the lack of usefulness of typologies on terrorism.

In this regard, the adjectives one can add to the concept of terrorism should be merely informative, but do not substantially change the concept of terrorism. An oversimplified definition of terrorism could be *politically motivated violence*, and any adjective one can add to that oversimplified definition should serve to inform about the goals of a terrorist organization or about its origins. In this regard, an ethnic/nationalistic terrorist organization is that which goals include the improvement of an ethnicity or nationality, from better services to complete secession<sup>5</sup>. Labelling terrorism international or transnational should serve to inform that the terrorist organization operates from a different country than the one it is targeting, or that does so in several countries, both operating in and targeting them.

It is interesting to note that, according to Hoffman, there are some links between the ideology of an organization and its operational imperatives. As such, he notes that left-wing terrorist organizations have narrower targets than religious terrorist organizations, to which the targets can comprise all non-believers, and even some of their very same religion (although, maybe, a different sect), and between the two lie ethnic or nationalist terrorist organizations, which usually target civilians or security forces belonging to the state they are targeting (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 229-230).

### **Nationalism studies**

In the media and our every-day language the word nation and others derived from it (like international) appear quite often: when the news anchor wants to talk about some-

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<sup>5</sup> Or, as Gleditsch and Polo define it on their research on whether if ethnic accommodation decreases terrorism, an ethnic terrorist group is that which ‘make public claims – or are held to make implicit claims – on behalf of a specific ethnic group’ (2016, p. 214).

thing that happened outside the borders of the state, it is usually referred as ‘international’; when the same anchor wants to talk about an allied state, it is likely that he or she would refer to it as an allied nation; one of the key international organizations, the United Nations, includes the word on the name; and on official documents, when asked about the country one was born in, it is usually referred as nationality. But the meaning of words in social sciences usually differs from the words’ meanings on other circumstances. Certainly, nation has something to do with the place one is born in. The word nation comes from the Latin ‘natio’, place of birth. In social sciences nation usually refers to a group of individuals who share a common language, identity, place of birth, and identify as such. It would be naïve to believe that an organization such as the United Nations is, indeed, composed of nations. Some of its members might be nations, but what all of its members share is not nationhood but statehood.

As mentioned above, the term nation is often used as a synonym of state. Both nations and states have been studied for some time now, but while the study of the modern state can be traced, being conservative on the estimation, to Niccolò Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, the study of nations is more recent.

Although some argue that nations have existed for millennia<sup>6</sup>, and thus, nationalism too<sup>7</sup>, the truth is that there is no trace of serious and systematic enquiry by classical social theory authors such as Weber, Marx, or Durkheim (Guibernau, 1997). Nationalism studies as a field of study is a recent one, and according to Montserrat Guibernau, the reasons for this is that, on its origins, sociology tried to understand the effects of the social changes of industrialization, classical authors tried to develop a theory that could explain the evolution of societies from its origins, and that nationalism has been seen as two-folded: it is thanks to it that civil rights exist, but it is also because of it that the biggest atrocities in recent history happened (Ibid).

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<sup>6</sup> E.g. Azar Gat considers that a nation is a people that has sovereignty, or that it is the dominant majority in a nation-state, or if it possesses elements of political self-determination or self-government, or tries to achieve it (Gat, 2014). To the author a people is an ethnies with consciousness of a common identity, history, and destiny (Ibid). Thus, nations have existed wherever and whenever a people (that is an ethnies which is conscious of a common identity, history, and destiny) has been sovereign, being the ancient Greeks an example of this.

<sup>7</sup> Or at least it is so according to Eric Hobsbawm, to whom ‘Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round’ (2000, p. 10).



Whether if nations existed two thousand years ago or not, the truth is that most scholarly research considers nations to be a product of modernity<sup>8</sup>, and as such, it could not have existed prior to the eighteenth century.

### What is a nation?

Several lines above it was said that nations and states are not the same. That the United Nations is not, in fact, a union of Nations but a union of States, but no definition was provided. To effectively define what is a nation the author considers that it is useful to define what a state is first.

As with many other concepts in social sciences, state can be defined in a wide array of ways, but one of the classical definitions of state still used in political science today is the one provided by the German Sociologist Max Weber. A '[s]tate is the human community which, within a given territory ("territory" is the distinctive element), claims (successfully) to themselves the monopoly on *legitimate physical violence*' (Weber, 1996, p. 83). Weber's definition includes the concept 'human community' but does not specify what type of human community. It can be a royal family, the elite of a socialist party on behalf of the entire proletariat, or the nation, understood as 'the people'. Furthermore, the other two elements are very important since a State is the human community that has a *delimited territory* –although it can be expanded or contracted- in which the mentioned human community hold the *monopoly on legitimate physical violence* (e.g. the police and the army). The monopoly on legitimate physical violence is *sovereignty*: no other human community *legitimately* can interfere inside the borders of another State.

To define nation, I will use Benedict Anderson's definition, since he is one of the founders of nationalism studies, and writer of the seminal book *Imagined Communities*. To Anderson a nation is 'a political community imagined as inherently limited and sovereign' (Anderson, 1993, p. 23). On the following paragraphs the author explains why it is imagined, limited, sovereign, and a community. It is imagined because even the members of the smallest nation 'will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (ibid), it is limited because even the largest nations set boundaries (although, as the

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<sup>8</sup> As evidenced by the fact that, in regard to the 'primordialists/perennials' versus 'modernist' debate, 'most of the political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, policy analysts and others moving into the nationalism studies field were drawn to the modernists position' (Breuilly, 2016, p. 627)

author notes, said boundaries are elastic) ‘beyond which lie other nations’ (Anderson, 1993, pp. 24-25), it is sovereign because no nation imagine itself as being subjugated to another, and it is a community because ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1993, p. 25).

Considering the nation as an *imagined* community does not imply that it is imaginary, and thus not real. What this means is that it is an abstract notion (Breuilly, 2016). The nation exists because communities imagine themselves as belonging to the same kin. Moreover, considering nations to be a modern phenomenon does not deny that communities existed before the modern era. Instead, they bring to the forefront the fact that in pre-modern times the one being sovereign was often an individual or a family (kings and queens and their royal families, oligarchs, etc.), but not the *nation* per se. It is thanks to the American (1779) and French Revolutions (1789) that the people (the nation) are considered to be sovereign. Hence the title of another seminal work on nationalism studies, Eric Hobsbawm’s *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. The fact that, in the eye of a given national, his or her nation is antique, probably centuries-old, is one of the paradoxes identified by Anderson that has perplexed theorists of nationalism. Regardless of one’s subjective perception of the antiquity and ancestry of one’s nation, as an academic, one has to be objective and scientific, and thus recognize nations as being a phenomenon of the modern era that began with the French Revolution.

With both the state and the nation defined, it is clear that while a state can also be a nation, and the same can be said the other way around, a nation can exist without a state, and a state without a nation. Another concept is that of the nation-state. If nations are a modern phenomenon, so are nation-states. A nation-state is the human community in a given territory that successfully claims the monopoly on physical violence (state) and that ‘pretends to unite its subjects through homogenization, creating a common culture, symbols, and values, reviving traditions and myths about the origins’ (Guibernau, 1997, p. 77).

### **What is nationalism?**

Nationalism has been linked to several catastrophes of the twentieth century. It is almost impossible to explain the mobilization of the First World War (1914-1918), the rise of Mussolini and Hitler (1930s), genocide, the de-colonization strain on the post-Second

World War era (1960s), and the wars on the former Yugoslavia (1990s) without mentioning or attributing part of the responsibility to nationalism.

Nationalism is linked to nation. Guibernau defines nationalism as the ‘feeling of belonging to a community, the members of which identify with a group of symbols, beliefs and a way of living, and want to decide their common political destiny’ (1997, p. 77). This definition of nationalism is consistent with that of Gellner’s, to whom nationalism is ‘a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (1983, p. 1). These two definitions have the advantage of being brief and concise, but Charles Tilly offers a better explanation for state-less nations or state-seeking nations.

### **How are nations created?**

There are as many explanations for how nations are created as there are definitions of nations. But the explanations that are relevant for our case are those related to the notion of nation defined above. This section will be largely based on Benedict Anderson’s theory, but also on Ernest Gellner’s to a lesser extent.

### ***Social communication theory***

The first significant author is Anderson. He is considered to be within the social communication theories of nationalism (Llobera, 1999). Benedict Anderson places vernacular languages at the origin of the nation. As stated above, a nation is, according to Anderson, a political community that it is imagined as limited and sovereign. According to him, nations came to be where and when three ancient fundamental cultural conceptions ‘lost their axiomatic grip on men’s minds’ (Anderson, 1993, p. 61): the idea that a certain written language gave access to ontological truth (Latin to Christians, classical Arabic to Muslims, etc.); the idea that society naturally revolved around and hierarchically under monarchs (sovereignty belonged to monarchs, not to ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’); and the idea that cosmology and history were the same kind of temporality (hence, the origin of men was the origin of the world, and vice-versa). The single thing that made this possible was the invention of the printing press, and thus, the term coined by Anderson: ‘print-capitalism’.

As stated above by Anderson, once these three ideas lost power inside men’s minds, the nation became possible. But this is not, yet, how nations are created. The printing press and ‘print-capitalism’ were a key element, but the reasons are detailed next.

### *Industrialization theory*

Ernest Gellner's theory on nations and nationalism is somewhat similar to that of Benedict Anderson. Both link nations and nationalism to the modern era, and both give importance to the expansion and consolidation of languages.

One of the skills required for this new kind of activity, that wasn't necessary on the labor of agrarian societies, is communication. The new set of skills needed plus the new mobility that the industrial revolution created (mass migrations from rural areas to the cities) called for a standardized *national* education: the homogenization of education across the state, with a single language being taught.

### *Charles Tilly*

According to Gellner's theory, the nation emerges as a necessity of the industrial society: the necessity to have a workforce that is highly mobile, easy-to-specialize, and able to communicate to virtually any other citizen and worker of the state (1983). By contrast, according to Anderson's theory, the nation emerges in the shared image of communion among the nationals due to the spread of vernacular languages made possible by the invention of the printing press, as well as other social changes explained above (1993). But what the two theories have in common is that they set the origin of the nation in the modern era, at a time in which states became increasingly centralized, and in many cases, became national. Moreover, none of the two presuppose that the nation equals the state, or that the state is always a nation.

Charles Tilly's take on nationalism is based on his theory of state creation. The modern state appears, according Tilly, when the elites inside the 'state' apparatus (feudal lords) used war to drive out competing elites, and thus needed to collect taxes to wage the war effort (food, manpower, weapons, logistics, etc.). In order to effectively collect taxes, a 'state apparatus' that centralized power was developed (bureaucracies), and when the competing elites were effectively driven out, the resulting elite in power had to keep taxes in order to maintain the security apparatus to offer protection to its denizens. As such, Charles Tilly identifies four different activities carried out by the agents of the state:

1. 'War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force

2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories
3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients
4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities –war making, state making, and protection’ (1985, p. 181)

Tilly acknowledges that each of the four activities may take different forms, but that ‘all four depend on the state’s tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion’ (1985, p. 181).

Centralized control, the growth of standing armies – increasingly made up of nationals and conscripts – and the growth of state budgets – through taxation – had as a consequence a more direct and deeper control system. As Tilly summarizes it, ‘central control extended, obviously, to property, production, and political activity; rulers stopped relying on highly autonomous magnates and pressed toward direct rule, toward the creation of administrations extending directly from the central power down to individual communities and house-holds’ (Tilly, 1994, p. 140). This centralized power had control over everything, including over culture, and made use of it in order to make its population less heterogeneous, creating national educational systems, imposing national languages, promoting national culture, creating national flags, etc. Tilly classifies all of the previous as state-led nationalism, the pursuit of homogenizing the peripheral cultures and peoples to make them less different from the center. The principle by which each people are entitled to a state was thus spread and normalized, and the consequence was that national and cultural minorities inside state began demanding their own state. This nation-seeking nationalism is also promoted by elites, but not central. Peripheral elites try to promote their culture, language, and generally speaking, nation, staging performances that promote the feeling or belief of being a nation (Brubaker, 2010) in the exact same way the central elites promote the central homogeneity. The notion of being a nation includes ‘stories that characteristically emphasize the antiquity, cultural homogeneity, and cohesiveness of the nation’ (Brubaker, 2010, p. 376). Tilly’s theory on nationalism and how nations are created intertwines with contentious politics, since the central elites will to homogenize, or the regional elites will to differentiate from the center, is made through practices involving ‘collective, public, visible claims on other people, claims which if realized would affect the objects’ interests’ and in which ‘at least one party to

the claims, including third parties, is a government' (Tilly, 1997, p. 56). These practices are also intertwined with social movements, which bring us to the following section.

### **Social Movement Theory**

Social Movement is interesting in order to study terrorism because it takes into account contentious politics. The contentious politics approach sees 'tactic, movements, and actors arrayed along a spectrum of related phenomenon rather than boxed in by formal, discrete categories' (Beck, 2008, p. 1566). Terrorism is thus another way of contentious politics, an extreme inside the spectrum of political movements. Beck summarizes it perfectly when he states 'Terrorist groups are first and foremost movements with political claims' (2008, p. 1566). Social movement theory is, a priori, a tool fit to understand terrorists groups and their actions, and it can also be useful to predict the emergence of new terrorist organizations.

In this research the synthesized model of social movement theory by Karl-Dieter Opp will be used. This model, a synthesis and integration of collective action, resource mobilization, political opportunity, identity, and framing, is called the structural-cognitive model by its author. In order to understand it first is necessary to understand each of the models in which it is based.

### **Collective action**

It is, therefore, necessary to explain what entails social movement theory. Social movement theory deals with collective action. In other words, it deals with why, when, and how do individuals organize in order to demand or attain the provision of a certain public good. Collective action is defined as '*intentional joint action*' which develops within the logic of '*claiming, in defense ... of a cause*' (Neveu, 2000, p. 31). Social movements differ from private companies in which the individuals involved do not participate in the cause for monetary reasons, as a job, but instead to achieve what they perceived is a greater good (public good), either if the movement fights to change a law, or to keep it from changing.

Social movement theory derives from Olson's collective action. Collective Action theory, proposed by Olson, was one of the first that tried to explain when individuals act jointly in a group to achieve a public good when it is far easier to free ride (to not participate in achieving the public good, but benefiting from it). An ideal public good is a good that satisfies two conditions: it is non-rival and non-excludable, meaning that its

utility does not diminish with use or consumption, and that one cannot be easily prevented from using or consuming said good. According to Olson, the larger the group the less feasible it is that it would provide the public good. Since the marginal contribution of new members is negligible, the group will fail in providing the public good. But, if there are selective incentives, either benefits from joining the group, or penalizations for not joining it, the public good will be delivered, since the incentives grant that individuals will take part in the provision of the common good (Opp, 2009, pp. 88-89). But Olson's take into collective action, although basic, is also insufficient.

### **Resource Mobilization**

The decade of 1970 was full of social movements, and as result, a new generation of academics step in, but instead of focusing on when individuals act jointly, they focused on the growth, decline, change, and success of social movements (Opp, 2009, p. 128). Resource mobilization was first proposed by John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, and in their view, a social movement is a 'set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure' (Neveu, 2000, p. 92). What is commonly understood as a social movement, to the authors is conceptualized as a social movement organization, which acts like a private for-profit organization.

Regarding individuals, the authors categorize several types of people according to their relation to the organization and the organization's goal. 'Adherents' differ from 'constituents' in the fact that the latter provide resources for the organization, while the former simply accept the organization's goals. 'Bystander publics' are those who do not adhere to the organization's goals, but do not oppose them either, which differentiates them from 'opponents' who, as the label reveals, oppose the organization's goals.

The authors also have three more categories: 'potential beneficiaries', the ones who would directly benefit from the accomplishment of the organization's goals; 'conscience adherents' are those who are part of the social movement (but not the organization) but would not be directly benefited by the accomplishment of the organization's goals; and 'conscience constituents' who directly support the organization and its goals, but would not benefit by the accomplishment of the organization's goals. According to McCarthy and Zald, when there is a general increase of resource (time and money) in a society (H1 in Figure 1, below), this will positively affect the resources available to the social

movement sector (SMS, comprising all social movement organizations), the availability of resources to the social movement sector has a positive incidence in the development of new social movement industries (SMI, comprising all social movement organizations sharing the broadest goals; represented by H2 in Figure 1) and SMSs. Moreover, an increase of resource of conscience adherents also has a positive incidence in the development of new SMIs and SMSs (H3). The more an organization is dependent on isolated constituents and adherents, the lesser the stability of resource flow to organizations (H4), which in turn increases the share of resources allocated to advertising (to add new constituents and adherents; H4a), and also increases the dependence of the resources of organizations on normal consumer behavior (considering social movement organizations as a regular for-profit company selling a product; H4b). The more different types of social movement organization supporters, the more tension and conflict inside the organizations (H5), for there are people with different degrees of involvement, and a conscience adherent may share loyalties among several organizations, raising tensions with the organization's constituents. The longer a movement has been organized, the longer it will endure (H6). More organizations in the SMI translate to more competition in the social movement industry (H7), which makes new social movement organizations to narrow their goals and strategies. An increase in the income flow to a social movement organization (H8) increases the professionalization of the organization's staff (which can then dedicate more time and more labor to the organization's goal). The bigger the sector and the industry (H9), the easier it is to develop a career in the social movement industry, which means that more organizations will 'professionalize'. The funding of organizations by isolated constituents (H10) increases the recruitment of beneficiary workers for strategic and organizational purposes. And last but not least, workers with free time in organizations (H11) means that the organization will develop 'transitory teams' which can be sent to demonstrations and other events, which in turn may recruit new supporters (Opp, 2009, pp. 132-134).

This model, which has been modified by other authors changing hypotheses and their relation, does not answer, according to Karl-Dieter Opp, 'what motivates individuals or organizations to invest time and other resources in order to provide the public good' (2009, p. 145). Yet the model is useful as long as one considers that resources generate social movements and protests: where there are protests there must have been resources.



## Political opportunity structures

The core theoretical elements of the political opportunity structures approach was envisaged by Peter Eisinger in the 1970s. Political opportunity structures (POS) are defined as ‘changes in the political environment that influence the “chances of success”’ (Opp, 2009, p. 161). One can determine whether a factor is a POS if it is related to the goals of individuals, there are objective probabilities of success, and if there is a causal relationship between the factor and the goal. POS seen this was pose a problem, since it is not clear what changes make a factor *objectively* more probable. Changing this objectivity for a perceived vision (that’s to say *subjectivity*) of the success solves this inconvenient. As stated by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, ‘no opportunity ... will invite mobilization unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity’ (2001, p. 43).

There are two key elements in regard of this approach. The first is to keep in mind that there are changes at the macro-level (changes in the political environment, i.e. a new government, the fall of the Berlin Wall, etc.) that affect the micro-level (individuals that decide to act together for a common goal). The changes at the macro-level alone do not directly affect the attainment of the goal. The second element is that POS are not the only factor determining when a social movement will emerge. Changes at the macro-level are a facilitator, especially when detected, but are not enough on their own to cause a social movement.




Figure 1. McCarthy and Zald's resource mobilization theory as it appears on Karl-Dieter Opp's 'Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements'. On the left side are represented all the variables affecting the model, each H represents a hypothesis of how the variable affects other parts of the model.

## Collective Identity

What makes this approach different from the mentioned above is that, for the first time, an approach takes identity into account in order to explain collective action. This model was first devised by Alberto Melucci in the late 1980s.

Central to Melucci's approach is the creation of a collective identity involving the distinction of the 'we' from the 'other', and being recognized by the different 'others' that exist. This collective identity is created 'through a reflexive understanding of its relation to the context or environment in which it develops' (Fominaya, 2010, p. 395), which also includes an awareness of the opportunities and constraints to achieve its goal. Instead of being consolidated via shared interests, this collective identity consolidates through conflict, and it also demarcates who can join the movements and how to do it. Collective identity, according to Melucci, is a process that involves three processes: formulating cognitive frameworks concerning the ends, means, and field of action; activating relationships between the actors, who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions; and making emotional investments, which enable individuals to recognize themselves (Opp, 2009, p. 209).

Following Melucci's model, the two macro variables affecting the rest of the micro-variables are opportunities and constraints, and social relationships. These two affect how individuals in a group will negotiate or interact, how their orientations will be adjusted, the formation of a 'we-feeling', the definition of the situation as susceptible of common action, and lastly, collective action. While the second macro variable, social relationships, will affect individual resources, which together with purposes affect all the previous micro variables except the formation of a 'we-feeling', which in turn also affects the calculation of costs and benefits, that will affect all the previous micro-variables, again except the formation of the 'we-feeling'. The creation of the collective identity, the 'we-feeling', together with opportunities and constraints and social relationships are the variables that help identify the problem and the kind of collective action needed to solve it.

## Framing

The framing approach to social movements was first developed by David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford in 1986 in a paper titled 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation'. By

frame alignment the authors ‘refer to the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary’ (Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). A frame is a basic scheme of interpretation that helps individuals identify and give general meaning to occurrences to events that happen to them or to the world. As Opp’s summarizes it, a frame ‘is a *mental model which consists of cognitive elements*’ (Opp, 2009, p. 235). When an individual observes reality, he or she then compares it with the cognitive elements of his or her mental model, and if the observed reality matches with a cognitive element that the individual regards as unjust and mutable, and that something has to be done, he or she proceeds to mobilize to change the perceived unjust reality. This alignment is a necessary condition for mobilization, but the alignment *per se* does not grant mobilization.

The above mentioned frame alignment can take several forms. The authors mention four types:

1. *Frame bridging*: ‘the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’ (Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 467). In this process, an unmobilized individual become aware of a SMO which frame he or she shares, and from that moment he or she begins mobilizing.
2. *Frame amplification*: this kind of alignment refers to ‘clarification and invigoration’ (Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 469) of a particular frame on a given issue. It can either be *value amplification* (by which a given value is reinforced because it is considered to be important for collective action), or *belief amplification* (beliefs are ‘ideational elements that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values’) (Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 470).
3. *Frame extension*: by which the authors mean the ‘amplification of ... ideational elements in order to clarify the linkage between personal or group interests and support for the SMO’ (Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 472). As Opp’s puts it, ‘in order to connect the different frames of the SMO and the unmobilized persons a SMO will have to show that its frame is congruent with the life situation and with the interests of the non-mobilized individuals’ (Opp, 2009, p. 239).

4. *Frame transformation*: when the causes and values of SMO do not align with non-mobilized individuals, only a transformation of the individuals' framework can lead to an alignment. Depending on the scope of the transformation, it will be either *domain-specific* (narrow scope), or *global* (broad scope).

According to the authors the higher the resonance the greater the probability that framing will be successful. Furthermore, the more align attempts by different SMOs the less likely that framing will succeed.

### The structural-cognitive model




Figure 2. Reconstruction of the structural-cognitive model, as it appears on Opp's 'Theories of political protest and social movements' p. 328

As previously stated, this model is a synthesis of all mentioned above. One of the advantages of this model is that it takes into account both macro-level explanations (resource mobilization, collective action, and political opportunity structures), which form the 'structural' part, and micro-level explanations (framing, and identity), which form the 'cognitive' part of the model. These macro-variables affect protests both directly and indirectly. Changes in the macro variables affect the cognitive processes of individuals (perceptions of injustices, creation of a 'we-feeling') only if the individuals perceive it. This implies that the definition of the problem is needed in order to spur protests. And indirectly, they generate incentives (a reduction of repression reduces the costs of protesting). Cognitive framing processes are not only influenced by macro variables, but might be influenced by other factors, such as social relationships (realising

that a close friend has an opinion A about an issue might spur interest for that matter). The same applies to the incentives: not all incentives come from the cognitive framing processes or, indirectly, from macro variables; other factors also play a role in it. One such factor can be the existence of mobilizations, which might reduce the costs (the 'I am not influential enough on my own' feeling might be reversed if one realizes that he or she is not alone on the issue).

If macro variables are to affect individuals at the micro level, it is to be expected that many individuals will be affected in a similar way, which thus aggregates individual protests which have an effect on macro protests. Individuals have an effect on the group, and at the same time, the group has an influence on individuals.

### Summary

Being political or wanting to achieve a political good is not the only commonality between terrorism and social movements. Both phenomena require collective action and support in order to achieve its goals, with the possible exception of lone wolf-style terrorists. Furthermore, both social movements and terrorism fall into Tilly's category of contentious politics, since both entail one or more groups, which make collective, public, visible claims on other people, claims which if realized would affect the objects' interests and in which at least one party to the claims, including thirds parties, is a government. Obviously, terrorism and social movements also have differences. For example, a distinctive element of terrorism is the non-legitimate<sup>9</sup> use of violence. Terrorism as a type of crime fits what David Garland calls 'criminologies of the other', 'a criminology of the alien other which represents criminals as dangerous members of distinct racial and social groups which bear little resemblance to "us"' (1996, p. 461). Criminologies of the other are, in contrast to criminologies of the self, those crimes that scape rationality, the type of crimes to which one cannot empathize with the perpetrator and thus any measure taken against it is not enough. If terrorism is considered to be rational and a tool to achieve a public good (social movements) one can more easily empathize with people who consider it to be a legitimate way to achieve political goals. In turn, the consideration of terrorism as 'criminology of the self' and not 'of the other' may help to devise tools to prevent and counter it. Considering terrorism as part of contentious politics or a social movement has the advantage of eliminating the definitional barrier. In

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<sup>9</sup> According to German sociologist Max Weber, a core characteristic of the modern state is the successful claim over the 'monopoly on legitimate physical violence' (1996, p. 83).

doing so, terrorist violence is political violence aimed at the consecution of a political goal. Moreover, following Opp's model, one can get ahead and forestall emergences of organizations using violence (resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, framing, etc.).

## **Context**

Terrorist organizations, as well as social movements, do not appear out of the blue. The context in which these appear is important, although, following Opp's model, the context itself is not the important feature, but the perception of the context.

## **The Spanish Transition**

The Spanish democratic transition occurred at the end of the Francoist dictatorial regime, after the head of state passed away in the tranquility of his bed in 1975. During Franco's regime, which started with the attempted *coup d'état* in 1936 that led to the Spanish Civil War, self-governing institutions that existed during the II Republic (1932-1939) were abolished, and all the power became centralized in, at least during the first years, a fascist dictatorship.

The Spanish Transition took place during the seventies and early eighties of the twentieth century.

## **Decade of 1970**

Since the end of the Spanish Civil War (1939) until 1973, Francisco Franco held the position of head of state and head of government. This changed in 1973 when, due to his ill health, delegated the position of head of government to his second in command, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was thought to be the designated successor for the regime without Franco (Riquer & Culla, 1989, p. 412), and to remodel it into an authoritarian monarchy (Valdeón, Pérez, & Juliá, 2006, p. 527). However, this changed on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1973, when ETA assassinated him (La Vanguardia, 1973) detonating bombs in a tunnel beneath the street when Carrero Blanco's car drove by. Carrero Blanco's successor was Carlos Arias Navarro.

After the passing away of Francisco Franco, King Juan Carlos I became the new head of state, with Arias Navarro continuing as head of government. The intention was to continue with the political line of Francisco Franco, keeping an authoritarian regime that

since the decade of the 1960s was somewhat open, with less cultural repression. But not everybody wanted this continuity, and not everybody mourned the death of Franco. As exemplified by Jesús Mestre i Godes, ‘upon hearing the passing of Franco, there were all kinds of reactions: *cava* bottles were opened, and there was crying in front of microphones and TV cameras’ (2010, p. 341).

Promises of reform during the 1970s failed, and as a consequence, mobilizations erupted. These mobilizations made the year 1974 the most conflictive in Catalonia since the Civil War (Riquer & Culla, 1989, p. 415). During this time, in the whole country, terrorism is emerging. ETA, while active since the late sixties, begins in 1974 with terrorism *en masse* (Alonso, 1986, p. 29) with an attack causing 12 victims. As observed in the graph below both terrorist attacks and the victims caused by them progressively augmented during the 1970s.




Figure 3. Terrorism in Spain 1970-1979. Information obtained from Global Terrorism Data Base. Numbers inside the graph represent the amount of casualties each year.

Still during Francoist dictatorship but under the government of Arias Navarro (1973-1976), state’s response to terrorism was execution and repression, which at the same time spur protests (Riquer & Culla, 1989, p. 417). ETA was not the only terrorist organization (or armed group) active during that time, although as shown in the graphs it per-

petrated the majority of terror attacks, and also caused the vast majority of casualties. Others include *Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre* (GRAPO – Groups of Antifascist Resistance First of October), which were the armed militia of a communist party (*Partido Comunista de España (reconstituido)*), Communist Party of Spain (reconstituted) and wanted the creation of a Socialist State in Spain; the anarcho-syndicalist and anti-francoist *Grupo Primero de Mayo* (1st of May Group); *Grupos de Acción Carlista* (GAC), a progressive, federalist, and socialist Carlist<sup>10</sup> group which wanted to remove Franco from power; the pro-independence *Front d'Alliberament Català* (Catalan Liberation Front), active during the early seventies; *Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación* (Iberian Liberation Movement), an anti-capitalist organization active in Catalonia in the early seventies of which one of its members, Salvador Puig Antich, was the last prisoner executed in Spain with the *garrote vil*<sup>11</sup>; and the Stalinist, anti-revisionist, and republican *Frente Revolucionario Antifascista Patriótico* (FRAP, Revolutionary Patriotic Antifascist Front) whose goal was the instauration of a Soviet-style federative republic in Spain; but there were many more. The last years of dictatorship in Spain, as well as the beginning of the democratic transition were full of armed organizations: separatist movements, anarchists, communists, and especially since Franco's death, also extreme-right organizations which were responsible of the *Matanza de Atocha*, in which labor lawyers belonging to a labor union were shot dead (El País, 1977).

But terrorism was not the only reason why the seventies in Spain were convulsing. During the early seventies labor strikes multiplied, leading to a loss of a million working hours in a week in April 1973 (Valdeón, Pérez, & Juliá, 2006, p. 526). After Franco's death and the government still under control of the regime forces led by Arias Navarro, the numbers could only go higher. In 1976 the 'democratic opposition' was clandestine, made up of illegal political parties (such as the Communist Party) with little affiliation, dissidents of the regime along with friends and some collaborators. The goal of this 'democratic opposition' was to launch labor strikes and demonstrations to force the government to legalize the existence of political parties, which the Communist Party of Spain labelled 'agreed democratic rupture' (ibid, p. 533). Following this strategy the

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<sup>10</sup> An anti-liberal, traditionalist, and catholic movement that began in the early XIX century which claimed the Bourbon-Parma dynasty as the legitimate ruling House in Spain against the House of Bourbon that has ruled in Spain for centuries.

<sup>11</sup> The *garrote vil* was the method of execution in Spain. The *garrote* consisted of a chair in which the prisoner was bound with a metal band on his or her neck which was tightened by the executioner until the prisoner died strangled.



number of labor strikes in 1976 reached 18,000, a six-fold figure compared to the previous year (ibid).

Due to the disastrous results of Arias Navarro's government, King Juan Carlos changed him, following the established procedures according to the regime's laws, and appointed Adolfo Suárez as head of government, who took office on June 15<sup>th</sup> 1976. Roughly two weeks before Adolfo Suarez's appointment as the new head of government, King Juan Carlos addressed a speech in the Congress of the United States in which he announced that the Crown, under democratic principles, would keep social peace and political stability in Spain (Sanchez Gijon, 1976). Adolfo Suárez announced reforms that included the recognition of popular sovereignty, amnesty, a referendum on the Political Reform Law, which finished the Francoist legislative organ, and parliamentary elections to be held on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballots (Valdeón, Pérez, & Juliá, 2006, pp. 535-536).

The aforementioned terrorist upheaval, including far-right and far-left terrorist attacks facilitated negotiations between the government and the democratic opposition without the intervention of the army in order to legalize political parties (ibid, 539). Such was the amount of political parties that were legalized, that a lot of people feared an atomized parliament as result of what was labelled 'soup of acronyms', but the result, thanks to D'Hondt method was not such (ibid, 540). Adolfo Suarez's party, *Union de Centro Democrático* (UCD, Center Democratic Union) won a simple majority of seats (165) in the new parliament, followed by the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Worker's Party) which obtained 118 seats. The rest of the seats up until 350 were held by minority parties, the biggest of which, *Partido Comunista Español* (Spanish Communist Party) had only 20 seats. The parliament included regional parties or coalitions, such as *Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya* (Democratic Agreement for Catalonia) or *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (Basque Nationalist Party). This resulting parliament, as well as the senate (in which there was a very low participation) was tasked with the production of a new constitution, which they did and approved in the year 1978. After the approval of the new constitution, PM Adolfo Suárez dissolved the parliament and called elections that took place in 1<sup>st</sup> of March 1979. The results didn't change much, and the two biggest parties obtained 168 seats (UCD), and 121 (PSOE) (Pérez J. , 1999, p. 681). As result Adolfo Suárez became the first democratic PM of Spain in decades.

One of the key elements of the Spanish Transition was the Amnesty Law of 1977 of October 15<sup>th</sup> by which all political actions, regardless of the result, which were considered to be crimes were amnestied, along with actions calling for civil rights, autonomy for the different peoples of Spain, and other politically motivated offences such as refusal of the mandatory military service (B.O.E., 1977). The amnesty also shielded the crimes of the Francoist regime from investigation.

### **The decade of 1980s**

The beginning of the eighties was not much quieter than the seventies. Criticized by members of his party, and with the party divided, Adolfo Suárez resigned his position as PM, and while the Parliament was holding a debate to elect a new PM, a *coup d'état* was attempted (ibid, p. 685) in February 23<sup>rd</sup> 1981. The military had suffered a lot of casualties from terrorism, and combined with a gradually and non-voluntary withdrawal from power, some officials conspired against the new regime. Led by lieutenant colonel Tejero of the *Guardia Civil*<sup>12</sup>, the conspirers took the parliament hostage, and awaited for other members of the military to join (some of them did so, establishing the martial law in Valencia), but King Juan Carlos (commander in chief of the *Fuerzas Armadas*) called several officers and told them that he did not endorse the *coup*. The morning after the conspirers surrendered. The UCD never recovered from the internal division, and the party was eventually dissolved in 1983.

In the general elections of 1982 PSOE obtained an astonishing absolute majority (202 seats and 48.43% of the votes), which marked an era of PSOE's governments led by Felipe González (from 1982 until 1996).

This decade also saw the consolidation of the *Autonomías*, and the establishment of autonomous parliaments for the autonomous communities (Spain is territorially composed of seventeen autonomous communities and two autonomous cities), and became a decentralized state. Originally only three regions were to be granted autonomy (Galicia, Basque Country, and Catalonia), since during the time of the II Republic (1931-1939) the regions became, or were about to become autonomous, but eventually all regions became autonomies. It was thought that it would decrease secessionist terrorism (mainly by the Basque organization E.T.A.), since it granted a great deal of autonomy (especially in the Basque Country and Navarre, in which the autonomous administration collects

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<sup>12</sup> A *Gendermerie*-like law-enforcement agency, organically part of the military.

all the taxes and gives a portion to the central government (ibid, p. 683). But as will be seen above, it did not do so. A part of E.T.A. left the armed struggle and pursued the independence of the Basque Country through pacific and democratic means, but the vast majority did not.




Figure 4. Terrorism in Spain 1980-1989. Information obtained from Global Terrorism Data Base. Numbers inside the graph represent the amount of casualties each year.

As shown on the graph above, as well as the graph on terrorism from 1970 to 1979, the democratic transition years can easily be recognized by the amount of terror attacks. Terrorism slightly decreases and stabilizes during the decade of 1980. As well as in the decade of 1970, the Basque ETA represents both the vast majority of attacks as well as of casualties. The eighties were not as quiet as the early seventies, nor as upheaved as the late seventies. Terrorism became a staple of Spanish politics.

### *Catalanisme*

According to Josep Termes i Ardèvol, *catalanisme* is ‘the movement in defense of the identity and in the fight to achieve self-government to Catalonia, away from centralisms and uniformness’ (Termes i Ardèvol, 2009, p. 7). But, as will be seen in this section, *catalanisme* has not always meant outright independence or secession. In fact, *cata-*

*lanisme* has been a very ambiguous and eclectic term to refer ideas that go from merely recognizing a differentiated culture, to outright secession (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2014).

It would be a mistake to place the origins of *catalanisme* or Catalan nationalism in dates as far back as the founding of the House of Barcelona by Wilfred the Hairy, and the ‘independence’ from the Carolingian Empire<sup>13</sup> (Pérez, Sabaté, Simon, & Balcells, 2004, p. 124), the *Corpus de Sang* (Corpus of blood) and the *Revolta dels Segadors*<sup>14</sup> (the Reapers’ revolt) (ibid, pp. 460-474), or the *Nueva Planta* decrees after the events of 1714<sup>15</sup> (ibid, pp. 513-515), since, as stated in the theoretical framework, nations and nationalism are a product of modernity.

*Catalanisme* has its origins during the *Renaixença* (Renaissance) in the nineteenth century. The *Renaixença* was the time in which, after the *Nueva Planta* decrees prohibited the official use of Catalan, a revitalization of written Catalan began (Termes i Ardèvol, 2009, p. 21). The *Renaixença* movement, as a romanticism movement, was, according to Termes i Ardèvol, inspired in the German romanticism ‘in the sense of recovering the historical spirit, the country of the past, the people’s soul, which determined its medieval dimension’ (2009, pp. 22-23). This medieval dimension was the first step towards a romanticism movement that, at the very least, forwarded an anti-unitary and anti-centralist regionalism (ibid, p. 24).

*Catalanisme*, although still based in a cultural dimension, slowly began to become involved in politics. According to Juan Díez Medrano, in the period 1876-1936 there were two types of nationalism in Catalonia: a bourgeois type of nationalism and a progressive type of nationalism (1994, p. 548). As an example are some of the very first *catalanist*

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<sup>13</sup> The counties in the Hispanic March were designated by the Carolingian Empero, until Wilfred the Hairy, count of several counties in what today is Catalonia, made them hereditary, no longer swearing fealty to the Carolingian, marking a *de facto* independence.

<sup>14</sup> Both events part of the Franco-Spanish War (1935-59), when Catalan pageants revolted against Castilian *tercios* due to their abuse to the local population. The *tercios* were stationed in Catalonia due to the war with France. During a brief period of time (17<sup>th</sup> – 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1641), led by Pau Claris, chief of the General Council of Catalonia, Catalonia became a republic. The short republic lasted until Pau Claris crowned King Louis XIII of France Count of Barcelona, which made Catalonia part of the French Kingdom until 1652, when the situation was reversed. As result of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, what is considered as *Catalunya Nord* (Catalan territories north of the Pyrenees, which included Roussillon, Conflent, Vallespit, Capcir, and Cerdagne) became part of France.

<sup>15</sup> During Spain’s Succession War, the Crown of Aragon sided with the house of Austria, while Castile sided with the house of Bourbon. In 1714 Barcelona, under siege, surrendered on September 11<sup>th</sup>. This date is considered as the Catalan National Day (or *La Diada*), in which protests and parades are held, and in the past years, demanded independence for Catalonia. The *Nueva Planta* Decrees ended centuries of different laws for the different crowns and kingdoms under the Spanish Monarchy, unifying customs and laws in most of the territory. Some people regard this event as the annexation of Catalonia by Spain, which is historically inaccurate.

parties to exist. The first *catalanist* political party to be created was *Lliga de Catalunya* (Catalan League) in 1887, which was right-leaning and conservative (Ucelay-Da Cal, 2014, p. 19). The next party to be created following the lines of *catalanisme* was *Lliga Regionalista* (Regionalist League), created in 1901, which would influence and even dominate regional politics for three decades (*ibid*), and pursued regional autonomy within a Spanish constitutional monarchy (Grau Mateu, 2004, p. 112). As contrast to both of them, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Catalonia's Republican Left), which obtained majoritarian support after the local elections of 1931 that signaled the beginning of the Second Spanish Republic, had among its demands 'the right of self-determination (their goal being a confederation of Iberian states), political and economic rights for workers, welfare measures for mothers, children, and the elderly, agrarian reform, and the recognition of human rights' (Díez Medrano, 1994, p. 551).

These types of nationalism still existed after the restoration of democracy after Franco's death. There are two ways in which the amount of support each type of nationalism had can be assessed: electoral records, and opinion polls. Only the first are available for the author, and thus, only these will be used.

In the first regional legislative elections since the restoration of democracy, six parties gained parliamentary representation: CiU (*Convergència i Unió*, Convergence and Union), PSC (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*, Socialists' Party of Catalonia), PSUC (*Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya*, Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia), CC-UCD (*Centristes de Catalunya – Unió del Centre Democràtic*, Centrists of Catalonia – Union of the Democratic Center), ERC (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, Catalonia's Republican Left), and PSA-PAC (*Partit Socialista d'Andalusia - Partit Andalus de Catalunya*, Andalusia's Socialist Party – Andalusian Party of Catalonia). On the next regional legislative elections the composition changed slightly: CiU, PSC, AP (*Alianza Popular*, Popular Alliance), PSUC, and ERC. And changed again in 1988's elections: CiU, PSC, IC (*Iniciativa per Catalunya*, Initiative for Catalonia), AP, ERC, and CDS (*Centro Democrático y Social*, Social and Democratic Centre).

For this research only the results of some parties are of interests. The criteria to select the parties are whether if the parties share some degree of Catalan nationalism (*Catalanisme*), or if the parties are secessionists.

- ERC: this leftist party has always had the right to self-determination on its program since its foundation in 1931. The position has always been pro-independence, but dosed with realism regarding its possibilities: in 1977 the party asserted ‘we have very radical goals: the national independence of *Països Catalans*<sup>16</sup> and self-management socialism’, while seven years later recognized that self-determination ‘is out of reach’ (Molas, 2000, pp. 81-82).
- CiU: this party was actually a federation of two other parties: CDC (*Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia) and UDC (*Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*, Democratic Union of Catalonia). The former was created in 1974 while the latter was founded in 1931. UDC has been a nationalist and Christian democracy party, although it has never been pro-independence (Molas, 2000, pp. 319-324). CDC formalized its existence as a political party in the year 1976, but between 1974 and 1976, according to Molas, the party ‘vacillated between being national conscience party or a class conscience party’ (2000, p. 47), in which case it would be a middle-class party. By 1978 the party had become clearly a nationalist party. Together they have won all autonomic legislative elections on the period studied and, as a matter of fact, Jordi Pujol, leader of CDC since its creation until 2004, has been the regional PM of Catalonia from 1980 until 2003.
- PSUC: although a communist party (in fact, it was the regional party of the *Partido Comunista de España* in Catalonia), the PSUC was much more due to its role during Franco’s dictatorship. The party was the anti-Francoist reference for the working classes in Catalonia, while at the same time helped integrate workers that had come from the rest of Spain to Catalonia’s society and traditions (Molas, 2000, pp. 292-296). In Mola’s dictionary there is a good synthesis of what the PUSC was: ‘a communist party, the spearhead in the struggle for democracy, and a catalanist formation’ (2000, p. 295). In 1987 PSUC became part of a new party, *Iniciativa per Catalunya*.

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<sup>16</sup> Països Catalans is a controversial term used either to define the regional domain of the Catalan language, or to define the Catalan nation, based on the geographical area in which Catalan is spoken: the Spanish Autonomous Communities of Catalonia, Community of Valencia, Balearic Islands, and the easternmost fringe of Autonomous Community of Aragon (known in Catalan as *La Franja*), *Catalunya Nord* (North Catalonia, an area roughly correspondent to today’s French Pyrénées-Orientales department), and Sardinian city of Aghero (*L’Alguer* in catalan), a remnant of the Aragonese domain of the island during medieval times.

- IC: this party was created after a crisis in PSUC for several years, starting in 1981 and bad electoral results. It was a merger of leftist parties, the most important of them PSUC. Another of the important parties that formed IC was *Nacionalistes d'Esquerres* (Leftist Nationalists). Due to the equilibrium between *Nacionalistes d'Esquerres* and PSUC, the party considered itself to be ‘Catalan “national”, but not nationalist’ (Molas, 2000, p. 134). However, it is safe to say that there was, at least, some degree of *catalanisme* in the party.
- PSC: this party, which acts as the PSOE’s regional representation, is in fact an independent party federated to PSOE. It was created in 1978 with the unification of three Catalan socialist parties. Since its beginnings the party has had two internal streams: the one coming from the PSC has its roots in *catalanisme*, and anarcho-sindicalism, and is more anti-centralist and anti-statist, while the one coming from the PSOE comes from workers’ socialism, and is more statist (Molas, 2000, p. 236). The party defines itself as a ‘working class party ... and calls for the national entity of Catalonia (ibid, p. 238).

As seen above, some degree of Catalan Nationalism or *catalanisme* can be found in the vast majority of political parties represented in the Catalan parliament. Still, only one of them (ERC) was open about the calls for independence from the Transition until 1990.

Year of election	Turnout (total minus abstention)	CiU	ERC	PSUC/IC	PSC	Percentage of nationalist vote
1980	61,34%	27,83%	8,90%	18,77%	22,43%	77,86%
1984	64,36%	46,80%	4,41%	5,58%	30,11%	86,9%
1988	59,37%	45,72%	4,14%	7,76%	29,78%	87,4%

**Table 1. Electoral result for the Catalan Parliament of parties considered to be catalanists. Information extracted from Generalitat de Catalunya website.**

As can be observed, outright independence was not the preferred option among the Catalans during the decade of 1980, but the vast majority of the electorate voted for parties that shared some degree of nationalism. Still, it can be argued that the turnout was low, and thus it is not representative. The author is well aware of this, but takes the electoral result as an approximation. Clearly Catalan society during the decade of 1980 was nationalist to some extent, but only a tiny minority was pro-independence.

In the general elections (State-wide) the results vary slightly:

Year of election	Turnout	CiU	ERC	PSUC/IC	PSC	nationalist vote
1982	80,82%	22,48%	4,02%	4,61%	45,84%	76,95%
1986	68,95%	32%	2,67%	3,91%	41%	79,58%
1989	67,62%	32,68	2,68%	7,33%	35,59%	78,22%

**Table 1. Electoral result in Catalonia for the General Elections of parties considered to be catalanists. Information extracted from Generalitat de Catalunya website.**

Participation is higher and PSC gets a higher percentage of the vote. No all votes to PSC in General Elections can be considered to be nationalist, since PSC is the regional representation of PSOE, but it is still remarkable that the vast majority of votes went to parties sharing some degree of *catalanisme*.

### **Terra Lliure**

*Terra Lliure*, as an organization, has its origins in other organizations and movements, from which it obtained human resources as well as the hardware needed for their attacks. In fact the people that would later become *Terra Lliure* first met in Fontpédrouse, a small French town bordering the Autonomous Community of Catalonia in 1978, to decide the position regarding the armed struggle (which they agreed upon, as separate to the political action) but were part of another organization the PSAN-P (*Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional-Provisional*, Provisional-Socialist Party of National Liberation) (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, pp. 49-50).

### **PSAN and PSAN-P**

The PSAN emerged as a scission in 1969 of the *Front Nacional de Catalunya* (FNC, Catalonia National Front), a pro-independence party created in 1940 in France by Catalan exiles. The PSAN differed from the *Front Nacional de Catalunya* in several aspects: its members were younger, born after the Civil War, and leaning towards communism (Rubiralta, 2004, p. 146). The PSAN-P split in 1974 after it accused the party of lacking anticipation and following other organizations, like the PSUC (ibid, p. 153). In 1979 the PSAN-P and the *Organització Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional* (OSAN, Socialist Organization of National Liberation), based in the Catalan speaking areas of southern France, merged together to form *Independentistes dels Països Catalans* (IPC, Independentists of the Catalan Countries).



## MDT

The *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra* (MDT, Movement in Defense of the Land) was created in 1984 as an organization that aimed to unite all radical-pro-independence extra-parliamentarian parties (Vilaregut, 2004, p. 76). As such the PSAN was one of the main parties in the organization, but a year after its creation, in 1985, the IPC –former PSAN-P- joined the MDT. This organization was deeply divided between those coming from the PSAN and those coming from the IPC (Rubiralta, 2004, pp. 198-199).

## EPOCA

The PSAN was in the political origin of *Terra Lliure*, but in the genesis of the organization was also a ‘military’ part known as EPOCA (*Exèrcit Popular Català*, Catalan Popular Army).

EPOCA as an organization has a very diffuse origin. During the sixties there was the general idea among people belonging to different pro-independence organizations, especially to the FNC, that national liberation could only happen through armed struggle: Ireland, Algeria and Vietnam were seen as examples (Falguera, 2014, p. 39). Although there was this general idea, little was done as an organization in the upcoming years. In 1974 began a series of action, mostly robberies, in which the organization obtained economic resources and weapons, assaulting factories and arsenals (ibid, pp. 107-114). The organization was known for two assassinations using the same method: placing a bomb in the armpit that would detonate if there isn’t enough pressure. The first to be assassinated in this way was José Maria Bultó Marqués, a successful businessman. He was assaulted at his brother’s house while he was having lunch there, and was asked to provide a large amount of money or else, 24h later the bomb that was attached to his chest would explode. He died at his house after he tried, unsuccessfully, to remove the explosive, in 9<sup>th</sup> May 1977 (García Pérez, 1977). The next target was former mayor of Barcelona Joaquín Viola Sauret, and as result of the explosion, his wife Montserrat Tarragona Corbellá died too (Quintana, 1978), while the assaulters were still at the former mayor’s house. The assaulters, the same as in the Bultó Marqués case, demanded a large amount of money or else the bomb would explode. Due to the intended anonymity of the organization, EPOCA might have had committed more crimes, but only some assaults, robberies and the two killings have been either recognized or attributed to the organization.

The people that committed both the assassinations and the assaults to obtain resources and weapons, although organized, did not have a name. The organized people referred

to the organization as ‘la Casa’ (the House) or ‘Mireia Puig’, a name and last name that started with M and P, which account for *Moviment Popular* (Popular Movement) (Falguera, 2014, pp. 92-93). According to Oriol Falguera, the police started labelling the organization ‘EPOCA’ after some members were arrested in 1977 (ibid, p. 94), although Sastre et al. give credit of the name to Jaume Martínez i Vendrell, who came up with it when was arrested in 1979 (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 39).

### **CSPC**

The *Comitès de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans* (CSPC, Solidarity with Catalan Patriots Committees) emerged to give support to the ‘persecuted’ Catalan patriots (incarcerated pro-independence militants, mostly arrested for being related to terrorist organizations or armed gangs). In the fourth point of its Declaration of Principles, the organization stated that ‘Catalan patriots are the ones who, with their fight, want to achieve the Independence and Reunification of the Catalan Countries’ (Comitès de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans, 1980). The CSPC gave support and helped those incarcerated based on their thought and ideals, regardless of the type of fight, and regardless of the deeds for which they are accused (seventh principle), and the way to do so was the legal defense, popular awareness and mobilization (ninth principle).

As it is common in this section, the CSPC has its origins in other organizations. In this case, most were grassroots organizations, locally based with close ties to those incarcerated. It gained momentum after the detention and trial, in June 1980 (ibid, p. 66), of the responsible of the deaths of Bultó Marqués (in May 1977), Viola Sauret, and his wife (in January 1978), who were amnestied in 1977 according to the Amnesty Law. The CSPC considered the trial to be political.

### **Terra Lliure: first steps**

Sastre et al. notes that four members of the proto-group that later became *Terra Lliure* had a secret meeting with ETA to receive training in the use of weapons and the manufacturing of explosives in by the end of 1978, and in return, the proto-group had to target France’s interests in Catalonia as retaliation for the extradition of (according to the authors) Basque refugees from France to Spain (ibid, p. 52).

The first actions undertaken by *Terra Lliure* but still in anonymity were the failed assault to an armored vehicle transporting money from the bank *Banca Catalana* in January 26<sup>th</sup> 1979, and two failed bombings at a Renault concessionaire on May 26<sup>th</sup> and on

June 2<sup>nd</sup> 1979. According to Sastre et al. the first assault failed when the ‘commando’ was on its way to take a car that had been stolen the night before, but found police officers nearby (protecting the house of a lawyer who had been threatened). The commando detoured around the street for a while, the police officers detected something suspicious and shot at the car in which the commando was in. As result, one of the members was fatally shot, abandoned in the car and died a couple of days later at the hospital<sup>17</sup> (ibid, p. 53). In regard of the first failed bombing, the proto-organization placed an explosive device in front of a Renault concessionaire, but it did not explode (ibid, p. 54). A week later, while the same members were repeating the operation, the artefact exploded and killed Félix Goñi (he was carrying the device) and injured Quim Pelegrí (also a member) (ibid). After this event the police sent a press release informing that the commando that planned the terrorist attack, known by the members as *l’Arxiu* (the Archive) was disarticulated, that it had close ties with ETA, and that the organization responsible was the armed branch of the IPC, and that the events of January were linked to the same organization (Cuerpo Superior de Policía, 1979).

After the failed assaults, the death of two members, and the detention of part of the organization, during the following months members of the proto-organization met with members of EPOCA and of PSAN-P in order to finally merge and create a new organization. From then on the organization was known as *Terra Lliure*.

The following year, 1980, *Terra Lliure* executed its first bombing. In July 25<sup>th</sup> *Terra Lliure* placed an explosive device in an office building of FECSA (*Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña S. A.*, an energy company), in Barcelona, and another, which the press considered it to be a firecracker (La Vanguardia, 1980) in the offices in Calella, a town 50 km away from Barcelona. The two bombings were the first to be claimed by the organization, and as such the name *Terra Lliure* appeared for the first time in a newspaper (El Periódico de Cataluña, 1980). Nobody was injured or killed during the bombings since, according to Sastre et al., the ‘commando’ carefully checked the targets and made it explode when nobody could be injured (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 69). A day before the *Diada*<sup>18</sup> *Terra Lliure* placed explosives in ENHER’s (*Empresa*

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<sup>17</sup> Apparently, at the time the press did not know that the dead man, Martí Marcó, belonged to an armed organization. The newspaper *La Vanguardia* only mentions that Martí Marcó died after being shot by the police, but does not mention what he was doing, or if he was with other people **Fuente especificada no válida.Fuente especificada no válida.**

<sup>18</sup>See footnote number 15

*Nacional Hidroelectrica*, National Hydroelectric Company) offices and threw a hand grenade in the Ministry of Education and Science offices, both in Barcelona. Both explosions caused damage, but did not result in human loss or injuries (La Vanguardia, 1980). This modus operandi repeated: *Terra Lliure* targeted energy companies that were related to the implementation of nuclear plants Vendellòs II (which opened in 1981, Vendellòs I was built in the decade of 1960) and Ascó I and II, all of them in Catalonia. It also targeted the Ministry of Education and Science to ‘denounce the system of allocation of teachers in the school system, which prioritized those from outside the Catalan Countries while it forced Catalan teachers to teach in other places of the State’ (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 70).

In early January 1981 three more bombings continued with the anti-nuclear spirit of previous actions. The targets were high-tension towers and transformers in Barcelona, el Prat de Llobregat, and Lleida (ibid). The next target was a jeep of the *Guardia Civil* in L’Hospitalet, during the night of March 26<sup>th</sup>, which was destroyed by a bomb, but did not cause any harm to humans (La Vanguardia, 1981). In April 11<sup>th</sup> two more bombings: one targeting offices of FECSA in Terrassa (La Vanguardia, 1981), and the other targeting a Pirelli warehouse in Vilanova i la Geltrú, which was mistaken as a FECSA warehouse (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 77).

All attacks mentioned above do not appear in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)<sup>19</sup> but are mentioned on *Terra Lliure: Punt de partida*, by Sastre et al. and can be found on newspapers. The first action that appears on GTD is the first in which there is a victim: Federico Jiménez Losantos, a Spanish teacher in Santa Coloma de Gramenet who signed what was known as the *Manifiesto de los 2.300*<sup>20</sup>. Jiménez Losantos was kidnapped together with another teacher after both left the high school in which he taught literature, driven close to a wood, tied to a tree, and shot at the right knee (La Vanguardia, 1981). After the deeds, *Terra Lliure* militants left the place, and the other teacher was able to untie herself, run to the closest road, and found a police car, which took the wounded to the hospital. Jiménez Losantos survived, and shortly after the attack left Catalonia along with other signatories of the *Manifiesto de los 2.300*.

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<sup>19</sup> When told the GTD about it, they mentioned that the database is corrected periodically with information and attacks that they did not know about before. The database is in constant work, not only to add new events happening each month, but to add those that happened and for some reason or another, was not added in time.

<sup>20</sup> Manifiesto of the 2.300, a manifesto denouncing the marginalisation of Spanish in Catalan schools. It was signed in January 25<sup>th</sup> 1981.

In order to boycott the emission of military parades from Barcelona to commemorate the Armed Forces Day, a group of *Terra Lliure* militants placed explosives and destroyed the UHF repeaters that *Televisión Española* (TVE, national TV) had in Montserrat (La Vanguardia, 1981).

New bombings took place during the night of June 23<sup>rd</sup> in Girona, Salou, and Reus against FECSA targets, although the one in Reus did not explode (La Vanguardia, 1981). To this point, *Terra Lliure* bombed several targets and shot Jiménez Losantos, and informed newspapers about the deeds, but the organization did not appear in public or made public any manifesto stating its goals. This changed in June 24<sup>th</sup> 1981, the day after the bombings in Girona, Salu, and the one failed in Reus, during the *Som una Nació* (We are a Nation) event organised by ‘*la Crida*’ in Camp Nou Stadium. ‘*La Crida*’ (*Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanes*, Call for Solidarity in Defense of the Catalan Language, Culture, and Nation), was a movement that resulted of the union of several civil society organizations against the *Manifiesto de los 2.300* (Rubiralta, 2004, p. 187). During the event at Nou Camp Stadium militants of *Terra Lliure* distributed a pamphlet entitled *Crida de la Terra Lliure* (the Call of the Free Land), in which it described the group as a revolutionary organization fighting for the independence of the Catalan Countries, called the people to fight against the systematic destruction (political, social, economic, and ecologic) to which Catalonia was subjected to, and explained the ways in which the organization acted: attacks on companies and people responsible for the destruction of the territory, attacks to those responsible of Lerrouxist<sup>21</sup> and pro-Spanish policies, attacks to companies and businessmen fostering unemployment, and attacks to the occupation forces and the broadcasting equipment of pro-Spain and militarist ideology (Sastre, 1999, pp. 26-27).

### ***Terra Lliure: attacks***

Since the data of regarding *Terra Lliure* is incomplete in Global Terrorism Database, I proceeded to create one as thorough as possible. This new *Terra Lliure* database has been built from the GTD and completed with the guidance of Sastre et al. accounts of *Terra Lliure* if, and only if the press reported the attack as claimed by *Terra Lliure* back in the day. In order to do so the archives of two important newspapers have been used: *El País*, and *La Vanguardia*. In Sastre et al.’s book appears a list of attacks that the au-

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<sup>21</sup> Alejandro Lerroux was a Catalan politician during the early twentieth century. Ideologically, his party was republicanist, anticlerical, pro-Spanish, and focused on workers. According to the Dictionary of the Catalan Language, *Lerrouxisme* represents an anti-Catalanist ideology.

thors claim were perpetrated by *Terra Lliure*, but some of them do not match the press records. Since the reasons behind a terror attack are communication (by the deed), it seems unlikely that those attacks were actually committed. However the attacks could have really been perpetrated by *Terra Lliure*. For this reason, this database is not, and cannot be complete.




Figure 5. Attempted and successful attacks by Terra Lliure 1979-1992. An attack is considered successful when it did the intended damage, and was not intercepted or thwarted by the police.




Figure6. Most common targets of *Terra Lliure*, bot attempted and successful.

According to the data gathered, out of 188 verified attempted attacks, 144 succeeded (76.6%), of which all resulted in property damage except the kidnaping and shooting to the knee of Jiménez Losantos (143). As seen in the graphs above, the most common target was some kind of governmental representation, be it tax collection offices, unemployment offices, ministerial offices, the *Guardia Civil* or *Policía Nacional* – regarded as occu-

pation forces –, or public companies such as RENFE (Railroads) or RTVE (Public TV). Some of their attacks resulted in wounded victims (50 wounded in 14 attacks), and only one victim died. Two *Terra Lliure* militants died while trying to set up the explosive devices.




Figure 7. Governmental targets. 'Government' includes ministerial offices, tax collection offices, government delegations, etc.

The rationale behind *Terra Lliure* targeting has already been stated above, in their first public manifesto. Energy companies were targeted due to their links with nuclear energy plants, unemployment offices, as well as a couple of private companies, were targeted due to their contribution to Catalan unemployment, *Guardia Civil* and *Policia Nacional* were regarded as occupation forces, and so on. Most

private banks were targeted due to their relation to Barcelona's candidacy to 1992 Olympic Games. The four attempted attacks to the Spanish Navy, only one of which succeeded, had the replica of *Santa Maria* caravel.

The kidnapping and shooting of Federico Jiménez Losantos constitute an exception, undertaken to intimidate those who shared Jiménez Losantos ideas. *Terra Lliure* claimed another kidnapping, but the police considered it to have been committed by petty criminals (Montagut, 1984). *Terra Lliure*: split, integration, detentions and dissolution.

*Terra Lliure* continued to act until 1992, the year of the Olympic Games of Barcelona. Three years before, though, the organization suffered a split. The split was originated by the divisions inside the *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra*, the organization that gave support to *Terra Lliure*. Those in the MDT coming from the PSAN unilaterally promulgated an assembly, which created *Terra Lliure-IV Assemblea* (Rubiralta, 2004, p. 199). The rest of the organization remained as *Terra Lliure-III Assemblea*. The IV Assembly, led by Pere Bascompte, joined in 1991 ERC (Buch i Ros, 2001, p. 189), which allowed *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* to claim that *Terra Lliure* was dissolved thanks to

them. But *Terra Lliure* continued to exist. In fact, still in 1992 *Terra Lliure* attempted at least 8 attacks, two of which succeeded, and one of them wounded 11 (Rius, 1992). In June 28<sup>th</sup> 1992, after a series of failed attacks, Joan Rocamora and Josep Musté are arrested, and the police operation that ended *Terra Lliure* began (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 189). Throughout the year more members of *Terra Lliure* were arrested. The trial, which judges 25 militants, was held in April 1995, but at the time only four remained imprisoned (ibid, pp. 205-206). Although sentenced to several years of prison, the prosecutor asked the court the application of minimum penalties and asked for measures of grace, such as partial or total pardon or remissions of penalties to make 'reintegration possible' (ibid, p. 208). Two former members still remained without trial. Later the same year Rocamora and Musté were sentenced to several years of prison.

*Terra Lliure* announced its official dissolution in September 1995 in a public statement in which it explained the dissolution was caused by the obsolescence of the 'armed propaganda', and 'the exhaustion of human resources due to the repression' (Sastre, 1999, pp. 219-221). Although the organization dissolved itself in 1995, it had been inoperative since the detentions of 1992 in which the organization was effectively stopped.



## Analysis

### The Structural-Cognitive Model

Karl-Dieter Opp's Structural-Cognitive model is a synthesis of different Social Move-




Figure 8. Reconstruction of the structural-cognitive model, as it appears on Opp's 'Theories of political protest and social movements' p. 328

ment Theory models. As such, each different model can be recognized in the general model. Resource mobilization and political opportunity structures are located at the top of the model, encompassing macro variables and macro protests. The framing perspective encompasses both the macro variables, cognitive framing processes and incentives (as outcomes of cognitive processes). Last, but not least, collective action and identity perspective encompass incentives and individual protests. The model is not rigid. Instead, it is dynamic and its effects change over time, due to the micro-level influencing the macro-level, and vice versa (Opp, 2009, pp. 327-350). Briefly, the whole model derives, at first, from Olson's Collective Action theory, which stipulates that large groups fail to achieve public goods due to the lack of incentives to join them (the larger the group, the less marginal impact a newcomer has), but will succeed if it provides selective incentives (benefits from joining or penalties for not joining it) as the theory assumes rational behavior of individuals. But, as stated in the Theoretical Framework, Collective Action theory on its own does not explain social movements.

According to resource mobilization, an increase of the resources available in a society will positively affect the creation of new social movements. Political opportunity struc-

ture approach takes into account the role that changes at the macro level (changes in government, a new law, or changes in the international sphere) have on the actions of individuals (more specifically, that encourage, enable, or make change seem possible). These changes, in order to positively affect mobilization, have to be visible to the potential challengers and perceived as an opportunity.

Collective identity perspective takes into account identity as a driving factor towards collective action. Following this perspective, collective identity forms through conflict and clearly demarcates, via the development of a ‘we-feeling’, who can join the movement (only members of the ‘we’ can join ‘us’). This collective identity is a process that involves, among other things mentioned in the theoretical framework, the formulation of a cognitive framework concerning the ends, means, and field of action of collective action. Related to the formulation of a cognitive framework is the framing perspective. A frame is a scheme of interpretation through which individuals give meaning to reality. In order to get involved into social mobilizations a necessary condition is a frame alignment by which one perceives an element of reality that does not fit what is just, or how things should be, and then decides to act in accordance. Identity in collective identity perspective is an outcome of the cognitive processes that form mental frames.

## Premises

Some premises need to be clear before engaging the analysis. Terrorism and Social Movements are generally understood as two completely different things. But they share some commonalities. Since this research is using a theory devised to understand social movements in order to understand terrorism, the first step is to make clear the commonalities. Both Social Movements and Terrorism are political, and their goals can be understood as public goods. *Terra Lliure*’s goal was to achieve national emancipation for Catalans, which can be regarded as a public good, since it is both non-rival and non-excludable. National emancipation, independence, will affect every citizen living in Catalonia equally, even if with national independence citizenship is only granted to Catalan nationalists.

This research, following the theoretical framework explained above, considers terrorism to be essentially political in nature, fitting inside Tilly’s contentious politics. In this regard, a terrorist organization is considered to be part of a social movement –a particularly violent part of the movement–, and as such, both the emergence of the organization as

well as its behavior can be understood as if it was a social movement. Moreover, the peripheral elites' actions in order to promote their nation, in contrast to the central government's nation (that is, to resist homogenization), what according to Tilly is nationalism, is also considered to be both part of contentious politics and a social movement.

### Political Opportunity Structures

In the case of *Terra Lliure*, the 'movement' emerges between the end of the decade of 1970 and the beginning of the decade of 1980, right after the Spanish Transition to Democracy. As result of the Spanish Transition, protests and social mobilization were more accessible: the era of repression was over, and the new constitutional and democratic regime granted civil rights. The fact that demonstrations were allowed, does not have to be understood as the end of police brutality or mistreatment of detainees. As Gonzalo Wilhelmi puts it 'torture was not exclusively used against people accused of being related to ETA, but it was applied to militants and sympathizers belonging to the radical left, and also to detainees detained for common crimes' (Wilhelmi, 2011). As mentioned above, in the 'Context' section, the last years of the Franco Regime and the Transition witnessed a boom in demonstrations, protests and social movements. This change of regime fits with the definition of Political Opportunity Structure.

The above are not the only elements of political opportunity structure. A former militant, Bentanachs, mentions in Bassas' documentary that one of the elements that made him join *Terra Lliure* was the existence of the 'Brest Charter'<sup>22</sup> (2007), since without the mutual aid provision of the Charter he, probably, would have not joined *Terra Lliure*, perhaps because otherwise the achievement of the organization's goals would not have seem achievable on their own.

In Bassa's documentary appears a fragment of a televised interview<sup>23</sup> from May 1989 in which a *Terra Lliure*'s spokesperson says, 'our current strategy is to potentiate a unitarian political movement around our organization which, with its symbolical actions (attacks), it is becoming the sole legitimate Catalan benchmark against the Spanish occupation' (Bassa, 2007). Not only is remarkable here the perception of the attacks as sym-

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<sup>22</sup> The Brest Charter was a document signed by socialist and nationalist parties of Europe (Irish Republican Movement, Breton Democratic Union, and the Galician People's Union; and later joined Herri Alderdi Sozialista Iraultzailea, Cymru Goch, the Socialist Party of National Liberation –provisional [PSAN-P], Catalan Workers Left, Su Populu Sardu, and Occitan Struggle) in 1972 in which the signatories confirmed mutual support (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 34)

<sup>23</sup> Originally broadcasted in the Basque public televisión network Euskal Irrati Telebista, it has been impossible to find.

bolical action, but especially the idea that the organization, with its attacks, was the reference for the pro-independence movement. Although, as stated in the Context section, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) has always been a pro-independence party, it was not perceived as such during the eighties. The previous statement by *Terra Lliure* in the documentary shows it clearly, but does not provide an explanation of why it was so. The answer may lay in the following lines by Antoni Segura i Mas: ‘In the decade of 1980, ERC appeared as a party subordinated to *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), electorally receding’ (2001, p. 174). The reason for this subordination was the fact that after the first Catalan elections, ERC, with 14 seats, gave support to the Government led by Jordi Pujol of CiU (ibid: p. 173). If that feeling of subordination was widespread enough, it is reasonable to assert that the more radical pro-independence were orphans politically speaking, with not a single party representing their interests in the parliament.

Furthermore, the spokesperson continued, ‘in the future, as the grouping of pro-independence increases, *Terra Lliure*’s actions will become a more aggressive military action. *Terra Lliure*’s actions are solely and exclusively adequate to the reality of our people and have as their only purpose to advance our own movement of national liberation’ (Bassa, 2007). If *Terra Lliure* planned to launch a full-fledge military offensive against the so called ‘Spanish Occupation’ it is clear that they needed more resources, human resources, and support. But this statement also fits K. D. Opp’s model. Symbolical actions are meant to rally more supporters to one’s ranks, and to make clear statements: ‘if you oppose the occupation, join us, act like us, be one of us’. But perhaps it is also interesting to note when the interview came up. It was May of 1989. Two years before two attacks, one by ETA and the other by *Terra Lliure* caused several civilian casualties. *Terra Lliure* had responded and publicly condemned ETA’s action in Catalonia, but accidentally killed Emília Aldomà. It is understandable that some people within the radical pro-independence supporters, even members of the organizations, as will be shown in the next paragraph, would be worried about the deaths of innocents. Having this in mind it makes sense that the organization would want to appear in television to justify itself, to clearly explain the reason behind its actions. Claiming that *Terra Lliure*’s actions are adequate to the Catalan people seems to infer that other national liberation movements may act the way they want, but ‘us, the Catalans’ don’t want to kill civilians.

Xavier Vendrell, who was a leader of the split organization *Terra Lliure-IV Assemblea*<sup>24</sup> stated ‘basically, the debate at the time was about the obsolescence of the armed option for the pro-independence movement, the lack of sense, and the irrefutable reality of national liberation processes in Europe that were advancing and that, in some cases, even achieved success democratically and pacifically, but above all, starting from political debate’ (Bassa, 2007). Some of the militants, as shown by Xavier Vendrell’s words, were worried about the obsolescence of the armed struggle, and instead, partly due to changing events in the European horizon, favored pacific and democratic means of action. Again, this is an example of how political opportunity structures, especially the perception of said opportunities, change the dynamics of movements, in this case, from violence to pacifism.

The IV Assembly split in *Terra Lliure* jumped to the spotlight when its members began to negotiate with ERC. As stated above, ERC was not perceived by some to be a clear and open pro-independence party, but this changed in 1989, when the party elected a new president and secretary general for the organization: Heribert Barrera and Àngel Colom, respectively. Àngel Colom was known as a founding member of ‘*la Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanes*’ that organized the event at Camp Nou in 1981 where *Terra Lliure* announced its organization and principles distributing pamphlets. With the new party leadership, it ‘leaned towards its own political space, republicanism and independentism, small but faithful’ (Seguria i Mas, 2001, pp. 174-175). Josep Musté’s following words also explain why some *Terra Lliure*’s members joined ERC, ‘we already knew where things were going, that there were people that wanted to join ERC and that there were people that was fed up and wanted to leave the organization’ (Bassa, 2007). He was a member of the III Assembly.

By the end of the eighties some macro-variables changed. National liberation movements were advancing in their goals in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, but unlike *Terra Lliure* their advancements were not due to the use of violence. As such, Sastre et al. write ‘aware of the shortcomings of the movement (MDT’s internal division) and of the unfavorable international situation regarding national liberation fight, the organiza-

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<sup>24</sup> A split originated by internal ideological differences. The mainstream organization is sometimes referred as *Terra Lliure-III Assemblea* (third assembly). According to Sastre et al. (which remained in *Terra Lliure-III Assemblea*), IV assembly had a militarist conception and exalted the armed strategy, even using the term ‘Catalan soldier’ (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 147), instead of the preferred militant or activist (which in Catalan are kind of synonym) of the III Assembly.

tion proposed to launch a resistance strategy with the goal to gather forces to be able to start a kind of trench warfare, “understanding it not as geographical positions, but as a political (ideological and organizational) rearmament of increasingly more popular sectors of society, rearmament that entails the awareness of identities, and an increasingly more precise definition of the sides, according to the defended interests” (2012, pp. 145-146). The above lines analyze events and internal debates that took place in 1988. One can interpret that the variation of some macro-variables (international scenario, the perception that the armed struggle might not be as legitimate as other national liberation movements, etc.) as negatively affecting *Terra Lliure*’s actions. In fact, 1988 was the year in which *Terra Lliure* perpetrated more attacks, but the following year only five of the less than ten attempted attacks succeeded.

Regarding the dissolution of *Terra Lliure* Josep Musté stated, ‘I think that the decision to abandon the armed struggle was taken because of the fear instilled by the repression (detentions against the organization) to the whole movement. There were no more actions and this made us re-think that maybe it was the time to end the armed struggle and continue the fight for the independence only by political and pacific means’ (Bassa, 2007). Political opportunity structure partly explains what Musté reveals about why the organization abandoned the ‘armed struggle’. The Olympic Games of Barcelona represented a structural change: Barcelona had to become a safe place during the Olympic Games that started soon after the detentions of *Terra Lliure*’s members, and as such, the State security forces actions to prevent violence intensified. The subjective perception of an ‘increased repression’ is a penalization for action, and as such it is understandable that *Terra Lliure*’s militants changed their mind regarding the use of violence. But Musté’s words also can be analyzed through resource mobilization, as shown in the ‘Resource mobilization’ section of this chapter.

### **Resource mobilization**

The aforementioned diminution of police brutality produces an increase of resources available, even if available economic resources remain the same, since social mobilization could be done in the open, thus requiring less effort to hide from security forces. Other resources, such as the materials required to manufacture explosive devices, which are not related to the Spanish transition will be explained below. Furthermore, the political parties from which the organization derives, e.g. PSAN and PSAN-P, once democracy was restored could act on the open, and as Sastre et al. recall, ‘to run for the Span-

ish Parliament elections of March 1<sup>st</sup> 1979' (2012, p. 62). Furthermore, as explained in the 'Context' chapter, the genesis of *Terra Lliure* merged with members of EPOCA, the already existing militant organization, which allowed the resulting organization to start off with some expertise and knowledge regarding the use of weapons and explosives. The merge of EPOCA with the genesis of *Terra Lliure* also provides a notion of resource mobilization: with more resources available – including expertise – a 'movement' is to be expected.

Thanks to the colossal book '*Estadísticas Históricas de España: Siglos XIX-XX*' coordinated by Carreras and Tafunell, the author has had access to important economic data of the period. Although it would have been more useful to have data per each year during the final years of the Franco regime, the transition and the restoration of democracy in Spain, the period in which *Terra Lliure* emerged, the available data should suffice. The available relevant data includes the available rent per family in millions of 1995's *pesetas* for the period 1930-2000. Instead of showing the data for each year, the authors show the data for every five years. Thus, the relevant years for us are 1970 and 1975 for the final years of the Franco regime, and 1980 and 1985 for the democracy period. In between is the transition period, with no specific data, although what is important here is the change from the Franco regime years to the democracy years in order to see the increase of economic resources available. In the year 1970 the available rent per family was 5,286,697 *pesetas*, while in 1975 it raised to 7,250,295 *pesetas* (Carreras, Prados de la Escosura, & R. Rosés, 2005, p. 1369). In the year 1980 the available rent was 7,544,182 *pesetas*, a small change since 1975, but in 1985 it raised to 8,228,101 *pesetas* (ibid). This change represents an increase of 42.70% on the available rent per family from 1970 to 1980, and an increase of 55.6% from 1970 to 1985. Altogether, both the availability of non-economic resources due to the end of the dictatorship and the increase on available economic resources as demonstrated by the increase in the available rent per family fit Resource Mobilization regarding the emergence of social movements.

The year 1985 did not see much action by *Terra Lliure*, but, paradoxically, it saw the biggest mobilizations in support of the independence until then. The newspaper *La Vanguardia* reports that the demonstration organized by *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra* in *la Diada* of 1985 gathered more people than in previous years (*La Vanguardia*, 1985). Although the organization was, structurally, at its weakest since its emergence (Bassa, 2007), the *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra* capability of reuniting the biggest

amount of people at a radical pro-independence demonstration is also a sign of the resource mobilization. Regardless of the amount of militants *Terra Lliure* had in that year, and regardless of its structural capabilities, more and more people were willing to show support to the cause.

As mention in the previous section, in Bassa's documentary *Musté* mentions the fear instilled by the repression as one of the reasons why the organization stopped acting after the Olympic Games' raid, and later decided to continue the fight for independence solely by political and pacific means. In the previous section, Muste's words are analyzed according to Political Opportunity Structure, since the Olympic Games represented a structural change that affected success perceptions. But his words can also be analyzed through resource mobilization, since detentions decreased the pool of human resources (as stated in *Terra Lliure*'s last statement in 1995 and explained in the context section). Moreover, increased police activity increased the costs of any kind of clandestine political activity which in addition to the lack of resources caused by the detentions, also explain why the organization was unable to undertake more actions.

### **Framing and Collective Identity**

Since there are elements that can be analyzed both through Framing perspective and as collective identity, the two part of Opp's model are together in this section. Moreover, collective identity in Opp's model is an outcome of cognitive processes that are also part of framing processes, thus being the two related to each other.

Following Opp's model, the objective fact that the new democratic regime was more open and thus allowed demonstrations and greater political demands is not as important as the perception that the organization had. Although it would have been better to ask members of the organization back in the day what they thought about their organization, how it emerged, and why they joined it, material produced after *Terra Lliure*'s dissolution can be very useful to obtain that information. In the documentary *Terra Lliure: Punt Final*, Jaume Fernández i Calvet states 'the context was that of the transition, which Franco said he left it tied, and well tied (meaning that the democratic regime after the transition was the continuity of Franco's regime)... the intention was to cut the transition, to create obstacles (to the resulting regime), and to create an independentist alternative' (Bassa, 2007). Similarly, Josep Serra states 'we are the defeated of the transition because we wanted a break with the Franco regime, and the ones who wanted continuity



won' (Bassa, 2007). The notion of 'we are the defeated of the transition' serves also as framing, since it aims to rally all those with the same feeling to the cause, while at the same time it also provides an explanation of a current event: it was not a transition towards democracy, a change so everything can remain the same<sup>25</sup>.

Frame alignments can explain the merge of militants of EPOCA and what will later become *Terra Lliure*. According to Xavier Barberà, who was a militant of EPOCA and later on of *Terra Lliure*, explains that 'we (EPOCA and *Terra Lliure*) got to the idea that the best for all of us is to create a single organization, to put tools, logistics, infrastructures, and experiences in common' (Bassa, 2007).

Framing does not only explain the merge of the two organizations, it also explains actions undertaken by *Terra Lliure*<sup>26</sup>. Jaume Fernández exemplifies it very well:

'the first thing one does is to create a series of images' flow. One image is that you give support to the anti-nuclear movement; another image is that you go against INEM<sup>27</sup> offices for solidarity reasons with the unemployed, etc. And so you touch different social sectors. From here on what is interesting is to give coherence. To say "this does not happen by chance but because a fight is going on", a combat against the State, and this kind of actions are its manifestations' (Bassa, 2007)

The above fragment is also a key example of the communication element of terrorism: by attacking certain targets, and claiming the attacks, one engages in propaganda by the deed, while at the same time tries to gather support from people who, perhaps, were not pro-independence at the beginning, but gave support to the anti-nuclear movement, and thus were potential supporters. Following the same logic as the excerpt above, Sastre et al. state the following regarding the first attack against *Guardia Civil*, 'It was the first action directly against the occupation forces, but it had a pedagogical intention behind it' (2012, p. 84).

Following the framing perspective, non-structural events external to the organization, such as the action by other organizations also had an impact on the cognitive framing

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<sup>25</sup> Like the motto of Lampedusa's novel *The Leopard*.

<sup>26</sup> Especially the actions against energy companies linked to nuclear plants and unemployment offices.

<sup>27</sup> Instituto Nacional de Empleo (National Employment Institute) is the Government's agency for the unemployed.

process. In June 19<sup>th</sup> 1987 the Basque terrorist organization ETA placed an explosive device inside a car, and parked the car in the parking lot of a supermarket in Barcelona. The terror attack, known as the Hipercor bombing, killed more than twenty civilians and injured more than forty, the biggest terror attack perpetrated by ETA<sup>28</sup>, and the second biggest in Spain<sup>29</sup> (La Vanguardia, 2012). This attack was not the only one aimed at civilians in Catalonia by ETA, but it represented a turning point. The very same year Emília Aldomà, the only fatality caused by *Terra Lliure*, died in the bombing of the courthouse of Borges Blanques. Together, according to Sastre et al., ‘changed the perception of the armed struggle’ (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 138). Carles Castellanos, leader of the PSAN-P and founder of the MDT stated, ‘the Hipercor bombing produced a lot of damage to the movement. It made the comprehension of these means of fight more difficult. In fact, it was an important obstacle’ (Bassa, 2007).

Regarding how he got involved with the organization, Frederic Bentanachs, stated ‘we came from a kind of *kale borroka*<sup>30</sup>; and we became more serious about it (referring the armed struggle) with the Brest Charter<sup>31</sup>, (Bassa, 2007). Bentanachs’ reasons to join *Terra Lliure* can be related to framing –since it shares reasoning and the means to change reality.

Another militant, who also was a leader of *Terra Lliure*, stated ‘I joined the organization motivated by a series of sensations motivated by my political commitment during the decade of 1970’ (Bassa, 2007). In this case, due to the low amount of information offered one can only guess that the origin of the political commitment that made him join the organization arose in a process related to collective identity or framing perspective

In Bassa’s documentary former militants explain how they became involved with the organization. The reasons why someone became involved with *Terra Lliure* are congruent with collective identity perspective. As mentioned above, collective identity consolidates through conflict. For example, Josep Misté states. ‘I entered *Terra Lliure* in the

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<sup>28</sup> Unlike *Terra Lliure*, ETA targeted civilians as well as members of the police, Guardia Civil, and armed forces. A complete list of ETA’s victims can be found here: [http://www.fundacionvt.org/index.php?option=com\\_dbquery&Itemid=82&task=ExecuteQuery&qid=1&previousTask](http://www.fundacionvt.org/index.php?option=com_dbquery&Itemid=82&task=ExecuteQuery&qid=1&previousTask). The Basque regional government counts 849 victims of ETA (Fonseca, 2014)

<sup>29</sup> The biggest terror attack in Spain was the 2004 Atocha bombings.

<sup>30</sup> Basque for ‘street fight’, a term employed to designate riots caused by people and organizations ideologically close to ETA, often as a ritual ‘activated as an immediate response to state repression (detention by anti-terrorism units, murders, torture, etc.)’ (Ferret, 2014, p. 1019)

<sup>31</sup> See footnote 24.

year 1989-1990 because the state, using repression, had detained pro-independence militants and I understood that I had to leave MDT and start with *Terra Lliure*' (Bassa, 2007).

In December 1981 21 pro-independence militants were arrested, although only two of them were imprisoned charged of belonging to *Terra Lliure*. Sastre et al. remark the open solidarity towards the two prisoners who were open about their pro-independence ideology, and the fact that, with the exception of only two parties (UCD and PSOE), there was no criminalization of the organization *Terra Lliure* (2012, p. 87). And this fact, in their own words, meant that 'although the repression had momentarily halted the fight, it also meant the widening of the independentist political conscience' (ibid, p. 88). Altogether, the dynamic 'detention – public support for the imprisoned – strengthening feeling' fits collective identity approach, especially regarding the formation of a 'we feeling' through conflict. Other detentions can be added to the mentioned in this paragraph. For example, in March 1982, three days after a demonstration against the LOHPA<sup>32</sup>, the police arrested six members of *Independència pels Països Catalans* (IPC) accused of carrying a banner that read 'INDEPENDENCE' which the judge, according to Sastre et al., qualified of 'incitement to rebellion', and were imprisoned for 'insults to the unity of the Spanish Nation (2012, pp. 91-92).

The election of the name can also be analyzed according to Opp's model. The name is not an individual and thus does not engage in either micro or macro protests, but it is interpreted by individuals. '*Terra Lliure* (Free Land) can also be interpreted among ecologist lines (*Terra* can be understood as Land, but also as soil, and the Earth). Alongside the name, in support of the organizations people chanted 'Visca la terra!' (long live the land) which was, in its origin, a chant against the centralist forces between the XVI and XVIII centuries (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 89), but it also made reference to ecologists' demands. The *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra* also appeals to this ecologist dimension of '*Terra*'. Altogether, the election of the name as well as the chants in support of the organization are part of framing processes that result in cognitive processes that also affect collective identity. The identification with *Terra*

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<sup>32</sup> LOHPA stands for *Llei Orgànica d'Harmonització del Procés Autonòmic* (Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomic Process), a law that set the process to which all sub-state regions in Spain (autonomous communities) would in time and according to their capacities, reach the same amount of powers. Many considered this law a way to appease the Armed Forces after the attempted *coup d'Etat* in 1981; most Catalan political parties considered this law an attack against Catalan self-government (Mas i Delblanch, 2014).

*Lliure* was many-fold: national liberation, protection of the country and its environment, as well as a reaction against the centralization and ‘occupation’ forces.

Other elements that can be attributed to both collective identity and framing can be found on demonstrations. In *la Diada* of 1982, according to the press, demonstrators chanted ‘*visca Terra Lliure*’ (long live *Terra Lliure*) and distributed pamphlets calling for the expulsion of *xarnegos*<sup>33</sup> (La Vanguardia, 1982). Sastre et al., in ‘*Terra Lliure: punt de partida*’ regard the distribution of these racist pamphlets as an undercover action by ‘fascistizing’ elements of the Spanish Secret Services (2012, p. 92), but also mention an op-ed by writer Manuel de Pedrolo in a newspaper. De Pedrolo’s op-ed title is *Fora fatxes del Fossar* (fascists out of the *Fossar*), and in it he claims that the pro-independence movement gathered at the *Fossar de les Moreres* (mostly pro-independence radicals) cannot afford to have such racists individuals among its members (1982). *Terra Lliure* did not only identify as ecologist and pro-independence fighting for national liberation. The organization was anti-fascist too, and as such reject racist elements and comments, such as the call to expel *xarnegos*. It is worth mentioning that both the name and surname of Manuel de Pedrolo are in Spanish, although he is one of the most acclaimed and reputed writers in Catalan of the twentieth century, and that some of *Terra Lliure*’s members also had Spanish surnames, such as Benítez or Fernández.

The organization *Terra Lliure* had its active members –militants- that undertook several actions – bombings mostly – and it is obvious that some people sympathized with the organization, the perception of which encouraged the organization to continue with their ‘fight’. Sastre et al. note that ‘the growing social implementation of the combative independence led by the activity of *Terra Lliure* was reflected in the fact that people and anonymous groups burnt flags and placed home-made explosive devices, etc. and claimed the actions in the name of *Terra Lliure*. In this sense, for coherence and security reasons, the armed organizations had adopted the policy of denying the actions of which it was not responsible’ (2012, pp. 109-110).

In the eyes of *Terra Lliure* members, ‘the organization acted as an invigorating and symbolical element, which unified the different pro-independence expressions’ (Sastre,

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<sup>33</sup> *Xarnego* in Catalan, or *Charnego*, in Spanish, is a contemptuous term referring to a non-Catalan speaker from any non-Catalan speaking region of Spain who has migrated to Catalonia or to someone from mixed Catalan and non-Catalan ancestry who does not speak Catalan.

Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 120). As such they claim that the growing numbers of demonstrators in radical pro-independence demonstrations were thanks to their actions, which whether true or not, may have had an effect in undertaking more actions/attacks. As such, Sastre et al. claim that ‘1985 was the year in which independentists committed more agitation actions in the streets, in clear opposition to the disenchantment generated by the Catalan Parliament and the Autonomous Community institutions’ (ibid, p. 125). These agitation actions can be understood as similar to the sporadic and spontaneous ‘urban guerrilla’ type of actions in demonstrations explained in the Collective Action section. Certainly *Terra Lliure* benefited from these actions, as they showed support for a more violent action against the Spanish state and its institutions (Autonomous Communities’ parliaments and the parties there represented, for example). Again these actions are micro-level protests. Micro-protests, according to Opp’s model, do not always add-up to scale to macro-protest, but some of them certainly do. Furthermore, micro-protests and similar actions are one of the ways in which movements and organizations get to recruit new individuals through collective identity and framing processes: one engages in a micro-level action partly because one identifies with the group, partly because one shares part of the perceived reality and how to act to correct it.

An exemplification of the political motivation of *Terra Lliure*’s violence can be found in Sastre et al.’s following lines, ‘In the number 22 of *Alerta*<sup>34</sup> of November 1988, *Terra Lliure* distanced itself from the use of the ‘empty of political content’ independentism and the simplification of the independentist strategy to agitation and riots in demonstrations, since it could lead the movement to ‘marginalization and criminalization’’ (2012, p. 147). It is clear with these lines that *Terra Lliure*’s intention with their ‘actions’ is to rally support, to educate the masses on who is the ‘enemy’ and why. This is perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of the communication nature of terrorism, and at the same time how the organization can take an active role in both framing processes and in promoting collective identity in order to get more people involved with the ‘movement’. At the time *Terra Lliure* distributed the newsletter, many were already aware of the possible bad press of certain actions, as well as the change in some of the macro-variables. One can guess that by distancing the organization from certain action, the leaders of

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<sup>34</sup> The organization’s bulletin.

*Terra Lliure* expected others to stop undertaking these actions and, at the same time, to make possible the identification of *Terra Lliure* as a less violent organization, capable of working to achieve national liberation the same way other organizations were working in other countries.

The ‘demobilization’ and integration into ERC of part of *Terra Lliure* (specifically, *Terra Lliure-IV Assemblea*) fits Karl Dieter Opp’s structural-cognitive model. Àngel Colom, then leader of ERC, ‘publicly announced a mediation, ..., to convince *Terra Lliure*’s leaders that violence is not the way to go’ (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 174). According to Sastre et al., Àngel Colom used the bombing of a *Guardia Civil*’s *casa cuartel*<sup>35</sup> in the Catalan city of Vic of May 29<sup>th</sup> 1991 by ETA in which ten died, half of them children, and more than forty were injured (EcoDiario, 2009; Macpherson, Tarín, Peirón, & Altarriba, 1991), to ‘criminalize combat independentism and to rush the operation to end *Terra Lliure* (2012, p. 176). Eight days later *Terra Lliure-IV Assemblea* announced a unilateral and indefinite ceasefire, and on July 19<sup>th</sup> the split organization dissolved itself, ‘due to the new independences in the former USSR and the process of European integration’ (Ibid, pp. 178-180). In this case, a perceived variation in the macro-level changes the perception of the chances of success (in this case, it opened new opportunities if one used democratic and pacific methods), which ultimately change both individual and macro protests. In this process a change of frames is involved: if change is possible with pacific and democratic methods, then the violent way of the armed propaganda is no longer acceptable. But this perceived change is not applicable to the whole organization, only to the split *IV Assemblea*. This fact is also revealing: *Terra Lliure* was not a homogenous organization, and in no way everyone shared the same frames and collective identity, although some shared frames and some shared collective identity could be found. In response to the announced dissolution of the *IV Assemblea*, which claimed the dissolution of the whole organization, in *la Diada* (11<sup>th</sup> September) that same year *Terra Lliure-III Assemblea* released a statement in which it reminded that ‘*Terra Lliure* will not look down as some former colleagues have, as long as there are (Catalan pro-independence) prisoners, oppression, and a constitution that is not ours’ (Ibid, p. 183).

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<sup>35</sup> Members of *Guardia Civil* in Spain live in headquarters/barracks with their families.

One of the last attacks by *Terra Lliure* spurred internal debate. In May 25<sup>th</sup> 1992 *Terra Lliure* placed explosives in two INEM offices in Barcelona, one in Horta quarter, and the other in La Sagrera quarter. This attack differed from previous attacks by *Terra Lliure* because the explosive device did not explode during the night, a way to provoke property damage but to avoid human damage, but instead exploded early in the morning injuring eleven (Rius, 1992). Sastre et al. note that this attack ‘spurred internal debate, due to which the organization took additional safety measures in order to avoid civil damage’ (2012, p. 185). This was one of the last actions by *Terra Lliure*, since the Olympic Games raid would commence roughly a month later, but it is worth noting that, due to the Hipercor bombing by ETA and the death of Emília Aldomà, the organization was well aware of the bad press and the consequences that ‘civil damage’, as they called it, could have to achieve the organization’s goal, since it hindered possible framing processes with which the organization could rally more support.

Throughout its years of activity, *Terra Lliure* offered several interviews. On them, a designated spokesperson spoke on behalf of the organization. From their statements one can identify what people inside the organization believed and perceived regarding certain issues. In an interview from February 1986, when asked about how *Terra Lliure* works as an organization, the spokesperson answers ‘as any other organization of this type (armed national liberation organization), what is more important is the infrastructure given by citizens sharing our goals, which allows the squads to act like they were on one’s element’ (Sastre, 1999, p. 225). This shows that framing is not only important to get new militants actively involved with the organization, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, to provide a structure to allow free movement of those involved in clandestine activities.

In an interview in December 1987 the interviewer asked the spokesperson about *Terra Lliure*’s presence at *la Diada* demonstration of September. The spokesperson answered that ‘what *Terra Lliure* does is to show that one of the possible ways to achieve our people’s national liberation is through the armed struggle. The day will come in which we’ll stop doing armed propaganda and we’ll start the proper armed struggle instead’ (Sastre, 1999, p. 229). This honest answer shows the communicational nature of terrorism, the propaganda/education by the deed with which the organization hopes to rally more people to join them in order to fight the state as equals. This element is consistent both with collective identity and framing. The organization’s actions and attacks have

the intention to convince other people to join them, not as a simple attack against the state. However, the intention of the action is not enough to prove framing and collective identity.

According to the authors of '*Terra Lliure: Punt de Partida*' there were three factors influencing the decline of the combat independentism: ETA's interferences and the armed struggle's discredit; the disintegration of socialist states in Europe; and ERC has an openly pro-independence party under Àngel Colom's leadership (Sastre, Benítez, Musté, & Rocamora, 2012, p. 155). Besides the change in the macro-level that affects the perception of the chances of success that the independence of eastern countries – mentioned in the Political Opportunity Structure section- one can also identify other elements of Opp's model. The authors' analysis is a good example of the changes regarding collective identity and identification with the organization due to the killed people (either at the hands of *Terra Lliure* or ETA's). *Terra Lliure* had popular support in part because, unlike ETA, they did not undertake attacks to kill people in the name of the Catalan independence. In fact, the authors acknowledge the effect of ETA's interference when they state that the aforementioned interferences 'undermined the didactic function of the armed propaganda' (Ibid, p. 156).

### **Collective action**

*Terra Lliure*'s main actions were explosive devices targeted at government offices, the organization, as a movement, also acted in reaction to detentions. The newspaper *El Periódico* narrates the events that happened after the detention of *Terra Lliure* militants and titles the chronicle 'Urban guerrilla outbreaks in Barcelona'. According to the newspaper, several hundred demonstrators, after being dispersed by the police, engaged them using guerrilla tactics such as improvising barricades with a bus (El Periódico de Catalunya, 1985). Analyzing the events, Sastre et al. write, 'it was the first time after the instauration of the Bourbon regime that the pro-independence youngsters incorporated to the movement appeared fully organized in the streets when there were mobilizations and clashes with the police' (2012, p. 113). This is an example of the organizational level the radical pro-independence movement had. These sporadic riots can be seen as the sum of micro-protests that make up the macro-protest. Not everyone involved was a member of *Terra Lliure*, the same way not everyone attending a protest organized by Greenpeace against the infamous Taiji dolphin hunt belongs to Greenpeace. Moreover, the fact that un-organized individuals spontaneously engage in actions



labelled as ‘urban guerrilla’ is also proof that there is a significant amount of people who share the same cognitive framework, that perceive reality in a similar way, and that believe that the actions they are about to undertake serve a purpose in relation to their perception of reality.

Furthermore, it is also possible to analyze from a collective action perspective the attacks perpetrated by individuals in the name of the organization that the organization itself did not claim (as a matter of fact, *Terra Lliure* disclaimed them).

## Recap

This chapter has analyzed the available information using Karl-Dieter Opp’s model of Social Movement Theory, the Structural-Cognitive model. In order to do so the author has interpreted Bassa’s documentary, and the information available in the books by former militants of *Terra Lliure* as if they were interviews<sup>36</sup> to extract the subjective perception they had about their organization. Any analysis of this kind can always be expanded if new data becomes available, specially interviews with former militants<sup>37</sup>, but with the already available information it should suffice to do a proper analysis.

With the exception of collective action, the most ‘primitive’ theory used in Opp’s model (and also the less relevant) there are multiple elements in the available information to check the utility of Opp’s model to study terrorist organizations as a social movement. All elements of the model are found in *Terra Lliure*, and with the exception of the use of violence, it resembles a social movement.

The table below is a summary of the items found in the available data and their relation to the Structural-Cognitive model. As can be seen, all parts of Opp’s Structural-Cognitive model can be found in a terrorist organization, and working in the exact same way.

Political opportunity structures	Op- Struc-	Resource bilization	Mo-	Framing	Collective Identity	Collective Action
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<sup>36</sup> It is important to keep in mind the limitations of the use of documentation instead of interviews listed by Valles: selectivity, by which the information contained in the documents might have been previously selected, excluding parts of it; the secondary nature of the material, which may produce limitations to the investigation; and the multiple and changing interpretability of the documents (1997, pp. 129-130)

<sup>37</sup> Carles Sastre, among some others, was contacted via Twitter on March 31<sup>st</sup> to request an interview, either face to face or via e-mail, but no answer was obtained.

Spanish Transition	End of repression			‘We are the defeated of the transition’	‘Recruitment’	Attacks by individuals disclaimed by the organization
The Charter	Brest	Merge with EPOCA		Merge with EPOCA	‘Detention – public support – strengthening feeling’ dynamic	‘Urban Guerrilla’ outbreaks at demonstrations
Independence of former socialist states	Increase of available	of rent	Targets: energy companies (ecologism), INEM (socialism)		Name’s election and chants in support of the organization	
Olympic Games	Olympic Games’ repression		Death of Emília Aldomà and ETA’s actions in Catalonia	‘Recruitment’	Death of Emília Aldomà and ETA’s actions in Catalonia	

Table 2. Elements of Opp’s Structural-Cognitive model.

## Conclusions

As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the goal of this research is to elucidate the behavior of terrorist organizations using Karl-Dieter Opp’s Structural-Cognitive model of Social Movement Theory. The research question that spurred this investigation is ‘how does Social Movement Theory explain the behavior of ethnic-nationalist terrorist organization *Terra Lliure*?’ and in order to structure the research, several propositions have been derived both from Social Movement Theory in general as from Opp’s Structural-Cognitive model. The four propositions are:

- Proposition 1: The organization emerged due to a combination of resources available (including time) and the perception that the transition period and early democratic period allowed for mobilization and realistic chances of success.
- Proposition 2: The organization resorted to violence due to the perception that armed struggle could help rally people to ‘the cause’, while at the same time be of leverage against the central government.

- Proposition 3: The organization had a limited scope of action due to the lack of human resources.
- Proposition 4: *Terra Lliure*'s human resources (recruiting pool) were dependent on frame-alignment within Catalan nationalists.

Using the information appeared through the Context and Analysis sections the above propositions can be checked in order to assess to what extent Opp's model explains the behavior of *Terra Lliure*.

Proposition 1 is a mix of resource mobilization and political opportunity structures. Following the resource mobilization part of Opp's Structural-Cognitive model, a movement is to be expected when there are resources available to do so (both economic and non-economic resources); and according to Political Opportunity Structure, a movement will emerge whenever a change at the macro-level allows for people to perceive realistic chances of success. As seen in the Analysis section, the availability of resources was a key element for the emergence of *Terra Lliure*. Not only more economic resources were available during the period in which *Terra Lliure* emerged, but both expertise –coming from EPOCA's militants that joined the genesis of *Terra Lliure*- as well as a decrease of repression allowed for the band to get organized and plan and execute its attacks, but also to receive popular support in demonstrations and other public appearances. It is not possible, and it is not also the goal of this thesis, to elucidate to what extent a similar organization could have emerged if resources had not been available, but the data provided in the Analysis section shows that these elements (increased available rent, the freedom granted by the new regime that allowed for better coordination as well as to show support for the organization's action, and the merging with EPOCA) played an important role in the emergence of *Terra Lliure*.

There is also at least a partial confirmation of the Political Opportunity Structure part of Proposition 1. It is important to remember that one of the key elements of POS in Opp's model is not the change in the macro-variable itself, but the perception that such change allows for realistic chances of success. As shown in the Analysis section, several militants of *Terra Lliure* confirm that they perceived the Transition and the beginning of the democracy in Spain as a time and moment in which an armed organization could achieve national liberation using armed propaganda. Furthermore, other elements have to take into account in order to confirm Proposition 1. The change at the macro-level

that represented the Transition was not the only POS-related event that affected the organization's perception of a feasible success. Another key element was the Brest Chart by which other armed organizations offered mutual help throughout Europe.

Proposition 2 holds that the organization resorted to violence in order to rally more people to 'the cause', a sense of terrorism being a tool for propaganda while at the same time related to framing perspective and collective identity, and the idea that the government, in order to avoid the risks of having an active terrorist organization would change some of its policies. Several testimonies demonstrate the positive and rallying effect violence had, although it was not the only framing process. Bentanach's process of getting involved, coming from a *kale borroka*-ish organization is only one of several. Other include . As shown in the analysis section, *Terra Lliure*'s actions had an educational intention, but also had the ability to rally like-minded people to join their ranks or at least to show support through the Solidarity with Catalan Patriots Committees. The merge of the genesis of *Terra Lliure* with EPOCA can also be put within Proposition 2, since the two organizations had a like-minded analysis of the current situation and the role of violence in the struggle towards national independence.

The first clause of Proposition 2 is confirmed by the evidence. Regarding the second clause, it is worth noting that it does not stipulate that the organization was effectively of leverage against the government, but a perception that it would do so. In order to confirm the second part of Proposition 2 one has to look at the organization's intentions and perceptions, not the objective fact of their actions. There was no explicit mention of this in any of the sources analyzed, although data can be inferred from the content: the spokesperson at the 1987 interview stated 'The day will come in which we'll stop doing armed propaganda and we'll start the proper armed struggle instead' (Sastre, 1999, p. 229). Together with the fact that *Terra Lliure* chose its targets in order to 'educate the masses', one can assert that *Terra Lliure* did not conceive its violence as leverage against the government. Thus, Proposition 2 is partly confirmed by the data, but the non-confirmed part of the proposition does not imply a flaw on the model.

Proposition 3 holds that the organization had a limited scope of action due to its lack of human resources. As seen in the Context and Analysis sections, *Terra Lliure* undertook a lot of attacks, and tries many more, in a relatively long time-span of at least 13 years (17 years if one considers the official dissolution as the end of the organization). As

such, its scope of action varied through years, with some years with little to none attacks (no successful attack in 1979, one successful attack in 1991, two in 1992, three in 1983, and five in both 1985 and 1989), and the rest of the years with several attacks (8 in 1990, 9 in 1985, 11 in 1982, 19 in 1984, 21 in 1987, 24 in 1981, and 32 in 1988). According to Bassa's documentary, *Terra Lliure* was at its weakest since its emergence in 1985, but that year was not the less active for the organization (although it was a relatively inoperative), and even though, the *Moviment en Defensa de la Terra* the political organization giving support, managed to mobilise the highest number of people at a *La Diada* demonstration that year, and the same year was, according to Sastre et al., 'the year in which independentists committed more agitation actions in the streets' (2012, p. 125). Moreover, although there are testimonies of the difficulties caused by detentions and other 'repressive actions', there are also examples of individuals that perpetrated attacks and claimed them in the name of *Terra Lliure*, attacks that were declaimed by the organization. In light of these facts, one cannot hold Proposition 3 as true, since it is not clear that the organization had a limited scope, and that if and when it had it, the limitation was caused by the lack of human resources. Popular support, according to militants of the organization, began to be questioned with the death of Emília Aldomà, the attacks in Catalonia by *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, and by the last attack perpetrated by *Terra Lliure* in which an explosive device exploded early in the morning instead of exploding during the night.

Proposition 4 holds that *Terra Lliure's* human resources, understanding them mainly as the recruiting pool, were dependant on frame-alignment within Catalan nationalists. According to the content analyzed in the previous section, the reason why *Terra Lliure's* militants joined the organization on the first place were related either to framing processes or collective identity, which itself is partly influenced by framing processes. Bentanach's aforementioned statement also is useful for Proposition 4, since it explains, through framing, why he joined the organization –he was part of a kind of *kale borroka*, thus sharing the goals as well as the means with what would become *Terra Lliure-*, but his testimony is not the only one useful here. Moreover, frame alignment explains one the most important moments early in the life of *Terra Lliure*, the merging with EPOCA, which resulted not only in the acquisition of new militants, but also of expertise regarding the use of weapons and the manufacture of explosive devices. Both elements are of vital importance for the emerging organization. In the eyes of former militants, it was

also important for them the notion of being the ‘defeated’ of the transition, since it was for many the justification for their fight for national emancipation: the Spanish transition was understood by many Catalan nationalists, to be a continuation of the Franco regime since, according to them, the State continued to discriminate against Catalans.

Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of Proposition 3, the organization had a somewhat long life-span in which the organization’s capabilities varied. The dependency of human resources (recruiting pool) on frame-alignment can be seen with the split of the IV-Assembly and their demobilization, which many understood was due to the death of the old lady Emília Aldomà, and the belief that the organization’s goal could be accomplished without violence. This is also an example on the dependency of human resources on framing, proving that Proposition 4 holds as true.

Through the analysis and discussion of the four propositions, the utility of Opp’s Structural-Cognitive model can be asserted. It is important to note that, being the model as complex as it is, and the data being as limited as it is, the investigator has had to narrow it down to certain aspects. However, all the information obtained and analyzed in the Analysis section can relate to the Structural-Cognitive model, and also explain several processes. With more resources and more interviews with former militants and leaders this investigation could be expanded.

With all the available information it has also been possible to analyse other elements not taken into account in the four propositions above. For example, *Terra Lliure* is an example of the importance of the communicational aspect of terrorism, which is not understood as part of warfare, but a part of propaganda, being the objective not the destruction of the government or the consecution of national emancipation but to rally more people to one’s cause.

The case of *Terra Lliure* is also an example of the disparity of definitions of terrorism used by the academia and by states. According to some definitions, for example, Richardson’s (which does not consider property as a valid target for terrorism), *Terra Lliure* would not have been considered a terrorist organization (except in the kidnapping and shooting to the knee of Jiménez Losantos), since the vast majority of its targets were property, especially government’s property. In this regard it is also worth noting the utility of considering terrorism not as a specific type of crime, but an extreme within

a wider spectrum of social movements and politically motivated violence, two spectrums in which terrorism can fit and can be better understood.

Moreover, it is also a good example of the utility of Tilly's notion of nationalism, more pragmatic than that of Anderson's or Gellner's in order to study social movements and terrorism, both elements fitting Tilly's category of contentious politics. In this regard, in Catalonia we can observe two regional elites competing to promote Catalan culture and heterogeneity compared to the state's central national elite: *Terra Lliure* being an elite promoting more violent means of propaganda, and the other regional elite being the different political parties self-identifying as 'catalanist', especially, during the period 1980-2003, *Convergència i Unió*, which ruled the region with Jordi Pujol as the regional Prime Minister during most of *Terra Lliure*'s existence. But although *Convergència i Unió* was the main party, and certainly part of the regional elite promoting the peripheral nation to differentiate it from the state's central nation, by the end of the decade of 1980 *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, led by Àngel Colom, managed to demobilize part of *Terra Lliure* (*Terra Lliure IV-Assemblea*).

It is also worth mentioning the current state of affairs regarding the independence of Catalonia. Since the year 2010 there has been a rise in support for independence, with the regional government backed by the *Junts pel Sí* (Together for Yes) coalition, composed of *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*<sup>38</sup>, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, and members of the civil society and other cultural organizations. Although not the subject matter of this thesis, the rise on support for independence is clearly attributable to non-violent and peaceful means, although, some may argue, it is not thanks to *catalanists* that support for independence has grown, but thanks to the perception of certain policies by the central government, as well as certain resolutions by the Constitutional Court. Still, it is possible to argue that *Terra Lliure*'s fight during the eighties could have had some effect on today's demonstrations and political fight for independence.

## Recommendations

The goal of this thesis has been to understand how terrorist organizations behave using an innovative and recent model, so far used to understand social movements – as it is a

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<sup>38</sup> *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* left the coalition due to *Convergència*'s support for independence. The party dissolved and created a new one, roughly following the same ideology: *Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català* (Catalan European Democratic Party).

model for Social Movement Theory – and the Islamic State<sup>39</sup>. As seen with the propositions, the model helps explain several aspects of the terrorist organization’s behavior, although there is still some missing information. It has to be clear that the model takes into account subjective perceptions, not only objective facts, and as such it is helpful to understand *how* and *why* the organization acts as well as *why* an individual decides to join the organization, but as shown in the Analysis section, the model also helps explain *why* someone decides to leave the organization. All this information should be taken into account both to prevent organizations from emerging as well as to prevent individuals from joining, and for those already involved with the organization, to help them demobilize.

One of the core elements of the theory, and perhaps one of the less subjective in nature, is Political Opportunity Structures. It is true that the interpretation one does about a change at the macro level is more important the change itself, but foreseeing possible changes and how they can be interpreted and analyzed is essential in order to prevent the emergence of an organization. Moreover, understanding what makes one want to join a terrorist organization is the first step in order to develop a strategy to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations and to convince those about to join an organization not to join it.

Understanding terrorism as if it were a social movement helps placing the political aspect of terrorism to the forefront, which in turn is essential in order to prevent people from joining terrorist organizations. It is true that police and event military interventions are needed to combat terrorism, but every time a law enforcement agency detains a possible terrorist or a military airplane bombs a possible terrorist base in a faraway country, it is probable that more people would join the organization due to the dynamics of collective identity (the creation of a collective identity through conflict, the ‘detention – public support – strengthening feeling’ dynamic). Crippling the organization’s infrastructure is useful, as it can prevent upcoming attacks, but it does not attack the ideas and perceived reasons that created one terrorist organization or another.

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. Gerges, 2016.



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