

# Violent Terrorists and Extremists

---

*What contributes to their de-radicalization, or disengagement?*



# Universiteit Leiden

Werner ten Doeschate  
Faculty of Public Administration  
Crisis and Security Management  
Thesis supervisors:  
Drs. G.M. Van Buuren  
E. J. van der Heide, MSc  
Date: 10-6-2016, Leiden

## Abstract

In the last decades Europe suffers more and more from the terrorist attacks. Most of the offenders of the European attacks actually grew up in that same country where they performed the attacks; so-called homegrown terrorists. In 2014 dozens of religiously inspired criminals were convicted in Europe. In many cases of conviction to prison, they rehabilitate, the criminals in order to get them reintegrated in the society. But only a few cases are known in which after extremists had done their sentence, they came out de-radicalized. So far it is unclear what kind of rehabilitation program would lead to the best result when it comes to the rehabilitation of extremists. The overall purpose of this study is to gain more insight into what factors contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. Therefore the main research question is: *What factors contribute to the de-radicalization or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001?* In order to formulate an answer to this question a thematic analysis is conducted. The main finding of this case study is that the factors that most often contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists have an individualistic backdrop. Mostly they are led by the individual disillusionment with the ideology, religion and organization.

## Preface

This thesis is written as completion to the master's program Crisis and Security Management, at the University of Leiden. During this program I have gained knowledge on the different causes and forms of crises, and threats to local, national and international security. Within the master's program I have gotten the opportunity participate in a capstone about rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders. This provided me the opportunity to consult and discuss with other students and the thesis supervisors, which I have perceived as both pleasant, and fruitful. It has led to a main topic: De-radicalization and disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists.

During the course of this thesis, I got more and more interested in the topic. By processing all the different interviews of de-radicalized, or disengaged terrorists and extremists, you get to see the more human side of the story. But still, there is a lot to be learned on this topic. Therefore I can conclude that I would like to do more research on this topic in the future.

Finally, I would like to thank both of my supervisors drs. Jelle van Buuren and Liesbeth van der Heide, MSc. They have gave me constructive criticism on my preliminary documents, and guidance in the course of the process if needed. I have greatly appreciated the collaboration.

**Table of Contents**

Abstract..... 2

Preface ..... 3

1.Introduction ..... 7

    1.2 Relevance ..... 8

    1.3 Structure of the Thesis ..... 9

2. Literature Review..... 10

    2.1 Radicalization ..... 10

    2.2 What is a radical, terrorist, jihadist, or violent extremist? ..... 11

    2.3 Homegrown terrorism and its threats: ..... 12

    2.4 De-radicalization and disengagement ..... 13

        2.4.1 De-radicalization..... 13

        2.4.2 Disengagement..... 14

    2.5 The process of Disengagement..... 15

    2.6 The pros and cons according to Bjorgo ..... 16

    2.7 Triggers described by Garfinkel..... 17

    2.8 Model of Bakker & Veldhuis..... 18

    2.9 Model of Demant ..... 19

    2.10 Legitimizing the links of the theories, concepts, and models ..... 20

    2.11 Hypothesis ..... 21

        2.12.1 Summary and conclusion ..... 22

        2.12.2 Conclusion ..... 24

3. Methodology ..... 25

    3.1 The principles of this case study ..... 25

3.2 Systematic Review.....	25
3.3 Unit of analysis.....	26
3.4 Data collection.....	27
3.5 Data analysis by using Thematic Analysis.....	27
3.5.1 Brief Explanation Bakker & Veldhuis.....	29
3.5.2 Brief Explanation Demant.....	29
3.5.3 Brief Explanation Bjorgo.....	30
3.5.4. Purpose of the models.....	30
3.6 Validity and Reliability.....	31
4. Results and Analysis.....	32
4.1 The conduct of the research.....	32
4.2 Meaning of Candidate Themes.....	34
4.2.1 Ideology, Religion and Organization.....	34
4.2.2 Lack of social belonging and New social belonging.....	35
4.2.3 Congenial Assistance by Friends, or Family.....	36
4.2.4 Mindset Society and Acceptance of Western Politics.....	36
4.2.5 Future Goals.....	36
4.2.6 The number of candidate themes.....	37
4.3 Results Model Bakker & Veldhuis.....	38
4.4 Results Model Demant.....	40
4.5 Results Division by Bjorgo.....	42
4.6 Analysis.....	44
4.6.1 Hypothesis Rejected.....	44
4.7 Summary.....	46

5. Discussion .....	47
5.1 Discussion.....	47
5.2 Limitations: .....	49
5.3 Further Research and Recommendations: .....	50
6. Conclusion.....	52
Appendix: I – Model Bakker & Veldhuis.....	54
Appendix: II - Model Demant.....	55
Appendix III – Framework Thematic Analysis.....	56
Appendix: IV – Interviews and Coding.....	57
Appendix V – Results Thematic Analysis .....	72
Appendix VI - Results in Tables.....	81
Bibliography .....	85

## 1. Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a larger issue on the political agenda in the Western countries (European Council, 2016). Though the Al-Qaida attacks took place on American soil, the Western European countries also started to brace their selves (Goodwin, 2011). Additional security measurements were taken, the rules on commercial flights became stricter, and border controls became tighter (Hayes, 2013). Despite the policy changes, terrorism struck again on March 11, 2004. Over 190 people lost their lives, after members of Al-Qaida set off ten bombs in four different passenger trains in Madrid (BBC, 2014). Less than two years later there were three attacks in the London underground and one on a public bus in the center of London. This time over fifty people were killed, and many more were injured (Connor, Rodgers, & Qurashi, 2015). In 2015, Paris got struck by two terrorist attacks. On the 7th of January the editors of the satiric magazine: Charlie Hebdo, got attacked by two armed terrorists. On the 13th of November eight terrorists planned attacks on six different locations, killing 130 people (BBC, 2015). All the attacks in Europe in the past decades has led to hundreds of deaths. But there is a curious difference between the attacks in the United States and those in Europe. The terrorists of the 9/11 attacks were all born in foreign countries, mostly Saudi-Arabia (CNN, 2015). Whereas most of the offenders of the European attacks actually grew up in that same country where they performed their attacks (Farmer, 2016). These so-called homegrown terrorists are familiar with the Western culture from a young age, learned the history, culture, and religions that are important in that certain country. Still they are lured into an ideology that conflicts with the norms and values of their homeland (Precht, 2007).

This changes the threat perception on terrorist attacks, in which the next attack could be organized in a simple living room of a small apartment. These future terrorists could now become radicalized, while being fairly integrated in the current society. Without openly showing their true colors and without having to pass borders, they can become a threat to the peace and safety of the citizens of the country they live in.

Also in the Netherlands there is a trend visible regarding radicalization of Dutch young men and women (Kern, 2014). The number of European Jihadists traveling to Syria has grown over the past couple of years (Stellini, 2015). In the Netherlands alone, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism estimated, over two hundred Dutch fighters

have been recruited to fight along the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Het Parool, 2016). But since the legislative amendments of the criminal law in the Netherlands in 2004, it has become illegal to join, set up, or lead a terrorist organization (Overheid.nl, 2016). Later, it has also become illegal to join, or contribute to trainings of terrorism. It is considered by the Dutch court to make the acquisition of knowledge on these matters are also illegal (Overheid.nl, 2016). Though one is allowed by law to think of, or have, a fascination for terrorist violence, planning an actual attack makes the act illegal (Overheid.nl, 2016).

In 2014 dozens of religiously inspired criminals were convicted in Europe. In many cases of conviction to prison, the criminals rehabilitated in order to get them reintegrated in the society (Gelfand, Gunaratna, & Kruglanski, 2010). Only a few cases are known in which the extremists were de-radicalized, after they had done their sentence (Kouwenhoven, 2015). But so far it is unclear what kind of rehabilitation program would lead to the best result when it comes to the rehabilitation of extremists. The overall purpose of this study is to gain more insight into what factors contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. In addition, the research should make clear what factors are most often a contribution to de-radicalization, or disengagement. Having the knowledge on these aspects could help the development of possible de-radicalization, or disengagement programs. In following line with these purposes is the main research question is:

*What factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001?*

## **1.2 Relevance**

During my literature research I have noticed that a lot of information can be found on radicalization of terrorists. De-radicalization, or disengagement got rather limited attention, and therefore little is known (Feddes, 2015). One thing that is currently sure; de-radicalization of terrorists and extremists is not as simple as reversing the radicalization process (Ashour, 2009). Being able to answer the main research question could expand the general knowledge on this topic. And with this knowledge the development of de-radicalization programs might get one step further to their goal of de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. Knowing the principle aspects that lead to a change of the rigid state of minds of extremists, is crucial regarding development of de-radicalization programs in the future. The programs may adapt their strategy and treatment to these results.



The relevance on a societal level is primarily the safety and security. The fewer violent extremists are active within society, the lower the threat level. Therefore, de-radicalization can be an important facet within the field of counter-terrorism (Noricks, 2009). To eventually be able to de-radicalize is a solution for an ever-expanding problem. A reduction of jihadi terrorists and extremists also means a reduction of the potential risk within society.

### **1.3 Structure of the Thesis**

In this thesis, the audience will first be introduced with several important concepts and definitions in the literature review. Where topics such as: radicalization, radicals, extremists, de-radicalization, disengagement and the process of de-radicalization and disengagement will be elucidated. Later in that chapter will be explained how the different concepts, models and theories are interconnected. In the third chapter, the methodology will be set out, explaining the data collection, method of analysis and hypothesis. In the fourth chapter, the results will be presented and analyzed. The fifth chapter will consist of the discussion, limitations and recommendations for further research. The final chapter concludes with a concise answer to the main research question.

## 2. Literature Review

In this literature review the key concepts, theories and definitions of the thesis will be explicated, by observing the relevant literature that has been published by numerous scholars on these topics. With the literature explicated below, I should be able to answer the main research question: *What factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001?*

### 2.1 Radicalization

In order to identify factors that could possibly lead to de-radicalization, or disengagement, it is important to be able to understand the concept of radicalization and its essence. In the English-language dictionaries radical is explained as: ‘very different from the usual or traditional,’ or ‘favoring extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions, or institutions’ (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). The verb, to radicalize, is subsequently defined as: ‘To cause (someone or something) to become more radical especially in politics’ (Merriam-Webster, n.b.). These definitions produce two fundamental factors describing the concept of radicalization: differences of the usual and extreme changes. Kwakkel and Pruyt combined these factors and formulated radicalization as: ‘the process whereby law-abiding citizens become more and more convinced about a societal phenomenon and the need to take more and more radical action (Kwakkel & Pruyt, 2014).’ Demant describes radicalization more as: ‘a process of de-legitimation, a process in which confidence in the system decreases and the individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008).’ She sees it more as a particularly political process, instead of societal process. But still, an unified definition on radicalization does not yet exist, because radicalization means different things to different people (Schmid, 2004). But since a leading definition is of importance for a thesis, I have picked the definition of Demant. It seems most comprehensive and because her analytic framework will be used as method for this study. A lot of research has been done on the process that leads to radicalization and the meaning of it. These are mostly tended to be answered in the field of socio-psychology and psychology (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). But theories about the process and factors leading to radicalization will not add any useful information for this thesis, since the main research question focusses only on de-radicalization, and disengagement.

## 2.2 What is a radical, terrorist, jihadist, or violent extremist?

A radical, terrorist, jihadist and violent extremist are notions that tend to be involved in topics about de-radicalization and disengagement. Though they all have common grounds, they still have a slightly different meaning. Since all the terms are so much alike, a clear decomposition will create clarity in this pile of concepts.

Radicals are sometimes characterized as: dedicated courageous people, who risk safety for their confrontational and often violent encounters, or people who advocate institutional change (Cross & Snow, 2011). But, with these definitions, radicalism is dependent on the situation and point of view. This notion can be clarified by an example of the student protests in Beijing, in 1989.<sup>1</sup> Some might say, these students and citizens were driven by radicalism (Calhoun & Wasserstrom, 1999). Partly because this could be seen as an alienation from the state (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Others say, it is often determined by the response of the state to a situation, whether term 'radical' is valid (Cross & Snow, 2011). A general and unified definition seems to be impossible since it is a relative term, but in this thesis a 'radical' means: an individual who merely expresses significant dissent from prevailing norms (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010).

But if an individual can be defined as a radical, this does not directly mean he is a terrorist. Research has shown that actually in most cases, people with radical ideas do not engage in terrorism (Borum, 2011). A focus on radicals, however, risks implying that radical beliefs are a necessary precursor for terrorism (Borum, 2011). Radicalizing by developing, or adopting extremist beliefs that justify violence is one possible pathway into terrorism involvement, but it is certainly not the only one (Borum, 2011). So, an addition has to be made on the definition of a radical. A clear difference exist between violent- and non-violent radicals. Whereas a violent radical can be described as an individual who undertakes terrorist activity, or directly aid, or abet terrorism (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010). A non-violent radical is an individual who holds radical views on status quo, but does not undertake, or directly aid, or abet terrorist activity (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010).

---

<sup>1</sup> In May, 1989, over a million students and citizens mobilized to the Tiananmen square to demand political change and more freedom. The demonstrations were halted by the government, by using the brutal force of the military, killing between hundreds and thousands of citizens (Brittanica , 2016).

So, a radical is not always a terrorist, but when is this term valid? Also in this case, no unified definition exists among academic scholars (Ganor, 2002). The recurrence of a relativity issue is the cause for the complexity of this task. For some people, certain types of terrorism can be defined as ‘freedom fighters’, dependent on the point of view (Ganor, 2002). Charles L. Ruby defines terrorism as: ‘politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Ruby, 2002).’ Criticism on this definition comes from its needs of evidence on the motivation of the terrorist, which is in some cases hard to obtain (Tilly, 2004). But with many definitions of terrorism, this aspect cannot be avoided. Even the United Nations is unable to reach consensus on the definition of a terrorist, or terrorism (Human Rights Voices, 2015). Throughout the thesis, the definition of Ruby will be used. And a terrorist will be defined as an individual who have been found guilty to activities related to terrorist activities (Tilly, 2004).

Final term that is important to elucidate is Jihadism. Nowadays this term has a rather negative connotation referring to extremist Islamic thoughts and use of violence towards non-Islamic people, in order to establish true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or God’s law (Brachman, 2008). Though this is not un-true, it still deserves a marginal note. Since Jihad, in the Islamic world, actually refers to internal spiritual campaign trying to be good, or the act of physically waging warfare in defense of the Islam (Brachman, 2008). So, the word Jihadism can be described as a modern neologism, since it is not originally part of the Islamic history, that is nowadays often being used to circumscribe the activities violent extremists (Brachman, 2008). Where Jihadists are seen as modern crusaders, fighting for the expansion of the ground of their religion, with terroristic violence (Cook, 2009).

### **2.3 Homegrown terrorism and its threats:**

Several forms of radicalism and violent extremism has been explicated above, but one type needs more attention in regard to the threat perception of Western Europe. Because of the homegrown terrorist, terrorism can no longer be seen as only an external threat (Mullins, 2010). The terrorist attacks in Western Europe of the last two decades has made that clear,

with examples such as the London bombings and the murder of Theo van Gogh<sup>2</sup> (Precht, 2007). Though the threat of these homegrown terrorists has developed over the period 2001-2005, its seeds for radicalization were planted around the 1990s by mostly radical preachers (Precht, 2007). Homegrown terrorism can be defined as acts of violence against targets primarily in Western countries in which the terrorists themselves have been born or raised (Precht, 2007). The homegrown terrorist had their formative phase, upbringing and cultural influence take place in the Western world (Precht, 2007). The overall purpose of such kind of terrorism, does not differ much from terrorism in general; advancing political, ideological, or religious objectives (Precht, 2007). Nowadays the return of Jihadists from conflict zones are becoming a growing threat. ‘This phenomenon, termed “blow back”, entails that foreign volunteers fighting in the aforementioned conflicts find new targets after they return home to their country of residence or origin (Precht, 2007).’ Because of their gained knowledge on the field of combat and new ideology supporting views, this can become an inspiration for radicalized groups and even supply them with information they otherwise would not be able to achieve (Precht, 2007).

## **2.4 De-radicalization and disengagement**

So far, a lot of research has been done on radicalization, less attention has been paid to the opposite process. The process in which the radicals leave their extremist activities, or violence behind, and maybe even renounce their previous ideology and reasoning (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). Still there are different thoughts on what de-radicalization entails, and when an individual is officially de-radicalized. In this part I will clarify the different notions. Both will be used within in this research.

### **2.4.1 De-radicalization**

De-radicalization is a term that has been used by several academics from different academic fields, therefore the definition is not unified. The following definition focusses on de-radicalization jihadist radicals and extremists. Of course means de-radicalization; becoming less radical. But denoting the reversal of the term radicalization, would simply be superficial

---

<sup>2</sup> Theo van Gogh was a columnist, film director and producer, was famous for his critical view on religion and his sagacious films, columns and statements. He got killed by a Muslim extremist; Mohammed Bouyeri on November 2, 2004 (Burke, The murder that shattered Holland's liberal dream, 2004).

and short-sighted. De-radicalization of jihadists and violent extremists can be described as a process of change that can occur on three different levels, each with their own distinctions. On the first level de-radicalization is a process in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals (Ashour, 2009). That is only one part of it, since during this process the acceptance of the social, political and economic standard will gradually be embraced (Ashour, 2009). This does not mean they actually have to be actively part on a political level, by for example voting, or participating in any form to this electoral system (Ashour, 2009). It is mostly about taking distance from the violence aspect that comes with radicalization of jihadists and violent extremists, rather than immediately changing all ideas on certain topics, such as other religions, and democracy (Ashour, 2009).

De-radicalization can also take place on a behavioral level only. This means that the ideology has not changed, but the actual practice of violence in order to achieve changes political goals has personally been rejected (Ashour, 2009). This has been described as the second level of de-radicalization.

The third level has been described as the organizational de-radicalization, in which the armed units of a violent extremist organization is dismantled (Ashour, 2009). This can occur when the leader of an armed extremist group de-radicalizes on an ideological and/or behavior level (Ashour, 2009). The definition of Ashour is in line with the definition of Demant in her publications. This is important because her analytic framework will be used within this research. Since this thesis only deals with individual cases, the third level will not be useful, for it describes the de-radicalization process of an extremist unit, or organization as a whole.

#### **2.4.2 Disengagement**

‘A disengaged terrorist does not necessarily need to be repentant or ‘de-radicalized’ at all (Horgan, 2009).’ Though the two terms may seem similar, it is important for the clarity within this thesis to elucidate the distinction between two terms. Since they are often used within the literature about violent extremists taking distance of their ideology and/or behavior. The difference between de-radicalization and disengagement can be described as two ways in which one can take distance from extremism. As it already has been mentioned, de-radicalization is the process of moderating the beliefs of an individual (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). Disengagement on the other hand, can be best portrayed as a behavioral

transformation of someone, argues Demant (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). This could mean the disengaged violent extremist has refrained from violence and withdrawing from certain radical, or violent extremist organizations. However Horgan describes the process of disengagement as critical cognitive and social changes, in terms of leaving behind the social norms, values, attitudes and aspiration which were shared with the extremist organization, while being a member of the group (Horgan, 2009). Though the definitions may differ, disengagement may actually be the introduction for a longer process of de-radicalization (Horgan, 2009). In both cases, the extremists that have been de-radicalized, or disengaged are then called former extremists, which is often abbreviated as ‘formers’ (Feddes A. R., 2015). . All and all, there is no unambiguous definition. But for this thesis, the definition of Demant will be leading because of the use of her analytic framework.

## **2.5 The process of Disengagement**

Socio-psychological research has found a common trajectory on the process of disengagement. It begins as a result of a trigger, which is mostly of emotional, or psychological nature (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). This trigger will eventually lead to doubts about the current situation. They are not sure anymore whether their activities or membership linked to their radical social group or organization is to their satisfaction. Subsequently they will weigh the pros and cons of exiting the organization. Horgan has provided his interpretation of the factors contributing to the disengagement, by attributing it to a role change. Within this role change, the individual is unsatisfied with its current state and is looking for a more satisfying alternative (Horgan, 2009). The factor for this role change can have a psychological, or physical base.

There are three psychological or emotional issues that could lead to disengagement. Firstly, the development of negative sentiments that are connected with extremist organization, caused by negative experiences or trauma (Horgan, 2009). Secondly, a change of priorities that is caused by the psychological state. Meaning a longing for a role that contains aspects the are lacking with the current membership, or existed before taking part of the organization (Horgan, 2009). Thirdly, a growing sense of disillusionment with the avenues being pursued, or its quality (Horgan, 2009).

The physical disengagement is in some way different from the psychological counter-part. In this case, the changes are externally identifiable through role migration (Horgan, 2009). Five

aspects that could constitute this form of disengagement, none of which are exclusive. Firstly, the apprehension caused by security services (Horgan, 2009). This threat of, for example imprisonment, could lead to the second aspect; forced movement to another role (Horgan, 2009). The subsequent effect is that the new role gaining activity, displacing the original role. The fourth aspect is a banishment from the movement, as a result of bad conduct within the extremist organization (Horgan, 2009). And the fifth aspect is, just as with psychological disengagement, a change in priority (Horgan, 2009). Besides the role change on a psychological, or physical base, can disengagement occur voluntarily, or involuntarily. In which the latter can take place in cases of punishment by security agencies, or banishment from the organization (Horgan, 2009).




Figure 1.1 Disengagement Trajectory

## 2.6 The pros and cons according to Bjorgo

Bjorgo also did conduct socio-psychological research, in his case on extremist racist groups, and found parallels with crime distance process (Bjorgo, 2002). His findings on disengagement were later also used in studies on disengagement of terrorists (Noricks, 2009). In 2002, Bjorgo first introduced the idea of push and pull factors regarding leaving extremist groups (Bjorgo, 2002). He argues that those who quit the group are affected by a combination of factors. And the higher the number of factors, the stronger the urge to quit the group (Bjorgo, 2002). This culmination of factors could be distinguished into two different types; push or pull.

The push factor relates to negative circumstances or social forces which make it unattractive and unpleasant to remain part in a particular social environment or organization (Bjorgo, 2002). This might include criminal prosecution, social disapproval, lose faith in the ideology and politics of the group (Bjorgo, 2002). In relation to specific terrorist activities is discomfort



with the displacement of violent activities described as push factor. All of these factors can make an individual want to take distance from a specific social environment. They contribute to disengagement from an extremist group.

The pull factors can be described as factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative outside the organization (Bjorgo, 2002). An example is longing for the freedoms of a normal life or getting to old for what the individual is doing (Bjorgo, 2002). Other factors are new future personal plans in the form of career prospects or the establishment of a family with responsibilities for children (Bjorgo, 2002).

As it has been said, the idea of a distinction between push and pull factors has been used several other studies with overlapping topics (Decke & Pyrooz, 2011; Noricks, 2009; Davis & Cragin, 2009). Later another label has been attached to the two factors. Since the push factors originate from within the organization, it is also referred as internal factors (Davis & Cragin, 2009). Factors such as maturation, mitigated career opportunities and family responsibilities are pull factors with external origin (Decke & Pyrooz, 2011).

## **2.7 Triggers described by Garfinkel**

Now the process of disengagement has been clarified, an explanation of the influences that make extremists dissociate from their ideology, or behavior will be analyzed. Garfinkel has given a view on the transformative development from a psychological perspective. In general, she argues that the change has to be approved by personal relationships, who supports and affirms the new peaceful behavior (Garfinkel, 2007). The interaction and thoughts that are shared with this person, are leading in the for the turning point of disengagement.

Garfinkel came up with this statement after a case study. She has studied the dynamics of religious extremists' transformation into proponents of peace by doing interviews. Her unit of analysis consisted of de-radicalized and disengaged individuals from conflict areas around the world (Garfinkel, 2007). She states that the individuals are after their de-radicalization, or disengagement still spiritual and continuing to commit a religious path. And their politics and ideology may still not be the same of the larger part of their society. But after their de-radicalization, or disengagement, they no longer advocate violence and engage people in an affirmative and nonviolent manner (Garfinkel, 2007).

They explained in their interviews, they have felt a great deal of emotional distress, despair and rage, estrangement from others and doubts about their own self-worth (Garfinkel, 2007). The factor that caused de-radicalization, or disengagement, was sometimes the promise of everlasting acceptance from caring peer group (Garfinkel, 2007). They all experienced loneliness until they eventually created a new and different social network. Thus a key factor in the process of de-radicalization, or disengagement is personal relationships (Garfinkel, 2007).

All and all she concludes that a key factor in the transition is personal relationships. Change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor, or friend who supports and affirms peaceful behavior (Garfinkel, 2007). After de-radicalization, or disengagement the individuals risk losing a great deal of social, emotional, and interpersonal support when they convert to a more peaceful outlook (Garfinkel, 2007). For those who have made the step to actually de-radicalize or disengage, a supportive community is vital to hold on to this choice (Garfinkel, 2007).

## **2.8 Model of Bakker & Veldhuis**

Bakker and Veldhuis have done research on radicalization. Previous research has shown that relative deprivation, Western policies in the Middle East, identity problems, bad integration and other psychological processes are often causing the radicalization (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). But Bakker and Veldhuis wanted to create more clarity by analyzing the factors that cause the radicalization. They describe the process of radicalization as an embedded individual process, herewith claiming that the research should be done from the individual perspective living in a social environment (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). With their model they argue that this environment is dividable into three different social levels: macro, meso and micro. By using this model with a large number factors, they have created a coherent body. All three models will be elucidated.

Firstly, macro level is also called the external level, describing the world around the individual where he, or she, has barely influence on (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). This is the social, economic, cultural, and political context in which someone is active. The position an individual takes within the society can be decisive for the process of radicalization. The feeling of no social belonging, or even social exclusion, on a local, national, or international level could cause radicalization (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007).

Secondly, the meso level, here is the individual influenced by social factors of its environment (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). On this level the focus is on identity processes. An identification with a certain social group, is a good indicator of the behavior of someone. Since our behavior is for a large part dependent on the people we identify with (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). An identity crisis for example, could lead to radicalization. Such a crisis may occur if an individual does not have a feeling of social belonging within a group, or relative deprivation (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). Relative deprivation is a subjective feeling of dissatisfaction and inequality when comparing their own situation, with the situation of others. Irrespectively to the objective situation, they will feel discriminated and deprived. This all could lead to frustration and rebellion actions (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007).

Thirdly, the micro level is all about how an individual experiences his, or her, surroundings, and deals with these stimuli (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). The way someone perceives his, or her, surroundings is largely dependent on the cognition. So, the knowledge and thoughts are decisive for the behavior of an individual. The cognition defines whether the behavior is correct, or abnormal (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). A failure in this rating of the correctness of the behavior is called cognitive dissonance. In such a case the individual will try to eliminate the thoughts that say their behavior is incorrect, and gradually believe the things they are saying (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007).

Though this model is created for factors that contributed to the radicalization, instead of de-radicalization, this still will be useful within this research. It provides the possibility to create a clear overview of the distribution of the contributing factors. The way this has been implemented on this topic, is explained in the methodological chapter.

## **2.9 Model of Demant**

Demant has done research on the de-radicalization of individuals. She wanted to find out why people would leave their radical group (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). In order to perform this research she developed an analytical framework. In this framework the motives for de-radicalization had to be described, and the circumstances of the de-radicalization process examined. Herewith she analyzed the similarities and differences and drew conclusions with regard to individual radicalization (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). Demant uses the concept of commitment to the radical group in order to describe why

someone remains radical. Within this concept she distinguishes three forms of commitment. All three forms will separately be elucidated.

Firstly, the normative commitment focusses on the values and views of the individual (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). The more ideological views of someone corresponds with those of the radical group, the stronger the attachment to the organization. The ideology provides meaning to the world someone lives in and a view on perceived injustice (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). A different view on an ideological level could cause a normative crisis, which could lead to disengagement (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008).

Secondly, the affective commitment can be explained as to which extent the individual feels an emotional attachment to an organization (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). The higher the affective commitment, the more the individual is prepared to commit themselves to the organization. The same goes for the contrary process of de-radicalization. Disappointing experiences linked to the organization will weaken the affective commitment, and therefore the participation within the group (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). Eventually it could lead to the disillusionment with the movement.

Thirdly, the continuance commitment is determined by the magnitude of the investment an individual has made, and the quality of the alternatives he, or she, sees (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). A good alternative is often not the only reason for de-radicalization, but could become the deciding factor. Especially when the individual already started having doubts about the membership. Often is the continuance commitment linked to practical circumstances, such as: costs, benefits and opportunities for the individual (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008).

The three forms of commitment are going to be used within this research. In the methodology chapter will be explained how this model goes into play in order to answer the main research question.

## **2.10 Legitimizing the links of the theories, concepts, and models**

All the theories, concepts, and models that are explained in this thesis, may seem difficult to scientifically connect with each other. It is hard to disagree on that notion, if only you look at the differences between the models of Bakker & Veldhuis, and Demant. One is developed aiming at the radicalization process, while the other focusses on the de-radicalization, or

disengagement process. Still there are certainly several commonalities between the models. In order to academically legitimize the interconnecting link between the theories, concepts, and models, a systematic review has been used. The main advantage of this review, is the ability to combine separate elements to form a coherent whole (Lunet, 2012). How the systematic review should be executed, can be read in the methodology chapter. But for this chapter it is important to know; to which extent systematic reviews provide relevant answers to the main research question, depends on the ability of showing the commonalities and connections (Lunet, 2012).

In order to justify the connections, an overarching common theme has to be leading (Lunet, 2012). The studies that are interesting for this thesis all have one overarching theme, namely: factors causing the transition of violent radicals. As it has been said, though one of the models focusses on the radicalization process and the other aims at the opposite process, they both try to create more insights on the transition of the extremists and radicals. The same accounts for the other theories and concepts. Another commonality is the psychological backdrop of the models, theories and concepts.

Then it is important, by the rules of the systematic review, to conclude whether the populations, methods, and results of the different studies are heterogeneous, or homogeneous (Lunet, 2012). In this case the populations, methods, and results are heterogeneous. Since this is the case in this study it provides the possibility to qualitatively analyze (Lunet, 2012). In other words, with the combination of the studies elucidated in the literature review, it is possible to perform a qualitatively analysis. The analysis could subsequently provide an answer to the main research question.

## **2.11 Hypothesis**

*De-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists depends on approval by personal social relationships.*

This hypothesis is based on the claim of Garfinkel. As it has been explained in this chapter, has Garfinkel performed a case study research on the transformation of religious extremists into proponents of peace in regions of conflict around the world (Garfinkel, 2007). As a result she argues that in general the change has to be approved by personal relationships, who supports and affirms the new peaceful behavior (Garfinkel, 2007). The turning point of

disengagement depends on the interaction and thoughts that are shared with this person. This could be to a loved one, a great companion, a family member, or a small cohesive social group.

If the hypothesis is correct it will mean that most of the factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement can be categorized on the meso level, as described by Bakker and Veldhuis. Since this level is about ones identity and relative deprivation in connection with others. Also the congenial and affective categories of Demant shall be applicable to most factors. The congenial level confirms this with the exceptional view on the importance of one single mentor, or friend that contributes to the de-radicalization, and disengagement. The affective level corroborates with the loss of social belonging with the extremist, or radical group. Logically will the individual look for his need of social belonging with another group, or friend. And since this personal social relationship is from outside the organization, it will mean that this factor has an external pull effect, as it has been described by Bjorgo.

### **2.12.1 Summary and conclusion**

In order to identify factors that could possibly lead to de-radicalization, it is important to be able to understand the concept of radicalization itself and its essence. Demant describes it as: ‘a process of de-legitimation, a process in which confidence in the system decreases and the individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008).’ Radicals, terrorists, jihadists, and violent extremists are notions that are involved in topics about de-radicalization. There are three levels of de-radicalization, of which two are useful for this research. On the first level de-radicalization is a process in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals (Ashour, 2009). De-radicalization on the second level means that the ideology has not changed, but the actual practice of violence in order to achieve changes political goals has personally been rejected (Ashour, 2009). Disengagement on the other hand means that a violent extremist has refrained from violence and withdrawing from certain radical, or violent extremist organizations. Since it is almost impossible to decide which one is applicable, when you are not the individual, both terms are used within this research.

The process of disengagement consists of several phases. It always starts with a trigger, which is mostly of emotional, or psychological nature, which will eventually lead to doubts about

the current situation and subsequently a weighing the pros and cons of exiting the organization (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010) Horgan has provided his interpretation of the factors contributing to the disengagement, by attributing it to a role change. Within this role change, the individual is unsatisfied with its current state and is looking for a more satisfying alternative (Horgan, 2009). The factor for this role change can have a psychological, or physical base.

Bjorgo first introduced the idea of push and pull factors regarding leaving extremist groups (Bjorgo, 2002). The push factor relates to negative circumstances or social forces which make it unattractive and unpleasant to remain part in an organization, while the pull factors can be described as factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative outside the organization (Bjorgo, 2002). Later another label has been attached to the two factors. Since the push factors originate from within the organization, it is also referred as internal factors, while the pull factors have an external nature.

Garfinkel concludes that a key factors for disengagement are personal relationships. Change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor, or friend who supports and affirms peaceful behavior (Garfinkel, 2007).

Bakker and Veldhuis have done research on the radicalization process. They developed a model consisting of three levels. Firstly, the macro level describing the world around the individual where he, or she, has barely influence on (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). Secondly, the meso level where the individual is influenced by social factors of its environment (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007) Thirdly, the micro level is all about how an individual experiences his, or her, surroundings, and deals with these stimuli (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007).

Demant has done research on the de-radicalization of individuals. She uses the concept of commitment to the radical group in order to describe why someone remains radical. Within this concept she distinguishes three forms of commitment. Firstly, the normative commitment focusses on the values and views of the individual (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). Secondly, the affective commitment can be explained as to which extent the individual feels an emotional attachment to an organization (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). Thirdly, the continuance commitment is determined by the magnitude of the investment an individual has made, and the quality of the alternatives he, or she, sees (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008)

### 2.12.2 Conclusion

Several parts of this literature review will be important within this research. Firstly, in the analysis will the models of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant be leading. They both use a manner of categorization in which they explain how and on what level the factors contribute to their de-radicalization. Of course describes the model of Bakker & Veldhuis the opposite transition. But it still provides a clear categorization when the notions are transformed from radicalization to de-radicalization. The division of Bjorgo will have an ancillary position. Meaning that it is not part of the core of the analysis, but will provide additional information for an answer to the main research question.

Within the literature review is Garfinkel the only scholar who made a notion that could be perceived as a possible answer to the main research question. Her findings are the result of a rather similar case study. Which makes it interesting to us it as the hypothesis within this study.

The linkage between the various theoretical parts are justified by the usage of a system review. Herewith it is possible to link studies with different populations, methods, and results, by placing them all under one overarching theme. In this study the overarching theme is: factors causing the transition of violent radicals.



### 3. Methodology

In this chapter I will present the method that will be leading in this research in order to answer the research question: *What factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001?* Firstly, the principles of this case study will be explained and the way the literature has been selected using the systematic review. Subsequently, the unit of analysis, data collection, and thematic analysis will be introduced. To finally explain the models and make a statement on the validity and reliability

#### 3.1 The principles of this case study

In this case study, fifteen different cases will be analyzed and categorized. In order to collect the data I will use a sequential transformative strategy (Creswell, 2013). This strategy has been described as a two-phase project with theoretical lens overlaying the sequential procedures (Creswell, 2013). In this case it starts with an initial qualitative phase, followed by a quantitative phase that builds on the earlier phase (Creswell, 2013). Meaning that the data of the first qualitative collection will lead to data, that thereafter will be analyzed in a quantitative manner.



Figure 2 Sequential Transformative Strategy

In order to eventually formulate an answer to the research question, the theory of Garfinkel will be tested. And though it has been explained in the literature, de-radicalization, or disengagement is a little more complex than just the contrary process of radicalization. Nevertheless, some methodological aspects of researches on radicalization are borrowed in order to eventually formulate an answer to the research question.

#### 3.2 Systematic Review

In order to find the right studies, concepts and theories to answer the main research question, is the literature collected by means of a systematic review. With a systematic review the search for information and studies that are used, have to be specifically useful to answer the main research question (Van Driel, n.b.). The following plan provided guidance in order to perform the systematic review. Firstly, it was important to make a definitive research question

(Lunet, 2012). Secondly, an identification and selection of original studies had to be done (Lunet, 2012). In this case the concepts, studies and definitions that were assessed, were the ones about: radicalization, radicals, terrorists, jihadists, homegrown terrorism, de-radicalization, disengagement and formers. In the third phase the data extraction took place. Only the literature that could help to answer the main research question, has been selected for the study (Lunet, 2012). Short summaries of the guiding concepts have been provided in literature review chapter, in order to subsequently elucidate different researches, findings, and theories. In the final phase the data synthesis took place (Lunet, 2012). The extent to which systematic reviews provide relevant answers to the main research question, depends on the accomplishment of showing the commonalities and connections (Lunet, 2012). The commonalities and connections were presented and the end of the literature chapter.

### **3.3 Unit of analysis**

In order to answer the research question, I will use de-radicalized and disengaged jihadi terrorists and extremists as research population. Whether an individual is de-radicalized and disengaged depends on the individual itself. Only they know that they have disassociated themselves from the radical or extremist mindset. The research population will therefore only consist of individuals who have openly taken this stance. There are probably more cases where ex-terrorists or extremists are de-radicalized, or disengaged. But if they keep this change to themselves, it is clearly impossible to approach them for interviews, nor will they publish a book about this process.

The factors that have contributed to the disengagement or de-radicalization of jihadi terrorist and extremists are indicated by themselves. The de-radicalized and disengaged will explain in their interviews what these factors may be. This could be one clear turning point or key moment, but also an outline of a period can be described as a factor of contribution.

The cases all have taken place in Western Europe from 2001 onwards. This means that the individuals all grew up in Western Europe, the de-radicalization, and disengagement can be triggered elsewhere. The reason for this delineation on a geographical level is for the sake of the comparability cases. They all took place in a rather similar cultural and political environment. In this region the national notions on democracy, freedom, rules and laws are in general comparable due to its cooperation with one another on a supranational level. The reason for the demarcation on time comes from a historical perspective. The attacks on

September 11, 2001, are often appointed as a moment of change when it comes to terrorism in the Western world (Palenchar, Heath, & Orberton, 2005; Gurwitch, Pfefferbaum, & Leftwich, 2002; Michel-Kerjan & Pedell, 2005). Therefore the year of 2001 has been set as limit, again to increase the comparability of the cases. Also due to the limited time to conduct this research, both aspects had to be framed.

### **3.4 Data collection**

The dataset that will be used to answer the research question, will consist of interviews of de-radicalized, or disengaged jihadi terrorists and extremists. These interviews can either be written in articles, or filmed for broadcasting purposes. The integrity of the data will be assessed by looking at its source. The quality of the interviews depends on the person, or program who did the interview with the de-radicalized interviewee. In most cases these will be hosts of news related talk shows and journalists of news media. The data can be obtained on the internet, or libraries.

I have used google in order to find the sources that are needed for this research. By searching on terms such as: 'ex-jihadist', 'ex-extremist', 'formers', 'disengagement' in Dutch, English and French, to find as many individuals as possible. Only problem with these terms is the fact that Google constantly wants to offer an alternative search term, referring to the cases of radicalization and extremism.

### **3.5 Data analysis by using Thematic Analysis**

In order to draw conclusions from the data, content analysis will be used, more specifically; thematic analysis. This methodology has a qualitative approach and will provide the flexibility that is needed. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At the end of the analysis it is possible to report the content and meaning of patterns (themes) in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The process of the thematic analysis can be divided in six phases. Each phase has different key points in order to perform a good thematic analysis. In the first phase it is important to familiarize with the data that has been collected, by reading, re-reading and transcribing data. The data should be transcribed to an appropriate level of detail (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A thematic analysis does not need a high level in the transcript; at a minimum it requires a

rigorous and thorough ‘orthographic’ transcript (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Meaning that it simply should represent the things that are said.

In the second phase the initial codes are generated, in which interesting features of the data have to be summarized in systematic fashion (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In a later phase the codes have to be categorized in themes. However, the coding will depend on whether the themes will be more ‘data-driven’, or ‘theory-driven. In the first case, the themes will depend on the data. If it is the latter, the data have to be approached with a specific theory in mind, which should be coded around (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In practice this means the codes should have a linkage to models of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant. Due to the limitations of time it is impossible to compare it with more models. In this phase it is important to work systematically, to give every data equal attention and identify interesting aspects, such as patterns and repetitions.

In the third phase the extracted codes have to be sorted in potential themes. This should be executed by combining different codes to form an overarching theme. Important for these themes is that they should be internally coherent, consistent, and distinctive (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In the first instance sub-themes are created. Then a second level of so-called thematic themes is constructed by combining the sub-themes. In the end of this phase there is a collection of candidate themes, sub-themes, and all extracts of data that haven been coded (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It could be possible to see where the candidate themes can be placed within the two models of Bakker & Veldhuis, and Demant.

The fourth phase is being described as the moment in which the themes are being refined. An important principle that should be considered while devising the themes is the internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This means that the data within themes should cohere together meaningfully, while at the same time the themes should have an identifiable distinction

The fifth phase is about defining the essence of each theme. In the case of a theory-driven analysis, the themes are already defined and should only be explained. But still the candidate themes should be explicated; showing what aspects of the data is captured by the candidate themes and its meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At the end of this phase all the themes have its clear distinction and definition.

In the final phase the report will be produced as a result of a final analysis. The analysis should provide a concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive and interesting account of the story the data tell (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The eventual report should go beyond description of the data, and develop an argument in relation to the main research question.

### **3.5.1 Brief Explanation Bakker & Veldhuis**

In the literature review is the research elucidated of Bakker and Veldhuis. They describe the process of radicalization as an embedded individual process. Herewith they claim that the research should be done from the individual perspective living in a social environment (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). They argue that this environment is dividable into three different levels. Firstly, macro level is also called the external level, describing the world around the individual where he, or she, has barely influence on (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). Secondly, the meso level is influenced by social factors of its environment (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). Thirdly, the micro level is all about how an individual experiences his, or her, surroundings, and deals with these stimuli (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007). Though this model was originally used to see which factors contribute to the radicalization of individuals, in this research this model will be used with a focus on de-radicalization, and disengagement. The factors that are explained by the de-radicalized and disengaged will be categorized in these three levels. For the exact definitions of the categories, I refer to appendix I (Table: 12).

### **3.5.2 Brief Explanation Demant**

The second categorization that will be used in this research is developed by Froukje Demant. She distinguishes three different kind of factors, which all can play an important part in the de-radicalization (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008). Firstly, the normative factor is applicable when the individual finds the ideology no more appealing. Secondly, the affective factor applies when there is dissatisfaction about the social and organizational aspects. And thirdly, the continuing factors contributing to de-radicalization is caused when the practical circumstances are no longer satisfying. Though these three different kind of factors will be helpful when it comes to categorization, but I believe she leaves a gap. Therefore a fourth kind of factor is needed, the self-appointed: congenial factor. Congenial can be defined as having the same nature, disposition, or tastes and existing, or associated together harmoniously (Merriam-Webster). The addition of this factor is the result of the view of Garfinkel on the transformative development from a psychological perspective. He argues

that the change has to be approved by personal relationships, who supports and affirms the new peaceful behavior (Garfinkel, 2007). The interaction and thoughts that are shared with this person, could be leading in the for the turning point of disengagement. This kind of factor is impossible to categorize in one of the three other factors described by Demant. For the exact definitions of the categories, I refer to appendix II (Table: 13).

### **3.5.3 Brief Explanation Bjorgo**

The third model is a division developed by Bjorgo. He states that those who quit the group are affected by a merger of factors. He argues that those who quit the group are affected by a merger of factors. And the more factors are applicable, the stronger the urge to quit the group (Bjorgo, 2002). Bjorgo divides the possibilities in push factors, and pull factors. The push factor relates to negative circumstances or social forces which make it unattractive and unpleasant to remain part in a particular social environment or organization (Bjorgo, 2002). The pull factors can be described as factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative outside the organization (Bjorgo, 2002). Later another label has been attached to the two factors. Since the push factors originate from within the organization, it is also referred as internal factors (Davis & Cragin, 2009). Factors such as maturation, mitigated career opportunities and family responsibilities are external pull factors (Decke & Pyrooz, 2011).

### **3.5.4. Purpose of the models**

By analyzing and categorizing the factors, I want to create a clear overview of the factors that contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe (Table: 1). The results will subsequently be quantitatively categorized in the models of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant. These two models of categorization of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant are both useful for creating this overview. They both will have a guiding role during the process of coding within the thematic analysis. The division of Bjorgo is not part of the core of the analysis, but will provide additional information for an answer to the main research question. The framework in appendix III provides an image of this process (Figure: 7).

Bakker & Veldhuis	Demant et al.	Bjorgo
Macro	Normative	Push / Internal
Meso	Affective	Pull / External
Micro	Continuing	
	Congenial	

Table 1: Models of categorization

### 3.6 Validity and Reliability

The abovementioned method has proper construct validity. Construct validity refers to the degree to which the method that is used, actually measures what it aims to measure (Trochim, 2006). By using two different models to see which factors contributed to de-radicalization, and disengagement it creates sufficient construct validity. Higher construct validity could be achieved, by using more models, but due the limitations on time of this research, this is not feasible. Despite the usage of the method it still has a restricted external validity. Since only a dozen of cases will be discussed in this research, this does not mean it will result in a general rule. For a higher validity more cases should be treated. But since the cases only consist of individuals who are open about their de-radicalization, or disengagement, complete validity is impossible. The group of individuals who had a radical, or extremist history, but keep it privately, will never be reached.

The reliability is limited due to the use of coding by one single researcher. Since the coding that is used within the thematic analysis is always subjective, it affects the reliability. If multiple researchers would do this, it would increase the reliability, by decreasing the influence of the subjectivity.

## 4. Results and Analysis

In this chapter the results of the research will be presented. Firstly, the process of the research will be elucidated, in which it will be explained how the data has been practically used within the thematic analysis, in order to get the final results. Subsequently, will the results be exposed and enucleated in two different ways. First the findings in relation to the model of Bakker & Veldhuis will be shown. Thereafter will the results of the model of Demant displayed, to eventually present the division according to Bjorgo. After that matter will several additional findings on the candidate themes be presented that have influence on the answering of the research question. Finally will the analysis be presented in which the theoretical framework will be applied in order to explain what factors contribute to the de-radicalization. And the hypothesis will be confirmed, or rejected depending on the correspondence with the findings.

### 4.1 The conduct of the research

In order to analyze what factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001, I have used the thematic analysis as described by Braun and Clarke. In this research fifteen different cases are highlighted to provide the data that was needed. These cases consisted of written interviews that have been published online, and interviews that were broadcasted on television and later has been put on the internet. Only the sections in which de-radicalization, or disengagement were the main topics of discussion, have been cited, or transcribed (Table: 2).

Data Extract: Nr. 10	Coded for:
Case: Morten Storm (DK) (2nd July, 2014)	
<i>Even so, Storm was beginning to doubt the message. He was troubled by what he saw as an incoherence within Islam on the question of free will and predestination. According to Agent Storm, however, his biggest problem was presented by the indiscriminate violence of the movement.</i>	Doubting the religion Critical thinking due to violence

Table 2: Example of coding



Thereafter the coding phase took place, in which the meaningful information on de-radicalization, and disengagement have been picked and organized manually (Table: 2). Seventy-four different pieces of text have been extracted and coded. The coding was ‘theory-driven’, meaning that the data was approached with several themes in mind, in which the code extracts of the data could be fitted (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this research these themes are those that are described in the two models of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant.

In the third phase all the codes have been allocated in the two models, therefore using all the codes twice. At the same time, sub-themes were created by sorting and combining codes with a similar focus, or message. All the sub-themes were organized in a table, and thereafter arranged on a wider level of similarities in candidate themes (Table: 3). When it comes to the categorization of the data, it was important to consider that data within themes should cohere together meaningfully. While at the same time there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The table now contains themes, sub-themes and data themes.

Case 5:				
Codes:	Sub-themes	Candidate theme	Bakker	Demant
Critical thinking about religion due to other views	<b>New view religion</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Errors in simplified political arguments	<b>Political understanding</b>	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
Errors in religious arguments	(New view religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)

Table 3: Example of allocation codes into themes

As it has been explained, the interviews provided the data for this research. Since every case consists of a different kind of interview, it contains no consistency in its length, nor in the size of each individual dataset. This means that a long interview could contain more codes than the shorter ones. To prevent that a longer interview would have more influence on the results, every theme should maximally be tallied once per case, in each model. So, if an individual indicated twice in an interview, that due to a critical mindset about religion he got de-radicalized, it only counted once in the table of themes. By counting all the coding it creates an overview of the frequency of the occurrence of de-radicalizing factors. Eventually it is possible to see how much and which factors contributed to de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists.

## **4.2 Meaning of Candidate Themes**

The data that has been extracted from the interviews lead to ten different candidate themes. As the thematic analysis explanation by Braun and Clarke state, it is important to elucidate the themes. Though some candidate themes show clear distinctions between one another, in some cases the dividing line seems really thin. The candidate themes will be explained by showing its meaning, the differences, and its possible relations. Lastly will be stated whether the candidate themes are internal, or external aspects that contribute to disengagement.

### **4.2.1 Ideology, Religion and Organization**

All these three candidate themes tend to have some overlap. Because in most cases the extremist organizations have a fundament of an ideology, in which religion is a great deal. But for this analysis there were differences in definitions and meaning which led to the division.

Ideology is defined as the idea on human relations and the organization of society and above all how the society should behave (Mariam-Webster, n.b.). So it is a concept of about human life and culture and a manner of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture (Mariam-Webster, n.b.). In some of the cases the individual kept it rather superficial, when it came to contribution to disengagement, by literally saying they did not agree with the ideology anymore. In other cases where the ideas on a political level and justice reasons for taking distance from the group.

An organization is more about the administrative and functional structure of the radical group (Marriam-Webster, n.b.) In comparison with the ideology is the organization more about the

actual activities of the group. These activities could range from the recruitment, up until the implementation of corporal punishment. The clearest distinction between the ideology and the organization lays in the passive and active thoughts and events done by the extremists. The factors of contributing to disengagement often had a linkage with its cruel activities.

The religion is defined as a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, principles, beliefs, and practices (Merriam-Webster, n.b.). One part of it is the commitment or devotion to religious faith and god (Merriam-Webster, n.b.). This organized system of rules that are used within the worship of a god, will find its implementation within the religious ideology of an extremist group. The difference lays in how the religious principles should be implemented within a society. For example, a religion could argue that homosexuality is a sin. And in some cases the religion explains that the people carry out homosexual acts, should be punished. The ideology will then describe how this sin reflects on society, and what retribution should be imposed. This punishment will eventually be executed by the organization. The factors that contributed to disengagement that had a religious backdrop were mostly caused by new views on the religion. In most cases they simply lost their faith, or did find a new interpretation of the religion. All of the three candidate themes can be described as external aspects that contribute to disengagement.

#### **4.2.2 Lack of social belonging and New social belonging**

These candidate themes have the same backdrop, but a much clearer distinction. Both themes are about the feeling of social belonging. The lack of social belonging is a candidate theme that shows that while the individual was part of the extremist group, he did feel displeasure about his social connections. In some cases he did not feel a connection with the members within the group. The expectations on this level, often did not match with the reality, hoping they would easily be included in the group. Other cases have shown that the individual was not able to connect with non-extremists and family members outside the group. The disengagement has an internal origin.

A new social belonging also contributed in some cases to the disengagement from the radical groups. This occurred in the form of wanting to find new friends outside the group, or already having new social connections outside the group. All and all the individual found, or want to find social acceptance by non-extremist. The disengagement in this case has an external origin.

### **4.2.3 Congenial Assistance by Friends, or Family**

Support by certain individuals contribute to disengagement of radicals. The assistance may come from friends, mentors, or family members. The base for a distinction between friends and family often lays in its number. When individuals refer in their interviews to their family as contribution to their disengagement, this is often a group of parents and siblings. Whereas the congenial assistance of friends, mostly refers to only one person. Another reason for a distinction is off course caused by the difference between a familiar connection, and a connection with a friend or mentor. Whereas one you cannot choose and happen to live with. And the other is often based on mutual acceptance. The support of the different categories of the congenial assistance, also have a difference in its supportive effect (Heller & Procidano, 1983). Both candidate themes can be categorized as external aspects contributing to disengagement of violent radicals and extremists.

### **4.2.4 Mindset Society and Acceptance of Western Politics**

The candidate themes on the mindset on society and the acceptance of Western politics might seem to have the same charge, still there are differences. The mindset on society is about the humans living around the radical individual and his idea about what is good or bad within society. The acceptance of Western politics is more about the governmental and legal system of the country the radical lives in. Each of these candidate themes describe external aspects contributing to the disengagement.

### **4.2.5 Future Goals**

This candidate theme is all about what the individual wants to achieve later on in his life. The disengagement was in these cases contributed by having new plans outside the organization. These contributions can be described as external aspects.

#### 4.2.6 The number of candidate themes

By counting all the candidate themes it creates an image in which it is possible to see how often a candidate theme contributed to de-radicalization, or disengagement. Again, to prevent that a longer interview would have more influence on the results, every candidate theme has been counted maximally once per case. The results show that most of the cases the religion contributed to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of the extremist (Figure: 3&4). This could have been caused by, for example, doubts about the religion, or new findings on how the religion should be expressed, or practiced. The ideology had in ten out of the fifteen a contribution to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of the individual. In which often the individual had another view on what is justice and injustice. These ideas were mostly caused by the abominations that were carried out from the beliefs of the ideology. The third largest contribution could be linked to the actual activities of the organization, from the cruel deeds, up until the way they recruited new members.




Figure 4: Distribution of candidate themes

Figure 3: Frequency of candidate themes, max 1 per case

### 4.3 Results Model Bakker & Veldhuis

In order to answer the main research question, the model of Bakker & Veldhuis has been used in combination with the thematic analysis, as it has been described by Braun and Clarke. The analysis of the data led to the following results (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Results model Bakker & Veldhuis

Only one clear case showed that a factor on a macro level contributed to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of an extremist (Table: 4). This level was characterized by factors that take place in the so-called external level. It consists of the politics, economy and culture of his, or her country, and the individual has barely influence on these aspects. In this specific case, was the de-radicalization, or disengagement partly caused by the sympathy of the Western politics and its society.

Candidate themes linked to macro level	<b>Acceptance Western politics</b>
Frequency	1

Table 4: Frequency of candidate themes linked to macro level

The results of the research show that in fourteen out of the fifteen cases the factors, that contributed to the de-radicalization, or disengagement could be linked to the meso-level. The meso level was described as factors that had its origins from social dynamics, in which the relation with others, the identity processes and relative deprivation are the main examples. In

almost all the cases has the explanation of the de-radicalized individual been categorized on this level. The factors that mostly lead to de-radicalization, or deradicalization on this level could be traced back to the extremist organization (Table: 5). Where in eight cases the individuals did not want, or could not identify themselves with the organization anymore because of its cruel, wrongful, or general activities. (Collective Identity) In six cases the individual argued that he de-radicalized as a result of congenial assistance. Finding other social relations outside the organization are also in three cases the contributing factors for the de-radicalization, or disengagement.

Candidate themes linked to meso level	<b>Congenial assistance family</b>	<b>Congenial assistance friends</b>	<b>New Social Belonging</b>	<b>Organization</b>
<b>Frequency</b>	2	4	3	8

**Table 5: Frequency of candidate themes linked to meso level**

In fourteen cases did factors, that could be linked to the micro level, contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. The micro level is about how the individual perceives its surroundings, which could be influenced by its psyche, rationality and personal experience. In eleven cases was the de-radicalization, or disengagement caused by a factor that had a religious backdrop (Table: 6). The individual mostly had gotten a new and different view on their religion, or god. In some cases this occurred by a personal dramatic experience. Others learned new ideas through education, or getting another view as a result of critics from outsiders. Besides the religion, was the perception of the ideology often a factor of de-radicalization, or disengagement. Examples of these cases describe a situation in which the individual did not agree with their perception of justice anymore, or found out that the political arguments were incorrect.

Candidate themes linked to micro level	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mindset society</b>	<b>Future goals</b>
<b>Frequency</b>	11	8	3	2	2

**Table 6: Frequency of candidate themes linked to micro level**

### 4.4 Results Model Demant

Besides the model of Bakker & Veldhuis is the model of Demant on de-radicalization used to categorize the data with the thematic analysis. The themes that were used are presented below, along with the results. Figure 9 shows which themes of factors contributed most frequent as factor of de-radicalization, or disengagement.




Figure 6: Results model Demant

In the fifteen cases that have been analyzed, did have all of the cases at least one factor of de-radicalization, or disengagement, that had a normative backdrop (Table: 7). The normative factors are characterized by a doubts about the ideology, or organization, and acceptance of the Western society. In eleven cases the de-radicalization, or disengagement was triggered by doubts, or even apostatizing the religion. This was often the result of religious education and new ideas on how the religion should be interpreted. Also the discontent of the ideology and the organization often led to the de-radicalization, or disengagement. The abominations and the different view on justice and injustice of the ideology and organization, were mostly marked as points of criticism in most of these cases.

Candidate themes linked to normative factors	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mindset society</b>	<b>Acceptance Western Politics</b>
Frequency	11	9	8	2	1



Eleven cases showed factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement that had affective aspects (Table: 8). This means that experiences the individuals had with the extremist organization, or activities, were disappointing. It is not what they had expected when they proverbially signed in. This led to a lower affective commitment, till the organization eventually did not meet his need for identity. The logical consequence were in these cases disengagement, or de-radicalization. In eight out of the eleven cases, the individual was disappointed about the organization because of its atrocities, or wrongful activities. A smaller part of the individuals did not feel they socially belong within the organization, or found new social belonging outside the organization. And finally there were four cases in which the individual did not have affection with the ideology of the extremist movement.

Candidate themes linked to affective factors	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Lack of social belonging</b>	<b>New social belonging</b>
Frequency	4	8	4	3

Table 8: Frequency of candidate themes linked to affective factors

Two individuals explained factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement, that could be placed within the theme of continuing factors. People who de-radicalize with a continuing backdrop focusses on practical circumstances. This means they take the costs, benefits and opportunities in regard, and find themselves better off without the extremist commitment. This was the case with the two individuals within this theme (Table: 9). Considering their future and setting new goals, made the two extremists de-radicalize.

Candidate themes linked to continuing factors	<b>Future goals</b>
Frequency	2

Table 9: Frequency of candidate themes linked to continuing factors

Finally, there were six cases in which an individual described factors, that contributed to the de-radicalization, or disengagement, which had a congenial backdrop (Table: 10). This means that they dissociated from their extremism with assistance of friends, or family members. These congenial companions are people who the individuals can trust and have a harmonious relationship with. The de-radicalized explained four situations in which they were supported by friends. And in two cases were the family members had a critical role, which eventually contributed to the de-radicalization, or disengagement.

Candidate themes linked to congenial factors	<b>Congenial assistance family</b>	<b>Congenial assistance friends</b>
Frequency	2	4

**Table 10: Frequency of candidate themes linked to congenial factors**

### 4.5 Results Division by Bjorgo

The models of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant on de-radicalization, or disengagement, were used to categorize the data with the thematic analysis. One of the results of this analysis are the candidate themes that later were assigned to the themes.

Another way of division that can be applied to the results of the research, is created by Bjorgo. He argues that a trigger will lead to situation in which the individual is not sure whether, or not to leave the organization. He will than weigh the pros and the cons of his engement with the organization. Bjorgo explained these factors influencing consideration, as push and pull factors. Push factors are the negative internal aspects that will shove the extremist out of the organization. Examples of internal aspects are: loss of belief, dissociation from the organization, or disillusionment with the inner group. Pull factors are attractive external aspects that will lure the extrmist away from the organization. These external aspects are for example: career opportunities, maturation, family and social responsibilities. Figure # shows how this applies for the candidate themes within this research and how often it occurred within the fifteen cases.

<b>Push factor / Internal aspects</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Pull factor / External aspects</b>	<b>Total</b>
Religion	11	Congenial assistance friends	4
Ideology	10	New social belonging	3
Organization	8	Mindset Society	2
Lack of social belonging	4	Congenial assistance family	2
		Future goals	2
		Acceptance Western society	1
<b>Total:</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>Total:</b>	<b>14</b>

**Table 11: Frequency of internal and external aspects of candidate themes**

The results show that almost twothird of all the factors have a pushing effect as explained by Bjorgo, that can lead to the turning point (Table: 11) In most of the cases, is the de-radicalization, or disengagement caused by the dissatisfaction that had lineage to the activities within the organization, or while being active in the organization. Disagreements on the activities, policies and plans of approach make many individuals want to turn their back to the organization. New visions and ideas on religion and ideology led to a whole new perceptions about what was good and bad. When they had come to this realization, it led to the dissociate as a result of disillusionment. In fewer situation are the postive luring aspects from outside the prevailing cause to dissociate from the extremist activities. New goals that were only able to be achieved outside the organization, relationships with non-extremists and accepting the Western society, are examples of reasons that made them desingage.

## 4.6 Analysis

In this part will the results be analyzed, in order to answer the main research question. My expectations, in the form of the hypothesis, will be tested and therefor serve as the leitmotiv. The hypothesis states: De-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists depends on approval by personal social relationships. This hypothesis is based on the claim of Garfinkel. To elucidate this notion, the factors that contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement, can be traced back to a strong social connection with an individual, or group. If this idea would be right, it would mean that in most of the cases, the factors will be categorized on the meso, affective, or congenial level. And that in most of the cases the factors are in nature pulling and internal, as explained by Bjorgo.

### 4.6.1 Hypothesis Rejected

The findings show that indeed in most of the cases the factors could be categorized in the meso level, within the model of Bakker & Veldhuis. But the same number could be categorized in the micro level. Meaning that the de-radicalization, or disengagement of the individuals was depended on factors that were the result of social relationships. Or in other cases by the way someone perceives their surroundings. This notion is only partly in line with the hypothesis. Many factors were categorized in the meso level, but also the micro level had great a contribution in an equal number of cases. When it comes to the model of Bakker & Veldhuis, it is possible to argue that the social dynamics are evenly important as the way an individual perceives its surroundings regarding its frequency.

But a side note has to be placed on this notion about the high frequency of the meso level. It suggests that it also confirms the idea of the importance and dependency of approval of a social relationship. But when you take a closer look at the cases, it is noticeable that within this research this is not completely true. Firstly, in one particular case an individual only de-radicalized because of his personal perceiving. No social aspects were involved in that case, in which his changes should have been approved. His decision to change only depended on his personal findings and his new political and religious understanding. Secondly, not all the factors that have been categorized in the meso level, had a direct linkage with an approval by someone with a close relationship with the extremist. In several cases the individuals did not have a feeling of social connection with the group, or did not want to identify themselves with the abominations of the organization, which led to their disengagement.

The expectation that in most of the cases, the contributing factors would be connected to the affective and congenial themes in the model of Demant, is not in line with the results of the research. Only in eleven, respectively six cases, did these factors have a contribution to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of the jihadi terrorists and extremists. Though, in all of the cases a crisis of the normative commitment actually did have a contribution. In these cases faded the moral obligation to remain engaged, due to doubts about the ideology, movement, or organization. The reality while participating in the organization was not in line with the expectations they had prior the involvement. Though in some of these cases the de-radicalization, or disengagement was partly caused by social aspects, still it was never a necessity for this to occur. In addition, the numbers of the affective commitment show a distorted image about the influence of a social aspect. Since not all of the factors that have been categorized within affective category, had problems on a social level. For example, in some cases the individuals felt disappointed about the experiences with the organization. Only six cases show a clear contribution of a personal relationship to the de-radicalization, or disengagement.

So the model of Demant shows that the de-radicalization, or disengagement does not solely depend on the approval by social relationships. On the other hand the results suggest that it is dependent personal doubts about the ideology, organization or religion, and its perceiving of justice and injustice.

The results of the division by Bjorgo, also indicate a rejection of the hypothesis. In most of the cases is de-radicalization, or disengagement caused by dissatisfaction had lineage to the activities within the organization. These factors pushed the individual away in a figurative sense, from the social environment. The feeling of discomfort about the activities, policies and plans of approach make many individuals want to turn their back to the organization. The factors that the hypothesis alludes to are described as external pull factors. But the social factors that should lure the individual away from the organization showed to be valuable in definitely not all the cases.

All and all, the hypothesis has to be rejected. De-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists does not depend on approval by personal social relationships. Only in a small part of the cases did the contributing factors have this kind of social backdrop. The model of Bakker & Veldhuis showed that in most cases the contribution was led by the way

an individual perceives his surroundings, and by the social dynamics. But a closer look at the category of social dynamics showed that not every factor is about the approval of an individual, or group. The model of Demant also reject the hypothesis. In all of the cases did a crisis on the level of normative commitment have a contribution to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. In these cases the individuals started having doubts about the ideology of the organization, or movement. The congenial and affective commitment did not have influence on all of these cases. Getting approval of a personal relationship in order to de-radicalize was no necessity in these cases. The results of the division by Bjorgo also rejected the hypothesis. They claim that the majority of factors contributing to de-radicalization, or disengagement had an internal push effect. Leaving the organization, or taking distance from the radical thoughts, did not stand or fall with social approval.

#### **4.7 Summary**

In order to analyze what factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001, the method of thematic analysis is used. It started with the transcription and citation of the interviews. Thereafter took the coding phase place, in which the meaningful information on de-radicalization, and disengagement have been picked and organized manually. In the third phase all the codes have been allocated in the two models of Bakker & Veldhuis, and Demant. In the meantime sub-themes were created by sorting and combining codes. All the sub-themes were organized in a table, and thereafter arranged on a wider level of similarities in ten different candidate themes. The candidate themes that were most frequent a contributing factor for de-radicalization, or disengagement were: ideology, religion, and organization. The categorization of the factors in the model of Bakker & Veldhuis showed that most of the them could be categorized on the meso- and micro level. The model of Demant provided a categorization in which the normative level represented. The division by Bjorgo explained that almost two-thirds of the factors that contributed to de-radicalization, or disengagement had an internal nature. The hypothesis which stated that de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists depends approval by personal social relationships, was rejected. Results show that de-radicalization, or disengagement is mostly led by disillusionment with the ideology, religion and organization. The tables, figures numerical results of the analysis can be found in appendix III, up until VI.

## 5. Discussion

The aim of this research is to know what factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. In this chapter the findings of the analysis will be interpreted. Firstly it will start with an evaluation of the used theoretical framework. Secondly will the findings be presented and the significance of the research explained. In the end the limitations, recommendations for further research will be set out.

### 5.1 Discussion

The usage of the models of Bakker & Veldhuis and Demant, in combination with the thematic analysis, has led to a clear oversight of the importance of certain factors. The candidate themes that were constructed as a result of the thematic analysis provide a glimpse of what kind of factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. The ten different candidate themes show a clear categorization of different factors contributing to de-radicalization, or disengagement of the individuals. Later on, these candidate themes are used in the division of Bjorgo. This theoretical framework did offer me the results in order to answer the main research question.

The hypothesis: de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists depends on approval by personal social relationships, has been tested. This hypothesis is based on Garfinkel claiming; change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor or friend who supports and affirms peaceful behavior (Garfinkel, 2007). The results of the analysis reject the hypothesis. De-radicalization, or disengagement does not depend on the acceptance of a close friend or group. The main finding is that the factors that most often contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists have an individualistic backdrop. Mostly they are led by the individual disillusionment with the ideology, religion and organization. The results of the thematic analysis confirm this notion regarding the model of Bakker & Veldhuis. The fact that the micro level has a high number of factors linked to it, suggests that the process of disengagement and de-radicalization more often depends on the own perceiving of the individual. Also the results of the analysis linked to the model of Demant shows that de-radicalization, or disengagement mostly depends on the personal perceiving. It is often caused by personal doubts about the ideology, organization or religion, and the perceiving of justice and injustice.

Garfinkel state in her study that every individual experienced loneliness until they eventually created a new and different social network. The total of candidate themes shows that the lack of social belonging, is only a fracture of the reasons to de-radicalize or disengage. In almost two-thirds of the cases the terrorist or extremist disengaged because they were disillusioned with the ideology, organization or religion. The analysis with the division of Bjorgo subsequently shows that most of the factors contributing to de-radicalization, or disengagement had therefor an internal nature, rather than an external lineage. The disillusionment about the internal course of affairs, made the individuals want to leave the radical environment. Factors that should lure them away from the radical environment, such as social belonging, had less cases influence on their persuasion.

Research on de-radicalization, or disengagement in general has not led much further than to creation of models and concepts. So far only Garfinkel has come with a clear claim stating the importance of the approval of social relationships. This analysis shows that in most of the cases the individual itself makes up his mind. And that the factors contributing to de-radicalization, or disengagement have a pushing effect. Therefore the reason to leave the organization or movement, comes from within the organization or movement.

This more specific categorization can be of importance for further research on de-radicalization and disengagement. The results of this research can eventually provide more insights for the development of de-radicalization programs. They show on what kind of factors, contributing to de-radicalization, or disengagement, the emphasis should be placed on while developing the programs.

All and all, the purpose of this research is to know what factors contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists. The theoretical framework did offer the results in order to answer the main research question. The main findings from the result show that The factors that most often contribute to the de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists have an individualistic backdrop. The analysis of the candidate themes explain that disillusionment with the ideology, organization and religion, are most often described as contribution to the de-radicalization, or disengagement. These factors are internal pushing factors, meaning that the need to step away from the thoughts, social group or organization, comes from being active within the radical



setting. The findings are clear, de-radicalization, or disengagement does not depend on the acceptance of a close friend or group. Therefore the hypothesis has been rejected.

## 5.2 Limitations:

The results of this research come with a few limitations. The process of de-radicalization, and disengagement is a lot more complex than as it has been elucidated with the different models. This has of course influence on the validity of this analysis. Firstly, the number of cases used in this analysis are not enough to be able to describe the results as generalities or even claim the development of a theory. A higher number will increase validity, but currently there are not that many cases of de-radicalized or disengaged people. Probably not every de-radicalized or disengaged individual wants to share their stories with the public. Because it could harm his future prospects, or put him and his family in danger (Haker, 2015). Besides that, no cases of de-radicalized or disengaged women were found, nor processed in this research. The findings only explain something about the male gender. The final remark on the cases; it remains to be seen whether the individuals are speaking the truth. In some cases there have been rumors about authenticity of the fact that they have been radical. Or say that the individuals who come out as de-radicalized or disengaged, only do this for the media attention, or to sell a book (Beckhusen, 2012).

Secondly, for this research I have used the interviews of de-radicalized or disengaged individuals as primary data. But the interviews that were used within this analysis were conducted by others. The limited time, resources and personal network could not provide me the opportunity to do the interviews myself. Because the information did not always come directly from the source, there is a high chance the information was biased. There is always a possibility that the researchers slightly twisted the words on the behalf of their own report, or made mistakes in general during the transcription.

Thirdly, the coding and categorization within the thematic analysis was performed by only one person. Though these processes has been repeatedly conducted, it still is biased. For example, my ideas on what should be categorized as ideology, organization or religion, might differ from others. This can easily be circumvented by letting the coding and categorization be conducted by multiple persons and discuss the motivations.

Finally, this research focusses solely on the psychological factors that contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement. As Horgan shows in his research could de-radicalization, or disengagement also be caused by physical factors (Horgan, 2009). These factors are not taken into account within this analysis, showing only one part of the process.

### **5.3 Further Research and Recommendations:**

This research still leaves plenty of space for further research. As it has been explained in the literature review, so far a lot of research has been done on radicalization, but the opposite process is still underexposed. The limitations demonstrate the difficulties when it comes to research on this particular topic, but it does not make it less interesting or important.

For future research, there are several things that can be adapted to reach new interesting results. Starting with the unit of analysis which is in this research limited in number and region. The results only describe the situations of a handful of cases in Western Europe. A higher number of cases will improve the generalizability of the statements. Also a comparative study on the cultural differences regarding de-radicalization, or disengagement could be of interest. Results may show it is harder to make a transition to a less radical lifestyle in other cultures and it indeed depends on the approval of friends and family.

The results of the analysis show in these cases that most of the factors that contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement are related about the change of mind about the ideology, religion and organization. These internal push factors deserve a more detailed research in relation with the current de-radicalization programs. In order to be able to see whether they touch upon the themes, or maybe whether they are too much focused on less contributing factors, such as getting them accepting the Western society. Are the best-practices in line with the findings of this research? The results of a research on these internal push factors could improve the development of de-radicalization programs. It raises the question whether it is even possible to change the mind of someone, when most of the time it is dependent on internal push factors?

And finally, is it possible to develop a strategy that would trigger the internal push factors by sharing certain messages on public locations, such as the internet? As it has been said, the findings of this research show that displeasure or doubts about the ideology, religions and organization are most often factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement. But these factors

have an internal origin and therefore hard to be accessed by governmental actors. Since the government is seen as an enemy by the radicals, an anonymous source that is publicly accessible could provide the opportunity to trigger the doubts.

## 6. Conclusion

Terrorism and radicalism is a growing problem with an increasing impact (Stellini, 2015). Though de-radicalization programs exist it is still difficult to designate what makes them change their thoughts, or activities. This study provided findings stating that: the factors that contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement of jihadi terrorists and extremists in Western Europe since 2001 are mostly led by disillusionment with the ideology, religion and organization. Disillusionment is the most important factor contributing to the de-radicalization, or disengagement. It occurs when their own thoughts and ideas about how the ideology, religion, and organization should be effectuated, do not correspond with the way things actually work out within the radical movement. The factors that had a social, or societal backdrop do not provide as much contribution to the de-radicalization, or disengagement process, as in first instance was expected. Furthermore, the findings explained that in most cases the extremists disengaged because of the disadvantages within the organization, rather than the advantages outside the organization.



## Appendix: I – Model Bakker & Veldhuis

<b>Definition:</b>	<b>Codes:</b>
<b>Macro:</b>	Factors that take place on this level are aspects that take place outside the individual. It comes from the environment in which someone lives. The individual has barely influence on this setting. This so-called external level consists of the politics, economy and culture of his, or her country. Though someone can have suffrage, or may be part of the economy by buying and selling goods, the influence insignificant. (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007)
<b>Meso:</b>	Factors that contribute to de-radicalization, or disengagement on this level, have their origins from social dynamics. These dynamics explain the way someone interacts and feels in relation with others. Identity processes, network dynamics and relative deprivation are examples of these social factors. Identity processes will in this case lead to feeling more part of de-radicalized, or non-radicalized individuals. This is comparable with network dynamics, in which someone feels more connected with non-radicalized social groups. Relative deprivation refers to the position of the individual in relation to the relevant reference groups that he, she compares with. Dissatisfaction with the relation with the other members of the radical organization may lead to de-radicalization, or disengagement. (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007)
<b>Micro:</b>	The micro level is about the individual, and how he, or she perceives their surroundings. These factors could have a psychological feature, rational ground, or may be influenced by personal experience. The factors that lead to de-radicalization, or disengagement on this level are created in the mind of an individual. It depends on how an individual deals with dramatic events like love and death of beloved one. Also his, or her knowledge in general is an influence. (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2007)

Table 12 Definitions model Bakker & Veldhuis

## Appendix: II - Model Demant

<b>Definition:</b>	<b>Codes:</b>
<b>Normative:</b>	A crisis on the level of normative commitment refers to the moment in which an extremist, or jihadist starts doubting the ideology of the movement, or organization. An ideology provides the view on justice and injustice. The society is no longer seen as an enemy. The moral obligation to remain in the organization fades. The factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement in this category is about ideology. (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008)
<b>Affective:</b>	Disappointing experiences when participating weaken the affective commitment, and lower affective commitment leads to a decrease in participation. A downward spiral will form in which the individual eventually becomes disillusioned with the movement. The movement, or organization no longer meets his or her need for ties and identity. A crisis in his or her affective commitment and leads to less emotional attachment to the organization. The factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement focus on the organization and subculture. (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008)
<b>Continuing:</b>	The awareness of the costs associated with leaving the organization makes the individual dissociate. The commitment is in this case determined by the magnitude of the investments that an individual has made in the movement and the quality of the alternatives that he or she sees. The alternatives mostly do not form the only reason for disengagement. But when an individual already has doubts, this can be a deciding factor. All and all this circumstance can be summarized as: the costs, benefits and opportunities for the individual. The factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement focus on practical circumstances. (Demant, Slootman, & Buijs, 2008)
<b>Congenial:</b>	The change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor, or friend who supports and affirms peaceful behavior. Vulnerability caused by stress, trauma and crisis due to the activities with the organization, makes the individual doubt about his, or her membership. A congenial companion is someone he, or she can trust and has harmonious relationship with. The factors of de-radicalization, or disengagement focus on friendship, or a close relationship. (Garfinkel, 2007)

Table 13 Definitions Model Demant

## Appendix III – Framework Thematic Analysis




Figure 7: Thematic Analysis in combination with the two models



## Appendix: IV – Interviews and Coding

<b>Data Extract: Nr.1</b> Case: Sohail Ahmed (UK) (28th August, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
But while at university, Sohail started having doubts about his own extreme views. He began researching evolution, which extremists insist didn't happen.	Began researching evolution
Sohail found himself convinced by the scientific evidence.	Convinced by science
I was having doubts that god existed but I knew hell existed. So weirdly, I was sure I would burn in hell for not believing in god.	Doubts god existed
You throw them (homosexuals) off the mountain and stone them to death. So growing up I hated myself. I thought I was something evil. But what disturbed me even more was that it could have been me carrying it out.	Disagree ideology due to abominations  Disagree organization due to abominations against homosexuals
Sohail was kicked out of his family home when he told his parents that he wasn't sure god exists. “He (father) told me I was disgusting. He said 'you are worse than an animal'. He told me I could only stay in the house if I agreed to be exorcised.” “I have tried twice to speak to my parents but it didn't go well. I haven't spoken to my siblings for eight months.”	No trust from family
I really liked some parts of western culture but had to say I hated it. I liked freedom of speech, freedom to practice religion, equality, legal protections, freedom to vote, music, films, TV, sport	Liking Western politics
(Someland, 2015)	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 2</b> Case: Yahya Kaddouri (NL) (16th September, 2011) (Interview is translated)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>I went to prison in 2004 and came in as radicalized muslim, and when I came out four years later, I was non-radical. So, somewhere in that period something has happened.</p>	
<p>When I was in the juvenile detention center, I wanted to change the other inmates and persuade them from the conflicts between Israel and Palestina. (The conflict between jews and muslims.) But this did not work out. Eventually did the group change me, instead of me, changing the group.</p>	<p>Not getting feeling of social belonging with non-extremists</p>
<p>At the beginning I was really stubborn. And started to change (radicalize) the other guys (inmates), trying to have them the same mindset. But they were not interested in these topics. But since they did not want nothing of that, I went along joined the group socially, along with their mindset. Because I did not want to socially isolate myself by just sitting in my prison cell.</p>	<p>Change due to the need of feeling to socially belong</p>
<p>When I left prison, I dissociated from the extremist guys, who wanted to give money to wife of Samir (Extremist).</p>	<p>Dissociate from former extremist friends</p>
<p>My life before prison was different. I used to have a black and white mindset. Because in society everybody has an idea on what is good, and bad. But inside prison you simply lose idea, since you have been placed outside the society. When I came out of prison, I was broad-minded.</p>	<p>Different personal mindset about good and bad within society</p>
<p>(Kadouri, 2011)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 3</b> Case: Javed (UK) (August, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>At the age of 18, Javed was arrested on terrorism charges for attempting to detonate bombs (...) Javed fully believed that carrying out this attack would liberate Muslims around the world. Subsequent psychiatric reports outlined Javed’s naivety and immaturity, which exposed his vulnerability to extremism while at university. Fortunately, with the assistance of “family, friends, certain religious councillors and most importantly education, both secular and religious”, Javed was able to turn his back on “political violence and the extremist ideology in all its forms”</p>	<p>Dissociate ideology with assistance of family</p> <p>Dissociate ideology with assistance of friends</p> <p>Dissociate ideology with assistance of religious councilor</p> <p>Dissociate ideology due to education</p>
<p>Education became key for Javed to “understand the roots of modern Islamist movements” and the “errors in their simplified political and religious arguments”.</p>	<p>Understand roots of modern Islam movements</p> <p>Errors in simplified political arguments</p>
<p>Javed found that “nuanced arguments against the Salafi jihadist movement are far more important than simple condemnations”.</p>	<p>X</p>
<p>Through his research, Javed was surprised by the level of improper analysis that was “simplified, misplaced or outright erroneous” and recognises that “many analysts are trying to explain a phenomenon they don’t understand”. He found that the complexity and multitude of factors which fuelled the problem are often not acknowledged.</p>	<p>X</p>

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 3</b> Case: Javed (UK) (August, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
Through education, Javed became empowered to challenge the roots of modern Islamist movements. This, coupled with strong support from family and friends, helped Javed to turn his back on Islamism	Understand roots of modern Islam movements  Strong support family  Strong support of friends
(La Bau & Manning, 2015)	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 4</b> Case: Abdul (UK) (August, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
However after stumbling across Sheikh Hamza Yusuf, a prominent Sufi scholar from America, Abdul started to listen to his sermons online. He then began to “buy his tapes for a pound”, and began to question how Hamza’s “version of Islam did not reconcile with the Islam endorsed by Hizb ut-Tahrir”.	Different versions of Islam  Critical thinking about religion due to other views
The skills Abdul had established through University studying law also enabled him to question the extremist ideology championed by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Studying law encouraged him to “constantly ask questions and look at the rationale underpinning an issue”. It was these critical thinking skills which enabled Abdul to see the hypocrisy and irrationality which underpinned the Islamist ideology, the charismatic recruiters of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the extremist group itself. This caused Abdul to lose support for both the organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the underpinning ideology, Islamism.	Critical thinking about Islamist ideology  Hypocrisy of the members of the organization  Critical thinking about the organization itself

Abdul began to research Islam for himself and “became a lot more spiritual”. This research enabled Abdul to become a lot more articulate and to “understand society a lot more”, which ultimately set Abdul on the path to deradicalisation.	Religious education Research enabled to understand society
Abdul also states that the atrocities committed by ISIL have further distanced him from Islamist extremism and have pulled him closer to Islam, while also encouraging him to champion ideals of tolerance and respect.	Dissociate organization due to atrocities
(La Bau & Manning, 2015)	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 5</b>	<b>Coded for:</b>
Case: Mohammed (UK) (August, 2015)	
However, Mohammed came across Maajid Nawaz’ story and it prompted him to re-think his own commitment to the Islamist cause.	Critical thinking about religion due to other views
Soon Mohammed began to see the error in the political and religious arguments championed by his peers and thereafter, Mohammed left the extremist group.	Errors in simplified political arguments Errors in religious arguments
(La Bau & Manning, 2015)	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 6</b> Case: Aamir (UK) (August, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>However, the degree of manipulation which was used to recruit individuals caused Aamir to become disillusioned with the organisation. Aamir became aware that “the cause itself was never sufficient to entice people into joining the organisation”.</p>	<p>1. Manipulation was used to recruit, made him disillusioned</p>
<p>This was enough for Aamir to research alternative views, including American-born preacher Hamza Yusuf. This broadened Aamir’s horizons and it allowed him to appreciate the plurality of opinions within Islamic thought.</p>	<p>Critical thinking about religion due to other views  Accept plurality of other religious views</p>
<p>Despite all of this Aamir stayed within the organisation, predominately due to his desperate desire to belong to a cause.</p>	<p>X</p>
<p>Maajid engaged in an “informed and deeply grounded discussion” about Aamir’s beliefs and fears. By deconstructing the foundations of Islamism, Maajid enabled Aamir to understand what he now sees as “the true teachings of Islam”.</p>	<p>Critical thinking about religion due to other views</p>
<p>Aamir was pleasantly surprised that “someone who had little reason to do so, took the time and effort to talk” to him, to allow him “to express [his] own beliefs before “carefully and cleverly offering [him] alternatives, instead of immediately labelling [him] as a lost cause”.</p>	<p>Critical thinking due to congenial individual  Feeling of social acceptance</p>
<p>Aamir began to think systematically and deeply about Islam and Muslims in a multi-faith world. This enabled Aamir to address the challenges of post-modernity and ultimately overcome the obstacles he faced. This empowered Aamir to disengage with the organisation and the negative ideological influences which had given birth to his identity. (Aamir found this particularly difficult, as every aspect of his life was connected to Islamism.)</p>	<p>Think Islam in a multi-faith world.  New view gave him new identity</p>

However, recognising that Maajid had faced a similar situation and prevailed, gave Aamir the strength to fully renounce his views and reform his life.	
(La Bau & Manning, 2015)	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 7</b>	<b>Coded for:</b>
Case: Maajid Nawaz (UK) (4th July, 2015)	
I want to pose a bit on this period in prison, because for me it was definitive, it was a pivotal moment in my own thinking. I could have taken it two ways. I convinced myself that I would take my extremism to the next level and join a jihadist terrorist organization, to seek revenge against the Egyptian. But the time made me think, whether I went the right way. Where am I from, and where do I go? When I left solitary imprisonment, I wanted to give my life one more chance.	Doubting own extreme views when it comes to future prospects
In prison I got the best ‘education,’ living within the hall of fame of jihadists. Terrorists and terrorist leaders stayed in that same prison. Also Adina Brian, a well known Egyptian American academic, who was imprisoned because of his liberal views. He became a friend of mine. Also a leader of another Egyptian liberal political party. But also homosexuals, and people who had been converted from Christianity to the Islam, or the other way around. And the conversations with this group of prisoners were critical for my thinking. Because of the debates with this mix of people and thoughts. Also I studied my religion, politics and read English literature, trying to understand the world.	Critical thinking about religion due to other views
When I was done with my sentence and was released, two things I left behind me in prison had a profound impact. Amnesty International defended me, and wanted me to get out of prison earlier. This was my first interaction with human rights. It was the first time that people who I considered my enemy, reaching out to me to help me.	Enemy reaching out to help me and became close friends

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 7</b> Case: Maajid Nawaz (UK) (4th July, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
So, I became very close friends with some of the people of Amnesty who wanted to help me. Though I had to finish my sentence, it had a great impact on me.	
The second thing that influenced me were the debates, the discussions and the reading that I did. So, when I came out of prison, and arrived in London. I could no longer propagate this, what I now believe to be, a theocratic fascist ideology in the name of my religion.	Dissociate ideology due to education
(Nawaz, 2015)	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 8</b> Case: Dennis Abdelkarim Honing (NL) (3rd March, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
What made Honing change his mind? He had a religious crisis. He could not understand that people were dying as a result of cancer, while it has been said that Allah is great and almighty	Doubting religion due to tragic circumstances  Doubts god existed
Besides, he kept loving his dad, who did everything for him. He thought to himself: Is that someone who has to die because of my ideology?	Dissociate ideology with assistance of family
And also some aspects of the religion, he finds unethical.	Religion has unethical aspects
And the thing that actually made him leave the group, is because of the critics he got within the group.	



<p><b>Data Extract: Nr. 8</b></p> <p>Case: Dennis Abdelkarim Honing (NL) (3rd March, 2015)</p>	<p><b>Coded for:</b></p>
<p>They thought he did not follow the religion properly, When he got remarks on his harmless jokes about the Islam, he got fed up with the group, and left.</p>	<p>Dissociate due to critics within social group</p>
<p>(Hakker, 2015)</p>	

<p><b>Data Extract: Nr. 9</b></p> <p>Case: Jason Walters (NL) (27th March, 2016)</p>	<p><b>Coded for:</b></p>
<p>In 2006 got sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In 2013 he was released after serving two third of his time. Though many muslim extremists radicalize in prison, for Jason, the opposite occurred. After doing a lot of self study and personal reflection, he de-radicalized. His conclusion was eventually: the radical Islam is an ideology of hatred. He wanted to dissociate from it immediately.</p>	<p>disagree ideology due to personal education Radical Islam is an ideology of hatred</p>
<p>I have come to realize that the members of radical movements are morally bankrupt. What started as a fight for freedom, has changed into a bloody escalation and cruelty.</p>	<p>1. Fight for freedom has become bloody escalation</p>
<p>(Walters, 2010)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 10</b> Case: Morten Storm (DK) (2nd July, 2014) (3rd March, 2015)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>Even so, Storm was beginning to doubt the message. He was troubled by what he saw as an incoherence within Islam on the question of free will and predestination. According to Agent Storm, however, his biggest problem was presented by the indiscriminate violence of the movement.</p>	<p>Doubting the religious message</p> <p>Critical thinking due to indiscriminate violence</p>
<p>He "began to reconsider some of the justifications for the killing and maiming of civilians", he writes. "Now I thought of the twin towers, Bali, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005 ... If they were part of Allah's preordained plan, I now wanted no part of it. My loss of faith was as frightening as it was sudden."</p>	<p>Critical thinking the ideology due to abominations</p> <p>Dissociate religion, due its inconsistency</p>
<p>(Burke, 2014)</p>	
<p>You were ready to go to Somalia in that time, however it didn't happen and suddenly it is not really clear why you did decide, that this was not the best way. Can you explain that pleas? - Yes, in my personal case I discovered that there were contradictions in the Koran. Because in the Koran Allah says: 'If you find contradictions, it would not be from me.' As fundamentalist I interpreted the Koran really literally. So it is either black or white, it is either true, or false. So for me the Koran was the Islam. So when I found something that contradicted it, it meant it was no longer the truth and I left. It is like a card house, it was really easy to blow away.</p>	<p>Critical thinking due to education</p> <p>Dissociation religion due to its inconsistency</p>
<p>So in my case, when I was convinced the Islam was no longer the truth, I decided to work for the intelligence services and to fight terrorism.</p>	<p>Dissociate religion due to education</p>
<p>(Storm, 2015)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 11</b> Case: Hanif Qadir (UK) (26th August, 2014)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>When I got there (Afghanistan), I was looking forward to be part of this network of brothers that were fighting for this just cause. Just helping the innocent women and children and fighting the enemy. But when I got there, it was a total hypocrisy. I was lied to from the moment of entry, up until the moment I left.</p>	<p>Organization was a total hypocrisy</p>
<p>There was no network of pious muslim brothers, it wasn't like that. It was hypocrisy, double standards; an arabic was more superior than a Pakistani, or Bengali, or Somali.</p>	<p>The network consisted of double standards.</p>
<p>And it was a very violent environment, that was what I understood from the beginning. You don't want to be going amongst the network where you were going to fight the enemy, when they were fighting each other.</p>	<p>It was a very violent environment</p>
<p>So the people I went with had no regard for my life, and had no regard with the others life.</p>	<p>They had no regard for my life, and I had no regard with others' life</p>
<p>(Press TV UK, 2014)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 12</b> Case: Adam Deen (UK) (26 <sup>th</sup> August, 2014)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>How did you become de-radicalized, what sort of process did you go through? The process that I went through, was not an eureka moment, it went more by osmosis if you'd like.</p>	
<p>In the last two years of my membership, a particular illustration; when 9/11 happened I called one of my co-members. We went through the streets of London cheering, trying to reach other muslims, telling them America has been hit. For us it was a joyful day. But two years later I became completely horrified by the acts of the terrorists. There was a protest on a particular location where a co-member brought a large poster, glorifying the nineteen hijackers, labeling them as the magnificent nineteen. And on that moment the change had already happened from within.</p>	<p>Horrified by the acts of terrorists</p>
<p>I was intellectually and emotionally making a change. I was quite uncomfortable with the poster. Then what happened, in the mix of this chaos, one lady approached us, she was in tears. She said her brother died in one of the Twin Towers. That moment had a tremendous effect inside.</p>	<p>Disagree ideology due to emotional story about terrorist violence</p>
<p>I looked to the face of the senior member and I made decision I could not take part. I had to look for different understanding of the Islam.</p>	<p>Dissociate ideology due different religious understanding</p>
<p>(Press TV UK, 2014)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 13</b> Case: Anonymous Former (FR) (22nd February, 2014)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>Why did you leave the foreign jihadist group? Because they joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Not all the ideas of Al-Qaeda are correct, for example that we should take pride of 9/11. This is not correct and has no basis in our religion. Our group recently took bad ideas of Al-Qaeda. They wanted an Islamic state, but the ways they want to get there are wrong.</p>	<p>Should not take pride of 9/11.</p> <p>Disagree with the political choices</p>
<p>(n.b., 2014)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 14</b> Case: Ed Husain (UK) (27th August, 2014)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>You in a fact did de-radicalize, you made the decision to leave a radical muslim movement. What made the difference for you? - My own family, my parents, my brothers, my sisters, were critical and constantly criticizing and rejecting my form of activism.</p>	<p>My family was critical and constantly criticizing my form of activism</p>
<p>A second factor would be meeting, in my case, Americans and others who were critical of rejection of Israel, my embrace of Hamas. Third factor would be, going to travel to the Middle-East, ironically enough, and meeting orthodox traditional muslim scholars, who opened my eyes to the difference between normative Islam, as it understood by billion plus muslims. And this modern warped perversion ideological form of activist Islam.</p>	<p>Critical thinking about Islamist ideology due to other minds</p> <p>Critical thinking due to education</p>
<p>(Husain, 2014)</p>	

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 15</b> Case: Abu Bakr Mansha (UK) (22nd July, 2012)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>But now, in an unprecedented interview, one of the released terrorists whose picture was featured in the newspaper reports is speaking out, describing to CNN not only how his life was turned around by an inspirational veteran cagefighter with a pioneering approach to deradicalization, but how under his guidance he has begun to confront al Qaeda's extremist ideology on the streets of London.</p>	<p>Turned around by inspirational cage fighter</p>
<p>Abu Bakr Mansha, now 28, a British Muslim of Pakistani descent, was convicted of terrorism in 2005 in a plot to kill or severely harm a British soldier, and served time in some of Britain's highest security prisons. But several weeks ago, we sat down with Mansha,(...) in a former British army gym in a military barracks town just outside London, which is now used by his new mentor Usman Raja to coach cage-fighting.</p>	
<p>The two first met in Woodhill High Security prison in early 2011, Raja says, after Mansha wrote a letter asking for his help. By then Raja had developed a reputation among convicted Muslim terrorists -- and British authorities-- as a man dedicated to helping them find a new life and with a success rate that demanded respect.</p>	
<p>We clicked straight away. We got on very well because we have got a lot of things in common. Our family backgrounds are the same, we come from the same place back home.</p>	<p>Feeling of social acceptance</p>
<p>Mansha started training with Raja immediately after he was released the second time from prison in March 2011. Mansha soon set himself a goal to become a coach like Raja. "I could channel my energy straight away and build something for myself,"</p>	<p>Goal to become coach</p>
<p>Once he had won Mansha's trust, Raja impressed on him that true Islam was spiritual, tolerant, and humanistic, and nothing like the narrow-minded divisive message he had been previously exposed to.</p>	<p>Critical thinking about religion due to other views</p>

<b>Data Extract: Nr. 15</b> Case: Abu Bakr Mansha (UK) (22nd July, 2012)	<b>Coded for:</b>
<p>After his release, Raja and his small team spent countless hours counseling Mansha at a variety of locations in east London, including after prayers at mosques and after martial arts training sessions at gyms. During these sessions, Raja encouraged Mansha to ask deep searching questions about his faith.</p>	<p>Raja encouraged Mansha to ask deep searching questions about his faith</p>
<p>Mansha says he has been strengthened by his new religious understanding. "I didn't know much about my faith. When I was younger I went to the mosque, I studied the Quran but it was in Arabic so I didn't know what it was saying," - "It's a big change, a big change, what I know now, my knowledge and my studies, what I know now, how I feel and how I think now."</p>	<p>New religious understanding due to education</p>
<p>(Cruickshank, 2012)</p>	

## Appendix V – Results Thematic Analysis

<b>Coded for:</b>	<b>Sub</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Bakker</b>	<b>Demant</b>
<b>Case 1</b>				
Began researching evolution	Science	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Convinced by science	(Science)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Doubts god existed	Doubts religion	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Disagree ideology due to abominations	Injustice of ideology	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)/ <b>Affective</b>
Disagree organization due to abominations against homosexuals	Cruel activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meso</b>	(Normative/ Affective)
No trust family	No feeling of social belonging	<b>Lack of social belonging</b>	(Meso)	(Affective)
Liking Western politics	Accepting Western Politics	<b>Acceptance Western Politics</b>	<b>Macro</b>	(Normative)
<b>Case 2</b>				
Not getting feeling of social belonging with non-extremists	No feeling of social belonging	<b>Lack of social belonging</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Affective</b>



Change due to the need of the feeling of social belonging	(No feeling of social belonging)	(Lack of social belonging)	(Meso)	(Affective)
Dissociate Former extremist friends	New social belonging	<b>New social belonging</b>	(Meso)	(Affective)
Different personal mindset about good and bad within society	Different mindset society	<b>Mindset society</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
<b>Case 3</b>				
Dissociate ideology with assistance of family	Assistance family and friends	<b>Congenial assistance family</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Congenial</b>
Dissociate ideology with assistance of friends	Assistance friends	<b>Congenial assistance friend</b>	(Meso)	(Congenial)
Dissociate ideology with assistance of religious councilor	Religious understanding	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Dissociate ideology due to education	Ideological understanding	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
Understand roots of modern Islam movements	(Ideological understanding)	(Ideology)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Errors in simplified political arguments	Political understanding	(Ideology)	(Micro)	(Normative)

(Understand roots of modern Islam movements)	(Ideological understanding)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Strong support family	(Assistance family)	(Congenial assistance family)	(Meso)	(Congenial)
Strong support of friends	Assistance friends	(Congenial assistance friend)	(Meso)	(Congenial)
<b>Case 4:</b>				
Different versions Islam	New view religion	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Critical thinking about religion due to other views	(New view religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Critical thinking about Islamist ideology	Ideology overall	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
Hypocrisy of the members of the organization	Lack of social belonging	<b>Lack social belonging</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Affective</b>
Critical thinking about the organization itself	Organization Overall	<b>Organization</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
Religious education	Religious understanding	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Research enabled understanding society	Different mindset society	<b>Mindset society</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)

Dissociate organization due to atrocities	Cruel activities organization	(Organization)	(Meso)	(Normative/Affective)
<b>Case 5:</b>				
Critical thinking about religion due to other views	New view religion	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Errors in simplified political arguments	Political understanding	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
Errors in religious arguments	(New view religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
<b>Case: 6</b>				
Manipulation by recruitment, made disillusioned	Wrongful activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Affective</b>
Critical thinking about religion due to other views	New view religion	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Accept plurality of other religious views	Accepting other religious views	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
(Critical thinking about religion due to other views)	(New view religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Critical thinking due to congenial individual	Assistance congenial friend	<b>Congenial assistance friend</b>	(Meso)	<b>(Congenial)</b>

Feeling of social acceptance	New social belonging	<b>New social belonging</b>	(Meso)	(Affective)
Think Islam in a multi-faith world	(Accepting other religious views )	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
New view gave him new identity	(New social belonging)	(New social belonging)	(Meso)	(Affective)
<b>Case: 7</b>				
Doubting own extreme views when it comes to future prospects	Doubting future	<b>Future goals</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Continuing</b>
Critical thinking about religion due to other views	New view religion	<b>Religion</b>	(Micro)	<b>Normative</b>
Enemy reaching out to help me and became close friends	Assistance congenial friend	<b>Congenial assistance friend</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Congenial</b>
Dissociate ideology due to education	Ideological understanding	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
<b>Case: 8</b>				
Doubts religion due to tragic circumstances	Doubts religion	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Doubts god existed	(Doubts religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)

Dissociate ideology with assistance of family	Assistance family	<b>Congenial assistance family</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Congenial</b>
Religion has unethical aspects	Disagree with religion	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
Dissociate due to critics within social group	No feeling of social belonging	<b>Lack of social belonging</b>	(Meso)	<b>Affective</b>
<b>Case: 9</b>				
Disagree ideology due to personal education	Ideological understanding	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Radical Islam is an ideology of hatred	Injustice of ideology	(Ideology)	(Micro)	(Normative)/ <b>Affective</b>
Fight for freedom has become bloody escalation	Cruel activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meso</b>	(Normative/ Affective)
<b>Case: 10</b>				
Doubting the religious message	Doubts religion	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Critical thinking due to indiscriminate violence	Cruel activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meso</b>	(Normative)/ <b>Affective</b>
Dissociate ideology due to abominations	Injustice of ideology	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative/ Affective)
Dissociate religion due to its inconsistency	Disagree with religion	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)

<b>Case 11:</b>				
Organization was a total hypocrisy	Wrongful activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Micro/ Meso</b>	<b>Affective</b>
The network consisted of double standards	(Wrongful activities organization )	(Organization)	(Meso)	(Affective)
It was a very violent environment	Cruel activities organization	(Organization)	(Meso)	<b>Normative/ (Affective)</b>
They had no regard for my life, and I had no regard with others' life	No feeling of social belonging	<b>Lack of social belonging</b>	(Meso)	(Affective)
<b>Case 12:</b>				
Horrified by the acts of terrorists	Cruel activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Micro/ Meso</b>	<b>Normative/ Affective</b>
Disagree ideology due to emotional story about terrorist violence	Injustice of ideology	<b>Ideology</b>	(Micro)	(Normative/ Affective)
Dissociate ideology due different religious understanding	Doubts religion	<b>Religion</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
<b>Case 13:</b>				
Should not take pride of 9/11.	Cruel activities organization	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Normative/ Affective</b>

Disagree with the political choices	Organization in general	Organization	(Meso)	(Normative)
<b>Case 14:</b>				
My family was critical and constantly criticizing my form of activism	Criticism family	<b>Congenial assistance family</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Congenial</b>
Critical thinking about Islamist ideology due to other minds	Ideology overall	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Normative</b>
Critical thinking about religion due to education	New view religion	<b>Religion</b>	(Micro)	(Normative)
<b>Case 15:</b>				
Turned around by inspirational cage fighter	Assistance congenial friend	<b>Congenial assistance friends</b>	<b>Meso</b>	<b>Congenial</b>
Feeling of social acceptance	New social belonging	<b>New social belonging</b>	(Meso)	<b>Affective</b>
Goal to become coach	New future goal	<b>Future goal</b>	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Continuing</b>
Critical thinking about religion due to other views	New view religion	<b>Religion</b>	(Micro)	<b>Normative</b>
Raja encouraged Mansha to ask deep searching questions about his faith	(New view religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)

New religious understanding due to education	(New view religion)	(Religion)	(Micro)	(Normative)
--	---------------------	------------	---------	-------------



## Appendix VI - Results in Tables

Demant	Normative	Affective	Continuing	Congenial
Frequency	15	11	2	6

Table 14: Frequency of themes model Demant

Bakker & Veldhuis	Macro	Meso	Micro
Frequency	1	14	14

Table 15: Frequency of themes model Bakker & Veldhuis

Total candidate themes	Religion	Ideology	Organization	Lack of social belonging	New social belonging	Mindset society	Congenial assistance family	Congenial assistance friends	Future goals	Acceptance Western Politics
Frequency	11	10	8	4	3	2	2	4	2	1

Table 16: Frequency of candidate themes, max 1 per case

Candidate themes linked to macro level	Acceptance Western politics
Frequency	1

Table 17: Frequency of candidate theme linked to macro level

Candidate themes linked to meso level	Congenial assistance family	Congenial assistance friends	New Social Belonging	Organization	Lack of social belonging
Frequency	2	4	3	8	5

**Table 18: Frequency of candidate themes linked to meso level**

Candidate themes linked to micro	Religion	Ideology	Organization	Mindset society	Future goals
Frequency	11	8	3	2	2

**Table 19: Frequency of candidate themes linked to micro level**

Candidate themes linked to micro level	Religion	Ideology	Organization	Mindset society	Acceptance Western Politics
Frequency	11	9	8	2	1

**Table 20: Frequency of candidate themes linked to micro level**

Candidate themes linked to affective factors	Ideology	Organization	Lack of social belonging	New social belonging
Frequency	4	8	4	3

**Table 21: Frequency of candidate themes linked to affective factors**

Candidate themes linked to continuing factors	Future goals
Frequency	2

Table 22: Frequency of candidate themes linked to continuing factors

Candidate themes linked to congenial factors	Congenial assistance family	Congenial assistance friends
Frequency	2	4

Table 23: Frequency of candidate themes linked to congenial factors




Figure 8: Division push/internal aspects and pull/external aspects




Figure 9: Candidate themes categorized in internal and external aspects

## Bibliography

- Ashour, O. (2009). *The de-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Bakker, E., & Veldhuis, T. (2007). Causale factoren van radicalisering en hun onderlinge samenhang. *Vrede en veiligheid*, 36(4), 447-470.
- Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and non-violent radicalization. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1), 1-21.
- Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & King, M. (2010). The edge of violence: A radical approach to extremism. *Demos*, 5-75.
- BBC. (2014). *Madrid train attacks*. Retrieved 2 12, 2016, from BBC.co: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/#top>
- BBC. (2015). *Paris attacks: What happened on the night*. Retrieved 2 12, 2016, from BBC.com: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994>
- Beckhusen, R. (2012). *Alleged CIA Mole Says He Played Matchmaker for Al-Qaida Propagandist*. Retrieved 6 9, 2016, from wired.com: <https://www.wired.com/2012/10/awlaki-bride/>
- Bjorgo, T. (2002). Exit neo-Nazism: Reducing recruitment and promoting disengagement from racist groups. 11-15.
- Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremismI: A review of social science theories. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4).
- Brachman, J. M. (2008). *Global Jihadism*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology*, 3(2), 77-101.
- Brittanica . (2016). *Tiananmen Square Incident*. Retrieved 6 5, 2016, from britannica.com: <http://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident>
- Burke, J. (2004). *The murder that shattered Holland's liberal dream*. Retrieved 2 14, 2016, from The Guardian : <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/07/terrorism.religion>
- Burke, J. (2014). *Agent Storm: My Life Inside al-Qaeda by Morten Storm – review*. Retrieved 5 3, 2016, from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jul/02/agent-storm-al-qaeda-morten-storm-review>

- Calhoun, C., & Wasserstrom, J. N. (1999). Legacies of Radicalism: China's Cultural Revolution and the Democracy Movement of 1989. *Sage Journals*, 57, 33-52.
- CNN. (2015). *September 11th Hijackers Fast Facts*. Retrieved 2 12, 2016, from CNN.com: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-hijackers-fast-facts>
- Connor, S., Rodgers, L., & Qurashi, S. (2015). *7 July London bombings: What happened that day?* Retrieved 2 12, 2016, from BBC.com: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598>
- Cook, D. (2009). Islamism and jihadism: The transformation of classical notions of jihad into an ideology of terrorism. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10(2), 177-187.
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Research Design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. Sage Publications.
- Cross, R., & Snow, D. A. (2011). Radicalism within the Context of Social Movements: Processes and Types. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 115-130.
- Cruickshank, P. R. (2012). *Convicted terrorist calmed by cagefighting*. Retrieved 5 3, 2016, from CNN.com: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/22/world/europe/uk-caging-terror-mansha/>
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2008). The Potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches. *Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe II*, pp. 4-20.
- Davis, P., & Cragin, K. (2009). *Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together*. Rand Corporation.
- Decke, S. H., & Pyrooz, D. C. (2011). Motives and Methods for leaving the gang: Understanding the process of gang desistance. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 39(5), 417-425.
- Demant, F., Slotman, M., & Buijs, F. T. (2008). *Teruggang en uittreding: Processen van deradicalisering ontleed*.
- DerSimonian, R., & Laird, N. (1986). Meta-analysis in clinical trials. *Controlled Clinical Trials*, 7(3), 177-188.
- European Council. (2016). *EU fight against terrorism*. Retrieved 5 3, 2016, from Consillium Europa.eu: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/>
- Farmer, B. (2016). *Who is Salah Abdeslam and who were the Paris terrorists? Everything we know about the Isil attackers*. Retrieved 4 13, 2016, from Telegraph.co: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11996120/Paris-attack-what-we-know-about-the-suspects.html>

- Feddes, A. R. (2015). Socio-psychological factors involved in measures of disengagement and deradicalization and evaluation challenges in Western Europe. 1-3.
- Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 287-304.
- Garfinkel, R. (2007). Personal Transformations: Moving from violence to peace. *US Institute of Peace*, 1-16.
- Gelfand, M., Gunaratna, R., & Kruglanski, A. (2010). Detainee deradicalization: A challenge for psychological science. *APS Observer*, 23(1).
- Glasse, G. (1976). Primary, Secondary, and meta-analysis of research. *Educational Researcher*, 5(10), 3-8.
- Goodwin, M. (2011). *9/11 Ten Years On: European Public Attitudes and Party Politics*. Retrieved 2 12, 2016, from Chathamhouse.org: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/177923>
- Gurwitsch, R. H., Pfefferbaum, B., & Leftwich, M. J. (2002). The impact of terrorism on children: considerations for a new era. *Journal of Trauma Practice*, 1(3), 101-124.
- Haker, B. (2015). *Nikki Sterkenburg over gederadicaliseerde Dennis Abdelkarim Honing*. Retrieved 6 9, 2016, from the post online: <http://media.tpo.nl/2015/03/03/nikki-sterkenburg-gederadicaliseerde-dennis-abdelkarim-honing/>
- Hakker, B. (2015). *Nikki Sterkenburg over gederadicaliseerde Dennis Abdelkarim Honing*. Retrieved 5 3, 2016, from The Post Online: <http://media.tpo.nl/2015/03/03/nikki-sterkenburg-gederadicaliseerde-dennis-abdelkarim-honing/>
- Hayes, B. J. (2013). *Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures Adopted since 11 September 2001*.
- Heller, K., & Procidano, M. E. (1983). Measures of Percieved Social Support From Friends and From Family: Three Validation Studies. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 11(1), 1-24.
- Het Parool. (2016). 'Er gaan nog steeds Nederlanders naar Syrië'. Retrieved 6 9, 2016, from [parool.nl: http://www.parool.nl/binnenland/-er-gaan-nog-steeds-nederlanders-naar-syrie~a4233447/](http://www.parool.nl/binnenland/-er-gaan-nog-steeds-nederlanders-naar-syrie~a4233447/)
- Horgan, J. (2009). Deradicalization or disengagement? A process in need of clarity and a counterterrorism initiative in need of evaluation. *Revista de Psicologia Social*, 24(2), 291-298.

- Human Rights Voices. (2015). *Human Rights Voices*. Retrieved 3 4, 2016, from Humanrightsvoices.org:  
[http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/eyeontheun/un\\_101/facts/?p=61](http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/eyeontheun/un_101/facts/?p=61)
- Husain, E. (2014). Former jihadist: U.S. not being smart. (Sciutto, Interviewer)
- Kadouri, Y. (2011). Yehya Kaddouri over zijn deradicalisatie - Pauw & Witteman. (J. Pauw, & P. Witteman, Interviewers)
- Kern, S. (2014). *De “explosieve groei” van het jihadisme in Nederland*. Retrieved 2 14, 2016, from ejbron.wordpress.com: <https://ejbron.wordpress.com/2014/11/05/de-explosieve-groei-van-het-jihadisme-in-nederland/>
- Kouwenhoven, A. (2015). *Ik zag mezelf as de Che Guevara van de moslims*. Retrieved 2 14, 2016, from NRC.nl: <http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/01/16/ik-zag-mezelf-als-de-che-guevara-van-de-moslims-1459729> 16
- Kwakkel, J., & Pruyt, E. (2014). Radicalization under deep uncertainty: A mult-model exploration of activism, extremism, and terrorism. *System Dynamics Review*, 1-29.
- La Bau, C., & Manning, R. (2015). *In and out of extremism*.
- Lunet, N. (2012). The Use of Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis in Modern Epidemiology. In N. Lunet, *Epidemiology - Current Perspectives on Research and Practice* (pp. 196-208). INTECH Open Access Publisher.
- Mariam-Webster. (n.b.). *Ideology*. Retrieved 6 2, 2016, from mariam-webster.com:  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology>
- Marriam-Webster. (n.b.). *Organization*. Retrieved 6 2, 2016, from marriam-webster.com:  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/organization>
- Merriam-Webster. (n.b.). *Radicalize*. Retrieved 2 29, 2016, from Merriam-webster.com:  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radicalize>
- Merriam-Webster. (n.b.). *Religion*. Retrieved 6 2, 2016, from merriam-webster.com:  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion>
- Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). *Congenial* . Retrieved 4 12, 2016, from Merriam-webster.com:  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/congenial>
- Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). *Radical*. Retrieved 2 29, 2016, from Merriam-webster.com:  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical>



- Michel-Kerjan, E., & Pedell, B. (2005). Terrorism risk coverage in the post-9/11 era: A comparison of new public-private partnerships in France, Germany and the US. *Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance* , 144-170.
- Mullins, S. (2010). Home-grown terrorism: Issues and implications. *Perspectives on terrorism*, 1(3).
- Nawaz, M. (2015). *Radical: My journey out of islamist extremism*. Aspen, U.S.
- Noricks, D. M. (2009). Disengagement and deradicalization: Processes and programs. In *Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together* (pp. 38-40).
- Overheid.nl. (2016). *Wet- en regelgeving* . Retrieved 2 15, 2016, from Overheid.nl: [http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0025962/geldigheidsdatum\\_15-02-2016](http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0025962/geldigheidsdatum_15-02-2016)
- Palenchar, M. J., Heath, R. L., & Orberton, E. M. (2005). Terrorism and industrial chemical production: A new era of risk communication. *Communication Research Reports*, 22(1), 59-67.
- Precht, T. (2007). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radi-calisation in Europe. *From conversion to terrorism*.
- Press TV UK. (2014). *Documentary Young British Muslims and ISIS*. London, United Kingdom.
- Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S. L., Ghez, J. J., & Boucek, C. (2010). *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. RAND CORP ARLINGTON VA NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIV.
- Rijkuniversiteit Groningen . (2012). *Bibliotheek GMW* . Retrieved 6 7, 2016, from rug.nl: <https://www.rug.nl/bibliotheek/services/bibgmw/systematischliteratuuronderzoek.pdf>
- Ruby, C. L. (2002). The definition of terrorism. *Analyses of social issues and public policy*, 2(1), 9-14.
- Schmid, A. (2004). Terrorism - The definitional problem. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 36(2), 375-420.
- Somerland, N. (2015). *'I was a hate preacher who radicalised at least one Brit jihadi but I've changed after coming out'*. Retrieved 5 3, 2016, from Mirror.co: <https://dub130.mail.live.com/?tid=cmpxkf9vQQ5hGT8didZ2YJVA2&fid=flsearch&srch=1&skws=interviews&sdr=4&satt=0>
- Stellini, D. (2015, 2 18). *European jihadists: facts & figures*. Retrieved 2 15, 2016, from eppgroup.eu: <http://www.eppgroup.eu/news/European-jihadists%3A-facts-%26-figures>

- Storm, M. (2015). 'Agent Storm': How a militant Islamist became a CIA spy. (M. Perelman, Interviewer)
- Tilly, C. (2004). Terror, terrorism, terrorists. *Sociology Theory*, 22(1), 5-13.
- Trochim, W. M. (2006). *Construct Validity*. Retrieved 10 6, 2016, from Social research methods.net: <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/constval.php>
- Van der Valk, I., & Wagenaar, W. (2010). *Monitor racism & extremisme: in en uit extreemrechts*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Van Driel, M. (n.b.). *Wat zijn een review en meta-analyse* . Retrieved 6 7, 2016, from kuleuven.be: <https://bib.kuleuven.be/2bergen/mgas/studenten/publicaties/review>
- Walters, J. (2010). *Brief van Jason W. is van begin dit jaar* . Retrieved 5 3, 2016, from NRC.nl: [http://vorige.nrc.nl//binnenland/article2632757.ece/Brief\\_Jason\\_W.\\_is\\_van\\_begin\\_dit\\_jaar](http://vorige.nrc.nl//binnenland/article2632757.ece/Brief_Jason_W._is_van_begin_dit_jaar)