The continuation of the South Sudan civil war

The complex contribution of its underlying factors

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction

The current civil war in South Sudan is causing one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises. Prevailing insecurity is posed by armed militias and has caused over four million people to flee from their homes. The lack of law and order combined with economic distress is resulting in civilians and humanitarian workers being targeted by soldiers from both government and opposition forces (UNSC, 2018, p. 5). This thesis will focus on this civil war in South Sudan and on the factors contributing to its continuation. By doing so, it is aimed to get an in-depth understanding of the South Sudan civil war and the underlying reasons for the continuation of the conflict. The greed and grievance theory by Collier & Hoeffler (2004), and its following debate, will be used to identify five factors. This theory, and the debate following its publication, create a lens through which this thesis analyzes the current security situation in South Sudan.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze how these different factors contribute to the continuation of the civil war. In other words, it is aimed to gain an in-depth understanding of the contribution which the factors make to the duration of the conflict in South Sudan. Consequently, the central question in this thesis is:

How do the different factors, identified through the greed and grievance debate, contribute to the continuation of the South Sudan civil war since 2013?

The South Sudan civil war started two years after the world's youngest country seceded from its former northern part Sudan. Since its start in 2013, the situation has developed into a humanitarian crisis in East Africa. The country's twelve million population is scattered: over four million people are displaced of which an estimated 2.4 million refugees having sought refuge in neighboring countries (WFP, 2018, p. 1). The country is heavily dependent on humanitarian aid as 5.3 million people face severe food insecurity (USAID, 2018). Despite regional and international efforts to restore peace and stability in the country, the situation has further deteriorated. The conflict has evolved from a political power struggle into a full-fledged civil war. Starting as a single conflict between the President and the First Vice President, the war has spread into a series of intra-communal conflicts, reigniting and encompassing historical localized conflicts and contests over land, resources and power. With over forty

armed groups fueling the conflict, the South Sudan civil war is continuing and peace far from obtained (UNGA, 2018, pp. 4-5).

Despite the devastating impact, civil wars, such as in South Sudan, are not a common subject in Western media and therefore in its societies. However, the academic field does pay extensive attention towards this concept. The interdisciplinary studies of conflict and security studies, among others, play a significant role in these efforts. Conflict studies use an interdisciplinary approach in which social studies are combined to look at the process and outcome of civil wars. Security studies focus from an international relations angle on the impact of the civil war on the security level of the affected country. These efforts are legitimate as the number of civil wars have been steadily, almost linearly, increasing since the Second World War (Fearon, 2004, p. 275). This thesis aims to contribute to both fields as it analyzes the role of several factors in their contribution to the ongoing instability and violence in the South Sudan civil war. Therefore, it addresses both the impact of the civil war and its continuation. It does so by posing the central research question: how do the different factors, identified through the greed and grievance debate, contribute to the continuation of the South Sudan civil war since 2013? This question will be answered in the final part of this thesis.

To be able to do so, it is needed to gain a general understanding of the current situation in South Sudan. This will be addressed in the next chapter in which both its civil war and the years leading up to it will be elaborated on. In doing so, this thesis does not aim to give an extensive and detailed picture of the conflict. Neither is it an attempt to validate the legitimacy of actions by both sides in the civil war. Terms like opposition versus government, or rebels versus the army, are meant as objective and do not hold any political preference. Once this background information is shared, Chapter 3 will address the theoretical lens through which the civil war will be analyzed. This entails a closer look at the concept of civil war, the greed and grievance theory, and the remarks made by other scholars on the theory. After that, Chapter 4 will reveal the research design which has been chosen to gather information to answer the research question.

These four chapters are the general framework on which the analytical chapters (5-9) and the conclusion are build. Each of these analytical chapters will address one of the factors as identified through the greed and grievance debate. Chapter 5 will give an analytical perspective on the capability of the government of South Sudan to address its current situation. This chapter

will give insight in the geographic and demographic picture of the country as well as the government's ability to impose law and order. Chapter 6 will focus on the opposition by looking at the economic environment of South Sudan and how this favors rebellion. The seventh chapter addresses the influence of ethnicity in South Sudan by looking at the ethnic diversity in the country and the prevalence of tribal violence. Chapter 8 will give insight in the role of the oil sector on the civil war in South Sudan. How does the oil sector contribute to the continuation of the current civil war in South Sudan? The last analytical chapter, before the general research question will be answered, will give an outlook of displacement in South Sudan and how that affects the ongoing civil war. More specifically, this chapter will look at the financial and political contribution which is made by South Sudanese nationals residing on foreign soil: the diaspora of South Sudan.

Chapter 2 – South Sudan in civil war

The civil war in South Sudan started in December 2013 and has entered its fifth year at the time of writing in 2018. The conflict is regarded to be in a stalemate, with the South Sudanese government army facing opposition militias *"scattered over a vast, inaccessible territory inhabited by people hostile to the government"* (Rolandsen, Glomnes, Manoeli, & Nicolaisen, 2015, pp. 89-92). After the secession from Sudan in 2011, the world's youngest state experienced two years of relative peace[1]. However, when violence broke out in Juba – the capital of South Sudan – in December 2013, the East African country was subjected once again to circumstances of civil war all too familiar to many generations of the population in South Sudan.

Background of the civil wars in South Sudan

Familiar, as the current civil war in South Sudan is not the first conflict that the country has experienced in the past decades. Although the current civil war is perceived as the first conflict in South Sudan as a separate nation, it has been subjected to Africa's longest civil war ever as former part of Sudan. This conflict finds its origin even before Sudan gained independence from its colonial rulers; Egypt and the United Kingdom, in 1955. Since then, the south of Sudan has experienced two civil wars, with the current civil war since 2013 being its third. The gaps between these wars have been filled with ongoing instability and remaining tensions between local communities and different armed militias. It is therefore a simplified, but comprehensible view to regard the entire period as one civil war. Looking at this broader picture, it becomes apparent that entire generations of South Sudanese have lived through decennia of violent conflict and have hardly known peace (Johnson, 2012, p. 207).

It is relevant to keep this in mind while looking at the current civil war in the country. Just as the South Sudanese are reminded of this everyday by, for instance, the political ruling party: the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The military branch of the SPLM is the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which finds its roots in 1983 at the start of the second civil war. Although it is currently headed by Salva Kiir Mayardit (the current President of

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[1] Although the border region with Sudan remained subjected to armed skirmishes and even a brief border war in April 2012. Besides, South Sudan's secession left several issues wide open between the two Sudan's. Therefore, underlying tensions remain between the two countries until this date of writing.

South Sudan), the former rebel army was founded by Dr. John Garang de Mabior whose statue in the city center of Juba still reminds the South Sudanese of his ability to unite the ethnically divided south against their 'second colonial rulers': Sudan. Although it is simplified to state that the second civil war was a war between a Christian and African south against the Muslim and Arab north, this statement does give an impression of the differences between the two countries. However, the conflict was caused by a broader resistance against the oppression by the north as the south felt colonized by its northern part (Johnson, 2012, p. 207). During these years of resistance, many of South Sudan's current elite, both government and opposition, fought side a side under John Garang[2].

In 2005, the second civil war came to an end and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the southern rebel forces and the central government in Khartoum. The CPA was heralded as the last and best chance for unity between the north and the south – as Garang's goal was not secession but equal rights for the north and the south. However, the 'founding father of South Sudan' was killed in a helicopter crash just eight months later, which caused his second in command Salva Kiir Mayardit to take over his position as President of South Sudan. As Salva Kiir favored independence, the CPA did not become a way towards unity, but was, instead, a stepping stone for the secession of South Sudan (Waal, 2014, p. 353).

From 2006 until 2011, President Salva Kiir proved able to obtain his goal of secession. Although he is perceived as inscrutable, somewhat aloof and portrayed as lacking visionary leadership and the capability to lead the nation, he has used the foundation laid down by the former rulers of the country through which he has remained President until this date (Rolandsen, 2015, p. 168). The President has effectively copied the neopatrimonial governance system of Sudan with a political office used primarily for personal and factional advantage. This design of political office is prevalent in Africa, but the South Sudanese version has particular features:

First of all, the system is kleptocratic (Waal, 2014, p. 348). This entails that national leaders use every opportunity to steal public funds for self-enrichment or as means to enhance loyalty

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[2] The current President, Salva Kiir, of South Sudan was the right hand – head of military intelligence – of John Garang from 1983 until 2005. Riek Machar, the former First Vice President and now leader of the main armed opposition group in the country, joined Garang in the 1980s. However, he also fought against him from 1991 until 2002 and has rejoined Garang's forces as third in command after reconciliation in 2002.

among their supporters. Research has shown, for instance, that humanitarian funds have been sold on the black market by the political elite of South Sudan (Foltyn, 2017). Secondly, the system is militarized (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 12). Members of the elite derive their power from their ability to use force, or the threat of it, as an instrument of bargaining. It is argued that the political elite in South Sudan have obtained their position because of their capability as 'warlords' (Interview II). This kind of leadership and those loyal to it, is heavily influenced by the ethnic diversity in South Sudan. Alignments are often based on the origin of the leader: his tribal background. A third characteristic is the fact that governance transactions are highly monetized. The ability to rule is heavily dependent on the financial ability of the government as state funds are used to 'increase loyalty'. A lack of cash flow will, therefore, lead to shifting loyalties (Waal, 2014, p. 349). This links with the fourth characteristic: the South Sudanese neopatrimonial system is a dynamic and turbulent system (AU, 2014, p. 59). Alliances are not stable but are a constant subject to renegotiation as a neopatrimonial system builds on social hierarchy rather than a formal political system. In such systems, state resources are used to 'buy loyalty' and in the case of South Sudan 'buy peace' (Interview I; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 15). According to De Waal (2014, p. 349) the members of the South Sudanese elite have therefore created a governing system that is even less regulated and no less brutal than its northern counterpart.

Exemplary of this system are the actions of President Kiir in the years leading up to the secession of South Sudan in 2011. In order to prevent other militias, besides the SPLA, to rejoin the cause of a unified Sudan, monthly payments of the militias were more than doubled. This in order to include them into the national army. Therefore, the ranks of the former rebel group increased from 40.000 soldiers towards 240.000, plus another 90.000 security officials. Also, a minimum of 40.000 'ghost soldiers' existed within the ranks whose salaries were pickpocketed by their commanders (Waal, 2014, p. 355).

Scholars agree that this system, together with civil war legacies, the general militarization of the South Sudanese society and the country's weak governance structure, has contributed to the start of its civil war in 2013 (De Waal, 2014; Johnson, 2012; Rolandsen, 2015; Rolandsen, Glomnes, Manoeli & Nicolaisen, 2015).

The current civil war in South Sudan

The South Sudan civil war commenced on 16 December 2013 after nine months of internal conflict within the ruling political party: the SPLM. As the young nation had experienced some challenges, several high officials announced their willingness to oppose President Kiir in the upcoming elections of 2015. One of them was the then First Vice President, Riek Machar. However, as the President proved reluctant to share power, a purge within the SPLM took place. Tensions rose in Juba during these nine months as the President extended his power and sidelined his opponents. On December 16, when the high ranking SPLM officials were in a meeting with President Salva Kiir in the Presidential Palace, fighting broke out in the city center between the SPLA forces loyal to the President – from the Dinka tribe – and those loyal to the First Vice President – a Nuer. Due to these ethnic alliances, Juba faced the deliberate targeting of the Nuer population in the city as Machar and his forces fled towards the north of the country, towards Unity state – Machar's home base (Johnson, 2014, pp. 300-302).

In the months following December 2013, armed clashes between the SPLA, loyal to the President, and the SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), loyal to the former First Vice President occurred. As Riek Machar had led earlier splits in the SPLA between 1991 and 2002, other officials and militia commanders loyal to him joined his battle against President Kiir. This led to the situation in which the SPLA-IO controlled three of the ten states of South Sudan and was able to march on Juba. However, President Kiir kept control over the capital and the central government apparatus as Uganda sent its forces to defend the capital (Interview III; Rolandsen, Glomnes, Manoeli, & Nicolaisen, 2015, p. 88). With a government apparatus unable to govern large parts of the country and an opposition unable to obtain control over the capital, the conflict slipped into a stalemate. The continuation of clashes between the opposition and government forces led to an increased insecurity throughout the country, which caused massive displacement among its population – already in December 2014, 1.4 million South Sudanese were driven from their homes (UNHCR, 2015).

As the fighting continued, efforts were made by the international community to resolve the conflict. This led to the establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity in 2015 in which Riek Machar briefly returned to the capital as First Vice President. The idea was for the two main parties to share power in a temporary government, until the country was stable enough to hold general elections. However, as the tensions between the SPLA and the SPLA-

IO were still high, the presence of both forces in South Sudan's capital led to a renewal of the conflict. In July 2016, a similar clash as at the start of the conflict occurred within Juba between armed forces. This time, Machar and his men were forced to not only flee Juba but to flee the country and travelled through the Equatorian region towards the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west. Hunted by the SPLA, Machar, needing medical treatment, eventually travelled towards South Africa. However, Machar was placed under house arrest there in Pretoria in October 2016. Instead of a safe haven, due to international pressure South Africa became Machar's prison until this day of writing in 2018 (Young, 2017, p. 11).

Despite Machar's confinement, the civil war continues. Although Machar is limited in his ability to lead the armed opposition, the SPLA-IO remains active. The general armed opposition, however, has fragmented due to lack of central leadership, communication issues and Machar's inability to provide the forces with military logistics (p. 27).

As mentioned before, the civil war in South Sudan is regarded to be in a stalemate. With multiple armed groups scattered over the country and the government unable to control its territory, the country is subjected to *"widespread insecurity, an unmatched humanitarian tragedy, and a heightening economic distress"* as a South Sudanese research institute states it in a weekly review of the situation in the country (Mayai, Jok, & Tiitmamer, 2018). The international community is facilitating peace talks in order to reach agreements on a ceasefire, sharing of power and increased security for the South Sudanese population. These efforts so far have not resulted in any significant agreements between the different parties. In the meantime, clashes between the different armed groups occur on a regular basis throughout the country. As the government is not able to maintain law and order, crime rates are high and tensions between local communities spiral up easily. These tensions are often the result of issues over cattle-related affairs. As the rural areas of South Sudan are still based on traditional ways of living, clashes over grazing lands and the raiding of cattle between local communities are prevalent. Due to the militarization of its society and the lack of governmental enforcement of law and order, these clashes sometimes lead to dozens of casualties (IOL, 2018). As the civil war in South Sudan continues, insecurity prevails and causes hardship for its population.

Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework

In order to address the central research question properly – *How do the different factors, identified through the greed and grievance debate, contribute to the continuation of the South Sudan civil war since 2013?* – it is required to elaborate on the different elements in the question. As the unit of analysis – the current civil war in South Sudan – has been presented in the previous chapter, this chapter will elaborate on the theoretical framework through which this question will be answered. Therefore, the concept of civil war will be described. Besides, the unit of observation will be introduced, being the different applicable variables found significant by Collier & Hoeffler (2004) which have been shaped through the following debate. As their model, the so-called CH-model, was presented in 2004, the academic debate – referred to as the *greed and grievance debate* – needs to be presented as well. It is by this combination of the original article and the remarks made in the years thereafter, that the variables which will be used as a lens to look at the current civil war in South Sudan have been constructed.

Civil war

Generally, a distinction in types of war is made between *inter-state war* and *intra-state war*. In which the former entails a battle between two or more state members of the inter-state system, resulting in at least 1.000 battle deaths per year. This type is often referred as 'conventional' warfare of which the Second World War is a clear example. The latter is divided in two sub-categories: *civil war* and *extra-systemic war* (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003, pp. 58-59). Both types of war place the conflict within the boundaries of a state between an insurgent group and the regime of the state. The criterion is not a minimum, but an annual average of 1.000 deaths by battle (Gersovitz & Kriger, 2013, p. 163). However, in an extra-systemic war, the insurgent group is not part of the state in which boundaries the fight is taking place (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003, p. 59).

Ever since 1945, the number of civil wars has almost linearly increased (Fearon, 2004, p. 275). This has caused intra-state conflict to be the new standard type of conflict in the world with sixteen countries experiencing civil wars over the past fifteen years (Walter, 2017, p. 470). Besides, the average civil war lasts over six times longer than the average international war (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004, p. 253).

Research on the topic of civil war is often aimed at gaining a better understanding of the underlying reasons of the outbreak and continuation of conflicts. This, in order to predict its outcome or to be able to take precautionary measures. Within this academic field, civil wars are approached from different sides. Some scholars address the issue of civil war onset, the start of a civil war. Others look at factors contributing to its duration and timespan. Also, efforts are made to look at ways to predict the appearance of a future civil war. Although it is relevant to keep these distinctions in mind while reading these academic works, it does not pose an existential issue to this research. As the factors in different stages of a civil war, have much similarity (Bleaney & Dimico, 2011, p. 145).

General: greed and grievance

In the research conducted on the concept of civil war, one of the ongoing debates has been that of greed and grievance. Even before Collier & Hoeffler published their seminal article on greed and grievance in 2004, the debate about factors influencing civil war was ongoing. The concept of grievance presents a wider range of arguments in which civil war is considered a socially constructed concept. In 1970, Ted Gurr's book *Why Men Rebel*, presented the theory of *relative deprivation*, which can be regarded as the foundation of this grievance-oriented way of thinking (Saxton, 2005, p. 4). The theory states that people who feel deprived will take action for social change in order to acquire something that they feel they deserve (p. 10). An example of such behavior would be a politically oppressed minority taking up arms against the regime in order to gain a voice over the country's allocation of resources (pp. 17-18). Grievance, therefore, focusses on social, psychologic and ideologic factors in their impact on civil war.

This perception, however, was challenged in the 1980s when the rationalist perspective on human behavior gained ground (Green, 2002, p. 2). This perspective is essentially what is connecting the arguments on the greed side of the debate: individuals base their behavior on the balance between costs and benefits in its outcome. In other words, a civil war is caused by the calculation of a rebel leader if the rebellion will benefit him more than it will cost him. Therefore, the greed side of the debate perceives civil war as a man-made situation in which personal greed is the trigger.

Theory: greed and grievance

Collier and Hoeffler joined the debate in 2004 when they developed an econometric model through which they aimed to predict the outbreak of civil war. Besides, they claimed to be able to measure the impact of different variables (p. 563). However, it was not the CH-model in itself that shook the academic world, but rather the conclusions draught from their research. Through quantitative analysis, they found variables almost exclusively linked with the greed argument to be of significant impact towards the prediction of civil war onset. Therefore, they discarded the widely accepted influence of the grievance variables (p. 588).

Although their claims were, and still are, controversial and started a fierce debate, the findings of Collier and Hoeffler pose a viable lens through which conflict can be analyzed. They carefully constructed different variables which can be regarded as underlying factors of civil war. Therefore, these different variables will be used as a framework to look at the civil war in South Sudan. However, their findings merely provide a starting point in this thesis. This has two reasons. First of all, Collier and Hoeffler's approach was econometric and therefore quantitative and unable to nuance findings and place them in their complex context. And, second, as their article stems from 2004, it is relevant to shape the different variables which were found significant through further academic research that has been conducted. By doing so, the greed and grievance theory, together with their criticasters, creates a useful framework through which the continuation of the South Sudan civil war can be analyzed.

Collier and Hoeffler divided their variables under the broader concepts of greed and grievance. In order to be able to measure them, multiple variables and underlying indicators were established as is revealed in the table on the next page. In this table, the underlying assumptions of these variables are presented as well. The concept of greed is divided in two broader topics. The first one is the *finance of rebellion* and basically aims to look at the financial support which armed groups are receiving from different sources. The second is *atypically low costs* for starting a rebellion. This topic contains various variables that indicate that this would make it easier to recruit rebels, provide forces with weapons and make it cheaper to oppose the government.

The concept of grievance is measured through four different variables without any subdivision in topics. These variables measure indicators contributing to the existence of ethnic or religious hatred, political oppression, political exclusion and economic inequality. The underlying

assumptions can be found in the table as well. The quantification of the greed and grievance variables is more detailed than revealed here. It is not necessary to do so, as this thesis will focus on five broader conclusions which were presented by Collier & Hoeffler based on the significant results of their research.

Greed				Grievance	
Finance rebellion	*assumption*	Atypically low costs	*assumption*	*variables*	*assumption*
Extortion of natural resources	*Presence of natural resources creates possibility of extorting these as income for rebel groups*	Foregone income	*Citizens without proper income are more likely to join rebellion*	Ethnic or religious hatred	*A polarized and fractionalized society has a greater risk of experiencing a civil war*
Donations from diasporas	*Sympathizing nationals residing abroad are a source of income for rebel groups*	Conflict specific capital cheap	*If military capital is cheap to obtain, conflict will break out more easily*	Political repression	*An autocratic society with a culture in which political openness is suppressed faces an increased risk towards experiencing rebellion*
Subventions hostile governments	*External governments hostile to the current regime are likely to financially support rebel groups*	Weak government military capability	*Weak military state apparatus leaves an opportunity for rebel groups to challenge them*	Political exclusion	*If political influence is based on ethnicity or religion and minorities are ignored or one group is dominant, this will increase the risk towards rebellion*
				Economic inequality	*If economic inequality is high in a society, the risk towards rebellion will increase*

First of all, the first topic under greed – *finance rebellion* – was found significant. This means that the extortion of natural resources, donations from the diaspora and subventions from hostile governments were all found to add explanatory power to rebel initiation (p. 588). Under the variable of natural resources, it was found that states with a primary commodity export product, such as oil, are more likely to experience rebellion on their soil. Also, a large diaspora substantially impacted the probability of rebel initiation as they are likely to donate for 'the good cause' (p. 588).

Second, the impact of *atypically low costs* was found to increase the likelihood that a rebellion will be initiated (p. 588). Collier & Hoeffler based this conclusion on the proven significance of the absence of proper schooling and income, which could lead to lower costs for recruiting new members due to a lack of a prosperous future and everyday activities (p. 574). Also, the variable *low costs of military material* was proven significant (p. 588). One of the indicators used, was the time that had passed since the last conflict on a country's soil as this would increase the likelihood of weapons already present within the state (p. 574).

This is closely linked with the third conclusion: military advantage of the rebellion over the state. This was not measured by looking at the number of, for instance, tanks that the government owned, but by measuring geographical factors as these would make it harder to fight rebellion. For instance, it was found that a high dispersion of a population across a country increases the risk of conflict (p. 581). Besides, a positive effect, but weaker influence, was found of mountainous terrain being favorable for rebellion (p. 582).

The last two conclusions are not linked with greed, but with grievance and a general demographic influence. The fourth conclusion addresses the only variable under grievance that was found of significant impact towards rebellion: ethnic dominance. However, Collier & Hoeffler were unable, due to the quantitative approach of their research, to give further insight in the meaning of this indicator proving significant. In general, they state that a heterogeneous population is safer than a homogenous population as long as they avoid dominance of a specific group (p. 588).

In the final conclusion, it is stated that the risk of conflict is proportional to a country's population. Again, the exact relation is not entirely clear as it is mentioned that this also might have to do with an increase in heterogeneity which could make the relation spurious – influenced by other unmeasured factors (p. 588).

Debate: greed and grievance

These final two conclusions and side notes, touch upon the stream of critique that was released after the publication of the article. A selection of these remarks will be addressed here, as will be the different conclusions of additional research that has been conducted between 2004 and 2017. The significant arguments made are used to shape the conclusions presented above into the framework through which this research will be conducted.

Besides the general discontent and disbelief among social oriented scholars, a fierce critique was expressed on the ability to quantitatively measure the complex circumstances under which civil wars occur. Especially a socially constructed concept as grievance is deemed hard to quantify. Furthermore, criticism was expressed regarding Collier's approach of excluding factors which he deemed difficult to measure (Bensted, 2011, p. 86).

Quantitative data is able to measure the relation between variables but is incapable of explaining why exactly this relation exists. Collier and Hoeffler acknowledged this flaw and started a project in collaboration with the World Bank: Political Economy of Civil Wars. Together with Nicolas Sambanis, Collier presented a book full of qualitative case studies derived from the project in which the CH-model was tested and used to identify variables to conduct further research on: Collier & Sambanis, Understanding civil war: Evidence and analysis, 2005. As co-author, Sambanis addressed in this book several key issues for further implementation of the CH-model. The first recommendation was already given initiation in the book itself and widely acknowledged by other scholars: using qualitative case studies to gain an in-depth understanding of the significant variables found by Collier & Hoeffler (2004).

Besides, Sambanis stated the necessity of looking beyond the initiation of rebellion and use the theory to investigate the role of state actors in the conflict. Other scholars already stated that the focus on greed of rebels would promote a bias towards rebel groups. This despite the evidence provided by case studies on the role of governments in fostering conflicts (Humphreys, 2003). Sambanis, for instance, asked the question why the presence of natural resources in a country applies specifically to rebels, while it also might contribute to the increase of grievances among a population if the government is looting these resources instead of the rebel group (Collier & Sambanis, 2005, p. 309). Indicatively, several case studies have proven that government resources or the state treasury are a primary 'lootable' resource during civil wars (Zartman, 2011, p. 303).

Looking back, the CH-model – originally designed to measure the onset of rebellion – has become a starting point for the academic world to look more in-depth into the role of greed in the onset, duration, continuation and ending of civil wars. This has caused scholars, including Anne Hoeffler herself, to conclude that a clear choice between either the greed or grievance side of the debate is far too shortsighted. Both concepts are linked in a complex manner. However, the distinction between the two remains useful as a lens through which further research can be structured. This, in order to gain a further in-depth understanding of the relation between the two concepts and their contribution to civil war (Hoeffler, 2011, p. 281).

Theoretical lens

This thesis is constructed in line with these remarks and uses the CH-model as a lens through which relevant variables can be identified in the South Sudan civil war. Therefore, this thesis uses the variables found significant by Collier and Hoeffler in 2004 in order to construct the factors which will be the focus in this research. The variables of the CH-model have been shaped through the criticism presented above and brought down to five variables. The goal of this research is not to test the CH-model – as this has been done extensively in the earlier addressed work of Collier & Sambanis (2005) – or look *if* the variables are present in the current civil war in South Sudan. This thesis rather uses the CH-model and the debate to identify several different variables which will present a lens through which the civil war in South Sudan will be analyzed. In doing so, the complex interaction between greed and grievance variables will become visible and an in-depth understanding of the current civil war in South Sudan will be created.

Each of these five variables will be addressed in the analytical chapters separately. The first analytical chapter, Chapter 5, focusses on the variable 'weak government capability' and addresses the strength of institutions in South Sudan with a central focus on the SPLA. It further sketches an outline of the geographic characteristics of the country and how these contribute to the duration of the civil war. Chapter 6 will focus on the 'low costs of rebellion' and therefore the economic environment in South Sudan in relation to the *modus operandi* of the armed opposition in the country. Chapter 7 looks at 'ethnic dominance' and paints a picture of the tribal landscape and prevailing ethnic tensions in South Sudan. After that, Chapter 8 addresses the influence of 'natural resources' – specifically South Sudan's oil sector – on the continuation of the civil war. The final analytical chapter will give an outlook of South Sudan's 'diaspora' and its influence on South Sudan's continuing civil war. Finally, the thesis will conclude by answering the main research question:

How do the different factors, identified through the greed and grievance debate, contribute to the continuation of the South Sudan civil war since 2013?

Relevance

By analyzing different factors in South Sudan's current civil war, it is aimed to create a better understanding how these factors contribute to the continuation of the conflict. This aim is twofold in its objective. First, the current civil war in South Sudan has received relatively little academic attention in relation to its impact on the region and its population. This might be due to the fact that the civil war is still ongoing, which makes the conflict generally more difficult to analyze. By looking at several underlying drivers contributing to the continuation of the civil war, this thesis aims to gain a deeper understanding of the specific conflict in South Sudan. Second, this thesis aims to create a qualitative, in-depth understanding of the specific role of the identified factors in a civil war and address the complex interaction between the greed and grievance perspectives. As the factors are derived from a quantitative theory by Collier & Hoeffler (2004), the ongoing debate focusses on the complex role of underlying drivers in civil war. This complexity in the possible joined contribution of different factors in the continuation of civil wars is difficult through econometric measurements and requires in-depth analyses of multiple sources in a qualitative way.

Chapter 4 – Methodology

This thesis conducts a qualitative single case study on the civil war in South Sudan in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the different factors contributing to its continuation. The case of South Sudan has been chosen because of personal interest and the fact that little research has been conducted on its current civil war. Therefore, the case presents an opportunity to gain new insight in the influence of the different factors in civil wars.

To be able to gain a qualitative insight in the South Sudan civil war, the research design is comprised of two different methods of data collection. First, a literature study has been conducted through both open and semi-open sources. As there is relatively little academic literature on the current civil war in South Sudan, both academic and non-academic sources are used. The information used spreads across multiple sources such as news articles by local and international media, reports by government and humanitarian organizations, publications by international and regional monitoring bodies, and so on.

Besides the literature review, expert-interviews are held and used to verify, falsify or nuance the findings made. By doing so, a triangulation of sources is used in order to increase the reliability of the findings made. The interviewees selected have an extensive knowledge about the current situation in the country due to their own experience in both personal and professional settings. As these interviews are not the main body of information on which this research is built, not all interviews are mentioned specifically as source. Most of the interviews have been used for a better understanding of the conflict of the researcher himself. However, four interviews are actively used in the thesis and are referred to as 'interviewee' and (Interview I-IV). Further details about the interviewees and a paraphrased version of the interviews held are displayed in Annex B: Interviews. The interviews held are based on a semi-structured interview design which has enabled the interviewer to present certain topics or findings towards the respondent in which he is free to ask additional questions for a better understanding of the answer given (Emans, 2002).

Because of this triangulation of methods, this thesis is able to tackle the issue of the availability of relatively limited data on the specific case. Although only one case is used, which hardens the generalizability of the findings, the case of South Sudan can offer new insight in the complex contribution of the different factors chosen towards the concept of civil war. The most

severe limitations posed towards this research are restrictions in time and means. However, through the triangulation of sources and methods, the research is posing a viable design to contribute to the academic field.

Chapter 5 – Geography and government capability

The relation between geography and the institutional strength in a country – and the impact on the continuation of civil war – is presented by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) as well as in the subsequent debate. Collier and Hoeffler state that high rates of population dispersion and the presence of mountainous terrain favor the onset of rebellion. This, as they pose a barrier for effective governance in a country. However, if institutions in a country are strong – for instance if the military apparatus of a country is deemed capable – such barriers might be overcome (2004, pp. 581-582). These findings have incited further research in which multiple authors have subscribed a general perception: low rates of accessibility of terrain, and therefore low access to the population, increases the risk of civil war onset (Butcher, 2017, p. 1455). However, such issues can be overcome by a high level of institutional strength of the government apparatus (DeRouen, 2004, p. 311). Scholars have subscribed this by looking at forestation and mountainous areas in relation to the onset of rebellion (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009, p. 546; Buhaug & Rød, 2006, p. 316). Others have linked the general state of infrastructure in the country to the accessibility of areas and therefore towards the government's ability to control these regions (Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 140). It is generally alleged that low access to an area causes such places to function as a hide out and safe haven for rebellion (DeRouen, 2004, p. 306).

How do the geographical factors of South Sudan contribute to the continuation of the civil war? And is the government of South Sudan capable to overcome such barriers in order to tackle the rebellion? In order to answer these questions, this chapter addresses several geographical factors in the country. Such as the dispersion of its population and the influence of the yearly raining season. Besides, the institutional strength in South Sudan will be addressed resulting in a closer look at the military capability of the country through the strength and composition of the SPLA.

The geographical characteristics of South Sudan in relation to the civil war have been visualized and can be found in Map 1 in Annex A – Mapping South Sudan.

Geographic characteristics

South Sudan is located in Eastern Africa and stretches over a vast territory about the size of France, Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Despite its size, South Sudan inhabits a small population of an estimated 12,2 million people (BTI, 2018, p. 3). This makes South Sudan the least densely populated country in Sub-Saharan Africa with only 13 people per square kilometer. In comparison, France, Belgium and the Netherlands combined inhabit roughly 95 million people on a similar sized territory (AfDB, 2013, p. 17).

Historically, the South Sudanese population is living around the White Nile and its side rivers. The river delta spreads from Juba in the south towards the northern border with Sudan, and in the north east towards the border with Ethiopia. The delta dictates rural life by its flow and seasonal variation (AfDB, 2013, p. 17). For a significant part, this is caused by the raining season which stretches from May until December, causing the delta to flood and leaving the rural population no choice but to move for dry ground (Pendle, 2017, p. 69). An estimated 83% of the population is living in rural areas, which leaves an urbanized population of 17%, merely 2,5 million people (BTI, 2018, p. 3). These estimations, however, are troubled by the ongoing civil war in the country and are generally perceived as inaccurate. One of the interviewees argues that outside the refugee camps in the country, only five million people are believed to inhabit the vast soil of South Sudan (Interview I). The yearly floods turn the grazing grounds of South Sudan into a large swamp in the northern and middle region (Salman, 2011, p. 158). This is the largest swamp in the world: The Sudd, which is near to inaccessible throughout the year (Craze, Tubioana, & Gramizzi, 2016, p. 18).

In this dispersed social environment, another factor is causing rural areas to have a low accessibility. Even during the dry months, vast areas of the country are best reached by air due to the highly underdeveloped road infrastructure in the country (ACAPS, 2015; Buhaug & Rød, 2006, p. 316). Only 2% of the existing road network in South Sudan is paved – roughly 300km of which the only international road towards Uganda already takes up 192km (ACAPS, 2015; AfDB, 2013, p. 34). As a rough 98% of the roads is composed of dirt, the raining season is having a significant impact on the accessibility of the infrastructure in the country. It is estimated that over 60% of the roads are inaccessible during the season. Even multiple landing strips for airplanes are flooded due to the accessive rainfall (Watchlist, 2018, p. 18).

The raining season in South Sudan does not only pose challenges to the accessibility of the rural areas. Is also causes the country to be subjected to a dynamic social pattern as it forces the South Sudanese population to mobilize as the floods start. The annual search for dry land causes the majority of the population to be nomadic, agri-pastorlists: most South Sudanese herd cattle as well as they farm land and fish (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 3; SAS, 2014-1, p. 1). This creates a social society in which historic ties and tensions are built. On the one hand, different tribes are related for instance through marriages between members from different communities. On the other hand, tensions between different rural communities exist due to yearly clashes over grazing rights as moving around implies accessing each others territories (Pendle, 2017, p. 69). These dynamic social patterns and the ties and tensions developed over time are posing a significant challenge for governing institutions. With over sixty tribes on its soil, ruling South Sudan has been an issue for both present and previous governments (AU, 2014, p. 72; Shulika & Okeke-Uzodike, 2013, p. 25).

Institutional strength: the SPLA

These geographic and social dynamics of South Sudan have influenced the governing ability of its institutions since the secession in 2011. The start of the civil war in December 2013 has further hardened this process, which has caused South Sudan to take the pole position in the annually published Fragile State Index (2017, p. 8). In ten of the twelve sections, the African country scores a 9.5 or higher on a ten-point scale, resulting in a 113.9 score out of the maximum score of 120 (p. 37). The institutional strength of the South Sudanese government can therefore be perceived as the lowest in the world.

The weak state of the South Sudan government finds its origin in the previous struggle for independence against Sudan (ICG, 2014, p. 7). The SPLA – a former rebel army – became the main political party of South Sudan between 2005 and 2011. Therefore, the former head of military intelligence – the executioner of John Garang – became the President of South Sudan. Once in power, President Kiir started to 'buy peace' in order to create a stable southern Sudan. These loyalty payments towards the commanders of different militias led to a vast expansion of the bureaucracy in the country (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, pp. 10,15). With over 230.000 names on its payroll, the SPLA became a vast 'national army'. However, instead of a unified multi-ethnic military apparatus – which it claimed to be – the SPLA was a bundled, unorganized group of multiple loosely affiliated ethnic militias (AU, 2014, p. 62) (Omia &

Obonyo, 2015, p. 100). During 2006 and 2011, over 80% of the security budget was used to pay the salaries of these soldiers among whom were over 700 generals – the highest number of generals in any African army (AU, 2014, p. 61; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 15).

Although South Sudan was a 'new' country, the SPLM inherited a long legacy of governing practices which were heavily influenced by previous colonial rulers (ICG, 2014, p. 7; Johnson, 2012, p. 207; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 14). Besides, previous rule had caused grievances to develop as many people in the south had not only been subjected to the civil wars but actively contributed to them. The SPLM inherited not only a significantly influenced system but also a heavily militarized society filled with war veterans (AU, 2014, p. 39; Pendle, 2017, p. 90). In this period, multiple 'factions' of the SPLA were stationed throughout the country. These factions were in fact civilians armed and paid by the SPLA as some kind of para-military forces who were mainly protecting their own communities instead of the national 'cause' (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 15).

In this society, the fighting in Juba broke out in December 2013 which started the current civil war in the world's youngest nation. Due to the heavily fragmented internal structure of the SPLA, it is estimated that 60-70% of the SPLA defected (AU, 2014, p. 59; ICG, 2014, p. 10; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 12). Large groups of Nuer militia who were spread out over the country, declared war after the ethnic targeting of Nuer civilians in the capital. Riek Machar and his forces marched north from the capital to join their 'Nuer brothers' – living in the rural areas in close vicinity of the river delta. Besides the Nuer community, the purge of the SPLM leadership by President Kiir caused many formerly aligned militias from other ethnic backgrounds to defect. Some defected to join the opposition, others because of conflict fatigue and a desire to protect their own local communities (ICG, 2014, p. 10). This significant loss of fighting capacity in the SPLA ranks led to the much-needed backing of the Ugandan forces in 2014 and even the deployment of private security company 'Blackwater' in 2014 to protect Juba (BTI, 2018, p. 6; EP, 2014, p. 2).

In order to restore fighting capacity and increase loyalty towards his position, President Kiir recruited 15.000 Dinka youth from his home region to become part of his personal militia. These actions led to an expansion of personally affiliated and ethnic oriented soldiers within the army (EP, 2014, p. 3; ICG, 2014, p. 7). Subsequently, he increased the mandate of the National Security Service (NSS) which led to a firmer grip on the political spectrum of South

Sudan by the President (BTI, 2018, p. 5). This has led to the current position in which President Kiir has 'extraordinarily wide and apparently all-pervading powers, with very limited checks and balances in place' (AU, 2014, p. 53). He has powers to remove key state officials – including the vice presidency, Ministers, Governors and judges. Although the SPLM is officially heading a democratic, multi-party system, the party has never held any internal election process and has become an exclusionary and elitist party (Omia & Obonyo, 2015, p. 99; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 10). There are believed to be 23 political opposition parties, but not one of these parties is delivering a governor to one of the 32 states of South Sudan (Knopf, 2013, p. 10; Omia & Obonyo, 2015, p. 101). Besides, President Kiir and his loyalists have been obstructing free media and cracked down on journalists of which one of the interviewees gives a testimony in Annex B: Interview I.

Despite the far-stretching powers of President Salva Kiir and the SPLM, the grip of the government of South Sudan on the affairs on its soil is marginal. Its military has proven unable to monopolize the use of violence and to impose law and order in the country (BTI, 2018, p. 6). The SPLA has no oversight on the different opposition militias and is incapable of overcoming the natural barriers favoring the rebellion: *"Sometimes we do not know who is fighting who and who they are"* (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 8). Despite the annual spending of 40-60% of its budget on security in the past years, the SPLA has lost its legitimacy among the South Sudanese population and is a source of insecurity (AU, 2014, p. 56; Knopf, 2013, p. 12; WB, 2017, p. 9). This paradox in expenditure and outcome, is caused by the *modus operandi* in the deployment of the SPLA: soldiers are expected to be self-sufficient. A tactical choice as much as a forced one, as the country is facing economic distress and is heavily troubled by logistical issues, especially during the raining season (Craze, Tubioana, & Gramizzi, 2016, pp. 142-143). As armed militias are expected to take care of themselves, the lack of command and control over these groups causes an instable security climate in South Sudan. With those tasked to secure the country, looting civilian property and ambushing humanitarian convoys or even robbing their compounds, law and order is absent (AU, 2014, p. 71; Interview IV).

These factors contribute to the inability of the SPLA to overcome the geographical barriers – social dispersion, the Sudd swamp and the influence of the raining season on accessibility – in South Sudan. As can be observed in Map 1 in Annex A, the vicinity of the swamp and flood areas of the country have been the hotspot for armed confrontations between opposition and

government forces in the first months of 2018. This is indicative of the inaccessibility of the terrain being a safe haven for rebel elements. Not in a way of hiding out but rather due to the increased logistical challenge in the area which is posed by the geographical barriers (Interview IV). The SPLA is incapable to overcome these barriers which prolongs the presence of armed opposition in the country.

Chapter 6 – The economics of rebellion

The lack of strong institutions and law and order in South Sudan is not exclusively connected to the government's ability to overcome natural barriers. The lack of accessibility of certain areas does favor rebellion in South Sudan, but weak institutions and unpaid military are obviously also related to the economic circumstances in a country. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) perceive a dire economic situation of a country as contributing to the fact that costs of rebellion can be 'atypically low' and therefore increases the likelihood of the onset of rebellion (2004, pp. 574, 588). Their findings led to further research focusing on the link between economic circumstances lowering the cost of 'conflict-specific' material. Generally, this 'low-costs'-approach has resulted in two broader findings. First, poor economic circumstances might lead to grievances which can lower the costs of rebellion as it makes the recruitment of fighters easier and therefore cheaper. This, as joining the opposition might add up to one's grievances but also provides for an opportunity to gain income, status and perspective (Regan & Norton, 2005, p. 322). The other approach focusses on the non-human conflict-specific material: the prevalence of firearms in a specific country. When weapons prevail in a society, initiating rebellion will be easier, cheaper and will happen faster (Tang, 2015, p. 269).

How do these broader approaches to the relation between economy and rebellion hold up in the current conflict in South Sudan? This chapter aims to answer this question by taking a closer look at the current economic situation in the country, the prevalence of fire arms in its society and the state of rebellion in South Sudan.

The South Sudan economy

When South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011, the country was not build-up from scratch but founded on existing historic grievances and inherited governance structures. The misperception of South Sudan as a 'new' country failed to identify the already existing neopatrimonial and militarized system built on billions of aid funding and oil revenues. Although the international aid and the production of 350.000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) provided a basic income for South Sudan as a nation, it also provided a significant challenge (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 15).

This became apparent when it was revealed that the kleptocratic system of South Sudan had managed to let $1.4 billion in aid funding disappear between 2006 and 2011 (Foltyn, 2017). Further, the heavy reliance of South Sudan on the oil sector proved an instable source of government income. As the country failed to diversify its economy – 98% of the GDP was derived from oil revenues – the young nation heavily depended on the sector (ICG, 2016, p. 15). Although the economy thrived at first – 24,7% growth in 2013 – a conflict over oil revenues with Sudan led to a shutdown of the oil production in April 2012 (ICG, 2014, p. 17). The issue was resolved in a few months, but the damage was already done. Every month cost the South Sudanese government $650 million which led to a quickly emptying treasury (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 16). By the time production was picked up again, the civil war had broken out in December 2013. As insecurity prevailed around the oil fields in Unity state, two of them were forced to stop the production (James, 2015, p. 40). With only half of its oil fields in production, South Sudan was forced to cut down from 350.000 bpd to 140.000 bpd. This heavy cut in income caused its economy to collapse, especially when worldwide oil prices dropped in that period – leading to a contraction 45% of the South Sudanese economy (WB, 2017, pp. 3, 8). According to the World Bank, the years of the civil war have seen a yearly decline of 12% causing the government to print money and subsequently inciting hyperinflation in the country. The South Sudanese Pound (SSP) devaluated from SSP3.16 to $1 in 2011 towards SSP300 to $1 on the streets of Juba in early 2018 (BTI, 2018, p. 20).

The economic collapse has led salaries to dry up and pushed an estimated 66% of the South Sudanese population into poverty (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 22; WB, 2017, pp. 3). Basic needs are increasingly difficult to obtain for the average citizen and is resulting in severe food insecurity throughout the country for at least 5.3 million people (USAID, 2018). The government of South Sudan is living 'from hand to mouth': failing to implement longterm policies and mainly focussing on obtaining loans and making prospective oil deals – selling oil before it is excavated (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 17). This has led to an outstanding debt of 38% of its GDP and over $70 million in oil sold through prospective deals at the end of 2016 (WB, 2017, p. 10). These figures are alleged to have increased even further, as no changes in policy have been observed in the past year.

Weapons in South Sudan

Besides being subjected to poor economic circumstances, South Sudan experiences a high level of firearms on its soil. Although weapons are illegal by law in the country, previous decades of civil war have caused conflict-specific material to prevail throughout it society – being widely available and used (SAS, 2014-2, pp. 1, 3). The upsurge of weapons used in South Sudan was first noted in the 1980s when rural communities started to use guns to protect their herds and raid other communities of their cattle (SAS, 2014-1, p. 1). These practices reached an additional boost during the militarization of the country between 2006 and 2011 and is still observed in the current civil war. In 2009, it was estimated that one of every ten South Sudanese was carrying a weapon. Recent research among pastoral communities in the Equatorian region revealed that 77% of the communities owned a firearm (SAS, 2014-1, p. 4).

The prevalence of conflict-specific material also played a significant role when the civil war broke out in December 2013. The wide range of weapons throughout the country gave the opposition part of its initial firepower. Remarkably, the SPLA decided to further arm civilians to fight this, arguing that the weapons would enable them to defend themselves against the insurgents. By doing so, the militarization of the South Sudanese society continued (ICG, 2014, p. 101).

Another source of firepower for the SPLA-IO came from the defection of entire divisions of the SPLA. This caused significant parts of the national weapon stock to be diverted to the rebels (Craze, Tubioana, & Gramizzi, 2016, p. 114). In Unity state, entire divisions of the army deserted to Machar and brought heavy weaponry and even tanks with them to the opposing side (SAS, 2014-3, p. 238). Riek Machar, as leader of the SPLA-IO, was therefore able to initiate the rebellion at low costs – using the SPLA weapon stock and the support of armed civilians.

Rebellion in South Sudan

Although the civil war in South Sudan is still perceived as a 'low-costs rebellion', the nature of rebellion in South Sudan has changed during the course of the civil war (Interview III & IV). The civil war started generally as a war between the SPLA-IO and the SPLA. The different militias loyal to both sides were joined under a common cause in which the Nuer versus Dinka dichotomy was largely accurate (ICG, 2014, p. 8). The Nuer militias unified ranks in reaction

to the ethnic targeting of their brothers in Juba in December 2013 which presented an ethnic motivation to fight against a common enemy: the autocratic Dinka-rule of President Kiir and his SPLM (Craze, Tubioana, & Gramizzi, 2016, p. 109; ICG, 2014, p.10; Interview I). Their unification gave them the power to obtain three of the ten states in South Sudan and even march on Juba. Obtaining the city and overthrowing the rule of the Dinka majority seemed likely until the SPLA was aided by the Ugandan forces (Interview III). The support of President Museveni gave President Kiir the power to suppress the rebel forces and attack them even during the raining season – normally of strategic advantage to the rebels (EP, 2014, p. 8). Despite this foreign aid, the government proved unable to eliminate the opposition and was forced to negotiate with Riek Machar. This led to the earlier mentioned peace agreement in 2015 which led to the brief return of the SPLA-IO in Juba.

The second clash in Juba in July 2016 caused the nature of the rebellion in South Sudan to change. This was caused by the flight of Riek Machar and his SPLA-IO through the Equatorias and his following housearrest in South Africa. The latter deprived him of three central pillars of rebel leadership: the ability to travel to rebel-controlled areas, representing the rebels in international settings, and finding foreign patronage (Kindersley & Rolandsen, 2017, p. 312). This caused the already weakened SPLA-IO to fragment into over forty different armed groups (UNGA, 2018, p. 4). The fragmentation of the opposition was already observed before the agreement of 2015 but was accelerated after Machar's confinement in October 2016. The SPLA-IO was not as unified as the former Vice President often claimed in his statements (EP, 2014, p. 7). Losing the central pillars of his leadership, caused a further decline in his ability to command and control the multiple militias of which the opposition force was comprised (Kindersley & Rolandsen, 2017, p. 308).

Exemplary is the composition and use by Riek Machar of the infamous so-called Nuer White Army (NWA) as described by, among others, the International Crisis Group report (2016, p. 44 a.s.o.). The NWA is an armed youth militia composed of different communities with an ethnic Nuer base who can be assembled for a joined cause. The massacre of their brothers in Juba at the start of the civil war was such a cause (ICG, 2014, p.10). Although Machar had used the militia in military campaigns in the past, he acknowledged the difficulty of controlling the NWA (EP, 2014, p. 6). This, as they often pursued their own interests during military operations which generally implied that an attack on the SPLA also meant to raid their cattle and release ethnically and historically motivated tensions. The latter often resulting in the

targeting of innocent civilians, i.e. women and children. As such groups, of which both the SPLA and SPLA-IO are partly formed, are difficult to control, most of these groups cannot be perceived as part of a regular 'army' (Kindersley & Rolandsen, 2017, p. 312). Rather, they are armed youth militias with a focus in the first place of protecting their communities and personal interests – often cattle. Although they are often aligned with an officially declared rebel group, their first loyalty is with the community (ICG, 2014, p. 8).

These youth militias are proxied by both government and opposition groups but mainly use violence in order to support their communities and their own survival. The multiple different opposition movements still align themselves with the 'general cause' of the SPLA-IO in opposing the autocratic rule of the SPLM and the kleptocracy in the country (f.i. Cirillo, 2017). However, the ongoing insecurity, the dire economic situation and the lack of access to food incite the use of violence to ascertain these primary needs. This tendency was already observed within the ranks of the SPLA in the previous chapter but also cited by rebel leaders: *"South Sudanese citizens cannot afford to provide their families with the very basic needs of food and medicine. Life has become hard, very hard. There is no clean drinking water. There is no food. There is no proper housing. Only the fat cats can provide themselves."* (Malong, 2018). Research among opposition militias in the Equatorias quotes a young rebel: *"Why should I waste my time in the camp if someone in the bush can be promoted to the rank of a brigadier?"* and *"It is the only way to get some money"* (Kindersley & Rolandsen, 2017, p. 320).

This way of reasoning is exemplary for the influence of the economic situation in South Sudan on the conflict. Violence has been the most constant way of earning basic needs for the South Sudanese population for decades. The existing prevalence of weapons on its soil facilitates these practices. According to Carver (2017) nothing has changed in forty years for the average South Sudanese: different militias have imposed their own law and order on the local population for decades. The central government has, in all these years, never been able to change that reality. Furthermore, the prevailing insecurity and instable economic situation in South Sudan keeps its citizens and government from breaking that trend (Interview II & IV).

Chapter 7 – Ethnicity dominating the civil war

Insecurity in South Sudan prevails and the central government has proven unable to sustain peace for decades. Consequently, its society is both fragmented and decentralized in its social and political structure (Interview II). Communities focus on internal needs and express loyalty along ethnic lines of which the case of the Nuer White Army is a clear example. The wide availability of similar examples in conflicts all over the world makes that the influence of ethnicity in societies and its role in the concept of civil war is widely perceived as a fact. But how does it influence civil war exactly? Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 571) allege ethnic and religious hatreds to be a cause of civil conflict. History has provided numerous examples of such hatreds playing a central role in both civil and interstate wars – for instance the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Second World War. It is therefore not surprising that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find ethnicity to be of significant influence in the onset of rebellion in a country. More specifically, they find the dominance of one ethnic group in a society to have a significant impact on civil war onset (p. 488). Scholars implicate that ethnic diversity in a country in itself is not problematic but rather the fractionalization of communities in which one ethnic group becomes dominant (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 571; Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 83). Especially the exclusion of other ethnic communities from power in a country, is found to make challenges of the formal government occur faster. Such a pattern in which one majority ethnic group is dominating the political system and has captured a society is prevalent particularly in weak states with weak institutions (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010, p. 93). As the Nuer vs. Dinka dichotomy has been briefly addressed in the previous chapters, it is apparent that ethnicity plays a role in the current civil war in South Sudan. But how does ethnicity contribute to the continuation of the conflict?

This chapter aims to present an overview of the complex composition of ethnicity in South Sudan and its influence in the current civil war. A central feature in this search is the dominance of the Dinka majority in the country. In this chapter on ethnicity, terms like nationality, ethnicity and tribes are used interchangeably. The thesis uses these terms to refer to a specific social group in South Sudan who perceive themselves as a community.

Ethnicity in South Sudan

South Sudan is one of the most ethnic diverse countries in East Africa. Although its twelve million population is relatively small for its vast size, the country is home for more than 90 different nationalities – sub-clans taken into account (Zambakari, 2015, p. 71). These communities are aligned to one another through various ways and are often referred to under several overriding tribes. (An overview of the ethnic composition in South Sudan can be found in Map 2 Annex A: Mapping South Sudan.) The two largest ethnic groups are the earlier addressed Dinka (30%) and the Nuer (19%) (Interview III). The ethnic diversity forms another challenge for the government of South Sudan. Managing the tensions between the different communities has been an issue for the colonial rulers, as well as Sudan, as well as the current SPLM-rule (Shulika & Okeke-Uzodike, 2013, p. 26).

When South Sudan seceded, it inherited both the issue as well as the practices used to control the ethnic diversity on its soil by its previous rulers (Marko, 2015, pp. 669-670). The British rule, for instance, had implemented a system of divide-and-rule in which different communities were kept apart and inequities intrenched. This was done by assigning certain regions more access to state power, resources, services and development opportunities than other regions. Although building a framework of one state, the British colonial rule used the dichotomy between different communities to let them control each other. Sudan adopted these practices and continued a similar structure of governance by allocating specific pieces of land to each ethnic group. It was aimed for to assign different ethnic communities with a 'homeland' (Zambakari, 2015, pp. 73-74). Under this administration, ethnicity became entangled with economic and political rights. A division was even made between rural and urban areas regarding the kind of law that applied to the region and its population. These practices created a system of second-class citizenship in which ethnic divisions were related to political rights. The stratification of the population – in which most South Sudanese were belonging to the lower class – was perceived by the South Sudanese as an outright oppression and second colonization (Johnson, 2012, p. 207; Marko, 2015, pp. 669-670). In fact, leaders of the SPLA explain this oppression to be the real purpose of the secession war (Marko, 2015, p. 672). During this war, the created division between the ethnic communities was used in a divide-and-rule tactic by Sudan in which existing grievances between different communities were exacerbated and used (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 10). By fueling existing tensions, the secession struggle has been filled with cases in which communities were paid and armed by

the Sudan government to attack other communities. This proxy-tactic was used, among other things, to clear land full of resources or to weaken a political opponent (HRW, 2003, p. 37). The earlier mentioned split by Riek Machar in 1991 from the SPLA is a clear example of this strategy. The Sudan government paid and armed Machar's Nuer forces to oppose the insurgency of John Garang's SPLA and disperse Dinka communities inhabiting prospective oilfields (AU, 2014, p. 62). By using Nuer militias to do so, tensions between the Nuer and Dinka tribes became further entrenched.

Despite the aim of the SPLA to fight this divide-and-rule tactics and second-class citizenship, the South Sudanese government has copied these governing characteristics of its previous rulers (Interview III; Marko, 2015). Indications were already observed during the organization of the referendum for secession. As the SPLM/A wanted to register as many voters as possible to guarantee the turnout rate, it started excluding anyone who might possibly vote against separation. Therefore, ethnic groups perceived to be allied with the Sudanese government were not considered to be *"indigenous ethnic communities of Southern Sudan"* (Marko, 2015, p. 673). Once again, ethnicity and political rights became entangled in South Sudan. Besides, the second-class citizenship was renewed between the rural population and the 'elite'. Indicative is the fact that official national citizenship is still only documented for less than 4% of its population. Only those wealthy enough have obtained one of the 250.000 ID cards issued so far and can prove their official identity as South Sudanese (Marko, 2015, p. 675).

This ethnic division and ongoing dichotomy between the elite and the average South Sudanese, was the foundation on which South Sudan seceded in 2011. As the political elite continued privileging the interests of SPLM members and its military wing, the trust of the population in its government spiraled down. Where 99% voted in favor of secession, only 50% of the population stated to have faith in its government in May 2013 (Knopf, 2013, p. 12; Shulika & Okeke-Uzodike, 2013, p. 27).

December 2013 as catalysator

In this sphere, the events of December 2013 took place. With First Vice President Riek Machar representing the opposition and President Salva Kiir representing the government, a political clash spiralled into an ethnic feud between the Nuer and Dinka communities. A clash which was soon backed by other communities who feld disgruntled and further exacerbated by existing grievances from the earlier decades of civil war. The targeting of Nuer civilians in Juba after Machar and his soldiers fled the capital became the 'Juba massacre' and proved to be a catalysator of renewed ethnic conflict (ICG, 2014, p. 10). The civil war that followed enabled existing ethnic tensions to be expressed violently due to a general lack of law and order in the country (Interview IV).

The targeting of the Nuer in Juba had a catalyzing effect as is revealed by Riek Machar's ability to mobilize the NWA – as addressed in the previous chapters. Ethnicity is a mobilizing factor in the civil war in South Sudan (Interview I & IV). Although Machar's initial motivation for the SPLA-IO was political, the critical factor on mobilizing support from for instance the NWA was ethnic hate against the Dinka and revenge for the killing of their 'brothers' (Craze, Tubioana, & Gramizzi, 2016, p. 39; SAS, 2016, p. 16).

December 2013 as enabler

Although the Dinka vs. Nuer rivalry is a viable and often used angle to address the civil war in South Sudan, it is a simplified view on the conflict in which stereotypes on communities have become leading (Jok, 2013, p. 2). The country is not solely subjected to clashes between 'opposition Nuer' and 'government Dinka' but rather leaves an opportunity for all kinds of ethnic grievances to be expressed. The civil war is therefore an enabler of further ethnic clashes in the country. The exacerbated tensions through the decades of divide-and-rule tactics are expressed without law and order to control them. Thus, leaving intercommunal feuds largely unpunished and paving the way for tribal clashes over land disputes and cattle raids (ICG, 2016, p. 19). These clashes are causing a significant spiral of violence in South Sudan during the current civil war. Without effective insitutions to resolve the tensions between these tribal militias the violence continues.

As the different militias are often armed by both government and opposition forces – used as proxies in the conflict – these clashes often result in large scale raids with numerous casualties and thousands of cattle raided (Interview III; Wild, Jok & Patel, 2018, pp. 1-2). The distinction between tribal militias and their violence and the violence of 'government wars' is dissolved in South Sudan. Tribal militias are proxied by warring parties in the national conflict but also continue their local feuding. A clear distinction between these types of violence has been dissolved because of decades of intertwined relations between politics and ethnicity in South Sudan (Pendle, 2018, p. 104; Wild, Jok & Patel, 2018, p. 2).

Ethnic dominance

The entanglement of politics and ethnicity in South Sudan is revealed when looking into the development of the political elite – members of the SPLM/A – since the start of the civil war. With the desertion of the Nuer forces from the SPLA and the flight of the political opposition from the SPLM, the Dinka tribe became the majority in both national politics and military (Interview I, II, III & IV). Although President Kiir's preference towards favoring his own tribe was observed in the previous years, this accelerated once the opposition was silenced. Not only recruited the President 15.000 Dinka youth to be part of his personal guard, the political system became ethicized as well (ICG, 2014, p. 6). Most of his core advisors are from the Dinka tribe, more specifically from his own home region: the Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap regions in the north of South Sudan (Interview I; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 10). Although it is not accurate to state that all decisions in the SPLM are made by ethnic Dinka, the favoring of own kin is obvious. A strong indication of the influence of the Dinka majority is the composition of the so-called Jieng Council of Elders (JCE) in 2014 – a Dinka elderly council of 45 influential individuals with a background in South Sudanese military, politics and judiciary. Justice Ambrose Riny Thiik, the head of the JCE, stated that any leader of South Sudan *"must be someone that can win the support"* of the overall Dinka umbrella ethnicity (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 11).

Another indication of the political agenda favoring the Dinka majority in the country is given by the controversial rearrangement of South Sudan. Following previous colonial rule, President Kiir ordered the rearrangement of the states in the country from 10 to 32. This is widely perceived as part of the divide-and-rule tactic used to weaken communities favoring the opposition and further exacerbate local tensions within their ranks (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 7). The re-division has favored the elite loyal to the SPLM by giving them access to

government positions and resources through the creation of new administrative areas. This tactic in which warlords are rewarded for their loyalty along ethnic lines has resulted in a society in which the civil war is fought by using ethnicity as an instrument of politics. Ethnicity has proven to be a mobilizing factor in the current civil war of South Sudan. Besides, the increasing division among ethnic lines, incited by the dominance of the Dinka majority in the country, has contributed to entrenched grievances among the population in the country (Interview II; Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 23; Wild, Jok & Patel, 2018, p. 2).

Chapter 8 – Fueling the South Sudan civil war

An important factor in this allocation of resources and obtaining revenues is the position of the oil sector in South Sudan. Chapter 6 already mentioned the influence of the oil sector on the national economy but the presence of oil as a natural resource does not limit its influence on mere economic figures in South Sudan. The influence of natural resources is a widely studied phenomenon in the academic world and perceived to have impact on issues such as state development and conflict in and between countries. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) address the position of natural resources by looking at the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP. Therefore, they measure the dependence of a country on its 'main product' and conclude that a high dependency is correlated with a substantial increase of conflict risk (p. 588). However, the exact influence is somewhat arbitrary. Although Collier and Hoeffler provide several possibilities – extortion of government, looting of the direct products or revenues, etc. – their efforts leave the exact relation be.

Further research has produced two main perspectives in the contribution of natural resources towards civil war. The first is called the 'resource curse' and was presented in 2005 by Le Billon. His theory states that: *"the dependency of a country's economy on resources such as oil and diamonds increases the risk of economic instability, low standards of living, high levels of corruption, authoritarianism and weak government, and the risk of civil war"* (pp. 11-12). These risks are related to the increase of greed and a lack of checks and balances within the institutional system of a country. The second perspective approaches the influence of natural resources as a possibility to create a 'rentier state'. This theory suggests that regimes use revenue from abundant resources to buy off peace through patronage, large-scale distributive policies and effective repression. Consequently, such rentier states would tend to be more stable politically and less prone to conflict (Basedau & Lay, 2009, p. 757).

Therefore, the presence of natural resources poses two streams in the literature. On the one hand, it constitutes a 'prize' which can be obtained by individuals. This indicates the likelihood of natural resources to facilitate, finance and to be an incentive towards rebellious behavior. On the other hand, resource rents might also enable governments to suppress the opposition and create a strong government control in a country (Voors, Windt, Papaioannou, & Bulte, 2017, p. 280). This chapter takes a closer look at the influence of natural resources – more specifically the oil sector – in South Sudan on the current conflict. To do so, the sector will be

briefly described after which two influences on South Sudan will be elaborated on: how it has developed a kleptocratic system and how it is still fueling the civil war.

Fueling the kleptocratic system

South Sudan is not only highly dependent on its oil sector, it has also been a driving force behind its secession and further economic and political development (Pedersen & Bazilian, 2014, p. 163). The oil revenues are a main source of income for governing institutions and have paid for President Kiir's earlier addressed attempts to 'buy peace' after the CPA was signed in 2005. These attempts aimed to turn South Sudan into a rentier state in which oil revenues would be the source of an autocratic government with strong military capability. Instead, these attempts resulted the creation of a kleptocratic system in which state revenues were perceived as rewards for those who had fought in the 'bush' for secession (Interview I). President Kiir himself has acknowledged the fact that over $4 billion was diverted by government officials between 2005 and 2011 – roughly one third of the oil revenues obtained in that same period (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 15). One of the interviewees states that it is currently alleged that over $10 billion was diverted directly abroad, aside from the indirect payments through the allocations of means or privileges for which the South Sudanese government has paid (Interview III). Numerous cases have been outlined in the media in which these practices have become apparent: aid funding has been diverted (Foltyn, 2017), real estate has been purchased abroad by officials through unexplained financial funding (Polychronis & Moore, 2018), construction projects have been paid with government money and assigned to companies with a direct link to President Kiir (RT, 2015-1), and so on. These practices have led to the presence of the 'resource curse' in South Sudan: ranking at the top of both corruption and fragility indexes, with a small elite taking advantage of the existing system and the majority of its population subjected to insecurity, inflation and lack of basic needs (FSI, 2017; TI, 2018).

This strong alliance between politics and the businessenvironment are added upon the already addressed link between the political elite and the military. The entanglement of these fields becomes further clear when taking a closer look at the way oil revenues are managed by the government of South Sudan. The management of the oil revenues has shifted during the civil war from the Ministry of Petroleum towards privately held companies (EP, 2014; GW, 2018; Sentry, 2016; Sentry, 2018). After being challenged by the opposition and having purged the SPLM in December 2013, President Kiir shifted the management of the oil sector largely

towards the Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet): a private company fully owned by the state and functioning as a wheel of the government to enter commercial relationships (EIA, 2018, p. 4; GW, 2018, p. 10). Although it is not uncommon for oil-dependent states to be involved through private companies in the oil-sector, Nilepet is directly controlled by President Kiir who is part of its managing board. Since the expansion of the National Security Services (NSS) in South Sudan in 2015, the director of the internal bureau of the NSS, Akol Koor, is part of Nilepet's board as well. He is alleged to have directly ordered the payment of SPLA militias by Nilepet. The company is involved in the entirety of the oil-process in South Sudan and functions as a 'black box' without any transparency on financial records and further decisions made. It is alleged that President Kiir and his loyalists have done so in order to keep a firmer grip on the allocation of the oil revenues. Where Nilepet sold 250.000 barrels cargo in 2013/2014, this expanded to 3.1 million barrels cargo at the end of 2015 (GW, 2018, pp. 12-13). Although the country installed strong legislation on the oil sector in 2012 to prevent such constructions, these laws lack enforcement (PAX, 2014, p. 10). As the company seems loyal to the Presidency rather than South Sudan, Nilepet has been used to divert oil revenues abroad (RT, 2015-2), pay for military equipment (Rolandsen & Kindersley, 2017, p. 16) and obtain prospective deals through which external loans have been obtained (GW, 2018, p. 18). These constructions in the oil-sector used by the government of South Sudan are illustrative of the corrupt system which has been created in the country. Such a system in which state revenues and aid funding are diverted on this scale, demands "*a fully corrupt system in which lawyers, companies, the commercial chamber, the registrar etc. need to join that system in order to be able to create these mechanisms.*" (Sentry, 2018, p. 7).

Fueling the civil war

The unwillingness of the elite to equitably share the natural resources of South Sudan is believed to have fueled the formation of rebel groups in South Sudan. These groups have been responsible for numerous attacks in the country and in parts of Unity state where a third of the oil output of the country is produced (Shulika & Okeke-Uzodike, 2013, p. 27). (An oversight of the clashes in South Sudan and the presence of oil fields and pipelines can be observed in Map 3 of Annex A: Mapping South Sudan.) The vicinity of the clashes to the oil fields is often addressed as aim of the rebels to obtain the 'prize' which oil revenues represent. However, the crude oil in South Sudan is not a resource which can be looted by rebel groups as it needs refinement and is heavily dependent on the entire logistic sector (Interview I & IV; Sefa-

Nyarko, 2016, p. 193). The only way to obtain the 'prize' for the rebels is to either overthrow the government and take hold of the oil sector. Or by making deals with that same government once they have obstructed production in the oil fields (Interview I & IV). Although the SPLA-IO repeatedly claimed that it would seize control of the oil fields and divert oil revenue to the rebels at the beginning of the conflict, this proved impossible for the opposition group. A more achievable goal, however, was accomplished almost immediately after the start of the civil war: to shut down oil production and massively reducing the income of the government of South Sudan. By ensuring insecurity to prevail around the oil fields, the rebels are sabotaging the government's ability to increase their income and causing oil companies to be reluctant to invest in the oil industry in South Sudan (Craze, Tubioana, & Gramizzi, 2016, pp. 131, 133; Interview I & IV; James, 2015, p. 7, 28).

Although President Kiir aimed to turn South Sudan into a rentier state, the oil revenues have proven to be a source for the prolongation of the current civil war in South Sudan. The revenues are unequally shared by the elite and therefore exacerbating grievances among its population towards the kleptocratic elite. Besides, the sector finances the military moves against the opposition and pays for the weapon stock in the country. As the main source of government income, the sector further presents a valuable target for the opposition. By obstructing the oil sector, it is able to cripple the government and hold leverage over that same government which forces President Kiir to negotiate with the different opposition groups. In doing so, the use of violence has become a way of leveraging the government to obtain influence, rewards and government positions by numerous warlords (Interview III). This contributes to the prevailing insecurity in South Sudan.

Chapter 9 – The South Sudanese diaspora

As insecurity prevails and has prevailed for decennia in South Sudan, a significant part of its population has fled the country to find a safe have in neighboring countries or elsewhere in the world. The longevity of the conflict and the tendency of refugees to hold their country of origin close, gives the civil war in South Sudan a transnational dimension (Hall, 2011, p. 3). These nationals residing outside of the boundaries of their own state form the *diaspora* of a country (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 13). As refugees often leave parts of their social network behind, it is argued that diasporas all over the world keep involved in the affairs of their country of origin and therefore have an influence in issues such as civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that a large diaspora is increasing the likelihood of rebellion in a state. Mainly as a source of finance towards the opposition (p. 13). Other scholars found diaspora networks to be facilitating the smuggling of money and weapons, amongst other elements, inciting further violence (Hall, 2011, p. 10). However, the role of diasporas in a conflict is subjective and fluid. Therefore, the influence of diasporas on civil wars is also viewed from a grievance-perspective: diaspora members are often perceived as 'long-distance nationalists', likely to become politically involved and their aid send home functioning as social welfare (DPI, 2014, pp. 5, 10).

This chapter aims to address the subjective and fluid role of the diaspora in the civil war of South Sudan and does so from different perspectives. First, a brief overview of the South Sudanese diaspora is given. (Map 4 of Annex A: Mapping South Sudan reveals a schematic oversight of the whereabouts of the diaspora.) After that both the financial and political influence of the South Sudanese population residing abroad will be elaborated on.

Diaspora of South Sudan

Decades of insecurity have caused the diaspora of South Sudan to grow to significant proportions. As addressed earlier, the current conflict alone has displaced over four million people of which two million are residing abroad. Figures on the total South Sudanese diaspora are, however, inaccurate as they are comprised of estimations by different aid organizations. Besides, they fail to take into account those displaced in previous years of conflict; as the people have been displaced since the 1960s, the diaspora of South Sudan is alleged of significant proportion (RVI, 2018, p. 5).

Exact figures are troubled due to the lack of documentation in South Sudan but also in hosting countries who often fail to differentiate between Sudan and South Sudan in their documentation. However, the World Bank published in their Migration and Remittances Factbook 2013 figures on the countries where South Sudanese refugees mostly remain. Approximately 85% of the refugees remains in the East African region with Uganda alone hosting over one million refugees (OCHA, 2018). Only 15% of the refugees reside outside the region. The diasporas in the United States (+/- 41.000) and Australia (+/- 30.000) are generally perceived as most influential hubs (Gambino, Trevelyan, & Fitzwater, 2014; RVI, 2017).

Financial influence of the diaspora

Following the logic of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the size of the South Sudanese diaspora makes it a significant source of finance for rebellion. Nonetheless, this is disputed by two of the interviewees who state that the current fragmentation among the rebel groups and the lack a 'common cause' is withholding the diaspora from making significant donations (Interview I & IV). Despite their remarks, it is alleged that financial support is provided by the diaspora. However, official figures on this possible revenue stream towards the armed opposition in the country are non-existent. Nonetheless, it is known that the SPLA-IO has made considerable efforts to maintain the loyalty of especially the Nuer community internationally. Officials of the party spend much time mobilizing and raising finances among supporters in Australia, Canada and the United States (SAS, 2016, p. 26; Young, 2015, p. 39). These efforts are facilitated by the fact that many families of the political elite are residing in these countries. This is the case for both SPLA-IO and government officials who can easily leverage their transnational networks to their advantage. These elites often have dual citizenship and the financial resources to frequently travel between South Sudan and their families abroad (RVI, 2017; Sentry, 2016, p. 2). Unfortunately, this possible stream of revenues obtained through this international network is not visible as it is an informal stream of funding.

Another stream of revenues which is visible is the formal stream of remittances. These formal remittances are send from the diaspora to their personal networks in South Sudan. Such formal donations are not perceived as possible source of finance for rebellion but rather as a contributor to political stability. Remittances send home can function as a social welfare system for those remaining in the home state and therefore reduce the motivation to rebel (Regan & Frank, 2014, p. 502). A recent study among the Australian diaspora in Melbourne and South

Sudanese in Juba by the Rift Valley Institute (2018) reveals the existence of such a system in South Sudan. Residents in Juba note that remittances form a way of peace-building as they cause fewer people to become desperate enough to commit crimes (p. 11). The investigation shows that 66,5% of the respondents in Juba frequently receive financial support from family residing in Australia through small local banks and intermediary organizations. One local bank manager estimated that 250 to 300 transfers are made between Australia and South Sudan per day (p. 12). Given the economic circumstances in the country, these remittances function as a welfare system which the government of South Sudan does not provide. The South Sudanese people must organize their own provisions for care and support in which their (international) social network plays an important role in obtaining everyday basic needs (p. 6). Such remittances enable people to receive schooling and contribute to an outlook beyond the civil war (Interview I).

Political influence of the diaspora

The South Sudanese diaspora is not just financially involved in the ongoing conflict. As insecurity has prevailed in the country, the South Sudanese political culture is international due to its history of mass migration and displacement. Its diaspora has always had considerable influence on the way the country's civil wars evolve (RVI, 2018, p. 5). However, the civil war has also influenced the diaspora significantly. Obviously, it has contributed to its origin, but it has also entrenched existing grievances within the refugee community. These grievances tend to remain strong among diasporas as they sustain traumatic memories from their departure and experiences in their homeland (Hall, 2011, p. 7). These grievances often cause diasporas to remain involved in various ways in their homeland. Not only by financial support of their families and friends but also through their human capital which often results in political involvement (Linden, Blaak, & Andrew, 2013, p. 649).

Two stereotypes are prevalent in South Sudan regarding the involvement of the diaspora (Carver, 2017). The first stereotype is that of the 'keyboard warrior' which refers to the use of social media in inciting violence and hatred. Due to the prevailing grievances in the South Sudanese communities, social media is often used to voice those grievances in which inflammatory language and images are used (PTL, 2016, p. 2). Social media is also often used to mobilize support among the diaspora in which the spread of fake or exaggerated news is not uncommon. A common tactic is to post images and videos from other African conflicts – for

instance the Rwandan genocide – and claim to depict a massacre by a specific South Sudanese tribe (Patinkin, 2017). These practices are contributing to the prevailing grievances and cause a further fragmentation between ethnic and political groups than is often seen in South Sudan itself. This is supported by one of the interviewees who states that he does not speak with other ethnic groups in the Dutch diaspora besides his own Equatorian brothers (Interview I). An investigation by the Rift Valley Institute (2018) among the diaspora in Melbourne, Australia describes this fragmentation by stating that the community there is a group in which every personal act and identity is politically coded. This contributes to the conflict in South Sudan in which community fragmentation is used as a means to mobilize support (pp. 22-23).

The second stereotype identified by Carver (2017) addresses the "inflated sense of the role they can play thanks to qualifications and experiences they have gained in their new homes". As the diaspora has fled from a developing to a developed country they generally have access to more financial means and higher education (DPI, 2014, p. 13). Together with their local understanding of the situation in their homeland this makes them important actors in peace and reconciliation processes (DAA, 2014, p. 4). However, Carver (2017) highlights the patronizing attitude and the easy escape routes which the politically involved from the diaspora often display. This patronizing attitude is causing grievances among those who have remained in South Sudan as a respondent in the Rift Valley Institute research formulates: *"Those abroad may speak but are not listened to in the country."* (2018, p. 14). Another respondent expresses: *"The problem is not Australians, but the freedom they have to return after challenging their own government."* (p. 15). As most of the political elite of South Sudan is residing abroad with their families, the political responsibility is undermined as they do not have to live with the consequences of their own political actions (p. 23). This makes diasporas – and especially the South Sudan elite – "*unique actors in its civil war as they are involved as actors of the violent conflict without paying the consequences of living in its society where insecurity prevails*" (Adamson, 2013, p. 65).

The South Sudanese diaspora is contributing to the continuation of the civil war as well as to the stabilization of the country during the civil war. The remittances send home have a stabilizing effect in the country by providing a social safety net for the South Sudanese population. This self-created social welfare fund is perceived by local South Sudanese as a contributor to peace and preventer of criminal activity. However, the diaspora also contributes to the continuation of the conflict. Although estimated figures are non-existent, the SPLA-IO

does receive external support from the diaspora and is therefore a source of income for the largest rebel militia in the country (this is alleged not to be of significant proportion (Interview I & IV)). Another negative influence is the existing bloated fragmentation and existence of even deeper entrenched grievances among the ethnic communities in the diaspora. This negatively impacts their political involvement in the present situation in the country. Due to their easy escape routes to their families and their second homes, they do not experience the consequences of their political actions. This undermines their political responsibility and gives them a lack of representational power towards the average South Sudanese.

Chapter 10 – Conclusion

This thesis has focused on the civil war in South Sudan and especially the contribution made by several factors to the continuation of the conflict in the country. These factors have been composed by using the greed and grievance theory by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and the subsequent debate. By identifying these variables, a lens has been created to analyze the case of the current South Sudanese civil war. To do so, a literature study has been conducted on both academic and non-academic sources. Besides, several expert-interviews have been held in order to nuance, verify and falsify the findings made. This thesis has aimed to answer the central research question: *How do the different factors, identified through the greed and grievance debate, contribute to the continuation of the South Sudan civil war since 2013?* The research has found that each of the underlying factors contributes to the continuation of the civil war through various ways. Although Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that each of the identified variables influences civil war from a perspective of greed, this thesis has revealed the complexity of their influence. This has resulted in a more nuanced perspective towards the contributions made by these underlying factors in which both greed and grievance characteristics have been observed.

So, how do the different factors contribute to the continuation of the current civil war in South Sudan? The continuation of the civil war in South Sudan is caused by the current status quo of the conflict between both opposition and government sides of the civil war. Both sides have experienced significant fragmentation within their ranks since December 2013 and are troubled by the poor economic circumstances in the country. After its economy collapsed, both sides have been forced to fight a low-costs war. They have been able to do so due to the prevalence of weapons in the country and by using ethnicity as a mobilizing tool. However, lacking significant resources, both have proven unable to overcome the other. Furthermore, this also has caused both parties to not have the means to effectively manage their own troops. Therefore, the civil war has spiraled into a situation with a general lack of law and order over the militias in the country. This inability to effectively steer military troops causes insecurity to prevail in the country as the lack of law and order leaves a window of opportunity for all kinds of tensions to be expressed. Decades of divide-and-rule tactics, in the ethnically diverse setting of South Sudan, have resulted in these prevailing tensions between different ethnic communities. The ethnic targeting of Nuer in Juba in December 2013 has proven to be a catalysator of ethnic feud. The following years of civil war have proven to be an enabler of

hatred being expressed between the different communities through tribal militias. These underlying grievances have caused a widespread insecurity in South Sudan in which tribal militias have become politically entangled and have been proxied by both opposition and government parties. Personal and political motivations – often greed-based – have abused existing grievances and the poor economic circumstances in the country to do so. Unable to control these grievances, insecurity has prevailed due to a lack of law and order which is further increased due to the geographic and social composition of South Sudan. Due to its vast size, low accessibility of rural areas and the high dispersion and mobility among its population, both sides are facing boundaries which they are unable to overcome. Therefore, either side of the conflict is unable to increase stability in the country.

Further, on a social level, the dichotomy between different ethnic communities has been entrenched by the continuation of the kleptocratic system in the country. The patronizing practices of the South Sudanese elite, headed by President Kiir, have focused on rewarding 'warlords' by using oil revenues to 'buy peace' and loyalty. Since the start of the civil war and the purge of the main political party, this has followed ethnic preferences and further incited anti-government sentiments throughout the country. As the average South Sudanese is experiencing hardship to obtain basic needs, the dichotomy between the political elite and the average citizen has further increased. While the majority of South Sudanese is relying on foreign aid through funding by the diaspora or aid organizations, the elite is subjected to increasingly less political responsibility because of their ability to reside and invest outside the country. This has led to the general situation in which the greed of the government elite is inciting grievances among the opposition in South Sudan and the average population.

Funded by the oil revenues, the rule of President Kiir has resulted in the presence of a 'resource curse' in South Sudan in which military, politics and business have become entangled. As this system is highly dependent on the oil revenues in the country, the oil sector is both a source of finance as well as a target for the opposition. Using ethnicity to mobilize support, the areas around the oil fields in Unity state are experiencing ongoing insecurity in an attempt to obstruct the oil sector and therefore cutting government funding. The target posed by the oil fields has resulted in grievances among the local population who have experienced atrocities in the attempts of both sides to obtain the oil-rich areas. The unequal share of oil revenues therefore finds its origin in the greed of the elite and has caused widespread grievances among those not able to profit.

This thesis has revealed the entangled influence of multiple underlying factors on the continuation of the civil war in South Sudan. The research has shown that both greed and grievance factors are having an impact on the concept of civil war. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is necessary to include both greed and grievance variables in research aiming to address complex phenomena such as civil war. To exclude one of the two perspectives leads to an incomplete and shortsighted view on the reality. However, the greed and grievance debate has proven to be a useful lens to observe the civil war in South Sudan as it has enabled this thesis to identify multiple influential factors in the current conflict. Consequently, this thesis has presented a comprehensive overview of the case and has addressed the situation in South Sudan from multiple perspectives. Therefore, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the civil war in South Sudan and the complex contribution of its underlying factors. Besides, it has revealed the complexity of both greed and grievance components within these different factors.

This thesis has found its limitations in the volume of the investigated subject and the means available to do so. A significant challenge was to overcome the absence of abundant literature on the current situation in South Sudan with its civil war still ongoing. However, by using both literature and interviews, the research design has enabled the creation of a comprehensive overview of the situation. The choice of five different underlying variables, however, has proven an obstacle in analyzing several factors as in-depth as was aimed for at the start of the process. Although no concessions have been made in the quality of the analysis, the number of factors investigated have withheld the author the ability to add more detailed descriptions and additional examples. Therefore, it is recommended for further research in this direction to dive deeper into a smaller number of different factors and investigate the specific contribution of each factor even more in-depth. Another recommendation to a slightly different direction of further research would be to carry out a second case study on a different case of civil war. This in order to increase the generalizability of the findings made as this thesis has been unable to do so as it has observed a single case.

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