Universiteit Leiden
The Netherlands

Building Peace or Democracy?

PERCEPTIONS OF POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA

Valentina Galeano-Muñoz
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY | ADVANCED MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY | S1896407

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Corinna Jentzsch, for her guidance and patience through the treacherous process of turning an 'idea that I was excited about' into a Master's thesis that I am truly proud of. MIRD Program Coordinator Ragnhild Drange, for sharing her boundless optimism and smiles of encouragement over cups of coffee.

My parents, Jerry Calhoun and Ligia Muñoz, for supporting me in my every adventure, no matter how impulsive or far away, and for being the kind of parents that always pick up the phone, regardless of the time difference. My grandmother, Ofelia Benavidez, whose selflessness and compassion should be a lesson to us all.

Additionally, I would like to thank the Wijnhaven study group for making this process bearable, the creators of Mendeley for miraculously keeping my scattered thoughts organized, and Stephen Fry - whose narration of the Harry Potter books kept me sane when I couldn't look at another screen or read another word.

Dr. Gary P. Gershman, because four years later I'm still haunted by the memory of trying to understand, and then explain, "why there is no why." It was in that same course that you taught me the most valuable lesson of my entire academic journey.

That lesson has been the foundation and driving force for this thesis. I wanted this work to serve as a reminder, to myself and to others studying the causes and consequences of conflict, that underneath dates, policies, theories, and variables, are people. Real people, whose lives, perceptions, and experiences cannot fit neatly into any dataset.

Finally, I would like to thank all of the incredible people I met during my field research in Bosnia. Thank you for sharing your culture, experiences, fears, and hopes with me. I know that this work will never do them all justice, but it is a start.

Hvala vam svima.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In the 1990's, international peacebuilding reached its apex in response to civil wars that afflicted Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. Since then, there has been an increased academic focus on postwar democratization. Academics and practitioners alike have queried whether liberal peacebuilding operations have been more successful at securing peace than at establishing liberal democratic regimes (Zürcher, et. al., 2013). Despite this spiked interest in peacebuilding and postwar democracies, little attention is dedicated to a key element of both of these concepts: citizens as the source of legitimacy. The legitimacy of any democratic institution is derived from the society which it serves (Dagher, 2018) and therefore advocates the assessment of local perceptions in research evaluating the state of democracy. This is consequent of the liberal assumption that in a democratic regime, the government is an agent of the people, and as thus should reflect the will of its citizens (Ozerdem & Lee, 2016). Public opinion and support for liberal democratic ideals and institutions are often overlooked in post-conflict peacebuilding research. Scholar David Lake cautions:

> *contrary to the prevailing wisdom, however, legitimacy is not inherent in institutions in general nor only in institutions with representative qualities. Institutions are not 'strong' or accepted by society simply because they are institutions. This puts the proverbial cart before the horse." (Lake, 2016 p.196)*

Post-conflict democratization, however, is not a process led by the governed. In fact, it is a process that is rarely even led by those governing. Instead, it is predominantly dictated by international actors, who have the capacity and expertise, to oversee, implement, and support a sustainable peace process (Ozerdem & Lee, 2016). While this inherently grants international legitimacy, it leaves many unanswered questions regarding shared beliefs, process, and performance legitimacy (Dagher, 2018). Do people even want democracy? How does their perception of the *means*, peacebuilding and democratization, impact their perceptions of the *results,* democracy? Gathering

and analyzing qualitative data from semi-structured interviews, this study seeks to explore the relationship between the two and develop a theory that can answer the following question: **How have local perceptions of post-conflict democratization and peacebuilding strategies impacted perceptions of democracy?**

This research will be focused on a single case study, Bosnia and Herzegovina.[1] While the results are not generalizable, their application and relevance extend far beyond this singular case. They will have implications for all levels of actors involved in the development of peacebuilding and democratization tactics in post-conflict societies. With this data, local and state actors can better understand how their own constituents view the process and the institutions around them – allowing them to address any issues or problems. Moreover, it is an opportunity for international organizations to evaluate how their macro-level initiatives are viewed at a micro-level, and the implications that they may have for self-sufficiency, sustainability, and above all - legitimacy. For Western powers, such as the United States and the European Union, who often play the largest roles in post-conflict democratic transitions, this study can be used as a new form of evaluating peacebuilding initiatives.

To this point, extensive work has been done on the process of post-conflict democratization. Predominantly, this work has focused on the process of peacebuilding and democratization, and on the outcomes in terms of sustainability of peace, the state and its institutions (Zürcher, 2011; Ohlson & Kovacs, 2009; Chandler, 2017; Culbertson, 2010). The aim of this research is to investigate how citizens in post-conflict, transition countries perceive democracy in terms of institutions, implementation, values, and theoretically. This seeks to link existing work on legitimacy and democracy (Dagher, 2018; Zürcher, 2011) to work on the post-conflict peace process (Chesterman, 2005; Kostic, 2008), and develop a theory using locals, or individual citizens, as the main level of analysis. This approach will complement Earl Conteh-Morgan's constructivist approach to peacebuilding (2005), calling for integration of bottom up approaches in post-conflict peacebuilding. In the aftermath of a war, the manner in which ordinary citizens perceive the system and institutions around them can determine the sustainability of that peace and

[1] From this point forward, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia.

system once the external actors have departed. With a lack of existing research on the impact of peacebuilding and democratization processes on citizen's perceptions of democracy, this study will focus on the perception and understanding of democratic values and institutions at a local level, aiming to develop a theory that can be further explored and tested in future studies.

ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The field of conflict resolution is notoriously hampered by a lack of a general consensus on terminology (Wohlfeld, 2010, p. 26). Before delving into the theoretical framework, Chapter 2 will introduce and define various concepts that are fundamental to this study and discuss their relevant literature in the scope of this paper and its goals. The existing literature on peacebuilding and democratization will be introduced in this chapter. The chapter will end by introducing existing studies on these themes, identifying the gap in this literature, and justifying the need for theory development to answer the proposed research question.

This thesis uses a constructivist framework to argue for a greater emphasis on the perspectives of ordinary citizens in both the implementation and the study of peacebuilding and democratization. Constructivism, as conceptualized by scholar Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999), will be introduced in Chapter 3. It will then be applied to the level of analysis used in this research, particularly founded in the work of Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005). Using his 2005 work, a constructivist approach to peacebuilding will be outlined. Finally, Chapter 3 will introduce the two preliminary hypotheses of this study.

A theory development methodology will be employed using a single case study, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the methodology and detail the data collection and analysis. This section will expand on the decision and justification for use of a case study in this theory development research. Next, it will detail the main source of data: semi-structured interviews collected during two research trips. The structure of the interviews and sampling methods. The most robust portion of the methodology is the method of analysis. Leaning heavily on the work of Johnny Saldaña (2009), this research will use a multistage coding process to analyze the data gathered from interviews.

Before attempting to analyze democratization, peacebuilding, or the perception of citizens, a certain level of historical context of the case study is required. Chapter 5 provides the necessary framework, beginning with a socialist Yugoslavia and continuing to the state of present day Bosnia. This chapter will explain the causes of the war including the death of Josip Broz Tito, and exploitation of ethno-nationalism. Furthermore, it will elaborate on the Dayton Peace Treaty that brought the war to an end, its implementation, and the state of Bosnia today.

Chapter 6 begins with an outline of the results, loosely following the structure developed in the Sample Questionnaire (see Appendix 1).

In Chapter 7, the results will be discussed and used to develop new hypotheses. The conclusion of this thesis will summarize the findings of this research, with an emphasis on how they can be applied in future research.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

> THIS BRINGS ME TO A SECOND POINT – THE NATURE OF THE PEACE THAT WE SEEK. FOR PEACE IS NOT MERELY THE ABSENCE OF VISIBLE CONFLICT. ONLY A JUST PEACE BASED ON THE INHERENT RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL CAN TRULY BE LASTING.
>
> BARACK H. OBAMA, NOBEL LECTURE, OSLO, 10 DECEMBER, 2009.

WHAT KIND OF PEACE?

At first glance, defining 'peacebuilding' may seem an easy task. You *build* peace, simple enough. This modest task becomes much more complex, however, when one tries to define peace. Politicians, musicians, and religious leaders have all discussed the concept of peace at length, and one can conclude that John Lennon's imagined peace differs vastly from Immanuel Kant's. In order to develop a strategy for building peace in a post-conflict society, there needs to be a common understanding, a clear goal, of what that truly entails.

In the field of conflict management, John Galtung (1969, p. 183-184) has classified two types of peace - negative and positive peace. A negative peace is the lack of war, or absence of *personal* violence. A positive peace is the absence of *structural* violence, which includes" poverty, unjust social, political, and economic institutions, systems, or structures (1969, p. 168)." If international involvement were to cease once the war or conflict ended, it is very likely that the violence would soon resume. However, a post-conflict mission seeking to abolish all forms of structural violence would be far too ambitious. In agreement with Roland Paris (2004, p. 58), the aims of any peacebuilding mission should lie somewhere in the between these two extremes, though finding the right balance has proved to be a challenge.

Post-conflict peacebuilding encompasses a wide-range of goals that can be loosely split into four components – security, development, humanitarian assistance, governance and rule of law (Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009, p. 8-9). Beyond these goals is one final objective: self-

sufficiency (Jeong, 2005, p. 21). For any peacebuilding process to be truly sustainable, programs and projects must be designed and implemented in a manner in which the post-conflict society can come to uphold without external international support. This makes the transition from international support to self-sufficiency a fundamental process of peacebuilding.

With diversity of goals and initiatives, peacebuilding intrinsically incorporates a myriad of actors at various levels: international, national, and local. In the scope of this study, international actors include international organizations, foreign states, and NGOs. The term 'local actors' will encompass both national and local level actors such as local governance, community leaders, NGOs, state government, security and defense forces. Finally, the focal point of this research will be locals, the ordinary everyday people within a state.

PEACEBUILDING: THE EVOLUTION

The 1990's rise of the liberal peacebuilding model as a standard for peacebuilding can be credited to the prominence of North American and European actors in international aid and interventions post-Cold War (Ozerdem & Lee, 2016, p. 39). This model was founded on the principles of the liberal peace theory, also known as the "democratic peace", which asserts that liberal values – democracy, international organizations, and free economies, are the foundations for lasting peace (Kant, 1970). Liberal peace theorists have long maintained that democracies rarely go to war with one another (Doyle, 2005). Some go a step further and ambitiously claim that democratic systems are more peaceful than authoritarian systems (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The idea behind this is that democracy allows for the resolution of conflict without violence. These two claims can be applied to peacebuilding. If democracies rarely go to war with one another, then one could decrease the occurrence of inter-state wars by increasing the number of democracies. Furthermore, if democratic systems are more peaceful, then this would decrease the occurrence of intra-state conflicts.

The liberal peacebuilding model has become a trending topic for criticism in conflict management. Many academics have been critical of this model, claiming that it employs a "one size fits all" approach (Newman, Richmond, & Paris, 2009), fosters dependency on international institutions (Chandler, 1999, p. 154), and others cite its adherence to statebuilding with little regard to

nationbuilding (Kostic, 2008). One of the most prominent points of debates regarding this model, has been its use of a top-down approach, rather than a local led bottom-up approach (Autesserre, 2005; 2017; Chandler, 1999, 2006; Hellmüller, 2013; McMahon, 2017; Ottoway, 2007; Swain, Amer, & Ojendal, 2009).

The overreaching role of external actors in liberal peacebuilding is another source of concern (Schmidt, 2008). During post-conflict interventions, international actors tend to impose or force democratization, regardless of existing conditions or the preference of citizens. In a study on peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sara Hellmüller (2013) found that in situations where priorities of various levels of actors (local and international) are askew, it is the international actors that often dominate. Local actors are limited in capacity, resulting in their compliance with the demands of international actors. This top-down approach presents a disconnect between how international actors perceive democracy functions domestically, in their own nations through self-determination, versus its coerced establishment in post-conflict states. (Ottoway, 2007; Swain, Amer, & Ojendal, 2009).

By taking on a predominantly top-down approach, it is easy to overlook the nationbuilding aspects of peacebuilding. The risk is that international actors will assume to know what is best for the local communities without accounting for their norms, cultures, and history. This can create a culture of resistance that may very well impede on the peace process, as was seen in the Congo where the failure to incorporate local agendas led to insurgencies and continued violence that destabilized the country and undermined the peace process (Autesserre, 2005; Hellmüller, 2013). Local resistance does not necessarily entail negative sentiments towards intervening parties, at times it is due to locals' inabilities to relate to the core principles of programs implemented (Lee, 2015, p. 1447).

Lessons learned in Bosnia (Chandler, 2006), and Rwanda, (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006), did not fall on deaf ears. In the last two decades the peace process has evolved, taking what has been called a 'local turn' in peacebuilding (Chandler, 2017; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). A hybrid model, mixing both top-down and bottom-up approaches, has surfaced (Mac Ginty, 2010; Wallis, 2012). In response, others warned that localization of peacebuilding has been romanticized (Paffenholz,

2015), and may be just as ineffective as the traditional top-down approach (McMahon, 2017; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). This is not a choice between one or the other, instead this thesis calls for the integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches, building local capacity *within* international systems (Autesserre, 2010; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011).

David Chandler's most recent work claims that the latest evolution in peacebuilding has been a pragmatic approach, that effectively takes 'peacebuilding' off of the international agenda (2017). He goes on to blame the 1990's criticisms, based on 'grand narratives of liberal internationalism' for discrediting the 'distinct policy sphere' of peacebuilding (Chandler, 2017, p. 203). Peacebuilding has, as Chandler noted, slipped from focus on the world stage. It has even been a source of recent discussion, as Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, Archbishop Benardito Auza proclaimed that the 'United Nations can and should *recommit* itself to, and scale up, its peacebuilding efforts[2]' (2018).

As I see it, Chandler fails to take into account today's reality. Liberal peacebuilding emerged at the end of the Cold War. Since then the peace process has traditionally been understood as a Western-led initiative (Mac Ginty, 2010). The world stage has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War and there are new actors in the field of peace and security. Non-Western nations, such as Japan, India, Korea, and China have become significant players in development assistance, and make substantial contributions to post-conflict states (OECD, 2018; Shinoda, 2018). Literature on peacebuilding rarely accounts for this. The few exceptions (De Carvalho & De Coning, 2013; Iwami, 2016; Richmond & Tellidis, 2013) point out that Non-Western approaches and agendas in post-conflict states differ from those of the EU or the US. China's strategy in Africa exemplifies two key features of this: principles of non-intervention, and a statebuilding approach focused on infrastructure and economic growth (Alden & Large, 2013; Lei, 2011). This offers approach to peace and security, provides an alternative to the classical model of peacebuilding. There is a lack of literature that looks at the impact that this alternative approach has had on the evolution of peacebuilding. Without properly analyzing these relationships, Chandler's claim that 'political' criticisms of peacebuilding have discredited peacebuilding is hasty at best. Peacebuilding has not

[2] Emphasis added

been abandoned nor discredited. Instead, I argue that it is evolving in response to a new international reality, different actors, and lessons learned. As such, the discourse on peacebuilding must also evolve.

DEFINING THE AMBIGUOUS: STATEBUILDING AND NATIONBUILDING

Peacebuilding, statebuilding, and nationbuilding are three concepts that are intrinsically intertwined. Often times in literature they are used interchangeably. For Simon Chesterman (2005), they are essentially different words that roughly describe the same thing. Different actors prefer to use different terms, depending on whom they are speaking to and what they want to convey (Chesterman, 2005, p. 4-5). However, Chesterman fails to realize that nationbuilding and statebuilding are, in fact, two fundamentally distinct, but equally necessary, processes of peacebuilding. They are essentially two sides of the same coin.

Statebuilding is the establishment of political, legal, economic and administrative institutions and the provision of security and resources to the public (Kostic, 2008). Nationbuilding has a broader goal of creating a sense of social cohesion, political culture, and a national identity (Ozerdam & Lee, 2016). In instances of social division or ethnic conflicts, nationbuilding plays a particularly crucial role, as it focuses on the construction of a national identity and on overcoming divisions. State-building measures alone cannot succeed in these instances if they cannot counter the disputing patterns of social identity (von Bogdandy et. al., 2005, p. 587).

Many see nationbuilding as part of the reconciliatory stage of the peace process (Lund, 1996). This in itself is not an issue. Much of what nationbuilding entails justice, social cohesion, are part of the reconciliation phase. However, this becomes an issue when nationbuilding is seen as something that comes only at the end of the peacebuilding process, and only in the reconciliatory stage. Stressing the need for cohesion between the two approaches, Lemay-Hebert (2009) argues that nationbuilding and statebuilding should be understood as one single process and without distinction.

As well-meaning as this sentiment is, it is quite dangerous. In peacebuilding, it is essential to prioritize some elements over others. By lumping all nationbuilding and statebuilding activities

under one term, it increases the likelihood that one will be prioritized over the other. Rather, I argue that statebuilding and nationbuilding must be recognized and as two separate and necessary cogs of a machine, both of which are necessary in order to build a functioning and durable peace.

DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND LEGITIMACY

Democratization, like the liberal peacebuilding model, is based on the Western theory of the liberal peace. International actors have applied this theoretical framework to promote peace and stability through post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The debates in the field of democratization are not due to preference for another political system over a democratic one. Most academics would agree, theoretically speaking, that a well-established democratic system is the ideal route to sustainable peace and development in post-conflict societies (Swain, Amer, &Ojendal, 2009), as it provides a framework that can manage conflicting interests without violence (Ottaway, 2007), allows for a peaceful transition of power, and values human rights (Ohlson & Kovacs, 2009).

Instead, it is the *process* of democratization, the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system, that prompts criticism. (Swain, Amer, & Ojendal, 2009; Carlson & Turner, 2009; Jung, 2012). During the process of democratization, international actors focus on the establishment of institutions and the development of a democratic constitution and policies (Chandler, 1999; McMahon & Western, 2009; Paris, 2004). However, the success of post-conflict democratization is rather disheartening (Zürcher, 2011). Recent examples, such as Nigeria and South Sudan, show that democratization has rarely proven to be a linear process (Frahm, 2017). This is particularly a concern in post-conflict societies where the institutions needed to foster democracy are weak and lacking (Zürcher, 2011), making them more susceptible to renewed conflict and aggression.

Again, peacebuilding is plagued by another ambiguous term: democracy. The definition often varies from state to state (Parra-Rosales, 2009), and person to person (Pietsch, Miller, & Karp, 2015). Admittedly, the aim of liberal peacebuilding and democratization is the establishment of a *liberal* democracy. However, few post-conflict countries reach that benchmark (Zürcher, et. al., 2013, p. 8), and instead are lucky to reach the threshold for an electoral democracy. Electoral democracies are countries that have minimum standards for political rights and civil liberties,

while liberal democracies practice a more robust observance of democratic ideals and a wider array of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2018). In other words, electoral democracies meet the minimum institutional and procedural requirements, but lack the liberal values and freedoms of liberal democracies. Often, local elites act as spoilers stagnating the democratization process, when the cost of adopting democracy may to be too high, as it does not guarantee that they retain power (Zürcher, 2011, p. 91).

Democracy needs legitimacy, which is gathered from four interconnected sources: shared beliefs, international legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and process legitimacy (Dagher, 2018). International legitimacy stems from international recognition. In post-conflict states this is inherently earned to some extent, as the international actors that are participating in the peace process will to give recognition in order to do so. Process legitimacy is earned through the establishment of institutions and frequent elections. The haste with which elections are conducted in post-conflict states has been a significant source of criticism due to its consequences, and competition between former enemies (Autesserre, 2014; Bennett, 2016). In response, it has been argued that minimum preconditions, such as structural and institutional requirements, should be met before a post-conflict state can democratize (Ottoway, 2007; Hippler, 2008; Schmidt, 2008). In fact, experts have suggested that U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should focus more its aid on nationbuilding and less on democratization, claiming that in the developing world, democracy is a "luxury good" (Boot & Miklaucic, 2016).

The creation of institutions alone does not make a democracy. To put it in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, "*building a house* is not the same as *establishing a home"* (1995, p.1). In addition to institutions, for a democracy to properly function, the state needs to be recognized and legitimized by the people through shared beliefs. The challenge that transitioning, post-conflict states face is the introduction of a new political framework without the necessary political culture. Political culture can loosely be translated as willingness to participate and to live by the rules of democracy (Schmidt, 2008, p. 112). For democracy to thrive, there needs to be a local demand for it (Parra-Rosales, 2009; Zürcher, 2011) This is increasingly difficult in societies that are severely divided and have not properly reconciled.

The final source of legitimacy, is performance legitimacy. It can only be achieved when three requirements have been met: the state must know the interests of its citizens, meet their expectations, and finally, the state must establish and maintain the capacity to provide basic services (Dagher, 2018 p. 91-93). To be a functioning democracy, the government must act as an agency that represents the will of the people it governs. However, immediately after war, post-conflict states do not possess the capacity to provide all of these needs, further supporting the argument that post-conflict states should meet preset requirements before moving toward the path to democratization (Ottoway, 2007).

THE MISSING LINK: PERCEPTION

There is a substantial collection of research on the processes of post-conflict peacebuilding and democratization, and the resulting democracy. This research contributes to the development of various arguments and theories of democratization and peacebuilding. However, its overwhelming focus on macro-level outcomes is a considerable limitation. Little, if any, literature on post-conflict peacebuilding and democratization takes into account public perception of the established democracy and its legitimacy.

This is not to say that there is no existing research on public perceptions and legitimacy of liberal peacebuilding, or democracy. Researchers have analyzed public opinion polls in Europe (Anderson & Guillory, 1997) and Latin America (Sødal, 2012) and found that citizens' perceptions of political institutions and economic situations in their country impact their satisfaction with democracy. However, these studies are focused on regions, rather than post-conflict states. A recent empirical study has focused on the public perceptions of democracy in post-conflict societies, linking the relationship between a citizen's exposure to violence and their support of liberal values (Dyrstad, 2013). This link between insecurity and willingness to sacrifice freedoms or rights is paramount to understanding perceptions of democracy in a society recovering from war. However, Dyrstad focuses only on security in terms of absence of violence and overlooks other aspects such as economic, political, and social needs. When the needs of citizens have not been met, whether in the economic, social or political realm, they see themselves at risk. Pietsch, Miller, and Karp (2015) claim that citizens are more apt to sacrifice some of their freedoms for the sake of effective governance, political order, and economic necessity. These studies address the

individual concepts of this research. What they fail to do is link them to one another. While useful, none of this existing literature offers a theory that can explain the impact of peacebuilding on local perceptions of democracy.

PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BOSNIA

Bosnia has often been used as a focal point for peacebuilding and democratization research. However, in most cases, the level of analysis is either at state level, or project level (Gillard, 2001; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005). Chandler's 1999 *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, provides a strong analysis of the processes of peacebuilding and democratization in Bosnia. Others have focused on the implications that Dayton has had for the peace process and democratization (McMahon & Western, 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2012). However, these studies focus on the institutions and political structure, rather than on the individuals within the society, and their understanding of democracy.

Much like the broader literature on peacebuilding, studies on the peacebuilding process in Bosnia fail to incorporate the role of international actors beyond EU, UN, and the US. The various ethnic groups in Bosnia have long had close ties with Non-Western powers, such as the Bosnian Serbs with Russia (Sito-Sucic, 2018) or the Bosnian Muslims with Turkey (Armstrong, 2018). While the influence and involvement of these Non-Western actors may not be as pronounced as those of the Western actors, does not mean that they have not been present. Omitting the role that these actors play and the influence that they have at the local level presents a curtailed account of the peace process in Bosnia.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

> PEACE CANNOT BE KEPT BY FORCE. IT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY UNDERSTANDING.
>
> ALBERT EINSTEIN, *COSMIC RELIGION* (1931), P. 32.

The overarching framework of this study is based on the constructivist theory of international relations. Constructivism, as explained by Wendt (1999), specifies that while the world exists in an anarchic system, states are still constrained by an international structure which is shaped and molded by the behavior and identity of states. A state's identities and behaviors are shaped by collective beliefs, history, norms, and social identities of the individuals within that state. Consequently, as norms and beliefs evolve, so do identities and interests, and eventually these lead to changes to the international structure. Alliances and coalitions are therefore a product of collective identity and interests, while conflict, both violent and non-violent, is more prevalent in nations with contrasting identities (Wendt, 1999, p. 975). This is not to say that power and interests are not relevant in international relations. It is the socially constructed *understanding* of power and interests that ultimately shapes the stage of world politics.

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING

Wendt uses his Constructivist model as a lens, through which to analyze the actions between states, at an international level. This lens, however, can be focused further – at state level. For the goals of this research, a constructivist framework gives us basis through which to understand the occurrence of conflict, and in turn how to *build peace*. In sharp contrast to liberals or realists, constructivists focus on the individuals within a society as the agents that shape a state's relations through development of identity, a sentiment deeply embedded in the constructivist peacebuilding approach. A constructivist approach to peacebuilding shifts the focus from relations between states, to relations within a state, and to the individual. As Earl Conteh-Morgan (2005 p. 70) explains, peace efforts often view the individual as "the *means* to political stability as opposed to

being the *end* of all peacebuilding efforts." Instead, efforts should be focused on realizing human security at the personal, institutional, and cultural-structural levels. To achieve this, Conteh-Morgan outlines three fundamental arguments of the constructivist perspective of peacebuilding.

First, an *interpretive* bottom-up approach should be imbedded into the peace process (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p. 72). In other words, peacebuilding requires interpreting the needs and insecurities from the perspectives of the individuals. As previously discussed, resistance can occur when locals fail to see their interests reflected in the peacebuilding process (Autesserre, 2015; Hellmüller, 2013; Lee, 2015). While peacebuilders bring experience and expertise to post-conflict states, they also bring their own culture. This includes both their individual culture, one shaped by their community and experience, and a shared culture of international peacebuilders, embedded with its own beliefs, taboos, rules, and world understanding (Autesserre, 2015). This culture, like any other, shapes their understandings and expectations of peace, development, and reconciliation. While this is natural and to be expected, the trouble arises when this cultural understanding eclipses the local culture, needs, and expectations. This constructivist approach does not demand a fully bottom up approach, rather it calls for the integration of bottom up approaches into the peace process. The procedure of peacebuilding is founded in the creation and establishment of new norms. However, this needs to be done in a manner that is compatible with the existing cultural framework.

Second, both material and ideational factors must be considered and adapted within the peace process (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p. 76). Earl Adler (1997, p. 322) defines constructivism as the view that *"the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human interaction and depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world."*[3] Constructivist peacebuilding emphasizes the understanding that shaping or building peace, depends on the way that those experiencing it, the locals, interpret the material world and the conflict. The reigning approach to contemporary peacebuilding is the liberal peacebuilding model. A constructivist analysis of the democratic peace also looks past the institution-building and liberal identification of liberal peacebuilding, at the process through which states develop a

[3] Emphasis from original source.

collective identity (Kahl, 1998). This reflects the needs to integrate both nationbuilding *and* statebuilding approaches. Again, this does not suggest that the material needs, such as institutions or security, are not of importance. Rather, this encourages the peace process to address the immaterial, such as enabling the development of a national identity, or fostering an appreciation for liberal values. The political culture and a shared identity alone will not establish peace. However, these ideational factors can dictate whether some actions are possible or even improbable within that culture (Autesserre, 2015, p. 29-30).

Finally, peacebuilding needs to move beyond immediate goals, such as achieving a negative peace and election monitoring (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p. 72). Instead, it must focus on a lasting and sustainable positive peace. This requires planning past the initial goals of personal security and addressing possible sources of future conflict embedded in social and institutional insecurities.

INITIAL HYPOTHESES

Based on the literature and concepts discussed above, two *preliminary* hypotheses have been developed. These will be used as starting points. In this paper I refer to them as 'initial hypotheses' (IH) however, they may be better described as starting points or hunches. They are narrow enough to give the study a direction, and yet broad enough that they allow the emergence of new concepts and variables. While these concepts will be used for initial interviews and data collection, it is necessary to note that these are quite likely to change and develop as the data is analyzed.

Initial Hypothesis 1 pulls from the nationbuilding versus statebuilding discussion (Chesterman, 2005; Kostic, 2008; Lemay-Hebert, 2009). It makes the assumption that locals who prioritize nationbuilding initiatives place a greater importance on ideational factors and therefore, they will hold liberal values in higher regard than institutions in the process of democratization.

> *IH.1: Locals who prioritize nationbuilding over statebuilding initiatives in peacebuilding will place a greater value on liberal ideals than democratic institutions in the democratization process.*

Peacebuilding requires that personal, institutional, and cultural-structural insecurities are addressed (Conteh-Morgan, 2005). When the peace process fails to provide these securities, locals will perceive themselves to be at risk. This sense of insecurity in turn, impacts the way in which locals perceive their political situation, and the state. If they feel that their new political system has failed to provide personal, institutional, or cultural-structural this thesis stipulates that local will become skeptical of its institutions and ideals.

IH.2: Locals who still feel at risk due to stagnant or unfulfilled peacebuilding initiatives are more likely to be skeptical of democratic institutions and ideals.

.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

SINGLE CASE THEORY DEVELOPMENT

There is a considerable gap in literature when it comes to the impact that democratization and peacebuilding have on the perceptions of democracy at a local level. This study will aim to address this and to identify indicators that can be tested in following studies. To do so, this study research will employ a single case theory development methodology. Theory development by means of a case study is an inductive process aimed at developing provisional conclusions that can later be tested against new data or a different case (George & Bennett, 2005 p, 90).

As is evident from Chapter 2, the concepts in this study, such as peace and democracy, are broad and difficult to measure. Case studies allow for a deeper conceptual refinement of these notions, where statistical studies run face the risk of "conceptual stretching" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19-22). Most importantly, case studies allow for the exploration of new variables and development of theory. While this thesis begins with two preliminary hypotheses, the nature of this research is such that expects these to evolve with the emergence of new variables and patterns in the data.

Bosnia and Herzegovina will be used as the case study for this theory development study. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the violent war that plagued Bosnia and set the framework for a democratic state and liberal peacebuilding efforts in the post-conflict country (Darweish & Rank, 2012; Paris, 2011). Since the implementation of Dayton, EU involvement in the Balkan state has become part of the landscape- ranging widely in activities such as EUFOR Althea, EU Policing Mission, and through its role in the OHR. These efforts focused on neo-liberal economic reforms, holding elections, and democratic consolidation (Bennett, 2016; Chandler, 1999). Peacebuilding is a long-term process that takes place over the course of many years. It has been over two decades since the conflict ended in Bosnia. Identities and values of a nation, as addressed in the constructivist framework of this research, evolve *over time.* This makes Bosnia

they key case in which to study the impact of peacebuilding processes and to evaluate the impact that they have had on public perceptions of liberal democratic values. Admittedly, a single case study lacks the representativeness afforded by a large-N studies (George & Bennett, 2005 p. 31; Reichertz, 2014) however the purpose is to develop a theory for *future* testing (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

DATA COLLECTION

The primary source of data for this study was collected through a series of semi-structured interviews. The inductive nature of this research required that the interviews be conducted in such a manner that answers can be fluid and unrestricted. In order to provide the degree of control needed to guide and analyze the data, a semi-structured approach was necessary with various open-ended core questions to prompt the interviewee (Galletta, 2013, p. 37).

The interviews were conducted in three stages. After doing considerable research on existing literature on peacebuilding and democratization, I formulated several initial hypotheses. I then began with several unstructured and informal interviews. These interviews allowed me to get a deeper understanding of the particular situation in Bosnia and aided in the development of the initial hypotheses. I then developed a standard questionnaire (see Appendix A.1 for sample of questionnaire), based on information from preliminary interviews and initial hypotheses. These questions included biographical questions, to provide insight into the participant's experiences, and concept questions, focused towards gauging their perceptions of post-conflict peacebuilding strategies, democracy, and other relevant concepts. Again, I stress that this was only a guiding questionnaire. When conducting semi-structured interviews, it is expected that the questions are amended or reordered to allow for a more natural flow of conversation (Castillo-Montoya, 2016; Edwards & Holland, 2013, p. 29). I began the analysis of the data as the interviews were conducted, searching for developing concepts and then revised the questionnaire as necessary. After further analysis of the data, several follow up interviews were conducted, to clarify any unclear responses or pose questions that arose after the original interview.

The data for this research was collected in Sarajevo during two separate visits. Throughout the course of the fieldwork, conducted 12 semi-structured interviews, 10 unstructured and informal

interviews, and several follow-up interviews were conducted. A multistage purposeful sampling strategy was used in the selection of the interviewees. I began with a snowball sampling method, through participants were identified with the help of various existing academic and social contacts in Bosnia. Snowball sampling is not ideal, as it presents the risk of selection bias and does not guarantee proper representation of the sample group (Emmel, 2013, p. 131). However, due to time constraints it was the most feasible option. The last stage of the sampling method was opportunistic or emergent sampling – this strategy allows for samples to be selected as opportunities arise during fieldwork (Emmel, 2013, p. 41). During my time in Bosnia, I often met people who expressed a willingness to participate or contribute to my work and this method allowed for the flexibility to take advantage of these unexpected opportunities during my fieldwork.

Admittedly, this research faced several limitations, the most significant due to cost and time. This study would have benefitted from a wider range of participants. I had initially intended to conduct interviews in several different cities and villages in the Federation and Republika Srpska, I soon found this to be far beyond my capabilities in the limited time. Instead, I focused my research in the capital city of Sarajevo.

The interviews were mostly conducted at local cafes, of the interviewee's choice. The logic behind this decision was to put participants at ease, in an environment in which they felt comfortable (Edward & Holland, 2013, p. 4n; Varraich, 2017). As I met most of the participants for the first time at the time of the interviews, I assured them that false names would be used when sharing the results of the research (Brandt & Eiro, 2017). I sought to digitally record the interviews, establishing this base of trust and security seemed of particular importance. **Table A.1 (**found in **Appendix 2)** outlines the date and location of each interview, as well as each interviewee's age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, and war experience.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

This inductive research study requires that the hypotheses and theory be constructed from the data. This methodology requires a constant level of analysis and adaptation. Rather than awaiting the collection of all the data before commencing the analysis, it requires that the analysis be done throughout the various stages of collection. This allowed for modification of the interview

questionnaire such as the inclusion of arising concepts, new questions, or the rewording of certain questions. When conducting qualitative research, especially with theory development methodologies, one can easily become overwhelmed with an influx of information, ideas, concepts, and themes. To deter this from happening, I used a coding method to structure the analytical process. Interview transcripts and field notes are reviewed and coded. From these codes, categories are created. These categories then lead to themes and concepts that are applied to develop a theory or provision.

Coding, as described by Johnny Saldaña (2009), is often conducted in two separate cycles. In the first cycle of the multiple coding method, I began with Attributes Coding. At the end of each interview, or as I transcribed them, I coded the interviews with basic descriptive information. This included participant demographics, such as age, gender, and ethnicity; interview logistics such as date, location, and length of interview; and a concept index list of the major themes or categories identified during the interview (Saldaña, 2009 p. 164). The participant demographics and interview logistics act as control variables - as any of factors may impact the responses that participants give, and how they give them. Unexpected patterns may emerge from these factors that could be worth investigating further (Bazeley, 2010). As this study is based on a small number of interviews, I did not use computerized data analysis. However, should this research be conducted in the future with a larger sample size and greater resources, a computerized data analysis could prove to be useful.

As this research is focused on the perception, values, and understanding of individuals, a combination of Initial Coding and Values Coding Methods were applied (Saldaña, 2009, p. 83, 90). Initial Coding is to be done instinctively, without much thought and can be a short phrase to summarize initial impression. Using the Values Coding technique, four preliminary labels, experience, values, attitudes, and needs, were used to code units. The experience label included occurrences before, during, or after the war that might have an impact on their needs, values, or attitudes. Socialist, liberal, identity, and nationalistic values were all coded under Values. The Attitudes label was used to code opinions of participants. To name a few, this included opinions of the war, current state of Bosnia, democracy, socialism, and the post-conflict peacebuilding activities. From this I was able to induce interviewees' perceptions of the peacebuilding process, democratization, and liberal values. Coded under the needs label were immediate post-conflict,

reconciliatory, and present-day needs. This is where I was able to identify whether or not participants still felt at risk, and what kind of insecurity they faced. During the Initial Coding process, I noticed, and had expected, that certain elements of possible categories were emerging from the data. I used sub-codes to label these with specific referents (e.g. nationbuilding, statebuilding, liberal). Once I completed the coding, I grouped the codes using the four preliminary labels, making it easier to analyze and look for patterns.

In the second cycle of coding a Focused Coding Method is applied. I used the sub-codes from the initial labeling to categorize the more significant or frequent codes based on themes or concepts (Charmaz, 2006; Saldaña, 2009). Once the interviews were coded and categorized, I was able to review and compare the data looking for themes and patterns, which I then used to formulate my final provisions. **Table 1** provides a quick review of the analysis process; for a detailed example of the coding process, see Appendix 3.

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW STEPS OF ANALYSIS

Preparation	1st Cycle Coding		2nd Cycle Coding	Analysis
Transcription	**Step 1: Attribute Coding**	**Step 2: Initial and Values Coding**	**2nd Cycle: Focused Coding**	**Analyze and Review**
Use digital recorder to review and transcribe interviews. Field notes also integrated with transcript.	Basic descriptive information, demographics, Ex: *Name, Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Occupation, Interview Time and Location, Concept Index*	**Initial Coding:** Short phrase to Summarize Unit *Ex: Tito Provided Security,* **Values Coding:** Values *Ex: Liberal Values, National Identity, Prioritize Personal Freedom, Community Oriented* Attitudes: *Ex: International Community Responsible for war, Tito Provided Security, Accustomed to Aid* Needs: *Ex: Economic Security, Justice, Physical Security, Housing, Family Reunification* Experiences: *Ex: War Kid, Studied in Spain, Strict Religious Upbringing, Refugee*	Use initial coding to develop categories from most significant and frequent codes. *Ex: Distrust of Institutions, Prioritize Economic Solution, Prioritize Liberal Ideals,*	Review categories data using codes and categories. Look for patterns to test initial hypotheses and/or formulate new ones.

TABLE 1 DEPICTS THE VARIOUS STEPS OF THE ANALYSIS PROCESS, INCLUDING EXAMPLES OF VARIOUS CODES FROM EACH CYCLE.

CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The outbreak of war in Bosnia was one of the many ripple effects of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Ethnic and religious identities play a central role in understanding the past and present of the Balkans and its peoples. Before delving into the immediate causes of the 1990s war in Bosnia and its aftermath, it is necessary to define terminology as it is used in this thesis, to refer to groups of peoples. These identities have been shaped by years of history, wars, empires, and coexistence. The inextricable nexus of religion and ethno-national identities in the Balkans can largely be traced back to the Ottoman Empire, during which people were governed and defined by their faith (Bennett, 2016, p. 18).

Before continuing, it is essential to define the terminology that will be used in relation to ethnic groups and identities. Today's Bosnia is largely composed of three ethnic groups: Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks. Unless directly stated, the terms 'Serb' and 'Croat' will refer to Bosnian-Croats and Bosnian-Serbs. Often, "Bosniak" and "Muslims" are used interchangeably, however, for this research "Bosniaks" will be used to refer to Bosnian-Muslims. "Bosnian" will refer to all of Bosnia's peoples, regardless of ethnicity or religion. In upcoming sections and chapters, this study will indicate the need for a 'national identity' referring to a *collective* Bosnian identity. When discussing the ethno-nationalist parties or divisions, it will be explicitly stated.

BROTHERHOOD, UNITY, AND TITO

Some trace the causes of the war back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Hagen & William, 1999) and other even further to the days of Emperor Constantine and the Roman Empire (Doder, 1993). While the history of the region and its peoples played a role in shaping the circumstances that led up to the conflict, the war in Bosnia occurred within the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the transition from socialism to democracy.

The Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina, and six socialist republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and

Herzegovina. This multi-ethnic Slavic country was best known for its charismatic leader, Josip Broz Tito. Tito's promotion of 'Brotherhood and Unity' coupled with his stern leadership enabled him to ease ethnic divisions.

The Yugoslav patriotism that promoted came crumbling down, shortly after the death of Tito in1980. Economic instability, debates over institutional structures, elite dynamics, and deficiencies in system legitimacy plagued the country in the decade following his death (Ramet, 2005 p. 55). Political elites, such as Serbian President Slobodan Milosovec flamed the fires of ethno-nationalism in the face of the instability, promoting tension between groups that had previously coexisted, for the sake of their own nationalist agendas (Greenberg & McGuiness, 2000, p. 35; Wilmer, 2002 p. 138).

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN BOSNIA

The breakup of Yugoslavia formally began in 1991, as Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. A referendum was held on the question of succession from Yugoslavia on 29 February- 1 March of 1992. At the time of the referendum, the Bosnian population was about 43% Bosniak, 35% Serb, and 18% Croat (Power, 2002 p. 248). The nationalist Bosnian-Serb party boycotted the referendum, and in the end, the results showed 99.4 percent of voters in favor of Bosnian independence (Power, 2002 p. 248). Shortly after Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia, the war erupted. Bosnian-Serbs violently opposed secession and fought to reunited with Serbia. Similarly displeased with the notion of becoming part of a new nation, Bosnian-Croats followed suit.

Croats and Serbs fought Bosniaks, and at times each other, for control of territories which were largely populated by their ethnic groups. Further complicating the issue is the fact that these contested portions of land were not ethnically homogeneous. It was not as simple as just letting Serbs claim the territory they deemed as 'Republika Srpska" for it was also largely inhabited by Bosniak and Croats. This led to the vile ethnic cleansing campaigns by Serbs, as they tried to clear Srpska of Bosniaks and Croats.

DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS

The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the violence between the Bosniaks and the Croats and created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler, 1999). A year later, the Dayton Peace

Accords were signed, officially bringing the war to an end and creating a high decentralized and deeply fragmented state. The Dayton Peace Accords recognized Republika Srpska, as a political entity. It divided Bosnia into two semi-independent entities, the Bosnkiak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republika Srpska. Furthermore, it recognized Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as its three constituent peoples. By doing so, Dayton formalized ethnic divisions and embedded them into the post-conflict structure (McMahon & Western, 2009, p. 69).

The Dayton Agreement also established a democratic framework in the hopes that, "democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society" (General Framework Agreement for Peace, 1995, Annex 4).The eleven Annexes of Dayton gave the international community effective power over the Bosnian state and its institutions (Chandler, 1999, p. 44), leaving the peace process and democratization formally in the hands of international actors. Additionally, Dayton created the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia to oversee the implementation of the treaty into the new political framework (Zürcher, et. al. 2013, pg. 55). A year after the treaty was signed, 17 foreign governments, 18 UN agencies, 27 intergovernmental organizations and approximately 200 NGOs were actively involved in the peace process (McMahon & Western, 2009, p. 69).

Provisions in the General Framework Agreement of Dayton called for future negotiations to determine the responsibilities of the central government and its institutions. However, the two entities had no desire to strengthen the central government and when the time came, the international community did not pressure them to do so (Bennett, 2017 p. 86). Instead, the power-sharing framework has resulted in a highly decentralized state, and two entities with extensive political powers. Today this power-sharing political framework includes three presidents (one Bosniak, one Serb, and a Croat), almost 200 ministers, and over 700 members of parliament representing a population of 3.5 million people. Each of these three presidents has the power to veto legislation, often resulting in an impasse (McMahon & Western, 2009). Citizens who do not declare themselves as one of the three recognized constituent peoples, are excluded from holding certain offices and positions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

For a study founded in constructivist principles, it is essential to develop an understanding of the participants and the world around them. This entails a particular consideration of experiences that may have impacted the way in which they perceive the world around them, before developing conclusions. This section will outline the data gathered from the interviews and will be followed by a discussion section, in the following chapter, in which the data and analysis will be applied to the initial hypotheses.

"LET'S START WITH THE BASICS": AGE AND ETHNICITY

The age of the interviewees ranged from 23-45, with half of participants aged between 23-27. [4] These younger participants, born during the war or just before, were either born outside of Bosnia as refugees[5] or in Sarajevo, where they remained with their families throughout the war. [6] Having been incredibly young when the war ended, they grew up in a post-conflict Bosnia, one recovering from a war that they did not remember. This generation has deemed themselves the 'war kids' and they stress that their views of the war, peacebuilding, and the Bosnian politics are significantly different than those of the older generations. [7] They have grown up with the aftermath and consequences of the war, in the midst of chaos and the peace process. In my research, I found that they held a lot of resentment towards the older generations, holding them responsible not just for the war,[8] but also the current state of the country. Amna explains, "Since I was born during the war I blame my parents and my grandparents for the things that happened. I tell them this country sucks but it's their fault."[9] War kids have a unique perspective, in that their lives and the world around them have been impacted by an event that they did not experience of have any influence over. They have inherited the aftermath of a war that they do not see as their own.

---

[4] See Appendix A.2
[5] Sara, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 19 March 2018; Tarik, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 17 April, 2018.
[6] Emin, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 12 March, 2018; Živko, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 17 April, 2018; Luka, interview by Author 17 March, 2018; Abe, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 15 March, 2018.
[7] Tarik, [Interview] 2018; Luka, [Interview] 2018; Živko, [Interview] 2018; Sara, [Interview] 2018.
[8] Bakir, interview by Author; Sarajevo, BiH, 16 March, 2018; Abe, [Interview] 2018.
[9] Sara, [Interview] 2018.

However, it is to be noted that the perspectives of War Kids in Sarajevo are rather different than those who grew up outside of the city.

> *"If you've been to Sarajevo you think 'Oh things are getting better!' but whoever comes here isn't getting the whole picture. If you go to other federations there are small, small villages were you only have a church and a mosque or maybe a school. It's so easy to go there and preach about nationalism or whatever and these people are poisoned with the rhetoric."*[10]

Sarajevo has long had a reputation for being multicultural. Though, this is not as common in rural areas, "When you're from a smaller environment you are not so exposed to different people and different opinions" said Luka.[11] This lack of exposure, Tarik expressed, makes the younger populations more susceptible to the "toxic" ideals of the older generations, "young people there are poisoned by their parents or grandparents." [12]

Alma, 37 school teacher, who was a teenager living in Sarajevo during the war described it as the best times of her life. Admittedly, it was terrifying, but she described living with a sense of freedom and different set of priorities, "it was like time had stopped. Suddenly the only thing that mattered other than surviving, was *living*. So, we did." [13] Similarly, I found that those who were teenagers during the war or lived in Sarajevo during the siege often referred to it with fondness, as a simpler time[14] and highlighting the sense of community. [15] As such, they found it much more difficult to adapt to life after the war. Josip, 44, elaborates,

> *"After the war ended there was an initial confusion, 'what were we supposed to do now?' Even after that, I don't think that people or the government had any idea what to do with themselves or how to proceed. For years our main goal was survival, we shared food with*

[10] Sara [Interview] 2018.
[11] Luka, [Interview] 2018.
[12] Tarik, [Interview] 2018.
[13] Alma, informal interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 11 March, 2018.
[14] Elma, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 19 March 2018.
[15] Luka, [Interview] 2018; Amna, [Interview] 2018.

> *our neighbors, we looked out for one another. Suddenly it was back to looking for employment, or paying rent, finishing school, planning a career. None of it seemed important."*[16]

The age at which the participants experienced the war and its aftermath have undoubtedly shaped their perceptions of the war and the world around them. As has their experience in Sarajevo, rather than in more ethnically homogeneous cities or villages.

As ethnic identity has played a major role in Bosnia during the war, and in its aftermath, it was also something that I discussed with participants. After explaining the goals of the research and the structure of the interview, I began all of my interviews with the following statement "Let's begin with the basics: age, gender, and ethnicity." By lumping this question in with other simple, "matter of fact" questions, I hoped that the participants would answer quickly without giving it much thought. In response to this question, 5 participants replied with "Bosnian," rather than the expected "Bosniak", "Serb", or "Croat".[17] Some like Sara, simply said "I am Bosnian and Herzegovinian" without explaining further.[18] Luka on the other hand explained "I identify myself as Bosnian, not those three main groups," making it clear that he was deliberately rejecting the other classifications.[19] Others like Elma, explained their identity further, "I am Bosnian. And Muslim. But I am Bosnian first," explaining that while she recognizes herself to be Bosniak, she above all she prioritizes her national identity.[20]

PERCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING

This thesis began with an initial assumption that participants would prioritize either nationbuilding activities or statebuilding activities. To determine this, I inquired about interviewees' interests and needs after the war, and what they deemed as most important for the country. Concerns such as physical security, economy, and institutions were categorized as statebuilding while justice, social cohesion, and development of a national identity were categorized as nationbuilding. However,

[16] Josip interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 18 April 2018.
[17] See Appendix 2. Respondents that answered with "Bosnian" are given the label "BiH" and when possible, more information was added.
[18] Sara, [Interview] 2018.
[19] Luka, [Interview] 2018.
[20] Elma, [Interview] 2018.

in this research I found that locals did not prioritize one over the other. Most participants distinctly emphasized the need for both, at different stages of the peace process.

The immediate concerns for most were security and infrastructure, particularly since the city of Sarajevo experienced massive destruction during the war and the siege. It is then to be expected that many of the participants named the urgency for physical rebuilding and infrastructure, as an immediate concern at the end of the war.[21] Homes, hospitals, schools, and communities needed to be rebuilt. Bakir, 31, and his mother spent the war in Canada, as refugees, while his father remained in the Bosnian Army.[22] Sara was born as a refugee in Croatia, while her father also remained in Sarajevo, fighting in the Bosnian Army.[23] Both Bakir and Sara emphasized that the main priorities for their families was reunification. For Raisa, whose family suffered a great loss in the massacre of Srebrenica, she and her family sought physical security, in its most literal sense.[24] In the aftermath of the war, the initial priorities of the participants and their families, were based in personal insecurity (Conteh-Morgan, 2005).

All participants, in one form or another, conveyed the need for nationbuilding and a collective Bosnian identity once a negative peace had been established. These sentiments bring to the foreground one of the lingering issues in Bosnian society: a lack of national identity. The manner in which five of the twelve participants chose to identify themselves, as Bosnian, shows a desire and dedication to the development of a national identity at the local level.

> *What we really needed after the war was a whole new identity, a new country. Not Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs. We should have come together as a brand-new country, with a new name. Instead we brought the baggage from the war with us and enforced divisions, making it impossible to come together as one country.*[25]

[21] Emin, [Interview] 2018; Milena, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 15 April 2018.
[22] Bakir, [Interview] 2018.
[23] Sara, [Interview] 2018.
[24] Raisa's father and two brothers were killed in the massacre of Srebrenica, along with several members of her extended family. Raisa, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 14 March 2018
[25] Bakir, [Interview] 2018.

Instead, international actors focused on stopping the fighting, rather than addressing divisions. "The priority should've been to convince people that they weren't enemies," explained Živko, "that's the part that didn't succeed."[26] The continued absence of national unity is evident in two of Bosnia's national symbols: a flag, to which many citizens feel little connection (Lakic, 2017) and a national anthem, which remains fully instrumental after 22 years, as authorities from the three ethno-national groups have been unable to reach a consensus on lyrics (Kovacevic, 2018). There was little focus on collective identity formation until it was already too late. "People adapt, after a while anything can become normal, even living in a fragmented country, for a lot of people the time to come together was after the war, now I think there's no drive for it." [27] The institutionalization of ethnic divisions was a recurring point in the interviews.

> *It's impossible to create actual progress when you have three groups of people working against each other for their own interests. So, if I'm being completely honest I think it was fucked from the start - [Dayton] set up us to fail.* [28]

Milena, 35, summed up Dayton with the metaphor, "band-aids on bullet holes."[29] This simple response sums up a sentiment that was echoed throughout the many interviews, the political framework established by the Dayton Peace Treaty was a short-term solution that froze the conflict, rather than resolved it. While the division of power ensured that the three major ethnic groups, Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs were all equally represented, it also formalized this separation.

> *"There have been no real efforts from the politicians to unite Bosnians. Why would they? It has been benefitting them to keep us separated, distracted, too busy fighting with each other to point the finger at them."* [30]

Instead of progress, locals have seen political elites prosper in the aftermath of the war and continue to promote top-down ethno-nationalist rhetoric.[31] It remains in their best interest to

[26] Živko, [Interview] 2018.
[27] Raisa [Interview] 2018.
[28] Živko, [Interview] 2018.
[29] Milena, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 15 April 2018
[30] Josip [Interview] 2018.
[31] Sara, [Interview] 2018; Milena, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018.

continue in power, over a fragmented country. Alas, the interests of the local elites often overshadow those of the masses (Bandovic, 2017).

CORRUPTION: CULTURE OR CIRCUMSTANCE?

There was one overarching theme, that came up in each of the semi-structured interviews, and most of the informal unstructured interviews: corruption. For the purpose of this research, I have defined corruption as the misuse of public office for private gains (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010, p. 121). I found that the participants perceived corruption as widespread at micro and macro levels, and across various sectors.

I was often told that it was common knowledge in Bosnia that the three presidents, Bakir Izetbegovic, Mladen Ivanic, and Dragan Čovic, are actually in league with one another and perpetuating nationalist agendas in order to distract from their own hidden agendas.[32] "They go into meetings together, giving dirty looks to each other as they walk into the buildings. But once they're inside and there's no more television, no more cameras, then they drink together and laugh at what fools we are," explained Emin.[33] This mistrust of the Presidency in BiH is not a new development. In 2000, a World Bank report (p. 43) showed that 50% of the general population believed that corruption was widespread among the presidency.

Both Elma and Luka detailed their experiences with corruption in the health sector. Elma, 42, a professional nurse, described the institutional corruption she witnessed while working in healthcare. One of the most significant, she says, was the cutting of staff wages in which the excess money was given to the party overseeing the health department.[34] Luka shared the story of his family paying a bribe to a doctor, when his younger sister was unable to get proper care after suffering a serious leg injury two years ago.[35] These two experiences illustrate the manners in which individuals are faced with corruption in their daily lives.

[32] Elma, [Interview] 2018; Živko, [Interview] 2018; Bakir, [Interview] 2018; Emin, [Interview] 2018.
[33] Emin, [Interview] 2018.
[34] Elma, [Interview] 2018.
[35] Luka, [Interview] 2018.

While all of the participants expressed disdain of corruption at institutional levels, some attitudes differed when it came to corruption in everyday life. Živko for example, laughed as he told a story of how his friend keeps an envelope of money in his car, so that he can bribe the police officer in case he gets stopped for a traffic violation. He dismissed this kind of interaction as "part of Balkan culture." [36] While recent research has found evidence that personal characteristics play a role in perception of corruption (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010, p. 121), Živko suggests that Balkan people are more prone to *participate* in corruption at microlevels. Abe, attributes the scarcity of corruption in Yugoslavia to Tito's "ability to keep the Balkan people in line."[37] These statements pose a significant question: if corruption becomes deeply engrained in a society, does it become cultural? If so, when? For some, giving in to corruption, at some level is inevitable. "Eventually, you will be presented with no other option, and you will be too desperate to refuse."[38] This implies that corruption is not inherently cultural, it is circumstantial. If the basic needs of society were met, individuals would be less inclined to participate in the cycle corruption.

Others outright refuse the assertion that corruption is cultural, instead they see this as justification:

> *People always say, 'it's just the way things are done here, in Bosnia, in the Balkans, in Yugoslavia,' but that is a lie, they say that because they do not want to admit that they have made it that way. By paying doctors or giving money to the [political] parties for a job they have created this cycle of corruption.* [39]

In fact, it was the older participants, Elma, Josip, & Amna, that shared this sentiment, as all three of them described the levels of corruption significantly increasing after the war.[40] This correlates with studies which assert that the climate and chaos of a post-conflict society, often breed corruption. Democratization introduces a new structure in a post-conflict society and initiates a change in power and political shift. These changes often create conditions in which corruption can

---

[36] Živko, [Interview] 2018.
[37] Abe, [Interview] 2018.
[38] Luka, [Interview] 2018.
[39] Here, Josip refers to individuals paying bribes to the hiring committees in institutions in order to receive a contract. This is seen as an investment. Source: Josip, [Interview] 2018. Also discussed in: Elma, [Interview] 2018; Amna, interview by Author, Sarajevo, BiH, 19 March 2018.
[40] Elma, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018; Amna, [Interview] 2018.

thrive and grow. In the early stages of peacebuilding, corruption is often overlooked by international actors as it is seen as a tradeoff for stability (Belloni & Strazzari, 2014). The problem is that these illegitimate ways of operating do not disappear on their own.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS

Participants were asked to elaborate on whom they perceived were the main actors, local and international, involved and the focus of projects implemented in the peace process. Despite the extensive EU, UN, and US involvement delineated in the Annexes of the Dayton Peace Accords, many did not distinguish a large commitment of Western actors in the post-conflict peace process. "I think the Americans pulled out. There isn't a lot of American influence here now, there hasn't been since the end of the war."[41]

Instead, several participants named "other Muslim countries" as the large contributors to economic development after the war.[42] Most recently, Saudi investors financed a €50 million shopping mall in Sarajevo (von der Brelie, 2018). Investments by conservative Islamic countries have raised alarm at the local level. "We now have communities here that have nothing to do with Bosnia. They are more Arabic, they come here and impose their rules because they have the money," Sara explained.[43] Despite the country's need for foreign investment, many are suspicious of these foreign investments. Tarik, 22, Bosniak Muslim stated "I see it like a trick. They are laundering money. They are using religion, these other countries or businesses from Muslim countries to get in and manipulate."[44] Mistrust is not solely reserved for Islamic actors, as interviewees also showed skepticism towards relations with Russia, Serbia, and Western actors. Some participants have concluded that like the political elites, international actors are profiting from the dysfunctional political system in Bosnia. [45]

Not all respondents had the shared the negative view of international actors in Bosnia. The most significant exception to this was Amna. Working as a business developer in Bosnia, she is well informed of the many projects undertaken by the EU and the US in terms of economic development

[41] Živko, [Interview] 2018.
[42] Emin, [Interview] 2018; Abe, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018.
[43] Sara, [Interview] 2018.
[44] Tarik, [Interview] 2018
[45] Emin, [Interview] 2018; Abe, [Interview] 2018

and investments into small business.[46] She admitted that many of these small businesses have failed, but ultimately, she says "if even just one out of every ten succeed, then we are making progress." [47] Working towards EU accession has its benefits as well. While undoubtedly facing a long road ahead, interviewees expressed beliefs that the accession process will promote progress and stability in Bosnia in the long run.[48]

When asked what the impact would be if all international actors pulled out of Bosnia, most answered that they believed that situations would worsen for the ordinary citizen. Even those that conveyed their distrust of international presence. "I don't think Bosnia could make it work on its own."[49] This response is particularly striking, considering many respondents' contempt towards foreign involvement. It reflects the incredulous level of distrust towards the existing institutions and political framework. Milena explained that foreign actors and local politicians "are both in it for themselves, but at least [the international actors] are providing jobs and resources. It's a choice between the lesser of two evils."[50] However, most alarming is the following response from Luka, which depicts a resigned acceptance of the corruption and inefficiency embedded in Bosnia's political framework:

> *The government would continue to do what it does, and continue to exploit people, the system, the constitution. Having all of the EU and other international institutions here is a positive pressure on the current government to follow that path [towards accession]. I think it's a good thing, but it wouldn't make much of a difference to Bosnians [if they left] because I'm not sure the government could get any lousier than this.*[51]

DEMOCRACY: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE

Before asking participants about their perception of the state of democracy in Bosnia, it was imperative to first determine their own understanding of democracy and what it entails. For several respondents, their definition of democracy is minimalistic, reflecting the principles of an electoral

[46] Amna, [Interview] 2018.
[47] Amna, [Interview] 2018.
[48] Luka, [Interview] 2018; Sara, [Interview] 2018; Tarik, [Interview] 2018.
[49] Sara, [Interview] 2018.
[50] Milena, [Interview] 2018.
[51] Luka, [Interview] 2018.

democracy. "For me, it's majority rules," explained Tarik.[52] For Elma, democracy "means that I can sit here, and talk openly with you, regardless of your ethnicity, religion, race. It means I can go to the mosque as much as I want to." [53] Similarly, Josip, Sara, and Raisa's definitions of democracy emphasize the prominence of individual freedoms and civil liberties that define a liberal democracy.[54]

As for the current framework of democracy in Bosnia, there is a general consensus by participants that it is an electoral democracy, at best. "We have democracy in the sense that the person that you voted for it will be in a position of power. But actually getting what you vote for? That's a different story." The democratic process that participants describe is one in which the government has minimal accountability to its citizens. There is even little faith in the legitimacy of elections.[55] Both Tarik and Živko admit to being approached by ethno-nationalist parties, offering bribes for votes.[56]

Some participants raised concern over the lack of liberal values in Bosnia's version of democracy, specifically civil liberties and human rights. Bakir noted that Dayton recognizes only Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs as its constituents. This excludes its significant Roma and Jewish populations from political representation.[57] Additionally, others pointed out the dangerous circumstances of vulnerable groups, such as the mass discrimination and violent attacks of the LGBT community[58] and lack of protection for persons with disabilities.[59] In the last two years, Bosnia's Civil Liberties ranking in Freedom House's annual *Freedom in the World* increased from 3 to 4 (Freedom House, 2016, 2018), signaling that these issues are not improving.[60]

Tarik reasons that civil liberties should not be the priority of Bosnia at the moment:

---

[52] Tarik, [Interview] 2018.
[53] Elma, [Interview] 2018.
[54] Sara, [Interview] 2018; Josip, [Interview] 2018; Raisa [Interview] 2018.
[55]Raisa, [Interview] 2018; Milena, [Interview] 2018.
[56] Tarik, [Interview] 2018; Živko, [Interview] 2018.
[57] Bakir, [Interview] 2018.
[58] Sara, [Interview] 2018.
[59] Josip, [Interview] 2018; Tarik, [Interview] 2018.
[60] On a scale from 0 to 7, with 0 being the "Most Free", and 7 "Least Free." Full methodology available at: Freedom House, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018.

> *There are organizations now, for things like [LGBT] rights. But the thing is … people here don't have jobs. They have bigger things to worry about. Yes, [civil rights and protections] would be nice, but this country has bigger problems. First, secure fundamental needs and good economy and then the rest will come.* [61]

This statement reveals several aspects about Tarik's beliefs and values. First, he does not define civil liberties as fundamental rights. Tarik is not alone in this belief, as Pietsch, Miller, and Karp (2015, p. 4) have recently asserted that citizens accept restrictions on their civil liberties in favor of political and economic security. Second, it reveals that Tarik, and others [62] hold the belief that economic development and political stability progress towards liberal values and liberties. This reflects the idea that socialism evolves towards liberalism. Nevertheless, it must do so at its own pace.

> *I think we were moving towards democracy slowly [before the war], but people were not ready for it the way it came. We were not there yet. For people, democracy was what stopped the war, and it meant that they were not going to get killed. [They thought,] 'If that's democracy, I'll take it.' I don't think people were fully aware of the what democracy mean, and at that point it didn't even matter.*[63]

Abe echoes this sentiment, adding that "democracy was an ideal that no one wanted. It was forced on us. [Bosnians] just wanted a better life, they never actually cared under which system." [64] These statements reflect academic claims that in order to succeed post-conflict democratization needs support from local elites (Zürcher, 2001 p. 9) and demand for democracy from citizens (Parra-Rosales, 2009). Without the right political climate, it is unlikely that it will truly succeed.

Approximately half of the participants openly rejected the notion of democracy. Amna discards democracy on the theoretical premise, insisting that there is no such thing as a "true democracy"

[61] Tarik, [Interview] 2018.
[62] Amna, [Interview] 2018; Luka. [Interview] 2018.
[63] Luka. [Interview] 2018.
[64] Abe, [Interview] 2018.

in Bosnia or anywhere else. "There is always someone else pulling the strings, so why pretend to give people the choice?" [65] On a similar note, Abe reasons that:

> *Tito had a better idea of what people needed and what needed to be done in the country. He was able to accomplish them, rather than trying to go around and create a facade that people knew what they wanted or what was needed.*[66]

Several interviewees also shared this opinion.[67] One participant bluntly stated that: "some people are just too stupid to be allowed to vote."[68] Participants holding this view argue that the ordinary citizen cannot possibly know what is best for the country at large and should not be entrusted with such decisions. It is worth speculating whether these participants would hold the same view, if they were experiencing a less corrupt and fractured version of democracy.

[65] Amna, [Interview] 2018.
[66] Abe, [Interview] 2018.
[67] Emin, [Interview] 2018.
[68] Živko, [Interview] 2018.

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

> CORRUPTION IS A CANCER, A CANCER THAT EATS AWAY AT A CITIZEN'S FAITH IN DEMOCRACY, DIMINISHES THE INSTINCT FOR INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY; ALREADY-TIGHT NATIONAL BUDGETS, CROWDING OUT IMPORTANT NATIONAL INVESTMENTS. IT WASTES THE TALENT OF ENTIRE GENERATIONS. IT SCARES AWAY INVESTMENTS AND JOBS. AND MOST IMPORTANTLY IT DENIES THE PEOPLE THEIR DIGNITY. IT SAPS THE COLLECTIVE STRENGTH AND RESOLVE OF A NATION. CORRUPTION IS JUST ANOTHER FORM OF TYRANNY.
>
> JOE BIDEN, REMARKS TO ROMANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AND STUDENTS, BUCHAREST, 21 MAY, 2014.

DISCUSSION

Prior to conducting the interviews, I developed two initial hypotheses (see **Figure 1**, below), centering them around concepts that I had anticipated to be central to answering the research question: **How have local perceptions of post-conflict democratization and peacebuilding strategies impacted perceptions of democracy?** I had expected that these hypotheses would evolve and develop as my research continued, and they did. Using the extensive data collected throughout my fieldwork, I was able to reevaluate and reanalyze these initial premises. Upon doing so I found that I had, unintentionally, incorporated my own assumptions into the rational and reasoning behind these hypotheses.

FIGURE 1: INITIAL AND CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES



FIGURE 1 LISTS THE TWO INITIAL HYPOTHESES, USED AS A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVIEWS AND THE COLLECTION OF DATA, AND THE TWO CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES, DEVELOPED FROM ANALYSIS OF DATA.

LACK OF NATIONBUILDING

Shortly after the first few interviews were conducted, it was evident that IH.1 would, at the very least, need to be amended. As discussed in the results section, participants did not prioritize one over the other and instead expressed a need for both nationbuilding *and* statebuilding initiatives. The interviewees identified the needs for infrastructure, physical security, economic security, political stability, and the construction of a collective national identity. 23 years after the signing of Dayton, participants perceive no significant efforts made towards the establishment of a collective Bosnian identity, and continue to cite ethnic divisions and fragmentation as one of the country's most prominent issues.

Moreover, the data also revealed a consensus regarding the type of democracy implemented in Bosnia. According to participants, Bosnia's political framework is far from earning the title of *liberal* democracy. Instead they largely expressed a system in which citizens could vote and elect their representatives, but still faced limitations of civil liberties and political freedoms.

IH.1 incorporated the relevant concepts. Nevertheless, it was based on the flawed assumptions that locals will prioritize one element of a concept over another, such as nationbuilding over

statebuilding, or democratic institutions over liberal values. This suggests that these priorities are established out of preference, rather than circumstance or necessity. Therefore, initial hypothesis 1 has been revised and developed into a new hypothesis:

> *H1: Locals who perceive a lack of nationbuilding initiatives in the peace process are more likely to also distinguish the absence of established liberal ideals in their post-conflict society.*

In both peacebuilding and democratization processes, locals have identified a shortcoming in the establishment of ideational factors. Namely, international actors have been unsuccessful at establishing shared values and collective ideals. It seems reasonable to assert that these two factors are linked: where there is a want for nationbuilding, there will likely be a shortage of established liberal ideals.

LINKING CORRUPTION AND INSECURITY

IH.2 focused on "participants who still feel at risk," making the assumption that those who still perceived a level of insecurity. would be more cynical of the post-conflict democracy, which failed to ensure their security. When initially developing IH.2, it is abundantly clear that I underestimated the widespread insecurity still suffered by locals. From the interviews conducted, participants identified three key issues in present day Bosnia: widespread corruption, absence of collective identity, and economic insecurity. Each of the participants revealed that they personally faced some level of insecurity, mostly economic.

Initially, I approached this study with the assumption that peacebuilding was the means, to which the end goal was democracy. However, this notion is as misguided as the assumption that democracy inherently brings peace and stability. The end goal, particularly for locals, is peace and stability. Democracy, I found, is the means by which this goal is to be attained. If the means falls short of realizing the goal, it is the means of achieving it that changes, not the objective. The results of this study show that the "goal" of participants remained the same: security and stability. There were, however, great discrepancies when it came to how to best achieve this.

Academics have largely agreed that democracy is the preferred political system (Ottoway, 2009; Ohlson & Kovacs, 2009). This sentiment is also reflected outside the academic sphere, as recent studies have shown broad support for democratic systems and liberal values, among individuals globally (Pew Research Center, 2015, 2017). During post-conflict democratization, international actors must find a balance between countering possible resentment from locals and establishing a workable and efficient political framework (von Bogdandy et. al., 2005, p. 596). However, in the case of Bosnia neither of these were goals were met with full success, resulting in the perception of widespread corruption, eroding the legitimacy of the established institutions.

Perception of corruption can impact citizens' opinions of democratization and its end goals. The insecurities faced by locals are rooted in this corruption. They recognize that the institutions before them are incapable of addressing their needs, and therefore their shared belief, is one of doubt and mistrust in their political system. As Dagher (2018) explains, legitimacy is obtained through four processes: international legitimacy, process legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and shared beliefs. Based on the data from these interviews, there is no shared belief that democracy is the preferred political system. Therefore, it innately deteriorates the legitimacy. A new hypothesis has been developed to represent these findings:

> *H2: Perception of widespread corruption deteriorates the legitimacy of the post-conflict democracy through shared beliefs.*

Arguably, widespread corruption also impacts the performance legitimacy of a nation, as it impedes their ability to provide basic needs for its citizens. However, the focus of this study is not on the government's capabilities, but on locals' perspectives of their government's capabilities.

CONCLUSION

Understanding shared beliefs and perceptions at the local level is imperative for evaluating the legitimacy of a democracy. In post-conflict peacebuilding, the interests and needs of locals are often overlooked by international actors in their haste to build democratic institutions. It is this peace process that designates the development of a democratic society, and therefore it is this peace process that influences the shared beliefs and political culture, whether intentional or not.

This research is not concluding with a definite theory to explain the relationship between locals' perceptions of the peace process and their views of democracy, in terms of both institutions and values. However, it has contributed to the development of a new theory by developing two new hypotheses, to be applied and explored in future studies.

First, the results of this study find that where peacebuilding fails to address the ideational concerns, such as national identity and reconciliation, it likely fails to integrate liberal values into the political culture. In the case of Bosnia, there was no focus on developing a collective national identity, and later no focus on instilling liberal values to complement the establishment of democratic institutions.

Finally, this thesis also concludes that when corruption is allowed to flourish and grow during a peace process, it not only impacts the capability of a state, but also threatens its legitimacy. As findings showed, participants perceived widespread corruption in Bosnia's political framework. In turn, they expressed vast mistrust of their current government, as well as skepticism towards democracy as the political framework. These shared beliefs depreciate the legitimacy of Bosnia's current government.

This study faced several limitations particularly due to time and resources. Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize the results of Bosnians in Sarajevo, to all of Bosnia, and more so to all post-conflict transition countries. Future research is needed to strengthen the findings of this research and test its relevance at a broader level. Due to significant time and resource restrictions, this study was not as representative of the Bosnian people as had been intended. Therefore, a follow up study is recommended using the same case study of Bosnia, with a larger sample size and a more representative sample in terms of age, location, and ethnicity. A final limitation, is the use of a single case for a theory development study. Therefore, this needs to be applied more broadly, outside of Bosnia. Overall, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on the individuals within a society, when evaluating the success of peacebuilding initiatives and democratization.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, *1*, 319–363. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003.

Alden, C., & Large, D. (2013). China's Evolving Policy towards Peace and Security in Africa: Constructing a new paradigm for peacebuilding?. In M. G. Berhe & L. Hongwu (Eds.), *China Africa Relations: Governance, Peace, and Security*, 16-28.

Anderson, C. J., & Guillory, C. A. (1997). Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Analysis of Consensus and Majoritaria. *The American Political Science Review*, *91*(1), 66–81. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952259.

Armstrong, M. (2018, May 20). Turkey's President Erdogan holds election rally in Sarajevo. *EuroNews.* Retrieved from http://www.euronews.com/2018/05/20/turkey-s-president-erdogan-holds-an-election-rally-in-sarajevo.

Autesserre, S. (2010) *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Autesserre, S. (2014) *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Autesserre, S. (2017). International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness. *International Studies Review*, *0*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw054.

Auza, B. (2018, April 26). *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace*. [Speech] Speech presented at Plenary of the High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in New York. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://holyseemission.org/contents//statements/5ae34c3e8f8d1.php.

Bandovic, I. (2017). The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy. *Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group* (March). Retrieved from http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/sites/default/files/articleattach/BIEPAG-The CrisisofDemocracyintheWestern Balkans.AuthoritarianismandEUStabilitocracyprint.pdf.

Bazeley, P. (2010). Computer-assisted integration of mixed methods data sources and analyses. In Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, C., Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research (pp. 431-468). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781506335193.

Belloni, R., & Strazzari, F. (2014). Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(5), 855–871. Retrieved from https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2014.921434?needAccess=true.

Bennett, C., (2016). *Bosnia's Paralysed Peace*. London, UK: Hurst & Company.

Biden, J. (2014, May, 21) *Remarks by vice President Joe Biden to Romanian Civil Society Groups and Students*. [Speech] Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest, Romania. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/21/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-romanian-civil-society-groups-and-stude.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2018). *Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report 2018*. Gütersloh, GE. Retrieved from https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BIH/.

Bloor, M., & Wood, F. (2006). Analytic Induction. In *Keywords in Qualitative Methods* (pp. 14–16). London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849209403.

Boot, M., & Miklaucic, M. (2016). Reconfiguring USAID for State-Building. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2016/05/Policy_Innovation_Memo57_BootMiklaucic.pdf.

Brandt, C.O., & Eiro, F. (2017). Qualitative Corruption Research Methods. In A. Schwickerath, A. Varraich, & L. Smith (Eds.) *Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Forum*.

Brzezinski, Z. (1995). *Central and Eastern Europe under the transition cyclone*, Bucharest: Diogene.

Carlson, M. & Turner, M. (2009) Popular perceptions of political regimes in East and Southeast Asia. *Democratization,* 16(2), 377–398.

Castillo-Montoya, M. (2016). Preparing for Interview Research: The Interview Protocol Refinement Framework. *The Qualitative Report*, *21*(5), 811–831. https://doi.org/Retrieved from: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2337&context=tqr

Chandler, D. (1999). *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton.* London, UK: Pluto Press.

Chandler D. (2006). *Empire in Denial: The Politics Of State-Building*. London, UK: Pluto Press.

Chandler, D. (2017). The Birth of a Mission / Peacebuilding as Statebuilding. In *Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1997-2017* (pp. 1997–2017). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50322-6.

Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing grounded theory" A practical guide through qualitative analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Chesterman, S. (2005). *You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*. Oxford: OUP Oxford.

Conteh-Morgan, E. (2005). Peacebuilding and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, *10*(1), 69–86. Retrieved from http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10_1/Conteh-Morgan_101IJPS.pdf.

Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452230153.

Culbertson, H. (2010). The Evaluation of Peacebuilding Initiatives. In D. Philpott & G. Powers (Eds.), *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World* (Vol. 6, pp. 45–66). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof.

David, C.P. (2010). Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *22*(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260512331391046.

Dagher, R. (2018). Legitimacy and post-conflict state-building: the undervalued role of performance legitimacy. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *18*(2), 85–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2018.1447860.

De Carvalho, B., & De Coning, C. (2013). *Rising powers and the future of peacekeeping and peacebuilding*. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175234/f194e6326ee12f80c3705117b151ef78.pdf.

Delaney, A., Van Der Haar, G., & Van Tatenhove, J. (2017). "If This Was a Normal Situation": Challenges and Potentials for Deliberative Democratic Peacebuilding in Kosovo's Emerging Governance Networks. *Public Administration and Development*, *37*(2), 136–152. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1791.

Doder, Dusko. (19 June 1993). Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds. *Foreign Policy*. http://foreignpolicy.com/1993/06/19/yugoslavia-new-war-old-hatreds.

Doyle, M. W., (2005). Three pillars of the liberal peace. *American Political Science Review, 99*(3), 463-466.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dyrstad, K. (2013). Does civil war breed authoritarian values? An empirical study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. *Democratization*, *20*(7), 1219–1242. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.688032.

Edwards, R., & Holland, J. (2013). *What is Qualitative Interviewing? "What is?" Research Methods Series* (Vol. 7). London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472545244.

Einstein, A. (2009) Notes on Pacifism, In *On Cosmic Religion and Other Opinions & Aphorisms*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc. (Original work published 1931), 66-70.

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges. *Source: The Academy of Management Journal*, *50118226*(1), 25–32. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20159839.

Emmel, N. (2014). *Sampling and Choosing Cases in Qualitative Research: A Realist Approach*. (N. Emmel, Ed.). London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473913882.

Frahm, O. (2017). Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa's established and simulated democracies: the cases of Ghana, Nigeria and South Sudan. *Crime Law Soc Change*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2.

Freedom House. (2016). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Freedom in the World, 2016.* Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/bosnia-and-herzegovina.

Freedom House. (2018). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Freedom in the World, 2018.* Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/bosnia-and-herzegovina.

Galletta, A. (2013). *Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From Research Design to Analysis and Publication*. *Setting the Stage*. NYU Press. Retrieved from http://www.jcb.utoronto.ca/publications/documents/Population-and-Public-Health-Ethics-Casebook-ENGLISH.pdf.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research, 6*(3), 167–191.

George, A. L., & Bennett, A.,(2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gillard, S. (2001). Winning the peace: Youth, identity and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Peacekeeping*, *8*(1), 77–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310108413880.

Greenberg, M. C., & McGuiness, M. E. (2000). From Lisbon to Dayton: International Mediation and the Bosnia Crisis. In M. Greenberg, J. H. Barton, & M. E. McGuinness (Eds.), *Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict* (pp. 35–75). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Hagen, W. W., & William, W. (1999). The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms. *Foreign Affairs*, *78*(4).

Hellmüller, S. (2013) The Power of Perceptions: Localizing International Peacebuilding Approaches. *International Peacekeeping.* 20 (2), 219-232.

Hippler, J. (2008). Democratization after Civil Wars – Key Problems and Experiences. *Democratisation*, *15*(3), 550–269. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340801972270.

Iwami, T. (2016) Understanding Japan's Peacebuilding in Concept and Practice. *East Asia*, 33(2), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-016-9255-9.

Jeong, H. (2005). *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*. London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Joshi, M., Lee, S., & Mac Ginty, R. (2014). Just How Liberal Is the Liberal Peace? *International Peacekeeping, 21*(3), 1-26.

Kahl, C. H. (1998). Constructing a Separate peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace. *Security Studies*, *8*(3), 94–144. Retrieved from https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636419808429376?needAccess=true.

Kant, I. (1970). "Perpetual Peace. In Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss; trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kostić, R. (2008). Nationbuilding as an Instrument of Peace? Exploring Local Attitudes towards International Nationbuilding and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Civil Wars*, *10*(4), 384–412. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369824080235448.

Kovacevic, D. (2018, February 7). Bosnia's National Anthem Remains Lost for Words. *Balkan Insight.* Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-attempt-that-bosnia-anthem-gets-lyrics-02-06-2018-2.

Krastev, I. (2007) Is East-Central Europe backsliding? The strange death of the liberal consensus. *Journal of democracy*, 18(4), 56–63.

Lake, D. (2016) *The Statebuilder's Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention.* Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Lakic, M. (2017, December 5). Bosnia's 'Foreign' Flag Still Draws Mixed Feelings. *Balkan Insight*. Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-s-foreign-flag-still-draws-mixed-feelings-12-05-2017.

Lee, S. Y. (2015). Motivations for local resistance in international peacebuilding. *Third World Quarterly*, *36*(8), 1437–1452. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1052063.

Lei, Z. (2011) Two Pillars of China's Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and International Peacebuilding, *International Peacekeeping*, 18(3), 344-362, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2011.563107.

Lemay-Hébert, N. (2009). Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure andthe Limits of the Institutionalist Approach. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *3*(1), 21–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970802608159.

Leonardsson, H., & Rudd, G. (2015). The 'local turn' in peacebuilding: a literature review of effective and emancipatory local peacebuilding. *Third World Quarterly*, *36*(5), 825–839. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029905.

Lund, M. (1996) *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace. *Security Dialogue*, *41*(4), 391–412. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610374312.

Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 110 (8), 681-711.

McMahon, O.C., (2017) *The NGO Game: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in the Balkans and Beyond.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mcmahon, P. C., & Western, J. (2009). The Death of Dayton. *Foreign Affairs*, *1*(October), 1–10.

Melgar, N., Rossi, M., & Smith, T. W. (2010). Perception of Corruption. *International Journal of*

Public Opinion Research, *22*(1), 120–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670032000174783.

Merlingen, M., & Ostrauskaite, R. (2005). Power/Knowledge in International Peacebuilding: The Case of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia. *Alternatives*, *30*, 297–323. Retrieved from http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6245~v~Power_Knowledge_in_International_Peacebuilding__The_Case_of_the_EU_Police_Mission_in_Bosnia.pdf

Newman, E., Paris, R., & Richmond, O.P., (2009) Introduction. In E. Newman, R. Paris, & O. P. Richmond (Eds), *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*. Tokyo: UnitedNations University Press, 3-25.

Obama, B.H. (2009, December 10) *A Just and Lasting Peace*. [Speech] Nobel Lecture presented at Oslo City Hall in Oslo. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html.

OECD. (2018). *Aid statistics by donor, recipient and sector*. OECD. Retrieved 18 March 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/statistics/datalab/oda-recipient-sector.htm.

Ohlson, T., & Kovacs, M. S. (2009). Peace Through Democracy? The Challenges of Postwar Democratization in Weak and War Torn States. In A. Swain, R. Amer, & J. Ojendal (Eds.), *The Democratization Project: Opportunities and Challenges*. 10: Anthem Press. https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843313250.011.

Ottaway, M. (2007). Is Democracy the Answer? In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. Washington DC: United States institute of Peace Press, 603-617.

Ozerdem, A., & Lee, S.Y., (2016). *International Peacebuilding: An Introduction*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Paffenholz, T. (2015). Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future research. *Third World Quarterly*, *36*(5), 857–874. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908.

Paris, R. (2004). At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Paris, R. (2011). Critiques of Liberal Peace. In S. Campbell, D. Chandler, & M. Shabaratnam (Eds.), *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (pp. 31–51). London, UK: Zed Books.

Parra-Rosales, L.P. (2009). Democracy without People? – The Risk of Monopolizing the Democratization Project. In Ashok Swain, R. Amer, & J. Ojendal (Eds.), *The Democratization Project: Opportunities and Challenges* (pp. 105-111). Anthem Press. https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843313250.007.

Pew Research Center. (2017). *Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy* (November). Washington, DC: R. Wike, K. Simmons, B. Stokes, & J. Fetterolf.

Pew Research Center (2015). *Global support for principle of free expression, but opposition to some forms of speech: Americans especially likely to embrace individual liberties*, (November). Washington, DC: R. Wike & K. Simmons. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/.

Pietsch, J., Miller, M., & Karp, J. A. (2015). Public Support for Democracy in Transitional Regimes. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, *25*(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.925904.

Ramet, S. (2005). *Thinking about Yugoslavia scholarly debates about the Yugoslav breakup and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Regional Cooperation Council. (2017). Balkan Barometer 2017: *Public Opinion Poll Survey*. Sarajevo, BiH: Gfk.

Power, S. (2002). *A Problem from Hell*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Third Edition). Cambridge, Polity.

Reichertz, J. (2014). Induction, Deduction, Abduction. In Uwe Flick (Ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis* (pp. 123–135). London, UK : SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.

Richmond, O. P. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the "liberal peace." *Conflict, Security & Development*, *6*(3), 291–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933480.

Richmond, O. P., & Franks, J. (2012). Bosnia: Between Partition and Pluralism. In *Liberal Peace Transitions Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* (pp. 54–82). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-

core/content/view/72D43ABD8EDF13D727D32E8708D18037/9780748642069c2_p54-82_CBO.pdf/bosnia_between_partition_and_pluralism.pdf

Richmond, O. P., & Mitchell, A. (2011). *Hybrid forms of peace: from everyday agency to post-liberalism*. Springer.

Richmond, O.P., & Tellidis, I. (2013). *The BRICS and International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.* Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/160996/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf.

Russett, B.M., & Oneal J.R. (2001). *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations: The Norton Series in World Politics.* W. W. Norton & Company.

Saldaña, J. (2009). *The coding manual for qualitative researchers.* Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Schmidt, J. R. (2008). Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States? *Orbis*, *52*(1), 107–122. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2007.10.008.

Shinoda, H. (2018). Peace-building and State-building from the Perspective of the Historical Development of International Society. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 18(1), 25–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx025.

Sito-Sucic, D. (2018, April 23). Russia says NATO membership of Balkan countries threatens security. *Thomson Reuters Foundation.* Retrieved from http://news.trust.org/item/20180423165128-fnzmc.

Sødal, T. F. (2012). *From Satisfaction to Support: A quantitative comparative study of attitudes towards democracy in Latin America*. University of Oslo. Retrieved from https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13418/Master.tonje.flatmark.sxdal.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.

Swain, A., Amer, R., & Öjendal, J. (2009). The Democratization Project: Peace, Conflict, and Development. In A. Swain, R. Amer, & J. Ojendal (Eds.), *The Democratization Project: Opportunities and Challenges* (pp. 1-15). Anthem Press. https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843313250.00.

UN Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2013). *Public Opinion Poll results: Analitical Report*. Sarajevo, BiH: Prism Research.

UN Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2015). *Public Opinion Poll results:*

Analitical Report. Sarajevo, BiH: Prism Research.

Varraich, A. (2017). *Making Sense of Corruption through interviews*. In A.Schwickerath, A.Varraich, & L.Smith (Eds.) Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Forum.

Velič̆ković, S. (2011). *Sahib: Impressions from Depression.* Sarajevo, BiH: Mas Media.

Von Bogdandy, A., Häußler, S., Hanschmann, F., & Utz, R. (2005). State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches. *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 9, 579–613. Retrieved from http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_bogdandyua_9_579_613.pdf.

Von der Brelie, H. (2018, April 26). Foreign influence taking over Bosnia and Herzegovina? *Euronews.* Retrieved from http://www.euronews.com/2018/04/26/insiders-foreign-influence-taking-over-bosnia-and-herzegovina.

Wallis, J. (2012). A liberal-local hybrid peace project in action? The increasing engagement between the local and liberal in Timor-Leste. Review of International Studies, 38(4), 735-761. doi:10.1017/S0260210511000787.

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, *46*(2), 391–425. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764.

Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. *American Political Science Review*, *94*, 429. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183.

Wengraf, T. (2001). *Qualitative research interviewing.* London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781849209717.

Widmaier, W. W. (2005). The Democratic Peace is What States Make of It: A Constructivist Analysis of the US–Indian "Near-Miss" in the 1971 South Asian Crisis. *European Journal of International Relations*, *11*(3), 431–455. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105055486.

Wilmer, F. (2002) *The Social Construction of Man: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia.* New York: Routledge.

Wohlfeld, M. (2010). An Overview of the Conflict Cycle. In M. Wohlfeld & O. Grech (Eds.), *Human Rights and the Conflict Cycle* (pp. 13–32). Msida, MT: MEDAC.

World Bank (2000). *Bosnia and Herzegovina - Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption*. Sarajevo, BiH: M. Shkaratan.

Zürcher, C. (2011). Building Democracy While Building Peace. *Journal of Democracy*, *22*(1), 81–95. Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/412895.

Zürcher, C., Manning, C., Evenson, K. D., Hayman, R., Riese, S., & Roehne, N. (2013). *Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization After War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction:
- Name/Age/Ethnicity/Gender (Bosniak, Serb, Croat)
- Years of schooling/level of education/Occupation
- Political Participation

Biographical:
- Tell me a bit about you. How long have you been in Sarajevo?
- Where did you live before?
- What was life like before the war? / Do you know much about your family/parents' lives before?

Peacebuilding
Can you tell me a bit about the initial healing and rebuilding process after the war? What did you see changing or going on around you (family/home, community, and government)?
- immediately after, 5 years, 10 years
- key players, what was the focus?
- Are you aware of any projects? Did you participate?
- if younger, what you've heard, or learned, etc
- if "none": How did Bosnia get from "then" to now? Or does it remain the same?

What do you think was most important to healing and post-conflict reconstruction after the war? And what do you think is most important now?
- What were your main concerns? Or "peoples main concerns?
- (Ex: Reconciliation, justice, security, economic development, infrastructure?)

How do you feel about the state of reconciliation and rebuilding in Bosnia today?
- Why do you think that is?
- In which ways does this impact your daily life?
- Or the daily life of Bosnians?

Personally, what would you say are your biggest concerns in regard to Bosnia's current state?
- Can you elaborate, or give examples?

What role did foreign countries or organizations play immediately after the war? What role do they play now?
- If all international actors were to leave, how would that impact Bosnia?

Democracy:

What is your definition of democracy? (in general)

How do you view the state of democracy in Bosnia today?
- Does it exist in Bosnia, does it match your definition of democracy? Why/Why not?
- Political representation/elections? Institutions that were constructed after the war?)
- Quality of life in "democracy" vs life in socialism?

You mentioned (politics, dishonesty, economy, ethnic tensions/divisions ….) can you elaborate, or give me examples?
- Why do you think this is?

What do you think can be done to correct this?
- Is something being done now? Is it working?
- Whose responsibility is it?
- Depending on answer: To what extent is _____ more/less important than respecting individual freedoms/democratic values/etc?

What role did foreign countries or organizations play immediately after the war? What role do they play now?
- If all international actors were to leave, how would that impact Bosnia?

Corruption
Can you tell me a bit about your routine interactions with (give example: paying a fine/ticket, healthcare, applying for universities, applying for government job, etc)

Is it the same across sectors (other examples) and at all levels?
- Highest levels (politicians, institutions), lowest levels (individuals, citizens)?
- Across which sectors? (local gov., police, health, educations, private sector, etc)

To what extent do you see it in your daily life?
- Can you give me examples? (if possible, personal examples?)
- Why do you think it exists to this extent?
- Who is benefitting?

How can corruption be decreased?
- Who is making the greatest efforts?

What kind of political system do you think would be best for Bosnia?
- Can it address corruption (or issues mentioned)?

Did I miss anything? Is there something else you think I should know?

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

TABLE A.1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Name	Date of Interview	Interview Location	Age	Gender	Ethnicity	Occupation	War Experience
Luka	17 March, 2018	Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo	27	Male	BiH, Family is Muslim, Atheist.	Data visualization, programming	Born as war began, remained in Sarajevo with family
Bakir	16 March, 2018	Jazzbina, Sarajevo	31	Male	Bosniak	Event promoter and coordinator	Went with family to Canada as a refugee, father remained in Bosnian army throughout war
Amna	19 March, 2018	Monolo, Sarajevo	37	Female	BiH, Muslim	Business Developer	Remained in Sarajevo with family
Elma	19 March, 2018	Monolo, Sarajevo	42	Female	BiH, Muslim	Nurse	Remained in Sarajevo with family
Sara	19 March, 2018	Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo	24	Female	BiH,	Student	Born a refugee in Croatia, father remained in Bosnian army throughout war
Živko	17 April, 2018	Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo	23	Male	Serb	Student	Born in Sarajevo during war
Tarik	17 April, 2018	Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo	23	Male	Bosniak	Unemployed	Born in Germany during war, family fled before outbreak of violence, joined father in Germany. Returned after war
Abe	15 March, 2018	The Bar, Sarajevo	23	Male	BiH, father Serb mother Croat	Server	Born in Sarajevo during war
Emin	12 March, 2018	Café Tito, Sarajevo	27	Male	Serb	Hotel Receptionist	Remained in Sarajevo with family
Raisa	14 March, 2018	Café Tito, Sarajevo	36	Female	Bosniak	Store Clerk, Tour Guide	Survived Srebrenica, lost family during the massacre. Moved to Sarajevo 10 years ago
Milena	15 April, 2018	Zlatna Ribica, Sarajevo	35	Female	Croat	Project coordinator, tourism	Lived in Mostar during war, moved to Sarajevo for university.
Josip	18 April, 2018	The Bar, Sarajevo	44	Male	Croat	Restaurant manager	Stayed in Sarajevo during war

APPENDIX 3: DETAILED CODING EXAMPLE

TABLE A.2: OUTLINE OF CODING CYCLES WITH DETAILED EXAMPLE

1st Cycle, Step 1: Attribute Coding	**Attributes:** Name, Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Occupation, Interview Date and Location Concept Index	*Example* **Name:** Luka, **Age:** 27, **Gender:** Male, **Ethnicity:** BiH, **Occupation:** Programmer, Data Visualization **Date:** 17 March 2018, **Location:** Kino Meeting Point, Sarajevo **Concept Index:** War Kid (E); National Identity (V); Corruption (E), No "Yugonostalgia" (A); Liberal Values (V), Role of Media (A); Civic Responsibility (V), Political Participation (E); Economic Solution (A),
1st Cycle, Step 2: Initial and Values Coding	**Initial Coding:** Short phrase to Summarize Unit **4 Values Codes:** Values (V): Liberal Values, Identity, Nationalism, Attitudes (A): Opinions of Participants (Responsible for War, Distrust of International Actors, Yugonostalgia) Needs (N): Immediate Post-Conflict Needs, Present Day Needs, Personal Needs, Needs of State Experiences (E): Unemployment, Refugee, War Kid, Well-Traveled, **Sub-Code:** Emerging concepts, possible categories (Nationbuilding, Statebuilding, Economic Solutions, Legitimacy, Democratic Skepticism)	*Example* **Values:** Identifies BiH (National Identity); Atheist; Free Speech (Liberal Values); Reconciliation on "human" rather than religious level (Nationbuilding/Identity); Acknowledge Past & Move On; Right to Vote Should be Earned (Democracy) ; Secure Needs and Divisions Disappear (Economic Solution); **Needs:** Housing and Rebuilding, (Post-War Need, Statebuilding); National Unity (Post-War Need, Nationbuilding) Adequate Healthcare (Present Need, Corruption); Mass Emigration Crisis (Economy); **Attitudes:** Participating in Corruption Inevitable (Corruption); Reconciliation Conferences/Workshops are Exploited (Nationbuilding); Ethnic Divisions Decreasing (National Identity); Divisions Decreased in Younger Generations; Lack of Local Capacity (Post-War, Peacebuilding); Distrust of International Community; War was Due to Failure of International Community; Pessimistic Politically (Legitimacy); Lack of Infrastructure Hurts Economy (Economy); International Community Benefitting Chaos and Corruption; Peacebuilding/Reconciliation Continues Today through EU Application; Test to Vote (Skepticism of Democracy), Social Issues Important Not Priority; Socialism Provided Security; Democracy Doesn't Work; **Experiences:** War Kid; Always lived in Sarajevo; Healthcare Corruption (Corruption); Attended Reconciliation Workshops; Previously Politically Active; Participated 2014 Protests; Noam Chomsky; Worked as Part of Census Team; Employed by American Company Outsourced in Bosnia;
2nd Cycle: Focused Coding	Use initial coding to develop categories from most significant and frequent codes.	*Example:* **Codes:** Emigration, Prioritize Local Business, Secure Needs and Divisions Disappear, Lack of Infrastructure Hurts Economy, Prioritize Jobs and Business, Social Issues Important Not Priority, Socialism Provided Security **Category:** Prioritize Economic Solution

APPENDIX 3 USES A PARTIAL LIST OF CODES FROM A SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW. SOURCE: LUKA, INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, 17 MARCH, 2018