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Master Thesis

Migration-terrorism nexus: Development in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices after the 2015 European migration crisis



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Abstract

This Master thesis analysis the subject of the migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after the 2015 European migration crisis. Its main objective is to answer the question whether or not can the changes in Greece's counter terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after the 2015 European migration crisis be better explained by securitization or politicization theory. The research is analyzed and assessed in three analytical part which closely elaborate on political discourse, proposed measures, as well as real changes in regard to the subject of migration, terrorism, as well as migration-terrorism nexus which was observed in Greece after the 2015 European migration crisis.

The analytical part identified several findings. Firstly, the subjects of migration and terrorism in Greece has already been securitized for many years prior to 2015. Second, the securitization of the European migration crisis was reinforced after several months of its politicization. None the less, the end of 2015 marked change in political discourse on the migration crisis which became securitizing. This was a direct result of political turmoil both on national and international level and dissatisfaction of political elites with Greece's management of crisis. As a consequence, Greek government was actively reinforcing the securitization of the migration-terrorism nexus though variety of policies and practices. These were supported mainly though variety of EU's agencies as well as the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Additionally, the securitization of migration-terrorism nexus was further supported though cooperation with NATO. In this regard, this Master's thesis argues that the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies in regard to border control are better explained by the securitization theory.

1.Introduction

Since 2015, the European continent has been flooded by millions of illegal migrants as a result of long-term political and economic instability, especially, in regions of Africa and the Middle East. The masses of arriving refugees, and economic migrants, have soon become one of the main concerns of the EU's agenda causing political turmoil. While some of the member states recognized the necessity of humanitarian actions, and were ready to accept the migrants, the others portrayed the crisis as a source of threats to both national and international security. Because the vast majority of the incoming migrants were of Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghan nationality, the dialogues over the migration crisis had soon been linked to threat of terrorism (Park, 2015). Given the fact that Syrian civil war had facilitated rise of various Islamist terrorist groups, many of which were supported by fairly large number of European foreign fighters, the nexus between the migration crisis and terrorism had been claimed as a present security concern (McKeever & Chowdhury Fink, 2017). Additionally, the arrival of thousands of migrants paralyzed border controls, especially, in the entering countries like Italy and Greece. The immigration authorities in these states failed to properly check and identify incoming flow of migrants crossing the borders of the European Union, and thus, faced criticism from other member states on many occasions (McDonald-Gibson, 2015). The inability of Greek and Italian law enforcement agencies in effective assessment of the crisis had left many believed that the loopholes in the border control could have been misused by individuals, with intention to conduct criminal and terrorist activity in Europe (McKeever & Chowdhury Fink, 2017). These concerns were partially based on the fact that the propaganda materials of the Islamic State (IS), the Islamist terrorist group controlling the vast territories in Syria and Iraq at the time, had suggested that hundreds of the IS's members had infiltrated the groups of migrants travelling to Europe (McDonald-Gibson, 2015). In addition, the IS was very successful in conducting high number of deadly terrorist attacks in the African and the Middle Eastern regions, many of which were extensively covered by the international and the national media outlets. Despite some political figures argued that migrants from Syria and Iraq should had been perceived as the victims of the terrorism rather than its supporters, the concerns over the security threats posed by the migration had become one of the focal points of the political debate in a number of the EU member states (Erlanger, 2016).

1.1 Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks

A considerable shift in the attitudes towards the migration-terrorism nexus had been observed after the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015. In the six coordinated attacks, the terrorist

killed 130 individuals while injuring more than 400 (Erlanger, 2016). These attacks have been the deadliest act of terrorism on the European soil since the Al-Qaeda orchestrated Madrid bombing in 2004 (Erlanger, 2016). The later investigation into the Paris terrorist attacks uncovered that at least two of the perpetrators arrived to Europe from Syria via the Eastern Mediterranean migration route, hidden among the migrants (Farmer, 2016). Additionally, the police report also revealed connection between the two other terrorist, involved in the Paris attacks, and Greece. One of them was identified as the masterminds of the attacks, a Belgium national, Abdelhamid Abaaoud (Farmer, 2016). Prior to the Paris attacks, Abaaoud had been linked to several European terrorists who had conducted or had been preparing to conduct terrorist attacks in various locations in Europe (Baker, 2016). Even after his death in the late 2015, Abaaoud had been identified as a connecting link between many individuals involved in the terrorist activities, especially, in Belgium and France. According to the reports, Abaaoud was located in Athens in the early months of 2015 (Baker, 2016). He came under the radar of the Greek law enforcement agencies due to a suspicious cell phone call in which he directed later foiled terrorist attack in Belgium. Although the police in Greece obtained information about Abaaoud's whereabouts he managed to escape without detection.

The second attacker of the Paris attack, whose movement was traced to Greece, was Salah Abdeslam. Prior to the attack, he was also known to the Belgium law enforcement agencies as a small criminal with suspicion of belonging to jihadist terrorist group operating in Belgium. The Belgium authorities targeted Abdeslam due to his close personal relationship with many known or suspected Belgium jihadists, one of which was his childhood friend Abdelhamid Abaaoud. The evidence showed that Abdeslam “drove to countries including Hungary, Germany and Greece to pick up[IS] ... fighters, who came to Europe from Syria with influx of refugees via the Balkan route (Scheftalovich, 2016)”. According to the media reports, “six of those smuggled into Belgium” with the help of Abdeslam “were involved in the Paris terror attacks ... while another four were implicated in the Brussels attacks (Scheftalovich, 2016)”.

The Brussels bombing was executed few months after the Paris attacks. Although it was not as deadly as the attacks in Paris the Brussels bombing claimed lives of more than 30 individuals (Baker, 2016). Immediately after the bombing, several media outlets speculated about the connection between the timing of the attack and the arrest of Abdeslam, which concluded months-long international manhunt targeting his person. Whether or not Abdeslam's arrest played a role in a planning of the Brussels bombing, the commonalities shared by the two attacks are undeniable. Similarly like in the case of Paris attacks, the investigation conducted

by the Belgium authorities identified number of previously known terror suspects to be responsible for the execution of the attack. At least two of the suicide bombers had travelled to Europe from Syria through Greece using fake Syrian identification documents, pretending to be migrants (Barker, 20106; Erlanger, 2016). Additionally, the evidence suggested significant mistakes regarding the cooperation between the national and international law enforcement agencies, which failed to act on the individuals associated with or suspected from affiliation to Islamist terrorism. Given these facts, the changing nature of the terrorist threat in Europe had signalized the compelling shortcomings of counter-terrorism policy and practice in many of the EU member states. The Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks demonstrated that the potential of the IS terrorist activities, and its misuse of the migration crisis for spreading the terror across Europe, must be recognized and addressed as a possible source of security concerns.

1.2 Rise of the Islamist terrorism in Europe

Despite the significance of the Paris and Brussels attacks, they were not the only events associated with the migration-terrorism nexus. Throughout the years 2015 and 2016, several cases of foiled terrorist attacks and identified terrorists had been linked to the migration crisis (Europol, 2017, Mantzikos, 2016). These occurred in number of the Western European countries. At the beginning of 2017, Europol released the report on Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) acknowledging that “the irregular migrant flow was exploited in order to dispatch terrorist operatives ... to Europe” and warned about possibility of IS or “other jihadist terrorist organizations” to use the same methods with intention to conduct terrorist activities on the European continent in future (Europol, 2017). The same report also observed that “terrorist groups continue to exploit the socio-economic grievances of Muslim immigrants to the EU, in order to recruit and incite them to engage in terrorist activities” indicating changing nature of present security threats in Europe (Europol, 2017). In 2016 alone, there were “718 arrests related to jihadist terrorism” in the EU (Europol, 2017). The evidence shows that this “number ... has sharply increased in each of the last three years (Europol, 2017)”. Furtherly, Europol's report suggest that the potential of the “jihadist terrorism remains high with indications of it continuing to rise (Europol, 2017)”. As a consequence, the authorities in many of the EU member states had acknowledged the loopholes in the EU security system and pushed for a proper re-assessment and management of the migration crisis, both on national and international levels. The debate had not only been centered around the practical security concerns resulting from free movement within the Schengen Area, but also the subject of more effective protection

of the EU's external borders and efficient border controls regarding the illegal migrants' inflow (Erlanger, 2016).

1.3 Research question

The risk migration poses in relation to terrorism as such is not a new phenomenon. The migration-terrorism nexus has also been the subject of academic discussion, for instance in the context of securitization literature. In a nutshell, securitization argues that political elites can present any political phenomenon as a serious security concern which poses an existential to any of state institutions. Based on this threat presentation, political elites ask for emergency measures which are outside the normal legal processed or mechanisms. None the less, a strong focus of the researcher on studying migration-terrorism nexus as a part of securitization processes had lately been critiqued. Other group of academics claim that security threat does not have to be necessarily securitized in order to be addressed by the political elites. And therefore, they argue that security practices and policies can also be constituted through process of politicization. Theory of politicization, on contrary to securitization, states that security practices and policies can be part of normal political processes. Concluding that security threat can be politicized without being securitized. Despite politicization have been applied for examination of many socio-political phenomenon, the migration-terrorism nexus have been fairly understudied subjects in the context of politicization theory. And therefore academic knowledge could benefit from more in-depth case studies in which the migration-terrorism nexus, in terms of its consequences for counter-terrorism policies, is being studied on the level of concrete security practices related to border controls. Further, it is also interesting to look into both the national incentives to adapt border management in the context of counter-terrorism, and the European influences in this field. Given the fact that Greece has been at the forefront of the 2015 European migration crisis, which has directly been linked to a number of terrorist attacks in Europe, this country is an obvious choice for a case study. This, however, requires an in-depth examination of Greece's security discourse, practices and policies which were introduced after the migration-terrorism nexus was observed. And therefore, this research will focus on an analysis of the relationship between the European migration crisis and Greek counter-terrorism policy with the main objective to answer the question: can the changes in Greece counter-terrorism policies and practices regarding the border management since the 2015 migration crisis be better explained by securitization theory or politicization theory?

1.4 Societal and academic relevance

Within the last few years, many of the EU member states expressed the fear over the possible security issues arising from massive the influx of the illegal migrants. Although there have been many security concerns linked to the migration crisis, the currently observed upsurge of the Islamist terrorism became one of the most compelling subject of the policy making in many of the EU member states. Given the facts that between 2015 and 2017, the vast majority of the deaths resulting from terrorist activity had been assigned to “jihadist terrorist attacks”; and a number of the terrorist attacks had proved to be linked to the migration crisis, the migration-terrorism nexus has become a highly debated political issue (Europol, 2017). The changing nature of the terrorism in Europe, and its connection to the migration crisis therefore should be recognized and addressed by an elaborate research. The current wave of the terror attacks in Europe must be examined both as a social and a political phenomenon. Since the migration-terrorism nexus was recognized by the national and international authorities, many political figures, especially the Euro-skeptics and Anti-migrant populists, have been using the threat of jihadist terrorism in order to strengthen their political influence. The promotion of the politics of fear has not only been observed in the Western member states, many of which were directly affected by the current wave of terrorism, but also in countries which historically faced very low threats of terrorist activity on their territories. Therefore anti-migration attitudes in many EU member states have been on significant rise, signaling rather hesitance if not refusal of the Europeans in an acceptance of the migrants. A proper analysis of the migration-terrorism nexus and its real implications on the Greece counter-terrorism policies and practices can address many socio-political issues arising from this phenomenon. This research can thus significantly contribute to an in-depth knowledge into how Greek authorities are dealing with this sensitive topic. At the same time the research determines whether or not migration-terrorism nexus in regard to border controls after 2015 stays in the domain of 'normal' politics or it has become a part of securitization processes which justify extraordinary measures in order to address security threat. Additionally, this research can provide more insight into the re-assessment of the EU security agenda which seems to be one of the most debated socio-political issues in the last years.

The case of Greece, which I have chosen to analyze, is especially relevant in the study of migration-terrorism nexus. As I have already highlighted, the evidence proves that several of the terrorist, involved in the attacks executed on the European soil, had successfully passed through the Greek border controls infiltrating the groups of the migrants (Europol, 2017). Since

this research focuses on the analysis of the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after the 2015 European migration crisis, the in-depth research of this subject can provide further academic knowledge on the development in the security practices and policies in the field of migration-terrorism nexus. At the same time, it might fill the academic gap in connection to securitization versus politicization debate. Although there have been many researches examining the migration-terrorism nexus through securitization perspective, there has been a lack of researches studying counter-terrorism policies in the context of politicization theory. In this regard, this research examines aspects of both theories, securitization and politicization, and therefore can further the insight into forms which counter-terrorism policies and practices, in relation to migration and border control, can take. And last but not least, this Master's thesis can contextualize the whether the analyzed changes are merely explained for by European and the international securitization pressures or merely national drivers. Therefore, this research might bring more insight not only into the general knowledge regarding the practical influences of the migration on the counter-terrorism policy but also specific case of Greece and the European migration crisis.

In the next chapter I analyze the literature addressing different dimensions of securitization and politicization theories in detail. This chapter serves as the main theoretical framework for the analytical part of this research. However, the exact indicators which are used for the examination of the migration-terrorism nexus in Greece are thoroughly identified and explained in the methodological chapter which follows the literature review. Both of the following chapters will therefore closely elaborate not only on the theoretical framework but also on the methodology of the research.

2 Literature review

A subject of migration has always been portrayed as a contentious socio-political phenomenon which has enjoyed a great political attention, especially, in the Western world. Since the late 20th century, many of the Western states have been actively pursuing the control and management of immigration through the introduction of various policies and laws. However, “since the 1980s and particularly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001” the subject of immigration “has [increasingly] been viewed through a security prism (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010, 43; Balzacq, 2006; 2009; Bigo, 2002; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008; Bourbeau, 2011; Buonfino, 2004; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans, 2006; Huysmans & Tsoukala, 2008; Vultee, 2011)”. Such approach has been observed in many “nation-states around the globe,

especially Western ones”, which have been “cracking down on migration for security reasons (Bourbeau, 2011, p.1)”. This trend of many national governments and an introduction of “the linkage between migration and security” has, subsequently, caused that “migrants” have been “presented in political discourses as criminals, troublemakers, economic and social defrauders, terrorist, [or] drug traffickers ... associated with organized crime (Huysmans, 2006, p. xi; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p. 22)”. And therefore “international migration has become a key security issue and is perceived, in some eyes, as an existential security threat (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 1)”. As a consequence, many scholars have been referring to this currently observed phenomenon “as securitized migration or as the securitization of migration (Bourbeau, 2011, p.1)”.

2.1 Theory of securitization: Copenhagen School

The concept of securitization was firstly introduced in the 1990s by “scholars [of] ... the Copenhagen School” (CS) as “a compromise” between the traditional and “more modern ... conceptions of security (Vultee, 2010, p. 34; Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998)”. Although the concept of securitization is based on “the traditional military-political understanding of security” as a phenomenon placed within the context of “survival”, it challenges the orthodox perception of “military power” as “the sole province of security (Vultee, 2010, p. 34; Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p.21)”. On contrary to the orthodox security studies, the concept of securitization “allows ... a socially constructed expansion of the realm of security, through a logic that recalls the traditional focus on the state while widening that focus to 'the survival of collective units and principles' (Vultee, 2010, p. 34; Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 26)”. And thus any “military, political, economic, societal and environmental” phenomenon, including issues like terrorism, “international organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking, immigration, and weapons proliferation move to the foreground [of] ... security agendas (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 21; Huysmans & Tsoukala, 2008, p.133)”.

In a nutshell, securitization is defined as an “intersubjective process” when “actors identify an existential threat that requires emergency executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitizing move, the issue is depoliticized and is considered a 'security' issue outside the rules of normal politics (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 23-25; Salter, 2008, p. 321)”. Based on this conceptualization, the authors claim that securitization can “be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” which, on contrary, they define as the process when “the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 23)”. None the less, it

is the articulation of the “existential threat” which according to the Copenhagen School “takes politics beyond the established rules of the game (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 23)”. Since securitization is referred to as process and/or practice its success does not entirely depend on the identification and presentation of the security threat (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 25). The authors argue that any “successful securitization” must fulfill “three components (or steps)” including the identification of an “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules (1998, p. 26)”. In the initial step of the securitization process, the securitizing actor undertakes “securitizing move” by which the subject of security concern is introduced and identified as “an existential threat” through an act of speech (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998, p. 23-6). By an articulation of the security threat the securitizing actor addresses its “priority and urgency ... [which subsequently] legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998, p. 25)”. None the less, “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to object does not only itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” concluding that “if no such acceptance exist” we cannot refer to “an object ... [as] being [successfully] securitized (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998, p. 25)”.

2.2 Securitization of migration: Beyond Copenhagen School

Since the development of securitization theory, many scholars have sought to address the limitation of the initial concept by introducing “an international political sociology approach to securitization which accounts for non-discursive construction of security threats and allows a more detailed theorization about the interaction between securitizing actors, audiences, and context (Karyotis, 2012, p. 391)”. While most of the new academic literature accepts securitization as the process through which an existential threat is constructed, many of the academics argue that conceptual narrowness of securitization is too restrictive for analytical purposes. And thus I will elaborate on the two most prominent limitations regarding the securitization theory.

2.3 Securitizing move: More than act of speech

On contrary to Copenhagen School, McDonald claims that “security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices rather than only through specific speech acts that enable emergency measures (2008, p. 569)”. Didier Bigo, for example, defines “securitization of migration” as “a transversal political technology, used as a

mode of governmentality by diverse institutions” which “emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (2002, p. 65)”. These, as he argues, are the compartments of institutional or bureaucratic configurations and networks which “not only respond to threat but also determine what is and what is not a threat or a risk (Bigo, 2002, p. 74)”. In this regard, “securitization ... is generated through a confrontation between the strategic political actors ... in the national political field, the security professionals at the transnational level ... and the global social transformations affecting the possibilities of reshaping political boundaries (Bigo, 2002, p. 75)”. The “administrative practices” of securitization can take “a range” of different forms including “population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and” others (Bigo, 2002, p. 65)”. Similarly to the claims of Bigo, Huysmans observes that “in bureaucratized and professionalized societies – in both the public and private ... domain – both technologies and experts play an extremely important role in modulating social and political practice (2006, p. 9)”. And thus Huysmans argues that in order to fully understand securitization one must consider and explore “a technocratic interpretation of the politics of insecurity” as a technique of governance (2006, p. 9-10). In this regard, “securitization has emerged as a mode of governance” which “combines technologies of surveillance, state scrutinizing the conduct of risk categories, with technologies of normalization, the policing of social surfaces through the mediated circulation of images watched by spectator citizens (Humphrey, 2013, p. 191)”. As a consequence, reinforcement of securitized migration in form of various policies, legislations, administrative, bureaucratic and/or technocratic “operational set-ups and practices” has been used as an extension of “governmentality beyond national borders (Humphrey, 2016, p. 181; Schlentz, 2010, p.7)”. The securitization of migration thus became embedded in “hypergovernance as a strategy of transnational governance of population (Humphrey, 2016, p. 190)”. In the very basic sense, “the securitization of migration flow constructs 'illegal migrants' and 'refugees' – those not arriving through the normal regulated channels – as a problem of 'border protection' (Humphrey, 2013, p. 186)”. Many of the scholars have been referring to this phenomenon as proliferation of technology and biometrics into management and control of borders (Baldaccini, 2008; Broeders & Hampshire, 2013). Since the events of 9/11 there has been reinforced perception of “asylum seekers as potential terrorists (Humphrey, 2013, p. 186)”. In other words, the migration-terrorism nexus became reinforced as a serious security concern (Bigo, 2002; Cross, 2017; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Léonard, 2015).

2.4 Process of securitization: Context, audience and authority

The next prominent limitation of the CS securitization theory, which according to some restricts from a proper analysis and understanding of the securitization processes, is “the lack of both a broader social theory and discourse and more specific theorization of sociopolitical processes (Stritzel, 2012, p. 550)”. Stritzel, for example, argues that the CS securitization is based on an idea of “a fundamental transformation of social reality [which] is possible through the mechanics ... of an act of speech” and which can be established by “single actors (usually state representatives) (Stritzel, 2012, p. 552)”. To put it differently, the securitization is presented through the act of speech by political elites which are automatically presupposed to possess a legitimate power for a construction of a security threat. This idea of traditional securitization is, however, very restrictive (Stritzel, 2012, p. 553). And therefore Stritzel argues that “the discourse of securitization must be understood as situated within a relationship between speaker-audience and within a context that predates the actual securitizing act (Stritzel in Salter, 2008, p. 326)”. In somewhat similar fashion, Balzacq claims that “securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction (2005, p. 172)”. In this regard, Balzacq argues that rather than “a self-contained process”, as proposed by the CS, “securitization is a historical process that occurs between an antecedent influential set of events and their impacts on interactions” resulting from “a complex repertoire of causes (2005, p. 193)”. Drawing upon the academic findings of Stritzel and Balzacq, Salter agrees that “the process of securitization is not a moment of binary decision but rather an iterative, political process between speaker and audience (2008, p. 321)”. This process, according to Salter, is happening within “multiple settings ... [and] distinct types of audiences and speech contexts” concluding that success or failure of securitization depends on an appropriate formulation of “securitizing moves” considering “different sociological settings that operate within unique rules, norms, and practices (2008, p. 321-45)”. And therefore, one must consider not only political setting within realm of which securitization takes place but also other external and internal contexts and influences which might be affect the understanding of socio-political reality of the targeted audience (Salter, 2008).

In case of migration, many scholars have observed that it is the social identity and fear for losing it which many times sparks securitization agenda and establishment. Stewarts and Karakatsanis argue that it was social insecurity which to a large extent supported political elites in

securitization of migration in 1990s in Greece (2012). Karyotis, however, goes even further in claims stating that securitization was mainly constructed by political elites which agenda appropriately matched “historical and institutional configuration” ultimately resulting in successful acceptance of migration as a threat both to culture and/or identity as well as security (2012).

Buonfino, for example claims that securitization of migration in both Britain and Italy must be understood in the context of dynamic interplay between mass media, public opinion, and political elites (2004). She argues that different discourses on migration can be present in the media and/or public sphere (Buonfino, 2004). None the less, public is the main factor which chooses which one is the most relevant (Buonfino, 2004). And thus construction of migration as security concern can be accompanied by presentation of migrants as threat to identity. This in many cases could support securitization of migration (Buonfino, 2004; Karyotis, 2012).

On contrary to Buonfino, Bourbeau argues that while media can and should be perceived as possible securitizing actors they might not be so important in establishment of securitization (2011). Additionally, he argues that analysis of media in connection to securitization might not explain the other contextual factors which can be extremely valid in construction of securitization (Buonfino, 2011).

2.5 Securitization versus politicization of migration

According to the CS, there are three different forms in which “any public issue” can be constituted within the political “spectrum” ranging from “non-politicized ... through politicized ... to securitized (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 23)”. In other words any issue can either be excluded from “public debate and decisions ... [be] part of public policy, requiring government decisions and resources ... [or be] presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 23-4)”. And thus politicization and securitization of migration do differ quite profoundly. While “securitization refers to the process of integrating migration discursively and institutionally into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defense”; the politicization should be understood as “the process of taking migration out of restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and bringing it into the public arena (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 44; Huysmans, 2006)”. In this aspect, politicization of migration is less limited in the form it takes. On contrary to securitized migration which is always constituted as security threat, and therefore is perceived negatively, politicization of migration “can have both positive and

negative overtones (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 43; Huysmans, 2006)". And thus can be referred to as "neutral process (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 130)". This, however, does not mean that there is no relationship between the two processes. As Bourbeau explains "the politicization of migration could lead to the securitization of migration and vice versa (2011, p. 43)". None the less, neither should be expected that "politicization of migration ... necessarily equate with a securitization of migration" since "an actor can politicize an issue without securitizing it (Bourbeau, 2011, p. 43)". Additionally, Huysmans argues that securitization might also be constructed and introduced "independently from the politicization of events" indicating that relationship between the two to a large extent depends on the numbers of actors and contexts affecting both processes (2006, p. 8).

The fact that politicization is rather a "neutral process" is, however, not the only aspect of this concept that differs from securitization. On contrary to securitization, politicization of migration might be addressed through variety of issues or side-effects which are directly or indirectly connected to migration. The most prevalent "two types of real or imagined treats" include "economic threats" and any issues referring to "cultural, religious and identity threats posed by migrants to the majority communities (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017)". Interestingly, Bourbeau proposes that one discourse on migration does not have to exclude the other from political debate (2011, p. 130-4). In somewhat similar fashion, Buonfino argues that different discourses on migration can be observed within society at the same time (2004, p. 37). In this regard, we can understand subject of immigration as "a rather obscure and contested issue for the wider public, suggesting that economic, cultural and security cues by political elites are crucial to elicit public reactions... and that parties have strong incentives to formulate clearly identifiable strategies of politicization with respect to the immigration issues (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017)". Politicization of controversial issues like migration thus must be located and analyzed within the context of the political polarization and "an interrelation between issue attention in public opinion, government agendas and party politics (van der Brug et al., 2015; Castelli Gattinara & Molrales, 2017)". Since the subject of immigration is related to "a complex bundle of loosely related policy issues" its significance for political actors lies in "a multiplicity of framing opportunities" which can be helpful in construction of "their politicization strategies by taking advantage of the different dimensions of choice ... without necessarily having to engage in securitizing moves (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017)". This, however, does not mean that security concerns as the main objective of the migration is not applied more often. On contrary, it is the migration-security nexus which is especially popular

in the political debates. The main causes, as Castelli Gattinara and Morales argue, is anticipation of “political parties ... [to win] the preferences of votes and respond to the demands of electorates (2017, p. 7)”. And thus one must consider “the construction of immigration as a public issue which is the result of the interplay between multiple factors: the behavior of government and opposition parties, the actual inflow of migrants, and the reception of these phenomena ... [by] public opinion (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017)”.

Despite the fact that securitization and politicization can be referred to as inter-related processes, there are at least three main aspects in which they differ profoundly. While the two have already been addressed it is necessary to elaborate on the third. And therefore, that politicization, on contrary to securitization, cannot be established through extraordinary measures which would exceed the ordinary political norms (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p.23-5). Such approach could only be utilized by securitization of migration. As a consequence, the politicization of migration, or any referential issue connected to migration, must be addressed in usual political and legislative procedures. In this regard, analysis of securitization and politicization concludes that the two phenomenon might have many similar aspects and be in direct relationship. None the less it is the neutral nature of politicization which allows subject of migration to be framed in different ways and restricts politicization from breaking the rules and norms of policy making in order to address the issue, unlike securitized migration.

The following chapter on methodology explains in detail how the analytical part of this research is assessed in order to determine whether securitization or rather politicization can better contextualize the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border management after 2015 migration crisis. The chapter is divided into several sections which address and explain the choice of research design and research method. Subsequently, it closely elaborates on the use of single case study and its aim to contextualize the phenomenon of migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after 2015 migration crisis. Additionally, it demonstrate why Greece is exceptionally interesting case study for contemporary security studies. Further, it explains the data collection and data analysis while determining the indicators. And last but not least, it gives a short reflection on the analytical chapters, the exact aim of their research, as well as limitation of the study.

3 Methodology

The subject of this Master's thesis is an analysis of the changes in the Greece counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to the border control and management after the 2015 European migration crisis. Based on the theoretical knowledge which is presented in the theoretical part of the research, it aims to analyze whether the changes can be better explained by the securitization or politicization theory. The selected theoretical frameworks have been chosen due to their academic and practical relevance for a research of the phenomenon like the migration-terrorism nexus. Additionally, since the late 2015 there have been planned and/or executed many jihadist terrorist attacks which proved the migration-terrorism nexus as a real security threat. As a result, some of the countries which have been affected by the current rise of jihadist terrorism in Europe have pursued the securitization of terrorism and migration. These activities have been observed in France, where terrorism and migration crisis have also become highly politicized issues. Similarly, number of the EU's member states, which have historically had a very limited experience with terrorism, have been affected by the politicization of the migration-terrorism nexus. The constructivist nature of the securitization and politicization theories are especially useful while analyzing the changes in the Greece counter-terrorism policy and practice, in regard to the border control, after 2015. None the less, the analytical findings of this Master's thesis are not aimed at generalization of the currently present phenomenon of migration-terrorism nexus in Europe but rather a contextualized insight into the Greece security agenda. And therefore this Master's thesis is analyzed through a qualitative single case study research design.

3.1 Single case study

Single case study has been chosen for an in-depth research of the migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after the 2015 European migration crisis. Because single case study allows such a detailed, contextualized examination of any socio-political phenomenon, and processes which affect it, this research design has been found as the most suitable for the nature and aims of this study. And thus the main focus of this single case study research is to closely elaborate on approach of Greek political elites towards addressing the migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after 2015 while it deeply investigate the contextual factors which had impacted the policies and practices established by Greek authorities in regard to this subject.

The case study of Greece have been picked due to several reasons which make this country, especially, relevant for study of the migration-terrorism nexus. Firstly, the geographical location of Greece predetermines country's vulnerability of becoming a gate to Europe for many

migrants. As a South-eastern border of European continent, Greece faces proximity not only to Africa and the Middle East but also to Asia. The fact that Greece presents an important strategic point for migrants from these continents have been proved during the European migration crisis. During its peak in 2015, Greece registered hundreds thousands of migrants, the vast majority of which were of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi nationalities. On contrary, any other South-European country like Italy or Spain did not accept that many Syrians. Additionally, all three states have been confronted with strong presence of various jihadist terrorist groups on their territories. None the less, it is the case of Syria and Iraq which seems to worry the European political elites the most. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the region has been confronted with a rise of numerous jihadist terrorist groups some of which have also managed to control many regions in Syria and/or Iraq. Perhaps the most dangerous of them has been the jihadist terrorist group known as Islamic State (IS). In the early 2015, several news reported about the possibility of IS fighters infiltrating the groups of Syrian and Iraqi migrants with an intention of committing terrorist attacks in Europe. The reports were confirmed when the two of the deadliest terrorist attacks, which were perpetrated since 2015, were directly connected to Greece.

Thirdly, Greece has historically been dealing with an issue of terrorist attacks which, however, were not of a religious nature. Despite this fact, Greece has been an important traverse point for various Islamist terrorist groups since the 2000s. None the less, Greece has been mostly confronted with left-wing and right-wing terrorist groups, many of which are still active. And thus it was the activity of left-wing terrorist group, known as Revolutionary Organization November 17, which had resulted into securitization of terrorism in Greece in the late 1990s (Karyotis, 2007). Additionally, the subject of migration has also been securitized in the late 20th century. In this regard, securitization of migration and terrorism was already present in Greece. Despite the different natures of the securitized subjects, and fairly different socio-political and economic problems that are currently faced by Greece, it might, to some extent, help in contextualization of the changes in the Greece counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after 2015.

Fourthly, as a consequence of Dublin III Regulation, which restricts any migrant from applying for asylum in more than one EU member state, Greece is obliged to take care of thousands of migrants and refugees. The regulation establishes that a member state through which an asylum seeker enters the territory of the EU is responsible for provision of the basic life necessities. Nevertheless, during the European migration crisis, Greek authorities were paralyzed by the

masses of arriving migrants due to its strategic place. The issue of relocation of migrants, which was supposed to take form of quotas, became highly politicized subject in many countries. Given the fact that Greece has been struggling with the worst economic crisis in the last few decades, it has rather limited economic resources. These does not only involve taking care of migrants but also re-assessment of the border control which might contribute to decrease of undetected criminals and terrorist from arriving to Europe.

3.2 Data collection, data analysis, and indicators

The following analytical parts are examined through document analysis. This allows for a detailed analysis of primary sources which main objective is an interpretation of researched text in relation to studied phenomenon. The assessment is based on coding system which incorporates identification and definition of indicators. These are an essential part of explanation and contextualization of analyzed subjects. Because of this features, the document analysis was found to be the most suitable form of qualitative research for the purposes and size of this Master's thesis. Additionally, I have chosen content analysis as a technique though which the data is being examined and assessed. This technique of document analysis allows for systematic research of content presented in the researched documents. The research of content is based on previously identified and defined indicators. Due to chosen research design and studied subject, a proper analysis of documents' content is of key importance for the overall assessment and contextualization of this Master's thesis. Consequently, document and content analyses have been identified as the most suitable form and technique for the objective of this research.

Besides the academic literature I analyzes (1) reports, interviews, and statements conducted by the most valid national and intergovernmental organizations, as well as the NGOs; (2) media news and reports addressing the subjects related to the researched topic; (3) and security measures taken as a respond to the European migration crisis while focusing on the counter-terrorism policies and practices in Greece. The collection of data is achieved through triangulation of data. The reports and statements of the most valid governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations are collected from the internet domains and internet databases of the organizations/agencies. In the case of media news and reports I entirely focus on Greek internet outlets which report also in English; and the most valid international online media which address the nexus between the Greece, the jihadist terrorism and migrants/refugees as well as the European migration crisis and subjects referring to security threat posed by the inflow of the mass of migrants. The documents concerning the

security measures, mainly counter-terrorism policies and practices, which had been taken as a respond to influx of migrants will be obtained from

As I have already stressed, the data and documents are analyzed through a content analysis. Since the objective of this Master's thesis is to examine whether or not the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism practices and policies in regard to border control after the 2015 European migration crisis can be better explained by securitization or politicization theory. While securitization argues that any socio-political phenomenon can be formed into a security threat in need of extraordinary measures beyond regular political processes, politicization theory claims that threat can also be addressed through 'normal' political provisions without being securitized. In order to assess the analytical part, I have chosen number of indicators which examination is vital for this research. However, due to time and size limitations of this research I have decided to develop limited number of indicators. These are solely focused on study of (1) political discourse (speech act) through which the researched subjects, therefore migration and terrorism, are presented by the political elites to public; (2) the proposed measures in order to deal with issues connected to the migration and terrorism; and last but not least, (3) the measures which were taken in order to address these issues. These indicators are closely explained in the following Table.1. None the less, I decided not to research public attitudes towards the European migration crisis, nor the approach of Greek security professionals. Understandably, examination of public opinion as well as security professionals would have been helpful in contextualization of the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after 2015. Despite that the time and size restrains of this research do not allow me to elaborate on these subjects. None the less, the following table defines the indicators which are used in the analytical part of this research. Based on these I will evaluate whether or not the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after the 2015 European migration crisis can be better explained by securitization or politicization theory.

Table 1. Operationalization - Indicators

	Securitization of migration-terrorism nexus	Politicization of migration- terrorism nexus
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Speech act	phenomenon is presented as existential threat to security of the state establishment/ nation/culture/identity	phenomenon is a part of public and political debate which can be polarizing and/or fierce, however, it is not referred to as existential threat
Call for actions/moves	phenomenon is in need of emergency or extraordinary measure; proposed actions are outside the normal political procedures	phenomenon is addressed through ordinary political processes and/or actions; no proposition for emergency measures
Measures taken	based on logic of security threat; reinforced through extraordinary/emergency measures; as well as legislation and/or administrative/bureaucratic/ technocratic operational set-ups, practices and policies; strong focus on border control;	phenomenon is addressed by variety of polarizing legislations, policies and/or practices which are constituted and reinforced through ordinary political and legislative procedures

The analytical part will be divided into four sections. In the first, I broadly analyze the presence of terrorist threat in Greece, including its nature and counter-terrorism policies and practices before 2015. This section of the analytical part also examines the securitization of terrorism in the late 20th and early 21st century, and the influence of the external factors affecting the counter-terrorism policies and practices in Greece. Additionally, I also explore the subject of migration securitization which was pursued by the Greek government in 1990s. None the less, this part is mainly based on already existing academic researches. Its main purpose is contextualization of the subjects of migration and terrorism, in connection to Greece's security agenda in historic perspective. Further, it serves as basis for assessing whether or not there were any important or extraordinary changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after 2015.

The second section of the analytical part focuses on the framing of the European migration crisis pursued by the political elites in Greece. I analyze the political parties, which are part of Greek parliament, and their framing of the European migration crisis and its connection to security threat. The main objective of this chapter therefore is understanding whether Greek political elites perceive migration as a serious security issue endangering Greek citizens or they focus a political debate on different aspects of the European migration crisis more. These might include both positive and negative phenomenon in regard to the crisis. Overall, this part will entirely elaborate on presentation of the subject of migration – and the issues connected to migration-security nexus, with special focus on Islamist terrorism – by different Greek political parties and their agendas.

The third analytical part elaborates on the changes in the Greece counter-terrorism practices and policies, mainly focusing on the border management and control, after the 2015 European migration crisis. The analysis will connectedly examine both the changes proposed by the Greek national authorities, as well as the international initiatives which had been accepted as a part of re-assessed migration management in Greece. Despite addressing the internal and external initiatives which affected the changes in the migration management in regard to counter-terrorism policies and practices, this part will not be deeply examining the relationships between these actors. However, its main premise is to contextualize the changes of counter-terrorism policies and practices as a respond to the migration-terrorism nexus which challenged the mechanisms of the EU external border protection.

The limitations of this research had been identified in several instances. Firstly, it must be pointed out that because of the time restraints and limitation to the scope of this Master's thesis, it is not able to fully address all of the events or actors influencing the Greek counter-terrorism policy since 2015. In this regard, I do not research public opinion, approach of the Greek security professionals, nor the Greek media and their presentation of the migration crisis and migration-terrorism nexus. Despite they can help in better contextualization of the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after 2015. And thus, this is limiting to the internal validity of my research. Further, I conduct my analysis solely through research of primary and secondary sources which address different aspect of the researched subjects. Given the time limitation, I decided not to interview Greek political elites nor Greek law enforcement officials specializing on Greece's counter-terrorism initiative. However, it further lowers the internal validity of the research since the insight of these professionals can offer more detail information on the security threat posed by the migration-terrorism nexus and

its recognition and management by Greek authorities. Additionally, it is important to state that this research will not work with classified documents, reporting on the threat of terrorism in Greece, but will be focusing on analysis of freely available documents and reports. It is also possible that some of the documents regarding counter-terrorism policy in Greece will not be able to be obtained due to various reasons. Since migration-terrorism nexus in Greece has been proved in the later 2015, there is still lack of academic sources referring to this phenomenon. Further, I am not Greek speaker which can be potentially limiting my ability to gather as well as research governmental documents and/or Greek media outlets. Additionally, there is a possibility that I am not going to be able to collect relevant data due to various other reasons. Thus, internal validity of the research is lower due to above presented limitations.

4 Subjects of migration and terrorism in a historical context of Greece's policies and practices

Both migration and terrorism have become especially prominent subjects of security concerns and political debate within the last few decades. With a rise of global migration, and Islamist terrorism, many governments were pressed to address different dimensions of these socio-political phenomenon. Despite many of these dimensions were not threatening to the state institutions, many Western governments have pursued a security based policies and practices in regard to migration as well as terrorism. In other words, securitized these phenomenon. Similarly like other Western states, Greece has historically been confronted with both migration and terrorist threats. As a result, they were recognized by Greek political elites who addressed them though an introduction of various policies and practices. And thus, their analysis is the subject of this chapter which aims to contextualize the presence of migration and terrorism in a historic perspective of Greece's policy making and governance. In the following subchapters, I examine the nature of these policies and practices in regard to migration and terrorism before 2015, in order to determine whether or not they can be better explained by securitization or politicization theory.

4.1 Greece's policy making and subject of migration

As many Western European states, neither Greece was immune to social and political transformation of Europe in the very late 20th century which, to a large extent, was caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc. Subsequently, the open borders as well as political and economic instability in the post-communist countries contributed to migration of millions of individuals. In the case of Greece, majority of the migrants were coming from Balkan countries,

especially Bulgaria, Romania and Albania (Giannoulis, 2011, p. 2; Karyotis, 2012). The process of the first migration wave, which refers to the influx of migrants in 1990s, was especially significant for both the Greek public as well as Greek political scene given the fact that Greece was fairly homogenous nation state with a rather limited presence of migrant communities. And thus the phenomenon of the illegal migration after 1990 partially resulted in socio-economic and political changes in Greece. The “first wave” of migration was, to a lesser extent, affecting “certain sectors of employment but also ... [nature of] criminal activities [in Greece] including petty thefts, street crime as well as organized crime which started growing steadily in number of activities and volume (Giannoulis, 2011, p. 2)”. Despite that, majority of migrants “did not constitute a major threat for the social and state security of Greece (Giannoulis, 2011, p. 2)”.

A very first policy respond to the migration wave to Greece was introduced in 1991 “by a New Democracy government (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 444)”. In a nutshell, the legislation focused on several main policy goals, the most prominent of which, were prevention of illegal “entry through border controls and a restrictive work permit regimes, and at facilitating deportation (Karamanidou, 2015, 444)”. In other words, the law was from a large part based on the “security concerns” that outbalanced other issues related to migration (Karyotis, 2012, p. 395). This policy respond was jointly pursued by both the Greek political elites as well as the security professionals who actively reinforced the newly introduced migration policy (Swart & Karakatsanis, 2012; Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002). On one hand, the legislation was defined by “a single policing-repression scheme [which] ... did not distinguish between economic immigrants, irregular immigrants or asylum seekers (Karyotis, 2012, p. 395)”. On the other hand, it recognized the two groups, “namely Pontic Greeks and Greek Albanians”, who were “defined by the Greek state as members of the diaspora community” and therefore had right to obtain “full citizenship status and benefits that aim[ed] to facilitate their integration into Greek society (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002)”.

Additionally, the 1975/1991 legislation was supported by harsh political discourse which referred to the subject of migration as a security problem in several instances. It included negative impact on the national interest, culture as well as a source of criminality and personal insecurity affecting Greeks (Karyotis, 2012; Swarts & Karakatsanis, 2012). This fairly negative discourse on migrants was thus used to justify various “regulatory tools” which accompanied the legal changes in regard to illegal migration (Karyotis, 2012, p. 397). Consequently, the reinforcement of migration control was “demonstrated [by] a high degree of militarization, through which the police and even the army emerged as key actors in Greek migration policy

(Karyotis, 2012, p. 397)". Further, the migration law of 1991 included various "regulatory instruments" like exclusion of "undocumented migrants from welfare services, such as healthcare ... and [right for free] education (Karyotis, 2012, p. 397-8)". It also "penalized" provision of accommodation to illegal migrants, as well as "forced medics to become police informers" in case of providing healthcare to "undocumented migrant (Karyotis, 2012, p. 398)". Additionally, it authorized the law enforcement agencies, mainly police, to perform so called "sweep operations (Karyotis, 2012, p.398)". These targeted "random street checks in areas with high migrant concentrations" and usually culminated into the arrests of "undocumented migrants ... [who were immediately] escorted to the country's northern borders, without even being allowed to collect their belongings (Karyotis, 2012, p. 398)". Such practices were, however, illegal since "migrants should be detained and then heard in a deportation court, with the right to appeal (Karyotis, 2012, p. 398)".

Despite the context of security-based migration policy pursued by Greek political elites, Greek Parliament issued "two Presidential Decrees (no. 358/1997 and no. 359/1997) ... [which] inaugurated the first regularization programme for illegal immigrants in Greece (Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002, p. 191)". These were, however, rather reactive short-term respond to migration phenomenon in Greece. The decrees "regularized 400,000 [illegal] migrants", majority of which were of Albanian nationality, "by setting the conditions and requirements for the holders of the White Card to obtain the Residence Card of Temporary Duration (Green Card) (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002, p. 197)". This document also used "as a work permit [which was] ... valid for one to three years and renewable", however, the migrants who were able to prove their staying "in Greece for five years" were eligible "for a five year duration Green Card (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002, p. 197)". Additionally, this type of Green Card "also protected the family members of the holder from expulsion (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002, p. 197)". Although this policy was short-term and reactive rather than proactive, it can be claimed that it was a "relative success (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2015, p. 179)". None the less, "the scheme failed to fully address the issue of irregular migration, as many eligible migrants failed to register, while irregular border-crossings by migrants who we were ineligible for regularization continued to rise (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2015, p. 179)".

A second wave of migration to Greece, which was different in nature from the first one, constituted further changes in migration policies and practices. On contrary to the migration in 1990s, a majority of migrants arriving throughout 2000s were from Africa, Middle East, and South Asian region. Despite that, second wave of migration to Greece shared many similarities

in regard to policy respond with the first one since it was rather reactive and lacking “long-term vision” to address this phenomenon (Karyotis, 2012, p. 403). In 2001, Greek government led by PASOK introduced “Law 2910/2001” which on one hand, supported “the family reunification provision in the EU (Karyotis, 2012, p. 403)”. On the other hand, it promoted the “institutional measures excluding irregular migrants from healthcare, education, and public services (Karyotis, 2012, p. 403-4)”. Additionally, it established the “readmission agreement with Turkey” in regard to illegal border-crossing (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 444). The same policy approach was reinforced in Law 3386 in 2005 “by a New Democracy (ND) government (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 444)”. This legislation furthered “the emphasis on preventing entry, while policies such as the establishment of border guard body ... and arrest and deport operations indicate[d] the continuing emphasis Greek policymakers have placed on strengthening internal and external controls (Karamanidou, 2015, p.444)”. Additionally, neither “3536/2007 laws marked a substantial transformation in the logic of Greek migration policy ... [which] despite the incorporation of EU directives” were heavily focused on depiction of migration as a threat to interests of the country (Karyotis, 2012, p.404). At the same time, the period of late 2000s was defined by “a series of regularization programmes ... granting amnesty to categories of long term migrants” while lacking a long-term policy respond to migration (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2015, p. 180).

A rather minor, but positive, change in Greek migration policies was observed in the early 2010s when Greek Parliament adopted 3838/2010 “Citizenship Law introduced by PASOK” and 3907/2011 legislation (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 446). While the 2010 law boosted “more inclusive conceptions of citizenship ... [through] the naturalization provisions for second generation migrants” the 2011 legislature supported “Asylum and First Reception Services, independent from the police (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 446; Skleparis, 2017, p.2)”. Despite this rather minor shift in migration policies and practices, Greece had actively collaborated with Frontex – EU's agency aimed at protection of Union's external border – in regard migration and border control since the second half of 2000s. This cooperation was between 2007 and 2015 supported through an introduction of various activities like Project Attica, Rapid Border Intervention Teams, and Regional Poseidon Programme (Booth et al., 2014). All of these were aimed at strengthening of Greek land and sea border control, use of technology in support of surveillance, minimizing the inflow of illegal migrants, as well as active screening of incoming illegal migrants (Booth et al., 2014). The presence of Frontex in Greece was a result of rising number of illegal migrants which rose profoundly since the second half of 2000s. In the same

context, Greek Parliament pursued strong security-based migration policies and practices between 2012 and 2015. The New Democracy government not only “returned the [newly introduced] citizenship law to its previous conservative state”, it also took several steps towards a more repressive policies against the illegal migrants (Skleparis, 2017, p. 2). These included establishment of “Operations Aspida ... and Xenios Zeus at the Greek-Turkish land border and in mainland Greece respectively” in order to counter the border-crossings of illegal migrants as well as their stay at Greek territory (Skleparis, 2017, p. 2). Additionally, it reinforced an “extended ... detention period of migrants and asylum seekers up to twelve months (Skleparis, 2017, p. 2)”. And last but not least, the Greek Parliament agreed on “the construction of a 12.5 km-long barbed wired fence” which separated the Greek-Turkish land border at river Evros (Skleparis, 2017, p. 2).

4.2 Greece: Terrorism as a serious security threat?

In a historical context, threat of terrorism was a rather absent phenomenon on Greek territory before 1974. This, however, changed with a fall of military junta which subsequently facilitated rise of two, most dangerous, terrorist groups in Greek history – Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) and Revolutionary Organization November 17 (17N) (Borgeas, 2013; Karyotis, 2007). Both of the groups pursued radical left-wing ideology through conduction of terrorist attacks in Greece during two decades (Karyotis, 2007). Despite their terrorist activities, as well as gradual rise in terrorist threat posed by other right- and left-wing terrorist groups, Greek political elites did have rather polarizing approach not only questioning the need for policies designed battling terrorism but also their form. The very first counter-terrorism legislation was introduced in 1974/1978 “Bill to Combat Terrorism and Protect Democratic Policy” proposed by New Democracy-led government. Although law “did not increase police powers in the areas of search, seizure and detaining of suspects”, it was heavily criticized by opposition as “despotic, undemocratic and tyrannical rule of law (Karyotis, 2007, p. 278)”. As result, the law was repealed three years after its introduction by newly elected Panhellenistic Socialist Movement (PASOK) government. None the less, a shortevity of this bill reflected a lack of political consensus and partial ignorance regarding this subject by political agendas of many parties (Karyotis, 2007, p. 278-9).

A similar political and public attitude towards counter-terrorism legislation was observed until 1989 when the assassination of “the chief parliamentary spokesperson of New Democracy ... marked the end of tolerance (Karyotis, 2007, p.279)”. This incident, along with strong international push on Greek government to fight domestic terrorism, resulted in an introduction

of “a new anti-terrorism bill entitled 'Bill for the Protection of Society against Organised Crime' (Law 1916/1990) (Karyotis, 2007, p. 281)”. On contrary to initially proposed legislature from 1978, this bill “significantly increased police powers in the areas of intelligence gathering and detaining suspects without specific charges; it offered protection to judges and their families; it increased the reward offered for police informers; and it prohibited the press from publishing proclamations from the terrorist groups (Karyotis, 2007, p. 281)”. When confronted by the opposition claimed that these “draconian measures [as] ... limitations on the civil liberties ... the government [argued that] there could be no freedom when the security of individuals was compromised by terrorists (Karyotis, 2007, p. 281)”. In other words, the members of government portrayed “terrorism as an existential threat to the state and society” which, according to them, justify these measures (Karyotis, 2007, p. 281). And thus the subject of counter-terrorism legislation became a part of political and social polarization on forefront of which was PASOK, once again. Further, “when PASOK returned to power in 1993, the bill was abolished and not replaced by other legislation (Karyotis, 2007, p. 282)”.

A radical shift in perception of terrorist threat took place between 1999 and 2001 when political parties recognized the need to address “terrorism as a security threat ... to Greek society and national interests (Karyotis, 2007, p. 282)”. The change was partially affected by ever strong international push for effective management of terrorism in Greece. As a consequence, Greek government, this time led by PASOK, introduced a new counter-terrorism legislature in June 2001 which was based on “sense of urgency to eradicate terrorism (Karyotis, 2007, p.238)”. The new legislature was even more repressing than the previous legal attempts. The consensus among majority of political parties, both opposition and government, portraying terrorism “as an existential threat” was reflected by the pressing nature of the bill. This “gave the police greater powers when arresting suspects and also permitted the use of DNA testing to aid in investigation [as well as] ...collection of personal data, including telephone conversation and videotaping of suspects (Karyotis, 2007, p.283)”. Additionally, it legalized “Greece's first-ever 'witness protection programme' and provisions for granting amnesty to members to members of terrorist group who turned state's evidence (Karyotis, 2007, p. 283)”. This legal provision was, however, one of the reasons why Greek law enforcement agencies were able to disable not only “the November 17 terrorist organization”, which has been “the most lethal” group of terrorist nature in Greece, but also many others (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 95).

After the acceptance of terrorism as serious security threat to the state and public in 2001, Greek political elites pursued this logic further through establishment of “anti-terrorism law 3251/2004

'European Arrest Warrant and Confrontation of Terrorism' [which] ... amended" the 2001 bill with more detailed legal provision (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 96). This introduced a specified definition of terrorist act; "sanctioned lone terrorists; increased the statute of limitations on terrorism-related crimes ...; increased prison terms for terrorist leaders; and heavily sanctioned those who threaten to prepare to commit a terrorist crime"; and others (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 97). Overall, "the law cited over twenty types of offenses considering terrorist acts" which were largely based on strengthening of Greece's security agenda in the wake of 2004 Olympic Games (Borgeas, 2016, p. 199).

Since then Greek Parliament passed number of law which amended the counter-terrorism law 2928/2001. These included Law 3691/2008 on "Prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing and other provisions"; Law 3857/2010 on "Ratification and Implementation of the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime and related provisions"; as well as Law 4285/2014 which "criminalises public incitement of violence or hate speech (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 97)".

In regard to exchange of "information on terror suspects" Greece accepted "Law 3663/2008, 'European Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST), Joint investigative Teams and other provisions", based on authority of which "the operation of joint investigative teams ... in the Greek territory for the investigation of terrorist actions is possible (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 98)". Additionally, in the same year "the Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP-NIS)" was granted "the mission 'to seek, collect, process and notify to authorities information' in the process of 'preventing and dealing with activities of terrorist organizations'... (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 98)". This legal provision was based on "Law 3115/2003" which allows the intelligence agency to surveil and collect the personal data of the suspect, "in matters of national security", to be taken out of the regular legal frameworks (Gutheil et al., 2017, p. 98)". Further, "Greece has been reported to have mechanisms for exchanging intelligence" with many national and international agencies including "the United States, Britain, [and] France (Gutheil et al., 2017, 98)".

In terms of international initiative on counter-terrorism, Greece had also been actively collaborating with number of bodies like "the United Nations, the EU, the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime ... the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation", and NATO in Operation Active Endeavour (United States Department of State, 2017).

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter was elaborating on the subjects of migration and terrorism, and attitudes of Greek authorities in addressing these socio-political phenomenon. The main objective of this analytical part was to assess whether or not can these policies and practices be better explained by securitization or politicization theory. In the following paragraphs, I am going to summarize my findings regarding these subjects.

The phenomenon of migration was at its initial stage rather politicized subject which, however, became portrayed as serious security threat to nation, culture, and state since 1991. This year marked introduction of policies and practices which were largely based on security focused logic. Their main aim was not only to discourage more migrants from coming to Greece but also at detention of illegal migrants already present at country's territory. The approach was seen as necessary measures given the fact that political discourse was presenting migration as an existential threat. Based on this, the government justified the policies and practices, number of which were beyond the ordinary legal processes. Policies and practices were many times in direct contradiction with human or individual rights. The security based attitude of Greek government was demonstrated by strong emphasis on border protection and control, sweep operations, detention of migrants, as well as militarization. Despite there were several attempts for regularization of illegal migrants, these programmes were only partially successful. Overall, Greece lacked any long-term policy which was focused on assimilation or regularization of migration. On the other hand, an analysis of these policies had showed that majority of them were pursuing rather securitizing logic. This persisted not only in political discourse but also through reinforcement of legal, administrative, bureaucratic or technocratic practices, policies and operational set-ups. These might have changed in the form of their activities. Their objective was, however, the same. And therefore reinforcement of securitization based on perception of migrants as security threat to variety of national interests.

In the case of counter-terrorism, Greece's political elites were lacking a political consensus in regard to terrorist threat. Before 1999, the polarization in regard to this subject was present in introduction and repealing of the two counter-terrorism bills. While the first did not provisioned any extraordinary measures, the second bill intended to reinforce securitization of terrorism. Never the less, this securitizing move was not successful as many Greek political parties did not share the securitizing logic in regard to terrorism. Despite that subject of terrorism was in Greece politicized for many year, strong internal and external pushes to recognize the seriousness of terrorist threat resulted in establishment of 2001 counter-terrorism legislature.

This was to a large extent based on surveillance, collection of personal data, and other activities which were moved outside of the normal legal procedures. The vast majority of political parties were promoting terrorism as existential threat to national interest and therefore legitimized the limitations of civil rights. Since 2001, Greek authorities have been reinforcing securitization of terrorism through adoption of amended counter-terrorism legislatures. These were more specific in regard to the offences, sentencing, as well as provision of powers given to the authorities. Additionally, some of them referred to international counter-terrorism initiative which was actively pursued. In this regard, Greece had been cooperating on data sharing or countering-terrorist activities with many international and/or national authorities.

Based on the above examination of the Greece's policies and practices addressing migration and terrorism, I assessed that they can be better explained by securitization theory since securitization of migration have been pursued since 1991, and securitization of terrorism since 2001.

In the following chapter, I examine the political discourse of Greek political elites in regard to the migration crisis. Its objective is to assess whether or not the political discourse on migration in Greece can be better explained by securitization or rather politicization theory. The chapter evaluates discourses of the political parties which are part of Greek Parliament since 2015 while it shortly elaborates on general agendas of party in connection to the subject of migration.

5 Greek political elites at the age of the European migration crisis: political discourse and party agenda

The year 2015 was full of dramatic socio-political changes in Greece. While struggling with the arrival of unprecedented numbers of migrants and refugees in the Greece's modern history, and the worst economic crisis in the last decades, the traditional political establishment in Greece was shanking in its foundations. On contrary to once highly popular political parties like New Democracy (ND) and PASOK, which used to be ruling political parties in Greece for several decades, the two general elections in 2015 had indicated a somewhat radical change regarding the perception of politics in Greece. In the wake of long-term austerity policies, which negatively affected both the public and private sectors in the country, many Greeks turned to populist political parties which anti-austerity, anti-capitalist, anti-establishment, and in many cases xenophobic and racist rhetoric, had challenged the face of Greek democracy drastically. Since the beginning of the Greek Debt Crisis in 2010, migration became one of the most debated

and targeted political subject in Greece. With the rise of many right wing political parties, especially extreme-right wing party Golden Dawn, the racially motivated violence against migrants was ever increasing. Despite the fact that anti-immigrant attitudes had occurred in Greece since 1990s, the socioeconomic grievances pushed many Greeks to develop xenophobic and racist moods mainly towards the illegal migrants from the African, the Middle Eastern, and the South Asian countries. Given the fact that the issue of migration has been an important part of the party agenda in Greece since the late 1980s, and the economic crisis facilitated the anti-immigrant attitudes, it is necessary to elaborate on the political discourses and party agendas regarding this subject in order to understand how Greek political elites approached the massive influx of migrants and refugees during the European migration crisis. Because the European migration crisis escalated in the second half of 2015, I will mainly focus on the examination of political parties, including their general political agendas, which had been elected to the Greek parliament in the September 2015 general elections. The position of the three strongest political parties are being elaborated on in separate subchapters while the rest of the parliamentary political parties are reviewed together.

5.1 SYRIZA's first term: U-turn on migration policy?

SYRIZA's agenda on migration policy, during its first term, was dramatically different on contrary to the previous ruling parties which cracked down on migration due to various reasons, predominantly security and economic concerns, for years (Nestoras, 2016). Between 2014 and the early 2015, SYRIZA's party agenda strongly focused on “protecting migrants who entered the country, instead of detaining and deporting them (Nallu, 2015)”. This humanitarian approach towards migration “pledged to expedite the asylum application process; stop the use of systematic and indiscriminate detention; close down the detention centers and replace them with open hospitality centers; stop push-backs at the borders; encourage family reunification; abolish EU restrictions on the travel of migrants; remove the fences from the Greek-Turkish land border; grant citizenship to second-generation migrants; and strengthen the protection of human rights in general (Skleparis, 2017, p.3)”. During the first Tsipras' term, between the January and August 2015, SYRIZA successfully implemented several of these promises when abolishing not only the detention centers for illegal migrants but also sweep operations – Xenios Zeus – which were in practice since 2012 and aimed to detect and arrest illegal and undocumented migrants (Mara, 2015; Nallu, 2015; Speri, 2015). Additionally, it passed law granting children of migrants born in Greece the right for the Greek citizenship, and planned to further imply its open-border migration policy by introduction of “the open centers of

hospitality (Nestoras, 2016, p.17)”. These were to replace the detention centers which, according to the minister of immigration policy Tasia Christodouloupoulou, were “incompatible with humanitarianism, rule of law, and any sense of reason (Speri, 2015)”. Connectedly, she was promising that detention of the migrants under the rule of SYRIZA was going to be only an exception rather than commonly used practice (Speri, 2015). None the less, most of the promised changes never happened due to contextual factors, both national and international, which disabled SYRIZA's intention for big shift in Greek migration agenda. And thus one might argue that an introduction of the migration reforms were to a large extent only symbolic and rather ineffective in long-term (Skleparis, 2017).

After the second general elections in September 2015, SYRIZA again dominated the political scene and, similarly like in its first ruling term, it allied with right-wing party ANEL and formed coalition. This time, however, the situation in regard to the subject of migration was totally different. The number of incoming migrants and refugees skyrocketed throughout the year 2015. And partially as a consequence of SYRIZA's new migration policies, Greece was paralyzed by the European migration crisis. From a contextual point of view, the migration crisis prohibited SYRIZA from expanding its new migration policy and pushed its agenda towards more restrictive responses. None the less, in order to fully understand SYRIZA's political agenda and the use of frames in regard to the migration crisis, it is necessary to elaborate on its political discourse. The main points of the political discourse, which had been applied by SYRIZA, will therefore be the subject of the following subchapter.

5.2 SYRIZA's second term: policy of solidarity, blame game, and ulterior motives

Since the beginning of the migration crisis, SYRZIA and its leader Prime Minister Alexi Tsipras pushed the EU and the member states to recognize the scale and significance of the crisis not only for the countries of arrival, like Greece, but also for the broader European community. He argued that the unprecedented flows of migrants, arriving to the offshores of Greece, create a “problem [which] surpasses the powers of the country (Smith, 2016)”. Given the fact that “we are experiencing the biggest refugee crisis since the second world war”, as he said, a common plan regarding a policing of this situation was necessary (Smith, 2016). The subject of the international intervention in connection to the migration crisis was especially significant due to Greece's socio-political and economic context at the time. Not only did Greece have to cope with the masses of incoming migrants, the country also struggled with sustaining the functionality of the state which was in long-term economic crisis. In this sense, Tsipras

highlighted two main issues arising from the economic and migration crises in Greece. Firstly, he argued that migrants “know that there is a crisis in Greece and that they will not find a job there”, implying that majority of the migrants intended to travel further to the Western European countries (Diekmann, 2016). And secondly, that “Greece is in a crisis within crisis” which meant that the magnitude of this situation could have not been handled by Greek national authorities which lacked financial means to manage the crisis (Kambas & Koutantou, 2015). And therefore Greece needed a major financial, and other, support to be able to tackle the situation. Despite these unfortunate factors, Tsipras many times stressed out the bravery and readiness of the Greek population, especially the islanders, and Greek authorities who “help rescue these people at sea ... [and] take care of them (Diekmann, 2016)”. On the other occasion, Tsipras connected the issue of economic crisis with humanitarianism which matched SYRIZA's overall political discourse connecting a push for humanitarian respond, criticism of the opposition, and reminder of the negative effects of the financial crisis. Despite “we are a poor people ... [we] have retained ... values and humanity”, he said (Kambas & Koutantou, 2015). In one interview, Tsipras claimed that it was Greeks who have been “defend[ing] the fundamental values of Europe” since the beginning of the migration crisis by helping those in need without “claiming a single euro” (Kambas & Koutantou, 2015). Additionally, he highlighted that “Greece must defend the human face of Europe, no matter how many refugees are coming (Diekmann, 2016)”. Although Greek prime minister almost always referred to Greece as a moral actor who “did and will continue to do everything” what was in its capabilities to take care of migrants and refugees, many governmental and non-governmental organizations heavily criticized the approach of Greek authorities which did little to nothing to facilitate an effective management of the crisis, especially in the first half of 2015 (Georgiopoulos, 2016). None the less, SYRIZA's push for solidarity was also observed in regard to the common EU initiative.

Similarly to the humanitarian approach presented through political discourse on the national level, SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras strongly appealed to the EU political elites to adopt a policy of solidarity in regard to the developing migration crisis. Tsipras claimed that the respond from the EU community and the national governments was about to show not only “how much potential there is for a solidarity Europe” but also a potential rupture in the EU project in case “everybody is concerned with their own borders” rather than commonly agreed action (Adamopoulos, 2015). In one interview, Tsipras said that “the refugee crisis ... existentially threatens the entire EU” since “the shared values” which the EU is supposedly based on “are

now being questioned by some” member states' officials (Diekmann, 2016). While some might argue that disagreements among the EU member states in regard to the migration crisis was present since its beginning, it was the opening of the Western Balkan route which facilitated even more political debate on this issue. Although it helped Greece in many ways, the movement of migrants and refugees also became more real and pressing issue for other member states. In a wake of this situation, many countries pursued intensive border protection. Tsipras on many occasions urged European political elites that “the solution to the refugee crisis is not building fences and promoting racism in Europe” but rather politics of solidarity (Diekmann, 2016; Neuger & Follain, 2016). He claimed that “the future of Europe is not walls and xenophobia”, implying that not agreeing on the common solidarity policy could have had catastrophic outcome for the future of the EU project (Neuger & Follain, 2016). A pursue of policy based on solidarity was unifying element between Tsipras and German Chancellor Angela Merkel who had been quiet opposing to Tsipras in regard to the Greek debt crisis rhetoric. On the other hand, solidarity and humanitarian approach was heavily criticized by many EU political elites, including the leaders of the member states located in Central Europe. Tsipras argued that “if the Chancellor had acted like Orbán”, Hungarian Prime Minister who strongly opposed the open border policy, “Europe would already be divided and would therefore have failed (Diekmann, 2016)”. None the less, Tsipras regularly criticized political elites who perceived the European migration crisis mainly through the security discourse and thus refused to take part in common policy which included redistribution of migrants across each member state.

During the speech in Greek Parliament, Tsipras voiced his feelings of shame “as a member of this European leadership, both for inability of Europe in dealing with this human drama, and for the level of debate at a senior level, where one is passing the buck to the other (Kambas & Koutantou, 2015)”. In the same speech, he argued that behavior of many member states is “hypocritical” since many of them “shed [tears] for the dead children on the shores of the Aegean” sea, however, “the children that are alive who come in thousands” are not wanted (Kambas & Koutantou, 2015). Additionally, Tsipras regularly claimed that it was the imperialist intentions of the Western powers which produced many conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In case of Syria, he argued that the Western and European political elites were to blame for the massive inflow of migrants and refugees from Syria and Iraq due to conflict caused by their actions (Georgatos, 2018). Tsipras believed that behavior of many EU member states who chosen to follow policy of “building fences and distributing bullets” rather than

accept responsibility is challenging “the very concept of a united Europe ... [and] European culture (Kambas & Williams, 2015)”. Decision to close border, which was pursued by some of the member states, Tsipras referred to as “unacceptable” and “non-friendly action” which not only “severely damage [Greece but also] Europe (Diekmann, 2016)”. He argued that “it will be those who have raised barbed wire fences, who have driven refugees away with violence and have turned their countries into fortresses who will be isolated in Europe”, implying that Greece had been acting morally and in accordance with the international and European law and thus must not be faced with exclusion of the Schengen Area which was proposed by some member states (Diekmann, 2016). Although Tsipras promised that Greece was decided to stand its humanitarian policy and offered “essential help security to uprooted, hounded people”, he voiced a “demand [for] a fair distribution” of responsibility (Diekmann, 2016, Georgiopoulos, 2016). SYRIZA and Tsipras pushed even stronger agenda of criticism targeting European political opponents before the summit of EU leaders regarding the European migration crisis which was held in March 2016. The heightened amount of criticism was partially affected by the belief of some member states that Greece should have been excluded from the Schengen Area since it was accused of protecting the EU borders ineffectively. These accusations became even more pressing after the November 2015 Paris Terrorist attacks and its connection to Greece. Yiannis Mouzalas, a Greek migration minister, called such accusations “hostile acts towards Greece and the EU” while highlighting that Greece “guards its borders ... in the best possible way” which was “confirmed by ... Frontex, the European Commission and other institutions ('Greece snubs Austrian minister over refugee camp request', 2016)”. In the same manner, Tsipras assured Greek political elites that he “will not accept turning the country into a permanent warehouse of souls with Europe continuing to function as if nothing is happening (Georgiopoulos, 2016)”. Before the EU summit on the migration crisis, the Greek prime minister argued that Greece “will either be in a union of common rules for all or everyone will do as they please: we will not accept the latter (Georgiopoulos, 2016)”.

Since the early stages of the migration crisis, SYRIZA also recognized the significance of Turkish authorities in facilitation and/or obstruction of the migrants' inflow to Greece. Greece's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nikos Kotzias from SYRIZA, argued that putting “responsibility [for the migration crisis] on Athens ... [is] a big mistake” since “the starting point of the problem lies in Turkey” and not Greece (Michalopoulos, 2015). SYRIZA seemed to criticize Turkey mainly because of the inadequate border protection, especially at the Aegean sea. According to the Greece's migration minister Mouzalas, Turkey was partially to be blamed for

the influx of the migrants in Greece because it did not targeted the Turkish smugglers who had been operating at the Greek-Turkish sea border ('Greek Migration Chief Defends EU-Turkey Swap Deal', 2017). The criticism of Turkey became more prevalent after many EU member states accused Greece from not protecting its borders and intended to exclude Greece from the Schengen zone. Despite an initial wave of blame game from the Greece's side, a necessity of the EU assistance for Greece in regard to the migration crisis and Turkey's intention to consolidate relations with the EU pushed the two countries to cooperate. After the EU summit on the migration crisis, Tsipras praised the EU leaders for acknowledging “the key role Turkey plays in the reduction of refugee flows” while adding that “the relationship between Greece and Turkey is pivotal ('PM Tsipras at EU Summit on Migration Crisis', 2015)”. The production of the EU-Turkey agreement, which was heavily criticized by many NGOs as suppressing the international laws on migration and refugees, was a welcomed step by the Greek government. On contrary to many human rights activists, Greece's migration minister argued that “migration and refugee flow of this magnitude have to be dealt with agreements of this sort ('Greek Migration Chief Defends EU-Turkey Swap Deal', 2017)”. The common plan, however, produced a division within SYRIZA, several members of which accused Tsipras and Mouzalas from deploying illegal practices in order to support the provision of the EU-Turkey agreement (Kingsley & Fotiadis, 2016). None the less, Mouzalas argued that the Common Action Plan “opened up a legal route to Europe through the resettlement scheme ... [as well as a safe] transfer of refugees from Turkey to Europe” and thus should have been understood as a way of protecting “the interests of refugees and migrant ('Greek Migration Chief Defends EU-Turkey Swap Deal', 2017)”. Connectedly, Tsipras strongly advocated the common EU initiative not only as necessity for Greece and the EU community but also for protection of refugees and migrants and reduction of the deaths at the sea. He argued that the proposed deal recognized the importance of Greece and Turkey, as a third country, in the reduction of the inflow. Additionally, he claimed that despite Greece and Turkey had “to work harder” in order to implement the agreement, it was the starting point which created a common EU policy on the issue and therefore its implementation was of crucial importance for Greece ('PM Tsipras at EU Summit on Migration Crisis', 2016).

In summary, SYRIZA's political discourse on the migration crisis was based on a number of frames which not only promoted the solidarity and strongly criticized its political opponents, but also connected the migration and economic crises in Greece. The subject of solidarity and humanitarian policy was pursued by SYRIZA's discourse throughout the migration crisis.

Despite that many may argue that the steps taken by SYRIZA directly opposed these beliefs. None the less, SYRIZA criticized approach of many member states and their unwillingness to support the humanitarianism but rather focus on neglect of the migrants and refugees. Prime Minister Tsipras argued that not supporting the humanitarian policy meant a deeper crisis faced by the EU, which was initially promoted as a common project based on solidarity. Connectedly, the target of the blame game became also the political opponents who accused Greece from insufficient protection of the EU borders. SYRIZA many times stressed out that Greece, on contrary to its opponents, had been actively saving lives and taking care of the arriving refugees and migrants. Tsipras claimed that Greece was in pursue of solidarity when other member states turned their heads away from the issue implying the moral and legal rightfulness of Greece's approach. Although he promised to follow its humanitarian policy he urged for the international cooperation. And thus SYRIZA pushed for intensive cooperation on the international level which would have meant a recognition of the migration crisis as the EU issue rather than issue faced by the entering countries like Greece. Consequently, SYRIZA strongly promoted the need to involve Turkey into the action plan since they argued that influx of the migrants could have not been dealt with without its authority. Tsipras and other SYRIZA's elite politicians initially blamed Turkey for not being able to crack down on the smugglers operating in the Aegean Sea. In spite of that the Greek government promoted Greece-Turkey relationship as being extremely important for the improvement of the situation in the whole Europe. In other words, Tsipras implied the significance of Greece and its role in resolving the European migration crisis. After the EU-Turkey agreement, SYRIZA praised the EU common action plan as the very significant step in guarding the interests of both, the EU and the migrants and refugees. Although this plan was criticized by many since it opposed SYRIZA's initial U-turn migration policy, the party argued that the EU-Turkey agreement was the only legal way how to tackle the situation due to refusal of the open-border policy by most of the EU member states. Additionally, it must also be said that the framing of the migration crisis by SYRIZA was to a large extend based on the broader political and economic context within which Greece was situated at the time. As the ruling party, SYRIZA seemed to understand the migration crisis as a possible way how to bargain better bail out conditions from its creditors, part of which are the EU community and institutions. This does not mean that SYRIZA did not perceive the migration crisis as very compelling issue. However, its policy on migration seemed to be framed to match the most important political problem which Greece had been occupied with since 2010 – the Greek Debt Crisis.

5.3 New Democracy: Border protection, public order, and international cooperation

Conservative-right party New Democracy had been one of the two ruling parties which dominated Greece since the late 1980s. Besides other subjects, New Democracy has been known for its rather negative perception of migration which was also reflected in an establishment of legislatures and practices that pushed for securitization of migration in Greece since the early 1990s. This position of the party in regard to the illegal migrants have not changed since, and was used as the main source of criticism towards the ruling SYRIZA during the European migration crisis. Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the leader of New Democracy and parliamentary opposition, argued that Greece “is called on to respect human lives ... [however] at the same time to protect its borders and security ('Tsipras and Mitsotakis take positions on refugee crisis', 2016)”. Mitsotakis claimed that government led by SYRIZA failed to recognize the severity of the crisis and its possible implications on Greece's public order (Filippakis, 2017). New Democracy's leader said that Tsipras “had a plan to adopt an open-border policy ... [which made] Greece a centre for transporting refugees and immigrants to Western Europe (Filippakis, 2017)”. In this regard, Tsipras' government was accused of failure since “the minimum obligation of a State [is provision of security] to its citizens (Filippakis, 2017)”. After the Brussels terrorist attacks Mitsotakis voiced that “the violent terrorist attacks ... have severe consequences for all of Europe and ... particularly for Greece,” which as he continued “is an inextricable need to examine security issues under the new circumstances the country is experiencing due to the dramatic refugee-immigration situation ('Kyriakos Mitsotakis Speaks with TNH', 2016)”. New Democracy's agenda strongly pushed the need for an effective plan on how to manage the crisis. This did not only involve the security aspect of the crisis, despite Mitsotakis stressed out that “in these circumstances, the issue of security becomes paramount for Greek citizens and our country ('ND turning focus to security and freedom', 2016)”. The party also promoted a mobilization of the state mechanisms which would have dealt with different challenges brought by the migration crisis (Makris, 2016). These also included the use of army in order to tackle unfavorable living conditions of migrants and refugees especially on crisis-hit Greek islands (Makris, 2016). Mitsotakis referred to government's approach towards the migration crisis as “fake humanism” which was masking the inefficiency of Tsipras cabinet to create an appropriate living conditions for migrants as well as the lack of border protection ('New Democracy slams coalition government over refugee crisis', 2016). The mismanagement of the crisis was, according to New Democracy, allowing the human traffickers to import high numbers of illegal migrants without any detention ('New Democracy slams coalition

government over refugee crisis', 2016). Additionally, Mitsotakis believed that a lack of coherent policy from the side of government was facilitating the xenophobic and racist feelings among Greek public towards the refugees and migrants who were situated on Greek territory. Although New Democracy based its discourse in regard to the migration crisis on harsh criticism of government, and especially SYRIZA, it also acknowledged and urged an intensive international cooperation on the EU level as well as with the Turkish authorities (Zikakou, 2016). Similarly like Tsipras, Mitsotakis claimed that the crisis is a common EU issue which must have been recognized and accepted by all of its members (Zikakou, 2016). He strongly urged for better cooperation between Greece and Turkey since, as he proposed, “the final solution to the problem lies with Turkey (Zikakou, 2016)”. Additionally, he pushed for a national initiative which would have created a plan for the humanitarian needs of the refugees and better coordination between involved authorities on local, national, and international levels. Despite the harsh criticism of the government, New Democracy together with several other parliamentary parties were able to cooperate with SYRIZA and actively sought the ways how to properly manage the crisis.

Overall, the discourse of New Democracy in regard to the migration crisis was focusing on a strong criticism of SYRIZA and its mismanagement of the emergency situation. The party, on contrary to SYRIZA's solidarity policy, mainly focused on the security dimension of the crisis. This dimension was, according to New Democracy, the most important given the fact that terrorism-migration nexus was observed. New Democracy thus refused open-border policy and promoted policy based on tight border control and detention of migrants. Connectedly, it praised the international cooperation with the EU and Turkey. Despite that New Democracy's leader Mitsotakis urged a need for humanitarian help and better cooperation between the national authorities in order to provide a decent living conditions for migrants who arrived. On the other hand, he favored the EU-Turkey agreement and return of the migrants who did not qualify for the asylum. And therefore New Democracy, as a conservative-right party, was mainly focused on protection of the borders and security of Greek public rather than acceptance of the migrants and refugees.

5.4 Golden Dawn: Racism, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant violence

A rise of Golden Dawn, an extreme right, ultranationalist political party, had to a large extent been facilitated by the long-term socio-economic grievances, imposed on the Greek society as a result of the austerity policy which was pursued in the wake of the Greek Debt Crisis. Similarly, like any other political party of this kind, the Golden Dawn strongly praised the

national identity and culture, alongside the harsh rhetoric targeting any opponent political party which failed to match its ideology. In the context of the debt-ridden Greece, the expansion of the Golden Dawn popularity among the Greek public was largely based on a strong anti-European, anti-establishment, anti-austerity, and anti-immigration political discourse. Even before the start of the European migration crisis in 2015, Golden Dawn had been well known for its racist and xenophobic rhetoric in connection to the migrants and asylum seeker (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2015). What, however, had been even more worrisome were numerous cases of politically and racially motivated crime and violence through which some of the Golden Dawn's members and/or sympathizers targeted the political opponents and illegal migrants in Greece (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2015; Strickland, 2018). Despite a fairly large academic interest of the Golden Dawn's ideology, rhetoric and use of violence as a tool of policy making, the following paragraphs will mainly be consisting of examination and summary on its political discourse in connection to the European migration crisis.

As I have already highlighted, the policies and practices of the Golden Dawn were to a large extent based on a harsh and hateful political discourse on illegal migration. This have not changed even after the start of the European migration crisis which, on contrary it boosted the preferences of the party in some of the refugee crisis hit Greek regions (Miller, 2015). The political discourse of the party in regard to the migration crisis was focused on portray of the migrants and refugees as a serious issue which challenges not only Greek national identity but also the interests of the Greece as a sovereign state (Miller, 2015). Elias Panagiotaros, Golden Dawn's MP argued that Greece has had “a huge problem with an illegal invasion [of migrants]” and “if we [Greeks] want to call ourselves a sovereign country we must patrol our borders (Miller, 2015)”. Panagiotaros, similarly other members of Golden Dawn, strongly urged the sealing of the borders and ban on illegal migration to Greece (Miller, 2015). He claimed that “tourists, businessmen and students may to come”, however, any other individuals like illegal migrants and refugees are not welcomed despite the fact that most of them were only passing through Greece (Miller, 2015). In the same manner, party's leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos, who is one of the most controversial political figure in Greece, voiced the need to “close the borders” and “make the army and the navy seal ... [protect Greece's] borders and not let people enter illegally (Powell, 2016)”. The party support their believes through the rhetoric of fear arguing that massive inflow of the illegal migrants and refugees from the Muslim majority countries would have caused Islamization of Greece and challenged Greek way of life (Zafiroopoulos, 2016; Carassava, 2017). Michaloliakos, during one of this public appearance said, that Greeks

“shouldn’t leave Greece like an open field for migrants to come and go as they want ... [but] should reclaim [their] ... country and ... [their] interests and put them first (Cassava, 2017)”. Michaloliakos accused the opposition political parties of being “sellouts” whose behavior would have caused “that Greeks will soon be a minority in ... [their] country (Zafiropoulos, 2016)”. Similarly, other member of the party strongly criticized the long-established political parties for their actions which had allowed “thousands of young barbarians take over [Greece] (Tagaris, 2015)”. In other words, the party agenda strongly focused on the criticism of both the national and international political opponents who did not correspond with their ideology. Their disagreements with the actions of the Greek government in regard to the migration crisis, especially the formation of the hot spots and reception centers, became the main reason why Golden Dawn organized numerous, often violent, protests against migrants and refugees (Zafiropoulos, 2016). Additionally, many of Golden Dawn's members had been facing charges in connection to the racially motivated crimes targeting migrants and refugee facilities (Miller, 2015). None the less, these kind of violent attacks have been observed for quite some time, and have seemed to rise with the Greece facing dual crises (Miller, 2015). On the other hand, the party promoted itself as the protector of the Greek values, nation and culture. Michaloliakos referred to Golden Dawn as the embodiment of the “Greek spirit” which is endangered due to the massive influx of the illegal migrants (Carassava, 2017). Although the very essence of the Golden Dawn is based on the struggle between the 'Greekness' and the others, the complicated political situation both in Greece and in the EU in regard to the European migration crisis facilitated the rise of the hate speech, racism and xenophobia presented by the Golden Dawn.

Overall, it is clear that Golden Dawn had been pursued the most extreme political discourse on the European migration crisis among all of the parliamentary parties. This, however, made the party incapable to cooperate with other political opponents. Its agenda was based on the closure of borders due to threat of incoming illegal migrants and refugees. These, as the Golden Dawn claimed, presented a serious danger to the Greek national and cultural identity. Based on these believes, the members of Golden Dawn pursued a strong anti-immigrant agenda and political discourse which also targeted the opposing political parties and their actions, both on national and international level.

5.5 Rhetoric on subject of the European migration crisis across Greece's political spectrum: agreements, disagreements and criticism

As I have already stated, the subject of the European migration crisis became especially compelling political issue in Greece in the second half of 2015. Understandably, the management of the crisis and the solutions on how to protect the Greece's national interests were at the center of a political debate which produced many disagreements as well as agreements between political parties. The examination of the political discourse in regard to the migration crisis presented by the three most supported political parties pointed at three fairly different understandings of this phenomenon. None the less, for a better understanding of the discourse on the migration crisis in Greece I am going to shortly elaborate on framing of the issue by the rest of the political parties which have been represented in Greek parliament since September 2015.

Perhaps one of the most critical opposition actor, targeting SYRIZA's inability to implement policy based on solidarity and humanitarianism, was Communist Party of Greece (KKE). While many aspects of the political discourse on the migration crisis were shared between KKE and SYRIZA, there were also many disagreements especially when it came to the implication of the party agendas in practice. Similarly like SYRIZA, KKE argued that the European migration crisis was a direct result of the Western imperialism which imposed poverty and despair on the Middle Eastern regions (Koutsoumpas, 2016). On contrary to SYRIZA, KKE strongly opposed to any cooperation with the EU, NATO or Turkey since the party believed that further cooperation would have facilitated the imperialist intentions of their agendas (Koutsoumpas, 2016). This also involved disapproval to use Greek territory, land or sea, in order to patrol and/or control Greek borders, and ultimately the inflow of migrants and refugees (Koutsoumpas, 2016). Additionally, it urged the refusal of “the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulations” which according to the party “trapped [refugees and migrants] in Greece against their will (Koutsoumpas, 2016)”. Connectedly, it accused the EU-Turkey agreement of being based on violation of the human rights and international conventions on refugee and asylum policies (Koutsoumpas, 2016). KKE claimed that not only was Turkey safe third country for migrants and refugee but it also strongly opposed to asylum qualification and quota system which, according to the party officials, were based on principal of “sorting” and exclusion (Koutsoumpas, 2016). And thus, KKE concluded that it “does not consent to the position of the government” since the collaboration with “the EU will have a direction that will

intensify the causes of the problem and will not deal with the negative consequences for the people of the EU and the refugees themselves (Koutsoumpas, 2016)”. In this regard, KKE and Golden Dawn became the two political parties which, based on totally opposite beliefs, completely rejected the approach of the government and its actions.

On contrary to the rhetoric of KKE's open-border policy with zero international cooperation, and Golden Dawn's neo-Nazi agenda, majority of the parliamentary parties were supporting an intensive international cooperation with the EU, NATO and Turkey (“Greek Pol Leaders Issue Joint Statement on Acute Refugee Crisis”, 2016). Despite most of the party leaders criticized SYRIZA's initial agenda based on an open-border policy; lack of management perspective in regard to the migration crisis; insufficiently reinforced measures; and indecent living conditions or facilities provided to the government; they were able to agree on several common policy interests. Before the 2016 EU summit on the migration crisis, Alexis Tsipras along with the leaders of central-right party New Democracy, social-democratic alliance PASOK-DIMAR, central-left party To Potami, and SYRIZA's right-wing populist coalition partner Independent Greeks (ANEL) collaborated on a joint plan which reflected common interests of the parties and Greece in regard to the management of the migration crisis ('Greek Pol Leaders Issue Joint Statement on Acute Refugee Crisis', 2016). The framework proposed a policy which included both “humanism and solidarity towards refugees but also ... [enforcement of measures which protected] the security of the Greek people ('Greek Pol Leaders Issue Joint Statement on Acute Refugee Crisis', 2016)”. All of the parties involved recognized the migration crisis as a regional problem which affected the whole EU community, Turkey as well as countries of the first arrival. In this regard, the political parties proposed intensive international cooperation based on respect to the international law and shared responsibilities among the EU member states in form of relocation system. It urged a financial and logistical aid for Greek authorities in order to support the management of the crisis. Additionally, it promoted a cooperation between Turkey and the EU which would have stopped the inflow of migrants and refugees to Europe but also reinforced mechanism for asylum processes and detention of individuals who did not qualify for asylum. The program supported the intervention of the EU's agencies and NATO for the purposes of border control and management of the crisis. At the same time, the Greek political elites voiced an interest in supply of appropriate facilities provided for the migrants and refugees. Connectedly, it stated the need for international cooperation in regard to end the Syrian war and revision of “the Dublin II agreement on grounds of urgency ('Greek Pol Leaders Issue Joint Statement on Acute Refugee Crisis', 2016)”. In this regard, it might be claimed that

most of Greece's political elites had the similar discourse in regard to the subject of the European migration crisis. This connected the issue of humanitarian and security policy, intensive border control and an international cooperation between the EU and Turkey.

Despite that, the Union of Centrists (EK), which is a part of the Greece's parliamentary opposition, refused to participate in the proposal. Interestingly, it shared predominantly the same discourse on the migration crisis with New Democracy, which strongly appealed to the international cooperation, the EU authorities, and recognized the significance of security provision for the Greece and the EU community ('Μήνυμα εκ μέρους του Προέδρου της Ένωσης Κεντρώων Βασίλη Λεβέντη: Υπόμνημα προς τον Πρόεδρο της Δημοκρατίας κ. Προκόπη Παυλόπουλο για το Προσφυγικό', 2016). None the less, the EK discourse also aimed at larger financial aid for Greece and relief of part of the country's debt as a way of reparation ('Οι θέσεις της Ένωσης Κεντρώων για την προσφυγική-μεταναστευτική κρίση', 2016).

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the discourse of Greek political elites in regard to the European migration crisis. Its main objective was to identify and assess whether the discourse can be better explained by securitization theory or rather politicization theory. The analysis focused on the political parties which have been part of Greek Parliament since the 2015 General elections. Despite recognizing the first General elections in January of 2015, the research mainly focused on political discourse in regard to the European migration crisis after SYRIZA's second term since September 2015 General elections. These were established after the fall of government which was a direct result of the long-term socio-political turmoil in Greece caused by the 2010 Debt Crisis. The study is assessed based on the indicators which were defined in the methodological section of the research. In the following paragraphs, I identify and explain, based on the indicators, whether the political discourse on the migration was securitized or rather politicized.

After SYRIZA won its first term in January 2015, the party intended to pursue U-turn in regard to migration legislature, policies and practices which until 2015 were to a large extent defined by security-based logic with many features of securitized migration. Initially, SYRIZA based its discourse on migration policies on humanitarian approach which was presented through open-border policies and hospitality rather than detention and restriction. Subsequently, SYRIZA reversed some of the policies of the previous government which were aimed at border control and detention of illegal migrants. In this regard, SYRIZA focused its discourse on welcoming

respond to migration influx. The migration situation, however, changed drastically in the second half of 2015 when number of arriving migrants and refugees skyrocketed. This resulted in political turmoil in regard to the issue of migration and ineffective protection of Greek national as well as EU's external borders. Despite that SYRIZA and its leader Alexis Tsipras called for humanitarian respond and open-border policy even after strong criticism from many EU member states' officials, as well as national opposition parties. The party argued that migration crisis was also humanitarian crisis and thus Greece was in need for joint EU respond based on solidarity and not border closure. The crisis was also referred to as international issue and not solely problem of Greek government. Additionally, Tsipras on many occasions stressed the bravery of Greek people who saved and supported migrants although the country was in an economic crisis and people did not have enough financial means. The subject of finances was regularly used in connection to the migration crisis. Such framing was not only aimed at emergency economic support for management of the crisis but also indirectly suggested SYRIZA's intention to bargain some support for Greek economic crisis. At the same time, SYRIZA used the migration crisis as a blame game, criticizing not only Greek but also EU member states' political elites. In this regard, it might be argued that SYRIZA's political discourse on migration crisis, especially in the first months of 2015, was largely based on politicization of this phenomenon. The crisis was not depicted as security issue but humanitarian crisis in need of solidarity respond from the EU community.

This, however, changed since the late 2015 when the international and national political elites called for more security-based policy in regard to migration. This pushed SYRIZA to accept the term emergency situation which referred to the masses of incoming migrants though Greek borders. In this regard, Tsipras stressed that not only EU but also Turkey was of an essential importance for the regulation of the migrants' inflow. As a result, the EU and Turkey agreed on joint cooperation which targeted several main aims. These included not only strong border protection which main focus was to prevent more irregular migrants from arriving to Greece. But also policies and practices though which security professionals thoroughly screened, profiled and sorted individuals eligible for asylum in the EU. Despite the introduction of these policies and practices was highly criticized by many intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations due to human rights violation, SYRIZA was supportive towards acceptance of this agreement. The political discourse justifying the reinforcement of the security-based measures was supported though framing situation as emergency which could have not been dealt with differently. Also, Tsipras argued that the joint cooperation between Greece, the EU,

and Turkey was a direct result of isolation approach pursued by many member states which refused to act in accordance to solidarity and humanitarianism.

And thus, the change in political discourse on the migration crisis was fairly prominent. The initial political discourse was reinforced through politicization of the migration crisis in the early months of 2015. None the less, since the late 2015 SYRIZA supported the establishment of emergency measures. These were focused on strong border control, prevention of migrants' arrival, and use of technologies for screening and risk-profiling purposes while reinforcing other types of policies which were based on logic of security. In this regard, SYRIZA pursued rather mixed discourse on the migration crisis which changed as the crisis was developing. Despite that since the very late 2015, SYRIZA's political discourse is better explained by securitization theory.

On contrary to SYRIZA, New Democracy and Golden Dawn pursued security based framing of the crisis since its early beginning. However, this is not surprising since New Democracy has historically been establishing and supporting legislations and practices in regard to migration through strong securitization. Golden Dawn, a Neo-Nazi, extreme right-wing party, has since its establishment promoted agenda on aggressive and violent anti-immigrant political discourse which was further developed since the beginning of the migration crisis. Never the less, Golden Dawn's discourse portrayed the migration crisis as threat to Greek culture and identity while it strongly refused open-border policy or any acceptance of migrants/refugees. The party promoted to close borders and not to collaborate with any other national or international actors on management of the crisis. Connectedly, the party was involved in several xenophobic and racially motivated violent acts as well as protests and attacks targeting the migrants and migration facilities. This approach was, however, the most extreme of securitization presented in political discourse. Similarly like Golden Dawn, New Democracy criticized the open-border policy of SYRIZA-led government. Despite that, its discourse was not as violent as Golden Dawn's. New Democracy perceived the migration crisis as a possible threat to the national and international security and public order. This framing of the crisis only strengthened after the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels which were used as a justifying element for migration-terrorism nexus in the party's political discourse. Consequently, New Democracy proposed a stronger border protection and collaboration with international partners, especially EU and Turkey, in order to restrict the inflow of migrants and detect criminals and terrorists. Despite this, the discourse also stressed the need to help the migrants who were already in the country while strongly supported the relocation program. In this regard, New Democracy based its

discourse on the migration crisis on securitization of this phenomenon which was perceived as a security threat to national and international order. However, the political discourse of the party in regard to the migration crisis can partially be a result of years during which New Democracy pursued securitization of migration in Greece.

When it comes to the political discourse presented by the other political parties it can be argued that their joint agenda with SYRIZA was largely based on support of international actors – including the EU, NATO, and Turkey – in order to protect Greek borders, and reduce the flow of migrants into Greece. It also stressed the need for the humanitarian help aimed as support of arrived migrants and refugees. Further, it promoted the financial and technical support from the EU to properly address the crisis. The parties agreed on strong border restrictions due to various security threats which were possible endangering the public order in Greece and/or in other EU's member states. Despite that fact that most of the parties partially pursued humanitarian approach towards the migrants, their agenda was largely set on security-based policy. This was especially evident when they supported the international cooperation which was mainly focused on restriction, surveillance, detention, and border protection policies and practices. In this regard, political discourse on migration pursued by majority of the political parties, both coalition and opposition, was based on securitization rather than politicization of the migration crisis. None the less, the KKE refused to follow the majority discourse when it proposed policy on humanitarianism and solidarity. The party did oppose to any kind of international cooperation with the EU, NATO, or other actors who based their policy on strong border control, detention of migrants who did not qualified for asylum, military presence, or any kind of security-based initiative. On contrary to majority of Greek political elites, they proposed open-border policy, acceptance of migrants, and management of the crisis based on help to ones in need. And thus, KKE's political discourse on the migration crisis is definitely better explained by politicization theory.

In the following chapter, I identify and examine the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after the 2015 European migration crisis. After their analysis, I assess whether they are better explained by securitization or rather politicization theory.

6 The migration-terrorism nexus: how the European migration crisis impacted Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices

The security-migration nexus became especially compelling issue in the EU and its member states after the opening of the Western Balkan route in the second half of 2015. None the less, it was the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015 which initiated a political debate on the re-assessment of the crisis border management in connection to the counter-terrorism policies and practices. This newly developing security concern had been since recognized by many national and EU's authorities which, despite no official report proved a systematic use of migration routes by terrorist organizations, addressed the need for development of mechanism tackling migration-terrorism nexus. Greece, as a country of arrival for many migrants and/or refugees from countries affected by Islamist terrorism, had been pushed to step up its border control management. Given the fact that several perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks had been associated with the European migration crisis and Greece, EU's and Greece's national authorities had responded to this phenomenon by introducing changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices. These were predominantly targeting the border control measures which involved the recognition of migration-terrorism nexus. And thus, in the following chapter, I am going to identify and analyze these changes and their nature in order to determine whether they were established as a part of securitization or rather politicization of the European migration crisis in Greece.

6.1 'Hotspot' approach and protection of the external borders: multi-dimensional policing tool of the migration crisis

Since the second half of 2015, Greece had actively been pursuing policy of hotspots which was officially supported by European Council's European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 (European Commission, 2015a). In a nutshell, the approach intended a more effective protection of EU's external borders along with a better cooperation between the national and EU's authorities dealing with management of then developing migration crisis (Carrera et al., 2015). These included not only emergency security measures but also emergency mechanisms for a faster asylum application processes and relocation of the migrants and/or refugees who qualified for EU asylum. After the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, the hotspots were also used as a policy tool for detention of the migrants who were rescued at the sea or not granted EU asylum and were resettled back to the third country – Turkey. Similarly like in Italy, the hotspots in Greece were situated in the regions which were affected by the inflow of the migrants the most.

In this case, hotspots were established on five islands – Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos, and Leros – and were run jointly by EU's agencies and Greek law enforcement agencies including the national coastal guard, police, and asylum authorities. These were set up under “a joint operation headquarters called the European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) (Carrera et al. 2015)”. Despite a fairly wide spectrum of activities which were combined under the common umbrella of the hotspots approach, reinforcement of a security based agenda with a strong focus on military and surveillance-oriented policing resonated the overall management of the migration crisis in Greece (Carrera et al., 2015; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016).

As I have previously stated, the EU-Greece cooperation was largely based on the support of the Greek national authorities by the external agencies like Frontex, Eurojust, Europol or European Asylum Support Office, and others (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016). Many of these were collaborating on the common security issues which arose from the massive inflow of migrants. Despite Islamist terrorism was only one of the security concern that was addressed by the competent authorities, alongside with numerous organized crime activities including migrant smuggling and document forgery, it changed Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in connection to the border management quite profoundly. In this regard, the hotspots facilities and identification processes were partially used as a counter-terrorism policing tool. The policy of hotspots was to a large extent based on an identification of the third-country individuals – not nationals of EU member state – and determining whether they pose any substantial threat to the Greek national and/or EU's security (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016). This identification process was divided into several stages. In the first stage, the migrant/refugee underwent a thorough background check which was conducted through both a biometric identification as well as interviews in regard to personal information. In case of biometric identification, the individual was obliged to be fingerprinted and photographed by the authorities. The obtained data were run through several information databases including SIS, Europol, Interpol and others national and international security systems. Subsequently, the personal information were stored into the Eurodact information system. Additionally to the biometric identification, many of the migrants/refugees were interviewed in order to prove their nationality in case of missing IDs (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016). And thus both of these processes were essential for security purposes since any suspicion which arose during conduct of personal information resulted in second stage security checks. The second stage is the most relevant – from counter-terrorism policy and practice point of view – since its

main purpose was to establish the specificity of the security concern which an individual might have posed (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016). The secondary stage of the identification process was to a large extent executed by Europol and Greek Police and was perceived as “the necessary [security] measures ... following the recent terrorist attacks in Europe (Council of the European Union, 2016)”. Its “primary purpose ... [was] to identify movements of suspected terrorists, but also ... to disrupt organised crime networks involved in migrant smuggling (Europol, 2016)”. Based on the migration-terrorism security threat Europol deployed “counter-terrorist and other investigators” whose presence “at key points on the external border of the EU [was established in order] ... to strengthen the security checks on the inward flows of migrants, in order to identify suspected terrorists and criminals (Europol, 2016)”. These emergency measures were directly supported by the EU's agencies and Greece which had “full authority and legal framework” over “Europol's operational activities in the migration hotspots (Europol, 2016)”. Understandably, the importance of the collaboration between Greece and the EU's agencies was fairly significant since it was able to establish an intelligence and person-profiling focused practice. These were rather impossible to pursue by the Greek national agencies which did lack financial, technological or personnel means to combat a higher level of terrorist threat endangering the Greek national and the EU's external borders.

Although the hotspot personal screening policies were one of the essential counter-terrorism policy tools, which were activated in the wake of the migration-terrorism nexus, it was not the only counter-terrorism measure taken. While hotspots in Greece were set up in the island regions, and were mainly targeting the migrants arriving through the sea, a rather smaller fraction of the migrants/refugees had crossed the Greek-Turkish land border. The land border protection was perceived equally as important as the sea protection due to high numbers of migrants passing through Greece to the Western European countries. This meant that Greece became a country which was battling not only the massive arrival of migrants/refugees but also their exit from the country. In this regard, Frontex was one of the most vital agencies which, under the authority of the Greek national agencies, had contributed to the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices beyond the hotspot approach. These will be studied in the next subchapter.

6.2 Greece and Frontex: Long-term partnership battling more than just illegal immigration

In the wake of the migration crisis, the Greek political elites reinforced a closer cooperation with the EU and many of its security and law enforcement agencies which emergency support to Greece was referred to as vital for both the national and the EU's internal security. Given the fact that Greece had already been actively collaborating with Frontex – an agency which mandate aimed at the support of the national agencies in the protection of the EU's external borders – Greek government initiated a need for a stronger presence of this agency on Greek territory by activating “the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Malkoutzis, 2015)”. By this step, Greek authorities “agreed to allow Frontex to operate on its border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Malkoutzis, 2015)”. The operation were to a large extent focused on the identification of the incoming migrants as well as protection of the EU's external borders. Additionally, Greeks issued “a request ... for the activation of the Emergency Intervention Team (RABIT) (Sideris, 2015)”. While its mandate was aimed at the border protection and patrolling both on the sea, it also reinforced a more enhanced “security checks and the cross-identification of [migrants'] fingerprints with national and European databases (Sideris, 2015)”. This was primarily observed in the hotspot facilities where presence of Frontex was especially significant for the identification processes during the first months after the introduction of the hotspot approach.

None the less, the events of the Paris terrorist attacks dramatically changed the form and mandate of Frontex. Partially based on the Frontex initial agenda, the European Commission adopted the European Border and Coast Guard Agency regulation (EU) 2016/1624 which introduced a new counter-terrorism dimension to its modified mandate. The creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was tied to the migration crisis and “the intensified security concerns following the terrorist attacks” several of which directly connected migration-terrorism nexus and Greece (European Commission, 2015b). And therefore part of the EU's external border protection provided by this renewed agency was “increased security and intelligence”, among others, established through the counter-terrorism initiative (European Commission, 2015b). The extended authority of the agency permitted the agency to closely cooperate with other law enforcement agencies, both the international and EU's, while supporting the member state on which territory the operation took place. In case of Greece, which along with Italy became one of the most supported member states, Frontex was directly involved in the reinforcement of the hotspot approach. After the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

was established and Frontex boosted its authority, the agency also reshaped its cooperation with Greece. In the joint operation Poseidon Frontex provided “Greece with technical assistance with the goal of strengthening its border surveillance (European Commission, 2016)”. Specifically, Frontex deployed several hundred officers, aircrafts, helicopters and ships “as combined instruments to tackle challenges ... of migration flows [including countering of] cross border crime and terrorism at ... [EU's] external borders (Council of the European Union, 2016)”. Connectedly, “the extended scope of ... [Frontex'] mandate” also authorized “new activities on processing of personal data for risk analysis, namely (1) process personal data on terrorists, (2) enable Frontex staff to collect personal data (3) send collected and processed personal data back to the host Member State (Council of the European Union, 2016)”. In other words, Greek national law enforcement agencies which dealt with security concerns related to the migration crisis, therefore predominantly police and coastal guard, were directly informed on the possible terrorist suspects along with number of other institutions which supported Greece's counter terrorism initiative after the development of the European migration crisis. The data provision and intelligence was a significant step in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border management because “an underlying threat of terrorism-related travel movements” indicated a heightened possibility of use of “fraudulent documents (Council of the European Union, 2016)”. Understandably, the ID fraudulence was very pressing security issue, also in connection to the counter-terrorism agenda in Greece, since the Paris terrorist attacks and Brussels bombing, investigations of which, proved the use of such documents by some of the attackers.

In this regard, cooperation between Greece and Frontex should be understood as a dual-faced process which not only affected the Greece's counter-terrorism practices and policies, as a part of strengthened border controls, but also the protection of EU's external borders which had to be reshaped due to a new security concern. The introduction of these rather intelligence and risk-assessment focused counter-terrorism practices and policies were to a large extent affected by the Schengen agreement. This affirmed a huge gaps in security mechanism and border control not only within but also outside the EU. In the wake of the migration crisis, Greece was internally and externally pushed to adopt new counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control as an emergency measures. Due to Greece's inability to meet the new security challenges imposed by the migration crisis, Greek political elites heavily focused on EU's support. This was partially caused by Greek political discourse referring to the migration crisis as a common EU issue rather than problem of Greece. Additionally, the economic crisis forced

Greek government to seek active cooperation with the EU's agencies also in regard to the reinforcement of the new counter-terrorism measures as a part of border control reassessment. Consequently, Greece's new counter-terrorism policies and practices connected to the border protection cannot be understood without considering EU's security agenda, part of which is Frontex' new mandate involving strong counter-terrorism initiative and protection of the external borders.

6.3 NATO: When Greek border protection becomes interest of the international counter-terrorism agenda

A strategic geopolitical position of Greece and the regional political tension caused by the migration had attracted not only the attention of the EU community but also other international organizations. This interest grew rapidly after many of the security concerns, tied to the thousands illegal border crossings, proved to have possibly very dangerous consequences on the order of the international security. One of the most compelling issue thus became Islamist terrorism and the rise of the terrorist activities in the Western world. The security concern in regard to the migration-terrorism nexus had several dimensions which seemed to affect security globally. These included return of foreign fighters, radicalization of migrants, but also different kinds of organized crime activities connected to the functioning of terrorist groups. And therefore inclusion of different security enforcement agencies was vital in order to address many dimensions of terrorist threat present on Greek territory.

In this regard, Greece along with Germany and Turkey requested an intensive security cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since February 2016 (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2016). NATO partnership was fairly significant step for a further militarization of the refugee crisis management and border control in Greece. Connectedly, it supported Greece in the fight against organized crime activities, including threat of terrorism, by controlling the waters which were beyond Greek or EU's jurisdiction. In other words, NATO fleet possessed an authority to patrol “international waters but also in Turkish territorial waters (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2016)”. This cooperation was thus seen as a necessary security measures since, as NATO's top commander Philip Breedlove warned, “criminality, terrorists, and the returning foreign fighters are ... a daily part of the refugee flow in Europe ('NATO Commander: Terrorists, Criminals Hidden Among Refugees Flooding Europe', 2016)”. After the joint request for the support, NATO deployed “Standing Maritime Group 2” fleet which was “tasked to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossing in the Aegean (Panayiotou, 2016)”. Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO, argued that “critical

information and surveillance” which was upgrading the enforcement of Greece's national and EU's common security agenda (Panayiotou, 2016). The NATO-Greece-Turkey-EU cooperation was even further intensified in October 2016 when the alliance agreed on establishing “a flexible maritime operation called Sea Guardian ('Operation Sea Guardian', 2016)”. The flexibility of this operation rooted in its ability to address as many as “seven maritime security operational tasks” including “countering terrorism at the sea ('Operation Sea Guardian', 2016)”. The Operation Sea Guardian was referred to as reinforcement of “collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security” which supported Greece's border protect and introduced a new dimension to Greece's counter-terrorism practices ('Operation Sea Guardian', 2016). In other words, the initiative was designed “to mitigate gaps in the capacity of individual countries to enforce civilian and/or military law at sea [while acting as a] ... complementary [guide] to efforts by other actors ('Operation Sea Guardian', 2016)”. In the case of Greece, NATO was focusing on “the planning and conduct of operations to deter, disrupt, and defend and protect against ... terrorist activities ...through the use of force ('Operation Sea Guardian', 2016)”. While NATO was reshaping different aspects of Greece's security policy as a direct result of the migration crisis, the introduction of the new counter-terrorism initiative provided a useful intelligence to Greek law enforcement agencies in tackling the changing security threat on its territory. Connectedly, it stimulated cooperation between EU's authorities and the third countries, especially Turkey, whose cooperation was fairly valuable.

Overall, the cooperation between Greece and NATO, and other partners, was defined by an intensive militarization of the migration crisis. The emergency situation resulting from the migration-terrorism nexus, and other types of cross-border criminal activities, was perceived by Greek government, EU's community, and NATO alliances as a possible danger to the security in the wider region of the Aegean Sea. Consequently, the joint operation of these actors was based on active surveillance and protection of the Greek sea borders while data sharing was one of the central contours of the cooperation. Although the operation was established through legal processes when Greece, Germany and Turkey requested the cooperation with NATO jointly, it was characterized by a heavy focus on security agenda. This used the military fleet, physical force, technological means, risk assessment, and intelligence as the policy and practice tools in addressing and combating the terrorist activities which increased with the illegal migration of thousands individuals. And thus the Operation Sea Guardian and its effects on in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to the border control must be understood as a reinforcement of securitization practices pursued by the Greek authorities as

well as NATO, and other involved actors. The securitization was in this case pursued by the military presence and its security agenda.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter examined the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to the border management after the 2015 European migration crisis. Its main aim was to (1) identify these changes as well as (2) to analyze their nature while determining whether they can be better explained by securitization theory or rather politicization theory of the migration-terrorism nexus in Greece. During the analysis I identified three main changes which were directly tied to the heightened terrorist threat posed by the migration crisis. These include: (1) hotspot policy which was used as a counter-terrorism tool for screening possible terrorists among the incoming illegal migrants/refugees; (2) the joint operation between Greece and European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) which heavily focused on border protection, intelligence, technical as well as personnel support of Greek law enforcement agencies in fight against the security threat of terrorism; and (3) the Operation Sea Guardian which mitigated Greece's counter-terrorism initiative through surveillance, data sharing, and technological support of the Greek authorities. While each of these changes in policies and practices did differ in some aspects, they shared several similar features.

Firstly, all of these changes were to a large extent supported by the external actors which provided variation of supportive tools. Secondly, all of the agencies involved in these changes were actively collaborating on the security agenda in regard to the counter-terrorism initiative. Thirdly, the introduced counter-terrorism policies and practices were part of a wider security agenda pursued by the involved agencies. And therefore they must be understood as a part of security based approach of Greece, the EU, and NATO in regard to the management of migration crisis. Fourthly, many of the introduced counter-terrorism initiatives were based on surveillance, risk assessment, profiling, heavy border protection, and last but not least, militarization of the Greek borders. On contrary to these similarities, all of the changes did differ in form of their authority or, partially, aspects of their activities.

In this regard, the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in connection to the border control after 2015 were a part of the overall securitization processes of migration pursued not only by Greece but also by the EU community. The common, securitization-focused agenda of EU's institutions and support of this approach by the Greek government was equally important for the inclusion of the new counter-terrorism dimension of Greece's border

management and control. The policies should therefore be understood as part of EU's and Greece's governance of mobility.

7 Conclusion

This Master's thesis was focused on study of the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices after the 2015 European migration crisis. Its main intent was to contextualize these changes and assess whether or not they can be better explained by securitization or politicization theory. The assessment was conducted in three analytical chapters, each of which was focused on detailed examination of political processes connected to recognition and addressing of subjects of migration and terrorism. In the first chapter, I examined the nature and historical context in regard to migration and counter-terrorism policies and practices which were established before 2015. I aimed to assess whether these subjects were securitized or politicized. The second analytical section was focused on an examination of discourse of political parties, which have been part of Greek Parliament since 2015, and their depiction of the 2015 European migration crisis. This chapter also elaborated on proposition of these political parties in regard to management of the migration crisis. The last, third analytical part identified and studied the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices after 2015. Its intention was to examine the nature of these policies and practices in order to determine whether they were based on logic of securitization or rather politicization.

During the examination I made several findings which are vital for answering and contextualization of the research question. The assessment of the first analytical part concluded that the analyzed phenomenon, therefore migration and terrorism, were addressed by both politicization as well as securitization logic during different periods. Understandably, these processes were to a large degree depending on national and international socio-political developments which affected the political discourse as well as introduction of policies and practices which were addressing these subjects. Despite the fact that both migration and terrorism were pursued through politicization and securitization logic, they shared many differences. Phenomenon of migration was securitized since 1991 when Greek Parliament established repressive, security based laws focused on border protection and detention of the migrants. These were accompanied by a strong anti-migration political discourse which portrayed illegal migrants as an existential threat to Greek national interests. On many occasions migration was referred to as threat to state establishment, Greek culture, as well as source of criminality. In this regard, politicization of migration was rather short term process which was

transformed into securitization logic quite fast. Since 1991, migration phenomenon was gradually reinforced through further securitization policies, practices, as well as administrative and bureaucratic operational set-ups. Although there were some attempts for regularization of illegal migration between 1997 and 2008, these were only short-term and considering all of the aspects of the illegal migration in Greece. With a rise of second migration wave, Greece pursued further securitization of migration and enforcement of operations that were aimed at detention of migrants. These were supported by number of joint collaborations with the EU as well as NATO. Their intention was to prevent Greek national borders which are also EU's external borders. In this regard, Greece along its international partners was since the late 2000s reinforcing military- and security specialist-based approach focusing on heavy border protection, restraint of illegal migration, surveillance and data sharing.

Subject of terrorism was, on contrary to migration, not accepted as existential threat till 1999. Years between the rise of domestic and transnational terrorism on Greek territory was defined by strong polarization in regard to counter-terrorism legislature. There were two attempts to establish counter-terrorism initiative during this period. None the less, both of them were unsuccessful when they were repealed few years after their introduction. Given these facts, subject of terrorism was heavily politicized till 1999. As a result, there was an unsuccessful securitization of terrorism in 1990. None the less, securitization of terrorism was present in political discourse since 1999 when it was identified as threat to Greek national interest and individual security. Based on this, Greek Parliament introduced counter-terrorism bill in 2001 which was very restrictive and shifted terrorism beyond the ordinary legal provisions. The law was limiting number of civil rights. Despite that, the law was supported by majority of political parties. Since the introduction of this bill, there were constituted numerous legislatures and practices which strengthened securitization of terrorism further. Additionally, Greece had been cooperating with many national and international actors on counter-terrorism initiative through surveillance and data sharing. These included the EU, the US, as well as NATO. In this regard, securitization of terrorism was in Greece present since period between 1999 and 2001. The securitization-based counter-terrorism policies and practices took place in different forms and were reinforced both on national and international levels.

The second and third analytical part were directly elaborating on changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border management after the 2015 European migration crisis. In regard to political discourse on the migration crisis, I assessed several findings. Overall, the subject of migration was securitized by majority of the political parties

residing in Greek Parliament since the later 2015. Despite that SYRIZA and its leader pursued politicization of crisis during its early stage. This was reinforced by political discourse which focused on presentation of this phenomenon as humanitarian crisis and push for open-border policy aimed at supporting the incoming masses of migrants and refugees. Additionally, during the first months of 2015, SYRIZA intended U-turn on migration policies and practices which, however, were rather insignificant and short-term due to a dramatic rise of migrants' inflow as well as national and international pushes for more border-protection based migration management. None the less, this interpretation of migration crisis shifted at the end of 2015 when SYRIZA, like majority of the political parties, supported securitization move through acceptance of intensive presence of EU's and NATO authorities, based on militarization and heavy border control. This, along with the EU-Turkey agreement, reinforced measures restraining further inflow of migrants, while supported intensive deportation programmes. Despite that, more extreme version of securitization was presented by extreme-right wing party Golden Dawn. This referred to migrants as threat to Greek nation, culture and state while promoted total closure of borders. Never the less, this political discourse was based on party's long-term anti-immigrant agenda. Additionally, the political discourse on migration was legitimizing anti-immigration violence targeting migrants and refugees. Only one political party refused securitization of migration. A strong politicization of the crisis was pursued by the KKE, which pushed for humanitarian and solidarity based management of crisis and open-border policy. None the less, as I have already explained, majority of the political parties was in favor of emergency and security based policy.

The securitization-based attitude was also reflected by an introduction of changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices since 2015. While Greek national government did not accept any additional legislation in regard to counter-terrorism, it strongly promoted emergency international cooperation on the issue of migration-terrorism nexus. The security threat posed by the migration-terrorism nexus was thus addressed and reinforced by (1) hotspot policy; (2) joint cooperation with Frontex, especially Operation Poseidon; and last but not least (3) collaboration with NATO in Operation Sea Guardian. All of these policies and practices were focused on surveillance, data sharing, risk assessment and profiling, as well as screening of incoming migrants and refugees. Its main objective was protection of borders supported by heavy militarization, as well as identification of possible terrorist suspects. In this regard, technology and biometrics was one of the essential parts of the introduced policies. And thus proliferation of technology was vital to effective border protection.

In this regard, the securitization of migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after 2015 is better explained not only as a continuum of already existing “extraordinary” and “administrative measures” though which Greek political elites and Greek law enforcement agencies pursued securitization of migration and terrorism for many years (Bigo, 2002, p. 65; Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998, p. 25). Additionally, it must be contextualized within the realm of EU's migration and security agenda. This, however, means that securitization of migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after 2015 was partially a result of EU's approach towards management of migration though “transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions (Bigo, 2002, p.65)”. And thus, “securitization ... [was] generated through a confrontation between the strategic political actors ... in the national political field, the security professionals at the transnational level ... and the global social transformations affecting the possibilities of reshaping political boundaries (Bigo, 2002, p. 75)”. In other words, the securitization of migration-terrorism nexus was securitized though interaction between Greek political elites, EU member states' officials, Turkey, and EU's as well as NATO's security professionals. They deployed policies and practices which combined “technologies of surveillance, state scrutinizing the conduct of risk categories, with technologies of normalization ... (Humphrey, 2013, p. 191)”. These are reinforced with the use of biometrics that helps in assessment of the individuals' threat to security (Broeders & Hampshire, 2013). And thus, securitization of the migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after the 2015 European migration crisis is better explained as top-bottom political process which was heavily reinforced though variety of emergency measures, administrative, security, and technocratic practices and policies.

Given all these facts, I conclude that the changes in Greece's counter-terrorism policies and practices in regard to border control after the 2015 European migration crisis can be better explained though securitization theory. None the less, it is necessary to highlight that securitization of both migration and terrorism in Greece has been present for many years. In this regard, the changes in counter-terrorism policies and practices must be understood as a result of long-term pursue of securitization in regard to these subjects. At the same the same time, further securitization was reinforced though policies and practices based on emergency due to migration-terrorism nexus. Further, the new counter-terrorism initiative has been established as a part of overall securitization of the European migration crisis pursued by the EU community, NATO, and other national and international actors.

7.1 Discussion

During the research of migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after 2015 I did was not affected with many limitations. I was able to access relevant documents of different kinds. Since Greece has been at the forefront of the European migration crisis, the subject of migration-terrorism nexus was fairly addressed by variety of international, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, there was enough of media reports targeting different aspects of the researched phenomenon. This was especially helpful during to the analysis and assessment of the studied subjects. Despite that I believe that one of the most prominent limitation of this research was lack of elaboration on approach of Greek security professionals and their take on the migration-terrorism nexus. However, this was not doable due to time and size of this research. On the other hand, I think that public and media respond to the migration-terrorism nexus was not limiting the internal validity of the research since securitization of migration and terrorism has been pursued in Greece for many years. None the less, it could partially helpful in further contextualization of this phenomenon. None the less, I believe that this analysis is based on solid ground.

And thus, the analysis of migration-terrorism nexus in Greece after 2015 migration crisis using the securitization and politicization theories was fairly easy to assess. This was mainly a result of securitization of both migration and terrorism in Greece many years prior to the 2015 European migration crisis and its connection to threat of Islamist terrorism. In this regard, the research did not bring new academic findings on the politicization of migration-terrorism nexus. Despite that, it closely elaborated on the approach of Greek political elites and their respond towards acceptance of migration-terrorism nexus as a serious security threat. Additionally, the research provided helpful information on the processes thought which EU's institutions provide a framework for further securitization of migration and/or terrorism. These were also supported by the international cooperation with third country, Turkey, as well as security focused organization like NATO. The supportive net of these different authorities were vital for addressing migration-terrorism threat in Greece.

Despite that I think that theory of politicization and securitization do differ quiet profoundly. This is, however, a result of in-depth researches on securitization of migration and terrorism which elaborate on different forms of securitization processes though which the security threat are presented and addressed. On the other hand, I believe that the theory of politicization can be helpful in contextualization of other security threats posed by different socio-economic phenomenon. None the less, securitization as a technique of governance seems to be fairly

popular among many Western societies and thus academic researches should focus on different regions which are not as affected by the securitization as many Western countries. Or, the politicization of threat should be researched in connection to other subjects rather than migration and/or terrorism.

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