Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management

Political stability in the Niger Delta

Program: Master Crisis & Security Management

Institution: Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Name: Tim Groothuizen

Student number: 1921460

Date of admission: 2018-03-13

Table of Contents:

List of Tables

Abstract

This research will identify specific indicators that are able to describe the conditions of political stability in the Niger Delta. By making use of the theoretical framework, that Barnett R. Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) has provided, this research tries to establish a new academic insight. The indicators that are being presented should not be seen as direct causes of political stability, but as factors that are in general linked to the increasing or decreasing of political stability in a certain region. This research will compare indicators based on the framework of Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) in their presence/absence during the relatively stable period of 2009-2011 to the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016. A document and content analysis form the basis in selecting the data that will be necessary to determine the relevant indicators. So in the end, this research will analyze the most important indicators and examine them in depth during the described periods of time. By performing such an analysis, the aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of the political stability in the Niger Delta area and other similar regions. Besides that, it could potentially help to predict the political stability trends of such regions.

1. Introduction

This thesis aims to produce an image of the factors that have impact on the political stability history of the Niger Delta, specifically focusing on the relatively stable period of 2009-2011 and the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016. The theoretical framework that Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) has provided will form the basis of the framework that will be used during a content analysis. This analysis will asses which indicators are most important in the context of the Niger Delta and elaborate on the reason why. This thesis will try to do so by answering the following research question: *"To what extent are the political stability indicators, provided by Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339), present in the Niger Delta and what does that tell us about the political stability trend of the region?"*. The presence of those political stability indicators will be compared, during the relatively stable period of 2009-2011 to the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016, by making use of a content analysis. This introduction will first elaborate on the turbulent history of the Niger Delta, the political stability trends of the region and important events. Furthermore, this introduction will focus on the academic and societal relevance. It will finish by presenting the research question in combination with the structure of this thesis.

1.1 History of instability in the Niger Delta

Political instability in the Niger Delta arose during the early 1990s, due to tensions between foreign oil corporations and a number of the Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups. These minorities felt that they were being exploited, by missing out on oil and gas revenue extracted from their own soil. This caused the emerge of criminal gangs and militias in the region. Political unrest has continued throughout the following decades, despite the conversion to democracy and the election of the Olusegun Obasanjo government in 1999. Competition for oil wealth has fuelled violence, causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by further

emerge of ethnic militias, criminal gangs, Nigerian military and police forces. In 2004 the violence reached a climax, with criminal activities aimed at oil companies, such as piracy, kidnappings, oil looting and illegal bunkering (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-274) (Newsom, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, pp. 2-16).

A new phase began in 2009. During that year Nigeria was (temporarily) relieved from the extreme violence and crime in the Niger Delta. This development was mainly attributed to a general agreement between militia leaders, the Nigerian government and multinationals (such as Shell), called the Presidential Amnesty Programme. The Amnesty Programme was later integrated in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme which had the same goals and approach, but just had slightly broader definition. As stated above, the Nigerian government, led by President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, was losing a lot of income due to militia attacks on oil productions. On top of that, during the previous years, most of the Niger Delta community supported these militants, who were active in that region, presumably due to poverty and feelings of insecurity. In other words, President Yar'adua was losing his legitimacy in the region and revenue to uphold the rule of law and the ability to deliver public services. These developments resulted in the Amnesty project, in which the administration stimulated the militia and criminal gangs to hand over their guns and stop with the violence and criminal acts in return for compensation and reintegration (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289).

In October 2009, most of the major militia leaders who were active in the Niger Delta region, accepted the offer of amnesty from the Nigerian government. This amnesty guaranteed the members of the surrendered militias and criminal gangs freedom from prosecution and monthly payments to be able to reintegrate within society and the ability to participate in

education. However, soon it became clear that this agreement was not sustainable. One of the reasons was that the Nigerian government did not pay most of the promised fees for reintegration and rehabilitation of the community in the region, during the years after the initiation of the Amnesty project (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-4) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 1-17). There seems to be some form of general agreement within the used academic literature that there was stability and security within the region, during the period 2009 – 2011. After this period the region slowly started to become restless again. Kidnapping, piracy, (oil) looting, illegal bunkering and armed raids on oil platforms and other forms of oil infrastructure, which were carried out by different militant and criminal organizations became business as usual (Aghedo, 2015, pp. 137-153) (Boris, 2015, pp. 568 - 573) (Eke, 2016, pp. 136-159). According to a report from the United States Institute of Peace, there was an arms build up during the end of 2011, which was also seen before the 2003 and 2007 elections in Nigeria (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16). Although the 2010 elections temporarily drew most of the political focus away from the Niger Delta, the tensions among the communities were slowly building up again. Several reports stated that new groups of militants were on the rise to claim a share of the profit from the natural resources in several ways. In the end, the looting, illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping and other forms of serious crime started again on a large scale, during 2013 and the following years, such as seen before the Amnesty project. In general, the reports and academic literature states that the period of 2014-2016 has to be considered as a period where the political stability trend of the Niger Delta was in a clear downward spiral (Aghedo, 2015, pp. 137-153) (Boris, 2015, pp. 563 - 573) (Eke, 2016, pp. 136-159) (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2016) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 1-17) (Platform London, 2012, pp. 16-22).

1.2 Thesis Relevance

At an academic point of view, the political stability in the Niger Delta area should be considered as a subject that is both relevant to the Public Administration and the Crisis and Security Management field. Governance, International Relations, Conflict studies, (Public) Policy, Private Public Partnership, crime and security are concepts that form the basis of this research design. This research aims to create insights in political (in)stability and the feeling of (in)stability by the community that is based in the Niger Delta area. From a theoretical relevance point of view this research could provide an insight on the indicators that are most relevant in gauging a negative or a positive trend regarding political stability in the region. So in other words, the conclusion regarding the relevant indicators could potentially help to support any policy to bring stability to the Niger Delta. Furthermore, a more stable and secure region will also be beneficial for Nigeria in general, with its potential economical boost, by generating more profit from the energy sector. The conclusion could also support the governance and Public Private Partnerships in regions which are also enriched with natural resources and (potentially) deal with the same, or similar tensions as the Niger Delta.

1.3 Research Question

As mentioned above, this thesis will try to produce an image of the political stability of the Niger Delta, with in specific a focus on the relatively stable period of 2009-2011 compared to the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016. This aim will be accomplished by answering the following research question:

To what extent are the political stability indicators, provided by Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339)*, present in the Niger Delta and what does that tell us about the political stability trend of the region?*

This research question is aimed at distinguishing the most important stability indicators, provided by Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339), when looking at the political stability trend in the Niger Delta during two periods in time. The theoretical framework from Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) is originally focused on Afghanistan during the post-Cold War era. His work describes the interaction between all of the indicators that influence political stability and instability within Afghanistan, during that period of time. Originally the framework was based on a Clingendael Institute report named; The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (2005). This report presented the same type of framework accompanied with instructions on how to perform a political stability analysis of a state or region.

As mentioned during this Introduction chapter, a comparison will be made between the relatively stable period of 2009-2011 to the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016, according to the theoretical framework of Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339). This first period is characterized by the Amnesty programme that is initiated by the Yar'adua government and the second period is characterized by the relatively unstable period that followed. During this second period the looting, illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping and other forms of serious crime were seen on a large scale again, just as before the introduction of the Amnesty programme. The history of the Niger Delta and in specific the characteristics of the two mentioned periods has been presented in the form of a literature review at the beginning of this Introduction chapter. This review will form the basis to perform a content analysis, according to the framework of Rubin. Some of the academic literature that has been presented during this introduction and other documents will be used to perform the content analysis. In the end, this will create an image of the most important Indicators of Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) in the case of the Niger Delta and will enable to tell more about the political stability trend in the

region, during the two chosen periods of time. The Methodology chapter will further elaborate on the use of the framework that will be used during the content analysis.

2. Theoretical Framework Conflict Studies

The inherent challenge of a comparison in the presence of political stability indicators between the relatively stable period of 2009-2011 to the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016 within the Niger Delta lies in defining what political stability exactly entails and how this comparison should be made. In the end the aim will be to create an image of the most important indicators that determine the trend in political stability within the Niger Delta, during the two periods of time. In short, political stability can be summarized as the balance of stability within a specific region. However, the definition is slightly more complicated when it comes down to a political risk analysis of a region, such as it is the case in this research. The first part of this chapter will focus on a broader definition of political stability. This will be followed by explaining the underlying theoretical basis of the concept of political stability, provided by Gultang (1958, pp. 159 - 167). The chapter will finish by discussing the political risk assessment framework provided by Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339), which will form the basis of the analysis of this research.

2.1 Defining Political Stability

When defining political stability, according to Claude Ake (1975) it is important to avoid an important presumption; The presumption that some political acts are intrinsically destabilizing. Political acts such as coups d'états, political assassinations, and (forced) changes in executive positions of the state should not necessarily be seen as acts that by definition will cause political instability. Each political act can have a positive or negative effect on the political stability trend of a region. For example, imagine a state with a political system in which the law prescribes elections must be held every four years. When looking at a political leader of such a state one would expect, that when he refuses to maintain this law in order to maintain his power, it would have a negative effect on the political stability.

However, the succession of political leaders itself can be destabilizing for a state, so the continuation of one political leader can also have a positive effect on the political stability of a state. This shows why it is important to lose presumptions when it comes down to defining political stability. It also shows that the definition of political stability should focus on the effect of political acts on a region or state instead off focusing on the concept itself (Ake, 1975) (Margolis, 2010, pp. 326-345).

In other words, when looking at political stability, negative or positive effects of political acts are important, because each act within the world of politics can be either one. Without this presumption, political stability could be defined best as a pattern of political behavior concentrated on the relationship between the institutional representation of roles and structures with society and their continuously changing social construction (Margolis, 2010, p. 342). At the same time, political stability should be seen as the health status of authority, resilience, legitimacy and replacement in a political object from an operational perspective. Usually when political stability is being discussed within literature, it focuses on states or regions. An important note is that a state or region is just one example of a political object. Religious organizations, international institutions, businesses, mass movements, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups, for example, all struggle with the stability of power relationships. In other words, political stability can be more than just stability from a state perspective (Margolis, 2010, p. 336). Nevertheless, this thesis will focus on the Niger Delta, which is a region within Nigeria. Each political act that is being described within the analyzed documents can have a negative or positive effect on the political stability trend in the Niger Delta during the two used periods in time. The political acts will be reviewed according to the framework that Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) has provided. This framework exists out of trend

assessment question, which clearly define when a political act can be identified in a positive or negative way.

2.2 Basic Human Needs by Galtung

According to Johan Galtung (1958, pp. 159 - 167) the basis of political, security and conflict research could always be traced back to basic human needs. With this knowledge it is important to keep in mind that politics should not be considered as a random process, there is always some form of goal-directedness present. Actors, individual, collective, subnational or supranational (including transnational) try to attain something in their interest. This everlasting effort to realize goals by implementing programs written in a goal language usually leads to conflicts, including conflicts over the definitions of those programs (Galtung, 1958, pp. 159-167).

So which goals should be taken most seriously? From a political point of view, goals should be as close to human needs as possible and at the same time express social reality (Goertzel, 1987, pp. 14-17). When it comes to variables regarding measuring political systems there is a wide variety. States can be seen as poor versus rich, powerless versus powerful. Societies can be conceived as open versus closed, capitalist versus socialist; the world system can be seen as unipolar versus bipolar versus multipolar (Agnew, 2003, pp. 127-135). Galtung (1958, pp. 159-167) claims that in the end all these variables are abstractions relative to the concrete satisfaction of basic human needs. The general view taken here is that the answers to political problems have to be found in political power formations and conflict, specifically in the structures built into human societies and the relations between human societies (Galtung, 1958, pp. 159-167). The realization of this concept, which binds politics to basic human needs, is important for this research. It provides a fundament for the stability indicators

provided by Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) within this academic research. The connection between politics and basic human needs works both ways. Governments can satisfy basic human needs to society, but on their turn basic human needs of a society can influence governments and their political acts. This means that there is a connection to political stability, due to the fact that political acts by governments play an important role in the satisfaction of basic human needs of its society (Moon & Dixon, 1985, pp. 688-690).

As shown below in table 2.1, the basic human needs can be linked to Socio-political problems, according to Galtung (1958, pp. 159-167). The basic human needs are categorized in; Most Basic Needs, Basic Needs, Near-Basic Needs and Relation to Nature. Each of those categories can be divided into practical needs, such as food or work. These practical needs on their turn can directly be linked to socio-political problems. Take for example, freedom, which can be linked to repression versus human rights. When individuals experience a certain amount of freedom within a society, there must be some degree to which human rights are being uphold. All of these socio-political problems in their turn form the basis of the indicators with their trend assessment question as seen in table 2.2. This means that the political acts performed by the Nigerian government can be traced back to the aim to satisfy basic human needs of its people, in the case of this thesis the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. Of course the absence of political acts can also be seen as a result that has influence on the indicators of Rubin. This is the case when one of the trend assessment question can be answered in a negative way.

Basic Needs	Socio-Political Problems
The Most Basic Needs	
Life & Survival	Violence versus Security
	Absence of violence
Basic Needs	
Input: food, water	Poverty versus growth
Environment protection: Clothes, shelter & health	Well-being
Community: education & social interaction	
Near-Basic Needs	
Work, creativity, freedom, mobility & participation	Repression versus human rights
	Social justice
Relation to Nature	
Partnership	Environmental deterioration
	Ecological balance
	- Depletion problem
	- Pollution problem
	- Population problem

Table 2.1 Basic Needs versus Socio-Political Problems (Galtung, 1958, pp. 159 - 167)

2.3 The Political Stability Indicators by Rubin

The work of Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) provides a framework of indicators for political stability, which is able to help create an image of the political stability of a country or region. This framework was based on a Clingendael Institute report named; The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (2005).

Rubin's framework consists of twelve indicators, which are divided among the following categories:

Governance indicators:

- The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state in upholding the rule of law, including the domain of human rights.

- To which extent the state is delivering public sector services to its citizens.

Security indicators:

- The extent to which the state holds the monopoly on violence trough a democratically controlled security sector.

- The extent to which the state is able to guarantee the security of its citizens throughout its territory.

- The extent to which the state is capable in holding off threats from external actors.

Socio-economic Development indicators:

- The extent to which economic benefits are equally distributed.

- To which extent are there demographic pressures and hostilities present.

In essence, the Clingendael Institute report (2005) is a guide for a trend analysis, focused on the political stability of a region. A trend analysis has the advantage to deliver a comprehensive image of political stability, by focusing on social, political, economic, and security conditions of a region. It is important to keep in mind that the twelve indicators of the framework are not the direct causes or consequences of political instability. They should be seen as indicators that are in general linked to the decreasing or increasing of political stability and enable them to create an image of the trend (Verstegen, 2005).

Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) uses the framework on Afghanistan, during the post-Cold War era. His work describes the interaction between all of the indicators that cause political stability and instability within Afghanistan. As shown below, each indicator can be expressed in a trend assessment question. Those trend assessment questions can be answered in a positive or negative way. So it has a positive or negative effect on the political stability of a specific region. Throughout this research, the results which have a positive effect on the political stability of the Niger Delta will be displayed in green color with a (+) behind it and the negative results in a red color with a (-) behind it. A result is being assessed as positive or negative when one of the indicators is being recognized, according to on of the trend assessment questions. The trend assessment question can always be answered in a positive, negative or useless way regarding political stability. The positive (+) and negative (-) are there to make sure readers get a clear image of the trend when it is printed in black and white. At the same time a distinction will be made between two time frames. The relatively stable period of 2009 – 2012 and the relatively instable period of 2014 – 2016.

As described in the introduction, the period of 2009-2012 is seen in literature as relatively stable, one of the main reasons according to a large amount of academic literature is the amnesty programme initiated by the government (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16). So one would expect positive results on the trend assessment questions when looking at this period. The period of 2014-2016 is seen as relatively instable, due to failure of the amnesty programme and a large arms build-up in the region. During this period, one would expect in general more negative results on the trend assessment questions coupled to the indicators. The results of the analysis will show which indicators are important to analyze the expected stability trend during the first period and the instability trend during the second period (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2016).

Nr.	Indicators of (in)stability	Trend Assessment Questions (example)
	Governance Indicators	
1	Legitimacy of the State	Is the state viewed primarily as illegitimate or criminal, or as a legitimate actor representative of the people as a whole?
2	Public Service Delivery	Is public service delivery progressively deteriorating or improving?
3	Rule of Law (with Human Rights)	Are human rights violated and the rule of law arbitrarily applied or suspended, or is a basic rule of law established and are violations ceasing?
4	Leadership	Are elites increasingly factionalized, or do they have national perspectives? Are leaders capable of winning loyalties across group lines in society?
	Security Indicators	
5	Security apparatus	Does the security apparatus operate as a 'state within a state', or is a professional military established that is answerable to legitimate civilian control?
6	Regional Setting	Are destabilizing regional (cross-border) interventions by multinationals, NGO's, IGO's or other political actors reducing or increasing?
	Socio-economic Development Indicators	
7	Demographic Pressures	Are pressures mounting or easing?
8	Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation	Is there massive movement of refugees and IDPs, creating humanitarian emergencies, or these resettled and resolved?
9	Group-based Hostilities	Is there a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance and paranoia, or is there reconciliation and a reduction of hostilities?
10	Emigration and Human Flight	Is there chronic and sustained human flight or a reduction in the rate of emigration?
11	Economic Opportunities of Groups	Is there uneven economic development along group lines, or are such disparities reducing?
12	State of the Economy	Is there sharp or severe economic decline, or is the economy growing?

Table 2.2 Indicators of Indicators for Stability Assessment Framework (Rubin, 2013, p. 261)

3. Methodology

This methodological chapter will shed light on the character of the research and an explanation of the type of analysis that will be used, namely a content analysis. Different aspects will be explained regarding this type of analysis, such as the documents that will be used, the universe, way of sampling and coding. This research has a deductive character because its starts from the perspective of a theoretical framework provided by Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) and The Clingendael Institute Report (2005) with the underlying basis of the human needs described by conflict studies (Galtung, 1958, pp. 159 - 167). The research will be of a qualitative nature, executed by making use of a single case study design, because the political stability of only the Niger delta will be explored during this research. However, at the same time the design also has a comparative character because of the use of the two time frames. In the end the research will gather an in depth understanding surrounding the trend of political stability in the Niger Delta, during 2009 – 2010 compared to 2013- 2014 (Yin, 2014; Kumar, 2011).

3.1 Content Analysis

A content analysis is method that finds its origins within the social sciences. This method of analysis uses specific research materials, which have a communicational character. This term has a broad meaning, which indicates it can focus on a variety of material such as: (written) conversations, books, letters, newspapers, reports, academic literature, paintings, etc.

Due to the communicative functions of these materials it is possible to look at the meaning of the content. Which in essence leads us to the center of qualitative research, namely an interpretative method where the focus lies on the reconstruction of the meaning behind content. This is exactly the research method that suits this thesis, due to fact that the factors

that influence political stability in the Niger Delta, should be examined by looking at the extensive available materials which already have been published concerning the political stability of this region.

A content analysis always uses raw material and the researcher has to observe this material to capture the relevant meaning behind the content. This is at the same time one of the pitfalls of this type of analysis, due to the fact that the researcher is always biased to a certain extent. This is why it is important to generate a clear coding sheet with straight definitions of the indicators, in which the researcher is being seduced to involve his own visions as little as possible. The straight definitions of the indicators will be given in the form of a clear trend assessment question, which will make sure that each indicator can be recognized in a positive or negative way. Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339) already generated trend assessment questions for each indictor. Later in this Methodology chapter these trend assessment questions will be refined, to make sure that these questions only can unambiguously be answered.

In this research, a content analysis would be one of the appropriate methods to answer the Research Question, due to the fact that there are several academic articles and reports, focusing on the specific two periods of time within the Niger Delta, which includes content about the trend in political stability. In other words, by analyzing these documents on their meaning of their content, it can paint an image to which extent the stability indicators are present or absent. These results will help in generating clear trend image of political stability during the two periods of time and point out which indicators have substantial influence.

3.2 Universe & Sampling

The universe surrounding the political stability of the Niger Delta is quite extensive and sometimes contradictory. There are a lot of reports available, provided by NGO's, IGO's and multinationals. For instance, institutions like Platform London, United States Institute of Peace, The United Nations, The International Crisis Group, The World Bank and The Justice Atlas, who among other things, focus on social and political conflict. Besides these institutions there is a lot of academic literature on the topic available, provided by different kind of research institutions. The fact that there is extensive information available on this topic enables the possibility to perform a content analysis. In this case, such an analysis is aimed to create a view on the dynamics of the political stability in the Niger Delta within the two periods of time. In the end, this will contribute in answering the research question, by creating an image of the political stability trends and the interactions between the indicators, during those periods of time.

It is impossible to analyze all the available material surrounding this topic, so sampling is needed. First of all, a selection in origin and type of document has to take place and at the same time there has to be made sure that there is some form of diversity present. During this research the used documents should focus on the two selected periods of time and at the same time counter the topic of political stability in the Niger Delta. This content analysis will focus on twenty picked documents provided by different institutions and journals. These document vary in their origin, author and type of structure. This will make sure that there is a natural variety in the used documents on this topic and will generate a diverse image of political stability in the Niger Delta, during two periods of time. The documents are all extracted from the Leiden Online University Library or Google Scholar, by using the following search keywords; "Political Stability Niger Delta 2009 – 2011" and "Political Stability Niger Delta

2014 – 2016". Of course these two keywords do not always directly produce suited documents, so that's why they are being scanned at first. This scan will focus on the title, abstract and introduction and look for information about political stability in combination with one of the indicators during one of the two periods of time. In other words, when the title, abstract or introduction of the document show a positive or negative result regarding one of the trend assessment questions, the document will be analyzed. This way the research tries to prevent any form of prejudice. However, this will remain a difficult point, because the researcher himself performs the scan of the documents. In an ideal world, this should be done randomly, in which the researcher is not directly involved in the selection of documents for an analysis. Nevertheless, the content analysis of the chosen documents will generate a broad picture of the political stability trends within the Niger Delta, by focusing on the presence or absence of the indicators provided by the Clingendael report (2005) and Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339).

3.3 Documents

Focused on political stability in the Niger Delta during: 2009 – 2011:

Cline, L. (2011). Today we shall drink blood': Internal unrest in Nigeria. *Small Wars and Insurgencies, 22* (2), 273-289.

Newsom, C. (2011). *United States Institute of Peace.* Retrieved March 27, 2017, from Special Report: Conflict in the Niger Delta:

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf

Oluduro, O., & Oluduro, O. F. (2012). Nigeria: In search of sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the amnesty programme. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, *5*(7).

Igini, M. (2011). Federal Government Amnesty Strategy in the Niger Delta. Retrieved 26, October, 2017, from:

https://www.africaportal.org/publications/federal-government-amnesty-strategy-in-the-niger-delta-will-it-go-beyond-satisficing-minimalism/

Udegbunam, K.C. (2013). Repositioning Nigeria's Amnesty Programme for Conflict Transformation and Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *Singaporean Journal of Business, Economics and Management Studies*, *2*(1), 42-58.

Sayne, A. (2013). *What's next for security in the Niger Delta?* United States Institute of Peace.

Egwemi, V. (2010). From militancy to amnesty: Some thoughts on President Yar'Adua's approach to the Niger Delta crisis. *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory*, *2*(3), 136-141.

Oluwaniyi, O. O. (2011). Post-Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta: Challenges and prospects. *Conflict Trends*, *2011*(4), 46-54.

International Crisis Group. (2009). Nigeria: Seizing the moment in the Niger Delta. *Africa Briefing N60*, 1-19.

Asuni, J. B. (2010). *Understanding the armed groups of the Niger Delta* (pp. 1-27). New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

Focused on political stability in the Niger Delta during: 2014 – 2016:

Zambakari, C. D. (2017). Instability in the Greater Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: An Analysis of Violent Events 2011-2015. Retrieved 25, October, 2017, from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950879

Ebiede, T.M. (2017). Community Conflicts and Armed Militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Change and Continuity? *Society & Natural Resources* 30:10, pages 1197-1211.

Okonofua, B. A. (2016). The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of Transitioning from Peace Settlements to Long-Term Peace. *SAGE Open*, *6*(2), pages 1-16.

Onokerhoraye, A. G. & Ikelegbe, A. (2016). The Amnesty for Peace in the Niger Delta: Political Settlement, Transitional Justice and Peace Building.

Risk Intelligence. (2016). A guide to militant, ex militant and activist groups in the Niger Delta. Retrieved August 27, 2017, from: https://www.norclub.no/assets/ArticleFiles/08-June-2016-Guide-to-Niger-Delta-Groups-2016.pdf

Adebayo, A. G. (2016). Economic Growth and Investments in Nigeria: A Synthesis of Sustainable National Security and Enabling Political Environment. *World Journal of Finance and Investment Research*, *1*(1), 13-26.

International Crisis Group. (2015) Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta. *Africa Report N231*, 1-27.

Tobor, J. (2016). Culture and the amnesty program in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *European Journal of Research in Social Sciences Vol*, *4*(3), 14-22.

Odubo, F. E., & Tobor, J. O. (2016). Nigeria's amnesty program: An educational and cultural perspective. *African Educational Research Journal*, *4*(1), 1-7.

Ebiede, T. M. (2017) Beyond rebellion: Uncaptured dimensions of violent conflicts and the implications for peacebuilding in Nigeria's Niger Delta. *African Security*, *10*(1), 25-46.

3.4 Categories and Unit of Analysis for this Study

Rubin (2013) describes in his work specific indicators and focuses, among other things, on the political stability in Afghanistan during the post Cold-War era. This thesis will show that some of these indicators should be seen as important factors that are able to asses the political stability of specific regions, in this case the Niger Delta. As mentioned before, Rubin uses the Clingendael report (2005), to come up with his political stability framework. This framework consists out of indicators which are covered by three different overlapping categories. The indicators are incorporated into a governance, security apparatus or socio-economic development category.

During the performance of the content analysis each indicator will be a category, which is linked to a trend assessment question. This trend assessment question can be answered with a positive, negative or useless answer. The unit of analysis will be paragraphs. Due to the fact that extracting information from paragraphs will create a broader image of political stability, than just using words or sentences. Each abstract, introduction and conclusion of the twenty

documents will be analyzed. These specific parts usually cover the most important parts of academic documents and reports.

3.5 Coding Process during this Study

During the coding process each indicator, which is linked to the trend assessment question, will be distinguished in a positive, negative or useless result. Each time an indicator is present in one of the paragraphs, it should be determined if the specific passage in the paragraph has a positive (+) or negative (-) effect on the political stability in the Niger Delta, during one of the specific time frames. So in other words, can the trend assessment question of each indicator be answered with a yes (positive) or a no (negative).

In the end this will create a quantitative coding scheme with an image of the presence of the indicators, in a positive or negative way regarding the political stability trend, during that specific period of time. This analysis will look for contingencies, so not just the frequencies of de indicators will be relevant, but the relation between those indicators ass well. These results will make it possible to generate an image about the trend in political stability and have the ability to show which indicators are most relevant. As mentioned above, besides the twelve indicators, a useless code is present as well. This will be used when one of the paragraphs do not show any content about one of the indicators in a positive or negative way.

Table 3.1 shows the category scheme which will be used during the content analysis. It is based on the Clingendael report (2005), Fund for Peace framework (2014) and the research of Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339). The trend assessment questions are slightly refined compared to the work of these institutions. This way the presence of the indicators, can be reviewed by answering a clear trend assessment question, which only can be answered in a positive, negative or useless manner. After presenting Table 3.1, each indicator will be discussed individually, by generating the definition behind the trend assessment question.

Nr.	Indicators of (in)stability	Trend Assessment Questions (example)
Governance Indicators		
1	Legitimacy of the State	Is the state a legitimate actor representative of the people as a whole?
2	Public Service Delivery	Is public service delivery progressively improving?
3	Rule of Law (with Human Rights)	Is a basic rule of law with human rights established?
4	Leadership	Do elites have national perspectives? So are leaders capable of winning loyalties across group lines in society?
Security Indicators		
5	Security apparatus	Is there a professional security apparatus with a democratic structure present?
6	Regional Setting	Are destabilizing regional (cross-border) interventions by multinationals, NGO's, IGO's or other political actors reducing?
Socio-economic Development Indicators		
7	Demographic Pressures	Are demographic (population density, ethnicity, nationality, religious and educational) pressures easing?
8	Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation	Are massive movement of refugees and IDPs, creating humanitarian emergencies declining or not present at all?
9	Group-based Hostilities	Is there reconciliation and a reduction of hostilities between hostile groups within society?
10	Emigration and Human Flight	Is there a reduction in the rate of emigration?
11	Economic Opportunities of Groups	Are the economic disparities along group reducing?
12	State of the Economy	Is the economy growing?

Table 3.1 Political Stability Category Scheme for the Niger Delta (Rubin, 2013, pp. 256 - 339) (The Fund for Peace , 2014) (Verstegen, 2005)

Legitimacy of the State

This indicator is focused on legitimacy from a governance perspective. In other words, to which extent is the Nigerian government, from state, regional and local perspective, being viewed as a legitimate actor that represents its inhabitants, by its citizens? The legitimacy will improve when policy in general is being implemented and maintained and the inhabitants accept this. It will decline when policy is not being implemented and maintained that is accepted as right and just by citizens. Take for example the implementation of the Amnesty programme, which is being viewed as a legitimate intervention to establish reintegration of members of the militia and criminal gangs. In the end, this programme was aimed to decline the instability and violence in the Niger Delta region (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 16-17).

Public Service Delivery

This indicator looks at the presence and delivery of public services. To what extent does the local community of the Niger Delta have access to public service delivery and are investments being made to improve it? Think of education, health care and other social support. If this is accessible and/or investments are being made, this means it will have a positive effect on the political stability of the region. However, when there is less accessibility or no investments are being made this will work the other way around region (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52).

Rule of Law (with Human Rights)

This indicator focuses on the establishment of basic rule of law within the region. It includes the question weather human rights are present within the prescribed law of Nigeria and to which extent those laws are being upheld. So if basic rule of law, which includes human

rights, is being identified as existing within the Niger Delta, it will have a positive effect on the political stability. If not, it will have a negative effect on the political stability trend (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52).

Leadership

When looking at leadership the focus should lie on the key figures of the government of Nigeria and their credibility and legitimacy. So in other words, are the different ethnic groups loyal to the Nigerian government and especially to their president. If so, this means this will have a positive effect on the political stability and visa versa (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52).

Security Apparatus

To what extent does the Nigerian government provide security within the Niger Delta? If there is a security apparatus present, does it have to answer to a democratic structure? When the Nigerian government is providing a democratic security apparatus, this will have a positive effect on the political stability trend. However, when this presence of the security apparatus is declining, it will have a negative effect on the political stability (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52).

Regional Setting

This indicator focuses on the destabilizing regional (cross-border) interventions, by multinationals, NGO's, IGO's or other political actors. Think of the oil and gas multinationals, such as Shell, who settled in the Niger Delta to extract natural resources from the soil and caused dissatisfaction among local community, due to pollution and unfair distribution of the profit from the natural resources, during the early 90s and later on in history (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16).

So if these interventions are present within the Niger delta this will have a negative effect on the political stability trend, however when these are not present it will have a positive effect.

Demographic Pressures

When focusing on demographic pressures the following factors play an important role; population density, particular group settlement patterns and skewed population distribution. These are the three factors play the main role in area's who cope with demographic pressures. Usually this goes hand in hand with the unequal distribution of food, economic wealth in general and natural resources (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52). Especially those last two factors play an important role within the Niger Delta. The local community clearly is dissatisfied by the unequal distribution of the revenue that is being made by the natural resources of the Niger Delta (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16).

Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation

This indicator focuses on the any form of mass movement of refugees or internally displaced persons. During the initial literature review it did not show that there were mass movements of people within the Niger Delta area (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 1-17). However, the documents that are being used for the content analysis must be conclusive weather there are problems regarding refugees or internally displaced persons within the area.

Group-based Hostilities

Group-based hostilities are usually based on a long history of exclusion, warfare, or any form stereotyping of groups. These forms of oppression usually initiate hostilities among groups within communities (Verstegen, 2005). The initial literature review definitely showed a lot of

group-based hostilities among criminal gangs, militia, other ethnic clans and the government (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 1-17).

Emigration and Human Flight

This indicator focuses on Emigration in general, including human flight. So if there is a lot of emigration from a country, it will usually stands for a negative political stability trend (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52). So during the analysis it is important to look for signs of emigration of the local Niger Delta community in general and in specific human flight.

Economic Opportunities of Groups

Economic development can be an important indicator for the trend in political stability of an area. However, what seems to be even more important is the distribution of economic opportunities among the community as a whole. As described above, there seems to be no equal distribution of economic opportunities, regarding the benefit of the natural resources of the Niger Delta (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 16-17).

State of the Economy

This last indicator focuses on the general improvement of the economy. A declining economy can have fatal impact on the political stability of a region. It can stimulate corruption, poverty and have a negative effect on the performance of the government as a whole (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52). During the analysis the focus will not lie only on the economy of the Niger Delta, but on the economy of Nigeria in general, because the documents and literature focus on the economy of the state and not on regions.

4. Analysis

This chapter displays the results of the Content Analysis in two charts, each focused on a specific period of time. All of the documents are analyzed (the abstract, introduction and conclusion) to see if the indicators showed up in a negative or positive way, regarding the trend in political stability of the Niger Delta. After the presentation of each coding sheet, the results will be discussed, in accordance with quotes from the analyzed documents.

	Focused on 2009 - 2011	Documents									
		Cline (2011)	Newsom (2011)	Oluduro & Oluduro (2012)	Igini (2011)	Udegbunam (2013)	Sayne, (2013)	Egwemi (2010)	Oluwaniy (2011)	International Cris group (2009)	Council on Foreign Relations (2010)
	Indicators										
1	Legitimacy of the State	2x (-) 1x (+)	1x (-) 1x (+)	1x (+)	1x (+)		1x (+)		1x (-)	2x (+)	2x (+)
2	Public Service Delivery			1x (+)		1x (+)	1x (+)			1x (+)	
3	Rule of Law with Human Rights		1x (-) 2x (+)	2x (-)				1x (+)		2x (+)	1x (+)
4	Leadership		2x (+)			1x (-)	1x (+)	1x (+)			
5	Security apparatus	1x (+)						2x (+)	1x (-)		
6	Regional Setting		2x (-) 2x (+)	1x (-) 1x (+)	1x (+)	1x (-)		1x (-)			1x (-)
7	Demographic Pressures		1x (+)	1x (-)	1x (-)		1x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)		
8	Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation										
9	Group-based Hostilities	2x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)	1x (+)	2x (-)		1x (+)	3x (-)		1x (+)
10	Emigration and Human Flight			2x (+)							
11	Economic Opportunities of Groups		2x (-)	1x (-) 1x (+)	1x (-) 1x (+)	1x (-)		1x (-)	1x (-)		1x (-)
12	State of the Economy		1x (+)	1x (-)		1x (+)	1x (+)	1x (-)			1x (-)
13	Useless	1x	4x	8x	3x	3x	1x	1x	1x	12x	7x

Table 4.1 Niger Delta Coding Sheet 2009-2011

4.1 Positive Political Stability Trend Results, during 2009-2011

The analyzed documents, which are aimed at the period 2009-2011, show a diverse result regarding the different indicators. During 2009, the Yar'adua administration began an Amnesty programme, which was integrated into a large scale operation to counter militia in the Niger Delta, as mentioned before in the introduction of this thesis (Asuni, 2010, pp. 2-3) (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289). During the analysis, the Amnesty programme continuously came forward in the used documents. This is why, this programme characterizes the political stability trend during this period within the Niger Delta.

As presented above in coding sheet 4.1, the used documents show, in general, a positive effect regarding most of the indicators. Especially the legitimacy of the state, which showed up nine times in the documents, with a positive effect on the stability trend within the Niger Delta, stands out. The legitimacy of the state improves when policy in general is being implemented and maintained combined with the approval of the society.

According to the analyzed documents the Amnesty programme is being viewed as a legitimate intervention to establish reintegration of members of the militia and criminal gangs (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 16-17). This result in combination with a positive effect on "the public service delivery", "upholding the rule of law (including human rights)" and "leadership", creates an image of a positive political stability trend from a governance perspective, during the period 2009-2011. In other words, it seems that the Nigerian government was able to create a feeling of legitimacy among its people, by establishing leadership, an effective way to deliver public services and upholding the rule of law.

4.2 Negative Political Stability Trend Results, during 2009-2011

Among the other categories, which are being presented in coding sheet 4.1, there are some signs of negative effects on the political stability trend. Such as indicators from a security and socio-economic perspective. Take for example the "group based hostilities", which showed up eight times in a negative way. This indicator is based on forms of exclusion, warfare and stereotyping of groups (Verstegen, 2005). It is clear that the Niger Delta has showed a lot of group-based hostilities among criminal gangs, militia, other ethnic clans and the government (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 1-17).

The "economic opportunities of groups", showed up seven times in a negative way. Although, the natural resources in the Niger Delta create huge economic opportunities, it turns out that there has never been a equal distribution of those opportunities (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oyeshola, Fayomi, & Ifedayo, 2011, pp. 16-17). Next to these two indicators, there also seems to be a negative trend in stability regarding the "regional setting" and "demographic pressures". The regional setting indicator focuses on the destabilizing regional (cross-border) interventions, by multinationals, NGO's, IGO's or other political actors. During the early 90s, oil and gas multinationals, such as Shell, settled in the Niger Delta to extract natural resources from the soil. They caused dissatisfaction among the Niger Delta's community, due to pollution and unfair distribution of the profit from the natural resources, which also showed up in the analyzed documents (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16) (Oluwaniyi, 2011, pp. 46-54).

Population density, particular group settlement patterns and skewed population distribution are the three factors that play a main role when looking at demographic pressures. This comes with the unequal distribution of food, overall economic wealth and natural resources, which is the case within the Niger Delta, according to the analyzed documents (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Oluwaniyi, 2011, pp. 46-54) (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52).

4.3 Political Stability Trend Image of the Period 2009-2011

The results of the analyzed documents give a comprehensive image of the political stability trend in the Niger Delta, during 2009-2011. The Amnesty programme of the Yar'adua administration plays an important role regarding the political stability trend, during this period.

The following quotes of the analyzed documents show that the programme has been viewed as legitimate during this period of time, due to the fact that the sympathies of the community of the Niger Delta for the militia has faded away and the decline in violence within this region received a warm welcome:

> "Starting in mid-2009, the international community watched as the Niger Delta took a break from violence. The decision to cease hostilities was shared. Militia leaders were taken aback by government raids on the camp of Tompolo, a powerful rebel commander. The Nigerian government was losing billions of dollars in oil revenues to militia attacks. Community sympathies of militancy were warning as battle fatigue and the costs of conflict grew. By October, most of the major militia leaders accepted an amnesty offered by the federal government, which guaranteed fighters freedom from prosecution and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process with monthly payments." Newsom, C. (2011, p. 2).

"The amnesty programme has without any reasonable doubt, brought relative peace and stability to the Niger Delta region. The almost whole scale embrace of the amnesty by the repentant militants has been a great relief for Nigerians." Egwemi, V. (2010, p. 139).

The results of the analyzed documents backed up by these quotes show that the Governance indicators find themselves in a positive state regarding the political stability trend in the Niger Delta, during this period of time. The Amnesty programme of the Yar'adua administration provided public services in education for the community, especially for the former members of the militias and criminal gangs. Besides the provision of education to the community, the programme stimulated the decline in violence and established better conditions for a secure region, with less crime. In other words, the rule of law, including human rights was better maintained during this period of time. Leadership is the last indicator which forms a part of the overlapping governance category. It is clear that president Yar'Adua is the face of the Amnesty Programme in the analyzed documents. So he can be viewed as a key figure within the analysed period of time, due to the fact that he was the first president that initiated some form of political stability, since the 1990s in the Niger Delta.

The following two quotes support the claims regarding the public service delivery, upholding the rule of law and leadership:

"Recognising the dangers of protracted militancy on the oil revenues, President Yar'Adua declared amnesty in 2009 for militants willing to surrender their weapons in exchange for financial and other reintegration benefits that would follow." Oluwantoyin O. Oluwaniyi (2011, p. 47)

"The Amnesty programme was introduced in order to end problems of insecurity and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. It had immediate effects in the cessation of hostilities, indicated by a ceasefire by MEND, emergence of relative peace and security, restoration of the oil infrastructure, extensive growth of petroleum production, oil and gas exports and revenues and improved human security. Since then, relative peace and security has been maintained." Onokerhoraye, A. & Ikelegbe, A. (2016, p. 80).

It seems that this first part of the content analysis mainly shows that the Yar'adua administration had an overall positive effect on the political stability trend, specifically from a governance perspective. The general image is, that the legitimacy of the state did grow in combination with the other governance indicators of the used framework. However, the underlying problems, such as group based hostilities, demographic pressures and the unequal distribution of economic opportunities for groups, were somehow neglected and not addressed at its roots.

The following quotes confirm the described presence of group based hostilities, demographic pressures and the unequal distribution of economic opportunities among the Niger Delta's community:

"The Nigerian government's 2009 amnesty of militants in the Niger Delta dramatically reduced the violence that had plagued the region and restored pre-insurgency levels of oil production. However, many of the problems that sparked violent confrontations remain unaddressed." Sayne, A. (2015, p. 1)

"To begin the process of removing structural violence, which include all the obnoxious laws mentioned earlier, will not in any way be an easy task. There is a fundamental problem that

establishes a nexus between the performance of the amnesty, and by extension the crisis in the Niger Delta, and the structure of the Nigerian state. The structure of the state, especially the legal structure, does not allow for a fundamental and radical management approach to the crisis as the ex-militants would want. Unless those structures are removed, the president cannot holistically and realistically handle the problem of the region. The National Assembly must be actively involved as well as the federating units in removing these laws in order to lay the foundation for conflict transformation." Udegbunam, K.C. (2013, p. 43)

"Though the programme has been appraised as a laudable project that might finally bring the complex crises in the Niger Delta to an end, the post-amnesty programme is flawed both in its planning and implementation. Therefore, it poses many challenges to the security and development of the region." Oluwantoyin O. Oluwaniyi (2011, p. 47).

"The strategy is a commendable initiative in so far as it brings back the developmental problem of the Niger- Delta atop the in-tray of the national policy agenda in Nigeria and allows the proponents of the Niger Delta developmental issues to ventilate their concerns through an administrative rather than an adversarial platform. However, there are many indications that the implementation of the vision driving the strategy was not well thought out and many of the solutions its purports to offer the Niger Delta development problems are unsustainable in the long term." Igini, M. (2011, p. 7)

The results regarding the state of the economy seem to be less interesting during this first part of the content analysis. The results were inconsistent regarding the general trend of the economy, however the documents did show that during the analysed period the oil productions in the area were rising again. Which are confirmed by the quotes from Onokerhoraye & Ikelegbe (2016, p. 80) and Sayne (2015, p. 1). One would expect that the

revenues of these productions cause a positive effect on the state of the economy, nevertheless this did not show up clearly during this part of the analysis of the documents.

The "refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) situation" indicator seems to be less significant compared to the other indicators, during this period of time. Non of the documents showed up a positive or negative result regarding the trend assessment question that is linked to this indicator. The same goes for "emigration and human flight", which just showed up two times in one document.

An important conclusion of Newsom (2011, p. 20) is that over the last decades the problems of the Niger Delta were being neglected by the international community and other stakeholders. They assessed the problems as a short-term risk, that could internally be managed. However, as the international interests were rising and the value of the delta's oil fueled, the involvement of the global stakeholders started to increase during the beginning of this century. When the Yar'adua administration initiated the Amnesty programme in 2009, the global community had high hopes. Newson (2011, p. 20) notices that these hopes are not justified. The Yar'adua administration never really exterminated the underlying conflicts among the community, multinationals and the Nigerian government. Newson (2011, p. 20) even ends with a notion that the international community should recognize the need to engage in the Niger Delta, to end the conflict for once and for all.

	Focused on 2014 - 2016									
		Documents								
		Zambakari (2017)	Tarila Marclint Ebied (2017)	Okonofua (2016)	Onokerhoraye & Ikelegbe (2016)	Risk Intelligence (2016)	Adebayo (2016)	International Crisis Group (2015)	Tobor, J. (2016)	Odubo, F. E. & Tobor J. O. (2016)	Ebiede, T M. (2017)
	Indicators										
1	Legitimacy of the State	1x (-)	3x (-)	1x (-)	2x (-)	1x (-)		2x (-)		1x (-)	1x (-) 1x (+)
2	Public Service Delivery	2x (-)			2x (-)		1x (-)				
3	Rule of Law with Human Rights	2x (-)			1x (-)						
4	Leadership										
5	Security apparatus	2x (-)	1x (-)		3x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)				1x (-)
6	Regional Setting	2x (-)		2x (-)	1x (-)		1x (-)	1x (-)			
7	Demographic Pressures	2x (-)		1x (-)				1x (-)	2x (-)	1x (-)	
8	Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situation										
9	Group-based Hostilities	3x (-)	3x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)		1x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)	2x (-)
10	Emigration and Human Flight										
11	Economic Opportunities of Groups	2x (-)				1x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)	1x (-)		
12	State of the Economy	1x (-)		1x (+)	1x (+)					1x (+)	1x (+)
13	Useless	3x	3x	8x	16x	1x	5x	7x	2x	4x	2x

Table 4.2 Niger Delta Coding Sheet 2014-2016

4.4 Negative Political Stability Trend Results, during 2014-2016

The used documents, which are aimed at the period 2014-2016, show a less diverse result regarding the indicators, compared to the first period of time. The documents that are focused on this second period, clearly describe some kind of post amnesty period that started somewhere during 2012-2013. During this period the Niger Delta started to become restless again, after a relatively stable period of time. This thesis views the first period of 2009-2011 as relatively stable, due to the results of the first part of the content analysis and based on the literature review, which was presented in the Introduction chapter.

The second part of the content analysis, which is displayed in coding sheet 4.2, shows a downward spiral in the political stability trend regarding the "legitimacy of the state" (twelve negative hits), "public service delivery" (five negative hits), "rule of law with human rights" (three negative hits), "security apparatus" (nine negative hits), "regional setting" (seven negative hits), demographic pressures (seven negative hits), "group-based hostilities" (fourteen negative hits) and "economic opportunities of groups (six negative hits).

In general, this means that the governance, security and socio-economic indicators all find themselves in a negative trend regarding political stability. Apparently from a governance perspective the Amnesty project with its plans did not prevail, which was already feared by some authors from the documents that were focused on the first period. The quotes from Onokerhoraye, A. & Ikelegbe, A. (2016, p. 80), Udegbunam, K.C. (2013, p. 43) and Oluwantoyin O. Oluwaniyi (2011, p. 47), which are presented during the first part of this content analysis, explicitly confirm this fear.

The results, regarding this second period, show that the Nigerian government has less legitimacy over its people compared to the first analyzed period of time. This trend is being supported by bad governance due to negative results in upholding the rule of law, including human rights and public service delivery, as showed in coding sheet 4.2. The following quotes from two of the analyzed documents clearly support this notion:

> "In 2015, when former President, Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost reelection, the event has led to a steady rise from activists demanding "greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting." Today the peace agreement is threatened and the opportunity the government had to resolve the multiple grievances were wasted due to political inertia and bad governance.

Today many of the root causes of the issues that led to the conflict remains unaddressed." Christopher Zambakari (2017, p. 5).

The findings of this research also accentuate the need for the state to take decisive action on communal conflicts to avoid the emergence of armed actors who may use their newfound positions to confront the legitimacy of the state. The concerns of all stakeholders in affected communities and a rule of law approach should be the foundation of any attempt by the Nigerian government to build sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region." Ebiede, T.M. (2017, p. 1209).

When looking from a security and Socio-economic point of view it is clear that the Nigerian government has less physical power within the region to address socio-economic problems. All kind of criminal behavior started on a large scale again during this second period of time, which indicates that the government has less legitimate security power within the region. Demographic pressures, group based hostilities and unequal distribution of economic opportunities of groups are the indicators that significantly show up during this second part of the analysis, and form the basis of the underlying problems which are still present in the Niger Delta and even more visible compared to the first analyzed period of time. The following quotes confirm these notions, regarding less legitimacy from a security perspective due to the discussed socio-economic problems:

"In the absence of substantive peace building interventions and efforts, the Niger Delta environment remains fragile and prone to violence reoccurrence. Peace building has not been privileged as part of an overall process of restoring security, stability and growth. There has been no peace building structures and processes to engineer social change and transformation and build capacity for conflict resolution; and no socio-political engineering to restore and support peaceful relationships and reduce divisions, tensions and antagonisms. There have

been no broad efforts for re-establishing the norms of non violence in the resolution of conflicts, building an environment of trust, rebuilding inter-communal and inter-group relations and trust and engineering personal, group and societal reconciliation. Therefore, the conditions for long term peace and preventing a relapse into violence have not been laid." Onokerhoraye, A. & Ikelegbe, A. (2016, p. 82)

"The NDAP was instituted at a time of great social, political, and economic ferment and trepidation. Since its inception, the program has had measured impact on the violence, helping to bring about the fragile peace existing in the region today. The peace is fragile because while the NDAP drastically reduced the onshore violence in the delta, the violence shifted to the offshore where oil assets are daily being sabotaged by former fighters and fighters who refused to enter the program including new parties that entered the violence after the adoption of the NDAP, particularly after the 2015 presidential election. This study validates the little success achieved by the NDAP but shows that the potential for violence to return is high. If violence returns, many former fighters who are presently participating in the NDAP will get involved, especially the more inexperienced former fighters, women, unemployed former fighters, and those who benefitted more from waging than engaging the NDAP-induced peace." Okonofua, B.A. (2016, p. 13).

4.5 Positive Political Stability Trend Results, during 2014-2016

The "state of the economy" is the one indicator that shows positive results, during the analysis of this second period. It seems that the Niger Delta finds itself in a serious negative spiral regarding the political stability trend, however the status of the economy forms an exception. The Nigerian economy is mainly driven by the energy sector, specifically due to revenues from the Niger Delta's oil and gas. The boost in oil and gas revenues during the relatively stable period 2009-2011, formed the basis of the opportunity for the recovery of the Nigerian economy. During 2014-2016 the DDR programme was introduced, which was among other

things focused on the maximization of the oil and gas revenues of the region. The following quote paints an image of the intentions and outcomes of the implemented DDR programme and the effect on the economy, during this second period:

"The armed conflict between militias and government forces in Nigeria's Niger Delta region has spanned for more than two decades, defying all solutions. A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme was established in August 2015 in effort to end the violence and has remained in place. It is a radically different approach from past approaches that displayed zero tolerance to all political challenges to oil production or the allocation of oil profits. The approach appeared to be immediately successful in that it forced a ceasefire, engaged militants in planned programs to rehabilitate and reintegrate them into civilian society, and opened up the oil wells (many of which had been shut due to the crisis) with the effect of increasing government revenue, which depends 85% on oil exports. Benjamin A. Okonofua (2016, p. 1).

Due to the boost in oil and gas revenues during the past years, supported by the Amnesty and DDR programme of the Nigerian government, the economy was able to recover from a downward spiral that was established during the first part of this century (Onokerhoraye & Ikelegbe, 2016) (Okonofua, 2016). Unfortunately, this development did not have a positive effect on the political stability trend in the Niger Delta, according to the results. So it seems that this indicator is less significant compared to the other indicators, when assessing the Niger Delta's political stability trend.

4.6 Political Stability Trend Image of the Period 2014-2016

Such as seen in the first part of the analysis the indicators regarding "refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) situation" and "emigration and human flight", did not show up. The fact that these two indicators are absent, does not directly make them inconsiderable. However, the fact that almost none of the literature and reports show any sings of emigration, human flight, refugees or internally displaced persons, does prove that these two indicators should be viewed as less significant, compared to the other indicators. During this second part of the analysis, the two less significant indicators were accompanied by the absence of the indicator regarding "leadership". When looking at the concept of leadership it is harder to determine the significance. The fact that leadership as an indicator did not show up, could apply that there was an absence of a key figure within the government of Nigeria. When comparing to the first analyzed period, in which it became clear that President Yar'adua was a key figure with in general legitimate power over his people, it seems fair to conclude that during this second period of time the analyzed documents did not identify such a figure. However, it is important to keep in mind that the fact that the analyzed documents did not identify such a figure, this not necessarily means that the absence of such a key figure, within the Nigerian government, has negative effects on the political stability of the Niger Delta.

The analyzed documents and the quotes above, confirm that during the period of 2014-2016 the Niger Delta finds itself in a relatively unstable period, due to the lack of good governance to address underlying socio-economic problems within society. It is clear that the Amnesty programme was not able to establish long term stability within the region. Change in administrations and the introduction of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme was all into no avail. The documents show that during this period the group based hostilities in forms of criminal gangs and militia still prevail. The Amnesty

programme of the Yar'adua administration was not able to fully eliminate the tension among the population and against the government. Especially the unequal division of economic opportunities caused demographic pressures and destabilized the regional setting, as seen in Content Sheet 4.2.

One would expect that legitimate governance, by delivering public services and upholding the rule of law, would address these problems. However, when you look at the demographic pressures, which is based on population density, particular group settlement patterns and skewed population distribution (Verstegen, 2005, pp. 25-52). It is clear that the Nigerian Government never was able to fully address it, despite the developed policy programs. The local community clearly is still dissatisfied by the unequal distribution of the revenue that is being made with the natural resources of the Niger Delta (Amunwa, 2012, pp. 2-12) (Cline, 2011, pp. 273-289) (Newsom, 2011, pp. 2-16). Onokerhoraye, A. & Ikelegbe, A. (2016, p. 82) even take it a step further by concluding that the community of the Niger Delta as a whole should be compensated on a large scale for the years of abuse by the multinationals and the Nigerian government. According to them, this would be the only way to really address the demographic pressures and group-based hostilities by eliminating the unequal distribution of economic opportunities among the people.

5. Conclusion and Reflection

The conclusion of this research will shed light on the results that have been presented in the former Analysis chapter. It will first summarize the results and try to make valid conclusions and wraps up with the answer on the Research Question and a reflection on this thesis.

5.1 Political Stability during 2009-2011

The results of the first part of the Content Analysis show a diverse image of the presence of the indicators. Especially the legitimacy of the state, which seems to find itself in positive trend regarding the stability within the Niger Delta, stands out. This result in combination with a positive effect in trend on "the public service delivery", "upholding the rule of law (including human rights)" and "leadership", creates a general image of a positive political stability trend from a governance perspective, during the period 2009-2011. The Nigerian government was able to create a feeling of legitimacy among its people. This feeling was generated due to the leadership of president Yar'adua, combined with the delivery of public services in forms of education and reintegration programs and upholding the rule of law by establishing more secure delta area with less crime. The analyzed documents supported by the quotes show that the Amnesty programme carried out by the Yar'adua administration had a substantial impact on this positive political stability trend.

Nevertheless, the coding sheet 4.1 shows some signs of negative effects on the political stability trend as well. This regards certain indicators from a security and socio-economic perspective. Take for example the "group based hostilities" and the "economic opportunities of groups", which show overall negative results. It is clear that the Niger Delta has known a complicated history of group-based hostilities among criminal gangs, militia, other ethnic clans and the government. These group-based hostilities were clearly present during the

period this first analyzed period of time. At the same time there was an unequal distribution of economic opportunities among the community. Although, the natural resources in the Niger Delta create huge economic opportunities, it turns out that there has never been an equal distribution of those opportunities among its community. Next to these two indicators, there also seems to be an overall negative trend in stability regarding the "regional setting" and "demographic preassures". When looking at the regional setting regarding the Niger Delta, it is clear that the Multinationals in association with the Nigerian government caused unrest and dissatisfaction among the Niger Delta's community, due to pollution and unfair distribution of the profit from the natural resources. The Demographic pressures that are present can also be attributed to unequal distribution of the overall economic wealth and generated profit from the natural resources.

The first part of the content analysis mainly shows that the Yar'adua administration with its Amnesty programme had an overall positive effect on the political stability trend, specifically from a governance perspective. The general image that this first part creates is that the legitimacy of the state did grow in combination with the other governance indicators of the framework. However, the underlying problems regarding group based hostilities, demographic pressures and the unequal distribution of economic opportunities for groups, were somehow neglected and not addressed at its roots. In the end this meant that the relatively political stable period of time was not permanent. At the same time, the problems of the Niger Delta were being neglected by the international community and other stakeholders. They assessed the problems as a short-term risk, that could internally be managed. The international community should recognize the need to engage in the Niger Delta, to end the conflict for once and for all.

5.2 Political Stability during 2014-2016

The second part of the analysis is focused on the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016. Somewhere between the two periods the literature describes some kind of post amnesty period. During this period the Niger Delta started to become less stable, by again a rise in criminal activities performed by criminal gangs and militias. In general, the governance, security and socio-economic indicators all find themselves in a negative trend regarding political stability. As previously discussed, the Amnesty project with its goals did not prevail. When comparing the two periods of time there could be concluded that during the first period the government should be seen as more legitimate, compared to the less stable period second period. It is not surprising to see that the rule of law including human rights shows the same trend, when comparing both periods of time. This is combined with the absence of leadership during this second period. The legitimacy of the state, the rule of law, leadership and public service delivery, are all governance indicators. These indicators are obviously closely related to each other, due to the fact that an administration usually creates legitimacy by generating leadership that upholds the rule of law within their territory and provides public services. When looking from a security point of view it is clear that the Nigerian government has less physical security power within the region. All kind of criminal behavior by gangs and militia arose again on a large scale during this unstable period. The presence of this criminal behavior means that the government has less control on the area through its security apparatus. Although predominately the governance, security and socio-economic categories show negative results, there are also some positive signs regarding the state of the economy. These positive results are caused by a boost in oil and gas revenues during the relatively stable period 2009-2011 and the implementation of the DDR programme which was among other thins focused on the maximization of the oil revenue in the Niger Delta. The general economy of Nigeria was able to recover from a downward spiral that was established during

the first part of this century. It seems that during the second period the economy in general is still profiting from this described boost and effort of the two programs. Despite the positive results regarding the state of economy indicator, one could argue that it has no significant effect on the political stability trend of the Niger Delta during this period of time.

5.3 The Role of Different Actors

The used documents show that several actors have an impact on the political stability trend in the region. There are a lot of multinationals mentioned, such as Shell and Exon Mobile, which are involved in oil and gas operations within the region. The documents show that they have different effects on the political stability trend, usually in a negative way regarding the pollution of the region and unequal distribution of economic opportunities. However, also positive involvement has been found, such as the involvement regarding the Amnesty programme of the Nigerian government to facilitate the local community and former rebels with labor, financial compensation and stimulate overall reintegration into society. Unfortunately, during the relatively unstable period of 2014-2016, the literature shows that the Nigerian government, with the multinationals, were not holding up their promise to deliver the compensation and facilitate reintegration.

5.4 Revisiting the Research Question

When revisiting the research question one more time; "*To what extent are the political stability indicators, provided by Rubin* (2013, pp. 256 - 339)*, present in the Niger Delta and what does that tell us about the political stability trend of this region?*", a direct answer seems that the indicators are all present when focusing on the two mentioned periods of time, except for the "refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) situation" indicator. This one did not show up during the performed content analysis. This means that problems regarding

the refugees or internally displaced persons did not have a substantial effect on the political stability trend in the Niger Delta, during the two periods of time. This also seems to apply for the "emigration and human flight" indicator, which just showed up two times during the full analysis, without any direct implications for the political stability trend of the region. The other ten indicators are present, however seven of them should be considered to have a substantial effect on the political stability trend of the Niger Delta. These indicators are: 1) The legitimacy of the state, 2) Upholding the rule of law (with human rights), 3) Public service delivery, 4) Leadership, 5) Regional setting, 6) Demographic pressures, 7) Group-based hostilities and 8) Economic opportunities of groups. These indicators seem to have the most significant effect on the political stability trend and on each other, according to the performed analysis, when looking at the Niger Delta.

The governance indicators, which include legitimacy of the state, upholding the rule of law, with human rights, public service delivery and leadership must be seen as a substantial category when assessing the political stability trend of the Niger Delta. Especially legitimacy of the state could be viewed as an overlapping indicator. Because this indicator is based on public service delivery, the upholding of the rule of law and the presence of leadership, due to the fact that a community views its state as legitimate if those concepts are being provided by the government. It became clear that during the first analyzed period, those indicators were overall present in a positive way regarding political stability in the Niger Delta. The main reason according to the analyzed documents was due to the implemented Amnesty programme of the Yar'adua administration. During the second analyzed period, the governance indicators showed an overall negative result. The reason behind this, according to the analyzed documents, was that during this relatively unstable period of time, the Amnesty programme was not able to establish long term stability within the region. So it seems that

according to the content analysis that all of the governance indicators should be viewed as significant, especially the overlapping legitimacy of the state, which was accomplished in some form during the relatively stable period and was absent during the relatively unstable period. The socio-economic and security problems seem to have a direct influence on those governance indicators. The content analysis did make clear that the Amnesty programme did not prevail due to underlying problems within society. These problems have been identified by the "the regional setting", "demographic pressures", "group-based hostilities" and "economic opportunities of groups" indicators, which mainly was fueled by lack in equal distribution of economic opportunities, regarding the revenue in oil and gas, the presence of underlying group-based hostilities within the Niger Delta's society and the lack of sufficient security in the region provided by the Nigerian government, to counter criminal gangs and militias. So next to the governance indicators these four indicators should also be viewed as significant, due to their ability to identify socio-economic problems within this region which directly has influence on the governance indicators and the political stability trend of the Niger Delta.

In its history, the Niger Delta has showed a lot of controversial trends in political stability. This research has displayed the most substantial indicators, based on the political stability framework of Rubin (2013, pp. 256 - 339), that have an substantial influence on the political stability trend of the Niger Delta, during the two periods of time. When looking forward and trying to obtain definite political stability within the Niger Delta region, more attention should be paid to the above described indicators. A comprehensive approach should be designed, in which the group-based hostilities, demographic pressures and unequal distribution of economic opportunities would be resolved at the described roots. At the same time, the other

mentioned five substantial indicators of this thesis should be taken into account. This could potentially lead to a permanent politically stable Niger Delta.

5.5 Reflection

This thesis has identified specific indicators that are able to describe the conditions of political stability in the Niger Delta. By making use of the theoretical framework of Rubin, the aim of this research was to establish a new academic insight in the form of a new framework, that is able to analyze the political stability trend of the Niger Delta. The presented indicators during this research should not be seen as direct causes of political stability, but as factors that are linked to the increasing or decreasing of political stability. With this note, it stays clear that this thesis is not a guidebook that will give the answers to a permanent political stable Niger Delta, but will create an image of the political stability history and its most important factors that have substantial influence.

After performing desk research, it became clear that this thesis would compare the indicators in their presence/absence during a relatively stable period to a relatively unstable one. It was quite a challenge to exactly determine those two periods of time because the literature was not completely consistent about the political stability trends in the Niger Delta. Eventually it became clear that the first period, 2009-2011, could be considered as relatively stable and the second period, 2014-2016, as relatively unstable. In the end, the two periods could be determined thanks to their different characteristics regarding political stability circumstances. Document and content analysis have formed the basis of this thesis to determine the relevant indicators and their conditions. During the collection of the documents for the content analysis it became clear that it was hard to directly find suited documents. In an ideal world, each of the two periods of time, would be covered by documents which are provided by the

same research institution. When each of the used institutions provide two documents for each period of time with the same research design, it would be possible to perform the content analysis in perfect academic research conditions. However, unfortunately this was not the case, due to the fact that most of the institutions did not perform research on political stability in the Niger Delta focused on both periods of time. On the other hand, this made sure that a wide variety of scientific material was used and thus established good conditions for the reliability of the research.

In the end, this thesis established a framework with important indicators, based on Rubin, which painted an image of the political stability trend in the Niger Delta during two specific periods of time. So during this conclusion the thesis has contributed to the understanding of the political stability in the Niger Delta area. Despite the fact that this thesis is not a guidebook, it has the ability to help predict the political stability trends of the Niger Delta and areas with similar conditions. Future research regarding political stability in areas with similar conditions, could confirm the designed theoretical framework that has been presented in this thesis. Research regarding the political stability focused on the Niger Delta could support this research and stimulate the international community to get involved to create a permanent stable Niger Delta area.

Bibliography

Adebayo, A. G. (2016). Economic Growth and Investments in Nigeria: A Synthesis of Sustainable National Security and Enabling Political Environment. . *World Journal of Finance and Investment Research , 1* (1), 13-26.

Aghedo, I. (2015). Sowing peace, reaping violence: Understanding the resurgence of kidnapping in post-amnesty Niger Delta, Nigeria. . *Insight on Africa , 7* (2), 137-153.

Agnew, J. A. (2003). *Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics.* New York: Psychology Press.

Ake, C. (1975). A definition of political stability. Comparative Politics. *Comparative Politics , 7* (2), 271-283.

Amunwa, B. (2012, August). *Platform London.* Retrieved April 5, 2017, from Dirty Work: SHELL'S SECURITY SPENDING IN NIGERIA AND BEYOND: http://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Dirty-work-Shell%E2%80%99s-security-spending-in-Nigeria-and-beyond-Platform-August-2012.pdf

Asuni, J. B. (2010). *Understanding the armed groups of the Niger Delta.* New York: NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

Boris, O. H. (2015). The Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out? *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences , 6* (3), 563 - 573.

Cline. (2011). Today we shall drink blood': Internal unrest in Nigeria. *Small Wars and Insurgencies , 22* (2), 273-289.

Cline, L. (2011). oday we shall drink blood': Internal unrest in Nigeria. Small Wars and Insurgencies. *Small Wars and Insurgencies , 22* (2), pp. 273-289.

Ebiede, T. M. (2017). Beyond rebellion: Uncaptured dimensions of violent conflicts and the implications for peacebuilding in Nigeria's Niger Delta. . *African Security , 10* (1), 25-46.

Ebiede, T. M. (2017). Community Conflicts and Armed Militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Change and Continuity? . *Society & Natural Resources , 30* (10), 1197-1211.

Egwemi, V. (2010). From militancy to amnesty: Some thoughts on President Yar'Adua's approach to the Niger Delta crisis. *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory , 2* (3), 136-141.

Eke, S. J. (2016). Running to Fight Another Day: Commodification of Peace and the Resurgence of Violence in Post-amnesty Niger Delta. . *African Security , 9* (2), 136-159.

Environmental Justice Atlas. (2016, May 20). *Environmental Justice Atlas*. Retrieved April 10, 2017, from Multinational Oil Companies on the Niger Delta, Nigeria: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/multinational-oil-companies-on-the-niger-delta-nigeria

Galtung, J. (1958). *Theories of conflict Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations.* New York: Columbia University.

Goertzel, T. G. (1987). Authoritarianism of personality and political attitudes . *Journal of Social Psychology , 127* (1), 7-18.

Igini, M. (2011). *Federal Government Amnesty Strategy in the Niger Delta.* Retrieved October 2017, from Africa Portal: https://www.africaportal.org/publications/federal-government-amnesty-strategy-in-the-niger-delta-will-it-go-beyond-satisficing-minimalism/

International Crisis Group . (2009). *Nigeria: Seizing the moment in the Niger Delta.* International Crisis Group, Brussels.

International Crisis Group. (2015). *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta.* Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Margolis, J. (2010). Understanding political stability and instability . *Civil Wars , 12* (3), 326-345.

Moon, B., & Dixon, W. (1985). Politics, the state, and basic human needs: A cross-national study. *American Journal of Political Science , 29* (4), 661-694.

Newsom, C. (2011, June). *United States Institute of Peace.* Retrieved March 2017, from Special Report: Conflict in the Niger Delta:
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf

Newsom, C. (2011, June). *United States Institute of Peace.* Retrieved March 27, 2017, from Special Report: Conflict in the Niger Delta:
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf

Okafor, G. (2017). The impact of political instability on the economic growth of ECOWAS member countries. . *Defence and Peace Economics , 28* (2), 208-229.

Okonofua, B. A. (2016). The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of Transitioning From Peace Settlements to Long-Term Peace. . *SAGE Open , 6* (2), 1-16.

Oluduro, O. &. (2012). Nigeria: In search of sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the amnesty programme. *Journal of Sustainable Development , 5* (7).

Oluwaniyi, O. O. (2011). Post-Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta: Challenges and prospects. *Conflict trends , 2011* (4), 46-54.

Onokerhoraye, A., & Ikelegbe, A. (2016). The Amnesty for Peace in the Niger Delta: Political Settlement, Transitional Justice and Peace Building. *CPED Monograph*.

Oyeshola, D., Fayomi, I., & Ifedayo, T. (2011). Education, Stability, and Security in Niger Delta. *Democracy And Security , 7* (1), 1-17.

Platform London. (2012, April). *Platform London.* Retrieved April 3, 2017, from Oil conflict in the Niger Delta – the role of Shell: http://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Platform-SRI-Investor-briefing-Shell-in-Nigeria-2.pdf

Risk Intelligence. (2016). *A guide to militant, ex militant and activist groups in the Niger Delta.* Retrieved October 2017, from Norwegian Hull Club: https://www.norclub.no/assets/ArticleFiles/08-June-2016-Guide-to-Niger-Delta-Groups-2016.pdf

Rubin, B. R. (2013). *Afghanistan in the post-cold war era.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sayne, A. (2015). *United States Institute of Peace*. Retrieved January 5, 2018, from https://www.usip.org/nigerian-2015-elections

Sayne, A. (2013). *What's next for security in the Niger Delta?* . United States Institute of Peace.

The Fund for Peace . (2014). *Conflict Assessment Framework Manual.* Washington: The Fund for Peace Publication.

Tobor, J. (2016). Culture and the amnesty program in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *European Journal of Research in Social Sciences , 4* (3), 14-22.

Udegbunam, K. (2013). Repositioning Nigeria's Amnesty Programme for Conflict Transformation and Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *Singaporean Journal of Business, Economics and Management Studies , 2* (1), 42-58.

Verstegen, S. v. (2005). *The Stability Assesment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development* . Clingendael Insitute, The Hague.

Zambakari, C. D. (2017). *Instability in the Greater Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: An Analysis of Violent Events 2011-2015.* Retrieved October 2017, from SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950879