



Universiteit Leiden

Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

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# Internal Market versus Internal Security

A study on the economy-security trade-off of EU border management policy

by

Rick Verkennis

s1436635

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**Supervisor: Drs. G.M. van Buuren**

**Second reader: MA S. Wittendorp**

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# Table of contents

<b>Foreword</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>List of abbreviations</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>1.1 Background</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>1.2 Academic and societal relevance</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.3 The EU as an economic and security actor</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>1.4 How bordering relates to the trade-off</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>1.5 Roadmap</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>2. Theory</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>2.1 Security economy</b> .....	<b>11</b>
2.1.1 Economic impact of security measures .....	12
2.1.2 Trade-offs .....	13
<b>2.2 The concept of Bordering</b> .....	<b>15</b>
2.2.1 Approaches to bordering.....	15
2.2.2 Changing context and threat perception .....	16
2.2.3 Cosmopolitan Borders .....	19
<b>3. Methodology</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.1 Research design</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.2 Case selection</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>3.3 Data collection</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>3.4 Operationalization</b> .....	<b>26</b>
<b>4. Discourse analysis of policy documents</b> .....	<b>29</b>
<b>4.1 Economic policy documents</b> .....	<b>29</b>
4.1.1 Single Market .....	29
4.1.2 Addressing shortages on the labor market.....	33
<b>4.2 Security policy documents</b> .....	<b>38</b>
4.2.1 Open and secure in a changing context .....	38
4.2.2 Towards Smart Borders .....	43
<b>4.3 Main findings</b> .....	<b>49</b>
4.3.1 Economic policy .....	50
4.3.2 Security policy .....	51
4.3.3 Identifying the act of balancing.....	53
<b>4.4 Academic concepts</b> .....	<b>54</b>
4.4.1 Balancing the interests.....	54
4.4.2 The role of globalization.....	55
4.4.3 Efficient border management.....	56
<b>5. Conclusion &amp; discussion</b> .....	<b>58</b>
<b>References</b> .....	<b>61</b>
<b>Annex</b> .....	<b>67</b>
<b>Annex 1. List of specific documents</b> .....	<b>67</b>
<b>Annex 2. Example of policy document</b> .....	<b>69</b>

## **Foreword**

This master thesis is the final result of the Crisis & Security Management course. This thesis was a challenge for myself to put my academic skills that I have learned during my bachelor and masters into practice. The subject of my master thesis also fit my personal interests, which made me enjoy doing this research. The issue of border management and closed or open borders came up when I was following the presidential elections of the United State of America and the discussion about the proposed wall. This is where my initial research began and resulted in this thesis, looking into the border management policy of the EU and the pressure of the migration crisis and terrorist attacks on it. Especially the process of aiming for an open economy but also a secure society is a process that intrigues me. I hope that this subject will fascinate you as it has fascinated me.

I also would like to use this moment as an opportunity to thank the people who supported me during the process of writing this thesis. Special thanks to my supervisor Drs. Van Buuren for guiding me. Your enthusiasm regarding the subject of bordering was contagious and caught me too. The feedback during the process was always helpful and moving me forward. Also, I would like to thank my family and friends who were always available for feedback and reflections on my thesis.

Enjoy.

Rick Verkennis

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## **Abstract**

The migration crisis and wave of terrorist attacks in Europe since 2015 have increased pressure on the 'borderless' Schengen area. The EU is facing the challenge of maintaining the European Schengen Area while being able to counter the coming threats. The abolition of internal borders is of paramount importance to the Schengen area and economy of the EU. However, some Member States have re-introduced internal border controls as a security measure against illegal migration and terrorist attacks. The European Commission finds that these security measures are not desirable because of the economic costs they bring. This is where the conflict of economic and security interests comes to light. This research focuses on this trade-off between economic and security interests surrounding border management policy.

This thesis aims to analyze if and how the economy-security trade-off has influence border management policy since 2015. To analyze this, a discourse analysis was conducted on economic and security policy documents of the Directorate-Generals of the European Commission. The DG's of the EC were chosen as case study because this is a European institution where both interests meet and has the right to both design and implement policy. The literature provided the discourse analysis with insights that were used in the discourse analysis. The findings of the discourse analysis on the economic and security policy documents indicate that the economic dimension of security policy is more present than the security dimension of economic policy. Economic motives seem to dictate the outcome of the security policy while security is not as dominant in economic policy. This means that the economic interests still prevail the security interests.

## List of abbreviations

EU	European Union
EC	European Commission
EPRS	European Parliamentary Research Service
EP DG IPOL	European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG TRADE	Directorate-General for Trade
DG MOVE	Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport
DG GROW	Directorate-General for Internal market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
EES	Entry/Exit System

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The recent terrorist attacks and migration crisis have increased the pressure on the Schengen Area and on the free movement of persons and goods in particular. The Schengen Agreement introduced the free movement of persons and goods across Europe. These freedoms now form one of the pillars of the European Union (EU). The abolition of internal borders and the free movement of persons and goods benefit the European economy and the Internal market of the EU (Popa, 2015: 44). However, recent threats have posed a challenge to the Schengen Area and especially to the freedom of movement within it. New security dimensions have emerged and the EU is facing the challenge of maintaining the European Schengen Area while being able to counter the coming threats. Some Member States have re-introduced internal border checks to deal with the huge influx of migrants and counter the terrorist threat (DG HOME, 2017a: 2). While the Schengen Agreement aimed at boosting the economy of Europe, it is increasingly becoming a security issue. This research will analyze how the EU is trying to facilitate the free movement of persons and goods while also maintaining a high level of internal security. Because contemporary border management has to facilitate mobilities and security at the same time and is considered as a prerequisite for a functional Schengen area, bordering is an interesting concept to use to analyze the economy-security trade-off (DG HOME, 2017a: 3). The economy-security trade-off represents the tension between the conflicting economic and security interests. The economy of the EU benefits from open trade, open borders and increasing mobilities; internal security benefits from more thorough internal and external border controls. This conflict of interests has especially come to light since the migration crisis and increase of terrorist attacks throughout Europe since 2015. The aim of this research is to shed light on how the EU is managing the trade-off, which leads to the following research question:

"To what extent has the economy-security trade-off influenced EU border management policy since 2015?". In addition to mapping the state of play of the economy-security trade-off, this research will also shed light on how the EU is managing this conflict of interests and what could be the way forward for the EU.

## **1.2 Academic and societal relevance**

Although much literature exists on border management, the internal market of the EU and the Schengen Agreement, little research exists on how the EU is actually balancing the freedom of movement and security. Scholars such as Franko Aas (2007), Andreas (2003), Amoore (2006), Rumford (2007), Brück (2004) and Stevens (2004) have acknowledged that there is a trade-off and act of balancing between economic and security interests, but insight into this phenomenon has not been provided yet. Considering that these values are at the core of the EU, the development and process these values have been through is an interesting field of research. This research is trying to analyze if and how the pressure on the free movement of persons and goods within the Schengen Area changed and how the EU is dealing with this development since 2015. Analyzing the free movement of persons and the balancing hereof with internal security will make a contribution to the existing academic gap and body of knowledge on the subject of the economy-security trade-off within EU policy and on the trade-off in general. The topic of border management in the EU is a hot topic. Recent terrorist attacks in Berlin, Brussels and Paris and the migration crisis since 2015 have created concerns about the strength of the external border, the absence of internal borders and the free movement within the EU (DG HOME, 2016a: 2).

Research among the 28 Member States, based on policy experts and public opinion, shows which issue of Schengen the Member States are most concerned about. In 13 countries, the protection of the principle of freedom of movement is most important, making it the primary concern. The second concern of Member States is the economic benefit of the Schengen zone tied with the ability of Schengen to manage the refugee flows (ECFR, 2016). Of course, these concerns are closely linked and cannot be seen separate from each other. The principle of free movement facilitates the economic benefits of Schengen and also creates concerns about the flow of irregular migrants through the Schengen zone. Security concerns, were not perceived to be the primary concern of Schengen. However, for many Member States it was the second or third concern on the list (ECFR, 2016). The main reason why Schengen matters for all Member States are the economic benefits it brings. Suspension of the Schengen system would be destructive for open economies, which have been built on free trade

and free movement. Time is money, and reinstating border controls will make cross-border transportation of goods and commuting an expense for every member state (ECFR, 2016). Amongst multiple EU Member States, these concerns have led to temporary reinstating internal border checks. These Member States include Germany, France, Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The European Commission aims to lift these temporary measures as soon as possible (DG HOME, 2017a: 2). The concerns that are present among the population within Schengen countries and the public and political debate on this topic make this topic of societal relevance. A research into this topic could therefore contribute to the public and political debate.

### **1.3 The EU as an economic and security actor**

The security policy of the EU is both directed at the internal security as well as at the countries on the periphery of the EU. The main targets are the non-traditional aspects of security such as organized cross-border crime, cyber crime and terrorism instead of traditional aspects of security that endanger the territorial integrity (Sperling, 2014: 590). The security policy of the EU is task specific and problem-solving to the collective interest. National security policies must not only serve a Member States' interests but have to serve the collective interests of the EU as well (Sperling, 2014: 591). The threats that emerged after the Cold War, such as terrorism and transnational crime, are hard for nation states to deal with autonomously. The threat calls for a coordination and harmonization of their security strategies (Sperling, 2014: 594) In 2010 the European Commission (EC) introduced the Internal Security Strategy (ISS), which define the EU goals of internal and external security policy, specifically aimed at transnational organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime and porous borders. Over the last decades the security task of the EU is growing. Where protection policy consisted of 0.52% of the Commission's expenditure budget between 1997-2000, it increased to 14.92% between 2011-2013 (Sperling, 2014: 600). The citizens of the EU perceive terrorism as the most important security challenge. The proportion of citizens identifying terrorism and religious extremism as the most important challenge has increased substantially, while also believing the challenge will become even bigger in the next three years (EC, 2015a).

The key economic aspect of the economy-security trade-off is the internal market. Central to the idea of an internal market is a borderless area of free trade and mobility



protected by a strong external border. To analyze how the EU seeks to balance economic interests with security interests it is necessary to understand the development, evolution and context of the Schengen Area. The establishment of the Schengen Agreement meant the abolition of internal borders between the participating states, facilitating the free movement of persons and goods through the Schengen area. Initially the cooperation took place on an intergovernmental level instead of within the framework of the European Community due to disagreements about the freedom of movement for third-country nationals.<sup>1</sup> The original agreement was signed in 1985 in Schengen, a small town in Luxembourg. In June 1995 the agreement came into effect and the internal borders of the Schengen Area were abolished. The states that have been part of the Agreement since its effect are: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Germany. The Schengen Agreement became part of the legal framework of the EU when the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and came into effect in 1999.<sup>2</sup> The abolition of internal border controls should go hand-in-hand with tightening the external border of the Schengen area. In order to abolish internal border checks, additional measures regarding visa and asylum policy were necessary. The Member States adopted a common visa and asylum policy and the Schengen Information System (SIS) was established. The SIS was created to share and gather information on goods and persons transiting the Schengen zone.<sup>3</sup>

#### **1.4 How bordering relates to the trade-off**

The benefits of the Schengen Area such as the boosting of economic activity, increased tourism and intra-Schengen traffic are undeniable (Popa, 2015: 44). However, recent activities in neighboring countries have posed a new challenge to the Schengen Area. The start of the Arab spring has resulted in an increase of 870% in the flow of migrants between April 2014 and April 2015. The external border countries of Schengen are the first to be confronted with this and certain Member States fail to have effective border control, such as Greece (Popa, 2015: 44). Failure at the external borders increases the pressure on reinstating internal borders to maintain a high level

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<sup>1</sup> Oxford Reference (2009), 'Schengen Agreement' retrieved from: <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/10.1093/acref/9780199290543.001.0001/acref-9780199290543-e-1947> (visited on 24-5-2017)

<sup>2</sup> Britannica Academia (2008), 'Schengen Agreement' retrieved from: <http://academic.eb.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/levels/collegiate/article/Schengen-Agreement/442542> (visited on 24-5-2017)

<sup>3</sup> "

of security. Due to the current migration and terrorist threats and the pressure on the Schengen external borders, there is being called for a reform of the Schengen Area to increase the border controls and security. However, Schengen is one of the most important pillars of the EU project, abandoning this project could be perceived as a failure for the EU (Popa, 2015: 45). The abolition of the internal borders within Schengen should be accompanied by a corresponding reinforcement of the external borders of Schengen (Popa, 2015: 45). Its creators did not foresee the current security dimension the freedom of movement is being challenged with. There is a need for a new attitude towards the freedom of movement within Schengen that is able to react to the threats but at the same time maintain the European core values (Keinis, 2016: 71). This research aims to find and analyze this new attitude within EU policy.

### **1.5 Roadmap**

After the introduction of the economy-security trade-off and the academic and societal relevance of this research, the next chapter will present the theoretical framework of the research. The theoretical chapter serves as an exploration of the academic field and body of knowledge on this subject. It will introduce key concepts and insights and build a foundation for this research. In chapter three the methodology of this research will be presented. This chapter will explain the choices and demarcations of this research and safeguard the validity and reliability. Consequently, in chapter 4 the analysis will be made. First, the policy documents of the EC will be analyzed. At the end of the policy analysis, the findings will be related to the academic concepts and insights in order to contribute to the academic body of knowledge. In chapter 5 the conclusions and key findings of this research will be presented, as well as the limitations and recommendations for further research.

## **2. Theory**

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the research. The area of the relation between 'economy' and 'security' is a relatively under-researched subject. Little to no theory exists on the actual economy-security trade-off taking place in certain policy areas. However, this chapter will introduce some interesting and key concepts and perspectives surrounding the academic field of the trade-off and the relation between economy and security. Subsequently, the concept of bordering will be explored.

### **2.1 Security economy**

One of the key concepts that sheds light on the economic aspect of security is the concept of a security economy. The concept of a security economy is a relatively new concept emerging from new and rising security concerns. It describes the accumulation of all activities related to increasing security and reducing risk of deliberate harm (Stevens, 2004: 8). The security economy is growing rapidly due to the technological progress and diverse range of social, economic and institutional factors. The potential damage by acts of terrorism, especially after 9/11, has also significantly affected the growth. Another major factor is globalization. The increase of foreign and cross-border trade increases transport of people and goods, which increases risks for security breaches in this sector. Rising immigration makes it harder for governments to exclude unwanted clandestine threats (Stevens, 2004: 8). Companies and governments are seeking for solutions to increase security and do not affect their core economic activity. The constant search for new and more efficient security measures and technologies contribute to the growth of the security economy. Furthermore, projections and forecasts predict that the security economy will grow further in the years to come (Stevens, 2004: 8). Rising mobility will pose security and efficiency challenges for governments and businesses. The rising levels of prosperity experienced by many societies in the world can be partly contributed to the rapid rise of movement of people and goods worldwide. However, the same channels that enhance mobilities and rising levels of prosperity are also vulnerable to abuse and fraud (Stevens, 2004: 21). In the recent years, the patterns of terrorist activity have changed. Contemporary terrorist activities have acquired a more global dimension by aiming at an entire economic, social, political or cultural system. Places where people

gather in large numbers have all become natural targets. This further boosted the security economy (Stevens, 2004: 21).

### **2.1.1 Economic impact of security measures**

A second relation between economic interests and security interests can be found in the economic impact of security measures. Dealing with insecurity has economic impacts. New security risks such as global terrorism, cyber attacks and organized crime dominate the security field, especially since the terrorist attacks in 2001 on New York and Washington DC. Newly emerging threats not only impact the security field but also the economy. Brück (2004: 102) referred to this development as part of the security economy. Central to the idea of a security economy is risk. Risk can have several economic meanings. First, risk describes the possibility of an event occurring that could cause substantial damage. Second, risk refers to the unpredictable development of economic indicators. And third, risk can be defined as an indicator that is close to a threshold. These economic aspects of risk are important to consider when analyzing security and economic developments (Brück, 2004: 103). Insecurity is the aggregated and unquantifiable form of risk. Risk can occur from different sources such as climate conditions, technical innovations, migration, globalization, war and terrorism (Brück, 2004: 104).

The economic effects stemming from insecurity can mostly be contributed to the strong responses of people and governments to insecurities instead of the actual risk itself (Brück, 2004: 105). The direct costs of the actual risk itself are for example the loss of lives, health, output and properties. The indirect first-order costs occur from actions taken by parties who are directly involved. The indirect second-order costs occur from measures implemented by the government (Brück, 2004: 105). These indirect effects dominate the costs of insecurities and risks. As the degree of risk and fear is a matter of perception, it is hard to assess the actual risk. When strong emotions such as fear are involved, people tend to focus on worst-case scenarios instead of focusing on the probability of the risk occurring. Risk leads to changes in preferences, information, perception, behavioral patterns, incentives, modes of economic organization and economic and security policy, although not always justified (Brück, 2004: 106). One possible indirect effect of insecurity is the increase of transaction costs due to higher transportation costs and transportation insurance

rates. This will negatively affect trade flows in the transport and tourism sectors on a national and international level, reducing the spread of economic activity (Brück, 2004: 108). Government security regulation is present in many economic sectors. Enhanced inspections and other security regulations create delays at borders, increase shipping times and reduce trade flows (Brück, 2004: 109). Although the actual costs are difficult to estimate, a one-day delay in border controls could generate costs of 0,5% of the value of the good. Because it is hard to estimate and predict the actual development and reaction of markets and countries to enhanced security measures, it should be a key focus of the policy to monitor the economic impact of the measure (Brück, 2004: 110).

### **2.1.2 Trade-offs**

While it is not clear if an optimal level of security exists, it is important to consider several important aspects in the pursuit of an optimal level of security (Brück, 2004: 114). An optimal level of security automatically involves preferences, which are a function of perceptions. This illustrates the complexity of finding the optimal level and balancing different interests. Perceptions and preferences are subjective and do not have to reflect the most rational response to a risk. Preferences could either lead to more security measures while overestimating the actual risk or to more security measures while previously underestimating the actual risk. The former will have a security demand higher than the social optimum; the latter will have a security demand moving towards the social optimum. Increased security should increase the security benefits such as the prevention of direct and indirect costs of insecurity. The costs of increased security come to light when choosing between letting the guilty walk free or putting the innocent to jail. Often, societies rather tend to punish the innocent than to let the guilty escape (Brück, 2004: 113).

In the pursuit of an optimal level of security, Brück (2004: 114) has identified five key trade-offs that dominate the balancing process of security interests and economic interests. The first trade-off is a basic principle: what is spent on security cannot be spent on other economy enhancing investments. It is a choice of budget allocation. The second trade-off is about efficiency. Security measures or interests may be preventing the economy from functioning efficiently. A good example of this is increasing border controls, resulting in higher transaction costs as it takes more time

to move goods and people across borders. However, security measures could also improve trade and growth on the long run when new regulations and technologies potentially reduce the transaction costs and increase trade: coordination and harmonization of regulation between countries is necessary to achieve this (Brück, 2004: 115). The third trade-off concerns globalization and its technological changes. It is argued that globalization could have both a negative and positive effect on the security economy. On the one hand, the countries and sectors that can bring such prosperity are highly vulnerable to security threats. Openness and interdependence also brings risks of destabilizing countries. On the other hand, globalization brings coordination, integration and harmonization between countries. This could also mean that it is easier to identify risks and insecurities that involve transnational activities. Another aspect of the security economy arises when considering international security issues. When an international organization or alliance consisting of ten countries, have nine countries with a high degree of security and one country with a low degree of security, they all are at risk due to the interlacing economic and security sectors (Brück, 2004: 113). Furthermore, globalization and technological changes such as automation, surveillance and informational exchange in harbors, airports and border crossings may eventually lead to a diminishing of the security-efficiency trade-off. New technologies could provide efficient border checks while not hampering the economic interests. (Brück, 2004: 116). The fourth trade-off is between security versus freedom and privacy. While new technologies and monitoring systems could be used to mitigate the insecurities, it could also conflict with the civil rights, privacy and individual freedom. In addition, new technologies are also highly vulnerable to cyber attacks, endangering the data collected on citizens. The fifth and final trade-off is about security versus equity. Who should pay for the enhanced security measures? The public and private security sectors probably benefit from this, but sectors that are being faced with higher transaction costs or less trade could pay the price. In the policy-making process, this aspect should be considered as well (Brück, 2004: 116).

This first part of the theoretical framework introduced the concept of a security economy, which describes the accumulation of all activities related to increasing security and reducing risk of deliberate harm (Stevens, 2004: 8). The security economy in general and the growth of the security economy because of the constant search for innovative and efficient security solutions is not of specific interest to this

research. However, the development towards efficient security solutions that do not hamper economic activities is a development that the EU aims for as well. Another dimension of the security economy is the economic impact of security measures. Especially indirect effects of security measures such as higher transaction costs apply to this research. And finally, the trade-offs as introduced by Brück (2004: 114) relate to the economy-security trade-off that centers this research. In light of the economy-security trade-off, the trade-offs of economic efficiency and globalization will be of specific interest.

## **2.2 The concept of Bordering**

To further study and analyze the economic impact of security measures and the trade-offs as explained by Brück (2004) it is important to explore the concept of bordering. Borders are an excellent example of a place where the trade-off comes forward because of the contemporary roles of borders in an era of globalization where mobility is paramount. There are different ways of defining borders and what borders entail. No academic consensus exists on the definition of the concept of bordering and on the conceptual changes it has been subject to. However, academic consensus does exist on the idea that borders have changed and that recent developments have created challenges for border management. Scholars have questioned the centrality of the state and the functioning of territorial borders through the increasing globalization and mobilities.

### **2.2.1 Approaches to bordering**

Contemporary mobilities are characterized by their speed and distance of communication and movement. Their elusive and transnational character makes modern day mobilities an enormous challenge for governments to control them (Franko Aas, 2007: 291). This challenge results in the objective for governments to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' mobilities. Governments want to securitize their borders on the one hand and maintain the global flows of mobilities to sustain the global economic order on the other hand. It is the function of the border to let the global flows cross the border without barriers but to filter out the unwanted mobilities such as transnational crime and terrorism. As a result of this economy-security challenge, new technologies have been developed to help distinguish 'good' from 'bad' mobilities such as biometric passports, visas and other information systems (Franko Aas, 2007: 292). Andreas (2003: 80) also recognizes the shift in the concept of

bordering due to the transnational character of threats and globalization but does not recognize the erosion of borders. Borders are being rebordered through ambitious, innovative and technological efforts to territorially exclude 'undesirable' entries while assuring territorial access to 'desirable' entries. Andreas (2003: 80) also refers to 'undesirable' entries as clandestine transnational actors (CTA's). CTA's are non-state actors that engage in transnational criminal activities such as drug trafficking, terrorism or human smuggling. However, territorial border policing still has a symbolic and perceptual appeal and will be likely to become an increasingly important state activity, regardless of its effectiveness to actual exclude 'undesirable' entries (Andreas, 2003: 80). While globalization is tearing down economic borders, the police are increasingly engaging in border policing activities to exclude 'undesirable' entries that facilitate transnational crime and terrorism. Contemporary state border strategies are characterized by the attempt to stimulate the free economic order and regional integration with mounting political pressures to assure more exclusionary barriers (Andreas, 2003: 84). To have borders that function as an effective security barrier and as an economic bridge at the same time, states are increasingly adopting and implementing smart borders such as laser visas and biometric technologies (Andreas, 2003: 96). A concern that accompanies the development of smart borders is the growing concern over civil liberties. New technologies and information systems could have profound implications for the privacy protection of citizens (Andreas, 2003: 108). This development is even more emphasized by Amoore (2006). Amoore (2006: 337) argues that the body of persons has become the actual border. Digital technologies and data integration resulted in borders becoming biometric. The body itself is inscribed with multiple encoded borders such as social, legal, gendered and racialized borders. The existence of territorial borders has only become one of the many borders (Amoore, 2006: 337).

### **2.2.2 Changing context and threat perception**

The concept of bordering has changed and adapted to new threats. The first important conceptual change that the concept bordering has been subject to is the shift from the (inter)national perspective to the transnational perspective. Although scholars acknowledge the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as shifting point in border management, President Reagan already introduced an important shift in 1986. By announcing the war on drugs the objective and perspective of border management



changed (Andreas, 2003: 86). The mobilities of persons and trade as part of the globalizing world, accompanied by the technological development, have extended a society and community beyond the scope of territorial borders of the nation state (Franko Aas, 2007: 283). Franko Aas (2007: 283) referred to this shift as a world in motion. The space of flows becomes more important than the space of places. She argues that the nation state has been outrivalled as the main creator of identity and that a society is no longer limited to territorial borders (Castells, 1996). Amoore (2006: 334) also acknowledges the transnationalistic character of contemporary border management. She argues that due to globalization and increasing mobilities, borders inscribed within the body are a key feature in the contemporary war on terror. Governments want to limit the economic liberalization as little as possible but want to keep hostile entities from entering the country (Amoore, 2006: 339). By inscribing multiple borders within the body the territorial national border is becoming the last line of protection. The portable biometric borders are able to check and process transnational flows before they cross the territorial border (Amoore, 2006: 340). While Amoore (2006) and Franko Aas (2007) mainly look at territorial borders as one of losing its significance and not able to entail the contemporary concept of bordering and society, Andreas (2003) still sees a pivotal role for territorial borders as a policing objective to keep CTA's from entering a nation's territory (Andreas, 2003: 108). Andreas (2003) acknowledges the transnationalism of bordering but does not dismiss the significance territorial borders.

A second conceptual change that has been subject to academic debate is the militarization of the borders. Where Franko Aas (2007: 289) speaks of militarization of the external borders of 'fortresses' such as Europa and the United States, Andreas (2003: 84) speaks of demilitarization of border management. Franko Aas (2007: 289) argues that the militarization of the border represents an intrinsic aspect of the globalizing condition. Defending and protecting the border from foreign contaminations is an essential part of the globalizing condition (Franko Aas, 2007: 289). Governance seems to struggle with the challenge to balance 'good' and 'bad' mobilities (Franko Aas, 2007: 292). On the contrary, Andreas (2003: 86) speaks of an increasing demilitarization and economic liberalization of the borders that is accompanied by an increasing policing bordering task (Andreas, 2003: 86). The enemy is no longer a nation state but CTA's have become the main threat to borders.

After the cold war the military function of borders has become much less important (Andreas, 2003: 81). Although Franko Aas (2007) and Andreas (2003) seem to contradict each other they do agree that bordering is becoming criminalized and both acknowledge the increasing role law enforcement has in transnational 'bad' mobilities. Franko Aas (2007: 289) focuses his argument on the external borders of fortresses, while Andreas (2003: 81) argues the internal borders as well. The complementing argument Amoore (2006) argues focuses on the increased turn to scientific and managerial methods to govern the mobility of bodies. Due to the implementation of biometric borders the physical border becomes the last line of defense (Amoore, 2006: 340). A widening sphere of actors is authorized to engage in surveilling and policing. Both Franko Aas' (2007) arguments about militarization and Andreas' (2006) arguments about demilitarization assume the nation states or fortress centered authority. However, Amoore (2006) argues that the biometric borders and increasing managerial and scientific input give the citizens of a nation state the shared authority to engage in surveilling and policing as well. Amoore's (2006) view of the distribution of authority amongst the people is, compared to Franko Aas (2007) and Andreas (2003), unique.

A third conceptual change is the idea of 'outsiders' or 'the other' who try to cross borders. Where in the cold war era the main threat was coming from other nation states, the new threat perception emerged alongside the rise of mobilities and globalization. Mobility has been, inevitably, connected to insecurity and resulting in the 'us' and 'them' division as Franko Aas (2007: 284) called it, or 'our' versus 'their' as Amoore (2006: 348) referred to it. In a globalizing world, with increasing mobilities, a growing fear and perceived threat develops of foreign populations (Franko Aas: 288). Franko Aas (2007: 288) refers to this as the criminology of the other, which was further strengthened by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Migration has become a securitized and criminalized issue (Franko Aas, 2007: 289). The 'us' and 'them' division poses a major challenge to contemporary societies, which is to find a way of doing justice to the outsiders (Franko Aas, 2007: 290). The threat of the so-called deviant immigrant serves as a constant reminder that domestic populations and cultures within nation states are no longer cut off from global disorder (Franko Aas, 2007: 290). The increasing mobilities and growing fear of foreign elements is an interesting paradox produced by globalization. Holding on to the nation-state principle has the ability to

exclude a large group of people, designating them as non-persons in a justice perspective (Franko Aas, 2007: 297).

As outlined there is no general academic consensus on the concept of borders amongst the scholars. There are different views that all contribute to the academic debate. The most dominant similarity is the conceptual change towards transnationalism within border management and the central role of the outsider within border management. On the position of the nation state and demilitarization of borders the scholars have different views. An important challenge posed by all the scholars is the balancing of internal security and economic liberalization of borders. In addition it is interesting to see the relation between globalization, increasing mobilities and the fear of foreign populations and contaminations. However, no in-depth analysis has been provided on this trade-off and balancing act. The conceptual changes provides this research with some interesting perspectives such as the movement towards smart borders, securing a 'fortress' and the filtering function of the border.

### **2.2.3 Cosmopolitan Borders**

Rumford (2007) argues a different view on bordering and the changes it has been through. Roughly two perspectives dominated the discussion about borders in Europe: securitized borders associated with the process of rebordering as Andreas (2003) argue. And a borderless Europe focusing on the single market and its mobilities. The idea of cosmopolitan borders goes beyond these two perspectives. Cosmopolitan borders are characterized by the ability of individuals to cross and re-cross borders which is part of the every day life of many European citizens. Cosmopolitanism implies a proliferation of borders instead of borderlessness. Rumford (2007) argues that cosmopolitan borders make it possible to study the importance of contemporary Europe but also study the relation between space and borders. Understanding cosmopolitan borders is necessary in order to study contemporary Europe (Rumford, 2007: 328). Furthermore, Rumford (2007: 329) argues that the idea of a networked Europe is replacing the traditional idea of a space of places with fixed borders and centers. Towards a space of flows rather than a space of places (Castells, 1996). Europe is not a simple aggregation of nation states but instead a network linked and formed by global flows of persons, goods and services. The idea of polycentricity

contests the spatial hierarchy of center-periphery. This idea of polycentricity and networked Europe together suggest a different role for Europe's borders. While facilitating and regulating new global flows and mobilities, national borders are becoming less important. Europe's borders are increasingly being networked in the sense that they are reconstructed at locations where mobility is most intense, for example at airline check-in desks and Eurostar terminals (Rumford, 2007: 331). This would mean a less significance importance of traditional territorial borders.

However, conflicting views exist. Opponents of Rumford's cosmopolitan, networked view of Europe and its borders emphasize the development of hard external borders as a consequence of the European single market and its increased internal mobilities. These views represent a new idea of fortress Europe, protecting European citizens and the economy against threats from outside of Europe (Rumford, 2007: 331). Schengen could be seen as the Fortress Europe: a model of unrestricted internal mobility accompanied by strong external borders to control the unwanted global flows such as illegal migrants, organized crime and terrorism. Rumford (2007: 331) argues that the security borders are far more rigid than other borders such as economic, telecommunication or educational borders. These borders are actually designed to facilitate mobility while security borders are designed to reduce mobility. Networked Europe and cosmopolitan borders focuses on these mobility-enhancing borders as well (Rumford, 2007: 336).

The second part of the theoretical framework explored the different approaches to contemporary bordering. Globalization and increasing mobilities have moved the border from a national perspective to a transnational perspective. National and territorial borders have become less important. Instead, the space of flows has become important. The mobility flows exceeds national borders. Border management focuses on the places where mobility is most intense such as key infrastructure points. Contemporary borders are characterized by their ability and ambition to distinguish good from bad mobilities in an efficient manner. This filter function for the border is established by increasingly adopting innovative technologies within border management such as biometric borders. While stimulating mobilities, globalization and a borderless area, the external borders of such areas are often strong, more closed borders. The enforcing of the external borders of an area such as Europe also creates a

fear of foreign populations. Thus, globalization has the ability to both create open, borderless areas but at the same time create an inaccessible fortress for others. The filter function of the border also implies a tension between economic and security interests. Open borders are good for economic interests while more closed and secure borders are good for security interests. Bordering is a concept where the trade-off comes to the surface. These findings will be important for the objective of this research. The way the EU manages its own borders also determines how they are managing the economy-security trade-off.

### **3. Methodology**

The main objective of this research is to provide insight into the conflict of economic interests and security interests on the EU policy level. By examining how the EU manages this conflict of interests and the trade-off between these interests, a contribution can be made both to the scientific body of knowledge as well as to the public and political debate. To gain insight into the economy-security trade-off, policies relating to border management will be studied. Border management is a policy area where both economic and security interests occur. In addition to providing insight into this process, this research also aims to make clear which direction the EU policy is going and what possible solution there is to the trade-off. The theoretical framework supports the discourse analysis of the EU policy documents to ultimately draw conclusions on the trade-off and the way forward for the EU.

#### **3.1 Research design**

This research will use a qualitative approach and conduct a case study. A case study design provides an excellent tool to conduct an in-depth analysis or exploration from multiple perspectives on a complex and unique phenomenon or particular project. It is research-based and evidence-led (Simons, 2014: 455). The particular phenomenon being researched in this case would be the trade-off between economic interests and security interests taking place on the EU policy level. While looking from both economic and security perspectives to the trade-off an in-depth exploration of this under-researched process can be made. The economic interests of relevance in this research will be subjects such as trade, mobility, transport, migration and tourism. The security interests this research will focus on are contemporary threats such as

irregular migration, cross-border organized crime and terrorism. These subjects are chosen because of their relation to cross-border activities and border management. Other contemporary threats such as environmental security and cyber security will not fall within the scope of this research. The purpose of using a case study is to portray an in-depth view of the complex process of finding the balance between economic and security interests. A case study is not restricted to a certain time period, method or by resources. This provides the opportunity to research a process of change and explain how and why things happened (Simons, 2014: 455).

However, a case study research also has its limitations and disadvantages. The use of only one particular case for the research is troublesome for those who think that only a large number of cases can constitute a valid research that is able to contribute to policymaking and science in general. The generalization of the outcome of one case study is therefore doubted by many (Simons, 2014: 463). To make it possible to be able to generalize the outcome to some extent, two options can be considered. One could examine and describe the context of the case in detail, which allows comparison with comparable contexts. The second option is to generalize the concept or process to other contexts. These two options make it possible, to some extent, to generalize results and outcomes of a case study (Simons, 2014: 463). This research will describe and examine the context in detail and also aims to provide insight into the economy-security trade-off, which also happens in different contexts, in order to increase the validity of this research. In addition, making assumptions or drawing inferences from a single case is also troublesome when a research is the main source of case selection and data collection. As it is in many other qualitative methodologies, subjectivity is inevitable. The subjectivity of the researcher should be disciplined through procedures that examine the validity and show that the researcher has indeed used multiple perspectives. It should be included in the research how the researcher has taken action to reduce the influence of the researcher's opinion and beliefs as much as possible (Simons, 2014: 464). However, generalization of a case study should not be the main purpose of a case study. It is argued that particularization is more important when conducting a case study. Particularization is the rich portrayal of insights and understandings of interpreted in the particular context. Studying the uniqueness of the case itself is the main reason for the research. The real strength of a case study comes

forward in the in-depth exploration or analysis of a particular complex phenomenon (Simons, 2014: 468). This will also be the aim of this research.

As a part of the case study, a discourse analysis will be conducted on EU policy. The discourse analysis is a key tool for this research. Discourse analysis is used for the study of meaning-making of language and texts. A discourse analysis has the ability to find the trade-off in the policy documents while the trade-off possibly will not be mentioned explicitly. It is important to study, interpret and analyze the language and text used in the documents to find how the different interest groups talk about the trade-off and how they deal with conflicting interests. The interpretative aspect of this study is a disadvantage of using this method. However, because there is a lack of prior research into this specific subject, this research is a good starting point to explore this field. The theoretical framework will provide the key features to look for in the discourse analysis. The reliability and validity of the theoretical framework will therefore also increase validity for the discourse analysis. By providing an extensive description of the process and contextual and historical background, the influence of the opinion of the researcher on the outcome of this research will be limited as much as possible. Every selected EU policy document will be thoroughly analyzed by marking the important and relevant features of every document. The important and relevant features of the texts will be supported by the theoretical framework, which will provide the deductive part of the discourse analysis. Examples of how the discourse analysis was conducted on a policy document can be found in annex 2.

### **3.2 Case selection**

The case selected for the analysis of the economy-security trade-off will be the European Union and in particular the policymakers and executors of European policy: the European Commission. A single market of the European Union is one of the key pillars of the EC. At the same time, they also have a joint approach to tackle transnational terrorism and organized crime. This makes the EC a typical case to research the trade-off between economic interests and security interests. This research does not look at the policy level of the nation state because border security and an internal market are European affairs. Looking at the EU level will therefore be more relevant. While analyzing all policy areas will not be feasible, this research focuses on the border management policy area. This is a policy area that includes both economic

interests and security interests. The economic interests will be limited to trade, tourism, migration, mobility and transport. These economic topics are most relevant when looking at their relation to security and cross-border activities. The security interests will be limited to irregular migration, terrorism and cross-border organized crime. These are the topics that created the concerns and pressure on the management of the internal and external borders of the EU.

This research will limit itself to analyzing documents mainly since 2015. This is a justified timeframe because 2015 is the year where the escalation of the migration crisis and several terrorist attacks produced strain around the Schengen Agreement and further opened the discussion on the abolition of internal borders and the possible reinstating of internal borders. However, some policy documents tend to have a longer history, before 2015, of debates and discussions, which will be researched if deemed relevant for the objective of this research. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Berlin have shown Europe how terrorists benefited from the freedom of movement within Schengen as well. These developments have now made this research necessary and more relevant than ever. The new challenges facing Europe make the EU and its border management policy an interesting case study. While prior research on border security and conflicting interests about border policy exists, especially focused on the USA after 9/11, little research exists on how the EU is managing this conflict of interests. Thereby, the role of borders within Europe is a hot topic in the public and political debate. This research would therefore also contribute to this ongoing debate.

The unit of analysis of this thesis will be the economy-security trade-off within EU policy and specifically limited to border management policy documents of the European Commission. The European Commission consists of multiple departments (Directorate-Generals), which focus on different interests. The EC is an organization of the EU where different interests meet, connect and conflict. Furthermore, the EC has the authority to both create and execute policy. To draw conclusions on the economy-security trade-off within EU policy, documents of different directorates of the EC will be analyzed to see how they try to manage the seemingly conflict of interests between the economy and security. For example, EC documents published by directorates that promote the internal market of the EU on the one hand and



documents of directorates that promote internal security on the other hand. EC documents are a justified unit of observation because these documents and policy outcomes of various DG's are most likely to have been subject to the economy-security trade-off. These documents by different groups, representing different interests are one of the main sources to actually find this possible trade-off. The focus on border management policy is also aimed at identifying and analyzing the trade-off because it is a policy area where different interests come together.

### **3.3 Data collection**

This research is using two ways of data collection. First, scientific articles and academic publications will be used to construct a theoretical framework and to provide a detailed description of the case and the context it is operating in. The study of scientific articles and academic publications resulted in the theoretical framework and the contextual background presented in the previous chapters. This theoretical framework will function as a guideline to explore the context, prior research and will support the main analysis. It will also provide an historical background from which the trade-off has emerged and explore the development of threats and borders. The theoretical framework consists of two parts. The first part provides a contextual and historical background of the economy-security trade-off. The second part of the theoretical framework provides insight into the concept of bordering. Besides studying scientific articles and academic publications, a discourse analysis will be conducted. The discourse analysis will be conducted on EC documents to examine the conflict of economic and security interests within EU policy-making and try to identify the trade-off between these interests. The discourse analysis will be conducted on economic policy documents as well as security policy documents of the EC concerning cross-border activities. This will be the most important part of the research that will actually have to answer the research question and give insight into this process of balancing different interests.

All EC policy documents are easily accessible via the online database of the EU, EUR-Lex. The policy documents that will be used for the discourse analysis are selected on the basis of their characteristics such as year published, key words and leading DG. To find relevant EU documents searches were led by key words such as 'internal market', 'trade', 'transport', 'tourism', 'mobility', 'migration', 'border security',

'internal borders' and 'smart borders'. Furthermore, snowball sampling provided this research with relevant EC documents. Initially selected EC documents referred to other related EC documents, which also provided relevant information. Documents possibly relating to the subject of interest were quickly scanned to see if they were applicable and had added value to the objective of this research. Documents that did not prove to be relevant were consequently not used for the analysis. A next step in the selection process was to only select documents where a specific directorate-general of the EC was the author and was published in 2015 or later. The DG's of interest and relevance were: Migration and Home Affairs (HOME); Internal market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW); Mobility and Transport (MOVE) and Trade (TRADE). These DG's were connected to both economic and security interests and engaged in cross-border activities. However, one document is included in the list that was published by the EC in general and not a specific DG and two documents that were published prior to 2015 are also included. Because of the valuable content of the documents they were included nonetheless. Not including these documents was deemed more harmful to this research than by exception deviate from the selection pre-conditions. The selection process resulted in the list of documents that can be found in annex 1.

### **3.4 Operationalization**

The information provided by the theoretical framework and the insights gained from the discourse analysis both have the function to answer the research question: "To what extent has border management policy been influenced by the economy-security trade-off since 2015?". To find the role and influence of the trade-off in the policy documents, the context descriptions and concepts provided by the theoretical framework are important. These will function as the deductive part of the discourse analysis and provide the analysis with focus points for the systematic analysis of the EC policy documents. The aim of the discourse analysis is to find empirical reflections of these concepts and theories in the EC policy documents. However, the academic language used in the literature differs from the policy language used in the documents of the EC. It is highly unlikely that EC officials will use academic language. Using academic concepts as variables or indicators for the operationalization thus will not be useful. The discourse analysis-method requires a alternative way of operationalizing concepts. In order to be able to use academic

insights for the systematic analysis of the documents, it is necessary to practically translate the academic language to policy language. Key academic concepts have to be put into context and the idea behind a specific concept is more important than the name of the concept. From the academic insights and concepts, expectations and sub-questions will be deduced that will be used for the discourse analysis and ultimately answer the central research question.

The key focus of this research is the conflict between economic and security interests. These conflicting interests are represented by several DG's of the EC. The process that this research analyzes is whether and how the economy-security trade-off has influenced border management policy because of several terrorist attacks in Europe and the migration crisis since 2015. The expectation of this research is that the economy-security trade-off has indeed influenced border management policy. This will mean that security interests will be taken into account within economic policy documents but that the economic interests will be dominant. Likewise, within security policy documents the economic interests will be taken into account but the security interests will be dominant. In addition, it is expected that the DG's will acknowledge relating and conflicting interests by using words and sentences that refer to finding a new balance, doing justice to both interests, maintaining high levels of openness and security and finding smart solutions. To study these expectations, the policy documents will be systematically analyzed by using the following operationalization table.

**Table 1. Operationalization**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>How to analyze this:</b>
<b>1. Explicit mentioning of conflict or act of balancing</b>	Do they explicitly refer to finding a new balance of interests or a conflict of interest? If so, how they do express it?
<b>2. Acknowledgement of conflict or act of balancing</b>	Do they acknowledge a conflict of economic and security interests? If so, how do they introduce this in the document and do they show a preference for their own interest? How do they support their own interest?
<b>3. Solution</b>	What is the solution they pose to do justice to both interests? Do they refer to technological or innovative solutions?
<b>4. Economic / Security dimension</b>	How extensive do they mention both dimensions? Do they only mention it or elaborate extensively about both dimensions of the policy?
<b>5. Context</b>	Do they refer to contextual situations and events such as the migration crisis or terrorist attacks? How do they refer to the age of globalization?

By answering the questions that form the operationalization scheme the analysis will be able to relate the outcome to the formulated expectations that were based on the theoretical framework. The academic insights complemented with contextual and historical descriptions have been 'translated' into questions that should be answerable by looking at policy document were academic language will not be used. Consequently, by answering the questions and comparing them to the expectations it will be possible to answer the central research question of this thesis. The subjectivity of this method cannot be guaranteed because the answering of these questions requires interpretation of EC policy documents. However, by extensively elaborating choices and arguments of certain interpretations it is the aim to increase the validity and reliability of this research.

## **4. Discourse analysis of policy documents**

This part will consist of the discourse analysis of the policy documents of the European Commission. Of every document a short summary and the relevant takeaways will be presented. First the economic policy documents will be studied and second the security policy documents. There will be thoroughly looked at where and how these economic and security interests conflict and how the EC aims to manage this conflict. Special attention will be given to the use of specific words or sentences that could provide this research with valuable information. The discourse analysis of the policy documents will be conducted on the basis of the questions introduced in the operationalization section. First, every document will be thoroughly analyzed. Second, the findings and insights from the discourse analysis will be summed up. And finally the insights from the discourse analysis will be connected to the academic insights and concepts. As argued earlier, this research will only focus on documents published by the Commission because this is a European authority that has the right and function to design and implement policy objectives and where conflicting interests could occur. The economic and security policy documents of the European Commission are being published and written by several Directorate-Generals (DG) of the Commission.

### **4.1 Economic policy documents**

#### **4.1.1 Single Market**

##### **Upgrading the single market**

On October 28th in 2015 the DG GROW presented a roadmap of actions to be taken by the European Commission to upgrade and deepen the European single market. Upgrading the single market is explicitly mentioned as a "top priority". These actions consist mainly of breaking down economic barriers to facilitate the single market and promote cross-border activity, especially amongst small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (DG GROW, 2015a). The single market is presented as one the greatest achievements of the EU. While this document continually centers the facilitation of cross-border trade and operations, a security aspect hereof is not spoken of. There is

not being spoken of any security safeguards to make sure that only desired entities use the economic liberalization to engage in cross-border activities throughout Europe.

### **Single market integration**

In a report on single market integration published by the DG GROW there is constantly spoken of increasing cross-border activities and economic integration within Europe (DG GROW, 2015b). Structural, behavioral and regulatory barriers limit the full potential of the single market. The removal hereof and increasing intra-EU trade are priorities for the EC. Promoting the reallocation of human and capital resources throughout sectors and Member States will bring further growth to the economy (DG GROW, 2015b). **While facilitating cross-border activities and intra-EU trade centers this document, security is not a dimension within this report.**

### **Single market for services**

As a part of the single market integration the EC wants to further strengthen and deepen the single Market of services (DG GROW, 2017a). Companies still face administrative complexity and other barriers when engaging in cross-border activities. Tackling remaining obstacles will result in stronger competition and increased innovation. The objective is to create a single market without borders for services (DG GROW, 2017a). **A security dimension of cross-border activities was not considered in this policy document.**

### **Trade for All**

Boosting the economy of the EU is at the top of the political priorities of the EC. In October 2015 the DG for Trade presented a strategy to facilitate trade to boost the economy: "Trade for All" (DG TRADE, 2015a). Services are becoming an increasing part of intra-EU trade, which increases the cross-border movement of persons, goods and information. Policy of the EU should be aimed at further facilitating the exchange of persons, goods and information across borders and also address those who feel like they are losing out from globalization. While trade policy must facilitate jobs, growth and opportunities, it must also spread European values. It has to be effective and responsible (DG TRADE, 2015a). In the next 10 to 15 years it is expected that 90% of the global economic growth will be generated outside the EU. To also benefit hereof,

stronger links with the centers of global economic growth are necessary. In order to do so, trade agreements have to be established with these centers (DG TRADE, 2015a). They also state that protectionist measures and nation-state oriented trade policy will bring no advantages. When increasingly focusing on cross-border trade and trade with non-EU countries, customs authorities of Member States have to cooperate and share information. Close international cooperation and coordination is necessary to address the risks of global trade while also being consistent with other existing EU policy. The DG calls the need for effective management of customs critical (DG TRADE, 2015a). Furthermore, the EU's ambition for the future global economic integration of the EU should not undermine the EU's broader objectives of protecting people and the planet: "**Any changes of the level of protection can only be upward**" (DG TRADE, 2015a). This document introduces a security dimension of the EU's ambition to increase trade and mobility across borders and connect to global economic growth centers. Although briefly, they do address the risks of global trade and state that no further global economic integration will happen if that would mean a lower level of protection. Although not specifying the risks or what they mean by protection, these statements could address the security dimension. In the document, protection also includes justice, health and safety protection. However, protection could be merely focused on social security or environmental security, it is unclear what exactly falls within the scope of protection within this policy document or if they deliberately used a broad term to address the security dimension. Another interesting statement is that protectionist measures will not bring advantages (DG TRADE, 2015a). Although this is not directly related to security or border management, economic protectionist measures could mean a nation state oriented policy, which will make it harder for mobilities to enter a nation's market or to cross and re-cross borders; this is clearly not the aim of the EC. This could be a response to the changing context of the EU: political pressure on the borderless Schengen area is rising and several Member States have re-introduced contemporary internal borders. The economic interest of this policy document is clear and extensively elaborated. The briefly mentioned security interests are vague and broad. The only indication this DG gives is that the level of protection will not decrease, while leaving protection to be a vague concept. This is an excellent example of acknowledging a relation to security interests but at the same time only represent economic interests. By mentioning the security dimension they do acknowledge that there is a relation

between increasing mobilities and security. However, it is not their ambition to increase the level of security.

### **The aviation sector**

As connectivity is a huge part of the globalizing condition, a thorough strategy for the aviation sector is important. In order to create growth and jobs in the aviation sector, high standards are necessary. This is most evident in the field of safety and security. High standards of safety and security are necessary for people to travel by air. Almost 80% of the stakeholders agreed that security was important for improving the competitiveness of the EU aviation industry (DG MOVE, 2015a). To increase mobility and maintain a high level of security, proposals aim to allocate the security resources to areas where there is a realistic risk and thus facilitating mobility in other areas; security policy has to be risk-based. Technological and innovative security solutions however, also bring benefits to the aviation sector. Security solutions providing few false alarms, good throughput, and good acceptability by travellers and personnel will bring huge benefits (DG MOVE, 2015a). Another step in the aviation strategy is to introduce the one-stop-security concept. The one-stop-security concept would mean that no further security controls are required after a security check had been conducted at the point of origin in the EU. This would also bring huge benefits to passengers, businesses and air transport operators due to greater convenience and speed, operational simplicity and cost savings (DG MOVE, 2015a). This economic policy document has a clear security dimension. **The act of balancing is acknowledged by their ambition to "increase mobility while maintaining a high level of security"** (DG MOVE, 2015a). By stating their ambition, they also express their preference for the economic interest. Maintaining a high level of security implies that it is not the objective of the DG to further increase the level of security; it is the objective to increase mobilities. The technological and innovative security solutions they mention thus have the foremost objective to process border crossings faster and more efficiently. They provide a solution to the act of balancing economic and security interests. Notable is that the ambition to increase security in the aviation sector is aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the aviation industry. Security measures and solutions are aimed at facilitating the fast border crossing of travellers



while being able to counter security threats. The security aspect of the aviation strategy is a mean to boost the aviation economy.

### **Automated mobility**

Another policy objective of the European Commission is to move towards intelligent systems of automated mobility through Europe. Facilitating automated mobility on a European level could open a market worth of dozens of billion euros. The increased use of automated mobility will increase intra-EU trade and mobilities. Furthermore, it will increase road safety, efficient road transport and ensuring competitiveness of the EU market. Automated mobility coordinated on a European level could ensure "mobility for all" (DG MOVE, 2016a). The DG for Mobility and Transport recognizes that a transport system for Europe requires coordination and cooperation across borders. **The aim for future automated mobilities to cross borders is acknowledged, however a border control aspect or any safeguards are not present in the security dimension of this document.** Road safety and cyber security are the focus points for the security concerns of the European Commission. Data protection and cyber security are top priorities to move towards a successful integrated automated mobility system (DG MOVE, 2016a). The possible use of transport and mobility systems by clandestine actors are not considered in this document, while the current transport sector is being faced with illegal trafficking and smuggling.

#### **4.1.2 Addressing shortages on the labor market**

##### **Highly skilled workers**

As Europe faces a major challenge in skill shortages on the labor market, the DG for Migration and Home Affairs aims to facilitate the use of highly skilled workers from non-EU countries. Shortages and mismatches on the labor market have the potential to limit the growth of the economy of the EU. In order to do so, it must be made easier for third-country nationals to access Europe and work in Europe. The EC aims to make it more attractive and easier for highly skilled workers from outside the EU to make use of the free movement provided by the internal market within the Schengen Area (DG HOME, 2016b). This is an interesting objective considering the disagreements on this subject resulted in the initial establishment of the Schengen

Area outside of the legal framework of the European Community<sup>4</sup>. By bringing in highly skilled workers from non-EU countries, the Commission wants to increase intra-EU mobility to benefit the economy and pose a solution to the demand and skill shortage on the labor market, which will increase in the coming years. While this idea was already presented in a directive published in 2007, this document responds to the changing context concerning the economic crisis and increased migratory pressure (DG HOME, 2016b). The recent influx of migrants will not be able to provide the solution for the labor market shortages. However, in light of the changing context, the EC wants to make it easier, also for highly skilled refugees and migrants, to be able to work and contribute to the economy of the EU. The Blue Card, a residence permit for highly skilled workers from outside the EU, currently explicitly excludes refugees. The EC aims to broaden the scope of the Blue Card so highly skilled refugees also are able to apply for the Blue Card (DG HOME, 2016b). Although the right to refuse a migrant for public security reasons is acknowledged, a security dimension of the Blue Card is not present within this document. **While responding to a changing context in the light of the migration crisis, there is not being spoken about border security or safeguards to exclude undesirable entries.** The document aims at making it easier to access Europe and its advantages and thus contributing to the economy. Thereby, the public consultation conducted by the DG was mainly focused on stakeholders such as potential migrants, employers and unions (DG HOME, 2016b). Border security did not played a significant role in the development of attracting more people to the EU. Not including a security dimension in a policy document that aims to further 'open' Europe to third-country nationals to address economic issues within the EU is remarkable. Especially because they refer to the migration crisis, which has caused tension throughout Europe on a public and political level.

### **Mobility and migration**

As a response to the public and political debate across Europe on migration and refugees, the DG for Migration and Home Affairs released a document on this subject and on the opportunities and challenges hereof (DG HOME, 2016c). It aims to

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<sup>4</sup> Oxford Reference (2009), 'Schengen Agreement' retrieved from: <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/10.1093/acref/9780199290543.001.0001/acref-9780199290543-e-1947> (visited on 24-5-2017)

provide the debate with facts on the influence of migrants on the economy of Europe. 57% of the citizens in Europe expressed that immigration from non-EU countries evoked negative feelings and 41% have negative feelings about European citizens crossing EU-borders without checks. According to the DG these negative feelings are caused by the factless debate on this subject. The freedom of movement throughout Europe and third-country nationals are necessary to facilitate the labor and skills shortages and will contribute to the economy of Europe (DG HOME, 2016c). Currently there are 14 million EU residents living in another EU member state and 28 million people live in the EU who were born outside the EU. To ensure further economic growth, these numbers need to increase. While calling for increased mobility and migration, this document also calls for effective border management and a common asylum policy (DG HOME, 2016c). This document is intended to spread positive messages on migration and how it will benefit the EU as a response to the negative feelings of many EU citizens. While not addressing the concerns of the citizens directly, the call for effective border management implies facilitating access to wanted migrants while denying access to unwanted migrants posing a possible threat. However, within this policy document the DG does not elaborate further on their idea of effective border management. **This document includes a security dimension and acknowledges a certain degree of balancing and conflict between economic and security interests, although not explicitly.** On the one hand they highlight the positive economic impact of third-country nationals. On the other hand they call for efficient border management and a common asylum policy. The latter indicates a security dimension. However, they do not elaborate extensively about the security concerns. This document can be considered as a preference of the DG for the economic interests and addresses the negative feelings amongst EU citizens. The document extensively highlights the positive economic impact that migrants could have and why the EU needs migrants while only briefly mentioning border management and an asylum policy. Economic growth is the top priority.

### **Agenda on Migration**

In May 2015, the Commission presented the European Agenda on Migration (DG HOME, 2015a). Similar to the previous document, this document also aims to provide the public and political debate on migration with facts. The European Agenda on Migration provides the policy objectives to deal with the migration crisis. Too many

narratives only focus on certain types of migration and in Europe many concerns exist whether the EU is able to manage the unprecedented influx of migrants. The Agenda is a clear response to the migration crisis (DG HOME, 2015a). This document is the first document that explicitly mentions an act of balancing: **"The EC faces the balancing of upholding international values and commitments, enhancing border security and securing economic prosperity"**. To manage this difficult balancing act, coordinated EU action is necessary. Effective border management and a common asylum policy imply making better use of technology and information systems. Maximizing the use of the existing information systems and adding the Smart Borders Package should facilitate the border crossings for the large majority of 'bona fide' travellers while being able to counter irregular migration (DG HOME, 2015a).

The Agenda on Migration does consider the security dimension of 'non-bona fide' travellers and that border management should be aimed at denying access to these travellers. The Agenda gives insight in how the EC thinks about effective border management: the increased use of information systems to facilitate border crossings for 'bona fide' travellers while being able to counter irregular migration (DG HOME, 2015a). However, the core of this document is to present the potential economic benefits from migration and the way to reach this potential. The aim of the policy proposals and objectives is to maximize the economic benefits from migration for personal and professional grounds while minimizing the risks of irregular migration and security. This document acknowledges an act of balancing different interests and addresses the conflict between them. The solutions the DG poses are the increased use of existing and new technological systems. **Information systems and smart borders have the ability to both increase mobility and deny access to unwanted travellers** (DG HOME, 2015a). In contrast to previous policy documents, this document uses less vague and broad terms when it comes to the security dimension. The security dimension plays a large part in their ambition to convince the public of the EU's ability to manage the migration crisis and securing economic prosperity. They introduce solutions to address the security issue and reap the economic benefits of migration. The security solutions they introduce serve as a mean to make sure that Europe profits from migration.

## **Back to Schengen**

Addressing the security measures taken by several Member States and the debate about internal borders and migration in Europe, the EC published a roadmap 'Back to Schengen' presenting actions to be taken to return to the full functioning of the Schengen Area (DG HOME, 2016a). Schengen is one of the key means through which the internal market can develop and prosper, bringing economic benefits to the citizens of the EU. The reintroduction of internal borders within the Schengen Area limit the economy and proper functioning of Schengen. Restoring Schengen without internal frontiers is of paramount importance for the EU (DG HOME, 2016a).

The Schengen Area brings economic benefits to trade and mobility within the EU. Suspending Schengen and reintroducing structural internal border controls would create major costs and damage to the economy of the EU. The EC has estimated that reinstating internal borders to check the movement of persons would generate immediate costs for the EU economy of €5 to €18 billion each year. The road haulage sector which conceives over €2800 billion in goods, would be hit hard and confronted with €1.7 to €7.5 billion additional costs per year. The extent of the costs varies per region, some sectors and Member States will experience higher costs compared to other Member States (DG HOME, 2016a). In addition to the immediate costs, the EC also considers the costs of time delay. Border controls would generate between €1.3 to €5.2 billion additional costs. Time delay functions as a discourager for cross-border opportunities and could reduce the economic efficiency of some European regions (DG HOME, 2016a). The tourism sector would also be confronted with a total cost of €1.2 billion. If the suspension of Schengen would also mean a suspension of the EU common visa policy, it could even mean additional costs between €10 and €20 billion. Finally, between €0.6 and €5.8 billion administrative costs would have to be paid by each member state's government due to the need for increased staff for border controls (DG HOME, 2016a).

To get back to a full functioning Schengen area, the EC presents several policy objectives. The external border must be enforced and is a shared responsibility of all Member States. The establishment of the European Coast and Border Guard and the Smart Borders Package is part hereof. While temporary internal border controls are allowed in exceptional cases, it is not desirable (DG HOME, 2016a). This document emphasizes the importance of an area without internal borders. To get back to the

functioning of Schengen the EC proposes several security related measures to enforce the external border of the EU. It is interesting to notice that these security-enhancing measures are meant to facilitate the functioning of the Schengen Area and contribute to the economy. Facilitating the economy by increasing security. The main goal is to get back to 'Schengen' and the security measures are a mean to do this. **While certain Member States see the internal borders as necessary security measures, the EC sees them as economic barriers.** This sheds light on the economy-security trade-off and the different interests. Internal borders are in no way a realistic structural option for the EC. By enhancing the external border of Schengen, the internal market without borders can function properly. The conflict of interest is clearly visible. While this document focuses on both the economic and security dimension, it is in favor of abolishing internal borders. By supporting their argument with the economic costs of reintroducing internal borders they strengthen their stance. They do not present research on the effectiveness of internal borders in the fight against terrorism, cross-border crime and the migration crisis.

Overall, the economic policy documents of the EC are largely focusing at maximizing economic benefits by increasing migration, intra-EU trade and mobility. The times they do bring up a security aspect of the policy objective it is, deliberately or not, limited to a few broad or vague words. It is interesting to notice that some economic policies could have severe consequences for border security but the economic policies only briefly mention this, if they mention it all. Furthermore, when a security dimension is included in economic policies, it is functioning as a mean to achieve the objective of facilitating the economy. Upgrading the single market and boosting the European economy are top priorities. When addressing concerns of EU citizens and Member States about migration, the EC focuses on emphasizing the positive effects of migration and the necessity hereof and point at the economic costs of security measures such as internal borders.

## **4.2 Security policy documents**

### **4.2.1 Open and secure in a changing context**

#### **An open and secure Europe**

Europe is facing a changing context, with new threats that require new approaches. While 2015 is considered as the year where this shift is most clearly visible, the EU

published an Agenda in 2014 to keep working on an open and secure Europe. Open, because Europe needs migrants for the economic benefits and to uphold international and European values. Secure, because technological innovations, humanitarian crises around the world, cross-border crime and terrorism are increasingly threatening the free and 'borderless' Europe. **The key objective is to maximize the benefits of migration and trade while also maintaining a high level of security** (DG HOME, 2014). This document is also a response to the rising xenophobia throughout Europe. To address modern security challenges, technical innovations and science must be harnessed. The way forward is to invest in technological innovations that will help to reach the objective (DG HOME, 2014). This could mean that the EC does not see a future where an increase in traditional security providers will be able to maintain a high level of security while also being open for economic reasons. In addition, the Agenda promotes synergies of different policy areas. Migration policy can have important implications for other policy areas such as education, employment, trade and security. While internal security policy also has important implications for policy areas such as trade, mobility, transport, internal market and customs. (DG HOME, 2014). The title of this document immediately captures the challenge Europe faces; the challenge of balancing economic and security interests. As the DG states it is their objective to maximize the benefits of migrations while maintaining a high level of security. Maintaining does not imply increasing, which indicates that the top priority is to maximize the economic impact. To address security challenges and also remain an open community, the DG aims for technological innovations.

### **Enhancing security in a world of mobility**

The challenge of maintaining an open and secure Europe has been put to test in recent years. The pressures of the migration and refugee crisis and the wave of terrorist attacks require a new approach to Europe's border management (DG HOME, 2016d). The free movement of persons within the EU and smooth procedures at the external border result in major economic benefits to the EU economy. At the same time it must enhance the other objectives of border management, such as the security aspects (DG HOME, 2016d). **The answer to this challenge lies in balancing different demands of border management through efficient, secure and comprehensive approaches to different kinds of travellers.** The act of balancing is explicitly mentioned. "Reaping the benefits of increased mobility with the imperative of security" (DG

HOME, 2016d). Reaping the benefits may not decrease the level of security. While security consist of more aspects than border control, gaps in border control means gaps in security. The emergence of foreign fighters and their return have underlined the importance of cross-border threats and border management, including controls on EU citizens (DG HOME, 2016d). While aiming to enhance the objectives, the imperative of security does not imply enhancing but could also mean maintaining the same level. In addition, by pinning the security aspect of border management under "other objectives", it does not indicate that security is the main priority. Although economic interests still seem to be dominant, the security dimension plays a significant role within this document.

### **Agenda on Security**

The European Agenda on Security, published in April 2015, is a follow up to the Open and Secure Europe document. This document presents the security strategy of the EU for the next five years (DG HOME, 2015b). Hence, this is a key document for this analysis setting out its security policy objectives. The way forward regarding security policy consists of closer cooperation between different policy areas and increasing the exchange of information and use of information systems to counter cross-border crime, terrorism and cybercrime (DG HOME, 2015b). The first sentence of the Security Agenda is that **"the European Union aims to ensure that people live in a free, secure and safe area without internal frontiers"**. Interesting to notice is the sentence "without internal frontiers". This immediately implies that physical internal border checks are not a long-term solution for enhancing the internal security of the EU. The freedom of movement is a basic right to European citizens and the EC emphasizes that all security measures must be in full compliance with the fundamental rights (DG HOME, 2015b). The issue of foreign fighters and the returning hereof is not new. However, the scale and flow the EU is currently facing is unprecedented. Furthermore, the social and economic costs from crimes such as human trafficking, smuggling and terrorism are significant. While large part of this Agenda is similar to the former Agenda, it does introduce a new perspective. The aim for a competitive security industry of the EU is introduced. The EU encourages the development of innovative security solutions and wants to remove remaining barriers to the single market to further stimulate the competitiveness of the security industry and also increase the competitiveness of the EU security industry in global export



markets. The introduction of the security industry as an opportunity is a new perspective (DG HOME, 2015b). Another important part of the Security Agenda is the role of Schengen. The EC emphasize the importance hereof and the economic benefits it brings. Every year, European citizens make over 1.25 billion journeys for tourism, business or to visit friends or family without undergoing internal border checks within Schengen (DG HOME, 2015b). However, the EC does also acknowledge that a thorough external border should accompany an abolition of internal borders. In order to enforce the external border, the EC aims at using the full potential of technological information systems. Europe wants to stay open to legitimate travellers while being able to efficiently filter out illegitimate travellers such as irregular migrants and clandestine actors (DG HOME, 2015b). To manage the increasing number of migrants and travellers, an efficient border strategy consisting of state-of-the-art technology is needed. The EC sees the Smart Borders Package as the way forward. **Enhancing border security should go hand in hand with giving access to legitimate travellers.** (DG HOME, 2015b) This implies that giving access to legitimate travellers prevails opposed to denying access to illegitimate travellers.

### **European Maritime Safety Agency**

In light of the changing context in Europe since 2015, due to the migration crisis and several terrorist attacks, the role of coast guard agencies has increased. Especially the Member States bordering to the external border of the EU on the Mediterranean Sea are being faced with the huge influx of migrants coming via boats from North Africa and Turkey. The establishment of a European Maritime Safety Agency aims at increasing cooperation and coordination of over 300 authorities of Member States engaging in coast guarding activities (DG MOVE, 2015b). Improving coordination and cooperation will allow the Maritime Safety Agency to provide national agencies with more efficient and cost effective services. It will create economies of scale, distribute relevant information and data and increase the use of state-of-the-art technological systems. The scope of the European Maritime Safety Agency is broad and will include safety, security, search and rescue, border control, fisheries control, customs control, general law enforcement and environmental protection. The establishment of the EMSA is fully in line with existing EU policy on migration, security and fishery. Furthermore, it is especially in line with policies on transport and mobility (DG MOVE, 2015b). By expressing the EMSA is in line with policies on

transport and mobility it ensures that EMSA's activities will not affect economic activities. Considering the broad scope of the EMSA including economic and security interests this is an interesting aspect. **The EMSA aims to improve the surveillance of the external border without hampering trade, mobility and transport and thus the European economy** (DG MOVE, 2015b). The EMSA, together with the European Coast and Border Guard, is established to support the Member States in the protection of the external sea borders. The act of balancing and conflict of interests is acknowledged by stating that it is their aim to survey the external border but without hampering economic activities. The document presents the action to be taken to enhance the external border in response to the migration crisis. Enhancing the external border seems to be the main objective. However, the condition that it will not hamper economic activities is emphasized often.

### **Temporary internal borders**

As a response to the changing context, Member States have taken measures independently from EU policy. Multiple Member States have re-introduced internal border controls as a response to the changing context and the gaps in the external border. The Member States that re-introduced internal border controls are: Germany, Norway, Sweden, Austria and Denmark (DG HOME, 2017a). These countries do not border the external border of the EU. However, because several parts of the external border were not able to manage the migration flows, the functioning of Schengen without internal borders is put at risk. It is allowed for Member States to temporarily re-introduce internal border controls in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, although this has to be a last resort and only put in place at specific parts of the border. The Commission aims at lifting the internal border controls as soon as possible to get back to a full functioning of the Schengen area. The Commission emphasizes that internal border controls put the functioning of Schengen at risk (DG HOME, 2017a). They recommend the increase use of targeted police checks in border areas. As long as these checks do not have the same effect in practice as border checks it is an appropriate measure. Furthermore, it should be noted that neither border checks nor police checks are able provide full security on their own (DG HOME, 2017a). In order to lift the internal border controls, the EC has taken actions to enforce the external border by establishing a European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The external border today is much better protected and equipped to respond

to a new crisis. They urge Member States to constant balance the impact of internal border controls against the results. **Internal border controls create high economic costs and form an obstacle for the free movement of persons and goods.** The Member States have to weekly report statistics and results on the internal border controls and show their necessity (DG HOME, 2017a).

This document shows that reintroducing internal border controls are not part of the EC's vision to address the problem short-term or long-term; internal border controls are undesirable and limit economic opportunities in Europe. The emphasis of the EC that police and border checks will not be able to provide the desired security on their own could be showing the stance of the EC: they do not believe that internal border controls are an effective measure. The EC wants to get the Schengen area back to its full functioning again and absence of internal border controls is a prerequisite for that (DG HOME, 2017a). While expressing that border controls are not an effective measure to provide full security on their own, Member States do use them as a measure against threats such as smuggling, trafficking, irregular migration and terrorism. This implies that Member States do think that internal border controls are an effective or necessary measure. The conflict of economic and security interests is clearly visible with the issue of internal borders. The EC is convinced that internal border controls will not bring a higher degree of security on their own and emphasize the economic disadvantages. Here it is interesting to notice the "on their own" part. It is highly unlikely that a security measure exists that does provide full security on its own; the same can be said for a strong external border. The EC does not introduce serious security arguments to counter the reintroduction of internal borders or to prove it is not an effective security measure. Again it seems like the security aspect serves as a mean to facilitate the economy. The external border is enhanced to lift the internal borders.

#### **4.2.2 Towards Smart Borders**

##### **Stronger and smarter information systems**

As the EC or DG's of the EC already mentioned multiple times in several policy documents, smart borders are seen as the solution to provide efficient border management. The Smart Border package or the establishment of an Entry/Exit System consists of an integrated information system within all the Member States. It applies

to third-country nationals who travel to the EU. Of every traveller, biometric data will be stored in a database. This should tackle the problem of overstayers in the EU and also could help providing law enforcement with biometric data in case of terrorists or cross-border crime (DG HOME, 2016e). The database will be integrated with existing information systems, which provides law enforcement and border management agencies with complete and reliable information about the travellers. The Entry/Exit System should address border check delays and improve the quality of border checks. The regular border migration is expected to rise to 887 million per year in 2025. To manage these kinds of numbers the traditional thorough physical checks are not sufficient (DG HOME, 2016e).

Currently, the stamping of passports is the only method of registering the entry date of a third-country national. The duration of the stay and to verify if someone is overstaying is dependent on a stamp. A stamp may become unreadable or can easily be falsified. Replacing the manual stamps by an Entry/Exit System will improve the effectiveness and efficiency. Persons who are not permitted to stay in the EU are thus more easily found and removed from EU territory (DG HOME, 2016e). While the scanning of passports and biometric data will be an automated process, border guards can now focus on the 'non-bona fide' travellers more specifically according to the information they receive. The impact on the public service of the border guards will be very positive. Instead of manually stamping every passport, the guards can actually use their human intelligence to focus on the assessment of the traveller. Border guards will have more time focusing on non-bona fide travellers. By storing the biometric data of travellers, identification will be way easier and faster (DG HOME, 2016e). By the absence of systematic biometric registration of border crossings, cross-border crime and terrorism is facilitated. **It is the objective of the EES to improve the management of external borders, prevent irregular immigration and facilitate the management of migration flows by decreasing the average duration of a border check.** The EES will facilitate the identification of unwanted travellers, while making it easier to grant access to legitimate travellers (DG HOME, 2016). The EES is presented by the DG as the solution to properly managing the increasing migration flows while also facilitating security. The EES serves the economic interests by not increasing the processing times of border crossings and thus facilitates mobility. The security interests are served because of the increased available information on

travellers and the border guards who will be able to focus on the assessment of the traveller instead of the manually stamping of passports. By expressing the ability of the EES to identify and deny access to unwanted travellers while making it easier for wanted travellers to enter Europe it implies they have found the balance they were looking for.

### **Impact of an Entry/Exit System**

The EES aims to help Member States to manage the increasing migration flows without necessarily using more border guards and also facilitating mobility within a secure Schengen environment. The importance of the EES was emphasized by the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks. While this is not the primary reason for the establishment, the EES will provide an additional tool for law enforcement in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and irregular migration (DG HOME, 2016f). The absence of systematic registration border checks facilitates crime and terrorism. **As explicitly mentioned, the security concerns around irregular migration and terrorism are not the primary reason for a new system of border management for Europe.** The primary reason, managing an increasing influx of travellers, is aimed at reducing waiting and processing times (DG HOME, 2016f).

There are several problems that the Smart Borders Initiative needs to address. First, the number of border crossings will continue to increase and lead to delays in border checks. The increased waiting time is already causing problems for the Member States. Second, the current manual stamping method is error prone. Third, current border systems cannot systematically register and check overstayers in a reliable manner. And fourth, the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime needs to be further strengthened (DG HOME, 2016f). **"The globalization of criminality follows the globalization of economics"**, this means that facilitating economic mobility cannot happen without also considering the security aspect of the liberalization and globalization of the economy (DG HOME, 2016f). This shows how economic and security interests may interlace and even conflict. Considering this statement it is remarkable that in the economic policy documents the security dimension often was only a minor part of the full document. The scope of the proposal is broad. A lot of different stakeholders are affected. For instance, third-country nationals, carriers, infrastructure operators and tourist agencies are all affected by the longer waiting

times at borders. But also EU citizens and regions close to border checks will be affected. The effective management of the external border is a prerequisite for the free movement of persons within the area, which makes a huge contribution to the EU economy (DG HOME, 2016f). Increasing migration flows could result in longer waiting times at border checks for EU and non-EU citizens. This could result in less thorough checks and thus less security. Without a registration system, law enforcement will be lacking a system that could help to combat cross-border crime and terrorism. **Using biometric border checks do not increase waiting time but do make Schengen more secure** (DG HOME, 2016f). And this is exactly the ambition of the EC. A strong external border is necessary for the internal market of the EU to function. And biometric border checks provide faster checks and more secure borders. Again, this shows how the DG has found the balance they were looking for. Increasing the security of Schengen while also facilitating mobility. Although the DG stated that the security reasons are not the primary reasons for the establishment, it does justify the security interests.

The improved border management should increase efficiency and effectiveness. Effectiveness in border management is facilitating border crossings for legitimate travellers while also denying access to illegitimate travellers. Efficiency in border management is seen as when the increase of border crossings does not imply a similar increase in border guards (DG HOME, 2016f). Interesting to see in the impact assessment was the analysis of using the iris scan. Fixed equipment could conduct the border check using iris scan very fast, 4 seconds. Mobile equipment however, needed up to 20 seconds to do a secure border check. The 4 seconds were considered fast and desirable but the 20 seconds was considered too long. The consideration between border methods is thus depending on seconds. The consideration for the preferred method and policy option involved formula's calculating the seconds every border check would take (DG HOME, 2016f). The decrease in waiting time for third-country nationals has a positive impact on airports, seaports and carriers. Longer waiting times would have negative consequences for the space allocation at airports and for connecting flights. Using the appropriate biometric identifiers will make sure that these negative economic impacts will not become a reality (DG HOME, 2016f). This weighting of options based on seconds shows the conflict between security and

economy interests and the balance they seek. Security is desired, but not if this takes too long.

### **The Smart Borders Package**

The Smart Borders Package was already introduced in 2011. Considering that this Package plays an important role in this research, it is interesting to also look at EU documents prior to the actual establishment of it. In 2011, the EC presented the Smart Borders Initiative and the way forward for European border management (DG HOME, 2011). Enforcing the external border was seen as a prerequisite for the functioning of the Schengen area. **Any measures to manage the external borders must meet the dual objective of enhancing security and facilitating travel.** This dual objective is the balancing act or the trade-off, which forms the central subject of this research. Every year, some 700 million border crossings are made via land, air and sea borders. Third-country nationals, who go through thorough border controls, make up a third of these crossings (DG HOME, 2011). Promoting swift and secure border crossings is a common concern for every Member State. In the future the amount of border crossings will increase, especially at airports. Europol expects a rise in border crossings at airports from 420 million in 2009, to 720 million in 2030. Innovative solutions have to be introduced because Member States cannot exponentially increase the amount of border guards due to budget deficits. In addition, letting all travellers undergo the same thorough border control does not represent an efficient use of border guards (DG HOME, 2011). This document sheds light again on both the economic and security dimension and shows the trade-off and conflict of interests between them.

There are two challenges in particular for efficient border management: how to efficiently monitor travel flow and movements of third-country nationals and how to ensure fast and simple border crossings for the vast majority of the travellers (DG HOME, 2011). The Entry/Exit System is specifically aimed at overstayers because they are the main source of irregular migration within the EU. Longer queues at airports present a poor image to visitors of Europe. Airport operators and airline companies consistently request faster and smoother passenger flows for increasingly shorter connection times. **The introduction of Smart Borders would improve the management of travel flows at the border by reinforcing checks while speeding**

**up border crossings for regular travellers.** This objective can be achieved without a unrealistic increase human resources and without compromising security (DG HOME, 2011). The security aspect of the dual objective to enhance security is now approached as not compromising security, which could also mean maintaining the same level. This is an interesting and contradictory expression. If the objective is enhancing security, not compromising security means that the security objective will not be achieved while the travel flow objective is achieved. This indicates that achieving a smoother and simpler border management is more important than enhancing security.

### **Illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives**

Finally, in addition to the smart borders package which focuses on travellers, the DG for Migration and Home Affairs is also focusing on an EU action plan against the illicit trafficking of firearms, explosives and human smuggling. This document presents an Action Plan against the illicit trafficking of firearms and explosive to and within Europe (DG HOME, 2015c). In the introduction they mention the changing context, which increases the importance of the action plan. Recent terrorist attacks have underlined the fact that terrorist networks acquire weapons and explosives through organized crime networks and black markets. **They aim for a comprehensive approach to support a crackdown on the illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives while also supporting the legal trade hereof and the use of legitimate chemical substances** (DG HOME, 2015c). This explicitly shows the filter function they aim for the border to have and the balancing between security and economic interests. A part of the action plan is to increase cooperation amongst organizations to conduct intelligence-led operations on key enablers. Key enablers include legal business sectors and express delivery companies (DG HOME, 2015c). However, they do not speak about the impact on this sector. Border checks or other checkpoints could result in higher transaction costs or processing times.

### **Human smuggling**

Migrant smugglers are treating migrants as goods. They use the same routes that are being used for the smuggling of other illegal goods such as the illegal trade in firearms and explosives (DG HOME, 2015d). The smuggling business is highly profitable. Although it is a black market and exact numbers are not present, it is



known that from one ship with 360 migrants, 2.5 million euros were earned. The action plan mainly consists of an increased use of available information systems and an increase in the sharing of information to address the root causes of irregular migration (DG HOME, 2015d). An interesting new insight is the handbook on prevention of migrant smuggling meant for truck drivers and operators of vessels presenting codes of conduct. The EC wants to create awareness among these companies and its employees. This can be seen as an attempt of the EC to also include private actors in surveilling activities to extent the reach of control (DG HOME, 2015d).

Overall, the study of the security policy documents has provided this research some interesting insights and perspectives. The emphasis is on efficient border management and to remain open and secure. This implies making use of existing and new information systems and being able to facilitate border crossings for 'bona fide' travellers while being able to filter out 'non-bona fide' travellers. Security measures should enhance mobility at the same time. An important movement of the EC is the adoption and implementation of smart borders. The way forward for the EC is the increased use of technologies involving biometric data. The EC sees no future in physical border controls or a society that is more closed to increase the internal security. It is remarkable that every security measure or security policy document has an extensive economic dimension ensuring that economic activities will not be hampered but rather facilitated.

### **4.3 Main findings**

The analysis of the selected security and economy policy documents published by the DG's of the EC has provided interesting insights and findings. It stands out that every security policy document also has an economic dimension, while not every economic policy document has a security dimension. In this chapter the most important findings will be presented as well as comparisons between the two policy areas. First the most important insights from the economic policy documents will be presented. Second, the most important insights from the security policy documents will be presented. Third, these insights will be used to say something about the trade-off of economic and security interests within the EC.

### **4.3.1 Economic policy**

Out of the ten analyzed economic policy documents, there were 4 documents that did not include a security dimension. The subject of these policy documents all related to cross-border activities and ways to facilitate such activities. The increase of cross-border mobilities was the main objective. They did not refer to illegal cross-border activities and how to make sure that only desired entities engage in cross-border activities. The economic policy documents that did include a security dimension, often limited this dimension to a few vague or broad sentences. In the economic policy documents the references to a security dimension are often expressed by using such broad or vague sentences without further elaborating on them. The security dimension and the balancing or conflict of interests can be deduced from such sentences. When the EC expresses that "the EU's ambition for the future global economic integration of the EU should not undermine the EU's broader objectives of protecting people and the planet", the EC is aware that a conflict of interest could occur (DG TRADE, 2015a). And by having the objective of "increase mobility while maintaining a high level of security" it also implies that there is a risk that increased mobility could lower the level of security (DG MOVE, 2015a). If mobility and security would not have a relation, the DG would not have to mention this dual objective. Often the DG's do not specify what falls within the scope of protection or security. They acknowledge that here is a connection between economic interests and security interests, but do not elaborate on this connection.

In some documents the act of balancing is explicitly mentioned: "The EC faces the balancing of upholding international values and commitments, enhancing border security and securing economic prosperity" (DG HOME, 2015a). In the few documents where they do elaborate more extensive on the security dimension of economic policy, the security dimension is often used as a mean to reach certain economic objectives. For instance, to increase the competitiveness of the aviation industry in Europe, high standards of security and safety are necessary. And to abolish temporary internal borders, which are an economic barrier in the eyes of the EC, enforcing the external border is necessary. The solution of the EC to do justice to both economic and security interests is to increase the use of technological and innovative information systems. The EC does not seem to see a future in an increase of traditional security measures such as increased border guards. Innovative information

systems have the ability to facilitate mobilities while also denying access to unwanted entities. Traditional security forces such as border guards are not preferred by the EC, because they take too much time and are not sufficient to maintain a high level of security with the increasing traveller flows. Especially concerning the internal borders it is not a desirable solution for the EC.

The final insight from the economic policy documents is the way the DG's refer to the context. The context they refer to is often that of a globalizing world. Cross-border activities and mobilities are increasing and it is the task of the EC to facilitate these mobilities and further develop global economic integration. A part of this globalizing world is the migration crisis and the ability of unwanted entities to easily enter Europe. The economic policy mainly focuses on the positive impact of migration for the economy of the EU. Certain policy documents about migration are published to provide the 'factless' debate with facts and figures and address the negative feelings amongst EU citizens. Sometimes they briefly mention the ambition to be able to facilitate access to legitimate travellers while denying access to illegitimate travellers, but the economic impact is dominant. The economic perspective is leading without a in-depth look at the security aspect.

#### **4.3.2 Security policy**

Out of the ten security policy documents, every document has included an economic dimension. The economic dimension of security measures or security policy is elaborated extensively and plays a large part in the justifying of these measures or policy. Often, the economic dimension of security policy is explicitly mentioned and is part of the objective of the policy. This comes forward in their aim to "keep Europe open and secure", "to enhance security" and that "the European Union aims to ensure that people live in a free, secure and safe area without internal frontiers" (DG MOVE, 2014; DG MOVE, 2016d; DG HOME, 2015b). Almost every intention expressed to increase security in Europe is followed by a sentence that safeguards mobility and openness. This seems to indicate that security may not limit economic potential or damage the economy. But the ambition to remain open is a recurring and leading objective when it comes to security policy. A good example where this expresses itself is the enforcement of the external border of the EU. The enforcement of the external border has become a priority on the security agenda to properly manage the

migration crisis and to make sure that internal borders within Europe were no longer needed. To restore Schengen in its full function without internal borders, a strong external border was necessary. Economic motives drive the new security policy. The new security policy that dominated the security dimension of border management policy since 2015 is the establishment of the EES. The implementation hereof is should make the borders of Schengen more secure and facilitate mobility.

In addition to the security measures as part of economic objectives, it is interesting to notice specific words the DG's use to describe their dual objective. When it comes to mobilities, they often use words such as 'enhancing', 'increasing' and 'facilitating'. When it comes to security, 'maintaining' and 'not compromising' occur more often or are being used together, which creates a question whether the ambition is to really increase security or just maintain the same level? The same accounts for the information systems' ability to exclude unwanted travellers. The facilitation of giving access to wanted travellers seems to be more important than the exclusion of unwanted travellers. Facilitating mobility is the key objective to implement the Entry/Exit System.

The context where the security policy documents refer to include more security aspects of the globalizing condition and migration crisis. Irregular migration, terrorist attacks and returning foreign fighters are part of the context the EC is referring to. However, the potential positive economic aspect of migration towards the EU is still the main perspective. The political and public pressure on a Europe without internal borders is acknowledged. But the emphasis is on the positive economic impact and the economic costs it would bring to re-introduce them. Based on economic motives, internal borders are no option for the EC. Comments on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of internal borders to counter the threats of cross-border organized crime or radicalized EU citizens within Schengen are absent. The solution that comes forward in the security policy documents is the establishment of the Entry/Exit System and increased use of other information systems. These systems have the ability to facilitate faster border crossings for wanted travellers and deny access to unwanted travellers. This serves both economic and security interests. It results in faster processing times at the border, more secure borders and guards have the ability to focus on their core human intelligence task instead of manually stamping passports.

### **4.3.3 Identifying the act of balancing**

The comparison of the policy documents of the different interests indicates that the economic dimension of security policy is more important than the security dimension of economic policy. The economic dimension of security policy is more often included in the documents and is elaborated extensively. While the security dimension of economic policy is less present in economic policy and when it is included, it often consists of a few vague or broad sentences. In security policy the conflict of interest is acknowledged in every document. Sometimes explicitly and sometimes it can be deduced from sentences where they express the objective to increase the one while also safeguarding the other. By expressing such dual objectives it indicates that these interests affect each other. Within economic policy the conflict of interest or act of balancing was only acknowledged in four of the ten documents and was, in general, elaborated less extensively.

The security dimension of economic policy often serves as a mean to reach certain economic objectives such as the abolition of internal borders, increased competitiveness and facilitating mobilities. The economic dimension of security policy also consists of economic motives to ensure that certain security measures will not hamper economic activities and preferably facilitate economic activities. It indicates that every security measure that will hamper economic activities in some way will not be accepted. Increased security must also safeguard openness and enhance mobility. The economic and security interests seem to meet each other at the posed solution: stronger and smarter information systems. The establishment of the Entry/Exit System and the increased use of other information systems have the ability to enhance security and facilitate mobility, doing justice to both interests.

Both within security and economic policy documents there is often referred to a changing context. The economic policy refers to the globalizing condition, increased importance of facilitating cross-border mobilities and the migration crisis. The security policy refers to the migration crisis, terrorist attacks and returning foreign fighters. When economic policy refers to the migration crisis they highlight the positive impact of migration for the economy of the EU. While the security policy also addresses the security concerns, the emphasis on the positive economic impact of migration is clearly visible. The security dimension of the migration crisis is not a

significant part of the economic policy. On the other hand, the economic dimension of the migration crisis is a very significant part of the security policy.

#### **4.4 Academic concepts**

The insights from the discourse analysis will now be reconnected to the academic insights in order to contribute to the academic body of knowledge.

##### **4.4.1 Balancing the interests**

The act of balancing economic and security interests and the economy-security trade-off are part of the security economy and the economic impact of security measures has become more and more important (Brück, 2004). The economic impact of security measures plays a major role in the security policy of the EC and the act of balancing economic and security interests is explicitly mentioned. A high level of security must be maintained in order for Europe and Schengen to remain open (DG HOME, 2014). The measures of the EC to establish a European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), European Coast and Border Guard and implementing an Entry/Exit System are meant to enforce the external border. A strong external border allows a full functioning Schengen Area without internal frontier, bringing major economic benefits for the EU economy and its citizens. Another valuable insight is the statement of the EC (DG HOME, 2015b) that "enhancing security should go hand-in-hand with giving access to legitimate travellers", again an indication that the economic impact is determining the outcome of security policy. While on the other hand the security dimension is not that decisive within economic policy.

Security policy may not limit the economic opportunities too much while economic liberalization may not compromise a high level of security. Governments seem to struggle with this act of balancing (Andreas, 2003; Franko Aas, 2007). The real struggle to find a balance has not been found in the documents. Out of the analyzed EC documents it became clear that smart borders and information systems are the future and that an increase in traditional security measures such as internal border checks are undesirable. To find an efficient outcome to this act of balancing, the EC wants to increase the use of information systems. Increasing the use of existing and new information systems provide an efficient tool for border management, able to filter out 'non-bona fide' travellers while facilitating 'bona fide' travellers (DG HOME,

2015a). This is comparable to the filter function Andreas (2003) and Franko Aas (2007) introduced.

#### **4.4.2 The role of globalization**

Brück (2004) introduced the aspect of globalization as both a challenge and an opportunity. The increased openness and interdependence between nations and parts of the world brings prosperity but also makes it vulnerable. Increased mobilities are becoming harder to manage and govern and thereby it becomes harder to exclude unwanted entities posing a threat to public security (Brück, 2004). The EC is being faced with this security challenge but also wants to maximize the economic opportunities stemming from globalization. An intrinsic aspect of the globalizing condition, according to Franko Aas (2007), is defending and protecting the borders from foreign contaminations. This is an interesting insight when studying the border policy of the EC that consists of abolishing internal borders and enforcing external borders. As a consequence of enforcing the external border, the idea of a 'fortress Europe' and a growing fear of the foreign contaminations appears within that fortress. Franko Aas (2007), Amoore (2006) and Andreas (2003) also argued this development: the 'us' and 'them' division, 'our' versus 'their' and an idea of 'outsiders' or 'the other'. This is comparable to the urge of the EC to constantly respond to the public and political debate on migration. By spreading positive messages about migration and warning for xenophobia, the EC wants to counter the growing fear of refugees and migrants or foreign populations and emphasize the positive impact migration could have for the European economy. This also refers to the globalization paradox: a process of tearing down borders and enforcing borders at the same time. The external border of fortress Europe is being enforced, while borders inside the Schengen area are torn down. The EC is thus partly contributing to the 'us' versus 'them' division because of the strong external border to 'protect' the internal market without internal frontiers.

Finally, the security measures are aimed at specific places where the flows are most intense such as known smuggling routes, airports and harbors. This is similar to Rumford's (2007) argument of the border moving to such places instead of fully bordering the territorial borders. A risk-based security policy: security policy to target specific areas or places where the risks are higher (DG MOVE, 2015a). While the

territorial border, especially of southern and eastern European Member States is of high importance, managing airport border crossings are a key objective for migration and mobility policy. This is another example of how the border is moving towards the space of flows instead of space of places (Castells, 1996).

#### **4.4.3 Efficient border management**

An important similarity between the literature and the policy documents is that the EC aims for a filtering function of the border. They want to facilitate border crossings for 'bona-fide' travellers while being able to deny access to 'non-bona-fide' travellers. This is similar to Franko Aas' (2007: 291) broader description of distinguishing 'good' from 'bad' mobilities and Andreas' (2003: 80) 'undesirable' and 'desirable' entries. Governments want to use the global flows for the benefits of their economy while also being able to tackle terrorist activities, cross-border crime and irregular migration. The speed and elusive character of contemporary mobilities create an enormous challenge for governments and the EU. As a response to this challenge governments are moving towards technological solutions for border management such as biometric borders (Andreas, 2003: 96). This development is also clearly visible within the EU policy documents. The way forward for the EC is to increasingly adopt technological innovations that are seen as an effective solution to the filtering challenge of contemporary borders. The Smart Borders Package / EES is the outcome of this development and will continue to grow in the coming years. It provides a solution that is doing justice to both economic interests and security interests.

While the move towards smart borders is in line with the theoretical framework, it is also interesting to notice the role of traditional security measures in policy documents. Where there was consensus amongst scholars (Andreas, 2003; Amoore, 2006; Franko Aas, 2007; Brück, 2004; Stevens, 2004) that biometric borders are the future, there was no consensus about the role of the military and police regarding bordering activities (Franko Aas, 2007; Andreas, 2003). Throughout Europe multiple Member States have temporarily reinstated internal border checks to counter terrorist threats and human trafficking. While the Schengen Borders Code allows Member States to take such actions, the EC wants to get back to a full Schengen Area without internal borders as soon as possible. This is where Andreas' (2003: 80) insights on border policing could apply. He argues that territorial border policing remains to have a



symbolic and perceptual appeal and that it is likely to become an increasingly important state activity, regardless of its effectiveness to actual exclude 'undesirable' entries. The actions of multiple Member States to reinstate internal border checks and also to take traditional security measures on the external border could be therefore be explained for the partly symbolic function and appeal it has. The EC does not see physical border checks as an effective long-term solution, but Member States do feel the urge to take such actions.

An argument that the EC uses is that border checks are not an effective measure for the vast majority of 'bona-fide' travellers. Brück (2004: 181) introduced the dilemma of letting the guilty walk free or putting the innocent to jail and argues that often societies choose to punish the innocent rather than letting the guilty walk free. In the arguments imposed by the EC this dilemma plays an important role. In the researched documents it becomes clear that any security measures cannot be at the cost of mobility of persons and/or goods. This becomes clear by the EC stating that enhancing border security should go hand in hand with giving access to legitimate travellers. Any newly implemented security measures should not only enhance security but also facilitate the mobility of travellers (DG MOVE, 2016d). The travellers can be seen as the innocent in the light of the dilemma as Brück (2004) introduced. It seems that the EC does not choose to punish the innocent although this happens often in societies as Brück (2004) describes. It has to be noted that this does not imply that the EC chooses to let the guilty walk free, but the priority is to give access to legitimate travellers (DG MOVE, 2016d).

Overall, the discourse analysis has provided this research with interesting insights. The analysis of the documents indicates the paramount importance of the economic interest for the EU. The security interests are often inferior to the economic interests. This does not mean that the EC is neglecting the security interests, but a preference and priority of economic interests is present within these documents. The connection of the analysis findings to the academic insights of the theoretical framework serves as a bridge to make a contribution to the body of knowledge on the field of the trade-off. The move towards transnationalistic and smart borders correspond to the academic insights. However, the struggle of governments to balance the interests was not as present in the documents as in the literature. The preference for economic

interests was dominant. Finally, the perspective of the security industry as an economic opportunity is also an interesting insight.

## **5. Conclusion & discussion**

This research aimed to study the influence of an economy-security trade-off within EU border management policy. Because of the migration crisis and recent terrorist attacks since 2015, it is expected that the tension between economic and security interests has increased and that the trade-off between these interests has influenced border management policy. The first part of this research provided the academic insights and contextual details that were used to formulate the expectations for the outcome of this research. The expectation of this research was that the economy-security trade-off has influenced border management policy. Within economic policy there will be attention given to the security dimension hereof and within security policy there will be an economic dimension. It was also expected that the DG's would explicitly refer to the act of balancing or conflict of interests. And finally, it was expected that the solution to the trade-off was the implementation of smart borders and innovative technologies to do justice to both interests. To study the trade-off, economic and security policy documents relating to border management were subjected to a discourse analysis. The objective of this research was to answer the central research question: "To what extent has the economy-security trade-off influenced EU border management policy since 2015?".

The outcome of the discourse analysis is that the relation between economic and security interests is indeed emphasized often within the policy documents. However, the security dimension of economic policy is not comparable to the economic dimension of security policy. While acknowledging an act of balancing interests, the economic interests prevail. The security dimension of economic policy is limited. It consists of ensuring not to compromise security and uses security as a tool to boost economic activities. The economic dimension of security measures is extensive and the economic impact hereof is imperative. The security measures have to facilitate mobility. The security measures taken by the EC from 2015 until now are mainly serving economic motives. Security measures that conflicted with economic interests, such as the reintroduction of internal borders by certain Member States, are

undesirable because of their damage to the economy. The EC is constantly aiming to maximize economic benefits while not compromising security. However increasing security and maintaining the economic level is absent in the EC policy. Maximizing and increasing economic possibilities and maintaining a high level of security are the recurring ambitions, indicating a preference for economic interests. Despite the references the EC makes to the changing context including the migration crisis, terrorist attacks and returning foreign fighters. The absence of a strategy to counter radicalized EU citizens or cross-border crime that already happens within the Schengen area is also remarkable. Both interests meet at innovative technologies as the solution. Smart borders and information systems have the ability to facilitate access for legitimate travellers while denying access to illegitimate travellers. In addition, the demand for innovative security solutions is seen as an economic opportunity for the security industry. In respect to the expectations prior to the discourse analysis it turns out that the trade-off is not a both-way trade-off. Security interests rarely limit the economic policy while economic interests always limit security policy. The expectations that the act of balancing or conflict of interests is acknowledged and that innovative technological solutions are the future do correspond with the documents.

This research is limited to policy documents published by the EC between 2015 and 2017. There exist many other European institutions that are affiliated with either economic or security interests. Therefore it is not right to generalize the outcome of this research for the entire EU. However, considering the fact that the EC is the only institution that has the right to both design and execute EU policy it does contribute to the body of knowledge on the economy-security trade-off, which remains an under-researched subject. Also, the discourse analysis-method has the risk of easily becoming subjective because of the interpretative character of the method. By basing the expectations of this research on academic literature and extensively arguing why certain conclusions were made, the validity and reliability of this research is strengthened.

Further research could choose to focus on other European institutions to broaden the scope. While the EC is an institution that represents many interests, it remains the same institution. Studying different institutions might result in to a bigger conflict of

interests. Because both the economic and security dimension conflict the most around the issue of internal borders, it would be interesting to further demarcate the research to solely the internal borders issue. Study the conflict between the stance of the EC and the stance of a Member State that re-introduced internal borders could also shed light on the trade-off and the different economic and security perspectives. For instance, the analyzed documents lacked a clear part about the effectiveness of internal borders because the EC is against them. The field of the economy-security trade-off within Europe is an under-researched subject. Overall, this research gives more insight to this process and encourages further research on this field of interest.

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## Annex

### Annex 1. List of specific documents

Directorate-General	Date	Subject	Reference ID
DG GROW	28-10-2015	Report: Single Market Integration and Competitiveness in the EU and its Member States	SWD (2015) 203
DG GROW	28-10-2015	Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and business	COM (2015) 550
DG HOME	7-6-2016	Entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment (Blue Card)	SWD (2016) 193
DG HOME	21-1-2016	Mobility and Migration in the EU: Opportunities and challenges	-
DG HOME	7-6-2016	Impact Assessment of the Blue Card	SWD (2016) 193
DG TRADE	14-10-2015	Trade for All	COM (2015) 497
DG MOVE	13-5-2015	A European Agenda on Migration	COM (2015) 240
DG MOVE	30-11-2016	Cooperated, connected and automated mobility	COM (2016) 766
DG HOME	15-12-2015	Establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency	COM (2015) 667

DG HOME	6-4-2016	Annexes & Impact Assessment of the Entry/Exit System	SWD (2016) 115
DG HOME	2-12-2015	Action plan against illicit trafficking and use of firearms and explosives	COM (2015) 624
DG HOME	11-3-2014	An Open and Secure Europe	COM (2014) 154
DG HOME	6-4-2016	Establishing an Entry/Exit System	COM (2016) 194
DG HOME	25-10-2011	Smart Borders - options and the way ahead	COM (2011) 680
DG HOME	6-4-2016	Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security	COM (2016) 205
DG HOME	25-1-2017	Temporary Internal Border Controls	COM (2017) 40
DG HOME	27-5-2015	Action plan against migrant smuggling	COM (2015) 285
DG HOME	28-4-2015	The European Agenda on Security	COM (2015) 185
EC	14-9-2016	Enhancing security in a world of mobility	COM (2016) 602
DG HOME	4-3-2016	Back to Schengen - A Roadmap	COM (2016) 120
DG MOVE	7-12-2015	An Aviation Strategy for Europe	SWD (2015) 261
DG GROW	10-1-2017	Services e-Card	COM (2016) 824

## Annex 2. Examples of analyzing policy documents

Europe should continue to be a safe haven for those fleeing persecution as well as an attractive destination for the talent and entrepreneurship of students, researchers and workers. Upholding our international commitments and values while securing our borders and at the same time creating the right conditions for Europe's economic prosperity and societal cohesion is a difficult balancing act that requires coordinated action at the European level.

This calls for a set of core measures and a consistent and clear common policy. We need to restore confidence in our ability to bring together European and national efforts to address migration, to meet our international and ethical obligations and to work together in an effective way, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility. No Member State can effectively address migration alone. It is clear that we need a new, more European approach. This requires using all policies and tools at our disposal – combining internal and external policies to best effect. All actors: Member States, EU institutions, International Organisations, civil society, local authorities and third countries need to work together to make a common European migration policy a reality.

1. Explicit mentioning

The EU has an established policy to help Member States build up sound and consistent external borders. The Internal Security Fund already provides over €2.7 billion to Member States for the period from 2014-2020. But while rules on border control are in place, border management today varies, based on a patchwork of sectorial documents and instruments. In 2016, the Commission will consolidate this into a Union standard for border management to cover all aspects of the Union's external border management.

Managing our borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe's capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the "Smart Borders" initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of 'bona fide' third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality. Following initial discussions on the first proposal and to take into account concerns raised by the co-legislators the Commission intends to present a revised proposal on Smart Borders by the beginning of 2016.<sup>27</sup>

The development of high standards inside the EU will also make it easier for Europe to support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders. Initiatives in key African and neighbourhood countries could be supported by Frontex as well

5. Context  
4. Security dimension

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3. Solution (smart borders)  
4. Security dimension  
2. Acknowledging interlacing interests

The EU is also facing a series of long-term economic and demographic challenges. Its population is ageing, while its economy is increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs. Furthermore, without migration the EU's working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy.

This is why, even if the case for legal migration will always be difficult at a time of high unemployment and social change, it is important to have in place a clear and rigorous common system, which reflects the EU interest, including by maintaining Europe as an attractive destination for migrants<sup>38</sup>.

### *Well managed regular migration and visa policy*

Decisions on the volume of admissions of third country nationals coming to seek work will remain the exclusive competence of Member States. But there is a specific role for the EU. Over the next seven years, European programmes such as Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ will attract talented individuals to the EU. The Directive on Students and Researchers, now under negotiation by the co-legislators, aims to give these groups new mobility and job-seeking opportunities. The swift adoption of the legislation would allow these strategically important groups to see the EU as a welcoming environment for their work.<sup>39</sup>

4. Economic dimension. Highlighting positive economic impact